The question(s) of recognition has been largely discussed at the level of public and political debate, as well as studied in sociology, theory of politics and philosophy since nineteen. But there is still much to do in studying and understanding all implications of it refereed to problems and experiences of misrecognition and dehumanization, and referred to the dialectic connection between politics of recognition and social recognition, social recognition and self-emancipation, self-emancipation and the recognition of the other. The question of 'What are the psychological, sociological and political implications?' is still open, but now, thanks to Taylor, Habermas, Ricoeur, Honneth, Thompson and Henaff's works (among others' works) it is clear that recognition may be established as a theoretical-practical basis for individual emancipation (psychology of recognition), social progress (sociology of recognition) and strengthening of justice and democracy (politics of recognition). In this way, recognition becomes a keystone concept for the study and the understanding of phenomena of injustice under a new key, as an expression of misrecognition and, at the same time, as a self- and social- emancipatory lack. In this contribution we will essentially use Taylor, Habermas and Ricoeur's approaches in a dialectical way, studying, at first, the possibility to consider Justice from a middle-way point of view between formalism of law and practical wisdom; and, secondly, connecting it to philosophy of recognition, which is supposed to be one of the best balanced register to rethink the justice/injustice problem under this dialectic of Law and Human emancipation.
Vinicio Busacchi, University of Cagliari, Italy
Stream: Philosophy - Comparative Philosophy
This paper is part of the ACERP2016 Conference Proceedings (View)
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