Financial of Public Enterprise Subsidiary in Corruption in Indonesia​​


Indonesia restructures State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the form of a holding company through Government Regulation Number 44 of 2005 in conjunction with Government Regulation Number 72 of 2016 on the Procedures of Participation and Administration of state capital in State-Owned Enterprises and Limited Liability Companies. This caused controversy. It is stipulated that the Subsidiaries of State-Owned Enterprises shall be treated in the same way as State-Owned Enterprises in performing public services or obtaining specific policies from the state, including natural resource management with certain treatment as applied to SOEs. This equality of treatment opens the possibility of equal treatment in terms of accountability between SOEs finances and Subsidiaries of State-Owned Enterprises finances. The problem is, whether the act against the law by the Board of Directors of a Subsidiaries of State-Owned Enterprises that causes losses to a Subsidiaries of State-Owned Enterprises is a criminal act of corruption. The method of writing is normative. State finances in the explanation of Law Number 31 of 1999 in conjunction with Law Number 20 of 2001 on Corruption Eradication constitute all state assets arising from being in the control, management, and accountability of SOEs. Whereas the juridical between SOEs and Subsidiaries of State-Owned Enterprises is 2 (two) independent limited liability companies which have their own corporate organs as regulated in Law Number 40 of 2007 on Limited Liability Company so that the unlawful acts committed by the Board of Directors of Subsidiaries of State-Owned Enterprises Causing corporate losses is not a criminal act of corruption. Keywords: Subsidiaries, State-Owned Enterprises, Corruption, Indonesia.

Author Information
Fauzan Prasetya, Universitas Andalas, Indonesia

Paper Information
Conference: ACSS2017
Stream: Politics, Public Policy, Law & Criminology

This paper is part of the ACSS2017 Conference Proceedings (View)
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Posted by James Alexander Gordon