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Paul Carnegie, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, BruneiAbstract
In the early 2000s, Indonesia experienced a surge in Islamist paramilitary activity, with the 2002 Bali bombings drawing global attention to the threat. Despite periodic incidents since then, the worst of the strategic threat forecasts have not materialized, as evidenced by the recent formal dissolution of Jemaah Islamiyah. This outcome prompts important questions about how Indonesian policymakers and security agencies have mitigated extremism and lessened the macro-threat environment. This paper employs a longitudinal analysis of extremist militancy in Indonesia, examining how authorities recognized the counterproductive consequences of prolonged punitive state actions. The latter risked alienating and further polarizing extremist segments of society toward the state. Using relevant examples, the paper explores the preventative and rehabilitative measures that now form the cornerstone of a more nuanced policy approach. While concerns persist, particularly regarding returnees from Syria, the paper demonstrates how Indonesia's balanced strategy of punishment and persuasion is better suited to counter extremist ideologies and curtail the conditions for their reproduction.
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