Abstract
A subculture in China, known as "moha" or toad worship, gained significant popularity on the Chinese internet in the past decade, with “ha” (the toad) referring to Jiang Zemin. This article aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of this subculture by conducting an in-depth examination of the trajectory of this phenomenon, through interviews with numerous sharers and creators of Jiang’s memes, and observations of their online usage. Furthermore, this article delves into the evolution of propaganda and thought work strategies in China, seeking to uncover the origins of this subculture by analyzing the lessons the Party has drawn from its historical experiences. It argues that toad worship emerged as a product of the propaganda strategy adopted by the Party in the early 1990s. In its initial phase, toad worship was practiced with a negative intent primarily by the Chinese nationalists, and was construed as a criticism of Jiang’s conciliatory approach to diplomacy. Nevertheless, it subsequently evolved into an implicit form of dissent against the current regime, mainly from the Chinese liberals, characterized by a nostalgic reverence for the Jiang era. Unlike the prevalence of cynicism in the USSR, which contributed to the disintegration of the state, the Chinese government’s acquiescence toward this politically sarcastic subculture in the past decade has enhanced the regime’s political stability. This article contributes to understanding the flexibility of dissent expression in China, enabling further exploration of the durability of the Communist regime in China from the perspective of ideological control.
Author Information
Haoguang Li, Keio University, Japan
Songqi Han, The University of Tokyo, Japan
Comments
Powered by WP LinkPress