

What Went Wrong: Millennial Higher Education Failures and Lessons for Generation Alpha in the AI Era

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Abstract

Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) stands to transform and disrupt labor markets at an unprecedented pace and scale. Estimates suggest that 80% of United States workers may see at least 10% of tasks affected by large language models, with some leading opinion leaders predicting widespread job displacement to a degree that necessitates government-sponsored universal basic income. Higher-income knowledge workers appear especially vulnerable. Generation Alpha will make post-secondary decisions during this transition, often under the same “college equals security” heuristic that contributed to Millennial misalignment: 52% underemployment among recent graduates and negative lifetime Return on Investment (ROI) in 23% of bachelor's programs. This study conducts an integrative analysis of the forces behind adverse Millennial higher-education outcomes using federal labor data (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census Bureau/American Community Survey), institutional datasets (Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce, Opportunity Insights), and behavioral economics literature. We identify overlapping domains including stigmatizing vocational pathways, assumptions about inflated credentials, cognitive biases of teen decision making, parents with obsolete priors about labor, and gaps in the K-12 guidance programs. The paper proposes a practical decision framework to help Generation Alpha families evaluate ROI, incorporate AI task exposure, and consider alternative credentials to avoid repeating the errors that shaped Millennial outcomes.

Keywords: higher education, Generation Alpha, artificial intelligence, labor market outcomes, return on investment, career decision-making

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Introduction

Millennials made their decisions to attend higher education institutions, what specific institutions and how to finance it during an unprecedented expansion of federal student lending, against a backdrop of societal narratives that made the four-year degree the consensus pathway to job security and a happy life. The outcome was \$1.4 trillion in outstanding federal student loan debt (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2017), 52% underemployment for recent grads (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2024), and bachelor's degrees that produced negative lifetime earnings at a rate of 23% (Preston, 2021).

Generation Alpha (born 2010–2024) is approaching its own postsecondary decisions while AI is having tangible impact on the labor market while also creating a higher degree of ambiguity about the future of labor and education. Millennials have expressed a high level of dissatisfaction with the decision architecture leading to their post-secondary decisions (information asymmetries, cognitive biases, outdated parental mental models, and under-resourced K–12 guidance) and the outcomes they yielded. Despite that sentiment, they are falling into the same patterns and stand to observe worse outcomes for Generation Alpha absent a more considered approach.

This paper synthesizes evidence on the institutional, cultural, economic, and cognitive forces behind adverse Millennial higher-education outcomes and translates each into considerations for Generation Alpha families such that they can prevent replicating recent outcomes. The objective is not to retrospectively indict but to prospectively support decisions: identifying which Millennial-era patterns are most likely to recur and which Gen Alpha-specific factors, particularly AI task exposure, warrant new analytical frameworks.

Methodology

This paper is a structured narrative review and conceptual synthesis based on iterative web-based research conducted from October 2025 till final draft. Sources were identified through keyword searches and citation chaining across Google Scholar, major working paper repositories (e.g., NBER/SSRN), and official U.S. government datasets (e.g., BLS/NCES), supplemented by policy and industry reports where peer-reviewed evidence was limited. The findings of this paper were organized into repeating mechanisms then consolidated into a multi-domain taxonomy and subjected to iterative refinement rounds. It does not present original causal estimates. The conclusions are framed consistent with evidence and yield decision-relevant implications.

The Institutional Architecture of Overborrowing

The Higher Education Act reauthorization of 1992 fundamentally transformed federal student lending by creating unsubsidized Stafford loans available to all students regardless of financial need, while removing annual and aggregate limits on PLUS loans (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). Outstanding federal student debt increased sevenfold from \$187 billion in 1995 to \$1.4 trillion by 2017 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2017). The proportion of bachelor's degree recipients who borrowed rose from 49% in 1992–93 to 66% by 2007–08, a 35% increase in borrower prevalence during the core Millennial graduation window (National Center for Education Statistics, 2012).

At the same time, state funding per FTE student fell to levels 30% below that of 2000 by 2012 (State Higher Education Executive Officers Association, 2013). Universities were passing the additional financial burden onto students in the form of higher tuition knowing they had access to capital. The end result was a structural cost shift where students' share of higher education revenue doubled from 1980 to 2012.

Under these conditions the for-profit sector was exploitive. They grew enrollment from 2.9% to 9.6% from 2000 to 2010 and accounted for a disproportionate amount of financial aid relative to that enrollment (20%). The impact seen over the following twelve years was higher default rates vs. private nonprofits, 52% vs. 17% (Looney & Yannelis, 2015). Cellini and Goldin (2014) discovered that tuition at for-profit institutions eligible for financial aid were charging rates 78% higher than comparable ineligible institutions.

These default rates could have been a warning about the potential outcomes experienced at these institutions. However, prior to 2015 when The College Scorecard launched (U.S. Department of Education, 2015) no data existed that made the link between institutions, earnings, loan repayment or employment outcomes.

Gen Alpha Translation

The information environment has improved but remains inadequate. Families must demand program-level ROI data (not just institutional averages), calculate debt-to-expected-income ratios before enrollment, and recognize that federal loan access is not an endorsement of educational quality.

Cultural Narratives That Systematically Misdirected Choices

The “college-for-all” paradigm emerged from Goals 2000 (1994) and No Child Left Behind (2001), which redirected K–12 systems toward college preparation while defunding vocational education. From 2007 to 2010, 71% of schools reduced instruction time in non-tested subjects including vocational training to meet NCLB accountability requirements (McMurrer, 2007). Vocational education became, in the words of San Diego Miramar College President Patricia Hsieh, “second choice, second-class” (Rosenbaum, 2001).

Parents had anchored to expectations for college based on their lived experience, but it was an incomplete understanding of the benefits of higher education. While the college wage premium was 39% in 1980 and steadily rose 100% by 2000, the career advice instilled in parents was going to college meant higher wages despite that generality not being equally distributed (Autor, 2014).

Prestige signaling drove families toward expensive private institutions despite empirical evidence that selectivity premiums were largely illusory for advantaged students. Dale and Krueger's (2002) landmark NBER study found that students who attended more selective colleges did not earn more than students who were accepted by comparable schools but attended less selective institutions. Yet families paid substantial premiums: private college graduates earn only 3.5% more than public graduates ten years post-enrollment (\$53,366 vs. \$51,551), while PayScale data shows public university ROI is twice that of private universities on a cost-adjusted basis (PayScale, 2023).

The book *The Hidden Ivies* is attributed to skewing Millennial parental perception on the need to attend highly selective private liberal arts colleges. It outlines 63 that even today have high brand recognition and command high tuition costs but fall short of Ivy League outcomes upon examination. On average they return 49% less than actual Ivy League schools and 9% less than flagship publics (Preston, 2021).

Taking these findings together, the college wage premium and affinity for private liberal arts colleges, the logic gap is evident. While going to college can produce a premium in wages, going to a more expensive college did not correlate to better financial outcomes for students. Simply put, parents couldn't rely on selectivity and cost to determine the wage premium an institution would yield.

Gen Alpha Translation

Public universities should be a primary consideration for most middle-class students given the comparable outcomes at fractional costs. Chetty et al.'s (2017) mobility data shows mid-tier publics (Cal State, CUNY, SUNY systems) produce higher mobility rates than elite privates due to higher success rates with the complement of higher access for low income applicants. There is a benefit to some Ivy-Plus schools, but primarily for those who are disadvantaged and will see a big jump in access to a more affluent network.

Cognitive Biases That Distorted Individual Decisions

Behavioral economics research documents systematic patterns in Millennial educational decision-making. Ruder and Van Noy's (2017) survey of 2,965 students found that students from financially disadvantaged backgrounds were especially prone to overestimate potential earnings from their major and degree. Seaward and Kemp (2000) documented that students were very optimistic about their future incomes and inaccurate when it came to estimating time to loan repayment.

Financial literacy deficits were severe and systematically distributed. Artavanis and Karra's (2020) study of over 1,000 students at a Massachusetts public university found 39.5% overall, dropping to 26% for female students, 24% for minority students, and 33% for first-generation students. The critical finding: 38.2% of low-literacy students underestimated future payments by more than \$1,000 annually. High financial literacy reduced this underestimation probability by 17–18 percentage points.

Present bias, the tendency to heavily discount future consequences relative to immediate benefits, created a structural vulnerability in the loan decision. The immediate reward (college experience, prestige, social benefits) was psychologically salient; the deferred cost (debt payments beginning four or more years later) was abstract. This aligns with the quasi-hyperbolic discounting literature (Laibson, 1997; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999): 18-year-olds systematically underweight costs delayed beyond their immediate planning horizon.

The actions of peers were an amplifier of biases and in the case of Carrell et al. (2009) the effects were of a much larger magnitude than in previous studies of college achievement. High school seniors in Barrios-Fernández (2022) research were more likely to attend university when their closest neighbor enrolled. Whereas a neighbor can be a proxy for similar socioeconomic conditions it is not a replacement for an individual level cost-benefit analysis.

Gen Alpha Translation

Where biases are predictable, they must be counteracted with good discipline and a focus on individuals. Basic financial literacy and realistic calculations of loan repayment in best and worst case scenarios should be taken before commitments. To the extent specific job pathways can be chosen before major selection, they should be to improve the accuracy of the financial assessment.

The Labor Market Millennials Actually Entered

Millennials graduating between 2000 and 2015 faced two major recessions that caused documented scarring effects with permanent earnings consequences. Rothstein (2020) found Great Recession graduates entering the labor market in 2010 had employment rates 2 percentage points lower than predicted through 2019, indicating permanent structural damage. Census Bureau economist Kevin Rinz documented that Millennials in high-unemployment local labor markets lost 13% in cumulative earnings from 2007 to 2017, compared to 9% for Gen X and 7% for Boomers (Rinz, 2019).

The job market transformed structurally during this period. Autor et al. (2006) documented polarization, with employment expanding in high-wage and low-wage jobs while middle-wage work declined. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2022) found that 50–70% of changes in U.S. wage structure over four decades could be explained by automation displacing workers from routine cognitive tasks. This explains why recent college graduate underemployment jumped to 44% by 2012 (up from 34% in 2001) and why consequences have proven durable: graduates who start underemployed are 3.5 times more likely to remain underemployed a decade later (Abel & Deitz, 2016).

Credential inflation accelerated after 2008. Burning Glass Technologies' *Moving the Goalposts* (2014) documented widespread credentialing: 65% of executive secretary job postings required bachelor's degrees despite only 19% of current workers holding them; 60% of IT help desk postings required degrees though only 39% of current workers had them. This created a credentials trap: jobs that did not require degrees now demanded them as screening proxies, while the degrees themselves taught little relevant to job performance.

Major-level variation was enormous and systematically underappreciated. Georgetown CEW data shows architecture majors faced 12.8% unemployment versus 4.8% for nursing, a nearly threefold gap (Carnevale et al., 2015). Information Systems majors faced 14.7% unemployment. Criminal Justice majors faced 67.2% underemployment. Meanwhile, the college premium narrative cited national averages that masked these disparities: at 1,233 institutions (30%), more than half of students earned less than high school graduates ten years after enrollment (Chetty et al., 2017).

Gen Alpha Translation

The labor market no longer offers stable career paths predictable five or more years in advance. Major selection must incorporate unemployment and underemployment data by field, not just average earnings. Parents' intuitions about safe career paths are calibrated to labor markets 15–20 years obsolete. The World Economic Forum (2023) projects 39% of key skills will change by 2030; static credentials face rapid obsolescence.

Gen Z Translation

Millennials did not anticipate recessionary forces, credential inflation, and were not discerning enough with major selection. Decisions Gen Z needs to make about postsecondary school, career pathways, and majors are far more sensitive to duration risk. The acceleration of AI is narrowing windows for course correction. Dedicating significant time and resources toward a career that will not exist at graduation is a real possibility. A high degree of awareness about demand in the job market and where AI technology is being deployed is warranted.

Why Forecasting Systems Failed Catastrophically

BLS occupational projections for 2000–2010 proved systematically wrong in ways that guided counselors toward poor advice. The Bureau projected manufacturing employment near 19 million; actual employment fell to 11.5 million, a 65% overprojection (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). Projected unemployment of 4.0% materialized as 9.6%. Projected nonfarm payroll growth of +1.4% annually became –0.1%, a directional failure. These projections, embedded in the Occupational Outlook Handbook, were the primary information resource counselors provided to students.

The methodological failure was structural: BLS assumed mature business cycle conditions with no recession during ten-year horizons, despite the historical frequency of recessions suggesting near-certainty of at least one. More fundamentally, projections did not incorporate routine-biased technological change (RBTC) into occupational staffing patterns, despite Autor et al.'s (2003) framework being available to policymakers.

K–12 guidance systems operated under impossible constraints. Actual student-to-counselor ratios averaged 400–500:1 versus the ASCA-recommended 250:1 (American School Counselor Association, 2019). Counselors allocated only 23% of time to postsecondary planning versus the recommended 40%. Training programs devoted approximately one course (6% of graduate credit hours) to career development. Most critically, counselors were evaluated on college enrollment rates, not graduate employment outcomes, creating systematic incentives to maximize enrollment rather than optimize fit.

Jaimovich and Siu's (2020) research identified the core forecasting error: assuming jobs lost in recessions return. Their key finding: job polarization, the disappearance of middle-skill routine jobs, occurs almost exclusively during recessions and these jobs do not return in recovery. The 1991, 2001, and 2009 recessions all produced jobless recoveries because employers used downturns to permanently eliminate routine positions through technology adoption. Time to employment recovery extended from 15 months (1975) to 31+ months (post-1991) as structural displacement dominated cyclical patterns.

Gen Alpha Translation

Historical job projections systematically overestimate employment in routine-task-intensive occupations. Current BLS projections incorporating AI effects remain preliminary. Families should evaluate occupations based on task composition (routine vs. non-routine, cognitive vs. manual, physical presence requirements) rather than job titles. Hershbein and Kahn (2018) demonstrated that MSAs hit harder by recession showed permanently elevated skill requirements; recessions accelerate rather than pause technological displacement.

Empirical ROI Data Reveals Systematic Perception Failures

Lifetime earnings by major show variance comparable to the college premium itself. Architecture and engineering majors earn \$3.8 million median lifetime; early childhood education majors earn approximately \$1.8 million, a \$2 million gap within bachelor's degree holders (Carnevale et al., 2015). Georgetown CEW data shows top-paying majors (STEM) earn \$3.4 million more over a lifetime than the lowest-paying majors.

Negative ROI is more common than the confidence in college-for-all sentiment would indicate. 23% of bachelor's programs have a negative ROI, meaning when lost wages and cost of attending are factored into lifetime earnings students would have been better off not attending. This neglects intangible benefits many attribute to attending university but resides outside the scope of this paper.

Debt-to-income ratios reached crisis levels. The Class of 2018 faced 66% debt-to-income ratios versus 39% for the Class of 2008, nearly doubling in a decade (Looney & Yannelis, 2022). The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau benchmark for healthy DTI is 36%. Master's degree holders spend 57% of their extra earnings (above bachelor's-only) on loan payments, suggesting graduate education frequently destroys rather than creates value.

The for-profit sector represents the clearest market failure. Despite enrolling only 10% of students, for-profit attendees represented 40% of all defaults (Looney & Yannelis, 2015). Twelve-year default rates at for-profits reached 52% versus 17% at private nonprofits. The Brookings analysis is stark: attending a for-profit is the strongest predictor of default, greater than major, income, or completion status.

Chetty et al.'s (2017) Opportunity Insights data reveals that elite access, not elite education, drives much of observed elite outcomes. Children with parents in the top 1% are 77 times more likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college than children from the bottom 20%. Yet conditional on attendance, low-income students achieve comparable success rates, indicating that the prestige premium largely reflects selection rather than treatment effects. Mid-tier public universities show higher mobility rates because they combine acceptable success rates (51% at SUNY Stony Brook vs. 60% at Ivy-Plus) with dramatically higher low-income access (16% vs. 4% from the bottom quintile).

Gen Alpha Translation

ROI must be calculated at the program level (specific major at specific institution), not institution or major level alone. The same major at different institutions can vary by \$80,000 in first-year earnings. Community college transfer pathways eliminate much of the debt burden while producing comparable outcomes in most fields. For-profit institutions should be avoided absent compelling evidence of specific program success.

Translational Framework for Gen Alpha Decision-Making

AI Exposure Redefines "Safe" Career Paths

Early studies from Eloundou et al. (2024) warn that 80% of U.S. workers could have at least 10% of work tasks affected by LLMs; 19% may see 50% or more task impact. For the first time higher paying jobs are seemingly at risk, those in mathematics, tax preparation, writing,

accounting and legal work. Lowest-exposure occupations include stonemasons, cooks, mechanics, meat packers, and athletes; professions characterized by presence in the physical world and tactile demands. Manning and Aguirre (2026) find that AI exposure and adaptive capacity are positively correlated ($r = 0.502$): many occupations highly exposed to AI contain workers with relatively strong means to manage job transitions. However, 6.1 million workers (4.2% of the workforce) work in occupations that are both highly exposed and where workers have low expected adaptive capacity, concentrated in clerical and administrative roles.

Confidence in STEM being a safe haven is also being challenged as generative AI continues to accelerate in coding tasks and disciplines within computer science and math. While early in the trend, Federal Reserve Bank of New York data (2025) shows computer engineering unemployment at 7.5% and computer science at 6.1%, higher than art history and philosophy.

Skills Portfolios Increasingly Trump Credentials

Skills-based hiring has gained policy momentum: twenty-plus U.S. states have eliminated bachelor's requirements for state positions (National Skills Coalition, 2024). However, employer practice lags rhetoric: Harvard Business School research finds that only 12% of companies have no degree requirements at all, and 47% of employers who removed requirements are not actually hiring more degree-less workers (Fuller et al., 2022). The gap between announced policy and hiring behavior suggests that credential signaling remains entrenched even as alternative pathways gain attention.

The vocational renaissance reflects labor market reality. Skilled trades face one million fewer workers than in 2007 (Associated Builders and Contractors, 2023). 65% of tradespeople feel their jobs are safe from AI automation (Manpower Group, 2024). Trade careers offer competitive starting salaries, AI-resistance, job security, and zero student debt. Yet 74% of Gen Z perceive stigma with vocational school, perpetuating the shortage (Strada Education Network, 2022).

Decision Framework Components

Major Choice Evaluation Criteria. AI exposure scoring (tasks being displaced and replacement propensity); physical presence requirements (hands-on work harder to automate); interpersonal intensity (empathy, persuasion, trust); underemployment rate by major (NY Fed data); and skills transferability across industries and roles (Manning & Aguirre, 2026).

Monitor jobs being displaced by AI and evaluate the propensity for replacement in the future; at the time of this paper physical presence requirements are harder to automate; reliance on interpersonal intensity (empathy, persuasion, trust and accountability); underemployment rate by major via NY Fed data; propensity for skills to be transferable to different industries and roles (Manning & Aguirre, 2026).

Institution Choice Calculation. Overcome biases of institution choice and focus on the program level ROI (Preston, 2021); limiting debt to projected first-year salary as a guideline (Hershbein & Kahn, 2018) with some discretion based on future earnings; geographic proximity to major metro areas with employment potential (Moretti & Yi, 2024); avoid for-profit institutions unless there is a clear benefit as they are rarely worth the cost (Cellini & Goldin, 2014); a community college with a transfer significantly reduces cost and yields minimal outcome differences.

Triggers to Consider Alternative Pathways. Can include but not limited to a high degree of interest or aptitude for skilled trades; clear labor shortages that can create immediate opportunities for employment; debt that exceeds an expected starting salary as a guideline; target career does not require a degree.

Preventing New Groupthink

Gen Alpha faces emerging misleading narratives that parallel “college-for-all.” The “AI-proof careers” discourse lacks empirical grounding; the technology is too new for reliable forecasting (Manning & Aguirre, 2026). The “healthcare is completely safe” narrative ignores AI augmentation of diagnostic and administrative functions. The learn to code and you’ll find a tech pathway shows 71% job placement but increasing self-employment as traditional entry-level tech contracts (Course Report, 2023).

The fundamental lesson from Millennial experience: parental intuition lags labor markets by 15–20 years. The World Economic Forum (2023) projects 39% of key skills will change by 2030. The generation ahead of Gen Alpha, Gen Z, is already seeing warning signs as they enter the workplace; 58% of graduates are looking for full-time work versus 25% of Millennials at that same stage (Handshake, 2024); 5.8% unemployment for recent graduates matching high school dropouts; 22% drop in Fortune 500 internship offers from 2022 to 2024 (NACE, 2024).

Conclusions

A confluence of factors contributed to the Millennial higher education crisis; incentive structure (enrollment over outcomes), policy failures (access to capital without protection), societal narratives (prestige seeking, stigmatizing vocational pathways), cognitive biases (optimism, bias of the present, financial literacy gaps), labor market transformation and forecasting failures (BLS over projections and misinterpretations). Each alone was problematic and in combination they produced systemic overinvestment in credentials with declining returns.

Gen Alpha is entering a highly dynamic environment where AI is automating cognitive tasks, a major departure from past technological revolutions. Entry level jobs where recent grads would perform low value tasks but learn the initial business workings are now contracting due to AI capabilities. This has not changed the decision architecture that was in place for Millennials: 17-year-olds with limited information and/or capacity to analyze it, influenced by parents with obsolete intuitions, making irreversible financial decisions to the magnitude of hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Gen Alpha families can draw three core insights from this research: First, major and program selection should be more heavily weighted than institutional prestige; there is more variance across programs within an institution by degree type than across differing institutions (Preston, 2021); second, excessive leverage will destroy future wealth regardless of credential prestige thus debt should not exceed first year earnings as a general principle (Looney & Yannelis, 2022). Third, on a risk adjusted basis many vocational and technical pathways offer better returns for students that don’t have a clear trajectory for academics or desired profession; the immediate employment, competitive wages and lack of debt provide an early resistance to AI disruption.

There are several limitations to this synthesis. Source selection was based on judgement vs. an algorithmic approach. The author provides an interpretation in the form of translational guidance for Generation Alpha that is sourced from historical patterns which is not empirically validated. ROI can be impacted by many other independent variables including discount rates, length of one's career and differences in earnings based on market trend and geography. Testing should be conducted to determine if this decision framework proposed did improve postsecondary outcomes for Generation Alpha.

The question "what went wrong?" has a clear answer: systems optimized for enrollment produced graduates optimized for obsolescence. The question "what should change?" requires recognizing that this is the time to exercise due diligence, make data-driven rather than vanity-driven decisions, and, to the extent possible at age 17 or 18, consider lifestyle design to inform educational choices. The tools exist: College Scorecard, NY Fed underemployment data, Georgetown CEW ROI rankings, and AI exposure assessments (Manning & Aguirre, 2026). Ironically, AI and large language models will themselves aid access to and analysis of this data. The Millennial experience provides the cautionary baseline. Gen Alpha's outcomes depend on whether their families learn from that experience before committing to paths that compound the same errors in a labor market changing faster than any generation has faced.

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