Turning to Violence: Science Fiction, Ethics and Difference in Priya Chabria's
"Generation 14"

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\Gerontologist Aubrey de Grey has suggested that biotechnology should aim towards 'engineered negligible senescence,' the extension of life and prevention of death (de Grey 2006). Inherent in de Grey's statements, and embedded into the existing technologies that are now working to achieve such goals, is the implied assumption that indefinite life extension is beneficial to humanity and therefore desirable. Even more fundamentally, de Grey's statements reflect the scientific rationalization of what was formerly in the domain of the religious. The idea of engineered life extension is a rational programme of immortality that replaces the concept of spiritual life after death, while obscuring its spiritual links. This is an example of how technology is 'morally charged' (Verbeek, 2011, p. 21). Technologies, especially biotechnologies, open up new possibilities for how we should live. The human individual can no longer be seen as acting autonomously but rather interacts intimately with his or her technologies.[1] Science and technology can therefore be seen as a discourse that materializes and makes concrete certain contingent values, which alter the way we relate to the natural world, leading to many difficult questions concerning how we should act.

Ethical discussions today seem to revolve around the central question 'how should one act?' with approaches focusing on the duties and responsibilities of the human subject (the deontological approach), as well as on the objective assessment of the consequences of his or her actions (this is the consequentialist approach). These approaches derive from a western humanist tradition that places the individual subject at the center, the source of moral decisions and practices, and who is positioned at a distance from the world of objects or others upon which it must act. The predominance of the deontological and consequentialist approaches suggests that humanist values (such as the separation of subject and object, subjective autonomy, and objective reason) guide ethical action and discourse today.

The problem with these approaches is that the question of 'how to act' can no longer be answered exclusively by this human(ist) subject. Technologies intervene on moral decisions, as I have pointed out, thus mitigating the responsibility of the human agent. Further, developments in biotechnology completely destabilize the very idea of 'human.' Medical science is creating new forms of life, presenting us with many fascinating possibilities and difficult choices. Developments in genetic medicine dissolve the supposed line separating 'human' and 'technology' and emphasizes that the two categories cannot be so clearly delimited. Carey Wolfe (2010) points out that the great irony of bioethical discourse is that, in spite of these radical changes, the idea of the unique and autonomous 'human,' continues to be 'taken for granted as an ethical (non)issue' (55). Ethicists instead seem to be concerned with establishing rules and protocols as the basis of how to act, in order to determine, for instance, if an individual or being has the 'right' to certain treatments, choices or protections (see Dworkin 1992, Jonsen et al 1998, and Beauchamp & Walters 1999, for example). This has been criticized by some such as Carl Elliott (1999) as being 'an almost purely technical enterprise' driven by an 'unthinking pragmatism' (xxii), a pragmatism that uncritically reinstates contingent, humanist assumptions about what a 'human' or 'person' is. And as Wolfe highlights, our moral responses are always already entangled in *language*; philosophical discourse—'what we say, what we write,

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[1] See Verbeek (2011) for examples of how moral decisions are not made by humans autonomously but in close interaction with technologies.

how we ask philosophical questions' already entails a moral attitude, 'open[ing] up lines of thought… and foreclose[ing] others' (60).

Fiction occupies an important position in ethical discussions because, on a very simple level, fictions re-contextualize abstract ethical issues, introducing them into relatable situations. Writers imagine the impact of technological change, for example, on the individual psyche and on human relationships, returning ethics to the realm of the personal and interpersonal. The typical narrative (those written in realist or naturalist fashion) is thus considered a repository of moral and ethical insight, which can be drawn from the way characters respond to dilemmas, and from the causal structures of the novel. Critics who adopt this approach (see Nussbaum 2005, for example) directly apply the fictional to 'real' life, collapsing the distance between the 'real' and representation. These readings, however, do not address the problematic issue of how fiction, as with any ethical discourse, might manipulate the reader. They often neglect to address the issue of *language* and how systems of signification can encourage a convergence of moral responses among members of the same moral community. These analyses do not attend to the ways writers, tapping into established codes (such as emotional framing, to elicit fear or pathos), can condemn or laud specific behaviours, thus manipulating the reader through language, inducting them into a moral culture, calibrating emotions and cultivating moral-emotional responses. Joshua Landy (2011) goes further and comments that in terms of our moral understanding, such fiction 'convinces us only of what we already believed before we began to read it' (66). The 'pleasure' we derive from these ethical readings comes from the reader intuitively taking on a certain 'role' in a game of 'make-believe' during which, for the time of reading, we participate in a 'fantasy of moral clarity' (74). Landy reiterates the idea that our moral responses to fiction are always already intertwined with language and discursive constructions, and the relations of power inherent in them, which tell us *how* to respond.

Speculative fiction offers something distinctive to the ethical discussion. Firstly, as a genre overtly concerned with the challenges of technological progress, SF valuably imagines the possible consequences of new technologies. What is more critical to my discussion is the idea that SF is a self-conscious play on signs and signification, and can draw our attention to how ethical responses are determined by the language we use. In other words, it is a genre that is exceptionally attuned to how language brings into being certain realities, while shutting out others. SF employs recognizable signs, eliciting conventional meanings. Yet, at the same time, because of its openness to alterity, it is able to disrupt norms and introduce new values, whilst foregrounding its own construction. SF thus effectively problematizes epistemological or ontological 'truths,' demonstrating how apparently natural assumptions about how we should act are constituted in a language that precedes us. In my analysis of Priya Chabria's recent (2008) SF novel, *Generation 14,* I will show how Chabria, an Indian poet, has employed the SF mode in order to, firstly, demonstrate how language presupposes certain contingent assumptions about "human;" and secondly, to disrupt these assumptions, offering an alternative ethical perspective that draws from Indic philosophies.

Chabria establishes the connection between signs and values at the outset, utilizing recognizable science-fictional tropes to set up certain expectations. Set in the twenty-

fourth century, Chabria presents us with a 'Global Community' in which death has been averted through the use of advanced biomedical interventions. This community has reached 'optimum efficiency' (59) through the scientific rationalization of life, with 'Matings' that are 'pre-selected' for 'optimum results' (15) and the 'refurbish[ment]' of worker functions that ensures maximized contribution (59). The sole beneficiaries of these technological advancements are the 'Originals,' a genetically 'pure' breed of humans. The Originals have created supporting strata of 'other' beings, with 'different orders of pre-ordained consciousness' (35), in order to maintain this privilege. These 'other' beings include genetic hybrids bred for military force and amusement, and clones who function as menial labour and organ donors, and who have been dispossessed of 'presence' (55) through extreme forms of body control. Without individuality or autonomy, they are considered a subhuman species, and therefore 'dispensable' (62).

At first glance, *Generation 14* seems to follow in a tradition of western dystopian fictions, which warn against unchecked medical advancement. In such fictions, cloning leads to the establishment of oppressive social hierarchies that threaten the autonomy and potential of the human individual, presenting the audience with a distinct morality that privileges humanist values of independence and liberation.[2] In these fictions, hope lies in the individual (re)gaining his or her authentic Self and fighting back against injustice. Chabria employs certain narrative devices to raise expectations that *Generation 14* will conform to a similar moral frame. For instance, the narrative focalization prepares the reader for the emergence of an autonomous and essential self. The narrator is a clone, a recognizable SF symbol of suppressed individuality, who documents her 'morphing' of consciousness (11) in her 'diary,' a 'cellchip' hidden 'within [her] neural circuitry' (15). This 'morphing' includes the recollection of some of her Original's 'memor[ies]' (11). The reader anticipates a process of growth, and the recovery of this 'true' self, in accordance with essentialist notions of being.

It is also suggested that the clone's morphing is the key to ending the Originals' oppressive regime. Early into the novel, the narrator is told by another mutating clone that her transformation is critical to the clones 'win[ning]' and ending '[t]his horror' (57). Later, she is told by the leaders of the Resistance, who stage a war of emancipation, that the 'secret' (272) she recovers from her Original's memories will be that which will incite this Uprising, a necessary 'Bloodbath' that must 'preced[e] the Joy of Liberation' (277). Not only does this reinforce an essentialist notion of identity, and locates the subject at the centre of ethical action, it also links self-determination to violence, which is justified as an appropriate response to a prior wrongdoing. Violence, in this moral framework, is seen as necessary to sustain the moral balance in the universe. This retributive "logic" is a line of reasoning rooted in a Christian morality (Gorringe, 1996) that has been normalized, used repeatedly in discourses justifying warfare and capital punishment, and continually reiterated in contemporary fictions (see Weaver 2000; and Philips and Strobl 2006, for example).

Having invoked this moral code, Chabria then proceeds to disrupt it. The Uprising, which takes place at the end of the novel, is an affair that has no 'end' in the

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[2] These include Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (first published in 1932) and also recent films like *The Island* (2005) and *Moon* (2009).

Aristotelian sense. The novel ends abruptly in the middle of the bloodshed and leaves the reader without any certain sense of who has 'won' and thus without a clear sense of redemption. We are instead left with a woeful image of the clone 'cradling pain' (279), fearing an endless cycle of violence in which 'atrocity is blanketed by even more atrocities' leading 'not to silence, but more violence' (252). This disruption is intensified by the fact that the clone does not recover an 'essential' Self despite the fact that she 'remembers' various aspects of her Original's life. Rather, she speaks 'neither as [her Original] nor [her]self' (104-105), and at times, finds that her Original repulses her (123), which emphasizes the fact that they are not essentially the same being. Further, the clone finds that she has to 'invent [her]… Original… as [she] has to invent [her]self' (60). Furthermore, the clone does not gain autonomy, and remains under the charge of the leaders of the Resistance, obliged to fulfil her prescribed duty in spite of her own hesitations (265).

I argue that this disruption provides an opening for Chabria to put forward an alternative understanding of ethical action based upon Indic beliefs about the nature of reality. Because of SF's fundamental openness to alterity, Chabria is able to re-signify the SF sign of the clone, distinguishing the clone not in terms of a singular and unique presence, but by an elemental *absence*, the absence of this unique coherent Self. In Western, binary conceptions, such absence would disqualify the individual from the realm of 'human' (and therefore from ethical consideration). Here, however, Clone 14/54/G's absence is described as a 'vastness without meaning' that is 'deeply beautiful' (244). The clone's absence of self allows her to be uncommonly receptive to others, even to the extent of being *inhabited* by the other entities, that is, actively moulded by and adapting to these others. Her transformation begins with 'visitations,' which are the implausible encounters with the fictional characters of stories that the clone's Original had written before her death. These fictional characters include a fish swimming in the Ganga river, contemplating the 'Ultimate Reality' (191); a mother who grieves for her son who dies during the Kalinga war (262-261 BC); and, a wolf-dog named Trichaisma who accompanies his master on a journey of conquest. These 'visitations' are not simply hallucinations. They are intense and corporeal identifications with difference: she sees through their eyes, and experiences their bodily instincts, even after the visitations end. For example, after a visitation from Trichaisma, the clone feels compelled to 'bay at the moon' (19). They transform her and she finds that she is becoming 'simultaneously many different people' who are all within her 'speaking together in a babble' (110). As a result of being inhabited by difference, the clone discovers that she can 'think more, feel more' (68), 'still' is 'one of [the clones]' (259) but also 'multiple' (86).

Chabria presents a distinctive notion of absence that is usefully informed by concepts of absence found in Indic philosophy. According to the Vaisesikas ontology ($3^{rd} - 2^{nd}$ C BCE), a Vedic system of thought[3] concerned with the status of the 'particulars' of reality and the cosmic order, or *dharma* (Hamilton 2001, p. 70-71), absence is seen as a legitimate quality of substance that allows the recognition of *difference*, as related to

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[3] A Vedic system is a school or branch that offers a distinct, systematic philosophy with regards to the Vedic texts, or Veda. The Veda is the corpus of material that constitutes the earliest scriptures of Indic thought and the basis for what is now recognized as Hinduism. Each Vedic system specializes in a certain aspect of, or approach to, the Veda, and is a distinct expression of the primary material that exists side by side with the other systems (Rajmani 1983, p. 22-23).

another being or state of existence.[4] In Buddhism (4th C BCE), a philosophy that developed in reaction to the hegemonic orthodoxy of the Brahamanical tradition,[5] the absence of Self (the realization of the 'non-self') is linked to the understanding of dependent origination. This idea suggests that nothing exists as an isolated, static entity, but rather arises in a continually evolving network of causes and circumstances (Fowler 1999, p. 46). While I do not wish to generalize, both of these notions of absence reflect an understanding of the interconnectedness between the individual with the world, and with difference, around it. Using SF, Chabria is able to literalize the abstract idea of a self that is outside of itself, a self that identifies with the otherness around it, and is both constituted and divided by these various identifications. This representation offers an alternative to the normative western conceptions of self.

The clone's absence of self enables a process of *turning towards*. This process is highlighted by the fact that the clone names her dead Original, whose identity has been erased from public record, 'Aa-aa' (59). The prefix 'aa' in Sanskrit means 'toward' (Grimes 1996, p. 9), and the clone is drawn to the fact that each time the name is spoken 'it sounded different and seemed to suggest different things' (60), emphasizing a movement towards difference. Most of the novel focuses on the clone's experience of turning towards others and becoming affected by them in a way that transcends the prescribed 'limits' (27) of her consciousness. These 'others' not only include the fictional characters of her visitations, as I have described, but also the sentient and non-sentient beings around her. At another point, a dismembered hand impacts her in a similarly unexpected way, and she feels 'sanctity' in its presence, a strange 'calm' that makes her wonder if her 'senses' are 'distorting' (54). Later, seeing another clone in danger compels her 'body [to] vibrat[e] viciously' she 'lea[ps]' towards the clone 'landing on all fours' in a bid to save her as if possessed (65), an irregular response that leads to her detainment. Equally irregular is her yearning to mate with the Leader of Resistance, whom we find out is Aa-aa's son, driven by a 'hunger' that ' pushes [her] onwards… to becoming part of another's body' (245) while at the same time still maintaining and 'knowing again [her own] body's limits' (245). All of these cases highlight a turning towards an other that is marked by a non-rational response that exceeds the stipulated bounds of the clone's 'actuality.' As a result, the clone finds she is no longer 'trapped in [her] body' (59) and 'no longer [knows] which world [she] belong[s] to' (52). Instead she feels both 'more—and less—than what [she] was' (95). She is still a clone but at the same time she is also 'simultaneously many different people' who are 'speaking together in a babble' (110).

Once again looking to Indic philosophies, we find that the Advaita Vedanta belief system (8th century CE) presents a 'non-dual' or monistic ontology that is particularly

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[4] Vaisesikas, from the Sanskrit word *visesa* which indicates 'difference' or 'particularity,' is a realistic school of thought, that is, it is concerned with the ontological status of the 'particulars' of reality (Fowler 2002, p. 98). This system of thought asserts that the universe is made out of atoms of earth, air, fire, water, as well as atoms of space, time, ether, mind and soul, all understood as elements co-existing for eternity with the god that formed it. In this ontology, absence is a quality of substance that can indicate several things: situational absence; non-existence prior to existence; non-existence after existence; or, the quality of never having existed (Hamilton 2001, p. 73).

[5] This refers to the ideas and practices established by the Brahmin priests, which became dominant in northern India by the 5th C BCE, and which focused on Vedic rituals and sacrifice (Hamilton 2001, p. 18)

resonant here.[6] Its 'non-dual' ontology is an understanding that the universe is One—that everything is ultimately *Brahman*, an unchanging, absolute and material essence.[7] It follows that Self or 'atman' (Sanskrit, 'essence, breath') is also Brahman. According to the Advaita Vedanta, all plurality is false perception. Plurality is a 'conventional reality' that has a real effect on us but which one must nonetheless strive to see through (Hamilton 2001, p. 127). It is not the unchanging Brahman but ignorance that is the source of the perceived separation and disunion between things. The clone's unrelieved compulsion to turn towards and become part of another materializes the traditional Advaitic saying "Thou in me and I in thee" (Radhakrishan 2000, p. 32).

Violence and the possibility of non-dual ethical response

Chabria's disruption of plot and genre conventions encourages the reader to redirect their attention to the repetition of violence that characterizes the novel. All of the clone's visitations are moments of violence or death, or of grief that follows; and her subsequent experiences of turning towards and 'becoming part of another' occur in unusually violent circumstances. She becomes increasingly conscious that it is violence that 'b[inds all beings] together in a sorrowful world' (40). I argue that it is *violence* that is the key to Chabria's enactment of a non-dual ontology that might form the basis of an alternative ethical response. It is important to note that in the novel violence is not resolved by the mechanisms of plot. Violence, is, to a large extent, delinked from narrative (namely, disconnected from character development and from plot advancement) and thus from the sense of rational, linear progress, and objective truth that is often associated with the typical narrative. Disconnected from *the rational,* the reader becomes aware of how representations of violence instead follow a pattern of heightened *affective response*.

For example, at one point in the novel, the clone narrator is stationed outside of the amphitheatre where a ritual, Exemplary Massacre of Others is taking place. She is unable to see the slaughter, but her robot watchdog, Bullet, can and reports what it sees (47). As it watches, Bullet starts to 'cla[w] itself' going into a 'frenzy of biting itself', chewing off its limbs and tearing out its eyes (47), seized by the 'bloodlust' (49) it sees. The Clone herself finds that she is unable to remain detached, and soon becomes aware of her own 'bloodlust' (49), which then affects her in strikingly similar terms. She feels her 'eyes… bur[n] as if ice crystals were embedded in them' (63), and feels her 'limbs.. jerking' (65) and [desires] 'to hit out' (63). This is an example of one of several moments of violence that seem to have less to do with the plot than with highlighting the affective intensities generated from the encounter with violence (see 63, 80-81, 263-264, for other examples). Significantly, the affective response to violence dissolves the apparent separation of the clone and the robot dog, overturning the apparent separation of subject and object.

By focusing on the affective responses to violence, rather than on its mechanisms or logic, Chabria encourages the reader to defer *judgement*. That is to say, we are

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[6] Advaita Vedanta is a chief Hindu philosophy dealing with the Upanishadic doctrine (the final part) of the Vedas, and concerned with the identity of Brahman (the ultimate reality) and atman (the self) (Hamilton 2001, p. 127).

[7] 'Monism' indicates a numerical rather than qualitative term. It is distinct from monotheism, which is the idea of one God.

encouraged to defer how we think we *should* respond to violence and to become aware of how we *already do* affectively respond to violence. We can link Chabria's attempt to re-frame the reader's response to violence to the idea of *Rasa*, an Indian theory of aesthetics that Chabria has self-consciously applied in the writing of this novel (Chabria). *Rasa*, from Sanskrit, means 'taste' or 'flavour' and refers to 'the experience of the full savor of an emotion provoked in an audience member' through an artistic event ("Rasa").[8] There are around nine commonly recognized rasas, or 'aesthetic pleasures' (Manuel 9).[9] The rasas are understood as 'essences' or 'universal forms of basic emotions' already latent in the audience, and are actuated when one appreciates a work of art. According to some, the experience of rasa involves transcending the personal and appreciating emotions that are transpersonal. It is believed that these affects proceed from 'unconscious memory traces' in each person that have been 'built up through previous lives as well as the present one.' Allowing oneself to respond to art in this way is to allow oneself to identify with a 'universal consciousness' and therein recognize that we are not distinct but in fact all a manifestation of the one ultimate realty, or Self ("rasa"). The clone, at the end of the novel, upon seeing her lover's organs 'burst outwards,' is prompted to ask the question, 'what remains inside the inside?' (280). She concludes that underneath the 'seen' and 'known' outer skins, there are 'spaces of thought and emotions and that something else that makes us human' and that 'makes us grieve with others,' making us all 'in the end, not different' (280).

Considering the novel in the light of the nine rasas, one discerns three main rasas in response to violence: *bhaynaka* (horror), *raudram* (anger), and *karuna* (sorrow). Chabria evokes bhaynaka rasa, for example, through numerous nightmarish images, such as that of a dying clone whose head revolves and body vibrates and bounces as her blood pools out of her body (80). Dream images of beheaded men running after their heads (263-264), and scenes of slaughter in which bodies are 'crunched… into halves' and limbs are torn from bodies (63-64) similarly shock the reader into an experience of horror. Chabria links these images of violence to historical contexts that the reader would be aware of and sensitive to. References to 'the Indian Mutiny of 1856' (96) and the wars in 'Hiroshima, New York, Iraq' (105), for instance, potentially elicit intense emotional associations in the reader; the non-mimetic signs of SF allows for various political meanings to be gleaned, triggering the imagination of each individual reader, and thus grips the reader and encourages active contemplation which I believe is necessary for aesthetic pleasure.

These potent associations lead to the transformation of *bhaynaka* into *raudram*, a rasa further invoked by Chabria's ascription of anger to the key character, Couplet, a

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[8] The poet Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941), uses an analogy to convey the meaning of Rasa: "Our emotions are the gastric juices which transform this world of appearance into the more intimate world of sentiments. On the other hand, this outer world has its own juices, having the various qualities, which excite our emotional activities. This is called in our Sanskrit rhetoric, Rasa, which signifies outer juices having their response in inner juices of our emotions. And a poem, according to it, is a sentence or sentences containing juices, which stimulate the juices of emotion. It brings to us ideas vitalized by feelings, ready to be made into the life-style of nature" (Tagore 2002, p. 142).

[9] According to Bharata Muni's *Natyasastra* (written between 200 BCE and 200 BC), a Sanskrit dramaturgy codifying the rasas, there are eight rasas, each with a specific colour attached to it. *Srngara* (love) is light green; *Hasya* (laughter) is white; *Karuna* (sorrow) is grey; *Raudra* (wrath) is red; *Bhaynaka* (terror) is black; *Vira* (heroism) is yellow; *Bibhatsa* (disgust) is black, *Adbhuta* (wonder) is yellow (Kale 1974, p. 110).

hybrid and a poet who functions as the clone's aide and voice of conscience ('tell me, Clone 14/54/G, how are we to progress unless you also take responsibility?' [82]), and who often 'turn[s] purple, then scarlet, before... explod[ing] with rage' (41) in accordance with the varying degrees of anger he experiences when observing injustices around him. The colour red, which symbolizes *raudram*, also permeates the novel. For example, the clone is dressed in 'saffron, vermilion, cherry and ruby' (83) and scrawls remembrances of Aa-aa's stories on the walls in 'scarlet lipstick' (87). Alongside this are the numerous images of bodies 'bathed in blood' (277), a result of violent conflict. However, blood functions as a motif that is not only identified with anger, but also with intense grief (see 205, for example). It is also connected to the awakening of consciousness. The antidote to the anesthetizing Drug given to all clones is a 'red pill the size of a teardrop' that 'taste[s] like blood' (57). The changing significance of blood and the colour red is suggestive of the fluidity and transformation of affective or emotional states, an idea crucial to Chabria's notion of ethical response, which I will return to shortly.

The *karuna* rasa (sorrow) is the key emotional essence evoked in the short stories of Aa-aa (see 159, 176, 208, for example). These stories make up Section VI of the novel ('The Visitations,' 145-224), a rather lengthy inset that interrupts the main plot of the frame narrative and brings into focus the intense emotions of pain and grief that result from violence and loss. *Karuna* rasa reoccurs at end of the main narrative but involves a subtle shift. Here, at the end of the novel, the *karuna* rasa is distinctly an evocation of compassion, which is the highest form of sorrow (Marchand, 2006: 88). Compassion is a feeling that goes beyond sadness, and which involves recognizing that the suffering of others is also the suffering of the self. It is a sorrow that is 'not self-centred' and brings about an 'unending kindness' towards all others (Marchand, 2006: 89-90). The clone demonstrates this evolution of sadness into compassion at the end of the novel. Against the backdrop of the blood and massacre of the Uprising, the clone, numb with grief and 'such a feeling of incompleteness,' recognizes that she is 'not the first to feel this way; nor the last' (283). She resolves to free herself from self-centred sorrow and instead 'love tremendously and way beyond [her]self,' a compassion that must now guide 'what [she] should do' (282).

Through her representations of violence, Chabria brings to our attention our instinctive capacity to respond affectively to violence. It is this 'sanctifying space within us' that 'makes us human' and proves that we are all 'governed by the same vast laws of life' (280). By focusing on the evolution of the rasas—the movement from horror and anger, to sadness and ultimately to compassion—Chabria encourages the reader to focus on our emotional responses to violence, rather than on its logic, and thereby, become attuned to how our emotions can transform, potentially into compassion. This path to 'touch[ing] compassion' (282) is, the clone tells us, the 'only way' (282) to resist violence, to make 'the killings stop,' and to 'be at peace' (284). And if we realize that compassion can proceed from violence then surely, Chabria urges, compassion '[c]an spurt from a source other than sorrow born in blood' (31).

By re-working the conventions of SF, and re-directing the reader's attention to emotional intensities, Chabria encourages the reader to reconsider the humanist tendencies and the privileging of reason that are embedded in many Western ethical discourses, and offers an alternative way to understand ethical response. For Chabria,

being ethical is not about rules or definitions, or rational processes. Rather, feelings such as horror, revulsion, and, indeed, compassion, feelings that fundamentally connect all beings, must be '[t]he origin of good action' (208).

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