

***Bureaucracy in the Power-Dependence of Domestic Politics  
and Linkage in Foreign Policy***

Yoshihiro Nagata, Nagoya University, Japan

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**Abstract**

The domestic politics and foreign policy have relevance. The policy-making actors in domestic politics are bureaucracy, party and parliament. Especially, bureaucracy is the most influential actor in policy-making. This paper will discuss how bureaucracy affects foreign policy. This paper consists of three parts. First, described is how various Ministries coordinate with the policy networks. In Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) bargaining, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry promote TPP because TPP develops the economic growth and linkage. But Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries opposes the TPP because of TPP's risk in agriculture. Furthermore, Prime Minister and majority of Liberal Democratic Party of Japan promote TPP, but the minority of the Diet opposes TPP. Second, I will investigate how bureaucracy affects foreign policy. In Japan, traditionally, Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been deciding diplomacy, but recently, various Ministries and politicians have become the actors of foreign policy. In Japan-EU EPA bargaining, various ministries and politicians have conflict in interest. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry promote the Japan-EU EPA because the EPA makes the economic growth and linkage, but Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and Fisheries and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism oppose the Japan-EU EPA because of problems with agriculture and train. I also comment on Japan-United Kingdom relations. Finally, I will analyze the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy from the viewpoint of the power-dependence and interdependence.

Keywords: Bureaucracy, Power-Dependence, Linkage, Foreign Policy, TPP, Japan-EU EPA

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## **Introduction**

Diplomacy and domestic politics are related each other. So, when a state's government conducts diplomacy, not only ministry of foreign affairs but also central government, the cabinet, the parliament negotiate with and link with various ministries, various parties and local government. Domestic politics is often influenced by diplomacy.

In Japan, the main actors who carry out domestic politics have been the bureaucracy. During the period of rapid economic growth of Japan, especially Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and Ministry of Finance among various ministries have mainly carried out domestic politics. But, from the 1980s, politics of Japan, United Kingdom, United States and the EC has been gradually changed. That corresponds to the concept of the power-dependence theory by R.A.W. Rhodes. In traditional politics, it is a common theory that central government conducted unilateral control to local government. On the other hand, in power-dependence theory by Rhodes, the central government and local government influence each other (Rhodes 1986a, 1986b). Power-dependence theory is the crucial model of modern politics.

Traditionally, the actors who conduct politics have been the bureaucracy in Japan, UK, the U.S. and the Europe. In modern politics, actors of domestic politics and foreign policy are government, bureaucracy, parliament, parties, interest groups including the industrial product association, Keidanren, and the agriculture association, Japan Agricultural Co-operatives (JA) and local government, policy networks. In modern politics, central governments create linkage with the bureaucracy, negotiate with statesmen of the parliament, and negotiate with policy networks of interest groups. As a result, the central government decides policy of not only domestic politics but also foreign policies by linking and negotiating with policy networks.

James Rosenau created "linkage" theory connecting with domestic politics and foreign policy in 1960s (Rosenau 1969). Linkage theory means how domestic politics affects foreign policy. Afterwards, in 1970s, the concept of "linkage" has been reconstructed by Henry Kissinger. The concept of linkage by Kissinger is the revolutionary idea such that when state conducts diplomacy and foreign policy, the states should not carry out diplomatic negotiations at odds with one of issues, but carry out diplomatic negotiations in the package of several issues. By using the concept of linkage, Kissinger challenged negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. When Kissinger reconstructed the concept of linkage, the linkage strategies were used as the concept to alleviate the conflict relations between the United States and the Soviet Union (Kissinger 1979, 1994). After that, in 1980s, the concept of linkage has been used as the relationships between the allies and the friendly nations, for example, the relations between the U.S. and Japan, the relations between the U.S. and the UK, the relations between the U.S. and the EU, and the relations between the U.S. and Canada. Joseph Nye Jr. have defined linkage strategies in association with trade and security between the United States and Japan (Nye 2007).

So, Japan has been guaranteed security and peace by the United States through the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America. Nye defines that Japan has to accept asymmetry, imbalance of trade instead of benefits of national security. This is the

matters of sensitivity and vulnerability. This is essential for the cost of interdependence. Keohane and Nye referred these matters to “interdependence” or “complex interdependence.” The concept of interdependence by Nye and Keohane has been based on the liberalism and constructivism, in a sense, as antithesis of realism, traditional diplomatic idea. The concept of interdependence is crucial in modern domestic politics and diplomacy (Keohane and Nye 1977).

The policy-making actors in domestic politics are bureaucracy, party and parliament. This paper will discuss how bureaucracy affects foreign policy. This paper studies bureaucracy by the two reasons; first, as Rhodes pointed out, all the services in the domestic policy network are a mixture of bureaucracy, market and network, especially, bureaucracy is the most influential actor in policy-making, second, what bridges between domestic politics and foreign policy are government and bureaucracy (Rhodes 2006).

There exists a preoccupation that domestic politics and foreign policy are absolutely different matters. Kenneth Waltz regarded the cause of wars as one of three images: within individuals; within the structure of individual states; or within the structure of the interstate system. The third Image depends on the sovereign state by rational and unitary actor (Cohen 2008, p.120, Waltz 1959). The relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy is not found in Waltz’s concept in 1959. Later, however, Waltz pointed out importance of domestic determinants of state action, such as leadership and bureaucracy (Waltz 1979), (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 2004, p. 653). On the other hand, from the end of the 1970s, new political theory emerged that the domestic politics is deemed to relate with the foreign policy. Representative scholars of this new political theory are Katzenstein and Putnam. The connection between domestic politics and foreign policy come to be captured in the international political economy, whose issues are free trade on car, agricultural product and oil because of tariff reduction.

In 1978, Peter Katzenstein presented a theory that domestic policy influences the foreign policy. In the preface of Katzenstein’s literature, “it was to understand how “domestic structures” shape political strategies in the international political economy” (Katzenstein 1978, p. vii). Katzenstein described “The action in society influencing the definition of foreign economic policy objectives consist of the major interest groups and political action groups. The former represents the relations of production (including industry, finance, commerce, labor, and agriculture); the latter derive from the structure of political authority (primarily the state bureaucracy and political parties)” (Katzenstein 1978, p. 19). In contrast to the statist regarding states as actors, the domestic structure privileged state-society relationship in Katzenstein’s theory (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 2004, p.667). Robert Putnam also insisted that domestic sphere and foreign sphere are interwoven more than previously assumed (Putnam 1988). Putnam presented concept of two-level games to integrate domestic structures, systematic opportunities and constraints, and foreign economy policy. Putnam’s two level games consists of domestic level where the game is played between public authorities and social actors, and of international level where the game is played among governments (Putnam pp. 427-460), (Cohen 2008 p. 128). Putnam pointed out that the bargaining power of a state could be enhanced, if its rules can demonstrate that their domestic supporters would only accept a narrow range of outcomes (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 2004, p. 668). Putnam also studied

entanglement of domestic and international politics. Putnam takes a case of Japan in which the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI), the Economic Planning Agency, and some politicians within the Liberal Democratic Party attempted to promote business interest agenda, using U.S. pressure against the resistance of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) (Putnam 1988). Peter Gourevitch also pointed two ways in which the world economy could influence politics; the basic institutional structures of politics including governing norms and capabilities and strategic opportunities of different interest groups (Gourevitch 1978), (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 2004, p.668), where the norm is one of the important elements of the regime.

### **Bureaucracy in the TPP Bargaining**

This paper will discuss how bureaucracy affects foreign policy. Described is how various Ministries coordinate with the policy networks. In Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) bargaining, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry promoted TPP because TPP develops the economic growth and linkage. But Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries opposed the TPP because of TPP's risk in agriculture. Furthermore, Prime Minister and majority of Liberal Democratic Party of Japan promoted TPP, but the minority of the Diet opposed TPP.

The TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement) is one of the most important multilateral FTA along with Japan-EU EPA and TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). In November 2011, Trans-Pacific Partnership Leaders Statement, called Honolulu commitment, was announced by nine countries; Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. The Leaders Statement of the TPP declared to have achieved this milestone in the common vision to establish a comprehensive, next generation regional agreement that liberalizes trade and investment and address new and traditional trade issues and 21st-century challenges. In 2013, Japan participated the TPP negotiation.

In TPP bargaining, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry promoted TPP because TPP develops the economic growth and linkage. Before Japan participated as TPP member, JA, the biggest agricultural association, announced opposition against the TPP. There are two reasons of their opposition. The first one is the predicted damage of the domestic agriculture product due to tariff reduction for imported product. The other reason is that the imported agriculture product cannot flow on the agricultural circulation which JA monopolizes.

In 2011, the Liberal Democratic Party opposed against the TPP, as the opposition party, when Trans-Pacific Partnership Leaders Statement, called Honolulu commitment, was announced. However, when Liberal Democratic Party takes government in 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party changed to support the TPP. It is true that the political party supporting current administration prioritizes national strategy rather than the previous party strategy. However minority of the Liberal Democratic Party still persisted in the opposition opinion against the TPP because the JA is a non-negligible favorable voting district.

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries did not directly oppose against the TPP because the ministry is also the member of the government. However, this

ministry was slightly different from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. The Ministry of Agriculture announced “we will guard what should be guarded”. This attitude influenced the TPP Agreement. As for rice, the existing trade system and existing tax ratio is maintained in the TPP Agreement. Japan Government could not neglect power of the JA in the TPP negotiation. As the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries supported the JA, fruitful result was gained to some extent. The tariff elimination was avoided by increasing non-duty range of the U.S. rice. In TPP bargaining, Japan will import 50,000 tons of rice from the U.S. in the first three years and import 70,000 tons of rice in 13 years, and remain to import 770,000 tons of rice by the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement. Japan imports ice cream in tariff rate 21.0%~29.8%, and will reduce the tariff of icecream 63%~67% in 6 years. Japan imports honey in tariff rate 25.5%, and will eliminate the tariff of honey in 8 years. Japan imports tea in tariff rate 17%, and will eliminate the tariff of tea in 6 years. Japan imports orange in tariff rate 16% from June to November, and in tariff rate 32% from December to May, and will eliminate the tariff rate of orange from April to November in 6 years, and will eliminate the tariff rate of orange from December to March in 8 years. Japan imports apple in tariff rate 17%, and will eliminate the tariff rate of apple in 11 years. The TPP negotiation brought change of the domestic structure of Japan agriculture. Because, some politicians from the Liberal Democratic Party began to reform the existing circular flow of the agricultural products, which so far the JA has been monopolizing.

In January 2017, President Donald Trump of the United States withdrew from Trans Pacific Partnership and switched to the new bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). The various lobby groups required Trump Administration to start early negotiation of the FTA. The interest groups, lobby groups which promote TPP are the Emergency Committee for American Trade, the Motion Picture Association of America, National Association of Manufacturers, USA Rice Federation, U.S. Wheat Associates, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Coalition of Service Industries and Wine Institute, etc. The Motion Picture Association of America promotes TPP and Japan’s participation of TPP because Japan will strengthen economic importance of TPP. The Wine Institute promotes TPP because though Japan imposes tariff rate of wine 15% to the U.S., but the Wine Institute considers that TPP negotiation with Japan will have positive impact on the U.S. wine against Chilean wine and European wine. The Wine Institute demanded Japan to reduce the tariff of imported wine from the U.S. On the other hand, the lobby groups which opposed TPP are Maine Citizen Trade Policy Commission and JA.

The bilateral Japan-U.S. FTA and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty can be addressed as twin set. In February 2017, the Defense Secretary of the United States, James Mattis, announced statement that Senkaku Islands, Okinawa, can be applicable range of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty), Article 5. After the statement of U.S. Defense Secretary, the joint communique of U.S.-Japan top-level talks also confirmed what Mattis announced "I want to make certain that Article 5 of our mutual defense treaty is understood to be as real to us today as it was a year ago, five years ago - and as it will be a year, and 10 years, from now" (Reuters February 3, 2017). Article5 of The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan) of 1960 is codified “Each Party recognizes that an armed

attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). At the summit meeting between the U.S. and Japan, President Trump said "The bond between our two nations and the friendship between our two peoples runs very, very deep. This administration is committed to bringing those ties even closer" (Reuters, February 11, 2017).

### **Bureaucracy in Japan-EU EPA Bargaining**

I will investigate how bureaucracy in the power-dependence affects foreign policy. The Japan-EU EPA, together with the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), will further strengthen the bilateral strategic relations. In Japan, traditionally, Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided diplomacy, but gradually, various ministries and politicians become the actors of diplomacy. Japan-EU EPA bargaining is linkage and strategic partnership between both sides. In Japan-EU EPA bargaining, various ministries and politicians have conflict in interest. Japan Central Government, the majority of the Liberal Democratic Party and the bureaucracy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry promoted the Japan-EU EPA because Japan-EU EPA makes the economic growth each other and strengthens linkage and strategic partnership between Japan and EU. But Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and Fisheries and Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism opposed the Japan-EU EPA because these ministries insisted that the Japan-EU EPA may jeopardize the agriculture and train market in Japan.

The Japan-EU EPA plays an important role due to approximately 10 % of Japan's total trade volumes. In the bargaining, the Japan-EU EPA attempts to eliminate tariffs and improve trade and important rules. Total exports from Japan to the EU are 8.0 trillion yen, and machinery is 24.5%, manufactured goods is 7.4%, transport equipment is 24.6%, electrical machinery is 18.7%, and foodstuff is 0.4%. Total imports from the EU to Japan are 8.6 trillion yen, and machinery is 11.9%, foodstuff is 9.6%, electronic machinery is 8.4%, clothing & accessories is 2.0%, and optical instrument is 4.4.% (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan).

Japan-EU relations have become very closer. Compared with the 1950s and 1960s under the President of the Commission of the European Economic Community, Walter Hallstein, and with the 1980s under the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, attempting unprecedented reform of the EU, Japan-EU relations have become strong linkage and partnership under the former President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker.

What the EU mainly proposed requirement in the bargaining is opening the train market in Japan. The EU alleged that Japan Railway Corporations should purchase European-made vehicle, and bargaining of non-tariff areas or non-tariff barriers. On

the other hand, Japan demands eliminations of tariffs on electronics (Nikkei, May, 7, 2014). In April 2013, Japan-EU EPA bargaining began. In 2014, at Brussel, Japan and the EU started the first industrial dialogue in the field of the train, especially opening market of train in Japan (Nikkei March, 28, 2014). President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, hoped the early conclusion of Japan-EU EPA.

On February 23 2015, at Brussel, the negotiation meeting of Japan-EU EPA started. As expected before, the negotiation between Japan and the EU was tough because both sides never easily compromised in the tariff matter. One of the obstacles is a demand from the EU; opening market of equipment procurement by Japan railway field. EU also demands to open the market of procurement not only of central government but also of local government. Japan resists to EU demands because Japan insists equipment procurements as railway areas are by private sectors. On the other hand, Japan demanded tariff reduction of industrial product, for example, tariff 10% on Japanese cars, tariff 14% on Japanese consumer electronics. EU criticizes that though EU opens more than 80% of economic activities, Japan opens only less than 30% of economic activities in government procurement as public purchase by government or public institutions or orders of construction services. In the field of the agricultural product, the EU also demanded tariff reduction, for example, tariff 15% (or 125 yen per liter) of European wine, or cheese and meat. Furthermore, EU demands to expand range of the indications of geographical origin for agricultural products.. Non-tariff areas are also negotiated in the bargaining. The EU added 40 requests, focusing on relaxation of regulations on non-tariff barriers, for example, safety of food. Japan keep prudent for these demands from the EU side, because the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan formed the parliamentary associations which seek careful negotiation of agricultural areas in Japan-EU EPA bargaining (Nikkei January, 17), (Sankei February 23, 2015)..

### **Japan-United Kingdom Relations**

I will comment on Japan-United Kingdom relations, with Japan-France relations, and NATO-Japan relations. Japan-United Kingdom relations remains de facto alliance or quasi-alliance traditionally. In 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Japan-UK alliance) was signed and started in London. In the present era, Japan and UK started to strengthen linkage and partnership in diplomacy, economic fields and cultural fields. Japan-UK Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting is typical linkage and strategic partnership. On 21 January 2015, the first UK-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting was held at London.

Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond said “The UK and Japan have long shared a very strong relationship. We work together in the G7 and G20 on issues that affect the whole world, including security, energy, cyber crime and healthcare, and we share a common belief in freedom of speech and freedom of expression”(Gov.UK January 21, 2015). Defence Secretary Michael Fallon said “This is the first ever meeting of this kind between the UK and Japan. That is not just hugely symbolic, it also clearly reaffirms our resolve to deepen and broaden our defence relationship” (Gov.UK January 21, 2015). On 8 January 2016, the second Japan-UK Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting was held at Tokyo. The Foreign Secretary Hammond said “The UK and Japan are close allies. We enjoy a strong, historic relationship, based on

common values and support for democracy, the rule of law, human rights and open markets” (Gov.UK January 8, 2016).

Before BREXIT, amount of trade between Japan and the UK is enormous such that total exports from Japan to the EU (8.0 trillion yen) and total imports from the EU to Japan (8.6 trillion yen). Especially in the security field, defence ties between the UK and Japan have been strengthened new agreement enabling closer joint work, by signing the UK-Japan Defence Logistics Treaty (Gov.UK January 26, 2017). Japan-UK Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting is based on shared values of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and open and transparent markets, in order to make a positive contribution to global prosperity, peace and stability (Gov.UK, January 21, 2015, Gov.UK January 8, 2016). The Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, said “The UK is working together with Japan as our closest security partner in Asia to promote global security, stability and prosperity”, and Defence Secretary Fallon said “Japan is an important British ally” (Gov. UK January 26, 2017). However, negotiation of new Japan-UK EPA or FTA has not started after BREXIT. The UK has been a Member State of the EU before the referendum last June and procedure of the leaving from the EU has not started. Therefore, even the negotiation of the UK-U.S. FTA has not started. On January 26, 2017, Prime Minister May made a speech on new UK-U.S. FTA that this negotiation is one of the most prioritized issues (Nikkei January 27, 2017).

Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting have been held from 2014. On January 9, 2014, Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting was held in Paris, and strengthen linkage and partnership between France and Japan. Furthermore, the relations between NATO (OTAN) and Japan have been strengthened. On April 15, 2013, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen signed a Joint Political Declaration between NATO and Japan (NATO HP). On May 6, 2014, NATO (OTAN) and Japan signed cooperation accord to deepen partnership. NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said “Today we signed an agreement that will take this relationship a step further.”

### **Conclusion: Relationship between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy**

The major findings of the case study of the TPP and Japan-EU EPA will be summarized briefly. The TPP bargaining and Japan-EU EPA bargaining are good cases to prove relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. This section considers the relationship by applying propositions proposed by Katzenstein, Putnam and Gourevitch.

- (1) As seen in the TPP negotiation, cases of the power-dependence in the United States are dependence between the U.S. Government and the American Automobile Association (AAA), and dependence between the U.S. Government and USA Rice Federation. Cases of the power-dependence in Japan are dependence between the Government and the Keidanren, and dependence between the Government and the JA.
- (2) In 2011, the Liberal Democratic Party opposed against the TPP, as the opposition party, when Trans-Pacific Partnership Leaders Statement, called Honolulu commitment, was announced. However, when Liberal Democratic Party takes

government in 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party changed to support the TPP. It is true that the political party supporting current administration prioritizes national strategy rather than the previous party strategy. This is a similar case in which the Local Government Association compromised the UK Government in the bargaining of the rate support grant, by confronting national crisis of the economic decline in 1976 (Rhodes 1986a), (Nagata 2017).

- (3) In the TPP negotiation which is multilateral bargaining, the U.S.-Japan negotiation was the main event. Car and agricultural product are main factor of the bargaining for both sides. These are cases that the domestic policy influences the foreign economy policy (Katzenstein).
- (4) Compared with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry involving big companies, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries involving JA was also obliged to take into consideration of the Ministry's interest, with prioritizing national interest. This is a case that the formulation process of the foreign economy policy influences policy preference of domestic group (Gourevitch).
- (5) In the TPP bargaining, Japan Government could not neglect power of the JA. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries supported JA and the result was obtained to some extent from the bargaining. The tariff elimination was avoided by increasing non-duty-range of the U.S. rice. This is a case that the bargaining power of a state could be enhanced, if its rule can demonstrate that their domestic supporters would only accept a narrow range of outcomes (Putnam).
- (6) The TPP negotiation has been bringing structural change of the agricultural system in Japan. Some politicians from the Liberal Democratic Party, by raising slogan of the agriculture reform, began to change existing monopolized system of the JA to open market in Japan. Since Inauguration of the U.S. President Trump, the bilateral negotiation of the FTA between USA and Japan has started. These are cases that the formulation process of the foreign economy policy influences policy preference of domestic group (Gourevitch).
- (7) In Japan-EU EPA bargaining, the most important requirement from the EU is open market of the railway in Japan. The EU alleged that Japan railway company should purchase the EU train. On the other hand, Japan demanded tariff reduction of industrial products, for example tariff 10% on Japanese cars, tariff 14% on Japanese consumer electronics. On the other hand, the EU demanded tariff reduction of agricultural products, for example tariff 15% (or 125 yen per liter) of European wine, or cheese and meat. These are cases that the domestic policy influences the foreign economy policy (Katzenstein).
- (8) The increasing number of immigrant in the EU and the United States became triggers of the BREXIT and Trump Administration. The United States and the United Kingdom have been rapidly switching from existing multilateral FTA to bilateral one. These are cases that the world economy could influence the basic institutional structures of polities including governing norms (Gourevitch).

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