

*Bureaucracy of Power-Dependence in Domestic Politics in Japan and
Interdependence of International Relations in the UK, U.S. and EU*

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Abstract

This paper investigates power-dependence of central-local government relations and interdependence of international relations. The power-dependence means political dependence in the political networks between central government, bureaucracy, local government and interest groups in common regime state. On the other hand, the interdependence means comprehensive relationship, from which zero-sum game is not necessarily derived, between various states with different regimes. This paper investigates two issues based on these political theories. First, this paper explores degrees of power-dependence among central government, bureaucracy and local government, focusing on degree of involvement of bureaucracy in Japan. By scrutinizing several cases, I classify degrees of involvement of bureaucracy into three categories; initiative of bureaucracy, initiative of the politicians and initiative of the domestic interest group. I also discuss conservatism of the bureaucracy in Japan. Second, as for interdependence in the international relations (IR), this paper explores degree of influence of the domestic interest group to the bureaucracy in the negotiation of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), especially between Japan and U.S. and the negotiation of the Economic Partnership Agreement between Japan and the EU. In both negotiations, strong opinions of the interest groups are seen from the conservative agriculture associations in the U.S., the EU and Japan. I consider reasons why conservative interest group raises conflict between different Ministries of bureaucracy group of a state. This paper also investigates Japan-United Kingdom relations from viewpoint of degree of involvement of bureaucracy.

Keywords: Japanese Bureaucracy, Interest Group, Foreign Economic Policy

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Introduction

This paper considers Japanese bureaucracy in the domestic power-dependence and international interdependence. Before proceeding the discussion, three political theories are outlined, on which this article is based, Katzenstein's theory, Rhodes' theory and Nye and Keohane's theory.

In the real policy making process, many aspects became to be seen which domestic politics influences the foreign economic policy. The increasing influence of the domestic politics to the foreign economic policy is clear due to the following reasons. First, the political theory emerged by Katzenstein or Putnam who proposed relevancy between domestic policy and foreign economic policy. Katzenstein pointed out that domestic interest group and political party influence the foreign economic policy. Putnam presented 2 level game model. In the domestic level of the model, the game is played between government and interest group, and in the international level of the model, the game is played between states. Second, the Japanese bureaucracy dealing bilateral or multilateral relations became influenced not only by the international relations but also opinion of the domestic interest groups.

R.A.W. Rhodes presented a political theory of dependence relation between British government and local government, which is called power dependence theory (1981). Rhodes proposed five propositions of the power dependence, where the keyword is the resource which means authority, money, political legitimacy, information and organization. Rhodes' main proposition is that all organization depends on the other organization for the resource. Furthermore, the organization exchanges the resource for achieving the goal. The policy network is unconsciously made based on the concept of the power dependence. Due to the definition by Rhodes, the policy network is a formal or informal linkage between the government and the other actors. In Japan, the policy network also plays an important role in the policy making process. However, main actors in the United Kingdom are government and local government, whereas main actors in Japan are government, bureaucrat and Liberal Democratic Party.

The linkage in the international relations, first advocated by James Rosenau in the 1960s and after that, in 1970s, strategically developed by Henry Kissinger for the cold war between the United States and Soviet Union. Kissinger described "linkage strategy" which makes diplomacy, not by focusing on one foreign issues, but by packaging several foreign issues. In the 80s, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane redefined "linkage diplomacy" to apply between the allies and friendly nations; the US-UK special relations, the US-France relations and US-Japan relations. The linkage diplomacy by Nye and Keohane is based on the linkage strategy by Kissinger. The common factor between power-dependence and interdependence is asymmetry. Asymmetry of domestic politics is applied to asymmetry between central government, bureaucracy, ministries, politicians, diet, interest groups and local government. On the other hand, asymmetry of international relations is asymmetry between nations.

Comparison of Bureaucracy in the History

	The UK	The U.S.	France	Japan	Austria
Characteristics of Bureaucracy	Party Politics by politicians	Party Politics by politician and interest groups	High Bureaucracy	High Bureaucracy	High Bureaucracy
Degree of bureaucracy From 17th century to 19th century	Middle	Low	High	High	High
Degree of bureaucracy 20th century	Middle	Middle	High	High	High

Table 1 Comparison of Bureaucracy in the History made by the author

Before proceeding to the bureaucracy in Japan, I briefly summarize traditions of the bureaucracy in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Europe and Japan. In the United States, from 19 century to mid of 20 century, as the machine politics is trendy by which politicians decides the policies by the leading of the interest group, the politicians assign bureaucrats under the influence of the interest group, which is called spoils system. The United Kingdom, compared with the United States, the bureaucracy is little influenced by the interest group. In the UK, the party politics is working well, therefore, the bureaucracy is not so dominant as France and Japan. In France and Austria, the bureaucracy is historically strong, especially at the time of the Bourbon Dynasty and the Habsburg Monarchy. Because the absolute monarchy and the bureaucracy are harmonious. The bureaucracy of Japan is also traditional like that of France. The bureaucracy in Meiji period, inherited from the strong bureaucracy in Edo period, continued to support the absolute monarchy, which featured authority of the new government. Though, in Taisho period, the bureaucracy was temporally weakened due to the rise of the party politics.

From Bureaucratic Leadership to Official Residence Leadership

From the post war to the present day, it is out of question that Japanese bureaucracy has been playing important role in the policy making process. However, at the same time, the involvement of the bureaucracy in the political process has changed in the transition of the relation with the Liberal Democratic Administration and US-Japan relation. I shortly summarize the involvement of the Japanese bureaucracy in the political process.

During the era from the post war to the sign of Treaty of San Francisco, Japanese bureaucracy was in fact under the control of the General Headquarters (GHQ) for the

Allied Powers. Though prime minister, Shigeru Yoshida, took strong leadership, Yoshida was still under the control of the GHQ. From the 55 System triggered by the merger of conservative party, the Liberal Democratic Administration, bureaucracy and big industry built strong network, called iron triangle, which was a driving force of Japanese economy revival.

From the late 50s to the 70s, each Liberal Democratic Administrations, led by strong leadership of prime ministers, Kishi, and Ikeda, succeeded in Japan-US Security Treaty and doubling of income, respectively. These results were realized by the leadership of the politician and bureaucracy. However, these results were not due to official residence leadership.

Katzenstein pointed out that Japanese foreign economy policy is supported by the business, especially big companies to which economic interest serves. He also insisted that Japanese foreign economy policy is facilitated by the high centralization between state and society (Katzenstein, 1978).

Since the 70s, the foreign economic policy is forwarded between the United States and Japan in place of the security and political issues between them. Its beginning is Japan US textile negotiation. In May, 1969, United States Security of Commerce, Stans, required self-regulation of Japanese textile product export. In March, 1971, Federation of Japanese textile announced self-regulation, and on October, memorandum of understanding of US-Japan textile problem was agreed. Japan government decided emergency loan (75.1 billion Japanese yen) and relief financing (128.7 billion Japanese yen). The resolution by the self-regulation is characterized by the following points. First, the self-regulation of Japanese textile product exports is derived from asymmetry between the United States and Japan at that time. Second, the political process of US-Japan textile negotiation is owed to the initiative of Minister of Trade and Industry, Tanaka, but its political process is cooperation between politician and bureaucrats rather than official residence leadership. The self-regulation is a cooperative work of the politician and bureaucrats.

After the US-Japan textile negotiation, the US-Japan car negotiation (ended self-regulation at Japanese side), the US-Japan semi-conductor negotiation in the 80s continued. Triggered by Plaza Accord (1985), the Structural Impediments Initiative (1989-90) and Japan-United States Framework for new Economic Partnership in the 90s continued. In each negotiations, the main actors were bureaucrats.

Hashimoto Administration of the Liberal Democratic Party emerged change from bureaucratic leadership to official residence leadership. However, resistance of the bureaucracy is strong. Prime Minister Koizumi attempted to abolish special corporations but failed. However, Koizumi Administration succeeded realization of Japan Post Privatization. Koizumi Administration also succeeded organization reform of every governmental department and agency.

Democratic Party Administration cannot make use of the bureaucracy. However, In Abe Administration of Liberal Democratic Party, the official residence leadership is remarkable. The bureaucracy become to be controlled by the government, because Prime Minister Abe set the bureau of personnel at Cabinet Office and this bureau decides personnel above the assigned rank at every governmental department and

agency. At the same time, the domestic interest group became to influence the foreign economic policy, and the self-regulation at Japan side disappeared.

Degree of Involvement of Bureaucracy in Japan

Diplomacy and domestic politics are related each other. This section considers degree of involvement of bureaucracy in the policy making process in Japan. It is nothing to say that the bureaucracy is involved in all the policy making. However, degree of involvement of bureaucracy depends on the policy and classified into three patterns.

The first pattern is the policy making by the initiative of the bureaucracy. The budget policy making by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the foreign policy making by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan and the security policy making by the Ministry of Defense are typical policy making by the initiative of the bureaucracy. The common characteristics is that these policies are basically formulated based on the sovereign strategy which is not influenced by the interest group.

The second pattern is the policy making by the initiative of the politician. The politician can make law under the institution of legislation by Diet Members. Especially, the political phenomenon is sometimes seen that famous politician introduces unnecessary infrastructure, for example road and station, to the favorable voting district of the country side. However, what I discuss here is not such a country side politician. I will focus on Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, who realized Japan Post Privatization by his strong initiative. When the Prime Minister proposed Japan Post Privatization, not only the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, but also part of the Liberal Democratic Party opposed to Koizumi's proposal. It is nothing to say that opposition parties were against the Prime Minister. As soon as the bill of the Japan Post Privatization was rejected in the Diet, the Prime Minister dissolved the House of Representatives. The result of the referendum was a land slide win of the Liberal Democratic Party and consequently the bill of the Japan Post Privatization was passed in the Diet. This case is a typical example that the policy making process is led by the initiative of the politician. It is to be noticed that the local authorities were not involved in this policy making process, although the Japan Post Privatization is essentially connected with the local administration.

The third pattern is the policy making process by the initiative of the domestic interest group. The bureaucracy of the corresponding ministry which takes charge of the domestic interest group, for example agricultural group, is influenced by the opinion of the interest group, therefore the foreign economy policy of this ministry is the reflection of the interest group. The reflection of the foreign economy policy is caused by the movement in which JA and relevant agricultural association try to protest tariff reduction of the imported agricultural products which may jeopardize Japanese agriculture, in the multilateral negotiation, TPP, and the bilateral negotiation, Japan-EU EPA. The foreign economy policy of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries sometimes becomes different policy from that of the central government supported by Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. The decentralization between the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and central government is due to opinion of the JA, which insists the interest of the agricultural product, supported by the Lobbyist-politician.

Conservatism of Japanese Bureaucracy

Kiyoaki Tsuji pointed out the conservatism of the Japanese bureaucracy as follows: “Considering the emergency of the bureaucracy is the result of the absolute monarchy, it is natural that our bureaucracy cannot overcome old principle of the feudalistic social position (Tsuji, 1956, p. 185). The bureaucracy in Japan started in Edo period. Okitsugu Tanuma, Masahiro Abe, and Naosuke Ii are the strong Roju or Tairo, chief senior councilor. In Meiji period, Toshimichi Ohkubo is the founder of the bureaucracy. After Ohkubo, Aritomo Yamagata and Hirofumi Ito are the strongest politicians. Yamagata built the bureaucracy of the absolute monarchy based on the army and police. On the other hand, Ito built the party Rikken Seiyukai, the big party of Japan. Although in Taisho period, the political party revived, the government controlled by the army was dominant and the bureaucracy supported the government in Showa period. Since the 55 System triggered by the merger of the conservative parties, the policy network among the government, bureaucracy and industry became strong connection. This iron triangle was driving force of the revival of the Japanese economy.

During Meiji period (1868-1912), the conservatism of the bureaucracy is especially remarkable in the local government. The government did not make much account of the local government from the starting point. In the letter which Lords of Home Affairs, Ohkubo sent to Sanjoh (Dajodaijin; Prime Minister), Ohkubo described principle of the legislation of the local government that the new legislation is not effective unless the legislation depends on the peculiar customs unique to the local society (Tsuji, 1956, pp. 147-148). Before the end of the Second World War, the prefectures are the branch office of the central government and supervising agency for the local society.

Next, I discuss conservatism of the bureaucracy derived from the professional technique of the bureaucrats. The conflict between the politician and bureaucrat has been pointed out from the era of Max Weber. The way by which the bureaucrat takes leadership to the politician has been the same in old days and present days, using professional technique of the law and occupation of the information, without showing conflict in public. The resource of the bureaucracy is derived from detail knowledge of the law which busy politician cannot obtain and widely collected information which the politician cannot know (Curtis, 2002).

The conservatism of the bureaucrat is derived from the instinct which makes bureaucrat to avoid under the control of the politician. This is because who becomes the next prime minister is unpredictable, moreover, the opposition party government may be founded. Thus, the bureaucrat is always ready for the escape route. Such an escape route is also seen in the administrative guidance by the bureaucracy. For example, the national university is guided by the Ministry of Education (MEXT) or the secretary -general sent from MEXT to the university. The manner by which MEXT or the secretary -general guides the university is not always direct order. They take indirect order to the university in such a questionnaire; “How do you realize the guidance of MEXT?”.

I discuss change of the correspondence to international relations of the Japanese bureaucracy. The foreign policy and foreign economic policy by the Japanese

bureaucracy have been made under the asymmetry between Japan and the United States. The self-regulation of the exports at Japan side, which are results of the Japan-US textile negotiation and Japan-US car negotiation in the 70s and 80s, is derived from the asymmetry between two countries. Such a self-regulation at Japan side is due to the political process in which the government and the bureaucracy cooperated in the bilateral negotiation, and the interest groups were obliged to accept the self-regulation of the export of the textile and car. In these negotiations, the interest groups were weak. However, as recent trend of the Japanese foreign economic policy, the bureaucracy and government come to be influenced by the allegation of the domestic interest group, whose representative is agricultural cooperative, which alleged risk of the imported agricultural product in the TPP negotiation. The influence of the domestic interest group to the foreign economic policy can be understood as the new trend against the conservatism under the US-Japan asymmetry.

Degree of influence of the domestic interest group to the bureaucracy

I will explore degree of influence of the domestic interest group to the bureaucracy in the negotiation of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), especially between Japan and U.S. and the negotiation of the Economic Partnership Agreement between Japan and the EU.

In the Japan-US negotiation of the TPP, the important agendas are agricultural product and car. The tariff elimination was avoided by increasing on-duty range of the US rice. Japan will import 50,000 tons of rice from the US in the first three years and import 70,000 tons of rice in 13 years, and remain to import 770,000 tons of rice by the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement.

In Autumn 2015, Japan central government has basically agreed TPP. So Japan central government began to promote agricultural reform, by the Liberal Democratic Party, especially Director, Agriculture and Forestry Division Shinjiro Koizumi and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries has submitted eight bills to the National Diet. The bills are the reform of JA and liberalization of raw milk.

In the final phase of the TPP negotiation (2015), the negotiator at Japan side are Cabinet Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, whose representative is Amari, Minister of MITI. The negotiator at US side is the Department of Commerce, whose United States Trade Representative (USTR) is Froman. The pressure to the Department of Commerce, especially Froman by the interest group in the United States was strong beyond comparison than that by the interest group in Japan. The main interest groups in the United States are Association of the cereals and Association of the stock raising in the mid west.

The asymmetry between Japan and the United States in the TPP negotiation is not so strong as that in the Japan-US textile negotiation. The self-regulation at Japan side disappeared and opinions of the interest group (JA) became to influence the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. In general, when the asymmetry works well, the interest group cannot influence to the bureaucracy.

In the bilateral negotiation, the Japan-US asymmetry is effective for the policy making advantageous to the United States. However, in the multilateral negotiation like the TPP, the asymmetry between two states is not effective. The reason why President Trump withdrew from the TPP and wants to negotiate free trade agreement (FTA) is that Japan-US asymmetry works well.

There exists another reason why Japan-US asymmetry does not work well in the TPP negotiation. It is because one aspect of the TPP is collective security for encircling net around China, therefore, the United States cannot strongly allege asymmetry to Japan.

In the World, the GDP of Japan is 7%, and the GDP of the EU is 18% (IMF World Economic Outlook Database April 2017). In 2016, the export from Japan to the EU is 8.0 trillion yen, and the import from EU to Japan is 8.1 trillion yen. On the other hand, the export from Japan to the U.S. is 14.1 trillion yen, and the import from the U.S. to Japan is 7.5 trillion yen.

In the Japan-EU EPA negotiation, the EU required opening of the train market in Japan. Japan resisted to EU demands because Japan insisted equipment procurement as railway areas and by private sectors. On the other hand, Japan demanded tariff reduction of industrial product, for example, tariff 10 % on Japanese cars.

The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan has demanded Japan central government that Japan central government should improve tariff imbalance between Japan and EU because 70% of import items from EU to Japan is non-tariff, and 70% of export items from Japan to EU is imposed tariff. Especially, about the tariff of cheese, the import of cheese to Japan is 30% from EU, and 68% from TPP countries like the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand.

On July 2017, Japan and the EU basically agreed the Japan-EU EPA. Among the elements of the Agreement, main import issues are cheese and wine, and the main export issue is car. The Camembert cheese *et. al.* (current tariff 29.8 %) is newly set the import framework of maximum 31,000 ton, and its tariff is decided zero after 16 years. The wine (current tariff 15 %) is decided to eliminate its tariff immediately.

Focusing on the tariff of the Japan-EU EPA, I consider the national interest, the interest group and the asymmetry between states. Though Japan guarded the tariff of the cheese in the TPP negotiation, Japan accepted the reduction and elimination of the cheese tariff in the Japan-EU EPA. From this fact, I can obtain the following results of the foreign economy policy. First, Japan and the EU had to make hurry to raise the flag of the free trade against Trump's protectionism. Second, Japan had to set the tariff reduction ration which cannot be accepted more, for the coming bilateral Japan-US FTA. Third, though the asymmetry exists between Japan and the United States, the asymmetry does not exist between Japan and the EU. However, the reason why the import tariff ration of some issue in the Japan-EU EPA is lower than that in the Japan-US agreement of the TPP is due to the above situation of Japan and the EU. Fourth, because this basic agreement is derived from the national interest of Japan and the EU, the domestic agricultural interest group cannot sufficiently influence its allegation and is sacrificed for the national interest of Japan.

Japan-UK Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting has been held in 2015, 2016, and

2017. On January 2015, the first UK-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting was held. The cornerstone of the Japan-UK Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting is the lucrative defense deal on April 2012 between UK prime minister David Cameron and Japan prime minister Yoshihiko Noda. The ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of Defence succeeded in the alliance or quasi-alliance between the UK and Japan. If Japan-UK EPA is agreed, the relation between the UK and Japan is expected to be stronger.

Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting has been held in 2014, 2016 and 2017. The ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of Defence succeeded in the alliance or quasi-alliance between France and Japan, NATO(OTAN) and Japan.

Conclusion

The major conclusions of this paper will be summarized briefly. These findings range in the following aspects: from bureaucratic leadership to official residence leadership, degree of involvement of bureaucracy in Japan, conservatism of Japanese bureaucracy, and degree of influence of the domestic interest group to the bureaucracy.

- (1) The Japanese bureaucracy supported the absolute monarchy in Meiji period. From the end of the second world war to the sign of San Francisco Treaty, Japanese bureaucracy was under the control of the General Headquarters for Allied Powers. In 1955, the merger of conservative party converged to the 55 System, and the string network called "iron triangle" was built by the Liberal Democratic Administration, bureaucracy and big industry, which is the driving force of Japanese economy revival.
- (2) In the 1970s, the foreign economic policy was forwarded between the United States and Japan in place of the security and political issues. The Japan-US textile negotiation (1970s) and Japan-US car negotiation (1980s) ended the self-regulation at Japan side due to the asymmetry between two countries. The self-regulation is a cooperative work of the politician and bureaucrats.
- (3) Hashimoto Administration of the Liberal Democratic Party emerged change from bureaucratic leadership to office residence leadership. This trend was inherited to Koizumi Administration and Abe Administration. The personnel of the bureaucracy became to be controlled by the bureau of personnel at Cabinet office, set by Abe Administration. At the same time, the domestic interest group became to influence the foreign economic policy, and the self-regulation at Japan side disappeared.
- (4) The degree of involvement of the Japanese bureaucracy in the policy making process is classified into three patterns. The first pattern is the policy making by the initiative of the bureaucracy. The budget policy making by the MOF, the foreign policy making by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the security policy making by the Ministry of Defense are typical policy making by the initiative of the bureaucracy. The second pattern is the policy making by the initiative of the politician. The policy making of Japan Post Privatization is a case in which Prime Minister Koizumi takes initiative for its realization. The third pattern is the policy making process by the initiative of the domestic interest group. The agricultural

policies in the TPP and Japan-EU EPA are cases in which domestic agricultural group influenced the policy making process.

- (5) The conservatism of the Japanese bureaucracy can be observed in several aspects. First, in Meiji period, the government did not make much account of the local government from the starting point. Second, the conservatism of the bureaucrats who take leadership to the politician comes from the professional technique of the bureaucrats. Third, the bureaucrats intend to avoid under the control of the politician by the ready for the escape route. Fourth, the influence of the domestic interest group to the foreign economic policy can be understood as a new trend against the conservatism under the US-Japan asymmetry.
- (6) In the bilateral negotiation, the Japan-US asymmetry is effective for the policy making advantageous to the United States. However, in the multilateral negotiation, like the TPP, the asymmetry between two states is not effective.
- (7) The reason why Japan and the EU reached the basic agreement of the Japan-EU EPA is the following. First, Japan and the EU had to make hurry to raise the flag of the free trade against Trump's protectionism. Second, Japan had to set the tariff reduction ration which cannot be accepted more, for the coming bilateral Japan-US FTA. Third, though the asymmetry exists between Japan and the United States, the asymmetry does not exist between Japan and the EU. However, the reason why the import tariff ration of some issue in the Japan-EU EPA is lower than that in the Japan-US agreement of the TPP is due to the above situation of Japan and the EU. Fourth, because this basic agreement is derived from the national interest of Japan and the EU, the domestic agricultural interest group cannot sufficiently influence its allegation and is sacrificed for the national interest of Japan.

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2014, 2016, 2017), Japan-France Foreign and
Defence Ministers' Meeting Joint Statement

NATO (OTAN) North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, TPP,

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, TPP,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan-EU EPA,

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