

## *Deconstruction of Power: An Ethical Response to Organizational Surveillance*

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### **Abstract**

State of the art pertaining to the technological surveillance in the workplace today witnesses alarmingly amplified ethical apprehensions in the forefront. The two major ethical approaches to surveillance, ‘coercive control’ and ‘caring,’ also demonstrate power relations and are vehemently criticized in respect to individual privacy, autonomy and dignity. The dilemma, however, is that majority of scholars unilaterally focus on individual rights, and consequently, the social impact and the social consequences of surveillance are being overlooked. While acknowledging the different possibilities of addressing the issue, this paper analyses the fundamental social challenges and implications of surveillance in the workplace in dialogue with David Lyon’s concept of surveillance as “social sorting”. This concept enables us to think beyond Michel Foucault’s disciplinary society, according to which persons are “normalized” by their categorical locations, as well as further than Gilles Deleuze’s argument of “society of control”. Hence a proposal of a more adequate work-ethics on the basis of a framework of “care-justice” or a synthesis of ‘culture of care’ and ‘social justice’ over against the ‘culture of power’. We will argue and identify, in opposition to power relations, how the combination of care and justice can serve as a useful hermeneutical key to reconcile the dichotomy between the conflicting rights and interests arising from the use of surveillance in the workplace.

Keywords: surveillance, coercive control, power relation, social sorting, care-justice

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## **Introduction**

The workplace is a major locus of human life, where possibilities of human relationality and interaction are generated and sustained. An extensive use of the available means of technological advancement today, intensifies increased observations, data collections and ubiquitous surveillance in the workplace that raise ethical and social concerns and dilemmas. The two major ethical approaches, surveillance as ‘coercive control’ and as ‘caring’ embedded in justifications of workplace surveillance, are vehemently criticized against the background of privacy, autonomy and human dignity, which pay major attention to individual rights and interests. While acknowledging the different possibilities of addressing the issue, such as a legal problem, a moral question, a social conundrum, this paper first discusses briefly coercion and care as part of ‘culture of power.’ Secondly, in dialogue with David Lyon’s<sup>1</sup> concept of ‘surveillance as social sorting’, we deduce that not only individual rights matters, but also social challenges and implications. Finally, we demonstrate how the framework of ‘care-justice’ as combination of care-ethics and social justice, which goes beyond the constraints of control and power relations, can serve as a useful hermeneutical key to reconcile the dichotomy between the conflicting rights and interests of the workplace surveillance. The question of surveillance in relation to power is seen here as an issue of sociological and ethical interest.

## **Organizational Surveillance: From Ironic Appreciation to a Hierarchical Power Relation**

Our point of departure is the resumption in the issue of surveillance and its various implications. Surveillance, in general, means an observation from a distance.<sup>2</sup> It is also an attentive and continuous inspection targeting everyday life where individuals, assigned groups, and institutions watch, listen, record, and manage persons and personal data. It is perceived in relation to risk management and hazard alleviation in particular situations. Lyon analytically defines it as “focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction” (2007b, 14). In the workplace, with the unimaginable quantity of knowledge available to third parties, surveillance becomes exceedingly infringing, and more adverse in its effects. According to Kizza and Ssanyu, “employee monitoring has the potential to undermine workplace morale, create distrust and suspicion between employees and their supervisors or management [...] adds high levels of stress and anxiety resulting in repetitive strain injuries, low self esteem [...] and worker alienation, which may also lead to adverse psychological effects” (2005, 12-14). An individual’s right to have a private life without arbitrary interference is radically challenged in an incessant surveillance.

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<sup>2</sup> Surveillance is coercive due to the mere fact that there is someone always observing. It can also, in an organizational setting, include a positive act of coercion from the organizer/the employer. We, rather, distinguish here the latter from the former to avoid the pseudo effect due to its Gnostic cliché-knowledge saves, and mean a massive growth in surveilling the individual and groups even in indirect observation without the determination and containment of particular spaces (Graham & Wood 2003).

The word surveillance covers also surreptitious investigations into individual activities. Hence, workplace surveillance can be accepted or rejected depending on whether it is seen as a legitimate technology that allows managers to care for everyone's interests, or as a powerful instrument of managerial coercion and employee subordination (Sewell & Barker 2006). Sewell and Barker explore the nuances of the conceptual opposition between 'coercion' and 'care' to make sense of organizational surveillance. The concept of 'coercion', as an action or practice of compelling someone to do something through the use of force or threats, is seen as a radical perspective on organizational surveillance, whereas the concept of 'care', as an effort to do something correctly, safely, or without causing damage, is perceived as more liberal perspective on the same (2006). However, care indicates here the means of more efficient work and increased productivity, disregarding the fact that care always directs one's attention towards a needful responsiveness in his/her behaviour and relationships and implies dependencies in human life. Hence, the coercive role is explained as an instrument of social control and domination while caring accounts with public order and social cohesion. Coercion functions with the relationships of power, whereas the mutual obligation under some form of social contract (Rawls 1971) becomes the foundational concept of care (Sewell & Barker 2006). On the competing discourses of coercion and care Sewell and Barker propose an ironic perspective that stirs-up the discussion beyond its paradox, and forces us to see things from diverse perspectives and thus crumble the one limited perception.

In the context of workplace, the irony of surveillance and 'resistance' explores deep concern. Sewell and Barker observe that in the workplace, "by participating in 'resistance by negotiation,' members are ironically appropriating the discourse of care while also relying on the ability of a liberal conception of participation and legal protection to identify and prevent egregious instances of coercion" (2006, 949). Hence, legitimate and enabling practices are embraced while rejecting repressive and constraining ones. In a paradoxical situation, organizational members understand the meaning of surveillance by negotiating the simultaneous truths of coercion and care and try to bring value-based judgements about situational surveillance practices. At this juncture, the balance of rational and moral status of surveillance involves the practice of a combination of coercion and care. It also involves the appreciation of the fallibility of one's own conceptions and creatively uses different formations to make sense of an ambiguous situation.

The dilemma unravelled here, however, is the polarized mentality of conceiving surveillance as a legitimate system to care for the interests of everyone and as a powerful instrument of managerial coercion and employee subordination. Yet, as we perceive in both circumstances, surveillance functions as a form of 'disciplinary power', which has to be discussed further as it foresees a deviation from desired norms of the organization - more powerful dominating less powerful and thus complete subjugation of employees. Here, relationships of power dominate among organizational members making work-life more controlled and predictable. The predominance of hierarchy will be strongly established in this context exercising exclusive rule-based conduct, often favouring the hierarchy itself. For example, in an employee-centered perspective, the panoptic metaphor of Jeremy Bentham, later analysed and applied by Michel Foucault also shows the gravity of this power relationship in the context of organizational surveillance. According to Foucault, "the major effect of the panopticon was to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and

permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” (Foucault 1977, 201). The employees as inmates in an organizational context have no choice but to act as if they are being watched incessantly even when they are not. Thus, we are forced to direct our discussion on organizational surveillance in relation to the exertion of power.

### **Surveillance and Organizational Life: Deemed in Culture of Power?**

Power is an ability to act which often produces decisive effects in the act itself and possesses control over things and people. It is broadly defined as asymmetric control over valued resources (Magee & Galinsky 2008), and therefore, is inherently relational whereby power exists in relation to others. It also demonstrates dominion over human relationships, influencing others through predominance and supremacy of acting agent - an individual, group or an organization. Michel Foucault as an observer of human relations examines the nature of power in society and states that power “reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault 1980, 30). Thus, for Foucault knowledge is power and is fully immersed in every human activity and relations. He also writes that “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time, power relations” (Foucault 1977, 27). Nevertheless, Foucault reviews the effects of power and affirms that “it produces domains of objects and ritual of truth” (Foucault 1977, 194). Clegg *et al.* also express that “[...] power need not always be regarded as something to be avoided. Power can be a very positive force; it can achieve great things” (Clegg *et al.* 2006, 3). Conversely, power, with its inherent capacity of influencing and controlling others, is also a resource to achieve certain goals with often vested interest in mind, which may be shared or contested.

However, power, according to Peter Fleming and Andre Spicer, seems to be an endemic part of organizational life and we need, today, a careful and vigorous conceptualization and articulation of how organizational power functions (2014). For, though, in general, power functions in positive overtone, within this particular context of organizational surveillance, it is even more important to discuss, how our life and behaviour can be negatively affected with this power relation. Because, constant observation turns to be a control mechanism in the organization and when few people control the knowledge acquired through observation, the possibility of oppression and subjugation of the observed is far above the ground. For, electronic and other data based surveillance in the organizational context reveals also the possession of control or command over others by few who are in the state of being an ascendant. In this regard, electronic surveillance could also be reflected in terms of the discretion of power. We posit here the taxonomy of Fleming and Spicer, who identify four faces of power: coercion, manipulation, domination, and subjectification to consider the nuances of electronic surveillance and power relations. Analysing Fleming and Spicer, we argue from a sociological and ethical perspective by using their own terms that these expressions of power may be “episodic” - such as coercion and manipulation, as well as “systemic” - such as domination and subjectification (Fleming & Spicer 2014, 240). For, it appears and occurs in different or irregular timings as well as relating entirely to a system spreading throughout.

Electronic surveillance, for instance, as exercising coercive power focuses on the direct implementation of power to achieve certain desired ends which become problematic when an individual or a group who exercise the same power go beyond the legitimate authority vested in their position. This power, the knowledge or data gathered through observation, could be manipulated to limit or to fit issues within the perceived boundaries to gain the anticipated outcomes, which may also cause powerlessness and low expectations among employees. Surveillance itself seems again a process of domination, whereby the agents influence through a reconstruction of ideological values, which causes to reshape the preferences, attitudes and outlooks of the targets. Finally, reflecting over subjectification, we articulate that the surveillance in the organization also seeks to determine an actor's very sense of self, emotions and identity, and thus normalizes a particular way of being in the organization. Power, hence, becomes an inescapable factor in organizational surveillance bringing more systemic power relations. In an organizational surveillance, employees become visible prey of surreptitious surveillance where its practice becomes a tool for establishing and enforcing a particular type of hierarchical power relationship, often, in the pretext of gaining desired effects of management. The subtle combination of coercion and care in a critical evaluation of surveillance could be seen only as a continuation of power relationship even when it is analyzed and scrutinized in terms of liberalist and radicalist traditions as explained above. Nevertheless, though surveillance as coercive control and as caring seem to provide pragmatic arguments for its vindication, its justification must be further discussed given the unresolved problems of curtailed freedom, power suppression, and constrained behavioural patterns due to anxiety, fear and irrational stress that further affect the organizational and social culture. Hence we need wider critical considerations being placed under surveillance debate that goes beyond the individual constrains.

### **From Individual Rights to Social Conundrum: Social Quest of Surveillance**

Surveillance, as a common practice in an organization, is generally understood as the gathering of information by surreptitious, secret and stealthy means using electronic and other technological devices and techniques. One of the major arguments that holds primacy in the debates about the workplace surveillance is that it infringes employees' right to privacy. It is a fact that "regardless of whether electronic surveillance technologies are used by employers as form of control or of caring, employee privacy may be eroded" (Allen 2007, 175). Moreover, it has several ethical implications in relation to the privacy expectation of the employee, the fairness and quality of work life and anxiety and stress-related illness that adversely affect the life of each and every employee. Privacy is considered as an essential employee right in the workplace due to a presumed moral entitlement to be protected from certain harms and physical, informational, and decisional infringements (DesJardins & Duska 1996, 119). Hence, the loss of privacy is said to be the most devastating effect of workplace surveillance. Along the same line, one can take cognizance of quite a few of publications on the hi-tech surveillance systems and their subsequent privacy issues in the light of the analysis carried out by scholars like Daniel Solove (2008), Helen Nissenbaum (2010), Adam Moore (2010), and Stephen Taylor (2011).<sup>3</sup> However,

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<sup>3</sup> A number of interests are evidently harmed by the invasion of privacy, many of which are closely linked to the accounts of restricted information, control over the body and decision making, and sustaining human dignity with intimacy, autonomy and so forth. Privacy is supposed to provide

unilaterally focusing on the individual rights, they often risk to overlook its social problems and implications.

In this regard it is more adequate to refer to Lyon's concept of surveillance as "social sorting" (Lyon, 2003), which reminds us that while the significance of individual rights and interests are not to be minimized, broader concerns of ethics and social justice have to be envisaged. 'Social sorting,' in this regard, highlights the classifying drive of contemporary surveillance that it sieves and sorts people for the purpose of assessment and of judgement. People are sorted into categories, assigning worth or risk, in ways that have real effects on their life-chances (Lyon 2003). Deep discrimination occurs, thus making surveillance in the workplace not merely a matter of personal privacy but of social justice. For instance, an organization with uncontrolled surveillance would lead to more administrative fear, lack of identity, perpetuating social inequalities (Ball, 2010). An employee is objectified and dehumanized when s/he is placed under the category of suspicion. Everyone is assumed to be guilty, until proven otherwise through systems. Moreover, the surveillance system obtaining personal and group data classifies employees according to varying criteria, to determine who should be targeted for special treatment, suspicion, eligibility, inclusion, access, and so on (Lyon 2003). Thus, we foresee that through surveillance, social problems such as distrust, over-policing, suspicion and exclusion are exacerbated and social groups defined as 'risky' or 'dangerous' are created in the workplace. Therefore, organizational surveillance is also a powerful means of creating and re-inforcing long-term social differences. In the same vein, surveillance "engages many kinds of power, and is both productive and , sometimes, pernicious" (Lyon 2001, 173). Coercive power in surveillance, thus, assumes greater power and privileged status for the one who holds the power and tends to thereby further devalue and distrust the target (Raven 1993, 242). Moreover, "the dominant groups determine how and in what interests the material infrastructure operates" (Lyon 2007a, 140). Besides, as a form of power discharge, through detailed observation and examination, the subjects become objectified as Foucault rightly distinguishes in his *Discipline and Punish* that the observed becomes 'the object of information, never a subject in communication' (Foucault 1977, 200).

At this juncture, Lyon's understanding of surveillance goes beyond that of Michel Foucault's disciplinary society, where persons are "normalized" by their categorical locations (Foucault 1975), as well as beyond Gilles Deleuze's argument of "society of control" (Deleuze 1992). For example, Foucault explains how the techniques developed for innocuous purposes create the system of disciplinary power. Three primary techniques of control in any society, for Foucault, are hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment and examination (Foucault 1977). Organization functions mainly on the basis of managerial rules and regulations that help to keep the decorum and demureness of the organization to move towards its original desired goals. However, surveillance as a managerial norm of a hierarchical observation also protrudes a power culture in the organization. Normalization means discipline through imposed precise norms, that is judging an action as allowed or not allowed by the law (Foucault 1977). This normalization also means, first, the awareness of being

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protection against overreaching physical, mental, informational and social control by others. In the workplace, as Philip Brey observes, privacy violations involving the information collection and dissemination are known respectively as *snooping* and *exposure*, while a physical intrusion in which physical intervention causes a privacy violation known as *disturbance* (2005).

tracked and then the encouragement to accept it as an unconscious reality without worrying much about it. The examination at the end is the prime example of power that combines both hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment (Foucault 1977). 'Normalization judgement,' for Foucault, is an action referring to a whole that occurs through comparison and differentiation and by following the principle of a rule. It could be defined as invoking a standard, but often imposed by an outsider, not by the result of consensus. In this regard, control over people attained through merely observing them hierarchically and a culture of power prominence through normalizing and examining, fades away the genuinity of employees' mutual obligation and social responsibility.

Nevertheless, reflecting on Foucault, Deleuze (1992) foresees that a strategic shift in power relation is underway. Foucault's disciplinary power, according to Deleuze, encounters the resistance of bodies to concentrated containment and regimentation, and thus a new form of control originates. This new mechanism fixes the body independantly of its location. Thus, though power extents its territory, its functional and informational parameters are controled so much that we are to live in circumscribed parameters (Deleuze 1992). In this way, surveillance ultimately conceives a society of control, which again well suits in power relations in any oranzational structure. Here again Lyon is akin to Carol Gilligan's (1982) ethics of care proposing that "care should be highlighted as a countervail against mere control" (Lyon 2001, 180). Bringing new conception of person as a node in a complex web of relation, which is more social, he adds that "...if the social, embodied person is seen in a web of relationships in which, at best, care is paramount, then this stance provides a truly critical ethical starting point for situating and assessing surveillance" (Lyon 2001, 179).

Moving further from this understanding, for Lyon, surveillance, however, is intensified in a world of remote relations without an embodied personal contact (Lyon 2003). Hence, relying on databases abstracted from live embodied persons and representing them to some organizations, investigators produce certain standpoint which will hardly be critical if they neglect the relations between abstracted data and embodied social persons. Because of its extreme flexibility and ambivalence, the missing "face" here offers possibilities of a moral guide to these two categories of figures and its epitome. It yields from sociology of surveillance to a strong ethical starting point which serves as a guide for our critical analysis as it always swing from a passive surveillance with an active body. Thus, surveillance in an organization begetes first to the categorization of people assigning worth or risk and then it subordinates persons to abstracted data. At this point of individual and social moral dilemma in organizational surveillance, we need, however, a more concrete evaluative model that goes beyond the normal managerial laws and precepts. For, no institution or organization can be free of power relations and can escape from the techniques of power. We bring, thus, an alternative discussion, a framework of "care-justice" or a synthesis of 'culture of care' (Stoddart 2011) and 'social justice' over against the 'culture of power', for an adequate work ethics. Can the phenomenal dynamics of the experience of combining care and justice really and adequately foster the relational capacities in the organization? We argue further that the combination of care-ethics and social justice can serve as a useful hermeneutical key to reconcile the dichotomy between the conflicting rights and interests arising from the use of surveillance in the workplace and its involved power relations.

### **Engaging “Care-Justice” : New Paradigm for Workplace Behaviour**

To engage and manage business people and their challenges fairly and successfully, any business model has to be true-to-life facilitating and bridging business goals with individual and social fabric of moral life. Justice as the first virtue of social institutions is about what people are due, and is also about fairness and equality (Rawls, 1971 & 1985). In a society, social justice is a basic structure of cooperation and reciprocity and essentially depends upon the equal treatment of individual's fundamental rights and duties, economic opportunities and social conditions. Thus, social justice applies to both institutions and individuals alike as we see respectively in David Hollenbach (1979) who sees it as a principle that orders institutional activities as suitable for production and protection of the common good, and in Michael Novak (2000) for whom social justice is not a principle applying to institutions alone, but rather a habit of justice applying to and an attribute of individuals. Analysing workplace surveillance in the light of Rawlsian principles of liberty and equality, we see that the existence of the opportunities of meaningful work conditions declined drastically due to the infringing situation of being under continuous surveillance. Social justice primarily implies the elimination of all forms of discrimination and social sorting and to respect the fundamental freedom, civil and moral rights and dignity of all individuals (Ferree 1997). Accordingly, refraining from any sorts of discrimination, individuals are allowed to freely pursue their aspirations within the legal and moral limits and capacity of concerned organization. Social justice, thus, marks the logic of equivalence (Ricoeur, 1995 [1987]) that governs everyday morality in an organization. As a result, justice-based evaluation offers an ethical framework for succeeding and even balancing the moral values of treating people with fairness and dignity combining material values of productivity and profits of the organization. It also structures and encourages organizations to promote and enhance the full potential of every member by structuring the diffusion of power inherently and increasingly reliant to and acceptable for every particular situation.

However, the presumption of general agreement with regard to what is just or fair at any given time becomes antagonistic with individual rights and interests of both employers and employees. In this context, care ethics that goes beyond the ‘justice view’ of morality will contribute to healthy debates and discussions. Care is “everything we do directly to help others to meet their basic needs, develop or sustain their basic capabilities, and alleviate or avoid pain or suffering, in an attentive, responsive and respectful manner” (Engster 2005, 55). The moral and social significance of the fundamental elements of human relationships and interdependence are implied in this care ethics. Care with its moral considerations of sensitivity, trust and mutual concern represent the human activity with added value of social relation and thus it presumes a face-to-face encounter, in an interpersonal level, to respond to the needs of the other (Stichel 2014, 501). Care in its ethical reflection emphasizes also the importance of response, shifting its face from ‘what is just’ to ‘how to respond’. It involves attentiveness, responsibility and the commitment to investigate such issues against the background of different perspectives (Sevenhuijsen 1998, 16). Analysing the modes of thought of Carol Gilligan, who as an ethicist and psychologist, identified a *different voice* (1982) in moral reasoning, Eric Stoddart, as a surveillance researcher, places moral problems as problems of care and responsibility in relationships, which are different from those of rights and rules (Stoddart 2011, 43). It looks for new responses with mutual obligation and



responsibility among organizational members and this logic of interdependence, as we call, enriches an affirmative response to workplace surveillance, which builds trust, mutual concern and interconnectedness among members of an organization.

Nevertheless, the singular application of care ethics seems to be ambiguous and insufficient since it lacks empirical accuracy and validity in moral reasoning and fails to offer concrete guidance for ethical action. For, the liberal concepts of autonomy, equality, and justice could be incorporated in care ethics and thus make it theoretically indistinct. Therefore, while both ethics of care and justice have access to all areas of discussion in the workplace surveillance, one bears greater authority in some situations than others. Favouring the clarity and certainty and emphasizing the absolute standards of judgement, the ethic of justice characterises with fairness, reciprocity, and rights claims, whereas an ethic of care emphasising creation and strengthening of relationships relies on the contextual complexities of relationships among people (Simola 2003). In this context, the concept of ‘care-justice’ admitting space for both care and justice, enabling their critical and contextual analysing and engaging them on a harmonious relationship that is far more elevated than a mere dialectical one, place a high ‘rhetorical value’ on human life and on our debate on surveillance. The concept ‘rhetorical value’ is used here in reference to persuading and influencing people for an alternative response without expecting any concrete solution or answer. Members in an organization with the framework of ‘care-justice’, are no more independent individuals but are interrelated, and this ethical preference harmonizing human relationships stays more in favour of crafting social integration than erranding fair imposition of managerial rules and organizational statutes.<sup>4</sup> This combination in business also makes on the one hand the nurturing of our immediate communities and the protecting of those closest to us the highest moral obligation and on the other hand asks us to review decisions not in terms of hard rules but in terms of how they will affect the people with whom we share our lives (Brusseau 2011).

In this regard, care inspires justice to become more human in its action by being an indispensable precondition for it. Justice, in the same vein, avoids the danger of reduction of care to sentimentality (Stichel 2014) and enables it to be practically embodied in diverse situations. Before discussing matters concerning rights and equality, justice, however, assumes and presupposes an attitude of caring, and provides mutual understanding and cooperatively formulated solutions in a given situation (Solomon 1998). Here, a discursive ethic of care and rights-based ethic of justice coexist for a mutually compatible approach to the debate. For, in a workplace, ‘care-justice’ integrating care ethics and social justice with their respective logics of interdependence and equivalence elucidates a positive response to surveillance and engenders a new logic of superabundance that goes beyond the particulars of any imposed or volunteered norms and regulations. We use here the term ‘superabundance’ more in line with ‘generosity’, not purely in the same sense of Ricoeur. He uses this term as what he calls the economy of the gift (Ricoeur, 1995 [1987]), where we see the domination of the love commandment (logic of superabundance) over the ‘golden rule’ (logic of equivalence).<sup>5</sup> This affirmative

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<sup>4</sup> From a critical-ethical point of view, we can look at the organization/firm itself as a participatory enterprise or as a social entity with a participatory vision – sharing with the wider society and with its own employees leading to social enhancement.

<sup>5</sup> Ricoeur coherently articulate ‘the economy of the gift’ more in terms of ‘mutuality’ and ‘generosity’ (logic of superabundance), basing on the commandment to love one’s enemies, than in terms of

response is generated by: first, holding managerial norms and statutes respecting individual rights and human dignity; second, shifting discussion from ‘what is just’ to ‘how to respond’ reminding mutual obligation and responsibility; and third, regaining trust with a reciprocal assurance of being for the other. Thus, in an organizational surveillance, contextually determined and acceptable range of agreements become compatible with the conflicting rights and interests through a combination of care ethics and social justice, which we bring here in the category of care-justice. Thus, we learn how ethical deliberations can fit seamlessly with managerial statutes in an organization.

## **Conclusion**

The purpose of this paper was to contribute to the growing discussion of ethics in organizational surveillance studies by identifying a potentially useful ethical framework, which is not previously given enough attention in the workplace surveillance literature. A framework of ‘care-justice’ is elucidated through theoretical discussions. For, organizational surveillance represents a ‘culture of power’ and a ‘culture of care’ to the extent that they mirror unjust social relations and just social cohesion respectively. Couple of attempts has been made to closely approach the debate such as an ironic appreciation of surveillance by Sewell and Barker. However, individual ethical approaches to the issue seldom germinate any progressive solution since they extend from individual problem to wider social consequences such as sorting people into different categories as well as involving power relations. In this context, ‘care-justice’ as a vocation to relate to one another in care and justice brings a universal dimension and a practical means for an affirmative response to organizational surveillance transcending all its particular appearances. This phenomenal dynamics of the experience of social concern combining care ethics and social justice fosters our relational capacities in the organization and this dynamics that begets and does care, justice, and love bring a new work ethics for today, shifting and deconstructing the power relations. The ultimate purpose of this framework is to create and sustain new management and work culture that enhance the dignity and development of every member of the organization, and to economically and socially empower each person as an owner and worker and above all as a human person in relation to one another.

The challenge today, however, is to get the balance right between the individual and the larger community. Therefore, although care-justice provides a novel approach to organizational surveillance, its idealistic tendencies and extremity of high demands may lead to be sceptical of its appropriateness as a workplace ethic. Will it be only idealistic and overly naive in the context of workplace relations? One can even critically ask: can ethic be satisfied with mere ‘cosmetic’ approach to an existing system or, should ethics approach the issue with a critical edge, encountering the very conception of surveillance itself? However, since, workplace is ultimately relational in its character this approach endows with an innovative moral framework for a guiding work-ethics. Nevertheless, given that, every organization functions under fixed statutes and norms to achieve its desired goals, this is only a supplementary response to the debate, which goes beyond the managerial laws and precepts that goes

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‘reciprocity’ based on the golden rule of treating each other as one wants to be treated (logic of equivalence). Yet, this logic of equivalence, as Ricoeur elucidates “governs everyday morality” and the “superabundance becomes the truth hidden in equivalence” (Ricoeur 1995).

with the logic of equivalence towards the logic of superabundance in terms of generosity.

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