

“AI Talent for All”: Sociotechnical Imaginaries in Korea’s 2025 AI Education and Regulation Strategy

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Abstract

In November 2025, South Korea announced under the slogan “AI talent for all” an AI education package including a 5.5-year bachelor's-to-PhD fast-track, investment in “AI highways” data centers, an AI regulatory “rationalization” roadmap, and a lifelong AI education strategy. Ultimately, these measures form a national plan for Korea to become a “top three AI power” by 2030. The plan emphasizes innovation, competitiveness, and talent production. However, it remains unclear how education is reimagined or what this implies for equity and public accountability. Using Sheila Jasanoff's concept of sociotechnical imaginaries, this study examines how Korea's strategy aligns education, regulation, and infrastructure around AI competitiveness. Methodologically, the study uses qualitative critical policy analysis and discourse analysis on a purposive corpus of authoritative agenda-setting official documents from November to December 2025. The corpus includes high-level speeches, cross-ministerial roadmaps, and official press releases explicitly linked to the “AI talent for all” and “AI G3” initiative. Data are analyzed through a hybrid coding approach integrating deductive categories derived from Jasanoff's framework with inductive thematic coding. Analysis suggests education is cast as an AI workforce production system, while questions of educational inequality, labor conditions, and democratic oversight remain marginal. By conceptualizing Korea's strategy as a sociotechnical imaginary, the study offers a lens to analyze AI initiatives in other countries. The study argues AI education policy should be imagined not only as an instrument of competitiveness, but also as a space for critical digital literacy, institutional accountability, and inclusive futures resonating with UNESCO and OECD priorities.

Keywords: AI education policy, national AI strategy, AI governance, South Korea

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Introduction

Artificial intelligence has become a central field through which governments imagine economic growth, industrial transformation, national security, and future social development. This shift has also changed the role of education within national technology policy. Education is expected to prepare individuals to use emerging technologies while developing the expertise and professional capacity required for national AI development. AI education is embedded within wider systems of infrastructure, industrial strategy, labor formation, data governance, and regulation. Critical scholarship similarly emphasizes that AI technologies operate within institutional, political, economic, and cultural processes rather than entering education as neutral technical tools (Williamson & Eynon, 2020).

South Korea offers a significant context for examining this relationship because its recent AI strategy explicitly links technological capacity with national competitiveness. In 2025, the government placed the ambition of becoming one of the world's top three AI powers at the center of a broader national transformation strategy encompassing the AI Highway, advanced computing capacity, domestic AI models, core AI talent, regulatory innovation, and the diffusion of AI across society (Ministry of Science and ICT, 2025b). Education became a particularly visible part of this project in November 2025, when the Ministry of Education announced its AI for All strategy. The strategy connects basic AI education across the life course with advanced talent cultivation, including a proposed five-and-a-half-year pathway from undergraduate study to doctoral training. AI education is organized along a continuum from general literacy to specialized expertise, linking inclusive access with accelerated talent production (Ministry of Education, 2025).

This relationship raises longstanding questions about the purposes of education during technological and economic change. AI literacy can support individual agency and participation in increasingly automated societies, while advanced education and research contribute to technological capacity. Yet access to digital devices, computing systems, and platforms does not guarantee equal participation. Differences in infrastructure, skills, and institutional support shape who benefits from technological change (OECD, 2023). UNESCO and the OECD similarly emphasize literacy, privacy, equity, stakeholder participation, labor rights, and institutional accountability as dimensions of responsible digital transformation (Miao & Holmes, 2023; OECD, 2023; UNESCO, 2021). These concerns become particularly relevant when education develops alongside the infrastructure and regulatory systems supporting national AI expansion.

The Korean strategy brings these dimensions together within a common national project. Computing capacity, data resources, and the National AI Computing Center are presented as foundations of technological transformation, while the AI Basic Act and its implementation framework seek to combine industrial promotion with safety and trust (Ministry of Science and ICT, 2025a, 2025b). The key question is how these objectives are related and which carry greater institutional weight. Equity may be recognized while investment remains concentrated on competitiveness; safety may be acknowledged while regulatory speed is prioritized; and AI education may be presented as a public benefit while assigning particular strategic value to advanced technological talent. A sociotechnical imaginary perspective makes it possible to examine the future that renders these investments necessary, the actors expected to build it, and the institutional arrangements through which it is constructed (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015).

Korea's late 2025 AI strategy can be read as a future-making project in which education, infrastructure, and governance are aligned around national AI competitiveness. The AI G3 objective identifies the desired national position, while the AI Highway and talent policies define the material and human capacities expected to sustain it. Educational institutions are positioned from general AI literacy to advanced expertise, and regulatory reform establishes conditions for technological development. This arrangement also raises questions about what becomes less visible within a competitiveness-centered vision, including unequal access across regions and social groups, changing labor conditions, and concerns over privacy, accountability, and public participation (OECD, 2023; UNESCO, 2021).

Existing research on AI in education has examined teaching, learning, competence, ethical risk, and digital governance, while critical scholarship has emphasized the need to situate AI within wider social and political processes (Williamson & Eynon, 2020). International frameworks further stress human-centered AI literacy, equitable infrastructure, and responsible governance (Miao & Holmes, 2023; Miao et al., 2024; OECD, 2023). This study extends these discussions by examining what happens when education becomes institutionally connected to national AI infrastructure and regulatory strategy under an explicit project of global technological competition.

The study asks how South Korea's 2025 AI education and regulation strategy constructs a sociotechnical imaginary in which education, infrastructure, and governance are reorganized around national AI competitiveness. It examines what this construction implies for the meaning of AI talent, the institutional role of education, and the place of equity and public accountability within the imagined future. Focusing on authoritative government documents associated with the AI for All and AI G3 initiatives, the analysis examines how policy language defines desirable futures, legitimate actors, governance priorities, and material infrastructures. The analysis demonstrates how national AI strategies shape the purposes assigned to education and the futures that public institutions are expected to create.

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research design combining critical policy analysis, discourse analysis, and qualitative document analysis to examine how South Korea's 2025 artificial intelligence strategy constructs a national vision of education, technological capacity, and governance. The analysis focuses on how authoritative policy texts define educational purposes, desirable forms of talent, relationships between education and technological development, and competing public values within a broader vision of an AI future. Policy documents are treated as substantive qualitative data because they reveal how institutions define problems, justify intervention, assign responsibilities, and establish priorities (Bowen, 2009).

The study examines a bounded policy period from November to December 2025, when AI education, talent cultivation, infrastructure, regulation, and national competitiveness became increasingly connected. During this period, the Ministry of Education announced the AI for All strategy, while the Ministry of Science and ICT advanced the implementation framework for the AI Basic Act and a broader national AI strategy (Ministry of Education, 2025; Ministry of Science and ICT, 2025a). The empirical corpus consists of 15 authoritative official documents selected purposively for their relevance to the research questions. These include government speeches, cross-ministry roadmaps, implementation materials, and press releases issued primarily by the two ministries and national AI governance bodies. The documents address the AI for All strategy, the AI G3 objective, and the broader policy architecture connecting

education, talent, infrastructure, and AI governance. The AI for All strategy serves as the central educational text, while the remaining materials situate it within Korea's wider AI policy framework. Media commentary, corporate promotional materials, and individual opinion pieces were excluded (Ministry of Education, 2025; Ministry of Science and ICT, 2025b).

The concept of sociotechnical imaginaries provides the main theoretical framework, directing attention to institutionally sustained visions of desirable futures that connect technological development with social order and political priorities (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015). The framework was operationalized through six deductive coding dimensions: future visions, legitimate actors, institutional arrangements, material infrastructure, governance rationales, and margins and absences within the dominant policy vision.

Table 1

Analytical Dimensions of the Sociotechnical Imaginary

Dimension	Focus of Analysis
 Future visions	Desired National & Social Future of AI
 Legitimate actors	Government, Universities, Researchers, Industry, Teachers, Learners, Citizens
 Institutional arrangements	Roles of Educational, Governmental, & Industrial Institutions
 Material infrastructure	AI Highway, GPUs, data centers, computing resources
 Governance rationales	Regulation, innovation, safety, trust, risk
 Margins and absences	Equity, Accountability, Participation, Critical Literacy, etc.

The analysis involved systematic reading and coding of the corpus to identify patterns across the six deductive dimensions of the sociotechnical imaginary. It also examined recurring themes concerning AI talent, education and workforce development, infrastructure, regulation and innovation, and the relative institutional weight given to equity and public accountability. Comparative analysis across documents and institutions identified common patterns while retaining meaningful differences. Particular attention was given to distinguishing between the presence of a policy value and its institutional weight, assessing whether values such as inclusion, safety, ethics, and equity were reflected in policy objectives, institutional responsibilities, or implementation arrangements. Korean originals served as primary sources where available, with official English versions used to cross-check terminology. This approach follows critical policy analysis by examining how policy discourse organizes priorities and legitimizes particular understandings of problems and solutions (O'Connor & Rudolph, 2023).


The study focuses on policy discourse rather than the long-term effectiveness of Korea's AI education strategy or its causal effects on educational inequality, labor market outcomes, and regulation. It examines the underlying logic through which education, talent, infrastructure, and regulation are integrated into a common sociotechnical imaginary.

Results and Findings

The analysis reveals that the Korean AI policy imaginary is organized around national competition, technological acceleration, human resource development, and institutional transformation. Across the documentary corpus, education is positioned within a broader national architecture linking talent, computing capacity, industrial transformation, and regulatory reform to Korea's ambition to become one of the world's leading AI powers. The AI G3 vision establishes the desired national position, while education and infrastructure provide the human and material capacity through which that future is expected to become achievable (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015; Ministry of Education, 2025; Ministry of Science and ICT, 2025b). Within this configuration, AI talent is constructed as a strategic national asset. The Ministry of Education presents intensifying global AI competition as a condition in which delay may produce generational disadvantage and connects talent cultivation to national survival. Students and researchers are positioned as individuals pursuing knowledge and as resources expected to strengthen the technological position of the nation (Ministry of Education, 2025).

Figure 1

From National AI Vision to Institutional Action




The connection between education and the AI G3 objective reinforces this construction of talent. The Ministry of Education presents talent development alongside infrastructure and data expansion as necessary to national AI advancement. Education is incorporated into a broader conception of national capacity in which human and technological capabilities develop together

(Ministry of Education, 2025; Ministry of Science and ICT, 2025b). Policy measures include earlier identification of students with AI capabilities, specialized education, support for advanced research, and an integrated pathway that could reduce the period from undergraduate entry to doctoral completion from approximately eight years to as little as five and a half years. Financial support for selected science and engineering students and expanded institutional support for research careers further reinforce this model (Ministry of Education, 2025).

Figure 2

The Accelerated and Interconnected AI Talent Production System



The analytical significance of these measures lies in their temporal logic. Time becomes a policy resource: the issue is not only whether advanced talent can be produced, but how rapidly it can enter research and professional roles. The shortened doctoral pathway most clearly expresses this orientation, linking educational acceleration to earlier participation in national technological development (Ministry of Education, 2025).

Education is also organized as an interconnected system for producing and renewing AI-capable labor. The policy extends from basic literacy in schools through higher education, specialist training, workplace learning, and lifelong education. At the university level, pathways range from AI education for non-majors to regional talent hubs and advanced research routes, while university-industry agreements, company-based graduate education, internships, and vocational restructuring bring education closer to employment (Ministry of Education, 2025). The learner is situated within a continuous pathway linking education, research, and productive work.

The findings do not suggest that workforce preparation is an inappropriate purpose of education. Rather, the documentary analysis reveals the growing dominance of a production-oriented logic. Education becomes increasingly legible to the state through what it can supply, while the value of institutions is linked to their capacity to produce people who contribute to an AI-

transformed economy. Broader purposes remain visible in references to AI ethics, critical thinking, and regional inclusion, but they do not organize the strategy to the same extent as talent cultivation and competitiveness (Ministry of Education, 2025).

Technological infrastructure gives this imaginary a material form. The AI future is tied to computing, semiconductors, and data centers rather than presented only through aspirations concerning innovation and competitiveness. The AI Highway frames computing capacity as foundational national infrastructure, with a stated objective of securing more than 50,000 graphics processing units through public-private collaboration and a National AI Computing Center expected to contribute more than 15,000 advanced graphics processing units by 2028. These commitments turn the AI G3 ambition into a material project requiring substantial investment in computing capacity and related infrastructure (Ministry of Science and ICT, 2025b).

The relationship between infrastructure and education is particularly revealing. Infrastructure and data expansion are presented alongside talent cultivation, while regional universities are expected to connect AI education with computing resources and local industry. The policy imaginary links deficits in computing, expertise, and regional capacity to measures including the AI Highway, accelerated educational pathways, and regional education-industry networks. Material and social arrangements are developed together around the same national objective (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015; Ministry of Education, 2025; Ministry of Science and ICT, 2025b). The state remains central to this process. Although the strategy relies on public-private cooperation, public institutions establish direction and capacity, while private actors contribute to implementation and commercialization (Ministry of Science and ICT, 2025b).

Regulatory transformation represents another dimension of the project. The AI Basic Act and its implementation framework retain provisions concerning fundamental rights, safety, and high-impact AI, including algorithmic impact assessments, while emphasizing flexibility, reduced uncertainty, and limits on unnecessary burdens for companies. Regulation is framed as part of the institutional infrastructure for technological development rather than simply as an external constraint. Rights and safety remain on the policy agenda, but within a political temporality shaped by technological urgency and national competitiveness (Ministry of Science and ICT, 2025a, 2025b).

Questions of equity, labor conditions, democratic oversight, and public accountability remain comparatively peripheral within this dominant imaginary. These concerns are not absent: the Ministry of Education addresses regional disparities, lifelong learning, and AI ethics, while national AI governance includes accessibility, social inclusion, and human-centered AI (Ministry of Education, 2025; Ministry of Science and ICT, 2025b). The finding concerns hierarchy rather than absence. Talent, infrastructure, industrial transformation, and competitiveness are translated into institutional pathways, measurable targets, dedicated organizations, and material investments. Democratic participation, the distribution of authority over educational transformation, and labor conditions receive less extensive institutionalization.

Educational inequality illustrates this distinction. The strategy recognizes the concentration of AI infrastructure and educational opportunity in the capital region and proposes regional centers and university hubs. Yet the dominant response remains the expansion and redistribution of AI capacity. Less attention is given to whether different social groups have equal influence over the purposes of AI education, experience similar educational pressures, or face new hierarchies through competition for advanced talent. Equity is primarily constructed

as access to participation in the AI transformation rather than as a reconsideration of how that transformation should be governed (Ministry of Education, 2025).

A similar pattern appears in labor policy. The strategy addresses workforce demand through skills development, practical experience, company involvement in training, and accelerated movement into professional roles. Employment security, professional autonomy, and working conditions receive less attention. The policy imaginary is consequently more developed around workforce supply than around the social conditions of future AI-related work (Ministry of Education, 2025).

Public accountability occupies a similarly complex position. The regulatory framework includes consultation with industry, academia, and civil society, and the National AI Strategy Committee addresses social, safety, and public-sector concerns. Yet the dominant institutional language emphasizes coordinated execution, rapid implementation, national competitiveness, and measurable outcomes. The analyzed documents provide less detail on how educators, workers, and affected communities can exercise sustained influence over the direction of national AI transformation (Ministry of Science and ICT, 2025a, 2025b).

Critical digital literacy is also significant. The Ministry of Education includes ethical AI use, responsible engagement, humanities education, and critical thinking, preventing AI for All from being reduced to technical skills acquisition. At the same time, the institutional architecture surrounding advanced talent is more extensive and more directly connected to national economic objectives. Literacy functions primarily as a supporting educational value, while talent production operates as a central strategic mechanism (Ministry of Education, 2025). This relative emphasis distinguishes the Korean strategy from international frameworks that place greater weight on human-centered, ethical, technical, and civic dimensions of AI competence and on equity and institutional accountability in digital education (Miao et al., 2024; OECD, 2023).

The five findings converge around a common structure: AI talent is constructed as national capacity, education as a continuous and increasingly accelerated system for developing that capacity, infrastructure as its material foundation, and regulation as a mechanism for securing trust while remaining compatible with rapid innovation. Equity, public accountability, labor conditions, and critical literacy remain present but carry less institutional weight.

The AI G3 objective functions as an organizing vision that connects policies that might otherwise appear separate. Shortened doctoral pathways, regional university investment, computing centers, and regulatory reform become parts of the same national project because each contributes to a shared vision of technological leadership. The sociotechnical imaginary coordinates social and technical change by defining what the future requires and assigning institutions responsibility for producing it (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015; Ministry of Education, 2025; Ministry of Science and ICT, 2025b).

The phrase AI for All contains a related tension. The strategy expands access through lifelong learning, regional provision, and opportunities for non-majors, yet participation remains closely connected to technological competitiveness. Citizens are primarily imagined as competent users, adaptable workers, researchers, professionals, and producers of economic and technological value (Ministry of Education, 2025). Inclusion can thus operate within a competitive sociotechnical imaginary without altering its central logic. The key issue is

whether values such as equity, participation, and accountability acquire sufficient institutional weight to shape the direction of technological transformation.

The findings show how Korea's 2025 AI strategy connects domains traditionally governed separately. Education becomes part of technological strategy, infrastructure part of national economic transformation, and regulation part of innovation policy. Universities serve educational, research, regional, and talent-development functions, while citizens enter a lifelong AI learning environment and selected individuals are positioned as strategic experts. These relationships create an institutional architecture through which the imagined AI future can be actively constructed (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015).

The central finding is that education has become a principal mechanism through which Korea's AI-centered future is made socially possible. The policy assigns educational institutions responsibility for developing the people, competencies, research capacity, and forms of participation required for technological transformation. The unresolved question is how broadly education can be defined when national technological competition becomes one of its most powerful organizing forces.

Implications and Conclusion

The findings of this study extend beyond Korea's 2025 AI strategy, showing that AI education policy is inseparable from the political and economic future it helps shape. When education, infrastructure, regulation, and industrial development are coordinated through a common national vision, education policy also shapes the society that technological transformation produces. The central challenge is to develop technological capability without reducing education to national competition. Sociotechnical imaginaries are useful here because technological futures reflect assumptions about desirable institutions, legitimate actors, and collective purposes (Jasanoff & Kim, 2015). While only a small proportion of workers may require advanced AI-specific capabilities, most will need basic digital competence, critical problem-solving skills, and the ability to work with AI systems (OECD, 2026). Given persistent differences in digital experience and access to workplace AI training across Korean firms (OECD & Korea Labor Institute, 2025), lifelong AI education must address not only skills but also the resources and institutional support required for meaningful participation.

Educational equity remains a central concern. The benefits of AI education may depend on unequal access to infrastructure, research capacity, financial resources, and digital experience. This is particularly relevant to Korea's regional strategy: expanding AI education beyond the capital region does not ensure equality without sustained computing resources, qualified educators, research networks, and pathways to professional opportunities (OECD, 2023). The same concern applies to accelerated talent production. The five-and-a-half-year undergraduate-to-doctoral pathway may respond to international AI competition and benefit exceptionally prepared students, but speed should not become a universal measure of educational effectiveness. Advanced education also requires disciplinary depth, experimentation, failure, and ethical reflection. As universities are increasingly expected to educate students, produce researchers, and collaborate with industry, technological capacity should not come at the expense of fundamental research, critical inquiry, or institutional freedom to question technological development.

The AI Highway should be understood as more than a system of computing resources. Graphics processing units, data centers, cloud resources, and research facilities acquire public value

through the institutions and people able to use them. Investment in physical infrastructure needs to be accompanied by investment in educators, researchers, public institutions, and regional networks. Digital infrastructure is not educationally neutral; its effects depend on how access is distributed and who has the capacity to determine its uses. The success of national AI strategy should be assessed through more than computing capacity, numbers of trained specialists, international rankings, or industrial investment. Evaluation should also consider who gains access to high-quality AI education, whether regional and socioeconomic gaps are narrowing, and whether teachers, learners, and institutions retain meaningful agency and public accountability (OECD, 2023).

Trust, regulation, and participation raise related questions. Public protection should not be treated simply as a cost of technological progress, as accountability and oversight can strengthen both legitimacy and institutional certainty (UNESCO, 2021). Korea's regulatory framework need not choose between flexibility and precaution; the more important question is whether innovation speed becomes the primary measure of effective governance. The current policy imaginary also emphasizes workforce supply more than participation in technological governance, despite the knowledge that students, teachers, workers, and communities can contribute to understanding AI's social effects (Doellgast et al., 2025).

National competitiveness should remain one legitimate public objective, not the unquestioned measure through which all other objectives are organized. Countries have understandable reasons to invest in AI, but competitiveness can become the dominant imaginary through which educational value, regulatory quality, infrastructure, and social participation are interpreted. A broader framework should evaluate technological development through capability, equity, rights, democratic legitimacy, and long-term social value. Within this framework, AI for All acquires a more substantive meaning. Universal AI education requires more than expanding access to basic knowledge or increasing participation in AI education. Advanced opportunities should not be determined primarily by geography or social advantage, and specialized expertise should develop alongside broader human and social capabilities. Innovation should remain open to scrutiny, while public investment in computing capacity should generate widely distributed benefits. Inclusion, in this sense, concerns the meaningful choices, capabilities, and forms of participation available to people as technological transformation proceeds.

The implications extend beyond South Korea. Many governments are developing national AI strategies that combine education, talent, infrastructure, industrial policy, and regulation. Although institutional arrangements differ, the questions raised here remain relevant: What kind of future is presented as desirable, who is authorized to construct it, and which public values receive institutional support rather than remaining primarily rhetorical? Sociotechnical imaginaries can illuminate not only national visions but also the distribution of authority and possibility within them.

The study makes a theoretical contribution by extending sociotechnical imaginaries more explicitly into AI education policy. Education is often treated as a response to technological change, yet the findings show that it can also be one of the institutions through which an imagined technological future is produced. Schools create basic forms of technological participation, universities develop expertise and research, lifelong education supports adaptation, and talent policies identify the actors expected to occupy strategically important positions. Education does not simply prepare society for a technological future that exists independently; it helps determine which futures become institutionally possible. The Korean case demonstrates why educational policy, material infrastructure, and governance should be


analyzed together. Computing investments provide the technical foundation for national ambitions, educational institutions produce the knowledge and expertise needed to use that infrastructure, and regulatory arrangements establish the conditions under which technological development proceeds. A sociotechnical imaginary gains practical force when future narratives become connected to systems of investment, education, and governance.

The methodological contribution lies in distinguishing the presence of a policy value from its institutional weight. Critical analysis should neither assume that a value is absent because it does not dominate a policy document nor treat the appearance of terms such as inclusion, ethics, safety, or fairness as evidence that they determine policy direction. The more important question is whether such values shape resource allocation, implementation structures, accountability mechanisms, and definitions of policy success. This distinction provides a useful approach to policies that pursue economic, technological, educational, and social goals simultaneously.

South Korea's 2025 AI education and regulation strategy can be understood as a sociotechnical imaginary through which a particular national future is made desirable and institutionally actionable. The analysis found that AI talent is constructed as a strategic national asset, while education is increasingly organized as a continuous system for developing and accelerating AI capability. Technological infrastructure provides the material foundation, and regulatory reform seeks to create conditions compatible with rapid innovation. Equity, labor conditions, critical literacy, and public accountability remain present within the policy environment, but they carry less organizing power than talent, infrastructure, acceleration, and competitiveness.

Figure 3

South Korea's 2025 AI Sociotechnical Imaginary: From National Competitiveness to Education, Infrastructure, and Governance



These findings do not suggest that Korea's AI strategy is merely a project of workforce production. Its ambition lies in coordinating AI education, technological capacity, advanced expertise, and regional development at a national scale. The critical question is how this capacity will be governed and for what purposes. Education should serve more than the needs of a technologically competitive state. AI education should help people participate in technological change while also understanding it, exercising judgment, and shaping the institutions that govern it. A society is not truly AI capable simply because it has advanced models, computing infrastructure, and specialized workers. It must also have citizens and institutions able to question how technology distributes power, opportunity, responsibility, and risk.

The phrase AI for All contains a possibility that is broader than the current logic of talent production. It can describe a future in which everyone is expected to adapt to AI, or it can describe a future in which everyone is given a meaningful capacity to participate in shaping it. The distinction between these two futures is ultimately a question of education and governance. The first requires skills. The second requires skills together with critical literacy, institutional accountability, public participation, and equitable access to the resources through which technological futures are created. The long-term public value of Korea's AI strategy will depend not only on whether it succeeds in producing competitive AI talent but also on whether the future constructed through that talent remains open to the people who are expected to live within it.

Table 2

Divergent Interpretations of "AI for All"

Dimension	AI for All as Talent Production	AI for All as Democratic Participation
Primary purpose	Workforce preparation	Participation in shaping technological futures
Education	Skills and adaptation	Critical literacy and agency
Social role	Economic participation	Civic and institutional participation
Governance	Innovation and competitiveness	Accountability and public oversight
Public values	Secondary / weaker institutional weight	Embedded in institutional decision-making
Desired outcome	AI-capable workforce	AI-capable and AI-governing society

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