

*Changes of German Foreign and Security Policy Since Russian-Ukraine War
–For Understanding the German Eurasian Strategy*

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Abstract

German security policy under Scholz government changed from prudent to assertive one. “Policy entrepreneur” led to Militarization of German foreign policy. Thereby they broke the taboo norm about weapon provision much more deeply. As the result, Germany mostly abandoned the “culture of restraint.” Additionally, they decided to promote militarization and increase the defense expenditure-to-GDP ratio from about 1.5% in 2019 to more than 2% by 2024. Moreover, German energy policy changed since the occurrence of Russian Ukraine war. As China’s economy developed and the concurrence in trade and the friction based on the difference in political system increased, German strengthened to recognize China as the villain which do not share the values. There is inconsistency in the Scholz government's China policy. Its background can be explained to some extent by the theory of political party differences. Being different from the Merkel government where there were consensus under “transformation through trade” strategy, there is a conflict under Scholz government between the Green Party, which pursues ideals, and the SPD, which emphasizes economic interests. Germany's overdependence on Russia's energy sources was corrected during the Russian-Ukraine, and the diversification of energy import sources has been promoted. Moreover, overdependency in trade with China has been revised since Russian-Ukraine war. German foreign policy, like the two-faced god Janus, fuses the ideas of civilian power and "normal great power," but possesses a "*Leitbild*" in which the latter is superior. German leadership and foreign policy would become more destable than before from the background of party system.

Keywords: *Leitbild*, German Foreign and Security Policy, Eurasian Strategy, Russian-Ukraine War, China, Scholz-Government

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Introduction

Since Russian invasion to Ukraine, the pillar of security global governance and cooperative international order has been exposed under strain. Mainly Russia and China develop militaristic power politics. Researcher whisper that there would come the military conflict between China and Taiwan, and even the possibility that Japan would be invaded by Russia, as Prof. Hirose Yoko referred.

EU faces with the crises such as Brexit and radical right populist, while USA views Asian and pacific region as a priority and France weakens its economy. Therefore, there appears the hope that Germany plays as the guardian of liberal democracy order in the world. On the other hand, one hears “German problem,” that it means the worry about if Germany grasp the hegemony in Europe and develops the power politics or not.

Scholz government in Germany has faced in the crisis through Russian invasion to Ukraine (followingly expressed as Russian-Ukraine War). As soon as Russia invaded to Ukraine, this invasion and the higher price for goods became the most and secondary important issues in German society. As result, since May 2022 until April 2023, German have given the negative evaluation to the German government, because they regarded that German government had tackled with the Russian-Ukraine war in a negative way. Also since then, the Russian-Ukraine war has been regarded as the important issue in German society.

1. Aims and Targets

(1) Research Questions

There are discussions which regard Germany as “reluctant hegemon,” civilian power (Mauil 2019), geo-economical power (Szabo 2015; Kundnani 2016). Moreover, there are discussions about German leadership (Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2019; Wright 2019).

Although researchers have approached the problem from different angles, after all, they have asserted the (supposed) orientation, role and current situation of German foreign and security policy from the perspective of a *Leitbild*.

Previous studies about the *Leitbild* of German foreign policy have attributed Germany’s *Leitbild* to the visions of its policymakers and their politics (Rittberger, 2003: 93, 96; Allers, 2016: 520). However, since the federal constitutional court decision on 12 July 1994, a majority support in the lower chamber (Bundestag) has become the precondition for military dispatches. Parliament is an arena in which the interests and ideas of a nation’s society are reflected, and they are coordinated through parliamentary debates in which the interests and ideas of both parliamentarians and policymakers are represented (Wagner, 2001: 194ff). Moreover, Parliamentarians cannot ignore the interests and ideas of voters because of re-election considerations; therefore, their interests and ideas are reflected in the arguments of parliamentarians. Therefore, the author understands that a nation’s *Leitbild*, which affects its foreign policy in the middle and long term, are reflected in the views of German parliamentarians.

Ewers-Peters regards German role as “midstream” or “balancer” (Ewers-Peters 2022). As are the same with the debates about “mediator,” her discussion shows one of the characters of

German foreign policy, however, it lacks in explanatory power to understand world view and identity of German foreign policy as a whole.

The civilian power and normal great power theses are exemplified in similar ways with only very subtle differences, as reflected in the previous studies that have encountered difficulties in judging the kind of *Leitbild* an actor has. For example, both theses affirm multinationalism. However, the civilian power thesis regards it as a way of seeking the international common good over the long term, whereas the normal great power thesis regards it as a way of maximizing pure national interests in the short term. In addition, both theses embrace national interests. However, whereas the civilian power thesis considers that an actor seeks national interests as an international common good over the long term (Maull, 2006: 62-76), the normal great power thesis insists that a nation seeks its pure national interests in the short term. Patrick Mello's discourse analysis was based on a quantitative analysis; however, he clarified only the change in the frequency of words that belong to the civilian power thesis, not the inductive changes in the contents of the words nor the power-political developments in German foreign policy (Mello, 2019: 295-316).

There are foregoing research which discussed the change of German foreign policy in the Russian-Ukraine War (e.g. Tsuruoka 2022). However, they do not clarify the changes of German foreign policy at the idea level.

(2) Aims, and Method for Analysis

From such background, first, I tackle with the theme of change of German security and energy policy and German Eurasia strategy in the Scholz government through the example of Russian-Ukraine War, and the relationship between Germany and China.

In order to understand the German Eurasian policy, I target Russia and China as an object for analysis. Second, the author analyses *Leitbild* as a collective idea to clarify the role, orientation and changes in German security and energy policy. To overcome the above research limitations, he analyses the parliamentary debates about the above-mentioned issues from 2021 using a discourse analysis and especially a qualitative content analysis. Thereby, he uses an approach from liberal constructivism.

A discourse analysis describes shared ideas, interests and behaviours as they are in society. It enables us to reflect on the subtle differences between the *Leitbild* models. Additionally, this approach allows us to analyze the intersubjectivity among the actors and the reciprocal changes between policies and ideas.

A qualitative content analysis provides high objectivity and trackability (Mayring, 2010: 49). This analysis is composed of deductive and inductive processes. In the deductive process, the author extracts the representative instances of the civilian power and normal great power theses as deductive peculiarities from the existing studies. Next, in the inductive process, the author extracts characteristic words or phrases from the parliamentary debates that relate to German foreign policy and labels them as inductive peculiarities. Thereafter, he analyses the parliamentary debates surrounding these deductive and inductive peculiarities (Mayring, 2002: 83-5).

Leitbild (guiding view) is an idea constituted of socially shared ideas about future goals as normative values that regulate criteria, norm visions and orientations for behaviour as well as

the recognition of the current situation that includes power and material interests (Schneider, 1992: 4f; Giesel, 2007: 74f; cf. Harnisch & Maull, 2001: 3; cf. Nakagawa 2021).

2. Widening of Militaristic Power Politics in Eurasia?

(1) Russian-Ukraine War 2022

(a) Change of Prudent to Assertive Policy

Since the end of cold war, there established the cooperative security order system constituted by EU, NATO and OSCE with the basis of liberal-democratic values in Europe. This system has the hidden potential which develops into the postmodern cosmopolitan community whereby the member states exit from militaristic power politics. Through the occupation of Crimean half island by Russia in 2014, European order since the end of cold war collapsed partly.

In November 2021, Russia repeated the military thrust to Ukraine. From the background of heightening thrust, Ukraine government asked German government to provide the weapons even if they were defensive one. Germany had taboo for provision of the weapons as the foreign policy principle. It had limited the provision of weapons only for the EU and NATO members and it had not provided the weapons to the battle regions and the states which violated the human right since the World War II. Article 26 (2) of basic law regulates that, peculiar weapons whose aim is to perform the war can be produced, conveyed and consigned only with the agreement of the government. Moreover, (1) regulates that the implementation of intention which interrupts the peaceful coexistence among people, especially for the preparations for the aggressive war violate the law. However, in case when the government itself decides to provide the weapons, it does not violate the law (Prantl 2014: 6). In addition, the ruling parties agreed with the content of coalition agreement which performed the restrained weapon export politics. Furthermore, German government found the provision of weapons with lethal potential would stimulate Russia and it led the worsening of affairs. After all, there were consensus between German society, and ruling and opposition parties that they would send no any offensive weapons to Ukraine and it has continued until the occurrence of Russian invasion to Ukraine.

However, the Russian invasion to Ukraine gave the German society the “invasion shock”. Germany abandoned this taboo norm about the provision of weapons and Scholz decided to begin providing weapons to Ukraine on 26. 2. 2022. They sent not only small arms but also heavy firearms.

It was not the first time for Germany to break the taboo norm about providing weapons. In 2014, German government decided to send the weapons to Kurdish people in Iraq who fight with ISIS. However, it was regarded for the policymakers as the exception, and limited to small arms. Being deferent from the timepoint of 2014, German government decided also to provide the heavy firearms to Ukraine this time. Scholz decided to provide self-propelled anti-aircraft guns “Gepard” on 26. 4.2022. At that time, Scholz refused to provide the tanks of Leopard2 to Ukraine.

Moreover, German government changed the existing defense policy. Defense expenditure had been calculated about 1.5% of GDP of the budget until then, however, German government decided this time to assign over 2% of the budget to the defense expenditure.

(b) Change of Energy Policy

From the background of the adhesion between the politicians and energy firms and joint venture among firms, both of Germany and Russia has been linked around the import and export of energy resources and the construction that Germany were dependent on the Russian energy resources overwhelmingly had been continuously frozen since 2014 until recently. 55% of natural gas, 35% of mineral oil and 55% of coal were from Russia.

After Russian invasion to Ukraine, Germany changed its energy policy. It abandoned to resist against economic sanction over SWIFT and the request of stopping the approval procedure of Nordstream2, after Scholz met with USA President Biden.

Germany boosted the speed of introducing Renewable Energy Sources (RES) so that it would be able to provide 100% of energy by RES as soon as possible. Moreover, Germany promoted the diversification of energy import and export destinations, while importing substitute energy other than Russia. Thereby it decided to import LNG as urgent substitute energy. Further, Germany reoperated the nuclear and coal power plants with due date which Germany had once stopped to operate.

(2) German China Strategy

The national security strategy which Scholz government submitted on June 2023 regards China as “partner, competitor and rival in the system” (Auswärtiges Amt, 6. 2023:4). The survey performed in 2023 by Allensbach Institute et al. showed that 60% of German regarded China as threat for peace in the world.

The relationship between Germany and China is a complicated one. German China policy was traditionally based on the "Transformation through Trade"-strategy. Germany is a major exporting country, and China is its biggest trading partner. Germany's trade dependence on China is higher than that of other EU countries, and it has the largest trade surplus with China in the region. Germany has relied on the phantasy that seek for the economy relationship with China would bring not only the reciprocal interest between Germany and China, but also the change of China for stressing democracy, governance in law, liberalization and human right. In the past, relations between Germany and China were mutually complementary from the background of the disparities in industrialization. However, as China's economy developed and the concurrence in trade and the friction based on the difference in political system increased, German strengthened to regard China as the villain which do not share the values.

The Scholz government referred in its coalition contract, for the first time in Germany's history, that it would develop China strategy that would take account of the changing role and behaviour of China in the world (Rühlig 2023). Moreover, the Scholz government urged China to comply with human rights and loosen controls over Hong Kong, and made a statement that it would encourage Taiwan to participate in international organizations. In its Indo-Pacific strategy, Germany called for maintaining "one country, two systems" over Hong Kong. In addition, it argued that changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait could only be resolved peacefully and by mutual agreement. However, Beijing criticized the German government, saying that Taiwan, Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region were internal affairs (Bloomberg, 25.11. 2021).

In the Scholz government, there exists the differences among the ruling parties in terms of relationship with China and they were difficult to take a unified attitude. The Greens and FDP have shown, being different from SPD, a critical attitude toward the dependency on China. Foreign minister Baerbock stressed that the provision of military materials by China to Russia which are available for both of civil and military sectors violated international law and she checked China. However, the Scholz government began to show a coherent China strategy gradually.

Since the Russian-Ukraine War, Russia and China have been pursuing aggressive policies. China has pursued a trade policy based on the “One Belt, One Road” strategy, and the position of Europe in international politics has declined as the US-China conflict deepened. Germany was forced to respond to it. As such, the German government launched a strategy against China.

Since the Russian-Ukraine War, dependence on China in the supply chain has become a problem. On the other hand, the German economy was in a slump because of EU’s economic sanctions against Russia and Germany tried to overcome that slump through deepening economic ties with China. For example, on October 26, 2022, the Scholz government issued a cabinet decision authorizing China Ocean Shipping (COSCO), a major Chinese shipping company, to acquire a stake in one of Hamburg's four port facilities. Germany also visited China for the first time among G7 countries since COVID19. On November 4, 2022, Chancellor Scholz visited Beijing accompanied by a delegation of 12 companies, including BASF and BMW. However, Prime Minister Scholz's visit to China was criticized.

Through the national security strategy on June and China strategy on July 2023, German China policy changed decisively. Firstly, German China strategy changed so that Germany decided to downgrade the dependency on China in the critical fields such as economy, key technology and important raw materials from the aspect of economy security under the word of De-Risking. As such, Germany seeks diverse trade and supply chains. At the same time, the Chinese market remains of great importance for German companies. Secondly, Germany has strengthened to regard China as the villain much more which is trying to reshape the rules-based international order. In the Indo-Pacific, China is increasingly aggressively claiming regional supremacy and questioning principles of international law. China’s decision to expand relations with Russia is of immediate security policy significance for Germany. Thirdly, Germany will expand the relations with Taiwan, but it does not change the so-called one-China policy. Fourthly, Germany would review its export control list against the backdrop of new technological developments to ensure German goods did not encourage human rights violations in China or support military rearmament. Fifthly, Germany will take a tougher stance against Chinese espionage than before (ARD Tagesschau, 3. 7. 2023).

3. Leitbild of Foreign and Security Policy Under Scholz-Government

(1) Peculiarities of the Leitbild Models

In the deductive process of a qualitative content analysis, the author extracted the peculiarities of the civilian power and normal great power theses. The results are as follows (Table 2):

TABLE 1 : PECULIARITIES OF THE LEITBILD MODELS

Leitbild I: civilian power	Leitbild II: normal great power
A1) Value orientation as motive for action (Kirste 1998:45)	B1) Strong pursuit of national interest based on cost-and-benefit considerations (Le Gloannec 2004: 28)
A2) Antimilitarism (Duffield 1999: 780)	B2) Crisis management by military power (Ritberger 2003: 93)
1. Scepticism about military power	
2. Emphasis on non-military means in the crisis settlement /worldwide construction of democracy	
A3) Multilateralism/supranationalism (Maull 2001: 652)	B3) Refusal to restrict sovereignty (von Bredow 2003: 9)
	a) Autonomy and subjectivity
	b) Unilateralism
A4) Culture of restraint I (Maull 2001: 259)	B4) End of taboo against specific foreign actions based on historical considerations (Bahr 2003: 137)
A5) Culture of restraint II (Hyde Price 2000: 220)	B5) Maximization of national interest using international institutions (von Bredow 2003: 10)
A6) Promotion of global rule of law	B6) Disregard of international law/UN
A7) Self-confidence I (Kirste 1998: 54)	B7) Self-confidence II (von Bredow 2003: 12)
A8) Promotion of human rights (Rittberger 2003: 89)	B8) <i>No existence</i>
A9) Exclusion of social and economic imbalances (Ibid: 93)	B9) Development assistance depending on security
A10) <i>Does not exist</i>	B10) Sense of equal rights (Hacke 2002: 99f)
A11) <i>Does not exist</i>	B11) Balancing

(Based on the aforementioned literature, the author forms)(Nakagawa 2021)

A1. means a norm orientation along which actors behave, even if they sacrifice their own interests.

A2a. means strict self-constraint against military usage.

A2b. means emphasising crisis resolution through non-military and diplomatic means.

A3. means multilateralism and the transfer of sovereignty to supranational institutions.

A4. means a self-controlled use of military power and policy behaviours based on historical contexts such as the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) atrocities.

A5. means giving priority to a European identity, international public goods and EU interests over the long term, even if the actor sacrifices national identity and interests. It means also reflexive leadership avoidance behaviour.

A6. means promoting global governance in law and a monopoly of military force by the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

A7. means actively engaging in civilising international relations along a civilian power thesis.

A8. means supporting individual and collective rights.

A9. means correcting global social and economic inequalities.

B1. means neglecting norms and maximising short-term national interests and power based on cost-benefit considerations.

B2. means the crisis resolution idea of using military power positively and as a resource for maximising an actor's power.

B3a. means avoiding the restriction of actions by not belonging to multinational organisations and not taking on a burden.

B3b. means to seek subjective and autonomous behaviour.

B4. means to abolish the taboo consciousness based on the historical context.

B5. means maximising national interests by joining international institutions because of the ability to acquire relative independence and institutionalise national interests.

B6. means disregarding global governance in law and avoiding an overestimation of the UN.

B7. means taking greater responsibility for the formation and maintenance of an international order along the normal great power orientation.

B9. means promoting development assistance by an actor to acquire their own security.

B10. means a sense of equality with allied partners and the USA, based on which the actor requests equal status and rights.

B11. means correcting power imbalances and acquiring international influence by forming a countervailing power with others against the Hegemon.

In setting the categories of the *Leitbild* I and II, the author adds the theoretical features of liberalism and idealism to the former and those of (neo)realism to the latter as their peculiarities because of theoretical affinities. These features are common in the rational theories. Peculiarities that have the same number under the different *Leitbild* -models (e.g., A1 and B1) are essentially in opposing relationships with each other. There are no counterparts to A8, B10 and B11 (Nakagawa 2021).

(2) Axis of Coordinates

TABLE 2: PERCENTAGE OF ELECTION VOTES & SHARE OF PARLIAMENTARY SEATS HELD BY THE MAIN PARTIES IN 2021

Election Year (Period of the Parliament)	2021 (20)
CDU/CSU	24.1 (26.7)
SPD	25.7 (28)
FDP	11.5 (12.5)
Coalition 90/The Greens	14.8 (16.1)
The leftist party	4.9 (5.3)
AfD (Alternative for Germany)	10.3 (11.3)

(Created by the author; the values are percentages. The percentages of election votes are the results from second votes. The numbers in parentheses are the percentages of the share of parliamentary members)

Above is the data of 20. period of the Parliament. When a peculiarity is shared by the parliamentarians of the two large parties, or one large and one small parties, then the majority of the electorate might share an idea and the author gives a score of ○.

When a peculiarity is shared by the parliamentarians of the two large parties and minimum one small party, then over two-thirds of electorate might share that idea, the author gives a score of ◎. When a peculiarity is shared by the parliamentarians of the two large parties and the leftist party, in case additional one more party would share that idea, the author gives a score of ◎.

When a peculiarity is shared by the parliamentarians of one large party and one small party, 38-43% of electorate might share that idea, the author gives a score of △○, when a peculiarity is shared by the parliamentarians of one large party and the leftist party, or two or three small parties, about 27-33% of electorate might share that idea, the author gives a score of △, and when a peculiarity is shared by the parliamentarians of one small party, the author gives a score of △×.

The author shows the results of inductive process of Qualitative content analysis as follows. Thereby, the above-mentioned consensus ratio to each peculiarities.

A1) Value Orientation as Motive for Action (×)

B1) Strong Pursuit of National Interest Based on Cost-and-Benefit Considerations (○)

The ruling parties of Scholz government especially for the Greens, appeal the “value oriented foreign policy.” The main parties except for AfD also stress the value. However, their groundings for action do not separate from interest.

Gerold Otten (AfD) criticized the establishment of democracy and governance in law as the false behavior which “misread fantasy as national interest”(Deutcher Bundestag (DBT), Stenographische Berichte [StenBer], 20. 5.2022: 3740). Thomas Erndl (CDU/CSU) insisted that the promotion of stability at Sahel region became our own interest, because chaos in Sahel region would finally threatens security in Europe (ibid: 3746). With the results about C4, we can see the idea of B1 in the ideas of politicians.

A2a) Scepticism About Military Power/“Never Again” (Δ×)

A2b) Emphasis on Non-military Means in the Crisis Settlement/ Worldwide Construction of Democracy (⊙)

B2) Crisis Management by Military Power (⊙)

Rüdiger Vogler (Leftist Party) called on the German government to engage in non-military diplomacy (Ibid, p. 3742). However, existing political parties, with the exception of the Left Party, have a view of crisis management that uses military force. In February 2022, the Scholz government decided to increase defense spending exceeding 2% of GDP every year until 2024 and to expand the military for nuclear sharing. On the other hand, as Agnieszka Brugger (Greens) said, Germany is implementing peacebuilding in the Sahel, including the transition to democracy, the establishment of a law-abiding state, and the SSR (Ibid, pp. 3727, 36.). Nils Schmid (SPD) calls for democratization and building democratic institutions, holding elections and overcoming economic and social conflicts in Mali (Ibid, p. 3730). Knut Abraham (CDU/CSU) also supported the deployment of EUFOR Althea troops to defend Bosnian democracy (Ibid, 8. 7. 2022, p. 5151). From their point of view, A2b is found.

A3) Multilateralism/Supranationalism (⊙)

B3b) Unilateralism (Δ×)

Abraham (CDU/CSU) and Adis Ahmetovic (SPD) called for EU enlargement and progress in EU accession negotiations among the Western Balkans and Southeastern European countries, including Bosnia, as the EU guarantees peace and freedom (Ibid, p. 5150; ibid, 22. 6. 2022, p. 4355). Ulrich Lechte (FDP) justified the Malian troop deployment by saying it trusted Germany to work together to secure it (Ibid, 20. 5. 2022, p. 3732).

Meanwhile, Harald Weyel (AfD) opposed the EU's eastward expansion, arguing that the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU would lead them to socio-economic losses (Ibid, 22. 6. 2022, p. 4356.). Joachim Wundrak (AfD) also criticizes Operation EUNAVFOR Illini as an operation merely to further the ambition to establish the CSDP and PESCO (Ibid, 7. 4. 2022, p. 2434). From their remarks, we can find B3.

A4) Culture of restraint I (Δ×)

B4) End of Taboo Against Specific Foreign Actions Based on Historical Considerations (⊙)

Boris Mijatović (Greens) spoke of a sense of confrontation with responsibility for the crimes of the Wehrmacht in World War II (Ibid, 24. 6.2022, p. 4704). However, during Russia's invasion of Ukraine after February, established parties other than the AfD and the Leftist Party further weakened the NSDAP's past ban on arms supply to combat areas and supplied weapons there (Ibid., 27. 2. 2022, pp. 1350-85). Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock (Green) justified the arms supply and defense spending increases by saying that "we remain cautious about arms exports and troops" but "abandon inherent prudence in foreign and security policy for the sake of our obligations"(Ibid, p. 1359). In the case of weapons to the Kurds in 2014, Germany only provided light weapons such as rocket launchers (Nakagawa 2020 pp. 186-7), During the invasion of Ukraine in February, Germany provided Ukraine with heavy weapons and demonstrated the idea of the B4. However, a certain degree of restraint in not providing tanks to the country still remains.

A6) Promotion of Global Rule of Law (●)

B6) Disregard of International Law/UN (Δ×)

Johann Wadephul (CDU/CSU) and Brugger (Greens) show their willingness to contribute to strengthening the United Nations (Ibid, 20. 5.2022, pp. 3729, 37). C. Schmied (SPD) also praised the UN as "the best means of resolving multilateral disputes (Ibid, p. 3735). The AfD, meanwhile, criticized Operation Iriini as an operation to cover up the UN's shame.

A7) Self-Confidence I (○)

B7) Self-Confidence II (○)

Wadephul (CDU/CSU) praised Germany's leadership role in the Berlin Process and its driving force in Europe in the debate over the Bosnian troops (Ibid, 22. 6. 2022, p. 4354). Adis Ahmetovic (SPD) called for Germany to actively promote EU accession of countries in Southeast Europe and the Western Balkans (Ibid, p. 4356).

On the other hand, Chancellor Scholz spoke of the active achievement of peace in Europe and decided to increase defense spending for deterrence (Ibid, 27. 2. 2022, pp. 1350-4). Foreign Minister Baerbock (Green Party) justified the provision of arms and increased defense spending as fulfilling his duty for the international order and peace in Europe (Ibid, p. 1359). Alexander Müller (FDP) spoke of Germany's European and global commitment to military expansion and security gains against the invasion of Ukraine and the destabilization of the Western Balkans (Ibid, 24. 6. 2022, p. 4701) and he showed the sense of B7.

A8) Promotion of Human Rights (●)

Just as Philip Krämer (The Greens), Serap Güler (CDU/CSU) and others called for the creation of a society that values human rights (Ibid, 7. 4. 2022, p. 2437; ibid, 8. 7. 2022, pp. 5150f), the major political parties attach great importance to human rights norms.

B9) Development Assistance Depending on Security (Δ)

Erndl (CDU/CSU) argues that stability in the Sahel region is in Germany's very own interests under the slogan "No development without security"(Ibid, 20. 5. 2022, p. 3746).

B10) Sense of Equal Rights (Δ)

Annette Widmann-Mautz (CDU/CSU) said Germany's engagement in EUTM Mali would be "on the same level" as the participating countries, expressing pride in being on an equal rights with other participants (Ibid, 20. 5.2022, p. 3738).

B11) Balancing (⊙)

The Scholz government sought to achieve solidarity in the alliance and to prevent the outbreak of World War III by balancing the military to deter Russia. Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht (SPD) expressed a sense of balancing by saying that the deployment of the EUFOR Althea troops was a contribution to stability against Russia's strengthened influence (Ibid, 24. 6.2022, p. 4699). Wadepuhl (CDU/CSU) said Germany and NATO needed nuclear deterrence so they would not be at the mercy of Russia (Ibid, 27. 2.2022, p. 1378).

In the debate on the deployment of troops to the EUFOR, Thomas Hacker (FDP) promoted to acquire the influence and security of the democratic camp by enlarging the EU, saying that authoritarian countries such as Russia and China are expanding their influence in Central Europe, threatening the stability of Europe as a whole (Ibid, 22. 6.2022, p. 4359). From their remarks, we can find B11.

C1) Integration of Security and Development (Δ)

N. Schmid (SPD) positions MINUSMA and EUTM Mali as examples of trial and error of "networked security," stating that "there is no development without security, and there is no guarantee of sustainable security without development." (Ibid, 20. 5.2022, p. 3730). Frank Schwabe (SPD) calls for achieving local stabilization through the integration of development assistance with security and military elements (Ibid, p. 3739). Thus, the fusion of the ideas of A7 and B2 is found.

C2) Comprehensive Security Concept/Networked Security Concept/Integrated Security (○)

Under the concept of "comprehensive security," Wadepuhl (CDU/CSU) calls for security assurance, the fight against international terrorism, democratization and social development on the grounds where troops are dispatched.

C. Schmid (SPD) calls for the implementation of "networked security" such as development assistance, social distribution and human rights violations, environmental correction, political participation of young people, and implementation of DDR.

Wiedmann Mautz (CDU/CSU) called for the implementation of "networked security" with the goal of security, development and state-building (Ibid, pp. 3729f). Schwabe (SPD) calls for judicial reform in the Sahel, fight corruption, and achieve regional stabilization through the integration of development assistance and military elements under an "integrated approach" (Ibid, p. 3739). On June 12, 23, the Scholz government presented a national security strategy, in which it presented the concept of integrated security. The concept of integrated security is defined as the promotion of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and

peace through civilian, military, and police means under multilateralism (Die Bundesregierung 2023: 6).

C3) Dispatch Troops as a Means of Achieving A2, A3 and A7 (☉)

Abraham (CDU/CSU) justifies the deployment of troops on the grounds that security stability is necessary to defend democracy and advance the process of EU accession (Ibid, 8. 7. 2022, pp. 5151). Güller (CDU/CSU) supported an extension to the Illini deployment in view of strengthening the CSDP, but criticized the Libyan Navy's non-participation in training as unilateralism (Ibid, 7. 4. 2022, p. 2437). Thus, politicians of established parties, except for the AfD and the Left Party, embrace the idea of a fusion of A2 and A3, A7 and B2.

C4) Interest (○△)

Merle Spellerberg (Green Party) sees the security of the Malian people as a benefit through the deployment of military troops (Ibid, 20. 5. 2022, p. 3727). Güller (CDU/CSU) sees the stabilization of the Sahel region through military deployments as in Germany's interest.

C5) Responsibility (☉)

Wadephul (CDU/CSU) considers it Germany's responsibility to deal with hunger and terrorism in Mali and the Sahel region, and to support the United Nations. Spellerberg (Green Party) sees filling the void left by the evacuated French troops, airlifting relief supplies and operating airfields as Germany's new responsibilities (Ibid, 20. 5. 2022, p. 3728). Krämer (Green Party) and Abraham (CDU/CSU) see it as Germany's responsibility to prevent wars and ethnic conflicts in Europe and to defend democracy (Ibid, 8. 7. 2022, pp. 5150f). Karamba Diaby (SPD) sees promotion of education, political participation and employment in Libya as its responsibility (Ibid, 29. 4. 2022, p. 2935). Max Lucks (Green Party) sees the creation of peace and stability in Libya as Germany's responsibility (Ibid, 7. 4. 2022, p. 2432). They assume the deployment of federal troops to accomplish these responsibilities. In this respect, their view of responsibility is a fusion of the ideas of A2 and B2.

C6) Coexistence of A7 and B7

In the same speech about the active achievement of peace in Europe and the increase in defense spending to that end, Chancellor Scholz spoke of his intention to achieve climate neutrality by 2045 in terms of energy security (Ibid, 27. 2. 2022, pp. 1350-3).

Conclusion

In the wake of the Russian invasion to Ukraine in February 2022, German security policy changed from prudent to assertive one. "Policy entrepreneur" led to Militarization of German foreign policy. Thereby, they broke the taboo norm about weapon provision much more deeply. As the result, Germany mostly abandoned the "culture of restraint."

In addition, they decided to strongly promote militarization and increase the defense expenditure-to-GDP ratio from about 1.5% in 2019 to more than 2% by 2024. Moreover, German energy policy changed after the occurrence of Russian Ukraine war. Germany boosted the speed of introducing RES. Moreover, Germany promoted the diversification of

energy import and export destinations. Further, Germany reoperated the nuclear and coal power plants with due date.

In the Scholz government's China policy, there has been inconsistency. The background of this policy inconsistency can be explained to some extent by the theory of political party differences. Under the Merkel government under Grand coalition, there existed consensus within the ruling parties over a "transformation through trade" strategy. However, there exists the conflict within the Scholz government about China policy between the Green Party and FDP, which pursues ideals, and the SPD, which emphasizes economic interests, and it has created inconsistency in China policy. German China strategy changed firstly that Germany decided to downgrade the dependency on China in the critical fields such as economy, key technology and important raw materials from the aspect of economy security under the word of De-Risking. As such, Germany seeks diverse trade and supply chains. At the same time, the Chinese market remains of great importance for German companies. Secondly, Germany has strengthened to regard China as the villain much more which is trying to reshape the rules-based international order. Thirdly, Germany will expand the relations with Taiwan, but it does not change the so-called one-China policy.

German foreign policy, like the two-faced god Janus, fuses the ideas of civilian power and "normal great power," but possesses a "*Leitbild*" in which the latter is superior. Politicians justified the deployment of troops under the logic that local stability based on military force was essential as a prerequisite for advancing local development and democratization. They also saw Germany's responsibility as an idea of promoting democratization, political education, and job creation by using military force to stabilize the region. In these we find a fusion of the ideas of A2, A7 and B2.

In addition, a fusion of A7 and B2 ideas, such as C1, was shown. Although B9 and C1 differ in whether development assistance or securities are at the top of the list, they are common that they emphasize on both, creating a discursive fusion while being "on the same floor, dreaming differently." Politicians also justify military deployments under the logic of multilateralism, and a fusion of A3 and B2 can be found. Moreover, A7 and B7 coexist. This discursive fusion logic contributes to the fusion between the ideas that make up these of civilian power and that of "normal great power."

As Germany's party system since 2021 experiences increased fragmentation and polarization, reduced segmentation, and reduced convergence between the top two parties (Nakagawa 2021: p. 100), it has become much more difficult to build a consensus among ruling and opposition parties under such party system, and there is a potential risk that the leadership and foreign policy will become more unstable than during the Merkel government.

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