

***The Diversity to Reflect Domestic Interests on International Trade Policy:
Comparison of FTA Politics in Korea and Japan and the Role of Indirect Lobbying***

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Abstract

This study asks why the government of Korea paid 180 billion US Dollars as agricultural subsidies in ratifying the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States despite the nation's farm lobby has not been influential. Compared with Japan, which the farm lobby has had rich political resources, the two major Korean farm lobby of the Korea Advanced Farmers Federation (KAFF) and the Korea Peasant League (KPL) had poor resources and had to rely on the street demonstration to express their opposition to the FTA. While the Japanese farm lobby gained the government's concession as a result of conventional style of lobbying, however, the street demonstration by the KAFF and the KPL played the role of indirect lobbying and pressured the government to increase the subsidies. This indicates diverse political channel to reflect political-economic interests on public policies.

Keywords: trade liberalization, farm lobby, Korea, Japan, indirect lobbying

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Introduction

This study asks why the government of South Korea (hereafter Korea) paid huge budget for its agricultural sector as the compensation of the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) comparing the political process of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in Japan.

Korea and Japan shares the characteristics of agriculture. Both of the two have mountainous landscape, which does not fit to use as farmland. In both of the two, each farm household cultivates less than three hectares, while an average farmer in Western Europe cultivates more than ten hectares. And most part of the two countries has cold and long winter, which prevents agricultural works. Therefore, both Korean and Japanese agriculture is too vulnerable to compete in international competition. This has been the major reason why most Korean and Japanese farmers have opposed to free trade.

On the other hand, the two countries' agriculture has distinguishing point: Farm lobby. In spite of its democratization in 1987, the farmers in Korea have not been organized influential political lobby such as the Japan Agriculture Group (JA Group) in Japan. The JA Group has been one of the most influential lobbying groups in Japan and the powerful supporter for the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Covering more than 10 million rural residents as its membership¹, which is equal to 10% of the nation's total voters, the JA Group has pressured the LDP government to protect Japanese agriculture. Its lobbying activity has gained huge concession from the government and the ruling party. In 1993, for example, the JA Group gained approximately half billion US Dollars as agricultural subsidies in exchange for approving the Uruguay Round Agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade². In Korea, meanwhile, two nationwide farmers' organizations of the Korea Advanced Farmers' Federation (KAFF) and the Korea Peasants' League (KPL) have been politically marginalized in the nation's political processes even after the democratization in 1987. The KAFF covers only 400 thousands farmers, one third of the total population of Korean farmers³. The KPL covers 20 thousand farmers, less than 2% of total farm population. Differently from the JA Group in Japan, these two Korean groups have no direct connections to the Office of the President, the National Assembly, or ruling parties. Both the KAFF and the KPL have employed street demonstration as a major tool of their political activities instead of pressuring policymakers mobilizing financial donation and ballots. This political weakness of farm lobby has been interpreted as the reason why Korean government has rapidly liberalized its trade⁴.

While the farmers have not been able to organized influential lobbying groups, however, the Government of Korea has paid huge budget for agriculture in liberalizing the nation's trade structure. In the case of the KORUS FTA, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) paid totally 21 trillion Won, or

¹ The JA-Zenchu (n.d.)

² Yoshida (2012)

³ KAFF (2014)

⁴ Nawakura (2017)

180 billion US Dollars, from 2009 to 2018⁵. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery of Japan expended 310 billion Yen, or 30 billion US Dollars, as agricultural subsidies on the TPP, de facto US-Japan TPP, in financial year 2016⁶. Even compared with Japan, where the farmers have organized influential lobby, Korea's farm sector gained much financial concession from its government in the process of trade liberalization.

Then, why did Korean farmers gain the huge compensation in spite of their poor political channel? Or why did the government of Korea expend huge domestic compensation for farm sector despite it is relatively free from the pressure of farm lobby? This study answers to these question focusing on the Korea's political process on the KORUS FTA and the Japan's one on the TPP. These two free trade pacts are ideal for comparison. The KORUS FTA is the largest FTA for Korea and the TPP is also the largest FTA for Japan⁷. In terms of agricultural products, the United States pressured Korea and Japan to remove most tariffs of agricultural products in the negotiation of these pacts. And these pacts triggered the farmers' strong opposition against the trade liberalization with the United States both in Korea and Japan.

The next chapter reviews previous studies on FTA politics and farm lobby in Korea and Japan. The Chapter 2 shows a hypothesis in this study. The Chapter 3 sees the farm lobby politics in Korea. The Chapter 4 sees that in Japan. And the Chapter 5 concludes this study.

1. Previous Studies on FTAs and Farm Lobby in Korea and Japan

Compared with the studies on farm lobby in the Western countries, those on Asian democratic countries have been minor. As one of the minor studies, Aurelia George Mulgan's work in 2000⁸ explains the lobbying process by the JA Group on the LDP. According to her study, the JA Group has pressured the LDP by mobilizing its huge membership, which covers most rural population in Japan. She also points out that the JA Group has not only lobbied the government and the LDP but also led political campaign to oppose unfavorable policies such as trade liberalization. From the perspective of a staff of the LDP, Osamu Yoshida's memoir in 2012⁹ reveals that the LDP lawmakers, particularly elected in rural constituencies, depended on political support by the JA Group. The two works above mention to single non transferrable vote (SNTV) system, the election system employed in the House of Representatives before 1994 and the House of Councillors still today, as the base for the JA Group's lobbying. The SNTV is the system to elect more than two representatives per constituency while each voter can write only one candidate's name on ballot. Under this system, parties need to nominate more than two candidates in every constituency and this encourages competition not only between parties but also among candidates in the same party. The SNTV system has, therefore, given candidates to rely on interest groups such as the JA Group rather than their party headquarters and this has made the JA Group influential on candidates in rural constituencies.

⁵ *The Chosun Ilbo* Dec. 18, 2008

⁶ Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (2015)

⁷ For the detail of the TPP and the KORUS FTA, see World Policy (2016)

⁸ Mulgan (2000)

⁹ Yoshida (2012)

In addition to the features of SNTV system, the Japan's election system has also worked to make rural constituencies over representative. Jun Saito and Yuki Asaba's study in 2012¹⁰ compared the FTA politics in Korea and Japan and concluded that the over representation in the House of Councillors has prevented Japanese government from promoting free trade.

After the SNTV system was abolished in the House of Representatives in 1994, therefore, the JA Group lost one of the major channels to be influential on policymakers. Ida's work in 2015¹¹ mentions that the JA Zenchu's political influence has been weakened since the 1990s. In fact, Yasuyuki Kobayashi, the chief of international planning in the Central Union of Agricultural Co-operatives (JA-Zenchu¹²) confessed that the abolish of SNTV and the introduction of single member constituency system to the House of Representatives in 1996 weakened the JA Group's political channel to the LDP¹³.

However, Otawara's work in 2008¹⁴ points out that the JA Group has already recognized that its lobbying channels has been narrow and has taken some countermeasures to sustain its political influence. According to Otawara, since the 1980s, the JA Group has sought the way to gain the support by broad public opinion to be influential socio-politically.

Compared with those on the farm lobby in Japan, previous studies on farmers' political action in Korea are rare. Though both the KAFF and the KPL have employed street demonstration as the main tool of their political activities¹⁵, the political influence and outcome of the street demonstration have been rarely analyzed in the field of political science. A few works to analyze the Korean farmers' street demonstration have shown skeptical view on the achievement of their political action. Go Myong-hyun and Ham Chai-bong's study in 2009¹⁶ analyzed the socio-political feature of the street demonstration to resist the import of US beef in 2008 and concluded that the demonstration was social phenomenon like epidemic, or fashion. Nawakura's study in 2017¹⁷ analyzed the KAFF and the KPL's protest against the Uruguay Round Agreement in 1993 and concluded that the Korean farmers' political action depending on street demonstration has formed poor channels with policymakers and let themselves politically less influential than the JA in Japan. In short, both Go and Ham's and Nawakura's studies see the Korean farmers' street action as minor and less influential activities from political peripheries. The argument in the previous studies above, however, cannot explain why the Korean farmers' peripheral political action has gained some concession by the government such as the expenditure of 180 billion dollars as the compensation of the KORUS-FTA.

¹⁰ Saito and Asaba (2012)

¹¹ Ida (2015)

¹² JA-Zenchu works as the national center of the JA-Group.

¹³ Author's interview at the JA Group Headquarters in Tokyo on November 28, 2017.

¹⁴ Otawara (2008)

¹⁵ In the case of the protest to the Uruguay Round Agreement in 1993, for example, the KPL mostly depended on street demonstration to express their anger on trade liberalization.

¹⁶ Go and Ham (2009)

¹⁷ Nawakura (2017)

Previous studies in political studies have offered insufficient explanation on the achievement of the Korean farmers' political action. Meanwhile, some recent studies in sociology point out that the street action by Korean farmers and their allies has been operated strategically to achieve their goals. Lee Hang-woo's research in 2012 argues¹⁸ that the street demonstration 2008 against the import of US beef was not simple bottom up networking activities but also collective action mobilized by top-down order to achieve a particular goal. Also the cross national by Ho Ming-sho and Hong Chen-shuo sees that the Korea's anti-US beef protest in 2008 aims to gain particular political goal¹⁹.

The literature review above suggests that this study needs some framework to see street demonstration, which the KAFF and KPL have employed, as a political action to achieve some particular goal. The following chapter shows the framework.

2. Theoretical Model and Hypothesis

This study employs the concept of indirect lobbying, which is the model to see social movement as a kind of lobbying, as the framework for analysis. While traditional concept of lobbying employed in political science has seen direct transaction between policy makers and interest groups, newly emerged concept of indirect lobbying defines social movement such as street demonstration, public relations, and petitions as a lobbying because they *indirectly* influence the decision of policy makers *via* the encouragement of public opinion as indicated in Figure 1. This framework emerged in the study of the European Union (EU) to ask why lobbying is active in Brussels despite most EU officers are not elected by the people's poll. On this question, the study of Bruycker in 2015²⁰ and Duer in 2015²¹ answer that the interest groups in Brussels promote public opinion to sympathize their preference by appearing on mass media's news programs, advertisement, and social networking sites on the Internet. The promoted public opinion, thus, works as a pressure on policymakers in the EU even if they are not elected by citizens directly because the decision making against the public opinion causes the distrust on the EU and it can prevent the policy implementation by the EU in near future.

¹⁸ Lee (2012)

¹⁹ Ho and Hong (2012). However, their study cannot show clear causal relation between the anti-US beef protest and the Korean government's counteractions.

²⁰ Bruycker (2015)

²¹ Duer (2015)




Figure 1: Concept of Indirect Lobbying
Source: Nawakura (2018)

In its history of mostly two decades, the studies on lobbying in the EU have revealed some important feature of indirect lobbying. First, though indirect lobbying can gain political concession from the government with lower cost than direct lobbying, the content of the concession cannot match the lobbyists' demand²². Though Korean government paid budget as concession, the KAFF and the KPL did not demanded subsidies but refuse the FTA itself.. Second, while direct lobbying is the influential activity to change the fundamental direction policy such as trade liberalization, indirect lobbying can be useful to gain more governmental expenditure such as subsidies²³. This fact is expected to contribute to explain why the Korean government expended the huge compensation. Third, in Europe, while newly emerged interest group coalitions attempt indirect lobbying in the EU level, most conventional interest groups remain to act in national level and tend to concentrate on direct lobbying on the governmental officials in the member states' government²⁴. This fact points out that only few interest groups attempt 'dual' lobbying, meaning that one interest group attempts both direct and indirect lobbying at the same time. According to the study by Otawara as observed above, meanwhile, the JA Group has sought to gain the support by public opinion to sustain its political influence while directly lobbying the LDP. Analysis on the recent JA Group, which attempt both direct and indirect lobbying, can contribute to the development of indirect lobbying model.

As seen above, indirect lobbying is like to be optimal framework to review the recent farm lobby in Korea and Japan. Based on the feature of indirect lobbying, the hypothesis of this study is launched as below.

H1: In the political process of the KORUS-FTA, the KAFF and the KPL mobilized street demonstration and it played the role of indirect lobbying. Because the indirect lobbying worked, the government of Korea expended huge budget as compensation.

²² Binderkrantz et al (2015)

²³ Nelson (2011)

²⁴ Rasmussen (2012)

H2: In the political process of the TPP, the JA Group attempted dual lobbying. Mobilizing both direct and indirect lobbying, the Group gained the budget of 30 billion dollars.

The following two chapters test whether the hypothesis above is approved.

3. Korean Farmers' Lobbying against the Korea-US FTA

The government of Korea agreed with Washington on the KORUS FTA at the end of March 2007. A few days later, the KAFF and the KPL began their protest against the FTA. Pointing out the fear of mad cow diseases, the two farmers' associations mobilized street demonstration insisting 'The KORUS FTA threatens our food safety.'²⁵ For both the KAFF and the KPL, there was only one tool to express their opposition to the FTA in national level: Mass media. Though the KAFF had built its own political channels to policymakers, they formed communication channels to only municipal and provincial assemblies²⁶. The KPL, with the membership of only twenty thousand, had no organizational capacity to lobby or to build platforms for lobbying by themselves²⁷ In the highly limited resources, The KAFF and the KPL attempted to encourage the mass public's opposition to the KORUS FTA.

The public disputes in spring 2008 on the import of US beef played the role of turning point for the KAFF and the KPL's activities against the KORUS FTA. Though Korea had banned the import of beef from the United States since 2004 due to the risk of mad cow disease, the newly inaugurated conservative President Lee Myung-bak decided to resume the import²⁸. This decision triggered the anger of public opinion of Korea because most opinion polls by major newspapers in early 2008 had indicated that the majority of Koreans had opposed to import risky beef from the United States²⁹. In April, twenty thousand citizens assembled to central Seoul and held candlelight demonstration to protest the government's decision.

The KAFF and the KPL joined the candlelight demonstration and insisted that the KORUS FTA encouraged the import of dangerous food such as infected beef.

The government had known that the KORUS FTA could cause serious damage. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) estimated the annual damage of Korean agriculture caused by the FTA as 1.2 trillion won, or 10 billion US Dollars, prior to the demonstration in spring 2008³⁰. Based on the estimation, the

²⁵ *The Chosun Ilbo* April 2, 2007

²⁶ Since the end of the 1980s, large number of KAFF members have run municipal or provincial elections and some of them have won. The elected members have acted as channels to connect the farmers and policymakers. However, these KAFF's activities have not reached to the level of the National Assembly (KAFF, 2014).

²⁷ Instead of lobbying by itself, the KPL has formed political alliance with trade unions and student groups to assist progressive parties.

²⁸ To avoid the risk of infected beef, the government of Korea permitted to import the beef from only cow less than thirty month old and introduced the inspection on the imported beef.

²⁹ Realmeter (2008)

³⁰ *The Dong-a Ilbo* Dec. 19, 2008

MAFRA launched the domestic compensation for farmers with 20 trillion Won, or 165 billion Won, during one decade following the FTA. However, both the KAFF and the KPL refused the governmental proposal because the compensation could not contribute to the sustainable production of Korean agriculture but cover a part of financial loss of farming households³¹. Setting 'sustainable production of Korean agriculture' as the goal, the two farmers' associations continued their anti-FTA demonstration after the government's proposal of financial compensation.

The anti-US beef candlelight protest expanded its size by forming networks encouraged by some Internet websites such as chatting. Though the networks had had no particular headquarters or leaders, some social activists launched the National Headquarters to Protest the Import of the Infected US (hereafter the National Headquarters) Beef in April 2008. This was an *ad hoc* but nationwide organization to cover most social groups to oppose the import of US beef. Following the broad protest to the import, most opinion polls conducted by major newspapers in early summer of 2008 indicated that the majority of public opinion was anxious to import risky food from overseas³².

The KAFF and the KPL joined the nationwide actions and insisted that the KORUS FTA could encourage the flood of imported risky foods such as infected beef³³. This flaming of argument contributed to link the beef import disputes and the KORUS FTA. The street protest opposed to not only beef import but also the KORUS FTA.

The broad opposition against the KORUS FTA appeared on TV news and newspapers almost everyday from spring to summer 2008. It gradually influenced the behavior of major opposition parties in the National Assembly. In the government-opposition party meeting on April 24 2008, Son Hak-gyu, the Chairman of the opposition Democratic Party, insisted on the President Lee that the ratification of the KORUS FTA is 'difficult due to the beef import disputes'³⁴.

While opposition parties began to oppose the ratification of the KORUS FTA, the social activists including the KAFF and the KPL continued the street protest. The continuous protest encouraged opposition parties further. When the government formally proposed the National Assembly to ratify the KORUS FTA, two major opposition parties of the Democratic Party and the Democratic Labor Party expressed their will to collaborate to disapprove the FTA.

Backed by the street protest, the opposition parties justified their protest against the KORUS FTA as a just and a democratic action. When a task force of the Office of the President declared to push the KORUS FTA by strengthening public relation in the end of October 2008 in spite of the broad opposition, Won Hye-yeong, a lawmaker of the Democratic Party, criticized the government was stealing the people³⁵. The opposition parties' strong opposition indicated that the government had to make some compromise on the FTA.

³¹ Author's interview at the KPL headquarters in Seoul on September 16, 2016.

³² Realmeter (2008)

³³ KAFF (2014)

³⁴ *The Chosun Ilbo* April 25, 2008

³⁵ *The Dong-a Ilbo* Nov. 1, 2008

On December 18, 2008, Chang Tae-pyung, the Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Affairs held a press conference and the MAFRA would pay extra one trillion won, or eight billion US Dollars, as domestic compensation to care the damage of agriculture by the KORUS FTA. The KAFF and the KPL demanded the FTA itself and refused the financial compensation. However, it is fact that the two farmers' associations' protest on the street influenced the behavior of opposition parties in the National Assembly and contributed to the financial compromise of the government on the FTA.

4. Japanese Farmers' Lobbying against the Trans-Pacific Partnership

Since November 2010, when Prime Minister Naoto Kan officially expressed his interest in joining the TPP, the JA Group has resisted to the multilateral trade liberalization pact of Asia-Pacific region. In July 2011, JA-Zenchu President Shigeru Motegi declared to resist the TPP without compromise³⁶. Following the Motegi's declaration, the JA group activated its opposition to the TPP. In December 2012, a JA branch in Miyagi Prefecture held a joint meeting to oppose the TPP with the Democratic Medical Institution of Miyagi and Consumers' Co-operative branches in Miyagi Prefecture³⁷. This joint meeting was remarkable for the JA Group because the Democratic Medical Institution has been a traditional supporter for the Japan Communist Party, the most hostile opposition party in the Diet. Also, joint action by the JA Group and the Consumers' Co-operative was distinctive event in the history of Japanese politics because the Consumers' Co-operative Act of Japan restricts the Co-op's political activity. Yasuyuki Kobayashi, chief of international planning in the JA-Zenchu told the author that the JA Group made the effort to encourage anti-TPP public opinion because conventional direct lobbying has been difficult³⁸.

After the government officially joined the TPP negotiation in March 2013, the JA Group began to lobby the LDP directly while continuing the promotion of public opinion against the TPP. After the contact of the cadres of the JA Group and the LDP lawmakers, in April 2013, the Standing Committee of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery in the House of Councillors passed a resolution on the TPP. This resolution demands the government to exclude sensitive agricultural products such as rice, wheat, meat, dairy products, and sugar from the TPP negotiation³⁹. This resolution worked as a 'defense line' for the JA Group to lobby against the TPP directly and indirectly.

Based on the resolution in the Diet, the JA Group pressured the LDP lawmakers. Particularly in the Diet elections, the JA Group demanded every LDP candidates to approve the resolution and oppose the TPP⁴⁰. As mentioned above, the JA Group's political influence has been weakened for the last two decades. Mass media reported the JA Group's lobbying was not powerful as ever⁴¹. As Ida⁴² points out, however,

³⁶ *The Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Shimbun* June 22, 2011

³⁷ JA Miyagi (2013)

³⁸ Author's interview at the JA Group Headquarters in Tokyo on November 28, 2017.

³⁹ House of Councillors (2013)

⁴⁰ *The Sankei Shimbun* Dec. 6, 2014

⁴¹ *The Sankei Shimbun* Dec. 6, 2014

⁴² Ida (2015)

prefectural branches of the JA Group sustained its organizational resources to mobilize farmers and to contact lawmakers. Based on these resources, the JA Group lobbied the LDP.

After the resolution in the Diet, the JA Group and the LDP played power game on the TPP. Because the LDP had decreased its dependence on rural collective ballots, the Party rejected to accept every request by the JA Group. Shinjiro Koizumi, a LDP lawmaker, warned the JA Group on May 2016 that the Group needs to reform its inefficient retailing networks to fight competition following the TPP⁴³. The Party's approach to the JA Group was based on the confidence that the Party does not need necessarily the support from the JA Group while the JA Group needs legal protection on agriculture provided by the LDP government. Based on the confidence, in the elections of the Diet, the LDP demanded the JA Group to support some candidates who approved the TPP⁴⁴. The JA Group, on the other hand, mobilized its huge membership to be influential on the LDP government. While supporting some pro-TPP LDP candidates in a few prefectures, the Group swung its support to opposition parties in other prefectures⁴⁵. Through these power games, the JA Group demanded the LDP government to protect Japanese agriculture in the TPP.

On the other hand, the JA Group's efforts to gain the support of wider public opinion in grass roots level fell into the deadlock until the end of 2013. First of all, the cooperation with pro-Communist Party associations was not sustainable. As the Diet elections were repeatedly held in 2013, 2014, and 2016, JA Group supported the LDP and it prevented to strengthen the cooperation with pro-opposition party organizations. Also, the cooperation with Consumers' Co-operatives and trade unions faced the gap of ideology. While the JA Group has been one of the core supporters for the conservative LDP, Consumers' Co-operatives and trade unions have been politically neutral or pro-opposition parties⁴⁶. Due to the lack of cross-sectional action as seen in Korea, the JA Group's action to promote anti-TPP did not work substantially. Differently from Korea, anti-TPP street action with tens of thousands of participants did not occur in Tokyo. Though fifty to hundred JA youth members organized street demonstration in Tokyo or their home town, the small size of protest did not attract mass media⁴⁷. Furthermore, the JA Group's street demonstration changed its message frequently. In the case of the protest in Yamagata Prefecture in summer 2015, for example, some local JA units insisted that the government had to follow the Diet resolution, other units insisted to reject the TPP without any compromise⁴⁸. These

⁴³ *The Mainichi Shimbun* May 2, 2016

⁴⁴ Mr. X (anonymous), a JA cadre in Miyagi prefecture, confessed the author that the JA branches in Miyagi prefecture supported some LDP candidates including the supporters for the TPP against their will in the past elections.

⁴⁵ Hirokazu Haraguchi, one of the famous lawmakers in opposition parties elected in Saga Prefecture, confessed to the author's interview on May 30, 2018 that he had gained substantial support from farmers' organizations in his home constituency.

⁴⁶ Yasuyuki Kobayashi of the JA Zenchu told the authors that the Consumers' Co-operatives and trade unions had demanded the JA Group to sympathize their ideology while not a few JA cadres have had allergy on progressive activism.

⁴⁷ From 2012 to 2014, only a few anti-TPP street demonstrations by the JA Group appeared as the headlines of nationwide-issued daily newspapers.

⁴⁸ JA Okitama (2015)

resulted in that the JA Group insisted different message in different opportunity and place. It caused the confusion of mass public in knowing the JA Group's opinion on the TPP. In short, the partisanship and the absence of preparation to organize street action prevented the JA Group's activities in grassroots level.

Though the indirect lobbying by the JA Group did not work substantially, its direct lobbying on the LDP government functioned. While sustaining the TPP negotiation, the LDP began to launch financial support to protect farm sector under the TPP. On November 2015, the LDP lawmakers held a meeting to demand the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) to prepare the budget for protecting agriculture. Besides the meeting the LDP lawmakers also held the meeting with the delegates of the JA Group⁴⁹. Though Prime Minister Abe and his government pushed the TPP, individual lawmakers in the LDP needed collective ballots of the farmers for coming elections. Finally the Party decided to demand the MAFF to implement agriculture protection measures following the TPP and to expend more than 30 billion dollars for the first financial year⁵⁰. Because the government estimated the agricultural sector's damage caused by the TPP as 130 to 210 billion Yen, or 12 to 19 billion US Dollars, per year⁵¹, the size of the expenditure of 30 dollars was not insufficient. The MAFF accepted the LDP's plan and declared to secure the 30 billion Dollars of budget not only the first financial year but also following years.

In the TPP politics, the JA Group attempted both direct and indirect lobbying to protect its interests. While conventional direct lobbying worked and brought the Group the subsidies more than 30 billion Dollars, indirect lobbying did not due to the Group's partisanship. In other words, the JA Group's strong tie with the conservative LDP prevented its indirect lobbying while the tie encouraged the JA Group's direct lobbying. This indicates indirect lobbying requires different resources from direct one to its actors.

5. Conclusion and Theoretical Implication

Korea and Japan have shared their agricultural structure and, in recent years, have faced similar challenge: Trade liberalization including agricultural products. While the government of Korea launched the KORUS FTA, also Japan joined the TPP. In addition, both the two countries have expended huge budget as compensation for agriculture in exchange for ratifying the free trade pacts with the United States despite the two countries have different structure in terms of farm lobby. Setting two hypotheses, this study has asked why Korean government paid huge budget for agriculture in the absence of influential farm lobby in comparison with Japan.

The analysis above indicates the answer to the question. First, the political process of Korea indicates that the Hypothesis 1 is approved. While the KAFF and the KPL had poor political resources for conventional direct lobbying, the two farm associations operated street protest to express their opposition against the KORUS FTA. Encouraged by the beef import disputes, their street protest got broader social sympathy to oppose the FTA. The mass public's protest influenced the behavior of

⁴⁹ MP Kazuo Maeda's Website (2015)

⁵⁰ *The Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Shimbun* Dec. 18, 2015

⁵¹ MAFF (n.d.)

opposition parties in the National Assembly and contributed the government's concession to expend another one billion won for the compensation for agricultural sector. In increasing the government's expenditure of concession, in short, indirect lobbying worked.

Second, meanwhile, the Hypothesis 2 is not approved. Though the JA Group attempted get broad social support to resist the TPP, its partisanship and absence of preparation prevented to form social alliance. Instead, the JA Group gained the government's expenditure of 30 billion dollars as the result of conventional direct lobbying on the ruling LDP.

From the perspective of the theory of lobbying, the comparative analysis in this study indicates that indirect lobbying can maximize the influence of interest groups with poor political resources. The previous studies in European politics indicate that indirect lobbying can be a useful tool to make interest groups influential on government organizations whose officers are not elected by the citizens' vote. On the other hand, this study shows that the interest groups with poor resources such as the KAFF and the KPL can be as influential as those with rich resources such as the JA Group if they succeed to operate indirect lobbying effectively. This means that the lobbying channels can be more diverse than the studies of classic direct lobbying studies have thought.

However, the KAFF and the KPL's indirect lobbying observed in this case study was encouraged by an intervening variable: The beef import disputes prior to the ratification of the KORUS FTA. It is the future's subject to generalize the achievement of the two groups' indirect lobbying.

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