NonStandard Ethics

Luís Homem, University of Lisbon, Portugal

Contemporary Ethics is, mathematically speaking, a field bewildered by its natural commutativity axiom, wherein any nonzero element is invertible. Not only disempowerment, segregation, aggresion, torture, death murder, terrorism, Nature depletion, but, even, genocide has, for any occasion, one integer to its inverse ($x \neq x^{-1}$), meaning with this that there is at least one n-tuple conscience [intention, belief, knowledge, action] willing to subscribe the inverse.

The canonical and strict *orthos*-axis of Ethics, commanding the different normative standard vectors through *ethos* and *mores*, is, of course, a perpetual derivative but, at present, also non-Classical with respect to different gradients and an orphan of a Foundation of Morals. Ethics is maximally non-congruent with a Metaphysic of Morals as interpreted by Kant, with a Categorical Imperative as the Supreme Principle of Morality, envisaged in one such *n*-tuple conscience as the following: [good will, imperatives, pratical reason, the formula for the Universal law of Nature].

And this *mergere* within the derivative patterns of Ethics is best exemplified by the effects of Physics and Biology on Ethics, in reductionism, from the atom and the cell. Intergenerational Equity and Environmental Ethics, on one side, and Bioethics, on the other, have, in their own rights, commanded the debate, oscillating between responsibility and normativity. It is the purport of this paper to dissert on the ambivalence of Contemporary Ethics, between Classical limits (The Golden Rule, Leviticus 19:18) and the exhaustion of potentially infinite (∞) many infinitesimals (ε) of non-integrality, in NonStandard Analysis, rethinking the Foundation of Morals from Mathematics in Leibnizian style.

Mathematics and Morals

The problem on the parallel between mathematics and morals commences disturbingly with the problem of parallels. The famous fifth postulate of the Euclidean Elements "If a line falls on two other lines so that the measure of the two interior angles on the same side of the transversal add up to less than two right angles then the lines eventually intersect on that side and, therefore, are not parallel." (Euclid, Elements, Book One) not only is a landmark fundamental postulate that divides Euclidian geometry from absolute or neutral geometry, but has also been a dividing ground on which the paramount alternative geometrical asserting views of Posidonius, Ptolemy and Proclo were cemented.

Euclid was just as important in congregating the sapience of Hippocrates, Pythagoras and Eudoxus, as with the fifth postulate igniting a whole readdress of geometrical considerations, simply by having driven followers to explore *reductio ad absurdum*, originally an Aristotelian counter-inference stratagem, in the face of the fifth postulate. A lineage of great geometers was, thus, captivated by imagining what was to come if the fifth postulate on the parallels did not hold. Ibn Al-Haythau (Alhazen), a *Ptolomeus Secundus*, Omar Khayyám, who predated Descartes´ method of geometrical algebra, Nasir Al-Din Al-Tusi, who endeavored into the limits of what would be later known as elliptical and hyperbolic geometry, are all fitting examples belonging to either Arab or Islamic civilization.

After the Discoveries and Europe´s Renaissance, Giovanni Sacheri, whose work seems a resurgence of Omar Khayyám in the era of calculus, Carl Gauss, who compacted and short-bodied geometry with both integral and differential calculus, as well as linear and multilinear algebra in R^3, János Bolyai and Nikolai Lobachevski who shared multiple discoveries in non-Euclidian geometry, and Riemann, who introduced dynamic tensors in higher dimensions, are to complete the referred lineage. Interesting to note, attesting Euclid´s omnipresent shadow, if forgotten the *memorabilia in titulus* in Newton´s *Principia Mathematica*, is the bare *reductio ad nominem* contained in the expression "non-Euclidean" geometry to refer to either elliptic or, most often, hyperbolic geometry.

Not to forget also that Euclid, in a geometrical metaphor, having acted between two points - Plato and Eratosthenes - thus, having lived in the time of Ptolemy and Archimedes, by this exceptional stand in relation to the emergence of the Platonist Academy, wherein the dialectic debate about the Good looked upon to the frontispiece *dictum* "Let None But Geometers Enter Here" typical of an exclusive society, embodied the idea of the parallel and inseparable wishful "royal roads" of ethics and geometry. And now a pertinent question:

What tells us about the earthly and axiomatically common vindication of ethics and morals, ultimately of less speculative nature if compared with geometry, to recall the fact that a prominent moral and political philosopher of our age, such as John Rawls, has in the major work, *A Theory of Justice* (1971), revindicated the status of a tendentially deductive moral reasoning envisaged in Euclidian full bloom?

*"We should strive for a kind of moral geometry with all the rigor which this name connotes. Unhappily the reasoning I shall give will fall far short of this, since it is highly intuitive throughout. Yet it is essential to have in mind the ideal one would like to achieve."(*Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition, the Belknap press of Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, p. 105)

And, in respect to a sort of *orthos*-axis and ethics analyticity, with integral and differential gradients, John Rawls has added:

"There are indefinitely many variations of the initial situation and therefore no doubt indefinitely many theorems of moral geometry" (Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition, the Belknap Press of Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, p. 109)

In between the long time from Plato to Rawls, geometry has diverged in speculative endeavors from different stances of axioms, with founded and progressive disregard of metric and equivalent (reflexive, symmetric and transitive) nevertheless persisting, congruent structures. As seen in the preceding discussion, these structures always held still in recognition the stronghold fundamental axioms. Never were the geometrical fundamental axioms disdained, not even and probably ever more so for the time being since Berkeley´s *immaterialist* idealism and Hume´s empiricist *causation*, let alone the ethicist fact that John Rawls is subsequent to the *Shoah* (a debacle which questionably grants authority to a historically deductive moral philosophy).

The fundamental axioms were to be left, intrinsically by nature, Euclidian. Not that it is not clear that morals and mathematics are infinitely set apart realms, even though, depending on the plane of thought, possibly parallel.

Euclidian geometry seems, therefore, with time past, to have equaled the trustworthy perception of space.

In like manner, it seems acceptable that ethics and morals remain, as in the Rawlsian framework, heuristically and optimistically Euclidian. This is so independent of ethics and morals having been, throughout the history of philosophy, *transformational* challenged.

We here address the sense of "transformation" of ethics and morals as though geometrical and one-one bi-continuous topological (*in continuum*), that is, being permitted either to be stressed from the interior or drifted astray. This is consentaneous with both the critical and intuitionistic traditions which assert either conceptual or representational phenomena to the object-in-itself by means of perceived sensibility, thus allowing space to present a theatre to the mind, inasmuch as the mind is imagined to represent a theatre within itself (as Daniel Dennett pointed out through the idea of a "Cartesian theatre").

It is, hence, by both these facets - a mindful sense of perceptional idealism and moral geometry combined - that it is explained, in the first place, the reason why Euclid of Alexandria carefully and deductively brought up at the end of the production in thirteen volumes, in its furthermost and exceeding point and pinnacle of *The Elements*, (Book XIII), the Platonic solids (regular, convex, polyhedron with faces of regular polygons and the same number of faces meeting each vertex, thus, also equiangular).

In such fashion, the Platonic dialogue *Timaeus* (an idealized prolonging of *The Republic*) is paired with Euclid´s last book in presenting the regular solids, again not just entangling, but also entailing morals with geometry.

The tetrahedron (or pyramid), the hexahedron (or cube), the dodecahedron (twelve faces), all discovered and known by the Pythagoreans, the octahedron (eight faces) and the icosahedron (twenty faces), in their turn discovered by Theatetus, all compose the five regular solids of Euclidian geometry (Plato had retrenched the solids to the group of four only, leaving out the dodecahedron, in faithful allegiance to the Pythagorean tradition).

The regular solids were typically an object of (perceptional) knowledge under the evidential-algebraic Greek style of μάθημα (*mathema*) display, making full use of spatial *rationes* or *geo*-imaginary fundamental structures that Pythagoras called "numbers" (notationally numbers were the decimal base list of the first nine letters of the old Ionic alphabet from *alpha* to *theta*).

In due course, citing the importance of *siti et loca* on γαια (gaia), we should always bear in mind that the Pre-Socratics constitute a sort of Ionian conflux or Asia Minor reoccurrence. In the Kirk's, Raven's and Schofield's rearing framework we find a circle closing line from the first Ionians - Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes of Miletus, Xenophanes of Colophon and Heraclitus of Ephesus, to the late Ionians, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Melissus and the atomists Leucippus and Democritus. All of them were, indeed, bestrew in the hiatus by both the Continental and Ionian strong influence of Pythagoras. And to the Pythagorean groundwork, we could furthermore knot the Eleatics ἕνωσις (henosis) similarity with the entrenching Hebraic monism ascending in the line south from Troy, Ephesus, Samos, Miletus and Halicarnassos, passing though Damascus,

Cafarnaum, Jaffa, Jerusalem and south further to Egypt. Interesting to note, in a close range arch (⌒), is located, we know today as a fact, the actual geographical center (superficial barycenter) of the Earth.

In *fairness* and philosophically, "numbers" in the Hellenistic tradition (as equally in the Hebrew tradition, both antithetical to the Egyptian ideogrammatic system) were better described as a sort of both conceptual and sensualist-vivid image of positive integers. As such, they intermingled and perhaps commingled different notions such as ιδεα (*idéa*), μορφή (*morphē*), εἶδος (*eîdos*), and παράδειγμα (*parádeigma*), but also γένος (*génos*), φύσις (*phýsis*), and οὐσία (*ousía*). Notably, the tradition from Pythagoras to Plato stages the Greek tradition by letting the theory of forms have the eternal good accommodate, in such way and in representational terms, *solid loci*.

Comprehensively, thus, the Platonic solids were subjects of work under the theory of irrationals, namely with Theatetus in the leading, by the method of inscribing the polygons inside a sphere and accounting for the remainder of the surface. This operation holds similarity with the problem of the incommensurables, by imagining successively interior polygons to the circle drawing near to the perimeter. This deportment is akin to the idea of the arch of a circle being composed, in abstract, by infinitesimal straight lines, one such idea that is, in its turn, historically *affine* with the practice of geometers of the XVII century.

Before proceeding to a closer inquiry into the special relations that the emergence of differential and integral calculus, led by Leibniz (and Newton), until modern Nonstandard Analysis conceptions, have determined until now the perception of Morals and Metaethics, we should assent the view that deeply lodged in the Hellenistic tradition was already and in unfathomable geometric terms the great set of categorical philosophical distinctions, often transporting antithetical, paradoxical, antipodean, refractory, and, even, intractable problems, of which a significant illustration of the most relevant comes as follows: Monism *versus* Pluralism, Materialism *versus* Idealism, Plenism *versus* Atomism, Chance *versus* Necessity, and Finite *versus* Infinite. We shall accentuate the importance of the last and closing dyad.

In the overall, we should be cognizant of the factualness that morals and geometry have been accompanied one by the other from the inception, all through the latter´s three fundamental stages - spatial geometry, analytic geometry and transformational geometry. One such view might even legitimize the view of an idealistic boundless and a sort of Gödelian dream that renders Platonism rather canonical (at worst, in evolutionary terms), instead of Platonism or mathematical realism being seen as an exceptional and out of the ordinary doctrine. Mathematical realism, in sequence and very much to the contrary, according to the archeology of philosophy is shown to be evolutionary outstanding and exceptional, which creates a natural (and dialectic) antinomy. By this we mean that it might just be apparent itself, and not a real opposition wherein a thesis is necessarily opposed to an antithesis.

The original four antinomies short of the establishment of rational truths disclosed by Kant were all, instead, real empirical laws impossible to be rescued by successive synthesis, being them the limitation of space and time, the indivisibility of atoms or irreducible units of matter, the problem of free will and causality and, as a final point, the existence of a necessary being.

In terms of spatial geometry (polygons, solids, circumferences, circles, angles and other sort of isometric relations), the foreground work led by Thales of Miletus and the special inroad of Cosmological "Politics" in its core, ensued further by the Pythagorean geometrical (and musical) *ethos*, derive to an extraordinary *acme* that, toward the III century B.C. concurs with accomplished Platonism and the founded institution of the Academy in Athens.

This new geometrical *ethos* converged everlastingly into the axiomatic and theorematic attestation proper of Euclid, the mechanical genius of Archimedes, and the work on conic sections led by Apollonius which may be said having advanced cosmologically (thus dynamically) and analytically (thus, mathematically) the future hypothesis of eccentric orbits. This work was based on the intersections of a cone (the already knew at the time circle, and by the time of Apollonius the newly coined ellipse, parabola and hyperbola).

Without the latter, the advances of Pascal, Descartes, Desargues, Halley, Newton, and Leibniz themselves could not have been brought into existence.

The Greek fountain most definitely seizes what Michel Serres, relying on the figure of Hermes, has designated, in the essay *Origine de la geométrie* (1980) as "wisdom of spatial schemes", "alphabetic-algebraic culture" and a "proto-geometry" in a "logo-syllabic" arena, as if "alphabetizing hieroglyphs" in the outset, would have constituted and been the paramount signal of a ceaseless, both transformational and analytical (formal and intuitionistic) *esse est percipere*. This anchors also in a wide sense on the importance of a sort of *Poétique de l'Espace* in the mindfulness sensitivity as Gaston Bachelard reclaimed. In chapter one of the book *The New Scientific Spirit* (1934) entitled "Dilemmas in the Philosophy of Geometry", Bachelard wrote the following:

"It´s on the immutable character of the architecture of geometry that Kant fundaments the architecture of human reason. If geometry divides itself, Kantianism can only be saved by inscribing principles of division in reason itself, opening rationalism."(my Trans.)

Within this passage is a culmination of the full appraisement that we, by invoking the following paragraphs, take into consideration for the structure of this paper.

Firstly, with this passage and the reference to Kantianism, it is clear that what is under focus withal and never to forget is Kant´s moral anthropology and practical reason, namely, the deontological formulation made explicit since the *Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals* (1785) and the accomplishment of the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), in which *terminus* is involved the notion of practical reason and whose *integrality* is conveniently summarized in the expression [good will, imperatives, practical reason, the formula for the Universal law of Nature].

Within this incontrovertible formal expression are also positively included the three formulations for the Universal law of Nature (incorporating also the "Formula of the end in itself" and the "Formula of Autonomy", whose hidden prepossession in favor of the "Formula for the Universal Law of Nature" has to do more with the fact that, though the first and not the synthesis, it aims for a natural law and original social contract. Of proof enough of the aforesaid serves the amplification to the "original position" neo-Kantian experiment in John Rawls' *Justice and Fairness*, curiously vindicated by means of what he called a "lexical priority").

Secondly, in the expression "*opening* rationalism" the italicized "opening" used by Bachelard meets, we believe, the sense already referred by us of "transformational challenged". The same is saying that the *corpus* of rationalism depended on the architecture of geometry of pure theoretical and practical reason (Platonist and Euclidian, in retrospective and in essence) for the permanence of its congruence classes and invariant properties, is of one such nature that it permits transformations affecting morals and ethics. If such transformations are arisen, by way of new orientations, magnification or contraction of certain properties, in limit, to all possible "topological" deformations (by means of any one-one bi-continuous permitted transformation), then the ensemble of *ethos* and *mores* is challenged. With this being said, we furthermore make implicit not only the (ethical and, even, religious, *credere* analogous) value of the trustworthiness contained in the simple perception of space, affine with the discrete value of geometrical boundedness, limits and finiteness, but also that the mindful sense of perceptional idealism and moral geometry combined are themselves *connected* and *in continuum* in one such fashion that ethics shares a *geometria situs* and an *analysis situs* alike, wherein and by which infinitesimal variation and analytic expression are convoked.

It can also be said that morals assume the duties of a projective geometry. The idea behind this statement is that moral anthropology (and, most especially, its deontological codification and Kantianism) presupposes the mental apperception of points at infinity, ideally rejoining parallels (impossible in Euclidian elementary geometry), resounding, thus, in the demarcation of critical limits. This is attestable in Kant´s *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the section of "The Antinomy of pure Reason", right after Kant having pointed out that the transcendental paralogism produced in the mind is only a one-third illusion, meaning with this that is only concerned with the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility of objects in general, which, in turn, prompt the already referred four antinomies (related with composition, division, origination and dependence, all of which except dependence are habitable in exclusively spatial and geometrical terms):

"Very different is the case when we apply reason to the objective synthesis of phenomena. Here, certainly, reason establishes, with much plausibility, its principle of unconditioned unity; but it very soon falls into such contradictions that it is compelled, in relation to cosmology, to renounce its pretensions." (Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, Kant´s Critiques, Wilder Publications, p. 204)

This is, in general, the reason why we envisage an unavoidable geometrical and analytical representation of Ethics, whose uttermost and crowning Euclidian (in integrality) and Platonist (in differential) conception rose to crescendo until Spinoza´s *Ethics* in *geometrico demonstrata ordine*, having at the same time Leibniz, as we shall understand, in the coetaneous period of calculus and henceforward, revolutionized to such apex *geometria situs* and *analysis situs* equally, that Metaethics really started a nonstandard era, despite of antagonistic views.

Spinoza's *Ethics* really represents, as you might say, a three-thirds illusion from the skeptic's point of view, and the very last example of one optically Platonist projective moral geometry, wherefrom knowledge of optics bears not anymore with the emission

theory of light (Newton´s theory being nonetheless of the sort in physical terms), all the same being morally settled according to Platonism and to the scientific prerequisites of the original Greek emission theory of light. The crystal spell was still captive within the very same sphere, without any possibility of a critical distance.

As for the matter yet of the projective moral geometry, from Jeremy Bentham´s *panopticon* and the foreshadowed utilitarianism and encapsulated decision theory therein contained, in the interval before the coming of Foucault´s criticism as the perfect metaphor for disciplinary societies, it is clear that the weight of moral *perspective* played a critical role in the orderliness of the discipline.

NonStandard Ethics

While Kant had as a lemma for deontological ethics *fiat justitia pereat mundus*, meaning "Let there be justice, though the world perish", Leibniz, a century earlier, without notice, in the inconclusiveness of his time, regularly set forth a conciliatory style of his own as to what concern the coming forth of the historical-philosophical classical opposition pairs. By this stance we mean what Leibniz himself wrote to Nicolas Redmond late in his life, referring to a synthesis of sects, hoping, in this fashion, to unite Catholicism and Protestantism, substantialism and dualism, materialism and phenomenalism, empiricism and rationalism, mechanism and scholastics, the Sacred texts and philosophy of law, atomism and synechism.

It is on one such pattern that is also assumed one integral and differential curve of ideations that Leibniz was able to chart, prior to the Critical Philosophy of Kant and Deontological Ethics, under the theory of pre-established harmony and the *Monadology*, thus, having found a transcendent meaning of an ontological *summum bonum* according to which the plane of the definite integral bounded by the graph of perceptiveness gradients finds derivatives in the slope of the tangent line of *ethos* and *mores*, for the sake of one Theodicy. It is by one such effect that is established the idea and sense of mirroring of the whole universe each from its own point of view, also images of the deity, as indicated in the Summary of the text *Discourse on Metaphysics* (1686) in what concern the theory of individual substances.

If noticed, the moral philosophy as found in Leibniz, comprising the angles of omnibenevolence, omnipotence, and omniscience, simultaneously trying to solve the problem of evil resorting, peculiarly, to a unadorned vacuum evidential of plenum, can only find equivalence to the degree of cosmological forgiveness and absolution of evil in Hegel´s philosophy of the Absolute. From this observation we can, in the main, bear witness of the very distant straightforwardness of one such deontological ethics proposed by Kant, in the interlude between Leibniz and Hegel, that demands through universalizability the categorical imperative in human deeds, as if it were the geometrical *ideal* straight line that was under consideration, and human action a promissory tangent.

These are all reasons and intellectual apprehensions related to contingencies proper to the history of philosophy, but, at last, what we think is worth to be mentioned in respect of ethics are, on the contrary, the formal-theoretical aspects behind the contraposition of infinitesimal views (and one intuitionistic *continuum*) against the discrete and integral

views, which, concurrently accrue, still and all differentiating, the continuous vocation of geometry and the discrete elemental nature of arithmetic and algebra.

This aspect is very is salient as it helps better to understand the "representational concomitance" of the body and the soul in Leibniz´s philosophy, next to the assertion that "corresponding is more than merely coinciding" (T12.5 G.W. Leibniz, Oxford Philosophical Texts) which, conclusively, benefits the comprehension of not only why Cartesianism and mechanicalism are overtaken by the metaphysical doctrine of dynamism, proper of active and indivisible entelechies or monads that admit non-mechanical principles, as also the assertion that "Everything happens in the soul as if there were no body, just as ... everything happens in the body as if there were no soul." (T16.8, G.W. Leibniz, Oxford Philosophical Texts).

This formal pronouncement avowals individual prismatic ideality of space combined with the new calculus. It embraces also, through a conciliatory and rational dialectics, a plane of *orthos*-axis with possible derivative choices, all under the motive of one Theodicy. At the same time frankly admits a fresh and unaccustomed value of mapping and function, which finds echo in the second-hand expression of the "idea that substances are individual things, *with* properties and not themselves the properties *of* anything else (...)" (T1.8, T1 App. A. G. W. Leibniz Oxford Philosophical Texts, R.S. Woolhouse, Richard Francks 1998). With this are also implicit the forerunner formal formulations of the transfer principle with the Leibnizian law of continuity, as, for the rest, the idea of structures in extensionality, a sort of nonstandard prerequisite without which the ensuing aspects could not follow. It could be said that the aforesaid "representational concomitance" is adequate to express from one side integral and discrete views, and, on the other side, infinite and infinitesimal analysis. Ethics is, thus, transferred in the same fluxion, being the most non-imparted substance, in fact the one only similarly consubstantial with matter, even if considered as the Cartesian one only substance, or even under the precedent "corpuscularianism" typical of Democritus and Epicurus.

It this, hence, this estimation that conjectures to find the ambiguity (standard *versus* nonstandard interpretations alike). Ethics is revealed affine with an archetypal (Platonist and the monistic approach of Spinoza) interpretation of morals and, at the same time, a non-metrical and intuitionistic approach (which utilitarianism alarmingly would fight against) and even, one could say, a vanishing hyper-reality of ethics, overwhelmed by the infinitesimal and the infinite.

It is not, though, exactly the nonstandard infinite and infinitesimal quantities that have shredded the most the Euclidian and Platonist geometrical morals, but instead, precisely, the mechanicalism fundamentals debasement, namely, the subsequent immaterial idealism of George Berkeley, and later on, David Hume´s scrutiny of the idea of causation (which Kantianism critically would fight against).

Most especially, the idea of causation in Hume´s philosophy, even if only dismantled to be rehabilitated later, as happened equally with the idea of *reality* in the philosophy of Berkeley, would never again quite grasp the newly abounding, exuberant field of possible relations between every critical limit considered (with this included infinitesimals to infinitesimals, infinite to infinite, and infinitesimals to infinite), resounding plenty in the geometry of morals considered before.

It is, thus, interesting to note how Leibniz welcomes wholeheartedly the Platonist and scholastic tradition, even more or even so affine with Spinoza´s *Ethics* in the

representation of a moral philosophy implied with *summum bonum*, even if the latter was deprived of a sense of Theodicy, and, at the same time capable of expounding embryonic nonstandard analysis.

It is true that modern ethics has derived later to normative conceptions and Intergenerational Justice and Bioethics are both the representative maximal and minimal critical limits in, respectively, cosmological and individual terms, but the study of proportion and the incommensurability field that account for its origin should not be lost.

As said before, all of this is clear in the notion of limits. A classical epsilon-delta limit is foreseen in the Religious Golden rule of the ethic of reciprocity:

"Thou shalt not take vengeance, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the Lord." (Leviticus 19:18)

While we know abundantly what was to come in terms of Kantianism about the critical notion of limits, it is also interesting to note the hidden sense of geometrical and mathematical *transformation* clandestinely present in the classical ethics of Leibniz, by means of integral and differential calculus analysis.

While firmly assuring the geometrical truth as eternal, the effect of expansion of one theistic ethics to a *summum bonum* theodicy, through a hidden veil and in a concealed manner, protrudes another ideation, which is the necessary objectivity of geometry and mathematics that Kantianism would receive.

This is particularly luminous in the following commentary on an argument of Leibniz against Cartesian speculations:

"Figuring in the second argument is a disagreement with Descartes about whether 'eternal' truths such as the necessary truths of geometry are dependent on God's will as well as on his understanding (see TT1. 2,2.4 §3, 19.46). His own view is that they are objectively true, independently of God's decision."(R.S. Woolhouse and Richard Francks, Editor's Introduction in G. W. Leibniz, Oxford Philosophical Texts, p.44)

Given as it is, it is almost saying, through Leibniz, that if God was called upon to respond morally to geometry's modes and existence, he could not do so, because geometry is morals *in its place* and, in actual fact, the decision already established and unavoidable. There was a pre-tension in the philosophy of Leibniz to a standard ethics tangent to its highest peak and a slope of the curve being arisen of nonstandard moral perspectives.

It can be said as well that one of the reasons why conventionalism, in terms of normative ethics, has, beyond doubt, exerted a bigger role than before, is that infinite and infinitesimal limits have come now to play together.

With this investigation we conclude that ethics itself, since Leibniz, has entered in an era of dynamism and the historical momentum and outstanding work of the Hannover *maître* responded to the integral value of past classical standard ethics, while marking differential values that are unavoidable to contemporary ethics, noticeably proponent of nonstandard analysis.