Ethnic Relations in Transnational Context : The Case Study of Chinese Indonesians - Indonesians Relations in Medan after Suharto

Chontida Auikool

Thammasat University, Thailand

0149

The Asian Conference on Arts & Humanities 2013

Official Conference Proceedings 2013

Abstract

The relations between Chinese and *'Pribumi'* Indonesians are unequivocally complicated, and vary according to global & local contexts. For decades, Chinese-*Pribumi* Indonesians relations have been very fragile. Ethnic tension had evidently reached its peak in 1998 and soon after that, many anti-Chinese riots took place in several cities, including Medan. This incident has unquestionably given an indelible memory of trauma and instability to Chinese Indonesians. In the Post-Suharto, the reformation government endorses the policy of multiculturalism and allows international observers to critique on the issue of Chinese-*Pribumi* protection and ethnic equality. These have certainly given rise to ethnic freedom as well as Chinese identity to re-emerge. Particularly in Medan, the Medan Chinese identity and community are well-built transnationally. And yet, they are less assimilated and integrated into local society.The research hence critically consider on the changes of the interethnic relations between Medan Chinese-*Pribumi* Indonesians after 1998 and aims to describe and analyze the considerable challenges in their relations, namely a strong ethnic-line, class differences and lacking of participation in civic life.

Significance of the Problem

Virtually every nation-state on the planet encompasses differing ethnic groups and cultural norms. As such, ethnic relations between varied groups are a crucial issue. There are several factors explaining why ethnic conflicts often occur and social harmony remains a rarity. Indonesia, in keeping with other multi-cultural and multi-ethnic states, has inevitably born witness to ethnic and cultural conflict. For decades, social harmony has been impeded by numerous ethnically driven disturbances. Episodes of anti-Chinese violence are an essential part of this infamous chaos. In particular, the May incident in 1998 marked the most infamous anti-Chinese riot in the history of the country. The events of that year have unquestionably left an indelible memory of trauma, impairing ethnic relations between the Chinese Indonesians and *'pribumi'* (local) Indonesians. Since then, Indonesian society has been left socially and politically fragile. Although the new regime has applied a democratic system and inclusive multi-cultural policy, ethnic relations among differing groups have not been significantly improved. Ethnic conflict and tension remains, to differing degrees, in the post-Suharto era. The case study of relations between Chinese Indonesians and *'pribumi'* Indonesians in Medan gives a clearer picture of the present state of ethnic relations within three different levels; local, national and global. This research critically considers changes in inter-ethnic relations between Medan Chinese and *'pribumi'* Indonesians in the reformation era as well as illustrating the considerable challenges in their relations.

Ethnic relations between Chinese Indonesians and Indonesians are deeply rooted in generations of conflict. The notion of a 'Chinese Problem' was intentionally introduced by the New Order regime as a means of strengthening support for the rigidness of the Indonesian nation in tackling the problem of the ethnic 'outsider.' Chinese Indonesians at that time faced steep obstacles to social progress as they were intentionally marginalized and discriminated against by the government. Outward forms of Chinese expression (for example, language, religion, tradition and organization) were denied and banned, with various negative Chinese Indonesian discourses fashioned and propagated by the state and the media. Yet, the discrimination policy proved to be ironic. While state policies culturally and socially discriminated against the Chinese Indonesians, Chinese Indonesian 'tycoons' enjoyed privileges and played important roles in the Indonesian national economy, where they were highly recognized. This set of circumstances left many Chinese Indonesians in a very difficult situation. As a consequence, hatred and pressure continued to rise, further complicating ethnic relations. Tensions eventually reached a peak in 1998. Soon after, the notorious May violence took place in several cities, including Medan. During the period of turbulence and instability, many Chinese Indonesians became the target of considerable hostility. Chinese businesses were looted and Chinese women were raped in many parts of the country. (Hoon, 2006; Purdey, 2003). These burdens made it exceedingly difficult for some Chinese Indonesians to continue the living inside the country as the riots granted them the new idea of being Chinese in Indonesia rather than 'Chinese Indonesians.'

However, the end of the May incidents coincided with the downfall of President Suharto, paving the way toward some degree of democratization and multiculturalism. Democracy became a significant tool in re-building the country, as well as accommodating ethnic and cultural differences in a similar way to the country's

ideology of 'unity in diversity.' The consequences of these reforms contributed to the activation of transnational Chinese networks and facilitated the re-emergence of a distinctive Chinese identity. Ethnic Chinese culture, religion, language, and media were extensively revitalized. (Dawis, 2008; Hoon, 2010; Surdiyananta, 2008). While Chinese Indonesians are no longer forced to be assimilated; a certain degree of prejudice and unfairness remains (Winarta, 2008, p. 65). Ethnic distrust and tension continues in certain areas. While ethnic relations are perceived as having slightly improved, this is largely dependent on the varied local contexts and the nature of differing social actors in deferent levels. For these reasons, the disruption has subsequently been brought to consideration in Chinese Indonesian studies as well as transnational studies.

Research Question

Why do ethnic relations between the Medan Chinese and the Indonesians in Medan remain strained despite efforts to encourage multiculturalism and democracy?

Methodology

The research employs qualitative methodologies through the application of primary and secondary sources. The qualitative methodology is advantageous for giving in-depth examination of certain phenomena. Fieldwork research helps one access primary sources, which reveals the studied subjects and collects new information at the place of study. Primary sources come via information obtained from interviews with groups and persons concerned: Chinese Indonesians in Medan who were victims of the 1998 riots. In this process, the collection of data is based on in-depth interviews with Medan Chinese. The author is also gravely aware of certain ethical issues. The informant's rights, as well as their privacy and the sensitivity of issues, will be protected. Moreover, secondary sources, which include academic works such as books, academic research, articles and reliable media sources, are also utilized in the study.

Scope

It is essential to study the trajectory of Chinese Indonesians between 1998 and the present year of 2012. The 1998 riots mark a critical juncture in Indonesian history, with the most infamous Chinese riots taking place all over Indonesia at that time, including in Medan. These events coincided with the closing stages of the Suharto presidency, the final period before the reformation era authoritatively emerged. This juncture altered the Chinese Indonesian circumstances in a positive way. Several assimilation and discriminatory regulations were removed, while globalization processes increasingly connected Indonesia to the outside world. Democracy and multiculturalism values increasingly predominated, becoming a more integral part of the country's re-building and paving the way toward Chinese Indonesian freedom in the political, cultural and economic arenas. Changes in Indonesian society also bolstered transnational economic activities and facilitated transnational Chinese networks. Medan provides a good example of the fragile ethnic relations between

Medan Chinese and Indonesians. While the riots have ended, ethnic conflict continues to plague the region. This is different from other locations in Indonesia, such as Java Island and Bali, where Chinese Indonesian - Indonesian relations are more peaceful and Chinese community is more integrated into local society. Moreover, the geography of Medan has its own unique and attractive features for study. The city is highly multicultural. It possesses a significant number of ethnic Chinese. Moreover, the Medan Chinese is very distinctive. Medan Chinese is highly preserved to continue to keep their Chinese traditions and language, *Hokkien* (Buiskool, 2009, p. 124). In contrast, the Chinese Indonesians in Java Island and Bali have become Indonesianized (Sidharta, 2004, p. 80). Lastly, Medan is a coastal city, providing the main gateway for foreigners to enter Sumatra Island. As it is located on the Melaka Strait, near Singapore and across from Penang, trans-border activities take place readily.

Main Argument and Hypothesis

Democracy and Multiculturalism opens space for ethnic freedom as well as tolerance towards differences. However, democracy alone cannot maintain peace at the local level. Sometimes, the democratization process paves the way toward certain tensions among ethnicities, especially when there is intervening factors such as business quarrels or religious strife. Ethnic conflicts tend to emerge at the place where civic life does not robustly exist in the democratic sphere.

Literature Review

Many studies have tried to figure out the problem over the sense of belonging among the Chinese Indonesians and how 'the Chinese problem' arose. Most studies point to the impact of Dutch colonial segregation policies. *'Divide et Imperia'* are held responsibile for ethnic Chinese exclusion from Indonesian society (Hoon, 2010; Somers, 1965; Suryadunata, 1992; Lembong, 2008). Thus, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Chinese Indonesians found assimilation into native society to be largely impracticable. Although the ethnic Chinese who settled in the archipelago were heterogeneous, they were frequently ignored. The *Peranakan,* who were mostly absorbed into the local society, and the new Chinese migrants, the *totoks,* were categorized into one racial group, the Foreign Orientals. With different legal rights and privileges, they were divided through a division of labor. The Dutch were in the wholesale business, the Chinese were involved in the intermediary trade, and the indigenous populations were mostly farmers and small traders (Lambong, 2008, p.49; Wertheim, 1964, p. 211-37). Accordingly, a pyramid hierarchy was intentionally built. Europeans were put on the top, the Chinese (as well as Arabian) merchants were put in the middle, and the natives were put at the bottom. Under these conditions, separated residences and differencing types of economic activity eventually lead to different social status and classes. At this stage, for the Chinese to assimilate into indigenous society, it would have meant a drop in social status and loss of privilege (Hoon, 2010). These conditions intensified the Indonesian perception that most Chinese Indonesians were outsiders, Dutch subject, *orang asing* (aliens), non-Indonesians, and not 'real Indonesias' (asli) no matter *Peranakan* or *totok*.

After independence, the situation of Chinese Indonesians became more complicated. In the midst of the Cold War, most Chinese Indonesians were accused of being communists. Chinese identity and cultural differences became a crucial part of

Indonesian politics at that time. Integration and assimilation approaches became significant debates in the country. Many Chinese Indonesians and Indonesians took different views in their views toward either integration or assimilation. It is implied that Chinese Indonesians tried to engage with the Indonesian nation and tackle national identity problems. Nonetheless, they still had their roles in the political sphere (Coppel, 1976; Somers, 1964). However, some regulations were introduced to discriminate against Chinese Indonesians, mostly in the economic arena.

However, Chinese Indonesians were clearly seen as a problem during the time of the Suharto presidency. As per state policy under Suharto, the Chinese Indonesians needed to be totally assimilated into local society (Lembong, 2008; Suryadinata, 2004; Copel, 2004). The removal of President Sukarno in 1965, and the beginning of the New Order, resulted in the victory of assimilationist ideology and the over throw of both the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and of the Baperki, a prominent Chinese organization (Lembong, 2008, Suryadinata, 1992). Total assimilation was introduced as a matter of official government policy. The state sought to do away with the three pillars of Chinese culture (Chinese school, Chinese organization and Chinese mass Media), while also maintaining ethnic Chinese economic standing within Indonesian society. In fact Suharto's system of crony capitalism strengthened ethnic Chinese economic status and prosperity. These outcomes often generated jealousy and opened the door for further ethnic tension. Following the 1997 economic crisis in Southeast Asia, anti-Chinese riots occurred in the major cities of Indonesia, from Jakarta, to Solo, to Medan, in May 1998. The violence seen in 1998 was certainly due to political motivations and linked to economic power struggles (Purdey, 2003). This unquestionably impacted Chinese Indonesian – Indonesian relations.

After Indonesia broke away from the period marked by the infamous riots, the regime changed. This coincided with rising levels of economic interconnectedness via continued momentum in the globalization process. Ethnic reconciliation seemingly helped resolve 'the Chinese problem' through democratic means, utilizing an emphasis on multiculturalism in order to re-unite the nation. Numerous studies have paid attention to Indonesian society after the incident, confirming the theory that democracy is a means to integrate Chinese Indonesians into multicultural Indonesian society. The Chinese Indonesians were given freedom and basic rights as Indonesian citizen (Dawis, 2008; Koning, 2011; Ong, 2008; Post, 2011; Tan, 2003; Winarta, 2008), with no more cultural restrictions. The Chinese Indonesians were also allowed greater opportunities to pursue and promote their unique cultural norms. Chinese religion, media, and language were not only supported by government, but also via the expanded footprint of international organizations from external Chinese communities, such as Hong Kong, Malaysia and Taiwan. Given the Chinese Indonesian connection with Chinese around the world, the constructing of Chinese solidarity and re-sinification of Indonesian Chinese inevitably occurred. Despite the seemingly positive signs today, evidence of broken ethnic relations is continually witnessed. Ethnic tension and discrimination in the country is far from over.

Studies after 1998 show the Chinese Indonesians in Java and Bali are more integrated into local society because of several factors. (Tong, 2010; Sidharta, 2004; Susanto, 2008). Myra Sidharta and Andres Susanto argue the Chinese in Yogyakarta and Bali, for example, became more Indonesianized. The assimilation process successfully worked for long time ago in Java Island and Bali. In Yogyakarta (a place without anti-

Chinese riots in 1998), the Chinese Indonesians were generally accepted by the indigenous society under the special relationship of the Sultan. However, living under the respect and loyalty for Sultan can be seen as dilemma. Chinese Indonesians in Yogyakarta were subsequently reluctant to express their freedom and their desire for Chinese culture. They also were hesitant to over-react to their "Chineseness"(Susanto, 2008, p. 169-173).

In Medan, the city is noted as a diverse and cosmopolitan city, where several ethnic and religious groups reside together. Most of the Medan Chinese were transnational migrants from Penang (Buiskool, 2009). This implies the existence of extensive family and business ties between the two cities. Moreover, the Chinese character of both cities has inevitably influenced one another, as the communities speak the same *Hokkien* dialect. Unsurprisingly, Medan Chinese often utilize trans-border activities such as schooling, shopping, and hospitalizing in Penang. This indicates a social and economic status that is often seen as 'better' than local Indonesians. As a result, the Medan Chinese tend to act as a closed group, following their social status and language. The politics of segregations continues in the city.

While ethnic relations improved within the context of both the new political atmosphere and increased transnational links, which increased humanitarian innovation from both Chinese and Indonesian initiatives (Nagata, 2010), it has been argued that the Medan Chinese community is being set permanently apart from *'pribumi'* majority. The state of fragile ethnic relations is confirmed by Yen-ling Tsai, as she illustrates ethnic relations through the symbolic importance of wall making after the riot. She argues Chinese exclusiveness and closeness is verified through the high security of gate and wall. They reinforce a sense of security, space for privacy and desire to segregate. Yet, paradoxically, it shows how Chinese Indonesians are now dependent on Indonesians guards or *joki* to ensure their personal safety (Tsai, 2012). These intimacy interactions are similarly found in the work of Nagata. Judith Nagata applies the case study of an educational institution (Yayasan Perguruan Sultan Iskandar Muda) and a heritage trust (Badan Warisan Sumatera Utara) to show the connection of various groups to promoting the issues of citizenship and human rights by leaving assimilation or ethnic interest alone (Nagata, 2010). However, the Chinese and non-Chinese tensions still exist, since separated settlements, social institution and lack of social interactions are presented. From these studies, one can conclude that the ethnic relations among Indonesians - mainly between Chinese Indonesians and other ethnics - are still very sensitive. And the research shows the extent of ethnic conflict in Medan, confirming the lack of 'civic life' in the society, which stayed behind ethnic tension and conflict.

The literature on ethnic Chinese and Indonesian relations in Medan remain is relatively rare. None of literature has yet illustrated how the ethnic conflict between Medan Chinese and Indonesians after 1998 within the democratic sphere plays out. They have not explained how tensions arise after democracy and multiculturalism paved the way to greater personal and ethnic freedom. Moreover, past studies have neglected the effects of transnationalism in explaining present circumstances. No studies have linked together how transnational Chinese networks that strengthen Chinese ethnic identity and social status in turn fuel segregation of different ethnic communities. The research thus sheds an analytical light on the nature of Chinese Indonesian – Indonesian relations in a transnational context, linking it to the question

over why ethnic ties remain strained in Medan, even with the encouraging developments of a greater democratic and multicultural space.

Theoretical Framework

Intensive scholarly work has been done examining ethnic relations and ethnic conflict. Several works have shown ethnic conflict mostly occurs in ethnically heterogeneous societies, where ethnic differences have continued to contribute to tension and strain. According to some scholars (Lijphat, 1999; Prazauskas, 1991; Dixon, 1994; Reilly, 2001 Pfetsch, 2006; Guelke, 2004), it is generally accepted that democratic regimes applying multicultural policies in such societies are a main key for resolution and preventing ethnic conflict. The research also agrees that democracy and multiculturalism play important roles for peace management. Yet, the research illustrates that democracy and multiculturalism is not sufficient to restrain ethnic conflict, particularly in the case study of Chinese Indonesian – Indonesian social dynamics in Medan. The case study illustrates that ethnic conflicts between Chinese Indonesians – Indonesians tends to occur on account of the absence of intensive civic engagement and the inter-ethnic interaction between different ethnic communities in both formal and informal forms. This is otherwise termed as 'civic life.' If this is robust, the degree of ethnic tension and conflict tends to reduce. In this case study, the research argues that civic life is the missing variable in Medan's democratic and multicultural sphere. So as to understand the research, the theoretical framework here is to exemplify the definition of ethnic conflict, causes of ethnic conflict, the relationship between democracy and peace, and lastly the role of civic life in managing peace and conflict.

In point of fact, ethnic conflict definition has often overlapped closely with ethnic violence, and several academic works have not made a distinction between them. The research finds that it is significant to differentiate between them and apply them with more understanding. By and large, ethnic conflict and ethnic violence are clashes between ethnic groups. However, conflict and violence has shown different forms. Although most of the time ethnic conflict inevitably results in violence, not every conflict becomes violent. This conflict shows the form of disagreement that illustrates the expression of irritation and tension, which is show in the form of a group demonstration, and/or debates in public sphere. However, these events do not apply aggressive methods and do not cause large casualties and destruction of groups like ethnic violence. Ashutosh Varshney explains ethnic conflict is very much dependent on situation, and can be shown in many forms such as the ethnic protest through institutions, assemblies, or on streets. In contrast, ethnic violence is likely to show violent forms such as riots, civil wars, and pogroms against some ethnic groups (Varshney, 2001, p. 366). In this case study, the research shows ethnic conflict between Chinese Indonesians – Indonesians in Medan, which confirms long contested territorial rivalries between Chinese and non-Chinese in the form of tension, small quarrels, and disputes between groups that have a possibility to result in violence if the conflict and tension cannot be managed.

Instrumentalist views inter-ethnic hostilities as an outcome of competition for resources and power. It shows elites frequently organize mass support by using the emotional appeal of ethnic identity in competition for state power, resources, and

economic interests. This is extended to ethnic conflicts and violence, since it often pits the interests of one group against that of another. Thus, being disadvantaged or discriminated against generates ethnic grievances and increases the possibility of ethnic conflict (Eriten and Romine, 2008, p. 4). This approach helps explain anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia. The hatred and anger directed against ethnic Chinese has been manipulated by radical Muslim Indonesian leaders on many occasions. Also, the recent episode of protestation against the Medan Chinese business over the relocation of the Mosque Islamic Raudhatul for residential development at Emerald Garden hotel is explained by the instrumentalist perspective that Muslim leaders in Medan used their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization against Medan Chinese business. It was not only religious issue, but it is a constituency in their competition for social, political and economic power in the society. At that time, anti-Chinese sentiment and stereotypes were brought back as a means to gather and mobilize Muslims in Medan for a certain cause. However, the research argues that the instrumentalist approach cannot be fully used to explain ethnic conflict in Medan in the post Suharto period. In certain instances, mobilization along ethnic lines is not caused by elites rallying followers' interests. There are also other factors explaining why the masses follow the manipulations of those leaders.

Furthermore, some scholars (Durkhiem, 1933; Newman, 1991, Gellner, 1983, Deutsch, 1953) argue that ethnic conflict is a product of the modernization process. Inequality and changes in the social fabric help causing ethnic conflicts. Inequalities and uneven benefits often elevate social strain and give rise to ethnic movements. In this case, when local Indonesians found themselves being disadvantaged on account of Chinese Indonesians monopolizing Indonesian business, it produced an ethnic backlash. Society has increasingly discriminated outsiders along ethnic and cultural lines, as well as begun to mobilize political movements. However, modernization cannot completely explain the result of ethnic conflict, since other political variables have to be engaged in such movements. Moreover, in some places where there exists large gaps income and wealth equality, there are little, if any, conflicts.

Further explanation over what causes ethnic conflict is via the institutionalism perspective. Institutionalists argue that there are links between political institutions on the one hand, and ethnic conflict or peace on the other hand (Horowitz, 1998; Blagojevic, 2009). In this framework, ethnic conflict does matter whether multi-ethnic societies have liberal democracy, consociational democracy, authoritarianism, or federalism. Each of these institutional alternatives can be shown to be linked to ethnic peace or violence. For example, in authoritarian regimes, the state lacks open spaces for differences and ethnic intolerance inevitably takes place. In this kind of society, some ethnics become targets of violence and discrimination. This was clearly evident in Suharto's authoritarian regime, where Chinese Indonesians were being discriminated against legally. Institutionalists believe conflict and violence can be managed through suitable institutions. For this reason, democracy is generally recommended by institutionalits as the better means than the various political alternatives in managing conflicts. However, the research raises questions as to why ethnic strains remain, even when regime changes lead to the development of democracy. Thus, it is significant to see debates over the relationships between democracy and peace. There are several studies explaining how democracy has given hopes that states will be stabilized and thus able to solve both international and national conflicts. Some scholars strongly believe democracy is a way of resolving

and/or managing conflict, creating peace at both the international and national levels. Some scholars (Rummel, 1983; Chan, 1984; Doyle, 1986; Weede, 1984) argue that democracy paves the way toward international peace, since wars between states have dramatically decreased after 1945. While, at the national level, democratic systems are perceived as acceptable and legitimate in managing intra-state conflict. The studies (Auvinen, 1997; Gurr, 1993; Rummel, 1995) point out that more fully democratic states would be less likely to experience high levels of conflict and violence.

On the contrary, democracy has its limitation to manage conflict. Several scholars believe democracy hardly works in divided societies (Horowitz, 1994; Huntington, 1997; Linz and Lipest, 1995) since the regular feature of ethnically plural democracies leaves room for freedom of expression of political and cultural demand and gives full equality to all individuals regardless of race, ethnicity, gender or religion. All individuals are ensured of their freedom to participate in any political and social activities. Nevertheless, the democratic system sometimes proves unable to accommodate political or social movements that have been stimulated via ethnic mobilization and social fragmentation. These are likely to reinforce political competition and ethnic conflict.

Accordingly, the research certainly agrees that democracy is a suitable system for maintaining peace in society, but it raises the question as to why, in some cases, conflict and social strains have not been solved within democracy states. In this research, ethnic strains are still an active part of Medan's multicultural and democratic atmosphere. This brings to the fore questions as to what accounts for ethnic conflict between the Chinese Indonesians and Indonesians in Medan? And what is the variable which proves to be the missing piece in the city in the midst of democracy and multiculturalism?

Obviously, the ethnic conflicts in Indonesia today are more complex than can be encompassed and explained via a single perspective. These perspectives inevitably avoid the present condition of globalization. Globalization is responsible for transnational activities and has changed inter-ethnic relations at the local, national and global level. It encourages fragmented identities as well as cultural formation (such as Islamification or sinification) which generates multiculturalism and democracy. Moreover, these social changes have contributed to new forms of identity and hybridity for individual experiences. This situation does not always mean ethnic groups and people tend to return to a primordial sense. This in fact implies the possibility of higher ethnic fragmentation in the midst of democracy, multiculturalism and globalization. This subsequently results in creating a sense of exclusion within separated communities.

In this case study of anti- Chinese conflict, the conflict in Medan is continues to persevere. The case study of Medan thus becomes an illustrative example of the missing variable for the democratic system and multiculturalism. It shows that requiring some conditions are required to encourage peacefulness and mitigate tension in the society. And here, it is essential to focus on inter-ethnic relations.

Varshney argues civic life is a key to resolving ethnic conflicts and violence. He urges inter-ethnic networks in order to build bridges and manage tensions, eventually

motivating the pursuit of social peace (Varshney, 2001; 2002). If civic links are sufficiently robust, such networks of engagement can manage tensions and conflicts. Without those networks, communal identities can often lead to terrible violence (Vaesheny, 2002, p, 9). He also distinguishes civic engagement as having two parts: associational and quotidian. The former, associational, encompasses forms such as business associations, reading clubs, hospitality clubs, and trade unions. The latter is composed of *everyday* forms of interactions among different communities, such as visiting each other's houses, having intermingling between children who play with each other in mixed neighborhoods, and joint participation in festivals (Varshney, 2002, p. 3). These imply that there is a link between civic life, institution and ethnic conflicts.

In view of that, the research argues that civic life is the key missing variable in the post-Suharto era. The ethnic conflict between Medan Chinese and Indonesians is an important example of ethnic strain that occurs when there is a lack of social interactions and when there are intervening factors such as crime and cultural mistreatment in the city. The form of protest, small fights as well as anxiety, tend to occur in the democratic and multicultural sphere.

Acknowledgement

References

Anderson, Benedict. Imagines Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London : Verso, 1991.

Buiskool A. Dirk. "The Chinese Commercial Elite of Medan,1890–1942: The Penang Connection" JMBRAS 82, Part 2 (2009) : 113–129

Hall, Stuart. "Cultural Identity and Diaspora." Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader. Eds. Patrick Williams and Chrisman. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 392-401.1994.

Heidhues, M.F.S. Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia. Cornell University, 1965.

Mackie, J.A.C. The Chinese in Indonesia : Five Essays.Honolulu: University

Press of. Hawaii in   association with   the Australian   Institute of International Affairs,1967

Marleen, Juliette., et al., eds. Chinese Indonesians and Regime Change. Amsterdam: Brill Press, 2010

Miller, D. On Nationality: Clarendon Press, 1995.

Pelly Usman, "social institutions and ethnic cohesion in Medan" in Sama-sama: facet of ethnic relations in South East Asia. Eds. Miriam Coronel Ferrer and Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City. 155-184. 1999.

Smith, A.D. National Identity: University of Nevada Press, 1991.

Susanto, A. Ambrosius. Under the Umbrella of the Sultan: Accommodation of the Chinese in Yogyakarta During Indonesia's New Order. Indonesia : Percetakan kanisius,2008

Suryadinata, Leo. Chinese Indonesians: State Policy, Monoculture, and Multiculture: Eastern Universities Press, 2004.

Suryadinata, Leo. "Chinese Politics in Post-Suharto's Indonesia. Beyond the Ethnic Approach?" Asian Survey 41, no. 3 (2001): 502-24.

Suryadinata, Leo. Ethnic Chinese in Contemporary Indonesia. Ed. Suryadinata Suryadinata, Singapore : Chinese Heritage Centre and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008.

Suryadinata, Leo. Ethnic Relations and Nation-building in Southeast Asia: The case of the Ethnic Chinese. Ed. Suryadinata Leo, and Studies Institute of Southeast Asian. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004.

Suryadinata, Leo. Political Thinking of the Indonesia Chinese, 1900-1995. Eds. Suryadinata Leo and Studies Institute of Southeast Asian. Singapore : Singapore University Press, 1997.

Tong, C.K. Identity and Ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia: Racializing Chineseness. New York : Springer, 2010.

Wilson, Rob, and W. Dissanayake. Global/Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary. Durham and London: Duke University Press,1996

Varshney, Ashutosh. Ethnic conflict and civic life: Hindus and Muslims in India, Yale University Press, 2003

Vertover, Steven. "Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism" Ethnic and Racial Studies 22. no.2 (1999): 447-462.