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The "Literature of the Catastrophe" as a Canon: from Genbaku Bungaku to Fukushima Bungaku

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Abstract

The literary responses to Fukushima disaster appeared in the last few years highlighted the similarities with Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombing experiences as long as both tragedies were caused by an arguable usage of nuclear power. What is remarkable, is that a seismically active area like Japan subjected to earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions ever since has not ever taken a stand on the "literature of the catastrophe" in itself. While the literature about Shoah got a foothold as Holocaust novel, the Japanese *genbaku bungaku* was instead refused by the Japanese *bundan* and by *hibakusha* themselves sounding a critical note for the literary value of the testimonial accounts. Nowadays, the increasing number of post-Fukushima literary works brought to the fore the need to reconsider the traditional literary canon to revalue a production, the one regarding catastrophe, which especially in Japan found literary expressions since the dawn of time: Kamo no Chōmei, Terada Torahiko, Akutagawa Ryūnosuke are just a few of the authors involved in the process of transposing into words the trauma related to disasters that occurred in the country and the necessary efforts to overcome them. This brief paper provides an excursus of the critical debate concerning the relation between literature and canon to define the literary responses to catastrophe. On one hand, it underlines the continuity of *genbaku bungaku* themes, on the other hand, it reveals the innovative character of the newborn *Fukushima bungaku* in terms of representing trauma not only in poetic and narrative forms but also on social media.

Keywords: catastrophe, literature, canon, genbaku, Fukushima

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Introduction: The Western Perspective of Literary Canon

To deal with canon means to investigate a wide range of works of literary criticism involved in the century-old debate around the idea of an aesthetic principle. For this reason it is more appropriated to consider this brief investigation as *théories de la connaissance*,[1] to quote Shaeffer's words, rather than a work of literary theory in a strict sense. Actually, the Fukushima literary responses appeared in the last few years brought scholars attention to recognise the importance of defining the canon of the "literature of the catastrophe" although works of literary criticism are still a few and the configuration of a canon is still out of the weeds.

The first approach to what is simply reffered to as "canon" or "classical canon"[2] owns its credits to the Greek artist Polikleitos and his sculpture known as *Doryphoros* (440 bC) which represents author's attempt to demonstrate by visual art the accuracy of his written treatise entitled κανών (*Kanṓn*, translated as "measure" or "rule"):[3] an explanation of Polikleitos's own view of harmonic and well-balanced proportions of the human body in the sculpted form. The *Canon*, then, assumed the connotation of a standard system of rules required in the creation of a perfect and sublime work of art, accepted as social convention. This "classical" or "aesthetic ideal" was soon applied to all artistic productions, including the literary field. According to Massimo Onofri, "Readers's tastes, critics's judgements, historians's works of reconstruction, are all factors that actually contribute to the constitution of the literary value."[4] But it is slightly more complicated than that. First of all, what "readers's tastes" represents is the point of view of the reception of the artwork. Literary tastes can change in relation to the historical period, political background, social environment and so on; that means that the canon, from a reader point of view, can change rapidly and differs widely from country to country. Moreover, a shift in themes and trends can be individuated among authors too, as the formation of literary *écoles* or *mouvements* proved.[5] Secondly, the "historians's works of reconstruction" refers to the work of an established authority: Roman Church (see Middle Age), a political group (see any totalitarian system and its censorship) and more recently, the publishing companies who answer to only one imperative, the one of profitability, are all examples of institutions in charge with interests in maintaining a particular canon alive. In the first case, the canon assumed the function to legitimise the political power thorough literary codes; in the second case, the canon is a mere definition for marketing purposes. What "reader's tastes" and "historians's works of reconstruction" both underline is that the canon can be no more considered as a fixed standard of rules but a flexible system instead. In the Japanese editorial world the literary production labeled by John Whittier Treat as *tsukaisute* 使い捨て ("read and throw away")

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[1] Shaeffer, J-M. (1983). Du text au genre. Notes sur la problématiques générique. In Genette, Jauss, Schaeffer, Scholes, Stempel, Viëtor, *Théorie des genres* (pp. 179-205). Paris: Points Essais.

[2] Developed during the Greek high Classical Period (400-450 bC) the term "canon" assumed the attribute of "classic" (often referred to simply as "the classic(s)".

[3] Stewart, A. (1990). *Greek Sculpture: An Exploration.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

[4] Onofri, M. (2001). *Il canone letterario.* Bari-Roma: Laterza (p.8). My translation.

[5] Actually the Italian term *corrente letteraria* ("literary stream") is to be preferred to address groups of authors, poets, novelists or journalists, who share the same aesthetic ideal or conception of literary production. See Vercier, B, Maurel, A. (1994). *La critique.* Paris: Éditions du Hachette (p. 31).

literature[6] serves as an example. The term is used to address the literary production of authors like Yoshimoto Banana and Murakami Haruki, just to name a few, whose works are highly demanded by the public. The success of these literary pieces of art is explained by the quality of being products for leisure and entertainment only, a caracteristic that arises doubts about their literary value, the last aspect of Onofri's statement. According to Jean-Paul Sartre[7] all artworks are inestimable because they are the result of a free creative act in terms of *liberté/gratuité*. Unfortunately, for Sartre this also means that this creative act is always useless (*inutile*) except for the focus on the engagement, the authorial commitment in the act of writing. This position was strongly criticised by Roland Barthes, stirring up the famous Sartre-Barthes debate around literature. As for Sartre, the act of writing is not neutral because words have the power to change the state of things. Even silence is not a neutral choice because its value is measured by the absence of words; as to say, whatever an author decides to write or not write, he is still taking a position in front of a particular matter and it is exactly this stance that qualifies the author as such, because it is his responsibility to denounce and accuse acts of useless violence.[8] This comittment turns to be an *impératif moral* towards writing itself and towards the public in terms of assuming all the consequences that the act of writing entails.[9] From this perspective, the *beaux arts* are a product of author's engagement. This is totally a different approach compared to the one of Barthes: the *beaux arts* answer only to the *plaisir* or *jouissance*, the simple pleasure aroused from the act of reading.[10] And this pleasant feeling is perceived precisely because the literary work itself was written with pleasure which makes the author similar to an hedonist. No engagement is required in Barthes's theory: the aesthetic principle "l'art pour l'art" ("art for art's sake")[11] is the only rule to follow. The success of a piece of art is then originality, singularity or something perceived as anew (actually Harold Bloom echoed Barthes in regards to this philosophy, see his *Western Canon*).[12] This different point of view concerning the literary engagement is a very thorny topic when trying to define the "literature of the catastrophe" as a canon in itself. To proceed with the last review of Onofri's statement concerning the "critics's judgements" it is useful to take advantage of Andrea Bernardelli's observations remarking two different approaches to the literary criticism: one, defined as "descriptive function or *ex-post* function" consists in an historical attempt to describe a map of literary genre; the other one is the "pre-scripted modality" or *a priori* modality: a subordination of the work of art to specific rules; in other words, the author himself brings his work in line with a particular genre or trend.[13] In addition to that, according to Innocenti the first approach is diachronic or atemporal because it attempts to establish a large-scale evaluation system valid all time, with a retroactive effect; the second one, on the contrary, can be considered as

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[6] Treat, J. W. (1993). Yoshimoto Banana writes Home: Shōjo Culture and the Nostalgic Subject. In *The Society of Japanese Studies*, 19, 2 (p. 357).

[7] Sartre, J.P. (1985). *Qu'est-ce que la littérature?* Paris: Éditions du Gallimard. This concept and the following ones are repeated several times in the essay.

[8] Sartre, J.P. (1946). *La Responsabilité de l'écrivain.* Paris: Éditions du Verdier (p. 56).

[9] Benoît, D. (2000). *Littérature et engagement.* Paris: Éditions du Seuil (p. 47).

[10] Barthes, R. (1982). *Le plaisir du texte.* Paris: Éditions du Seuil. This concept and the following ones are repeated several times in the essay.

[11] Slogan credited to the French literary critic Théophile Gautier (1811–1872).

[12] Bloom, H. (1995). *The Western Canon: the books and school of the ages*. New York: Riverhead Books.

[13] Bernardelli, A. *Che cos'è l'intertestualità*. Roma: Carocci Editore (p. 43). My translation.

synchronic because answers to the current trends.[14] This academic work is referring to the first one, of competence of critics.

Literary Canon in Japan

A quick overview to the perception of canon in Japan is provided by the investigation of Sadami Suzuki.[15] Since the concept of canon was created anew in Japan to answer the need to compare it to Western literature and art, it maintained unchanged the definition in itself and the role of an institution to protect it, namely, the Japanese *bundan*.[16] As Japanese literature was defined for its characteristic of been written in Japanese language, the attention can be turn to the high quality that designates the literary product in order to be ascribed as a work of *jun bungaku* 純文学 (translated as "pure literature" as a derivative of the UK "polite literature")[17] and its opposite, the *taishū bungaku* 大衆文学, as to say, "popular literature"). This two notions obviously underline a different approach to the literary production: the *jun bungaku* responds better to Sartre's ideas while the *taishū bungaku* would have been more appreciated by Barthes. What is remarkable here is the definition of "high quality products worth of a proud nation".[18] This aspect is directly connected with the Japanese aesthetics fundaments: *mono no aware* 物の哀れ, *wabi* 侘び, *sabi* 錆び (often considered as a unit maybe because of the alliteration) *shibui* 渋い, *yūgen* 幽玄, 雅 *miyabi, fūryū* 風流 and so on;[19] although any further investigation about these different Japanese approaches to aestheticism are now out of place, a common denominator can be identified in these concepts: they are all connected with nature. In particular, they refer to the transcendence and frailty of life, a kind of thinking that gives priority to the enjoyment of the impermanence as the source for beauty in itself, a concept derived from the Buddhist perspective of *mujō*.[20] The most common image in this sense is the one of cherry blossoms, more appreciated "when the air is thick of their falling petals"[21] to quote Richie. The turning point of this study is then revealed: the importance of nature in the Japanese artistic and literary production. The attention can be focused on literary works written around the topic of nature, or better, on the theme of a catastrophic natural event: although the term "catastrophe" implied a feeling of fear and sorrow in the Western perception, the aesthetic mindset peculiar to Japan justifies the beauty of literary works on this theme and even encourages a reading in a new light. As stated at the beginning, to define a canon for the "literature of catastrophe" is all the more necessary to investigate past literary works on the theme. The most quoted is without any doubts the *Hōjōki*『方丈記』("An Account of my

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[14] Innocenti, L. (2000). Introduzione. In *Il giudizio di valore e il canone letterario*. Roma: Bulzoni Editore (p. 20). My translation.

[15] Sadami, S. (2000). From Canon formation to Evolutional Reformation: Man'yū, Genji, Bashō (pp. 25-45). In *PAJLS Issue of Canonicity and Canon Formation in Japanese Literary Studies. vol 1*, Bellingham: AJLS.

[16] 日本文壇, the "Japanese literary circle".

[17] Salami (p. 27).

[18] *ibidem*.

[19] For further investigation, here out of place, see Richie, D. (2007). *A tractate on Japanese Aesthetics*. Berkeley: Stone Bridge Press.

[20] Murakami, H. (2011). "Speaking as an Unrealistic Dreamer" in *The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 9*, Issue 29 No 7.

[21] Richie (p 38).

Hut", 1212) by Kamo no Chōmei, a report of various disasters such as earthquake, famine, whirlwind and conflagration that occurred in the ancient capital city of Kyōto. Several works by Akutagawa Ryūnosuke (芥川龍之介, 1892-1927) and Terada Torahiko (寺田寅彦, 1878-1935), just to name a few, are worth to mention too. Finally, the *genbaku bungaku* 原爆文学 ("literature of the atomic bombings") makes its appearance as a label used to described all the poetic and prosaic responses to the double atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of which Ibuse Masuji's *Kuroi ame* 『黒い雨』 ("Black Rain", 1965) is the most well-known example: even if the *genbaku bungaku* genre refers to a men-made catastrophe, it sets a precedent in the Japanese literary production that deserves scholar's attention.

From *Genbaku Bungaku* to *Fukushima Bungaku*

The final approach to a critic review of the *genbaku bungaku* literary genre is conceived following Tachibana Reiko's *Narrative As Counter-Memory*[22] as the main source of criticism.

As sum up by Tachibana, the *genbaku bungaku* genre can be considered by the point of view of the strict form, as suggested by Hijiya-Kirschnereit; in these case works concerning Hiroshima or Nagasaki atomic bombings can be divided into:

1) *jun bungaku* 純文学;
2) *taishū bungaku* 大衆文学;
3) private accounts (diaries, letters…);
4) scientific data (reports, inquiries…), the last of which is nowadays labeled as non-fiction. It must be added, for the sake of completeness, that even though many academics like Takahashi Toshio and Jonathan Dil share the opinion that a *jun bungaku*/*taishū bungaku* distinction is no more a necessary discourse,[23] the influent critic Harold Bloom still defends the position of the superiority of "the classics".[24] Although the aim of this study is not headed to classify the authorial literary responses to catastrophe as products of "high" or "low" literature, this division can not be lapsed while dealing with the revaluation of the genre. This article takes then the stance of Sartre in considering every literary expression as a potential *ouvrage de l'esprit*.[25] As regarding Japanese non-fictional production however, a further division can be figured out in regards to the literary form assumed by the piece of work in question, as to say:

- *kiroku bungaku* 記録文学 ("literature of the recording"): journals, autobiographical notes, *mémorial*: private accounts with the aim of registering facts;

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[22] Tachibana, R. (1998). *Narrative As Counter-Memory: A Half-Century of Postwar Writing in Germany and Japan.* New York: State University of New York Press.

[23] According to a private conversation with Dottor Dil, assistant professor at the Department of Foreign Languages and Liberal Arts of Keio University in occasion of this IAFOR conference. Takahashi Toshio, professor of Late Showa and Contemporary Japanese Literature at Waseda University, shared his thought-provoking stance about this topic during his course about non-fictional production at Waseda University, May 2016.

[24] Farkas, A. (2015). *Che cosa resta della letteratura? Intervista con Harold Bloom.* Luxembourg City: Amazon Media EU SARL (Kindle format only).

[25] Benoît, (2000) (p. 141).

- *ruporutaajyū* ルポルタージュ ("reportage"): articles and journalistic inquiries with journalistic purposes (often politically compromised);
- *jiken shōsetsu* 事件小説 or *nyuusu sutoorii* ニュース・ストーリー (derived from English terms): fictional paraphrase of an historical event, merely an accident;
- *jijitsu shōsetsu* 事実小説: autobiographies (also in the form of *shishōsetsu* 私小説)[26] and biographies of notable people or novels based on events claimed as true.[27]

According to Treat however, the *genbaku bungaku* genre can also be observed by the authors' point of view, as to say, the "post-nuclear generation" approach:[28] in the first case the author is also the witness and identifies problems in depicting his experience; Treat individuates Hara Tamiki, Ōta Yōko, Kurihara Sadako as the main representative examples. The second and third cases concern authors not directly involved in the atomic bombings which is considered as a personal (Ōe Kenzaburō, Ibuse Masuji, Hotta Yoshie) or social problem respectively (Oda Makoto). Tachibana herself distinguished the literary production on the theme in two categories: one, derived from the German *Trümmerliteratur* and translated as "rubble literature" consists in works written and published soon after the World War II; the other, called "long-distance literature" regards works of art published after decades.[29] These three categories can be applied to the literary responses to 11th March 2011 too, with the only difference that the focus is not on the nuclear atomic bombings but on the three-fold catastrophe of earthquake, tsunamis and nuclear meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant instead. By the way, a link between the two tragedies has just be underlined, as many authors remarked soon after 3/11 (one for all, the nobel prize Ōe Kenzaburō in his *New Yorker*'s article).[30] In this regards the debate around the different but similar nature of genbaku 原爆 (Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings)/*genpatsu* 原発 (Fukushima nuclear accident)[31] broke out among scholars after 11th March must be kept in mind too. Although the literary works belonging to the *genbaku bungaku* genre can not be found so easily in bookstores's shelves, so do not the post-Fukushima literature, as highlighted also in Kimura Saeko's first work of literary criticism about this topic. A critical note can be raised in regards to the title chosen, *Shinsai bungaku ron* 『震災文学論』 ("A theory of the literature of the catastrophe): it is more likely to refer to the "literary of the catastrophe" as a canon in itself, since the term *shinsai* 震災 often translated as "disaster" implies a seismic event; as noticed before anyway, 11th March catastrophe was a double-nature crisis that involved a human mismanagement at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant too. In these light the label *shinsai-jinsai bungaku* 震災・人災文学 is thought as more appropriated. Moreover, for these reasons the *shinsai-jinsai bungaku* can be

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[26] *shishōsetsu* or *watakushi shōsetsu* 私小説 means, literally, "I-Novel" and represents the Japanese version of the German confessional literature known as *Bildungsroman,* introduced in Japan in the Meiji period.

[27] The main source of inspiration for this scheme was professor Takahashi's course.

[28] Tachibana refers to Treat's *Ground Zero* here. For further information see Treat, J. W. (1996). *Writing Ground Zero: Japanese Literature and the Atomic Bomb*, Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

[29] Always refer to Tachibana (1998).

[30] Ōe, K. (2011). History Repeats. In *New Yorker*, March 28.

[31] Kimura, S. (2013) *Shinsai bungaku ron. Atarashii nihon bungaku no tameni*. Tōkyō: Seidosha.

considered as a possible translation for the "literature of the catastrophe" as a canon, while the literary responses to 3/11 disaster can be addressed simply as *Fukushima bungaku* フクシマ文学 written in *katakana* to emulate Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the sense of cities exposed to nuclear radiation. Both *genbaku bungaku* and *Fukushima bungaku* are to be considered as a part of the *shinsai-jinsai bungaku* canon.

Conclusion: Fukushima *Bungaku* Genre

In addition to Hijiya-Kirschnereit, Treat and Tachibana perspectives this article also offers further contribution to the description of the *Fukushima bungaku* by keeping in mind the diversification in poems and prose (fiction, non-fiction and mixed-up literary approaches to the catastrophe). In particular, a new trend in the poetic production is represented by the popular poet Wagō Ryōichi who, soon after 11th March, started publishing on his Twitter profile poems about Fukushima situation; his production, called *net-poetry* as a paramount word of "network" and "poetry", can be conceived as the missing link between social media (as a worldwide platform to share traumatic feeling in real time) and the lyricism attributed to the poetic production.[32]
According to a work of testimony, with a slight revision of Treat's approach it is possible to distinguish:

- authors who directly witness 3/11 or not;
- authors who became spokesmen for friends, relatives, acquaintance;
- authors who chose silence or took action in other ways (for instance by participating in no-nuclear energy movements).

In this respect, as far as this study has been developed, a notable tendency in authorial choice between fictional and non-fictional format has been observed: authors who directly witnessed 11th March earthquake and tsunamis or suffered from the evacuation measures approved by Japanese government to limit the radiation exposure in the neighbouring area of Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant, show a preference for private accounts that directly depicts the catastrophe, while fictionalised works are the major response of those authors who can not give a personal testimony of the event.
The Sartre-Barthes debate regarding the importance of a *littérature engagée*[33] is directly correlated to authorial responses to 3/11 and must be born in mind too, especially while dealing with the purpose of author's writing. For example: can a work for entertainment labeled as *tsukaisute* been re-evaluated for its devotion to post-Fukushima trauma? The question here is clearly referring to Yoshimoto Banana's *Suiito hiaafutaa*『スイート・ヒアアフター』("Sweet Hereafter", 2011)[34], just to give an example. Moreover, according to Kimura, the literary production can be divided into two categories: the one written after 3/11 (which consists in the majority part) and works started before 3/11 but ended up with a change in plot due to 11th March catastrophe. A third analysis can be conducted on the authorial responses, as to say, authors who devoted themselves to literary

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[32] Further investigation about Wagō Ryōichi's *net-poetry* can be found in De Pieri, V. (2014), (2016).
[33] "committed literature", see Sartre (1985).
[34] Yoshimoto, B. (2011). *Suiito Hiaafutaa.* Tōkyō: Gentōsha.

productions focused on 3/11; or, the case of authors who, after writing a work on the topic, turned back to their "common" themes; eventually, a periodical return on post-Fukushima matters can be noticed too. An other categorisation is a remark on the popularity of authors in question, already famous before 11th March or not. To conclude, literary works can also be divided by topics, considering the *Daishinsai* or the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi as the main feature although works written on both themes are also available. This study represents a first overview of the "literary of the catastrophe" as a canon and an attempt to define the newborn *Fukushima bungaku*, especially in relation to Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombing experiences. Anyway, further investigation and an implementation of the selected sources would be the right path to follow in order to revalue this Japanese aesthetic literary response to trauma.

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Japanese Mythology and Nationalism: Myths of genesis, Japanese identity, and Familism

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Abstract

In the nationalism's toolbox, mythology is one of the most useful and productive tools for the construction of national identity. Mythic tales provide a sense of "essence" for the nation; in a way, they symbolize the "roots" for the members of nation. Because of this valuable meaning, pre-nationalist /nationalist thinkers revive and reproduce these narratives according to their agenda. By the revival of mythic stories, a discoursal link which works as cement between the nation and the selected ethnic group is created. Among these, especially the myths on genesis are functional for building a family-nation concept which enhances solidarity and unity between the members of the nation. Being a country with a rich culture and strong historical roots, Japan has a great variety of mythic stories in its literature. In an attempt to discover the links between the myths and the discoursal construction of Japanese nation and Japanese national identity, this study focuses on the Tale of Izanagi and Izanami, Amaterasu-ōmikami, Ukemochi-no-kami, and Jimmu Tennō. These myths were revived first by Motoori, who is a pre-nationalist thinker, and then by Yanagito Kunio, who is a Meiji period nationalist; therefore, it is also important to analyze the relations between these myths and the discourses of these nationalist thinkers. Considering that the details of the mythic stories contain many hints about Japanese *minzoku* ("nation") and *kazoku kokka* ("family-nation") concepts, a review of these tales from the viewpoint of political science can also depict the "nature" of nationalism with more vibrant colors.

Keywords: Japanese mythology, nationalism, familism, Japanese history

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Introduction

Japan has a wide source of mythology which carries Confucian, Buddhist and Shinto traces in addition to some inspirations from Chinese, Indian, Korean, and Ainu mythologies (Ashkenazi, 2003). In this study, I will focus only on the parts that are mainly used for building a national discourse. They are mostly the ones which "explain" the origins of Japanese nation, the "creation" of Japan, and the "pureness" of Japanese people.

I will start with the legends and, then, I will try to explain how they are used in nation-building process. In an attempt to discover the links between the myths and the discoursal construction of Japanese nation and Japanese national identity, it is vital to read Japanese mythology from a critical point of view.

Myths of Genesis, Japanese Identity, and Familism

The Japanese legends are taken from the ancient texts which are the main sources of Japanese legends and semi-legendary history called *Kojiki* ("Record of Ancient Matters") and *Nihonshoki* ("Japanese Chronicles") (Güvenç, 1980). *Kojiki* is written in Japanese (app. A.D. 712) and *Nihonshoki* is written by Yasumaro Omo in 720 (in original, it's written in Chinese) (Mackenzie, 1996).

According to the tale, at the beginning, there was only three gods without gender or sex and when they died, seven generations of gods appeared. These gods told young god Izanagi (means "the man who invites") and young goddess Izanami (means "the woman who invites") "to create a land on the world" and gave them "heavenly jeweled spear" (referred as *ame no tama-boko* or *ame no nubuko*) for the creating process (It is possible to consider the lance as a phallic symbol). Here, "*tama*" is a bead or any other round-shaped jewel on the spear. Gods gave the spear of *tama* to siblings, because *tama* is "the material of life (Mackenzie, 1996). Those days, earth was "floating on the water like oil". Siblings speared *ame no tama-boko* into the sea and stirred the sea with it. When they pulled the spear up, the falling drops turned into islands on the sea (Ashkenazi, 2003 and Mackenzie, 1996). These are the islands of Japan; therefore, Japan was created by these gendered *kami*s (gods and/or goddesses). Obviously, Japanese islands and Japan as a country are absolutely holy in the eyes of Japanese people for ages (and even today), because legends say so. A land, a country, created by *kami*s is strictly different and higher than all the others. This legend can enlighten a part of patriotic feelings of Japanese people about their homelands.

Let's continue with the myth of creation. After they accomplished their task, Izanagi and Izanami turned back to heaven, but other *kami*s told them to go down to the earth and create their own "descendants". By the help of a rainbow (sometimes it's described as "holy stairs"), they landed on Onogoro and then built the Eight Measure Palace around a central pillar called Heavenly August Pillar.[1] They rounded the column as a matrimonial ceremony and the siblings became man-and-wife. Their first baby, Hiruko was still unable to walk after 3 years; therefore, he was left in the river

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[1] The central column is an "object of honour" in Japan, both at Shinto temples or at homes.

on a boat (Mackenzie, 1996).[2] Izanagi and Izanami asked the gods to find what they were doing wrong. Gods told that, in order to have a healthy baby, the man has to take the initiative; he has to invite first, not the woman. (Apparently, this myth also gives hint about the social position of women in Japanese society.) Izanagi and Izanami did as they said and Izanami gave birth to the eight main islands of Japan (*Oyashimakuni*), the other minor islands, and the main *kami*s of sea and harbor, of wind, trees, mountains, and so on (Ashkenazi, 2003). Izanagi and Izanami continued to have babies, until Izanami got burned and died while she was giving birth to her fire-child, god of fire, Kagu-tsuchi. Before her death, she created eight more gods/goddesses including Ukemochi-no-kami, the goddess of food (Mackenzie, 1996). After her death, the quantity of the *kami*s changed and Izanagi had many other adventures, but I will skip these parts and will focus on the birth of Amaterasu, sun goddess.

When she died, Izanami went to *Yomi*, the land of darkness. Izanagi wanted to save her, but it was not possible anymore, because she had already eaten the foods of *Yomi*. After his visit to *Yomi*, Izanagi left her wife there, turned back to the lands of living, and needed to wash all the dirt away: "I came from a nasty, dirty land. For this reason, I will clean my magnificent body!" While he was washing himself, two evil gods appeared from the dirt and when he dived into the lake, three water gods appeared and when he washed his left eye, Amaterasu -sun goddess- was born, when he washed his right eye, Tsukuyomi – moon god- was born. (As a female, Amaterasu comes from the "left" and as a male, Tsukuyomi comes from the "right" eye. Associating females with left is a very common cultural pattern all over the world and Japanese myths seem to be coherent with this habitude.) Then, Izanagi took off his necklace embellished with *tama,* gave it to Amaterasu and ordered her to rule "the celestial plains" (Mackenzie, 1996). Obviously, these "celestial plains" signify Japan and Amaterasu gets her legitimacy from another god, a male god. Legend also tells us the rivalry between Amaterasu and her brother Susa-no-wo, but gods decided to recognize the legitimacy of Amaterasu, and through the history, they sent many other gods for helping her grandchildren, i.e. the Emperors of Japan, during wars.

The children of Amaterasu and Dragon King of The Sea lived for generations. As a descendant, Jimmu Tennō conquered Japan app. B.C. 660 and succeeded to establish his dynasty which is widely accepted as a dynasty never broken (Güvenç, 1980). According to the *Kojiki*, the first emperor Jimmu Tennō is descendant of Amaterasu (Mackenzie, 1996). For this reason, his legitimacy is given by Izanagi, practiced by Amaterasu, and approved by the other gods. Therefore, any contradiction against the authority of emperor is considered a blasphemy, a revolt against the will of the gods. More than the authority he signifies, he is a holy human being; every mikado is a *kami* similar to the pharaohs of the Ancient Egypt. That means, Japanese people are derived from the gods as well. Although scientifically Japanese people are paragenetic having genes from people of Kuriles, Sakhalin, Kyushu-Korea, and the Ryukyus, Manchus, Chinese, Ainu and Koreans (Ashkenazi, 2003) and even archeological researches in ancient imperial tombs indicate that Japanese imperial family is originally Korean (Guthmann, 2000), the belief about the "pureness" of Japans keep its illusion-maker effect even today. The first migrations from the continent to the islands took place in very early times in the history and after people have settled to the

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[2] This myth specifically has some similarities with the story of Moses.

islands, no new major migration has ever occurred; that could be a reasonable explanation why they do not remember any "fusion effect". The only two big threat of occupation of Mongols were gotten over by the help of stormy winds ("*kamikaze*"-"breath of gods") and, then, people of Japan have never encountered with a similar type of threat.

These myths and other similar ones that I did not mention here were revitalized in 18th century by an essentialist nationalist group headed by Motoori. This group was aiming to "turn the Japanese society back to the origins" and "purify the society from foreign effects", including Chinese words or Buddhist cults and customs.[3] In their opinion, all these non-Japanese cultural contents were weakening the Japanese society and that was the main reason of chaos in shogunate. This opinion was also in accordance with the views of defenders of isolation.

"Motoori Norinaga, the eighteenth-century scholar of the National Learning School, was, in effect, an interpreter of myths. He very strongly believed that the Japanese foundation myths were unique to Japan and they demonstrated the primacy of Japan in the world. He (and his many followers) attempted to explain the nature of Japanese myths based on linguistic associations, constructions of elaborate tables of genealogy and chronology, and relating ideas common in his own era to scraps of items found in the classics." (Ashkenazi, 2003)

The leaders of this movement, Motoori Norinaga and his follower Hirata, were strongly advising the "Revival of Pure Shinto", because Shinto was the religion/belief of masses. Although Buddhism was the official religion/belief, it could not diffuse to the lower society. In fact, it would be utterly against its own aim, because Chinese Buddhism –specifically Confucianism in practice- is a sect for warrior class, which means, for higher class. While revitalizing Shinto and Japanese culture, this movement also reinterpreted the myths about Japan's power and uniqueness. According to some historians, it was one of the main triggers which caused the Meiji Reformation, because it created a base for the idea of "a mighty emperor" by supporting and advising the holiness and uniqueness of *tennō* (Mackenzie, 1996 and Hunter, 2002).

On the other hand, Yanagita Kunio shares the idea of "uniqueness of Japan and Japanese people", but he also assumes that this kind of uniqueness and pureness can be only found "in the practices of the common people and the peasants in remote villages", because "peasant had not been contaminated by the Confucian, Buddhist, and Chinese influences that the elite writers of the Great Tradition [including, presumably, Motoori] had been touched by." (Ashkeanzi, 2003) Clearly, his opinion has the same motivation point with early German romantics. Although Motoori finds his assumption and his indirect accusations ridiculous, some other scholars shares his thoughts. Moreover, there was a cultural concept which supports his idea: Peasants are simply the producers of rice and it's one of the main nutrients of Japanese people, but also, it's a "sacred gift" from Amaterasu.

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[3] In my opinion, this group seems very similar to "Atsızcılar" headed by Nihal Atsız, in Turkish history.

According to the tale, Amaterasu sent her brother Susa-no-wo to visit the goddess of food, Ukemochi-no-kami. Goddess of food took rice and other food from her mouth and served to Amaterasu's brother, but he considered this behavior as an insult, because "food was polluted by a female mouth". So, he killed her. (As the myth of creation, this myth gives some hints about the social position of Japanese women too.) When Amaterasu heard that Susa-no-wo killed Ukemochi-no-kami, she went to see her body: "Millet was found in her forehead, and silkworms in her eyebrows. Rice was in her belly, and wheat in her genitals. These were presented to Amaterasu, who declared they would be used by humanity for its living." (Ashkenazi, 2003) The legend points out that Japanese people clearly owe their existence to Amaterasu and her sacred gifts. "[Japanese] cosmology is based on rice culture" (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993) and for this reason, Yanagita supports the idea which says "Japanese culture cannot be completely understood without a study of Japanese rice culture" in a way (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993). His thoughts also clarify the social position of peasants. Traditionally, peasant rank is higher than merchant rank within the Japanese social class system, because peasants are not as "contaminated" as merchants (especially dealing with "money" is what makes merchants more "corrupted") and they produce rice – the source of life, in both material and celestial meanings.

All these myths about genesis, foundation of Japan, the origin of rice, and the main characters -as Amaterasu or Jimmu Tenno- end up with a social consequence with two dimensions. First, all Japanese people are "naturally" brothers and sisters, because they all derive from the same origin. Homogeneity creates the concept of family-nation which has a pure origin and a common genealogy. Secondly, this family-nation is built around the *tenno* who is the purest person among pure people, because Jimmu Tenno directly derivates from Amaterasu and the Japanese dynasty has never been broken. *Tenno*'s pureness is unquestionable, so is his divine authority. Nation obeys utterly and shows deep respect to *tenno*, because this is "natural" as "the obedience of children for their fathers". *Tenno* is the holy father of the nation and so, patriarchy is the final touch which completes the picture.

This two-dimensional social structure finds its expression starting from *jomin* (ordinary person) to *tenno*: *Kazoku kokka* (word by word, "family nation"). According to the Gregory Clark (1978), it looks like that Japanese society is sociologically an example of a family-tribal society. Güvenç (1980) says that it is also possible to see it as a community, a *gemeinschaft*; because it is organized as a big, well-developed family. At this point, Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1998) argues another possible term for describing Japanese society: *minzoku*. At first glance, *minzoku* is closer to the terms of "ethnicity" or "ethnic"; on the other hand it "(…) can but does not necessarily refer to a group of people who are physically related to one another. It can also refer to a community bound together by ties of language and tradition, and in some cases (as historian Kevin Doak emphasized) it is used in a sense close to that of the English word 'nation'." (Morris-Suzuki, 1998)

In general opinion, clearly there is a reference to blood relation for describing Japanese nationalism; but also, Morris-Suzuki reminds us that, for Japanese people, culture (*bunka*) is really important too. For this reason, although they are genetically Japanese, people who grew up in U.S. or Brazil are not accepted as "totally Japanese". On the other hand, members of other nations who grew up in Japan are also can't be "entirely" Japanese; because they lack the qualities of "Japanese blood". For being an

ideal Japanese, genes and culture have to match. Although genes are unchangeable and one cannot choose his own genes; still they come first; then, culture (*bunka*) completes them. This is also an explanation for why a part of Japanese people see Koreans or Chinese "inferior" who were born and always lived in Japan.

All these narratives and explanations are useful for an analysis of Japanese nationalism. First, these myths and legends on divine origins and foundation give a hint about the existence of "a Japanese nation concept" for Japanese people. Nation is a phenomenon of modern times and appears with industrialization; but as Smith (2010) indicates, existence of these myths and legends, at least, shows us that the society has some ideas about their ethnic construction. On the other hand, as Gellner (2006) says, the existence of high-culture is vital for being a nation. Japanese culture has settled and started to keep a chronology since 7th century (as mentioned before, with *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki*) and further developed after the Meiji Reforms by "modern" touches, such as first Japanese newspaper in 1868 (Belge, 2011).

Timing is also significant. The first revitalizing movement of Motoori and others occurred in 17th century; which is almost the same time of pre-nationalist movements in Europe. (Even if there was an interaction, its rapidness would be quite surprising.) Although interaction could be possible with Europe via the colonies in Japan (Belge, 2011), it is not wrong to say that the very first Japanese nationalist reactions were not a "creation" of Western world because even if there was an interaction, considering the timing, it can't be utterly a "work", a "product" of Occident (Chatterjee, 1999).[4] Though there were some similarities with Europe –especially with Germany- (Takahashi, 1984), the emerging of capitalism in Japan had its own conditions; the course of nationalism in Japan had both similar and specific conditions as well (Esenbel, 1999). At least, for the emergence of nationalism it is appropriate to say that the first movements were "genuine", not "imported" from the Occident. Although Yanagito accuses Motoori and the other leaders of the movement "being contaminated" by the non-Japanese cultural features, they were getting their ideas, aims, and ideals directly from the Japanese cultural source. They had no desire for "being Occidental"; neither for appearance, nor for inner world. Mostly, it was a seeking for the "good old days of the empire" in a mercantile, pre-capitalist age and that was a well-known reaction of a changing society who wants to stay in its own, safe inner space. But also, it was different than an ordinary essentialist rebellion or reaction; because here, there is an effort to differentiate the Japanese society from the others in all respects; the discourse of first nationalists resembles a nationalist movement and again, the discourse confirms the belief that the essence of being a nation is having a national ideal for the future. This movement has it: For the sake of Japanese society, movement declares an aim, a final destination, and a program for reaching this goal. It is a very common path for the nationalist movements; even Motoori's profession resembles the "Western" examples, because he was a linguist, and in Japan, first national "awakening" started with researches on linguistic and history, like other examples. Again, in Japan, national awakening started with the efforts of upper class; first followers were the intellectuals too. For Japanese example, social engineering was not very strong within the structure of the movement, but its impact continued in further movements: From the Meiji Reforms to militarist movements between two world wars, even in 1970's, different political movements

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[4] Here, Chatterjee criticizes Anderson's thoughts. Although Benedict Anderson (2009) describes nationalism as a phenomenon "copiable" by non-Europeans in *Imagined Communities*, Chatterjee refuses to describe non-European nationalist movements as a "copy" or "replica".

again and again used and reproduced the myths and legends which were "revitalized" by Motoori (Wilson, 2002). Considering the social and geographical features of Japan, it was very "natural":

"By whatever definition, a consciousness of nation has been widely considered to be very important to modern Japan, especially during the pre-war period. Japan's relative cultural homogeneity, apparently natural geographical boundaries, isolation from much of the outside world between the mid-seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries and its ancient imperial house has seemed to indicate the inevitability of national consciousness." (Wilson, 2002)

Conclusion

Japan should be pronounced as a successful example of construction of nation and national identity by reproducing historical myths and legends. As the theories of Gellner and Hobsbawm claim, "Japanese nation" and "Japanese identity" appeared at the same time with the processes of industrialization and modernization. On the other hand, Smith also has a good point in this case: Japan's own specific conditions have made it more successful to create its own nation and identity, because in this case, invented traditions are merging with reinterpreted narratives of an imagined Japanese society. Smith is right to say that if there are any historical features that remain (such as legends or myths which can be reinterpreted or a distinct territory which is geographically separated), they make the process easier. In history, every example has its own peculiarities; therefore, Japan's specific characteristics such as its historical line, distinct location, homogeneity, its special *tennō* figure or its own family form as *ie* cannot be ignored. For this reason, for a better understanding of Japanese nationalism and the construction of Japanese nation and Japanese identity, it is vital to examine the roots of reinterpreted myths, legends, and narratives.

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Kioku: An Analysis on How the Memory of World War II Remains Influencing Social and Political Aspects in Japan [*]

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Abstract

On 15 August 1945, the Japanese people listened on the radio, through the words of Emperor Hirohito himself, the unconditional surrender of their country. The World War II (WWII) was then coming to an end at the Pacific theater. However, the end of the war created fertile soil for various memories about the conflicts that happened in the region between 1894 and 1945. The complex framework of Japanese memories became a big ideological conflict inside and outside Japan. Its effects are currently characterized by two points: the differences between the appropriation of facts; and the link between past and present. Currently, it is possible to observe such appropriations in various aspects. Memory was, from the immediate end of the war until the present moment, a determinant of Japanese politics. The main factors of influence by this memory are the complex variety of ideologies between identity groups formed inside the country and the memory representations by its neighboring countries about the WWII. Therefore, this research aims to analyze how, nowadays, the continued transmission of those war memories indicates that a final reconciliation among Japan and its neighbors, about the WWII, is still far from being reached. This objective passes through the analysis of the relation between memory and history, the analysis of WWII events, the framework of memories inside Japan and regionally, also the overview of the current ideological conflict and the attempt of pointing to a way of getting closure on the matter.

Keywords: Memory; War; Japan; Politics; Society; Ideology; World War II

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Introduction

The WWII had an official end in 1945. However, the memory of the war's events has been, from the immediate end of the conflict until the present moment, a determinant of many political and social interactions. Germany and Japan, as the main aggressors of the war, remained afterwards as the actors whom generated most of the traumatic memories and should mandatorily perform atonement policies.

Germany officially addressed memory issues many times and made the historical burden a little lighter for the country. One of the most famous cases related to the memories of war and apologies happened in 1970, when the West Germany chancellor knelt before the monument marking the Warsaw Ghetto. After the symbolic act by Willy Brandt before the marks of the holocaust and the Jewish people, the position of regret by Germany became concrete for the entire world. According to Resende and Budryte (2013), "it's not surprising, then, that images of Willy Brandt's kniefall have had a major political impact. Because of its visual power, the apology received immediate media attention across Europe, and indeed the world." (p. 55)

Japan on the other hand never openly addressed the memory issues. Several reparations were paid over the years and many speeches on the matter were made, but the government never presented an official positioning on the war memories related to the country. Every day the news shows that war memory is very present in Asia. A number of articles and new developments happen on the daily basis, showing the importance of the subject for the Japanese society and also for its neighboring countries.

During the last months, the visit by the US president, Barak Obama, to Hiroshima created a wave of demonstrations and opinions on the memory of the atomic bombing of Japan. Also, the recent talks between Japan and the Republic of Korea also brought to the table a fresh debate on the solution of the "comfort women" issue, between those favorable to an agreement and those who believe that the issue is far from an end. Cultural productions on the matter are also very common and their releases keep the memory of Japanese acts during the war alive. Inside Japan, issues related to Japanese war dead and the domestic consequences of war also feed the permanence of these memories as causes for a permanent ideological conflict.

The permanent remembrance of WWII events brings the past to the present and constantly affects this present with the past. This presence of the past is the key for most of the existent political obstacles, especially in Japan. Therefore an analysis of the relation among memory, the region's history and the present consequences of this relation is vital for a better understanding of the situation in Asia.

Memory and History

According to Rousso (1996), memory is the presence of the past. Le Goff (1994) also defines memory as the very origin of History, as it serves the present and the future, saving the past. The importance of memory for the historical and historiographic processes is the connection between remembrance and the very historical event.

Violent events, as conflicts between countries, are always important sources for

several memories; and these memories are determinant factors for social, political and economic positions taken during the following decades.

It is important, however, to highlight the issues related to the study of memory: memory's capacity of adapting; memory's characteristic of being produced in the present; and the oblivion. Memory is always adapted according to the point of view and ideology of its narrator. The production of any kind of memory is also always connected to the time when its narrator lives, always a present time, which influences directly its narrative. Another issue that makes the historiographic work based on memories very complicated is the phenomenon of the oblivion, because everyone can be subject of forgetting details about events.

These challenges of studying the memory of events connect this subject directly to a very specific field. Memory is one of the greatest themes of the History of the Present, considering that the present is basically the time when these memories are formed and reproduced, a time of memory. Events from the past become present events through memory.

The History of Present, therefore, works on the analysis of how past makes itself present in current societies. According to Bédarida (1996), this field of historiography aims to understand the present through the past and the past through the present.

However, the complexity of a relation between past and present lays on a complexity related to memory that goes beyond the challenges already quoted. Memory is always fragmented in several different understandings, according to the events that gave origin to this personal remembrances. The WWII was a very fertile soil for a great number of different memories and it is vital to know some of these turning points to understand how they influenced what we can call a patchwork of memories.

World War II

The official beginning of war in Asia happened in 1937. However, the instability and the conflicts that took Asian countries to the so-called Pacific War started 44 years earlier, in 1894. Japanese imperialism, as it was by the end of the war in 1945, was then the main reason for the crisis.

The first conflict at the region, from which the violence escalated, was the Sino-Japanese War, in 1894. In 1904, 10 years later, happened also the Russo-Japanese War. By the end of this second war, Japan and China signed the Shimonoseki Treaty that took to the annexation of Korea in 1910.

After the Word War I, Japan joined the League of Nations as one of the war winners. However, the policies against imperialistic aggressions adopted by the League were not positive for the Japanese militaristic position at the time. Therefore, Japan left the League in 1923, after a military joint assumed and gained power at the government of the country.

In 1931, Japan invaded for the first time the region of Manchuria, North of China. The first invasion of the Chinese territory marked the beginning of a new imperialist wave by Japan over Asian countries. Following the similar policies adopted in Europe by

Germany and Italy, Japan joined the Axis in 1936 and invaded Manchuria definitively in 1937. The alignment and the acts of aggression were considered official acts of war.

Differently from its official and small territory, Japan expanded and dominated most of Eastern Asia during the war. In 1940, French Indochina and neighboring countries were invaded. The Japanese expansion created a deep concern by Western powers that followed the developments and Europe and then started to see the same happening in Asia. Therefore, Western powers, mainly the US, imposed economic embargoes to Japan in 1941.

In the same year, Japan attacked the North-American military base of Pearl Harbor, as a demonstration of power. The US entered the war right after the attack.

During the year of 1942, Japan continued the territorial expansion and invaded the Gilbert Islands, Philippines, Mariana Islands, Borneo, Thailand, Hong Kong, Manila, Papua New Guinea, Singapore e Sumatra. In the same year, the territories of Australia, Sri Lanka and Canada were not invaded, but suffered Japanese attacks. At the same time, the Allied forces advanced and landed in Guadalcanal.

After two years of embargo, the Japanese empire found itself in a deep crisis. The strategy to keep the the Japanese advance over Asia was discussed during the Greater Eastern Asian Conference, in 1943. However, the Allies continued to advance over the territories invaded by Japan.

In 1945, the US forces landed in Japanese territory. The invasion of Japanese territory was the final stage of the Japanese defeat. The violent clashes in Okinawa showed how weakened were the Japanese troops. Even though, in the same year the US forces performed the first atomic bombing of human history in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The atomic bombings gave no options to the Japanese empire but the unconditional surrender, announced on the radio by the Emperor Hirohito himself.

After the end of the WWII, the trauma caused by its events was inevitable. The Japanese population, right after the war, could be defined as a population obligated to embrace defeat and recover a country unstable and destroyed by the Allied advance. (Dower, 2000) At the same time, the neighboring countries were deeply marked by the Japanese advance over the region.

A Thousand Memories

The French opinion on the heroic aspect of the Resistance and the disdain by Koreans about compatriots dead fighting for Japanese forces, as well as the German alleged lack of knowledge on the holocaust and the Japanese vision of noble fight for Asian prosperity during the war, are parts of the great patchwork of memories related to the WWII. All the intense experiences brought by the war were the main cause for the formation of a number of different interpretations. Several groups of memory were born inside and outside Japan, all of them presenting different objectives and positions.

According to Seraphim, the memory inside Japan, from a public point of view, the so called unofficial memory, was created under the historical circumstances of the post-war. A number of groups were formed immediately after the war and some of them are very active until the present days. Some of these groups are: the Association of Shinto Shrines, the Japan Association of War-bereaved Families, the Japan Teachers' Union, the Japan-China Friendship Association, Japan Memorial Society for the Students Killed in the War. These were the first associations to create an effective selection of memorable facts, forming identity groups inside the post-war society. (2008, p. 16)

After the first post-war decades, the new generations brought the concern of keeping alive the memory of the war, connecting past and present over and over again. These memories, kept alive by these groups over the years, became legitimate motivations and a base of arguments for political achievements. (Seraphim, 2008, p. 37)

At the same time, the Japanese government had the necessity of creating an official version of the war memory. The official memory was established in Japan after the end of the US occupation, from 1960, following a liberal line and aiming to unify the population under a new national unity. This variation of memory created an unquestionable version of "produced amnesia." (Dower, 2000)

The recovering and growth of Japan gave strength to a new nationalist speech. During the 70s' the support to a great Japan were reborn and a war memory "erasing" the Japanese role at the conflict gained power.

This change was fundamental for a wave of complaints from another memory groups. Outside Japan, many groups of memory were also created. Countries like China, Korea (both, North and Southern territories), Philippines etc. were direct victims of the Japanese actions during the war and the memories formed inside these countries were also very strong.

The neighboring memories about the war also had origin in several events of the conflict. During the war, the Japanese troops were responsible for acts considered as war crimes, sexual slavery, local population exploration and cultural imposition. This foreign variation of war memory became one of the most evident aspects of the Asian war memory internationally.

A Current Conflict

The activity of the different memory groups and the variation of interpretations brought the war to the present. Therefore, ideologically, the WWII never had an end in Asia.

Currently, four main topics are fundamental for this ideological conflict: the Yasukuni Shrine, the Japanese History Textbooks, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Japanese government's position.

Yasukuni Shrine was created during the Meiji Era as a memorial for all the people who died fighting for Japan. After the war a number of Japanese military were considered war criminals according to the so called Tokyo Trials, however their names were enshrined at Yasukuni.

The polemic around Yasukuni assumes different aspects inside and outside Japan. Inside Japan, the shrine represents for part of the population the honor of the country and, at the same time, for another group the place represents the sadness of war. Outside the country, Yasukuni represents the terrible years of aggression and a tribute to those countries tormentors.

Japanese textbooks are also a polemical subject. Memory groups are always contesting the content of such books, with the accusation of transmitting a wrong version of the war history. The books bring a resumed version of facts, excluding the Japanese crimes most of the time.

The polemic around the textbooks is mainly related to the neighboring countries in Asia that demands a better transmission of information about the tragedies of war.

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is one of the most discussed topic around the world. Inside Japan, this topic divides the society between pacifists and nationalists. The Japanese positioning as an aggressor that caused the war and the final catastrophe of it goes against the interpretation of Japan as a victim of the US criminal bombing.

Lastly, the Japanese government position is also a polemical matter towards the country's international relations. Controversial remarks by Japanese politicians, as acts related to war events or visits to Yasukuni, cause enormous dissatisfaction by neighboring countries and pacifist groups. At the same time, the government also disappoints great part of the Japanese population with atonement policies.

Consequences of this conflict are clearly seen inside Japanese politics, international news and even on international politics. For the last 15 years, Japan had a total of 8 prime ministers. The popularity of Japanese politicians is affected by war memory issues.

Japan is also constantly attacked at international arenas because of war memory clashes. The attempts to reform the United Nations Security Council are a clear example for this conflict, considering that China always blocks Japanese aspirations to a permanent seat in the Council. The arguments are always related to the behavior of Japan during the war.

How to Get Closure?

One of the most difficult, although important, questions is how to give an end to this war memory conflict. As the memory debates go on, war memory is transmitted and the cycle of hate goes on.

The last months were marked by an increase of hate speech occurrence in Japan, racist signs were always common in China and provoking outdoors were allocated in front of the Japanese embassy, in Seoul, Korea.

There are two hypothetical situations to be considered for a possible closure driven by Japan. One considering a complete apologize and a second when Japan completely ignores the current issues and moves on without apologizing. These situations generate a number of questions.

If Japan makes everything possible to apologize for its acts of war, just like Germany did especially from the 70s`:
   – Will the victims (the so-called comfort women, neighboring populations etc.) be satisfied?
   – Will the Japanese population support the government?
   – Will this ideological conflict be over?
If Japan does not make an effort in apologizing and moves on:
   – Will the acts of war, crimes and policies be forgotten some day?
   – Will the country assume a new nationalist and military rise?
   – Will this ideological conflict be over?
These questions, for both situations, have the same negative answers.

Conclusion

Memory and history keep the past alive, especially in places that suffered with violent conflicts. This war memory causes constant clashes between groups all over the world, especially in Asia.

The Japanese actions during the war marked the population of its neighboring countries and also the Japanese population. The last seven decades represented a constant clash between different memories about the first half of the XX century.

The Asian war memory about WWII became a Godzilla over the years and we are far from finding a hero to kill the monster.

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A Democratic Solution for Japan's Fading Political Public Space: Constitutional Inquiry into Article 1

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Abstract

The public space, where political life begins by citizens' participation in the matters of collective concerns, has faded considerably in postwar Japan. Building upon Hannah Arendt's work on the political public realm which she argues is sustainable so far as it has a balance between power which derives itself from freedom's temporality (human opinions and actions) and *nomos* (an ultimate authority and law) that endures in time, this paper contends that constitutional and democratic debates on Article 1 – which designates Japan's emperor as the symbol of the state – need to escalate further, given that *nomos* signification of emperor is obscured in this designation, sustaining the crisis of the balance between power and *nomos* throughout the postwar period. By taking Japan's post-World War II Constitution as a case in point, this paper highlights contra-democratic consequences which the modern state's inadequate application of secularization could bring about. It proposes the significance of relocating emperor's locus to the head of state, the relocation which may counteract the *privatized* public space of postwar Japan – where the permanence of the measures constitutive of public realm such as culture, tradition and rituals is at stake.

Keywords: Constitutional Amendment, Article 1, *Nomos*, Public Space, Arendt, Emperor, Secularization

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Introduction

It was in the early 1990s that public debate on the revisions of Japan's post-World War II Constitution were rekindled. As the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War was over in 1991, the first Gulf War broke out. For the first time in its postwar history, Japan was confronted with the need to think in all conscience the question of Self Defence Force's (SDF) overseas deployment and its constitutionality, in view of the country's international contribution (Ohara 2001, p. 18). As the United States-led war on terror escalated, Japan ended up with paying some \$13 billion (Williams 2006, p. 43) in exchange of providing what was then requested, 'human contribution' (Hughes 2006, p. 729). In the wake of rising new security agendas, the debate inescapably heightened on the question of the constitutionality of SDF's overseas dispatch (Ohara 2001, p. 18). Following Koizumi Junichiro's entrance into the Prime Minister's office in 2001, public discussion on the issues of constitutional amendment escalated further – particularly, concerning the peace clause of Article 9, which prohibits Japan from engaging in war and maintaining military forces.

Japan's 1947 Constitution,[1] originally created by 25 staff of GHQ's (General Headquarters) Government Section just over 6 nights (Ohara 2001, p. 26), has never been amended to date. The world's oldest Constitution, the Constitution of the United States ratified in 1788, has had 18 times of revision already; and the amendments of Germany's 1949 Bonn Constitution[2] have amounted to 46 times to date (Sakurai 2000, p. 12). According to the public opinion poll taken by Asahi Newspaper in May-April 2016, the percentage of respondents who favour the maintenance of Japan's 1947 Constitution is higher than those who support revision, with 55 percent of people in survey willing to keep the Constitution in its current form and 37 percent of people backing amendment (*Asahi Shinbun Digital* 2016, May 2). The gap between the amendment opposition and the pro-revision widened in the 2016 poll, given the result of the previous year being 48 percent rejecting amendment and 43 percent pro-change. In respect of controversial Article 9, 68 percent of people wish to keep the no-war clause and 27 percent pro-amendment (*Asahi Shinbun Digital* 2016, May 2). As for the revision of Article 1 which this paper examines with the aim of highlighting the public significance of designating Japan's emperor as the head of state, a public poll illustrates that disinterest in the emperor system has grown among the young generation by degrees, to whom neither affirmation nor negation is important (Ohara 1989, p. 9; Fuse 1969).[3]

This paper argues that amending Article 1 of Japan's Constitution by relocating Japan's emperor to the head of state from the symbol of the state may be pressing, given the tremendous decline of Japan's political public space in the postwar period. Japan's emperor takes a role of that which responds to the notion of *nomos*, the Greek word for law and an antiquated concept in the modern age. *Nomos'* multiple meanings propose that Japan's emperor and the emperor system are an elixir constitutive of public space, a human-political community, without which the sustainability of Japan's public realm may be at stake.

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[1] The World's 13th oldest constitution
[2] The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany
[3] The 1960s' student uprisings indicated a crisis of authority, as seen in the claims of radicals who described 'both the symbol and agent of legitimation as "phony"' (Fuse 1969, p. 334).

Nomos and the Public Space

In the commentary of *The Japan Times* in January 2016, one of prominent Japanologists, Hugh Cortazzi, writes on growing constitutional debates in Japan, addressing his uneasiness about Prime Minister Abe Shinzo's[4] move to revise the 1947 Constitution – the move that may revise not only Article 9 but also the status of the emperor. Notably, Cortazzi's commentary addresses the mainstream perspectives and interpretations held in the international sphere on the emperor of Japan and the potential move in which the emperor's status and authority are promoted (Cortazzi 2016, January 29; Conrad 2003; Beer 1998). He writes, 'Any attempt to change the "peace" Constitution will be highly controversial. Anything that might suggest a return to outdated myths or undermine human rights would arouse vehement opposition'.[5] Referring to Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, he speaks of 'the crimes of evil tyrants' as those that 'cannot be expunged from the records', and presumes the rise of fears about a 'revival of Japanese nationalism'. While Japan continues to suffer from a population crisis and its economy stagnation, he wonders whether there are not much more important issues that confront Japan today than the public's growing momentum for revising the Constitution.

But is it true that contemporary Japan's major distresses, such as economic stagnation, demographic change as well as increasing national security agenda, are entirely unrelated to the way Japan's emperor is defined in the Constitution of this country? As Cortazzi suspects, will the revision of Article 1 – a change in the way Japanese citizens acknowledge the emperor – resurrect Japanese nationalism that generates fear? What is Japan's emperor above all, his relation to Japan's public realm, and an implication of strengthening this relation for Japan's future? This paper proposes that Japan's emperor as a thread of public-unity draws many analogies and significances from the early concept of *nomos*, which Carl Schmitt explains as 'the *ordo ordinans*, the inner measure of an original, constitutive act of spatial ordering' (Chryssostalis 2013, p. 158). Examining Arendt's work on the relation between law and the public realm, and to some extent, Schmitt's notion of *nomos*, highlights *nomos* signification of the emperor, which this paper contends may help retrieve postwar Japan's public space from privatization – a force which converts citizens to consumers. In this regard, amending the Constitution's Article 1 may not be unrelated to the major distresses of contemporary Japan, contributing to the recovery of the measures constitutive of the public space.

Hannah Arendt's political philosophy focuses on postulations which create an authentic political community,[6] which she calls the public realm. It is opposed to the private realm where biological life is enclosed, where the activities of labouring and consumption, and the concerns of economy take its centre. On the one hand, the public space is a space of *power* and freedom, which manifest with citizens' action in

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[4] Following the Japanese convention, Japanese names are written surname first and given name second.

[5] Beer writes that 'Japan's history and the continued resistance of some nationalistic Japanese leaders to recognize the nature of her barbaric aggression in wartime Asia suggest that a revival of the military ascendancy was more likely…' (1998, p. 816).

[6] In this paper, an authentic political community or authentic politics is defined as the (political) public space which manifests with the actions, discussions and deliberations of citizens: their agencies are driven by the principles of virtues, and their deeds and words are facilitated and united by power.

concert (1958, p. 244).). Arendt highlights that power which is 'what keeps the public realm' is realized:

Only where word and deed have not parted company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities. (Arendt 1958, p. 200)

For her, because the products of politics – deeds and words – are 'so fleeting', collective actions into which power is crystalized spring out *in search of* a body politic that endures in time; power and freedom are dependent upon the measures such as culture, laws, tradition and rituals, which outlive human life-span (Arendt 2007b, p. 189-190; Arendt 1993). On the other hand, the private space is a realm of biological life, the realm which 'uses up durability, wears it down, [and] makes it disappear' (Arendt 1958, p. 96). In the public space of the ancient Greeks from which Arendt derives an original model of political life, citizens' concerns rested upon the foundation of a body politic – the polis, 'a kind of organized remembrance' (1958, p. 198), which closed itself off from the private realm where the enduring measures are no less subject to tomorrow's erosion and disappearance than consumption objects.[7]

The resident of public space is not consumer, but citizen, for whom the form of government – e.g. a republic, monarchy and tyranny – matters because the growth of citizen-agency or ontology, which incarnates an authentic and sustainable political community, counts upon it. For Arendt, virtues such as glory, distinction, excellence and love of equality which inspire a citizen-agency and capacitate excellent actions are acquired not only in one form of government (Arendt 2007a, p. 722-723; Kateb 2006, p. 138; Arendt 2005). For example, while the form of government is different between republic and monarchy, she argues that neither bodies politic cancel out authentic political experience, in which citizens' concerns are directed not only to power's perpetuation but also to the *preconditions* that facilitate and safeguard power. For Arendt, these preconditions are that which transcend time, saving human political life from its temporality (1993).

In her essay on 'The Great Tradition I. Law and Power', Arendt explains the problem of politics in our age, in which the criteria of citizens to judge just or unjust government are predicated primarily upon the question as to whether a government is lawful or not. For her, it overlooks the question of the different forms of government in which authentic politics is possible. Monarchy or constitutional monarchy no less nurtures principles that construct citizen-agency than republic. She illustrates that our questions as to the different forms of government have waned, as an old inquiry into

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[7] For Arendt, action and speech, which represent the political faculty of human beings and give rise to the phenomena of public space, are as transient as the human activities of consumption and labour that are those of private realm. What distinguishes the activities of the political from those of the private is that the former could appeal to the memory of spectators through the manifestation of distinctive and excellent – virtuous – actions, whereas on the other hand the latter 'leaves no permanent trace' and produces 'the least durable of tangible things' (1958, p. 90, 96); Owing to the capacity of political faculty to remain in human memory, in other words, to become memorable deeds and words, these activities of the public are, albeit as ephemeral as those of the private, different from the activities of the private, where everything (e.g. human interactions, communications and products of labour) is taken to be analogous, namely, common denominator such as human *behaviour* which Arendt argues is distinct from human action which addresses the distinctiveness of identity or personality (1958).

an indispensable distinction inherent in *nomos* declined, that is, the distinction between the cosmic law (a higher law, universal law or ultimate authority), and the general or positive law. A declining public space in the modern age continues to unsettle Arendt, given the foregoing event of totalitarianism in the twentieth century, in which *nomos* – which withstands transient human affairs in the integration of law and the ultimate authority – began to move. For one thing, the positive law is a set of prohibitions, providing people with the standards of right and wrong (Arendt 2007a, p. 721). For another, the cosmic law – *nomo basileus panton* – which existed in the pre-Socratic world is that which is 'an order inherent in the universe and governs its motion' and 'applicable to all things and to every man in every situation' (Arendt 2007a, p. 718). According to St. Augustine, the eternal cosmic law is 'the divine reason' which '*precedes* all human laws and which is coextensive with the "eternal order of things"' (Chroust 1944, p. 196, italics added).

In highlighting the significance of maintaining the distinction between the universal law and the positive law, Arendt emphasizes the imperative of positive codes of rules in order to forestall one universal law from overriding the border between the public and the private realms (Arendt 2007a, p. 718, 720). However, she simultaneously emphasizes the importance of acknowledging the *interdependent* relationship of two laws, given that it is the one universally valid law – the ultimate authority – from which the positive law derives its legitimacy, in other words, its relative permanence. She writes, 'the standards of right and wrong as they are laid down in positive law… are absolute insofar as they owe their existence to a universally valid law, beyond the power and the competence of man' (2007a, p. 720). The principal function of the general law, which aims at the prevention of wrongdoings, must be in harmony with the universal law accordingly, because it is from the latter that the precepts of right and justice, that is, the concept of virtues or virtuous life, are drawn (Chroust 1944, p. 201).

The harmony of two laws are essential because human affairs are contingent and transient; human opinions constantly change; and the birth of new generations always challenge and violate the 'pre-existence of a common world' (Arendt 2007a, p. 716). For Arendt, crucial to the early notion of *nomos* is its function as fences or boundaries – that which stabilises eternally changing human condition through its relative permanence (2007a, p. 717). Put differently, the *validity* of positive laws, which makes the laws endure in time, is agreed by a community of people whose integration is initiated by the cosmic law, 'the Command of God' (Arendt 2007a, p. 719). The contingent and temporal nature of public space is thus protected through the relative permanence of laws and regulations, which provide the citizens of a public realm in the present and the future with the historically learned and shared standards of judgement. Arendt demonstrates that the old question of the forms of government which capacitate an authentic political community must hence begin with the account of equilibrium between the cosmic law and the positive law.

Like Arendt, Schmitt speaks of the notion of *nomos* spatially in illustrating that it is 'found at the beginning of the history of every settled people, every common wealth, every empire… [and] every historical epoch' (Schmitt 2003, p. 48). For him, *nomos* whose original meaning has been lost in our time is tied to earth with its beginning

resting upon 'land-appropriation',[8] 'land division and distribution' (Chryssostalis 2013, p. 163-164). Schmitt writes that 'jurisprudential thinking', which stems from *nomos*, 'occurs only in connection with a total and concrete historical order' (2003, p. 20). Chryssostalis' reading of Schmitt's work on the bond of earth and *nomos* highlights the geographical character and limitation of law, as that which 'begins with land-appropriation' – one that is 'the constitutive process through which law and legal order are initiated' (2013, p. 163). It is thus irreducible to the general sense of law, regulation or rule; rather it is 'the outer edge of legality… that precedes and constitutes the established legal order' (Chryssostalis 2013, p. 165). For both Arendt and Schmitt, *nomos* is the constitutive process that produces (the validity of) laws and demarcates those of boundary.

Nomos Defect: Japan's Post-World War II Constitution

Given the tie of *nomos* to earth, the identity of the inhabitants and the features that distinguish them are shaped in the bounded or shared space (Chryssostalis 2013, p. 169). Contra-*nomos,* Japan's supreme law – the Constitution enacted in 1947 – was made by the American officials in the aftermath of its war defeat however. Combined in the package of the Occupation policies was *the Shintō directive*, which curtailed the extent of interaction between the public and Japan's emperor whose lineage is presupposed to originate from the Sun Goddess *Amaterasu* (Mori 2015, p. 137). Japan's emperor is, first and foremost, a sacerdotal authority (祭祀: *saishi*) which has performed *Shinto* rite – the religion which was formalised as that of the imperial household. Through the performance of ritual ceremonies which are exemplified in the ceremony of *Shihōhai* (四方拝)[9], the emperor mediated the interaction of his people with his ancestor, the God *Amaterasu,* in pre-1945 Japan. In interweaving culture, norms, tradition and rituals through which the Japanese citizenry has been integrated, the emperor thus took a role of *nomos*.

Under the *Shintō* directive, Ohara illustrates that *Shintō* received the most severe treatment among other religious creeds, the extent of which was so thorough as to manifest as a notion of 'absolute divisionism' between state and church, even after the end of the Occupation in 1952 (1989, p. 111). In undertaking the drafting of Japan's post-World War II Constitution, the Occupation staff defined Japan's emperor as 'the symbol of the State and of the unity of the People' in Article 1 of the 1947 Constitution (Uleman & The Constitution of Japan Project 2004) – a new, postwar status of the emperor whose sovereign power was transferred to the will of the people. While Article 1 defines the emperor as the symbol of the state, the Constitution's Article 20, which states 'The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity', yet bars him from performing *Shintō* rites as

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[8] In respect of "land-appropriation" with which Schmitt illustrates that *nomos* begins, Immanuel Kant defines it as 'law of mine and thine that distributes the land to each man' – that which 'is not positive law in the sense of later state codifications, or of the system of legality in subsequent state constitutions; it is, and remains, the real core of a wholly concrete, historical and political event' (Schmitt 2003, p. 48).

[9] It is a ritual performance of the emperor who pays homage to the four directions of the cosmos and prays for averting natural disasters and harvesting abundant crops (Hasegawa 2003, p. 63).

public functions and thus, Hasegawa Michiko contends, from being 'a symbol of the unity of the Japanese people' (2007, p. 63).[10]

One of the indicative academic discussions on the role of Japan's emperor as *nomos* was unfolded during the Occupation period (Titus 1980, p. 535). The debate between Odaka Tomoo and Miyazawa Toshiyoshi critically scrutinized the tenor Arendt proposes, that is, the proposition that an authentic political experience cannot be realized by the general law alone, requiring the aegis of the cosmic law – the ultimate authority – for stabilizing the 'constant motion of all human affairs' (Arendt 2007a, p. 716). Against the view of Odaka to whom reconciliation between popular sovereignty and imperial sovereignty is possible within *nomos*, Miyazawa criticized his point as 'an obfuscation of sovereignty', arguing that every political system has a *single* concrete organ or locus wherein the absolute lies (Titus 1980, p. 539). While Odaka insisted that Japan's emperor suggests a fountain which comprises *nomos* and 'symbolizes the eternal parcel of values' since the country's foundation, toward which he believes citizen's search for authentic politics should be directed (Titus 1980, p. 540, 542), it was Miyazawa's idea of popular sovereignty, that is, the single locus of sovereignty which has no space for reconciliation, that has become the mainstream interpretation of legal scholars in postwar Japan (Titus 1980, p. 541).

Until around the revival of constitutional debate at the beginning of the 1990s, the nation's focus was riveted to the issue of economic growth, having left the question of the emperor's public significance unexamined.[11] Although Japanese intellectuals' opinions were those of 'vocal minority', as opposed to the 'silent majority' of the ordinary people (Shimizu 1980, p. 102), given the upper hand of their publication work through which their voices are heard widely, the narratives of Marxist and neo-Marxist, whose ideology prevailed in postwar Japanese academia, exerted great leverage upon the public sphere, where political action manifested as labour-union, social and democratic movements (Mori 2015). As in the 1946 popular front ushered by the activists such as Nosaka Sanzō and Yamakawa Hitoshi, communist and socialist led socio-political movements in postwar Japan, unfolding such discussions as the urgency of constructing democratic Japan by conquering reactionary-autocratic politics, one that arose from the emperor-centred polity (Mori 2015). As the 1950 Korean War set out, the Japanese economy began to skyrocket, which was followed by the period of plateau in which the nation's high living standard was maintained. In 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's signing of the San Francisco peace and security treaties restored the state's sovereignty and independence to Japan, officially unshackling it from the Occupation. What is known as the Yoshida doctrine,[12] through which the postwar pacifist consensus developed, amassed the support both of

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[10] Noah Berlin puts forth a similar argument with Hasegawa, stating that 'the relationship between Chapter 1 and Article 20 is not, as it stands today, legally justiciable' (1998, p. 383). Berlin argues that it is inevitable for Japan's emperor whose historical role is not only chief shaman-priest of the Shinto religion but also constitutionally mandated symbol of the State to violate, at a minimum, Articles 4 and 20 of Japan's Constitution if he is to accomplish these roles (1998, p. 384).

[11] The key newspapers and weekly magazines have spotlighted the imperial family throughout Japan's postwar period, depicting the emperor and his family as a 'likeable' and 'commoner-like' figure, and 'the model of Japanese family': Owing to this, while the imperial household has been the subject of popular attention in the postwar period, the emperor's political significance has hardly been discussed (Titus 1980, p. 557, 563).

[12] The doctrine through which the concerns of Japan's national security are left with the sphere of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) Yoshida faction, and of socialist and communist (Kataoka & Myers 1989, p. 18). In the 1950s and 1960s, progressive intellectuals representing postwar Japanese academia such as Kuno Osamu (1996) cerebrated the arrival of the postwar period, where he argued the border of private and public life emerged due finally to the dismantlement of *kokutai*, the emperor-centred polity.[13] For Maruyama Masao (1963), a key cause of the rise of 'psychology of ultra-nationalism' in pre-1945 Japan stemmed from the emperor's assumption of sovereignty and the belief of the Japanese people in the emperor that he represents absolute values.

But would the recession of ultimate authority not destroy the necessary balance between the general and cosmic laws? That is, given the retreat of ultimate authority from which values and norms have generated, would it not precipitate Japan's public space into a constant motion of human affairs, in which citizens lose the standards of judgment? To that extent, would it not be the trend of the time that starts to influence people's opinions?[14] Furthermore, would the new generations not be stripped of the wisdom and memory of the pre-existence of a common world? For Japanese citizens, what does the symbol of the state denote? Leaving the issue of necessary harmony between the general law and the cosmic law, those very important yet neglected and marginalised questions accordingly have been subject to critical scrutinies time and again in the postwar period (Sakurai 2006; Mizubayashi 2006; Ohara 1989; Okudaira 1990; Shimizu 1980). In pointing to the French term "*symbole*", Ohara illustrates that its concept does not just mean sign and mark, but contains also the signification of unity and integrity (1989, p. 28). Moreover, Ohara denounces the orthodoxy of contemporary constitutional scholarship in Japan which highlights Japan's emperor to be a *mere* symbol of the country, stressing that even the Occupation's Government Section did not characterize the emperor as a mere symbol (1989, p. 26), as testified by Milo E. Rowell, one of the key officers who worked on the draft of Japan's Constitution. According to Milo, the use of the term, the symbol of the state, by no means disregards the meaning of the head of state as in the usage of the West (Ohara 1989, p. 15-16). However, given that the Constitution's Articles 3 and 4 request every action of the emperor to go through Cabinet's advice and approval, and bar him from having powers related to government, Japan's emperor does not have any political power and is precluded from engaging in actions related to government or the public at will – a condition which raises the question as to whether Japan's emperor can be appropriately considered, within such definitions and limitations, as the head of state (Shiraki 2013, p. 60-61).[15]

For Nishio Kanji who explores the foundation of Japan's polity, it is a misconception to equalize monarchy with dictatorship. In Japan's history, the former suggests a form of government in which the notion of justice prevails through the monarch's work to

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[13] As Schmitt writes, it is important to note that 'land-appropriation… precedes the distinction between private and public law; in general, it creates the conditions for this distinction' (2003, p. 46). In this regard, as the next passage illustrates, it is possible to suggest that the act of Japan's emperor in the lead-up to *taihō ritsuryō* was that of *nomos*, a constitutive process.

[14] According to Kataoka Tetsuya (2006, p. 119), today Japan has become a country that can be characterized as the direct democracy of a mass society. Everything is decided according to the climate of the day.

[15] For example, the countries such as Sweden and Spain which have a monarch define him/her as the head of state in their constitutions (Yomiuri Shibun Seijibu 2013, p. 181).

expropriate lands and people from powerful clans, and to divide and reappropriate them (2001, p. 148-149). This process was preparatory to the birth of *Taihō* code (*taihō ritsuryō*: 大宝律令)[16] at the beginning of the eighth century, the code through which the idea of the public ownership of land was realized. Nishio points out that the 'emperor-centred' meant for Japan to ground the public (2001, p. 149). As though it upheld Schmitt's theory of *nomos* which is originally 'an initial distribution and allocation of mine and thine' – 'the truly constitutive event of legal order' (Chryssostalis 2013, p. 164; Schmitt 2003, p. 345), Nishio's examination of the process before the advent of the *ritsuryō* state, which was propelled by Japan's emperor, points to the inseverable relation of Japan's geographical public space with *nomos*, the emperor.

Despite such characteristics of the emperor as *nomos*, as found in David Titus' review of Satō Isao's analyses, the emperor is 'negative' in postwar Japan, one that responds 'passively to the "trends of the times"' no longer figuring as 'some eternal bundle of values eternally unique to Japan and the Japanese polity' (1980, p. 549). Characterizing Japan as an 'economic animal', Kataoka Tetsuya describes the nation as one whose primary concern rests on the survival of its biological life, the nation which has neither dignity nor ideal – a behaviour observed, particularly, in its handling of foreign affairs (2006, p. 64). Seen from Arendt's viewpoint, given the activity and concern of economy and consumption being the character of private realm, it is open to question as to whether Japan has a public space, whose resident is not consumer who 'uses up durability' (1958, p. 96), but citizen for whom the forms of government are an essential question concerning the sustainability of his or her public space (Arendt 1993; Arendt 2007a). Evidenced in the case of many citizens' indifference to the National Foundation Day on February 11, contemporary Japanese hardly know the meaning of this national holiday, which is related to the first Emperor of Japan, Jimmu (Tōjō 2012, p. 74-75). Such phenomenon raises the question as to the extent in which nationalism exists in Japan; as to whether people consider themselves as a member of the public space. While the LDP's draft on constitutional revision publicized on April 27, 2013 amends Article 1, wherein the emperor is defined as the head of state, as in Cortazzi's view a fear of the extent to which Japan's emperor acquires 'actual political and government-related powers' (*The Japan Times* 2013, Mar 14) continues to be expressed both domestically and internationally, given the memory of Japan's expansion in Asia in the years preceding 1945.

Secularization's Dilemma with Democracy: *Nomos*' Implication for the Recovery of Japan's Political Public Realm in the 21st Century

Closely connected to the importance of developing democratic debate on the amendment of Constitution's Article 1 – which may open up examination on *nomos* signification of Japan's emperor – is the need to review the notion of secularization,[17] as the extent of secularism has an impact on the way in which Japan's public sphere

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[16] *Taihō ritsuryō* indicates the (new) system of law which was enacted in Japan in 701: its references were derived from Confucianism and the laws of Tang dynasty.

[17] Citing the definition of Peter Berger, Madan addresses that secularization is 'the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols' (1987, p. 748).

takes shape in the future. While secular state[18] is commonly considered to be reciprocal to democratic society, it has been a familiar practice in many parts of the world that state is not necessarily *categorically* separated from religion under the laws outlining secularism – often constitutional. After the end of the Occupation in 1952, despite the lapse of the *Shintō* directive, many Japanese constitutional scholars inherited the Occupation's early interpretation of the directive – absolute divisionism – in their interpretation of Article 20 (Ohara 1989, p. 112, 115). The 1977 *Tsuji Chinsai* lawsuit was a landmark case in this respect, as it interpreted Article 20 of Japan's 1947 Constitution as that which requests the state to be neutral in respect of religion in illustrating that the clause is not a sanction on the state's any interaction with religion (Ohara 1989, p. 43). But as David Martin, one of the distinguished secularization theorists in the West, discusses, the concept of secularization itself remains 'a hotch-potch of ideas, [and] some of them contradictory' (2005, p. 19). He highlights that secularization was '*in part* an ideological projection on history based on an apotheosis of reason' (2005, p. 19). Should secularization be yet a contended concept among prominent secularization theorists, why would Japanese scholars not revisit its concept and scrutinize the origin and history more actively, given that the extent of secularism is a constitutional question?[19]

According to Hannah Arendt, while the presumed role of citizen is to have deliberation on the forms of government, due to the meagreness of democratic debate on this matter in postwar Japan, many contradictions remain to be enclosed in Japan's Constitution. These contradictions include the facts that: in spite of *nomos* which is territorially specific, Japan's post-World War II Constitution was not made by the hands of the Japanese people; Japan's emperor cannot officially play a role to unify Japanese citizens given the limitation of Article 20; he does not adequately represent the head of state under the specifications of Articles 3 and 4; and these constitutional limitations have deprived Japanese citizens of occasions and spaces to interact with a thread of permanence that has historically interwoven the unity and integrity of the people.

Further to these contradictions, Japan's Constitution is encumbered with dilemmas in which the locus of ultimate authority is equivocal and its lodging institution puzzling. With Japan's defeat in the Second World War which dissolved the ultimate authority, the 1947 Constitution appropriated the institution that lodges *nomos* to the Supreme Court which, as specified by Article 81, interprets the 'constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act' (Uleman & The Constitution of Japan Project 2004, p. 217). However, as Sakurai Yoshiko points out, it has been the tradition of postwar Japan that an institution known as 'the shadow authority' – the *Cabinet Legislation Bureau* (内閣法制局: *naikaku hōseikyoku*) – sets forth the Japanese government's official interpretation of Japan's Constitution as the government's consensus (政府統一見解: *seifu tōitsu kenkai*)[20] (2000, p. 172). In view of this, the institution that pronounces the interpretations of *nomos* remains critically ambiguous in the polity of

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[18] It is generally interpreted as the separation of church and state. Habermas demonstrates that secularism should be the essential norm of modern liberal democracy (2006).

[19] Madan demonstrates a key problem associated with secularism, writing that 'the *transferability* of the idea of secularism to the countries of South Asia is beset with many difficulties and should not be taken for granted' (1987, p. 754, italics added).

[20] This is despite the Bureau's locus being outside the Constitution.

postwar Japan. This enigma contributes to deepening the paradox of Japan's democracy, leaving the question of whether the emperor could in any way officially relate to and interact with the citizens and the matters of government (Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu 2013, p. 182).

Since the end of the 1940s in which the Japanese government adopted *the reverse course* in acceptance of the Occupation policy on the reconstruction of Japan, the nation's focus has been fixed to the politics of economic growth – the subject which continues to be the centre of national interest to date and even more so after the rise of neoliberalism and the prime minister's implementation of *Abenomics*.[21] Hence, it is open to question as to whether Japan in its postwar period has been successful in the development of political public space – the development which this paper has argued may set in if legal or *nomos* signification of Japan's emperor is re-examined – not the privatization of public realm. For Titus, 'most legal scholars… have paid little attention to the legal implications of the emperor's symbolic role' (1980, p. 548). While the great ascent of people's apathy towards the emperor system in postwar Japan and the ingrained perceptions on Japan's emperor – which arise from the legacy of prewar and wartime Japan[22] – cloud the constitutional debates on Article 1, the citizen's presumed role is, as Arendt argues, to seek a form of government in which citizens engage in authentic politics (the manifestation of power and virtues) – the form which could take a constitutional monarchy.

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[21] Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's policy on Japan's economy since 2012: including fiscal stimulus, structural reforms and monetary easing.

[22] When the *nomos* theories of Arendt and Schmitt are concerned, it is possible to propose an alternative historical perspective or *historiography* which – with regard to the Second World War or the Pacific War – may take its distance from appropriating moral judgments to Japan's war conduct. David Williams at The LibertyWeb interview (2014) suggests that the Pacific War (which Williams calls "the Greater East Asian War") has been seen and approached by the Western powers from the standpoint of moral crusades. While Japan has been thus condemned by the people who interpret the war on the basis of moral judgments, Williams points out that the role of historians is to analyse facts on the basis of historical objectivity (2014). Such Williams' historiography on the Greater East Asian War arguably responds plausibly to Ulmen's introduction of Schmitt's *nomos* of the earth (2003). Schmitt's theory illustrates the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the League of Nations as the products of a historical watershed in which President Woodrow Wilson's idea of a new world order began to advance and to destroy European public law (the *jus publicum Europaeum*) that had been constitutive of the old world order (Ulmen 2003, p. 12-13). For Schmitt, since the end of the nineteenth century, the *jus publicum Europaeum* started to decline without finding its alternative, which rendered a regime of new international law to be the law of the international sphere – one that lacks 'any spatial reference' (2003, p.11). While transforming the old model of international law, Wilson introduced 'a discriminatory concept of war – a "just war" – into [the new model of] international law', with the League of Nations having served as an arbiter of this concept (Ulmen 2003, p. 21). In this view, it is important to give a new light not only on Japan in the Greater East Asian War but also on the continuity of "spaceless universalism" (Ulmen 2003, p. 11) which capriciously warrants the sovereignty of each state today.

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Framing the Pre-Olympic News Coverage of Tokyo 2020:
A Comparative Analysis of Tokyo's Successful Bid and the Olympic Stadium Design

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Abstract

As a global spectacle, the Olympics is a powerful symbolic event, generating images that dominate international news coverage for the host country, while at the same time attracting millions of viewers and readership.

The power of the media to shape public opinion can be interpreted as a connection between the macro (mass media) and the micro (individual person) level of communication (Ellul, 1973). The mass media's influential role unceasingly continues to receive researchers' attention. By incorporating this premise, within the context of Tokyo's upcoming 2020 Summer Olympics, we can presume that Olympic media messages could have an influential effect on global public opinion.

This study focuses on the Tokyo 2020 pre-Olympic news coverage to explore this conjecture. While news discourse analysis is a well respected research tradition, the concept of news framing suggested itself as the most effective method of deconstructing media texts (Entman, 1993). The framing of two prominent news stories, the Zaha Hadid Olympic stadium design and winning the 2020 Olympic bid are examined by identifying issue specific frames on a micro level, such as Zaha design criticism/defense, tri-city contest and cost effectiveness of economic resources. A corpus of English language news stories for international readers was collected from Japanese, British and U.S. newspapers and news agencies.

This analysis will highlight dominant news frames in Tokyo 2020 news stories and suggest answers to the question: Could these dominant news frames have significant political, economic or cultural implications for Tokyo as it prepares itself to be the next Olympic city?

Keywords: Tokyo 2020, news framing, Tokyo, Olympics, print media, stadium, news, mega-event

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1. Introduction: "Let the (Olympic) Games Begin"

Winning the coveted bid in September 2013 to host the 2020 Summer Olympics was a significant achievement for Japan. Although the financial risks of hosting an Olympic event are relatively high, the rewards can be worth the gamble, as was the case with London 2012. At the same time, the Olympics are undoubtedly powerful symbolic moments, an "image conglomerate" (Farrell, 1989: 160) or a kaleidoscope of pictures covering the global media landscape. And that also translates into millions of spectators, television viewers, newspaper readers and social media fans focusing on Tokyo, even after the Olympic games have ended.

For a number of years media scholars have alluded to the mass media's highly influential role in shaping public views and opinions" by "reproducing preformulated ideologies" (Van Dijk 1988 :11). Hence we have seen how host nations use this opportunity, as in the case of Beijing 2008, to carve out their national identity and influence audiences "through a nation-tinged lens" (Hargreaves,1992: 127) or "selectively edited information" (Ellul, 1973). These two systems working in tandem, mass media and host country national identity, suggest that within the context of Tokyo's upcoming 2020 Summer Olympics, Olympic media messages could have an influential effect on global public opinion.

Furthermore the economic stakes are extremely high if we consider budgets for live broadcast coverage, logistical planning and preparation costs. Broadcast networks compete to buy the television rights for Olympic games, large entourages of news personnel descend on the host city and corporations vie for primetime television advertising slots. And these are just some of the costs. Taking a look at television rights fees for the Olympics reveals just how big these costs are. NBC Universal paid $USD 4.38 billion after successfully acquiring the television rights in the U.S. for three recent Olympics (Soichi 2014, Rio De Janeiro 2016, Tokyo 2020) (Real, 1996). In a similar deal, NBC Universal has recently won the broadcast rights for all of the upcoming Olympics between 2021 and 2032 for $USD 7.65 billion, investment costs that need to be protected (Hughes, 2014).

As a starting point to examine the question of how the Tokyo pre-Olympics coverage might influence international audiences, the concept of news framing suggested itself as the most appropriate methodology. Framing methodology charts a different direction from traditional news discourse analysis by examining the "power of a communicating text". Consequently, how journalists frame stories could affect how society reacts and responds to them (Entman, 1993: 51). A correlation between framing and audience attitudes, for instance, is evident in a study by Billings, Brown K. and Brown N. on the 2012 London Olympics media coverage. The study reveals that "heavy (television) viewers" showed higher levels of "nationalism, patriotism and internationalism" (Billings et al., 2013: 587).

Developing the methodology also required a perusal of news stories during this pre-Olympic phase. This list was reduced to two major news stories; Tokyo winning the 2020 Olympic bid and the Zaha Hadid Olympic stadium design scandal. The following two research questions became a focal point for the study:
What are the dominant news frames in the Japanese, British and American news media?
Could these news frames have any political, economic or cultural implications for Tokyo as it prepares itself to be the next Olympic city?

2. News case studies: Tokyo 2020 Zaha Hadid Stadium scandal and the Tokyo 2020 Olympic bid

If we examine news framing in previous Olympic Stadium stories, the Beijing Bird's Nest stadium (2008) is an example of the rise and fall of a stadium story. At the time of its debut, the Bird's Nest stadium was heralded as an architectural wonder in modern Olympic stadium design. Nearly eight years after the Olympic mega-event, the news frames have changed substantially, focusing instead on the declining number of tourists, the stadium's deteriorating condition and critical attacks by one of the stadium's designers, artist/activist Ai Wei Wei.

A cursory examination of news stories on the Tokyo 2020 Zaha Hadid Stadium scandal, suggests that news frames shifted dramatically after more than three years of ongoing controversy, ranging from laudatory support for the project in 2012 to cancellation of the design in July, 2015. The acrimony between the late Iraqi born British designer, Zaha Hadid, and the Japan Sports Council continued for months after Prime Minister Abe scrapped the Hadid project.

The Hadid stadium story is also an illustration of the cultural concept of news, characterized as "an arena of dramatic forces and action" (Carey, 1989: 21). In the case of the Hadid story, the dramatic forces divided into two separate camps. In one camp: the Japanese and Tokyo Government, Japan Sports Council, Japan Olympic Committee (JOC), a group of prominent Japanese architects and a group of local citizens. In the opposing camp: British architect Zaha Hadid.

The selection of the final stadium design, submitted by Japanese architect Kengo Kuma in December 2015, brought the "action" in the Hadid stadium story to a tentative conclusion. Hadid's accusations continued into 2016, so the design story was missing a final conclusion for a long time after Hadid's design was cancelled. Hadid claimed, for

example, that (1) her original design was copied by Kuma and (2) her architectural firm had not been fully paid for her design.

The issues in the competitive bidding process for the tri-city contest between Tokyo, Istanbul and Madrid revolved around budget, economy, infrastructure, public support, and politics. Like the stadium story, news frames were constantly changing over the two-year period, after the application was submitted to the International Olympic Committee (the IOC) in 2011, and even now, completely new frames are still emerging.

Istanbul and Tokyo, with stronger economies and Olympic budget proposals, naturally dominated the tri-city contest news stories, but at the same time, Madrid's successful hosting of the 1992 summer Olympics also assured their position in the bidding process up until the IOC final vote count (Tokyo 60, Istanbul 36) in September 2013. However, Tokyo was plagued with worries over radiation leaks in Fukushima and weaker public support, while Istanbul's anti-government civil riots earlier that summer (2013) and its close proximity to the Syrian crisis became a series of other disconcerting factors.

In the next section, an examination of the literature on news framing concepts and Olympic news framing studies, served as the basis for formulating the theoretical components and methodology for this news framing study.

3. Framing: Definitions, "Framing devices"

The concept of news framing also raises the uncomfortable issues of news balance and objectivity. Or as media scholar Michael Schudson frames it: Are we more likely to read or watch "advocacy under the guise of objectivity" in news reporting today (Schudson, 2003)?

The prevailing literature on news framing explores the question of how journalists "frame" important public events and issues. Beyond traditional news discourse analysis, news framing has been regarded by media researchers as an effective method to deconstruct media texts. Even though there is no consensus on the definition of framing, Entman defines framing as selecting "some aspects of a perceived reality" and then making it "more salient" in the communication (Entman, 1993: 52). Gamson and Modigliani take a different slant, characterizing frames within the context of "media discourse", or so-called "interpretative packages that give meaning to an issue or a "central organizing idea" (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989: 3). Incorporating a slightly

broader view, Goffman's (1974) earlier work on framing asserts that frames are "principles of organization which govern events" (Goffman, 1974: 10).

Although framing as a discipline can attribute its foundation to psychology and sociology, this study will only focus on the sociological concepts (Pan & Kosicki 1993, Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007). Part of the sociological perspective in framing includes the newsgathering process itself. Scheufele cites three influential factors which occur concurrently, (1) the journalist's personal "ideologies and attitudes", (2) the "political orientation" of the news organization and (3) the newsmakers or "interest groups" (Scheufele 1999: 116, Van Dijk 1988). Media researchers also differentiate between (1) the standard reporting of facts ("frame sending" approach) and (2) the case where journalists help readers understand the issue by putting it into a larger, more opinionated context ("frame setting" approach) (Bruggemann, 2014; Scheufele, 1999).

On a micro level, "framing devices" allow us to identify frames in a news text, namely "the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases and stereotyped images" (Entman, 1993: 52). Adding to these framing devices, we can also include "headlines, subheads, photos and captions, leads, quote selection, pull quotes, logos, charts and concluding paragraphs" (Tankard 2001:101).

It is also instructive to note that from a narrative or storytelling perspective, framing devices also "define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments and suggest remedies" (Entman, 1993: 52). The Tokyo 2020 Olympic bid story is a clear illustration of Entman's paradigm. The "problem" can be identified as Japan's desire to host the Olympic games, aiming for 2016, but eventually winning the 2020 bid. The "cause" was the fierce competition from the competing finalists. "Moral judgments" centered on such issues as the unresolved problem of Fukushima in Japan, civil riots in Istanbul and the declining economy in Madrid. One of the strongest reasons the IOC finally agreed to award the 2020 bid to Japan was because of its "safe" environment and stable economy.

4. Classifying news frames

Beyond the framing devices themselves, classifying news frames as either generic or issue specific is an important consideration. Generic frames appear frequently in framing studies, following a deductive approach wherein "frames are defined. . . prior to the investigation" (de Vreese, 2005: 53).

Some news framing scholars agree that generic news frames should be a part of any framing methodology (Borah, 2011), such as conflict (Valkenburg, Semetko, and de Vreese, 1999), "human interest", economic, moral values (Neuman, Just and Crigler, 1992, de Vreese, 2005), and "attribution of responsibility (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000, de Vreese, 2005). One of the shortcomings with this approach is that relevant details can be overlooked in specific issues.

Using the reverse process, issue specific news frames are generated at the same time as the coding in the data analysis, following an inductive approach (de Vreese, 2005: 55).

"Issue specific" frames created the framework for Zhou, Shen, Zhang and Zhong's (2013) study of the opening ceremony of the London Olympics, citing 11 frames in total, including "countryside, heritage, creativity, sports, music, innovation, technology, knowledge, green and shopping" (Zhou et al., 2013: 880). The authors found little variance in the media coverage among news outlets in three countries (Zhou et al., 2013: 884).

Similarly, Carey, Mason and Misener (2011) identify three primary issue specific frames in their study of competitive bidding for the 2016 Olympic games: (1) "development discourse" (2) "potential benefits" for the host city and (3) "competition between host cities" (Carey et al: 252,253). This particular study is also important for comparing the framing of Tokyo 2016 with the Tokyo 2020 frames, identified later in the study results section. Tokyo's dominant frames were "environmental benefits" and "green games", while "financial strength", "financial stability" and "commitment of the government" assumed a lesser role (Carey et al., 2011: 256).

Another secondary research area, becoming more prevalent in news framing research is comparative studies of news practices among different news organizations. These studies generate a range of findings: (1) variances in news practices based on the origin of the news outlet or (2) news outlets sharing the same frame regardless of the country of origin. For example, in a comparative framing analysis of U.S. and Chinese telecasts during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Billings et al. (2011) conclude that in the framing of the same athletic performances, there were vast differences between the U.S. and Chinese telecasts.

These final studies in the literature review also follow the comparative studies approach, restricting their focus though, to Japanese news agencies covering the same Olympic event. Lee Thompson, for example, concludes that each Japanese newspaper interpreted the Olympics differently, based on the "political and ideological orientations" of the newspaper, in her study of the London 2012 Olympics media coverage, suggesting that each news organization had a significant influence over the "framing" of the Olympic story (Thompson, 2013: 1781).

Naka and Kobayashi (2010) point out that reporting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics Opening ceremony was initially positive in Japanese television news coverage, however, subsequent Japanese television stories dwelled on "three negative aspects" (Naka et al., 2010: 1792). In the end, the authors found there was no significant improvement in China's general image. Similarly, Lin (2010) observes that Japanese newspaper coverage of the Nagano Torch replay focused on "this event as a political issue, embedding a China vs. Japan emotion, hence reminding the Japanese people of a possible political conflict" (Lin, 2010:1567).

5. Methodology

The research questions developed for this study were created after studying a number of news articles from the Japanese and British press on the Tokyo 2020 Olympic bid and Zaha Hadid stadium, which led this inquiry in the following direction:
What are the dominant news frames in the Japanese news media and in the Western news media (Britain and the U.S.)?
Could these news frames have any political, economic or cultural implications for Tokyo as it prepares itself to be the next Olympic city?

This study restricted the dataset to news articles about specific news events, newsmaker announcements or new policy directives pertaining to the Zaha Hadid stadium design or the 2020 Olympic bid. A corpus of English language news stories for international readers was collected from Japanese, British and U.S. newspapers and news agencies. Selecting English language publications ensured that the dataset would be aimed at international readers rather than local communities.

A mixed quantitative and qualitative content analysis approach was implemented in order to understand (1) the frequency of recurring frames and (2) the stylistic conventions in the text. This mixed methodological approach was utilized successfully in two previous media studies by this author, "A Stylistics Analysis of News Agency Articles on the Japan-China Senkaku-Diaoyu Issue" and "Japan's "Abenomics" Media Coverage: A Comparison between Print and Social Media" (Natusch and Hawkins, 2014).

A total of 73 stories was collected for the dataset with about half covering the story of the tri-city bid for the Olympics and half covering the Hadid stadium design story. This study attempted to conduct a tri-country comparative analysis, however, the few U.S. articles produced in the LexisNexis search made the US analysis a significantly lesser part of the framing analysis.

The dataset was analyzed primarily using an inductive approach, therefore frames were being generated during the data coding. The qualitative methodological approaches of Lin (2010), Carey, Mason and Misener (2011), Zhou, Shen, Zhang and Zhong (2013) and Naka and Kobayashi (2010) were adopted in this study. A few generic frames were selected as a starting point in order to become familiar with the framing possibilities in these Olympic stories.

The approach to the qualitative data analysis consisted of open coding to determine the recurring frames and trends, using a chronological approach, starting first with the stadium stories and then the Olympic bid stories. Following Tankard's (2001) comprehensive listing of "framing mechanisms", these sections within each news story were selected for the qualitative analysis: headlines, subheads, leads, pull quotes, and concluding paragraphs. After the open coding, a quantitative analysis of each news frame was conducted to determine the dominant news frames and identify any disparities between the Japanese and British news framing.

6. Pre-Olympic Coverage Framing Results and Discussion

Although the Tokyo 2020 Olympic bid was submitted in September 2011, the starting date for the data search was set for two months earlier (July 11) in order to observe emerging news frames. This data search on LexisNexis using the search term "Tokyo 2020 Olympics" was terminated three years later in July 2016 to coincide with the abandonment of the Hadid design. Only news articles relating specifically to the Olympic Bid or Tokyo Olympic Stadium were selected.

The dataset included editorials and opinion columns, in addition to hard news stories, to understand not only the facts, but also how journalists create this "advocacy under the guise of objectivity" or "frame" important public events and issues.

The search yielded 43 articles from the UK press, 24 from Japan but only a small number from the US press (Table 1). This paucity of reportage by the US press was perhaps due to the US not being connected with a contender for the Olympic bid.

	Japan	England	U.S.	Total
Olympic Bid Announcement Stories	11	21	3	35
Olympic Stadium Stories	13	22	2	37
Total number of articles collected	24	43	5	73

Table 1. Number of articles collected for the study.
Source: LexisNexis

Table 2 lists the publications from which the articles were taken.

Publication	Number of Stadium articles	Number of Olympic Bid articles	Total number of articles per publication
Japan Times	8	3	11
Nikkei Asian Review	1	1	2
Nikkei	1	0	1
Japan News	4	3	7
Asia News Network	2	0	2
Daily Yomiuri	0	4	4
Guardian	5	3	8

Guardian Weekly	1	0	1
The Times	**4**	**2**	**6**
Irish Times	**3**	**1**	**4**
Observer	**1**	**3**	**4**
Western Mail	**1**	**0**	**1**
Irish Independent	**1**	**0**	**1**
Belfast Telegraph	**1**	**0**	**1**
I-Independent	**1**	**0**	**1**
The Herald	**1**	**0**	**1**
Daily Telegraph	**1**	**1**	**2**
London Evening Standard	**1**	**1**	**2**
Evening Standard	**1**	**0**	**1**
Independent	**0**	**2**	**2**
Daily Mirror	**0**	**2**	**2**
Financial Mirror	**0**	**1**	**1**
Scottish Express	**0**	**1**	**1**
Bristol Evening Post	**0**	**1**	**1**
Sunday Express	**0**	**1**	**1**
New York Times	**2**	**1**	**3**
Washington Post	**0**	**1**	**1**
Hollywood Reporter	**0**	**1**	**1**

Publication country of origin: Japan   UK   U.S.

Table 2: Number of articles per publication
Source: LexisNexis

Table 3 lists the frames that were identified in newspaper articles taken from Japanese, UK and US newspapers.

News Frames **Olympic Acceptance Bid Story**	News Frames **Olympic Stadium Story**
Tokyo Politics	**Zaha Design Criticism inside and outside Japan**
IOC Politics	**Zaha Defense of her stadium design**
JOC Politics	**Cost effectiveness of Economic Resources**
Japan Earthquake/Fukushima Issue	**Japanese business communication practices** **(what the agencies are saying to each other)**
Attacks on Japan as Host country	**JOC Politics** **Japan Sports Council (oversees stadium project)** **Sports Ministry**

Tri City Contest (Tokyo, Madrid and Istanbul)	IOC Politics
Application Strategy and Protocol	**Design Modification**
Zaha Hadid Design Praise	**Technology**
Cost effectiveness of Economic Resources	
Japanese business communication practices (what the agencies are saying to each other)	

Table 3. Frames identified in Olympic bid stories and in the 2020 Stadium design stories.

Frames in the Bid Story

The quantitative part of the study is presented in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 summarizes numerical data taken from the tri-city Olympic bid contest frame. The UK newspapers accounted for the highest proportion of mentions (57.2%), Japanese second (34.3%) and the US with a small representation of 8.5%.

Madrid and Istanbul, being European countries, attracted more attention in the UK, despite Japan's enthusiasm for bidding. In Japan, on the other hand, and quite naturally, there was more framing of the contest bid frame than in UK newspaper articles.

The Fukushima earthquake frame received prominence because of rising concern over whether Japan had cleaned up the earthquake and radiation debris. The frame "Attacks on Japan as a host nation" frame was used far more in the UK press than in Japan. Together these frames were used 13.3% of the time in the Japanese press compared with 36.2% of the time in the UK press.

At the time of the bid, the Japanese business communication frame accounted for some interest in the Japanese stories, but was close to zero in the UK press. But post-bid, this frame incidence rate rose markedly both in Japan and UK. After the success of the bid, the number of IOC frames dropped markedly, while the number of JOC frames rose significantly.

Subheads, Leads, Pull Quotes, Concluding Paragraph

Frame	Japan	UK	US	Total no. of Mentions for Each Frame
Tri-city Contest (Tokyo, Madrid, Istanbul)	174	265	15	454
Japan Earthquake/ Fukushima Issue	80	244	34	358
Attacks on Japan as Host Country	29	251	19	299
IOC Politics	146	205	19	370
Application Strategy and Protocol	153	112	24	289
Cost Effectiveness of Economic Resources	96	177	55	328
Stadium Design Praise	34	74	36	144
JOC Politics	35	36	0	71
Tokyo Politics	37	4	0	41
Japanese business communication (interagency communication)	35	0	0	35
	Total mentions for Japan = 819	Total mentions for UK = 1368	Total mentions for US = 202	Grand Total of Frames in 3 countries = 2389

Table 4. Olympic Acceptance Bid Story: Frames revealed by Headlines, Subheads, Leads, Pull Quotes, Concluding Paragraph.

Frames in the Stadium Design Story

The Stadium design revealed some slightly different trends in the data on framing. Table 5 summarizes numerical data on framing taken from stadium design stories. Again, the UK newspapers accounted for the highest proportion of mentions (58.2%), Japanese second (36.1%) and the US with a small representation of 5.7%. In this case the reason for the higher proportion of stories reported in the UK and the Japanese press was likely due to the designer Zaha Hadid being a UK-Iraqi architect and the controversy which occurred between the designer and the Olympic committee.

Overall, Zaha Hadid's design criticism and defense frames account for 1027 frames (34.6% of all framings). The "cost effectiveness of economic resources" frame (one of the main reasons the Hadid-designed stadium was scrapped) is next at 701 (23.6%), with the Japanese proportion of framing being half that of the UK. Perhaps understandably, stories framed around the idea of Zaha Hadid defending her design was only noted in 25% of Japanese stories when compared to the UK stories.

So although England criticized Hadid's design more than Japan, they also reported her defense four times more than the Japanese press. At the time of the bid, there was only praise reported for Zaha Hadid's design, although less so in Japan than the UK. However, after the Hadid-designed stadium was scrapped, more unfavorable framing ("Zaha criticism") began to surface about her previous "unbuildable buildings" e.g., "the Cardiff Bay Opera House" in Wales and the "Dubai Performing Arts Centre".

The rising costs for constructing the Hadid stadium started to appear as a frame at the end of 2013. Accompanying this was also criticism of the Hadid overall design and whether it was an appropriate design for the surrounding environment - a rising concern among Japanese architects, in particular. Evidently the press did not see much hope of a design change (design modification frame) rescuing the project since this had a relatively low level of framing instances overall (7.4%).

Reporting interagency announcements accounted for a considerable proportion of Japanese business communication frames (31.8%) compared with 25.7% in the UK press framings.

Frame	Japan	England	U.S.	Total Number of Mentions for each frame
Zaha Design Criticism inside and outside Japan	228	490	39	757
Zaha Defense of her stadium design	58	212	0	270
Cost effectiveness of Economic resources	256	406	39	701

Japanese business communication practices (what the agencies are saying to each other)	193	223	39	455
JOC Politics Japan Sports Council (oversees stadium project) Sports Ministry	147	221	39	407
IOC Politics	75	57	0	132
Design Modification	106	101	13	220
Technology	5	17	0	22
	Total mentions for Japan = 1068	Total Mentions for UK =1727	Total Mentions for US = 169	Grand Total of Mentions in 3 countries = 2964

Table 5. Olympic Stadium Story: Headlines, Subheads, Leads, Quote Selection, Pull Quotes, Concluding Paragraph.

7. Conclusion: Implications of the Study and Tokyo's Historical Legacy

Historically we have seen how international Olympic media exposure grows exponentially for the Olympic host nation as the time draws closer to the actual event. This increasing media exposure can also translate into a form of political power, enabling Olympic host nations to wield more influence within their own borders and in their relationships with other nations (MacAloon, 1984: 263, Hargreaves, 1992). In the case of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, Japan gained wider recognition as a viable Western economy emerging from the shadow of World War II. Similarly, the grand spectacle of the 2008 Beijing Olympics marked China's ascendance among world economies.

How will Japan's position in the Asia-Pacific region or among Western countries be enhanced or diminished as a result of Tokyo 2020? What kind of influence will Japan wield within its own borders? While these are far reaching, complex questions, the results from this study's examination of news framing in the pre-Olympic media coverage of Tokyo 2020 can offer some suggestions in the form of future implications.

The preponderance of economic frames found in the Tokyo 2020 Hadid stadium story (23.6% of all framing) suggests that economic news stories will continue to be a dominant news frame. The controversy over the Hadid stadium design lasted almost three years, generating a substantial number of news articles. In the case of the 2016 Rio Olympics, economics news stories continued even two months before the actual Olympic

event. BBC news, for example, published this headline, "Rio state declares 'public calamity' over finances", to highlight Rio's financial difficulties (BBC News).

"Security and public safety" could become more important news frames in the next few years, which are peripherally related to economic costs, given the number of police and security officials that will be needed for the Olympic games. Japan will feel more pressure in this area based on the rise in terrorism in Europe and elsewhere. The recent G7 Ise-Shima summit (May 26-27, 2016) in eastern Mie prefecture shows that Japan takes security very seriously. Also new security technology is being positioned in key locations, which is costing additional economic resources. New facial recognition software for identifying suspicious characters is one example, and has become operational at some train stations and conference entry points.

"Technology" in general will become an increasingly visible frame, with the showcasing of new robots and the creation of Hydrogen Town proposed for the Olympic Village (located in the Harumi district of Chuo Ward, Tokyo).

Zaha design criticism/defense frames accounted for almost 35% of all framings in the stadium story, providing further evidence of the popularity of conflict frames. Conflict also helped to extend this newsworthy story for three years, through a maze of events from Japanese architect petitions, local citizen opposition, Prime Minister Abe's cancellation of the Hadid stadium design to intense negotiations among the relevant local and governmental agencies.

Will these scandals continue to be played out in the near future? We already see evidence of this possibility in the "Black Tidings" bribery news story, which first appeared in early 2016. This news frame is already gathering momentum as investigators, primarily in France, are probing a possible link between the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Bid process and "Black Tidings" company. Black Tidings first came to light over suspicious deposits made into a Singapore account belonging to the Hong Kong company, Black Tidings (Osaki: 2016).

To add to the increasingly lengthy list of conflict frames, Tokyo Governor Masuzoe's sudden resignation in mid-June 2016, also reaffirms this observation about emerging scandals, as illustrated in the headline, "Masuzoe resigns over expenses scandal" (Yoshida, 2016). Masuzoe was accused of buying artwork to impress foreigners who might be coming to Tokyo before the Olympics, along with other questionable business expenses. As a result, Tokyo was unable to send an incumbent Mayor to the Rio Olympics on August 4, 2016. Masuzoe saw the Tokyo 2020 Olympics as his crowning achievement as mayor, but his resignation has compromised Tokyo's Olympic position.

"Greater transparency" in the Olympic planning and decision-making process has been an important frame in this study (Japanese Communication frame), therefore, if unforeseen conflict frames should occur, "greater transparency' could help to manage these kinds of news stories.

Press censorship is turning out to be a more visible frame under Abe's administration. It could hamstring Japanese journalists covering the Olympics, but at the same time it may not affect foreign journalists to the same extent. Evidence of this could be found in the 2016 press freedom index conducted by Reporters without Borders. In this study, Japan was ranked 72nd of the 180 countries in the survey. Japan has dropped 11 places since last year (Reporters without Borders). Another recent example is further evidence of this growing problem. Hiroko Kuniya, the presenter of "Close-up Gendai", a current affairs program on NHK, departed after irritating Yoshihide Suga, the chief cabinet secretary and a close Abe ally, with an unscripted follow-up question" (Guardian 2/17/2016).

Tourism in Japan is a recurring frame due to the number of tourists rising appreciably since the drop in the value of the yen and will probably increase as Tokyo continues to prepare for the Olympics. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga, for example, has urged government agencies to boost the number of foreign tourists to 40 million by 2020 (Kyodo). Making Tokyo more foreign friendly will become an increasing priority and at the same time will become a more frequently-occurring news frame. Other features to boost tourism include new translation services offering direction translation for foreigners at train stations, a possible conflicting frame between Hotels and Airbnb and a similar conflict is likely to rise between Uber and the licensed taxi companies.

"History is a gallery of pictures in which there are few originals and many copies" (de Tocqueville, 1856). In the same way, the Olympic images we have seen replayed over the years will create historic impressions of Tokyo for millions of people throughout the world. For the 2016 Olympic bid, Tokyo's dominant news framing emphasized "environmental benefits" and "green games" (Carey et al., 2011). As Tokyo prepares for 2020, however, the leading frames, identified in this study, have shifted to "cost effectiveness of economic resources", "tri-city contest", "Zaha design criticism" and "attacks on Japan as host country". More conflict frames are emerging (Black Tidings). "Security", "technology" and "tourism" will become more prominent frames. As Tokyo seeks to burnish its cultural legacy based on the Tokyo 2020 Olympics, selection of positive news frames, and controlling damage from negative conflict stories, will become increasingly important.

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Visual Framing in Ichikawa's 1964 Tokyo Olympiad

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Abstract

Depicting a mega-event such as an Olympic Games is generally centered around heroic victories played out in spectacular stadiums. Such films usually combine elements of Nichols' (2010) poetic and expository modes. But beyond the use of Nichols' taxonomy, the issue of framing is also paramount in deconstructing an Olympic documentary. At the heart of the deconstruction process is selection and salience (Entman, 1993). Filmmakers face dilemmas: for example, choosing between depicting events within a national frame or an international frame. There are also stakeholder issues such as national and international politics, nation branding, commercial sponsorship, and issues of discrimination which jostle to be highlighted. This study primarily describes the classic Olympic documentary, *Tokyo Olympiad* (1964) by Kon Ichikawa to explore the filmed events through the lens of generic frames such as competition and persistence and issue specific framing of Olympic ritual. Roles of both production and direction are discussed. The film employed cutting edge filmmaking techniques of the time, resulting in a spotlighting of the competitive identity of Japan. This highlights such controversies as states commissioning filmmakers who are sympathetic to their agendas, and the funding of productions which promote national agendas over those of various competing nationalities and minorities. Such analysis has relevance to the 2020 Tokyo Olympics: how might the Japanese Olympic Committee influence a documentary film on the 2020 Olympics being framed, scripted and directed?

Keywords: documentary film, framing, Kon Ichikawa, Olympic Games, Tokyo 2020, Tokyo Olympiad 1964

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1. Ichikawa Kon and *Tokyo Olympiad*

Telling Olympic stories through film as a genre of sports spectacle can be done through biopics, such as the feature film *Chariots of Fire*, or by attempting to capture the reality of an event via a documentary film. In either case the film makes much of the spectacle of rituals, events, and human stories. There have not been a great number of Olympic documentaries made. There are even fewer of specific games but two stand out: Ichikawa's *Tokyo Olympiad* and Riefenstahl's *Olympia*.

Critics have lavished praise on *Tokyo Olympiad* (Criterion, 2002 edition) focusing on multiple elements:

- for the <u>spectacle</u> of merging Olympic ritual with Japanese culture "…the torch-bearer running across the screen, as Mount Fuji fills the background, stands as one of the most profoundly moving shots in cinematic history" (Null, 2002);
- for its <u>personal intimacy</u> capturing "… a far more intimate portion of Olympic spirit than recorded anywhere else" (Nesbitt, 2002);
- for <u>art in documentary</u> "… the craft of artistic documentary filmmaking" (Weinberg, 2002);
- <u>technically</u> as a "… visual marvel of cinematic techniques…" (Kendrick, 2002); and
- <u>culturally</u> as a "… document not just of an event but also of a time and place and a culture" (Bailey, 2004).

Ichikawa began his career as a film animator and developed into a multi-genre director of more than 50 films. He was asked to direct the official film of the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 to replace Akira Kurosawa, who had fallen out with with the Japan Olympic Committee over issues of filming. "Kurosawa quit when he was not given as much control as he wanted…" (Yoshimoto, 2002). Ichikawa, impressed by Leni Riefenstahl's 1936 documentary of the Berlin Olympics, had been inspired by her film and used it as a departure point for his Olympic film.

Riefenstahl, a German dancer, actress, photographer and film director, was noted for her innovative technical direction of films such as *Triumph of Will* (1934) and *Olympia* (1936). Working closely with key figures in Germany's Third Reich, Hitler, Himmler, and Goebbels, helped Riefenstahl further her career but caused controversy for her after World War II. Unsurprisingly, she distanced herself from the Nazis after the war.

These two films are definitive statements in the genre of making of Olympic films. *Olympia* begins with an artistic tribute to Olympic rituals and the poetry of athletic prowess. But where Riefenstahl celebrated the athlete's bodies, Ichikawa focused on their struggles and challenges. In this study, the focus will be on Ichikawa's film and its innovative approach. The discussion will consider contemporary characteristics of documentary filmmaking and how these could result in a different approach to a film on Tokyo 2020.

Several factors influenced the production of the Tokyo Olympiad Documentary. Tokyo in 1964 was emerging from World War II and reshaping its identity. In *Tokyo Olympiad*, Ichikawa blends Olympic history and ritual with Japanese culture. But he also focuses on capturing the struggle of athletes in filmic asides, highlighting their pain and triumph. Ichikawa had resources for the project: 164 cameramen, over 100 cameras, 250 different lenses, 57 sound recordists, 70 hours of footage. But to create the unique atmosphere of the film, he relied heavily on telephoto lenses allowing asides of vivid psychological insights and artistic effects.

Quandt (2002) notes that Ichikawa was trained in manga filmmaking which shows in the graphic design of the films, rapid dialogue and precise positioning of characters within the frame while Russell (2002) highlights Ichikawa's use of telephoto lenses, perfect lighting, abrupt montage and use of freeze frames.

Although it was well-received outside Japan, domestically it was controversial. As Ichikawa summarised the problem, critics asked whether it was documentary or art? Many saw the approaches as being mutually exclusive. The Japanese government and the Japanese Olympic Committee were expecting a film that would celebrate Japanese athletes and Japanese Olympic buildings. He didn't particularly highlight these and so the film was criticized. These criticisms of the Tokyo Olympiad came from people who were insisting on a "record" of the Olympics which emphasized Japanese involvement in the staging of the event, and who were not film critics. Quite likely, had Ichikawa given in to their demands for a more conventional record and repressed his instincts as a filmmaker, the film would not have retained its lustre as a great piece of filmmaking over the years.

The research questions driving this study could be framed in this way: An Olympic Games is a ready-made mega-event for a spectacular sports genre documentary as Riefenstahl and Ichikawa did so successfully. What might a great documentary of Tokyo 2020 Olympics be like? Looking back on the Ichikawa Olympic documentary of 1964, we explore what would be the production considerations such as budget,

equipment, rights, publicity, and choice of director. So how might a chosen director frame and film the event?

2. Framing

To contextualize the study, literature relating to Olympism, Japan, film as legacy in nation branding, the notion of framing in documentary films covering narrative, visual elements and the film's release, was collected.

Olympism is a concept embracing the games and nationality. It may have begun idealistically as a stage where athletes can compete but it has become an arena for nationalistic goals to be triumphantly showcased. Thus as Hargreaves (1992) notes, "nationalism pervades the Olympic movement" so that "great powers who are in conflict use the Games as an extension of pursuing conflict" and "newer, poorer, weaker states, with problems of development and of building national identity, take the opportunity the Games provide to compensate for their deficiencies."

Japan saw its Olympic Games of 1964 as an opportunity to demonstrate the rebirth of a modern country, with organizational competence and technological flair. As with other countries, Japan used the traditions, symbols and rituals of the Olympics as an instrument of public relations. Hogan (2003) shows in a study of three Olympics (Nagano 1998, Sydney 2000 and Salt Lake City 2002) how the local Olympic committees incorporate elements of their countries' history, culture and achievements into their opening ceremonies so that these opening ceremonies become a national cultural festival based on the skeleton of Olympic tradition.

Olympic Games are therefore a rich opportunity for nation branding. As Widler (2007) and Jansen (2008) observe, national stereotypes are the first step in developing the nation brand and that every culture is to be defined through the opposition of "Us" vs "Them" in order to differentiate themselves on the competitive market. It's an opportunity to leave a political, cultural and technological legacy. In terms of this study, it is also an opportunity to leave a memory of the event through a cinematic artifact.

Olympic Games thus offer a unique opportunity for documentary films to be made so that a nation's moment in the international spotlight remains long after everyone has gone home. There have been only a handful of Olympic documentary films which are judged by critics to have been well executed in their telling. To film something arrestingly so that it seems real requires what Aufderheide (2007: 56) describes as "a wide variety of artifice" to frame their interpretations of a story. For that it is how a film tells its story: through framing.

Framing has been approached in numerous ways through a variety of disciplines beginning with Goffman (1974) who explained that individuals organize their experience through a set of structures, or frames, in order to understand society. Framing as applied to media and film refers more to how a story is told. At a basic level framing determines what gets put in and what gets left out, the spin which is put on a story, or which specific elements are foregrounded. Gamson and Modigliani (1987: 143) defined media frames as representing "a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events. Entman (1993: 52 regarded

framing as the process of selecting "some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation." Entman emphasizes the concept of "salience" or the way that events of a story are highlighted. He also described the field of framing theory as being a "fractured paradigm" although later commentators such as D'Angelo (2002) have defended the advantages of a multiparadigmatic approach.

Another key framing concept lies in the distinction between general and specific themes. De Vreese (2005) identifies universal frames which are found across many different narratives occurring in different cultures or eras such as "conflict" or "economics". He contrasts these with issue-specific frames which typify only specific topics or events. In the present study issue-specific frames were "Olympic ritual" or "rebuilding Japan". De Vreese (2005) also noted that the theme of a narrative can be associated with the concept a frame.

How a researcher goes about identifying frames in a text or film has been described by Semetko and Valkenberg (2000) who propose a deductive method, predefining certain frames in press and television such as conflict, human interest, economic consequences, morality, and attribution of responsibility. A limitation of using a deductive approach is the fact that frames are known beforehand so the researcher could miss newly emerging frames. By contrast, Matthes and Kohring (2008: 264) describe an inductive approach in which "frames are neither identified beforehand nor directly coded with a single variable."

These are notions of and approaches to framing which can be applied to all media stories: print, TV and documentaries. But in this study the focus is on documentary film which communicates its message through both narrative and visuals. Nichols (1991) explains that the impact of a documentary film owes as much to its visual characteristics as its text. Gitlin (1980: 7) notes that frames are verbal and visual. Messaris and Abraham, 2001) pointing out how selecting some images and not others redefines a story, noted that journalists choose "one view instead of another when making the photograph, cropping or editing the resulting image one way instead of another" or choosing "one image out of many" taken at the same place and time (Messaris and Abraham, 2001: 216). They also identify three distinct properties of image: their analogical quality, their indexicality, and their lack of an explicit propositional syntax. They stress that images appear more closely linked to reality than words.

Visual framing in film can be described in terms of extreme close-up shots creating a sense of intimacy, personal distance to put a character in a setting, or to give prominence to an environment. Tuchman (1978: 116-121) has identified six ways journalists frame subjects on film. The camera may be held at intimate, close personal, far personal, close social, far social or public distance. Intimate and close personal framing may breach journalistic neutrality.

Visual framing can also be used to completely alter the truth of what happened in a story. Schiller (2009: 479) reports on a reexamination of footage shot during demonstrations against Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. The footage on TV showed pro-Chavez gunmen shooting at demonstrators whereas the full frame footage

shows the same pro-Chavez gunmen were defending themselves against anti-Chavez snipers. Schiller also (2009:498) gives an example of a television editor who realized that narratives are created by juxtaposing different images not necessarily shot at the same time or place. So to understand how ideological messages are embedded in the media, Schiller emphasizes the need to decode image by image.

Cheregi (2015: 111) reports on a BBC documentary about Romanian migrants arriving in the UK. The framing of the story and the visual framing creates the sense of threat, distinguishing between "Us" (the British) and "Them" (the migrants). She concludes that the dispositif analysis revealed the stereotypical representations of Romanians in British media in terms of economy, politics, social benefits, employment, national security and EU policy creating a hysteria around the subject.

To conclude this section on framing, mention should also be made of the effects of framing of the documentary when it is shown in theaters or released on other media or the environment and the climate of opinion which surrounds its release. Budgets, behind the scenes stories, even controversies can result in creating a favorable audience climate. Schiller (2009) describes how in "The Revolution Will Not Be Televised" the role of distributors and activists brought that film to a wider global audience. Nornes (2002) describes how *Tokyo Olympiad* was previewed by the Japanese Emperor along with the Japan Olympic Committee members and it was their reactions which spiked controversy.

3. Methodology

Since the directing of a documentary film owes as much to visual characteristics as text (Nichols, 1991), visual framing of the scenes employed by Ichikawa was the major focus of the study. The 142-minute Japanese version was used primarily but the 170-minute English language version by Criterion (2002) was also used for references.

So in characterizing the approach of this study, the following could be said. It is a mixed method seeking to reveal how the director framed it through Gamson and Modigliani's (2005) notion of organization of the narrative elements, and of Entman's (1993) concept of salience. The visual aspects of the film were explored using an inductive approach by looking at the footage for the occurrence of frames. The visual component of the methodology follows that of Schiller in adopting an image by image analysis. It is also incorporates a dispositif standpoint (Charaudeau, 2005) in which the director attempts to interpret the characters' identities, psychology and relationships with each other.

In analyzing a film, framing is not just a macro-level consideration. The director also makes decisions at the micro-level on how to frame a shot by positioning the camera or by cropping the shot. Specifically, this means that each scene is framed by the camera and edited for salience and length in post-production, the stage where raw footage is cut into scenes, transitions are inserted, voices and music are added. The methodologies employed by Schiller (2009) and Cheregi (2015) are particularly useful in this regard. It seemed that to better understand what sparked critics evaluations, it could be instructive to find out what Ichikawa was doing at the micro-level.

So overall, an inductive approach to scene tagging was employed, that is, frames were identified from an investigation of the footage rather than categorizing according to a preselected taxonomy, after which types and numbers of frames in each scene were tabulated. As will be shown in the next section on overview of data, each scene will be divided into an analysis of visual images which are divided into main sets of scene framing and subsets of microframes.

Four scenes were chosen for close analysis: Opening Scenes (Ritual and Identity), Men's100 Meters Event (Sports Spectacle), Marathon (Sports Spectacle), Closing Ceremony (Unscripted Narrative).

4. Overview of data

The concept of "scene" as used in this study refers to an action taking place with a specific subject focus, such as the opening ceremony. Within scenes are "microframes" which refers to a reframing of the scene (including features such as the scene being shot from different angles, or cropped differently).

Table 1 summarizes the numbers of scenes and their durations together with the number of microframes within each scene collected from the four sections of the film. The opening of the film ran for 25 minutes with 84 scenes lasting on average 17 seconds.
This was followed by the Men's 100 Meters, a short event, which ran for 5 minutes with 10 scenes lasting on average 30 seconds. The final event, the Marathon, ran for 25 minutes with 99 scenes with longer takes including a lyrical 92 second extreme closeup of Abebe running. By contrast, the Closing Ceremony ran for only 5 minutes with 43 scenes lasting on average 7 seconds creating a somewhat choppy effect.

	No. of Scenes	Average Length of Scene	No. of Microframes (Views and Crops)	Average No. of Microframes per Scene
Opening Ceremony 25 minutes 10 seconds	84	17.7 seconds (ranging from 5s to 2 minutes)	237	2.1
Men's 100 Meters 5 minutes 3 seconds	10	30.3 seconds (ranging from 6s-1:23s)	21	2.1
Marathon 24 minutes 58 seconds	99	16.4 seconds (ranging from 2s – 1 min 32s)	166	1.7
Closing Ceremony 5 minutes 1 second	43	7 seconds (ranging from 1s-45s)	65	1.5

Table 1. Comparison of Opening Ceremony, Men's 100 Meters, Marathon and Closing Ceremony Microanalysis.

Identifying frames was carried out by an inductive approach and frames and frequencies of occurrence are summarized in Table 2. A mix of generic (such as frames of ritual) and specific frames (such as the use of sports apparatus like starting blocks) were identified. Although Olympic ritual and sport spectacle feature highly in the scene framings, analysis shows Ichikawa often included scenes of human interest and asides. It is these human interest scenes that make the film come to life.

Frame	No. of Frames				
	Opening Ceremony	Men's 100 Meters	Marathon	Closing Ceremony	Total
Olympic Ritual	41		1	16	58
Sport Spectacle		2	50		52
Human Interest	15			22	37
Details or Asides	7	2	8	12	29
Technology, apparatus	7	2	8	5	22
National Identity, Symbol, History	14	2	3	2	21
Athlete's Feelings (Stoicism, Pain)		3	17		20
Spectator Reaction		1	11		12
Sport Ritual, Procedure, Technique	2	3	1		6
Cultural Exchange Impact	4				4
Artistic Spectacle	2				2

Table 2. Comparison of Opening Ceremony, Men's 100 Meters, Marathon and Closing Ceremony Frame Analysis.

The data supports the impressions of critics that this was a film which includes scenes thought to be of lesser importance than scenes of ritual, culture and sports spectacle. Figure 1 highlights the dominance of ritual and spectacle frames but also reveals that it is closely followed by human interest frames and aside details. It is therefore perhaps understandable that the JOC suggested that, in their view, Ichikawa should re-edit the film to increase the time spent on ritual and spectacle and reduce the number of human interest asides.

Figure 1. Main Scene Framings in Opening Ceremony, 100 meters, Marathon and Closing Ceremony.

5.1 Details of the framing analysis

Four parts of the film were subjected to a close frame by frame analysis: the Opening Ceremony (including the lead-up scenes), the Men's 100 meter event, the Marathon and the Closing Ceremony. These were chosen because of the contrasts between them. The opening ceremony is a lengthy 24 minute spectacle of tightly organized ritual and celebration, the Men's 100 Meters and the Marathon are representative of the way events were filmed, and the closing ceremony shows how the tightly ordered ritual of closing dissolved into a spontaneous party of athletes celebrating and how a well planned shoot had to be reorganized on the editing bench.

5.2 Opening Ceremony

In the opening scenes of the film, covering 25 minutes, Ichikawa mixed images of Olympic ritual with scenes of Japan as a newly-made nation arising from the ashes of World War II. Even so, he faced criticism from the Japanese government and the Japanese Olympic Committee for not having included more imagery which celebrated Japanese identity and achievements. Critics criticized his film for being too "artistic" and not sufficiently a "documentary record" of events. If he hadn't pursued his artistic vision, and given in to the "documentary record" approach, quite likely the film would not be as critically well-regarded now.

Olympic ritual mixed with national identity (history and scenes) dominated the opening scenes. As can be seen in Figure 2, occasionally these were as long as 40 to 60 seconds but the majority were less than 10 seconds. Short interjections of human interest scenes darted in and out.

The opening scenes leading up to the Opening Ceremony is a complex interweaving of Olympic ritual (such as the journey of carrying the Olympic torch, the marching parade of athletes, the flags' ropes clanking on steel masts, the speeches opening the Games) with the insertion of symbols of national identity and references to national history (such as the rising sun and the focus on Hiroshima Dome, the rebuilding of the country). There are also quick glimpses of Japanese technology. But it is in the introduction to the Games that we see Ichikawa's approach as a feature filmmaker emerge with the numerous human interest frames (the Japanese faces watching the processions, the boy with binoculars, the foreigner with a camera). These are human interest scenes with a direct connection to the ceremony but there are other flashes of human interest, which might be called asides, randomly caught, such as the couple outside the ticket gate more interested in each other than the ceremony inside, the boy who blocks his ears at the sound of the gun salute, the feet of the person jumping to catch a better view).

Figure 2. Opening Scenes Framing Profile.

Within the Opening Ceremony (and in the Closing Ceremony too) predictable frames such as ritual acts, artistic performances, and artistic spectacle appeared. Rituals reflecting host nation culture, national identity, heritage, creativity, sport, music, countryside, innovation, technology were identified. These were also observed by Zhou et al (2013) in their description of the London Olympics but they also noted frames they inductively identified such as entrepreneurship, green, knowledge, and shopping which Ichikawa did not include.

5.3 Men's 100 Meters

Two events were chosen as representative of Ichikawa's approach to filming sports: the Men's 100 Meters and the Marathon. The 100 meters was presented as two

spectacle frames, one normal speed of the event (20 seconds) and one in slow motion (80 seconds), intercut with shorter close-ups on the athletes' feelings. The frame analysis is summarized in Figure 3.

The Men's 100 Meters is a story told through flashbacks. The race is shown from infield, at normal speed, so it only takes 10 seconds. The winner, Bob Hayes (US) runs far as he warms down, then he is caught up by and congratulated by second place sprinter Enrique Figuero (Cuba), and third place-getter Harry Jerome (Canada). An interesting aside is that three of these four athletes only lived until they were just past 40 years old.

Following this spectacle, Ichikawa then slows the pace right down. He returns to the pre-race build-up of suspense focusing on the tension leading up to the explosion of energy of the race. He draws on frames of apparatus (starting blocks), sport ritual (Ready, Set, then the starting gun), human interest to show the athletes' reactions to stress, asides (the running shoes, Hayes had borrowed shoes for the event he won), audience reactions snapping pictures, shaking heads in disbelief), and displays of national identity (flag-raising and anthem). This is the application of feature film techniques to documentary.

Figure 3. Men's 100 Meters Scene Framing Profile.

5.4 Marathon

The marathon scene applies feature film narrative structure to tell its story. It begins with a mix of long and short frames of the start intercut with shorter shots of the spectators. Its climax is a long 92-second scene of Abebe leading the race in the later stages as other runners drop behind. Then it draws to a close with short frames capturing athletes' feelings of triumph also intercut with shots of exhaustion and pain as they near the end of the race. Abebe seems almost unaffected by his feat, not needing assistance and electing to do warm-down exercises. Overall, there is a

balance of frame durations between 5 and 30 seconds. The use of extreme close-ups of runners in the marathon capturing athletic triumph and tragedy is brilliant cinematography. Athletic events frames often focus on concentration, strength, skill, composure, commitment, courage, experience, intelligence, as Billings, et al, (2011) point out and all these are particularly featured in Ichikawa's framing of the marathon event.

Figure 4. Marathon Scene Framing Profile.

5.5 Closing Ceremony

The closing ceremony posed problems for filming. Ichikawa commented that his cameramen were stationed at various points ready for a choreographed parade as orderly as the opening ceremony. It wasn't. The participants all poured into the stadium and turned the event into a spontaneous party with scenes such as a runner jogging around the track in his running gear, another athlete conducting the band with his umbrella. It was display of fun and goodwill but the cameramen had no script so the footage collected was random, totally different compared with the opening ceremony. Ichikawa had to salvage clips in post-production resulting in mostly exuberant short frames best described as asides. The profile of the closing ceremony as shown in Figure 5 is typified by very short (mostly less than 5 seconds) framings of human interest ending with a 45-second frame of the closing ceremony.

Figure 5. Closing Ceremony Scene Framing Profile.

6. Discussion: Implications for a Tokyo 2020 Documentary

Tokyo has an opportunity to leave a legacy through the 2020 Olympic Games. As Mayor of Rio de Janeiro, Eduardo Paes, put it, "Hosting the Olympic Games guarantees the world's attention, but there is more to it than simply bathing in the global spotlight. Host cities can use the opportunity to create a positive and lasting legacy" (Paes, 2013). Such a mega-event is a great opportunity for nation-branding as Florek et al (2008) have pointed out.

Japanese culture, Japanese behavior, Japanese technology will be showcased before, during and hopefully after the 2020 Games. But a documentary film of a mega-event is also a legacy. The Tokyo Olympics of 1964 left a cinematically renowned legacy in Ichikawa's documentary film, celebrating the Games, celebrating athletes, and celebrating Japan. This study is not only about looking back on a film made many years ago. Also driving this study are some questions concerning how a Tokyo 2020 documentary film might adopt contemporary innovations, particularly social media, crowd-sourcing, technical innovations, even animation.

So a documentary film will help, just as a well-made film no doubt helped Japan win the 2020 Olympic bid. The following are a few considerations for commissioners of an Olympic film to weigh carefully:

- Documentaries are now more popular (e.g. Inconvenient Truth, Man on Wire)
- Fund sourcing: JOC, Japanese companies (e.g. Toyota, Sony)
- Political spin (e.g. the Tokyo Olympic bid film)
- Technical innovations (e.g. use of drones, computer graphics)
- Social media and crowd sourcing content (possibly contest-based)

- Framing of the narrative may be post-modern rather than chronological
- Framing of visual footage could follow Ichikawa (rapid changes of scene pacing)
- Framing the release of the film: (e.g. highlighting funding or controversy)

The science and art of making documentary films has changed since 1964 leading naturally to speculation on what a documentary about Tokyo 2020 Olympics might look like. And since a documentary is driven by the vision of a director, who among Japanese directors might be invited to be the director of the Tokyo 2020 Games? Such directors as the following spring to mind:

- Takeshi Kitano
- Hayao Miyazaki
- Tetsuya Nakashima
- Kiyoshi Kurosawa
- Takashi Miike
- Yojiro Takita
- Seijun Suzuki
- Yoji Yamada
- Hirokazu Koreeda

But there are also possibilities among documentary filmmakers from abroad. There are clear cultural and cinematic advantages to inviting a director from outside Japan to direct the film. However, Olympic Games are an event where issues of national pride are not to be counted lightly; already the design of the Tokyo 2020 video, the logo and the stadium have seen heated discussion on this.

We have looked at the technicalities of making an Olympic documentary film. We have considered framing the story. We have microanalyzed scenes in terms of visual framing. But there is yet another aspect to framing. The meaning of a film is shaped not only by its composition but also by who is responsible for its circulation, when and where the film is screened, and the contextual information provided to the audience. As Nichols (1991: 24) argued, the distinguishing mark of documentary may be less intrinsic to the text than a function of the assumptions and expectations that characterize the viewing of a documentary." Himpele (1996), Lee and LiPuma (2002) and Schiller (2009) have also emphasized the important roles of distributors, exhibitors, and activists in creating media worlds around documentary films to accompany their release. This includes public relations, reviews, screening locations, organizing attendance of pro and anti groups to frame the venue in order to give publicity and authenticity to the event. So the way in which a documentary film about the Tokyo 2020 Olympics is proposed, commissioned, filmed and ultimately released will also be crucial to ensure that it measures up to the legacy that Ichikawa left.

7. Conclusion

At a general level this study touched on Olympism, Japan, film as legacy in nation branding, the notion of framing in documentary films; narrative, visual and release. At the specific level, the study closely analyzed Ichikawa Kon's *Tokyo Olympiad* and how his approach to framing influenced the finished film.

The study presented data to show that Ichikawa's film received critical acclaim and continues to do so. For the very reasons that it was criticized (not being sufficiently nationalistic, that it highlighted human behavior asides), it is now recognized as a great film driven by Ichikawa's unique artistic and directorial vision.

The methodology revealed that the director used visual framing skillfully to tell a number of vignettes. The methodology also showed clearly through a numerical-based, frame by frame analysis how the film was constructed; this in turn reflected what Ichikawa was trying to do. The inductive approach revealed more frames than a deductive approach would have. Also, what the director was trying to do with numerous asides of human interest is well understood in terms of a Charaudean dispositif analysis in which the director attempts to interpret the characters' identities, psychology and relationships with each other.

A film produced for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics is likely to be very different from Ichikawa's *Tokyo Olympiad* due to changes in political, technical, funding, and social approaches to contemporary filmmaking.

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Tokyo 2020 Olympics: Nation Branding Creates an Opportunity for a New Cultural Narrative for Japan

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Abstract

What is the role of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics in shaping the narrative for Japan's cultural and national identity? This paper highlights changes in Japan's nation brand, and examines how Japan's branding for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics is an opportunity for creating a future legacy for Japan, particularly in human resource development. A cultural approach to nation branding targets a range of identities for a country, shaping a country's narrative. Nation branding is presented as the theoretical lens for analyzing Japan's efforts to date. Building on the concept of nation branding, mega event planning can reinforce a positive cultural image and change negative cultural images. This paper reviews the impact of past Olympics on a host nation's brand, including the Tokyo 1964 Olympics. Japan's branding to date, Cool Japan, has evolved, and an analysis of the incorporation of this work in the current plan for the development of Japan's nation brand via the Tokyo 2020 Olympics will be presented. In the discussion section, recommendations for the branding of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games will include opportunities for deepening Japan's legacy. Government-led reform initiatives could provide a springboard for creating an Olympic legacy that is a cultural narrative inclusive of cultural issues such as women's societal roles and increased foreign representation in educational institutions.

Keywords: Nation Branding, Olympics, Cultural Identity

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Introduction

Mega events, such as the Olympic Games, have been utilized to shape the identity of a nation through nation branding (Florek, 2008; Nauright, 2013; Zhang & Zhao, 2009; Zhou, Shen, Zhang, & Zhong, 2013). Nations can utilize mega sports events to present themselves to the world. In this sense mega events are a vehicle for nation branding that serves as global diplomacy (Nauright, 2013), meaning these mega events can strengthen a nation's global position and serve to build its cultural diplomacy or soft-power (Zhou, et al., 2013). From this perspective, what role might the Tokyo 2020 Olympics serve in shaping the narrative for Japan's cultural and national identity? This study highlights Japan's nation brand, its evolution over the past two decades, and opportunities for the Olympic Games to contribute towards Japan's legacy, particularly in human resource development.

In 2013 Japan won the bid to host the 2020 Olympics and the planning work began. Planning for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics has included a wide swath of activities, from establishing leadership and committee structures, to designing the logo and venues. Included in the planning was the strategy for building on Japan's nation brand.

Past Olympics have contributed both positively and negatively to a nation's brand (Nauright, 2013). Examples from three past Olympic Games are reviewed, Tokyo (1964), Beijing (2008), and London (2012), to highlight the impact of branding. Tokyo, 1964, was selected to provide a comparison to the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games, from over fifty years ago; while Beijing, 2008, and London, 2012, were selected as the two most recent Olympic Games held. Nation branding is presented as the theoretical lens for analyzing Japan's efforts to date, and as a perspective for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics to shape Japan's cultural and national identity. This paper presents a review of Japan's nation branding goals, Olympic planning documents, and a discussion of human resource branding for Japan. If nation branding can build a nation's legacy, what will Japan's legacy be as a result of hosting the Tokyo 2020 Olympics?

Lessons from past Olympics

The Tokyo 1964 Olympics was the first ever Olympic Games held in Asia. They were considered an enormous success, seen as a mega event that transformed Japan and allowed it to gain legitimacy in the world (Hargreaves, 1992). The Tokyo 1964 Olympics was an opportunity for Japan to present itself to the world, post WWII. For Japan, "The 1964 Tokyo Olympics symbolized the full (re)admission of Japan into the US-dominated post-war imperial order…" (Wood & Abe, 2011, p. 3245). In preparation for the 1964 Olympic Games, Tokyo experienced dramatic development from its post-war infrastructure, including the construction of the Metropolitan Expressway and the Tokaido Shinkansen railway (a.k.a. "the bullet train"). This development served as a gateway to rapid economic growth in Japan, an incredible development that was viewed as "miraculous restoration" (Tokyo 2020, 2016). While the concept of nation branding had not yet been named in 1964, the result of the efforts to prepare for and successfully host the Tokyo 1964 Olympics could be viewed as a successful example of nation branding, as the next section on nation branding describes. In addition to the reconstruction of basic infrastructures, the Tokyo 1964

Olympics showcased a nation that was anxious to be seen as a member of a global community (Hargreaves, 1992; Wood & Abe, 2011).

The Beijing 2008 Olympics presented mixed results, positive and negative, of nation branding. Beijing's strengths were promoted through the Olympics however its identity and core values were not in alignment with the perceptions held by the general public (Zhang & Zhao, 2009). While the Olympic logo was designed to represent: *One World, One Dream, A harmonious city of the international community*, there was a gap between city government portrayals of China and the residents' reality. Beijing was perceived to be biased in its storytelling, altering negative images regarding human rights, social issues, and social justice (Panagiotopoulou, 2012; Zhang & Zhao, 2009). Researchers (Zhang and Zhao, 2009) reported that the Olympics did not seem to change or alter people's experience of Beijing due to the mismatch between the vision for the city and reality. Beijing was working to reposition itself as a new superpower, seeking acceptance as a modern city however its efforts at public diplomacy fell short (Panagiotopoulou, 2012). While its rich cultural heritage was a strength, its environment and social well-being were weaknesses. As a result of the Olympic Games, Beijing's international status as a famous cultural city was achieved, however its past history of isolationism and human rights violations blemished its nation brand (Vitiello, 2008). Due to the gap between vision and reality, Beijing was seen as great place to visit but not a place where you would want to live (Zhang & Zhao, 2009). In reviewing nation brand rankings (Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index, 2016), China's ranking dropped from number 28 (out of 50 countries) in 2008, the year of the Olympics, to number 22 in 2009 (Panagiotopoulou, 2012). While a causal relationship cannot be determined, the drop in rank bears noting. More information on the ranking method is provided below.

In contrast, the London 2012 Olympics were thought to be hosted with overall positive results, and the media described this mega event as successful in defining the British culture, successfully promoting Great Britain's global reputation (Zhou, et al., 2013). Research showed that the London 2012 Olympics succeeded in rebranding Great Britain in the areas of heritage, creativity, sports and music (Zhou, et al., 2013). While promoting a country's identity is challenging, efforts made throughout the Olympic Games are opportunities for presenting a nation's brand. From the opening ceremony to the finale, a nation is on the world stage. While review of the media coverage of the London 2012 Olympics had highs and lows, overall the goals of the British government to present an image of Britain that was creative, heritage-rich, humorous, green, presenting an overall favorable image of Britain was accomplished (Zhou, et al., 2013). In reviewing nation brand rankings (Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index, 2016), the United Kingdom ranking increased from fourth place on the nation brands index in 2010, two years before the Olympics, to third place in 2014 (Nation Branding, 2016). In summary, the Tokyo 1964 Olympics, Beijing 2008 Olympics, and London 2012 Olympics are three distinct examples of how a country's identity or nation brand was linked to the Olympics with varying results. As seen in the examples of the most recent Olympic Games, Beijing and London, the Olympics can impact a nation's identity to varying degrees. The Tokyo 2020 Olympics come 52 years after the first Olympic Games held in Tokyo in 1964. In just over half a century, Tokyo has emerged from a war-torn nation to a global power. How will the 2020 Olympic Games be utilized to present Japan to the world?

Nation Branding

The term nation branding was introduced by Simon Anholt in 1996 (Anholt, 2008; Kaneva, 2011). Emerging from the field of marketing, where products are presented for sale by their brands, nation branding is a new field where a nation's identity is being marketed. Nation branding has emerged as a field of nation identity, related to diplomacy, image, and reputation (Dinnie, 2008).

Kaneva (2011) offers the following definition of nation branding, it is "… a compendium of discourses and practices aimed at reconstituting nationhood through marketing and branding paradigms" (p. 118). She states that different lens can be used to view a nation's brand, and these include economic, political and cultural approaches. According to Kaneva, the cultural approach is related to politics, diplomacy, and identity. For the purposes of this paper, the cultural approach will be utilized for examination of Japan's brand, focusing on the identity of Japan as opposed to the economic approach of increasing exports, investment and tourism.

Central to understanding a nation's brand is a nation's identity (Dinnie, 2009; Kaneva, 2011; Panagiotopoulou, 2012). National identity is formed from a broad definition of culture, including language, traditions, food, beliefs and values. People become familiar with a country not only through its products and services; but also through conversations, images and behaviors. A nation brand, based on a nation's identity, can be thought of as a country's narrative or story. Dinnie (2009) shares, "…a nation's culture may be regarded as constituting the true essence of the nation-brand" (p. 118). A nation's brand, including its image and reputation, can be shaped and managed. Fan (nd) defined nation branding as "a process by which a nation's images can be created, monitored, evaluated and proactively managed in order to improve or enhance the country's reputation among a target international audience" (p. 6).

This shaping of an audience's perception of a country is seen as cultural and public diplomacy. A diplomacy that is directed at reaching and communicating with foreign publics, not diplomat to diplomat but rather, diplomat to public (Dinnie, 2008, Panagiotopoulou, 2012). Anholt also noted that countries, in working to manage their identity abroad, linked national identity to the politics and economics of competitiveness, a concept he terms competitive identity (Anholt, 2008). Competitive identity is seen as the outcome of intellectual capital rather than economic capital, and has a better return on investment. Thus cultural or public diplomacy is a strategy nations can work on to manage and enhance their image, both internally and externally, with a focus on national identity. A cultural approach to nation branding has implications for a country's social power or political standing on the global stage (Kaneva, 2011).

This paper focused on a review of documents about nation branding in Japan from 2002 – 2016 and the link of nation branding to the official government planning process for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics. Government documents were reviewed from 2013 – 2016 specific to Olympic planning, including formation of the Olympic Planning Committees and development of the Olympic planning infrastructure. Themes were identified as a result of document review to then formulate the discussion on recommendations. The three questions addressed include:

- What impact can the 2020 Tokyo Olympics have on Japan's cultural and national identity?
- What new opportunities exist for Japan in shaping its nation brand as a result of the 2020 Tokyo Olympics?
- What recommendation can be offered towards building Japan's legacy, post-2020 Olympics?

Japan's Nation Brand and Cultural Narrative

According to Dinnie (2008), Japan has been effective in developing its nation brand, even though Japan has a history of isolationism and insularity. Overall Japan's nation brand has ranked sixth in the world, in 2014 and 2015, on the Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index, a measuring tool for nation brands (Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index, 2016). To calculate rankings, consumers in 50 countries are polled regarding items such as culture and heritage, people, governance, exports, tourism, and investment and immigration.

Researchers have noted that an effective nation branding campaign includes a strategic action plan with well-defined goals; priorities based on values; long-lasting duration; and developing cooperation between national and international stakeholders (Dinnie, 2008). Japan's brand has evolved over the past two decades and to a certain extent followed these strategic action steps. From a review of documents, including government reports, research articles and media coverage, the following key points related to Japan's nation brand have been identified.

Launch

In 2002 Prime Minister Koizumi seated a working group to focus on the strategic utilization of intellectual property, which is seen as the launch of nation branding in Japan (Akutsu, 2008; Cannon, 2012). This working group noted that the goal of nation-branding effort is to improve the image and reputation of Japan. The aim was to become competitive through the creation and development of Japan's intellectual property; ideally, to have Japan respected worldwide (Cannon, 2012). The focus expanded in 2003 to the management of media, including music, movies, game software and animation. Then in 2004 the working group's focus examined policy issues for strengthening Japan's brand, discussing food culture, local brands and fashion. Cannon shares that the vision was to develop a strong Japan brand linked to cultural diplomacy versus military or economic power.

Cool Japan

While the branding concept of Cool Japan had emerged in 2002, it was in 2005 Japan's government promoted Cool Japan as its nation branding project in an effort to advance cultural diplomacy (Valaskivi, 2013). The historical evolution of Japan's nation brand has been described in detail elsewhere (Akutsu, 2008; Daliot-Bul, 2009), outlining the efforts of government committees to harness and manage Japan's brand. The Cool Japan Advisory Council, the main driver of Cool Japan, is composed of representatives from Japanese government ministry offices and the Cabinet Office, with a focus on emphasizing national cultural policies.

In 2006 there were concerted government efforts to promote culture to the media abroad, including Japanese pop culture, Japanese anime, and Cool Japan (Akutsu, 2008). These were promoted as reactive efforts by the government, not proactive, as Japanese pop culture and anime had spread worldwide and offered a positive connection to Japan (Cannon, 2012). In order to harness this success, there was an attempt to harness pop culture, which was viewed as the vehicle for cultural diplomacy.

National Identity

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, through his influence as head of state, shifted how nation branding was described, introducing the term country identity as opposed to nation brand (Cannon, 2012). In his speech of January 29, 2006 (Abe, 2006) he shared that Japan's identity should focus on"…Japan's ideals, the direction in which we should aspire, and the way in which we convey our Japan-ness to the world" (para. 53). This definition is considered to have reinforced the concept of nationalism, a position that Abe supports (Morris-Suzuki, 2013). Nauright (2013) explains that "mega events also must be understood from political and social viewpoints, because mega events involve the political leadership of a host country and often shape legacies that governments and leaders envision for themselves" (p. 25). Prime Minister Abe's legacy will in part be impacted by the success or mishaps of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games (Lewis, 2016).

Japan's nation branding initiatives and strategies continued to evolve, from a 2010 focus on an expansion of Japan's brand to Japan's national strengths, to a 2011 focus on the Great East Japan Earthquake which featured Japans ability to manage difficult issues such as natural disasters. Japan's nation brand emphasized building something better – new solutions (Valaskivi, 2013). The branding strategy included a safe and secure Japan; and excellence in science and technology.

Cultural Narrative

Valaskivi (2013) notes that the Cool Japan Advisory Council asked the questions, what kind of country does Japan want to be? And, what should Japan's vision of the future be? In the related areas of nation branding, national identity and cultural identity, who does Japan want to be? These questions are brought back into focus as the planning for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics advanced. As Anholt, who is quoted in a personal interview with Valaskivi (2013), shares, "Branding a nation is not a marketing effort…Changing your national image is virtually impossible, what you can do is to do right things for the right reasons and be useful for the world and then – just as a collateral effect – your reputation gets better" (p. 499). In designing the cultural narrative for Japan's nation brand, the upcoming 2020 Olympic Games are taking center stage. As the work for branding Japan via the Olympic Games emerges, various agencies and committees are focused on strengthening Japan's nation brand, including the development of a cultural narrative that will advance Japan's legacy.

Tokyo 2020 Olympic Planning

The Tokyo 2020 Olympics are seen as an opportunity to feature Japan as a nation, in part, based on culture and education. This is to be accomplished through continued building of the Cool Japan strategy, via the Olympic Games, whose mission is to position Japan as a nation providing solutions to the problems of the world (Cool Japan Strategy, 2015). The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) is also central to this goal of promoting culture and education. Overall, these goals are aligned with Prime Minister Abe's vision which he shared in his policy speech to the Diet in January, 2016, articulating a desire for Japan to promote its world-class art and culture, thus proactively engaging in cultural diplomacy (Abe, 2016).

The Tokyo 2020 Organizing Committee (TOC) is responsible for the planning of the Olympic Games and the committee has developed the Tokyo 2020 Games Foundation Plan which includes elements such as the Games' vision, clients, venues and infrastructure, support functions, support structure, action and legacy, and engagement (The Tokyo Organizing Committee, 2015). The Games' vision includes building three core concepts: achieving personal best, unity in diversity, and connecting to tomorrow. Achieving personal best refers to both athletes and spectators realizing their best personal performance, in competition or in everyday life. Unity in diversity has a focus on accepting and respecting differences. Creating a legacy is included in the concept of connecting to tomorrow. Five pillars or focus areas have been identified in the Tokyo 2020 Games Foundation Plan, including culture and education. The goal of this pillar is for Japan to become a country grounded in culture and the arts, that is, to create a foundation of strong cultural power (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2016a).

The Intermediary Plan towards creating a nation based on the Olympic pillar of culture and the arts was developed in 2014 by MEXT ((Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2016a). The goals of the plan include developing human resources or a competent workforce that has global perspectives, revitalizing communities through cultural assets, and promoting international cultural exchange. Of these three goals, the goal aimed at nurturing human resources is the goal that is most pivotal to impacting the future position of Japan on the world stage. Cultural assets and cultural exchange, to a certain degree, involve the presentation and outreach of static assets. Human resources are a dynamic asset that have the potential of positioning Japan's legacy as a legacy that is people-based, engaging Japan globally, emerging from a nationalistic past to a global, cosmopolitan future (Chappel, 2013).

Discussion

Government-led reform initiatives could provide a springboard for creating an Olympic legacy, recognizing that nation branding takes time and intention (Panagiotopoulou, 2012). A cultural narrative stemming from human resource development could include women's roles and increased foreign representation in educational institutions. Nauright (2013) shared, "Governments that have been most successful have carefully thought out long-term strategies that focus on the creation of legacies rather than immediate economic results" (p. 26). While the Foundation Plan

and Intermediary Plan for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics are building on past branding history and experience, many of the goals, activities, and strategies seem to be focused on strengthening the cultural assets of Japan and positioning Japan in a favorable light to the world, and less on creating a springboard for transformation, such as resulted from the Tokyo 1964 Olympics.

The deeper work of human resource development is building on what MEXT has been promoting in terms of globalization of universities, focused on training a future workforce. While it is central to the Intermediary Plan developed by MEXT, the goals of human resource development do not seem to be central to the nation brand emerging from the greater Olympic planning and vision. The multitude of goals set by the various committees and government agencies, all tasked with supporting the planning of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games, cut across Kaneva's (2011) different lens that include economic, political and cultural approaches. The cultural approach, related to politics, diplomacy, and identity, could be the approach to decisively engage women and foreigners (Chappel, 2013; Narita, 2014). This effort could prove to be transformational for Japan. In order for this to be accomplished, Japan's Olympic planning efforts need to align goals towards advancing cultural diplomacy through an inclusive lens that is aspirational, guided by a long-term vision as opposed to piecemeal and fragmented efforts.

For example, Japan's current narrative related to women in higher education casts Japan not as a global power but rather as a provincial nation. On the Gender Gap Index which ranks national gender gaps on economic, political, education, and health-based criteria, Japan ranks 101 out of 145 countries, indicating that Japan is in the bottom third of countries with the greatest gender gap (World Economic Forum, 2016). Robert Dujarric's view is that

Despite its economic weight, Japan lacks strength in what is known as soft power…(and) Japanese universities wield minimal influence…If Japan wishes to develop international human networks, it will need elite undergraduate programs, as well as some high schools where most courses are taught in English. This will allow the country's future leaders to establish global connections from the time they enter college while familiarizing themselves with foreign cultures thanks to overseas professors and students. (Dinnie, 2008 p. 9)

MEXT has been committing resources to the development of English language competencies in junior high and high schools, while also advancing globalization at the high school and university levels (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2016a). This effort towards globalization has not emerged without criticism (Chapple, 2013). While the vision is to deepen efforts towards human resource development prepared for a global stage, MEXT's efforts convey an approach that develops English-language learning, international experiences, as well as welcoming foreigners, as long as the Japanese cultural way of life and values are not disturbed (Chapple, 2013).

The Olympic pillar of culture and education provides an opportunity for Japan to showcase a commitment to the transformation of the country's workforce, to one that is inclusive of women, foreigners, and supportive of leadership development and integration into the Japanese society. As long as the majority of women and foreigners

in Japan are excluded, intentionally or unintentionally from high level decision-making, advancement in human resources will remain limited.

For human resource development to be transformational it will need to be positioned as the gateway to global citizenship (Chappel, 2013). MEXT's goal of increasing the number of students going to study abroad and increasing the number of incoming international students is a step in the right direction, however a shift in worldview and perspective comes from the inclusion of professionals from abroad into the fabric of Japan, in leadership positions, as a voice at the table – that is critical for advancement of the human resource development goals. MEXT seeks to create an Olympic legacy that is driven by a human legacy that builds the future of Japan, post-2020 (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, 2016b). MEXT's goal is to develop high school students capable of developing solutions to problems, not a transformation of broader and more meaningful inclusion and diversity within Japan. The legacy for Japan post-2020 will require a monumental shift in perspective towards those individuals currently perceived as outsiders in the realm of governance and leadership. This includes both women and foreigners.

Conclusion

A shift from Cool Japan to an Olympic Global Japan could set the stage for a transformation based on people's ability to authentically serve as a bridge between countries, linking nations, global perspectives, and global goals. Japan is challenged by an aging population and a decline in population. To boldly advance in meeting these challenges, engagement of women and foreigners in Japan's workforce could increase the country's GDP (Matsui, 2014) and build bridges across the global stage. The continued transitioning and shifting of Japan's nation brand goals have not allowed Japan to gain full traction. Japan has moved from promoting pop culture, food and fashion to much more complex goals, striving to be seen as a country with solutions to complex problems.

What is the role of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics in shaping the narrative for Japan's cultural and national identity? Building on the concept of nation branding, the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games could advance and deepen government-led reform initiatives in human resource development, providing a springboard for creating an Olympic legacy that is a cultural narrative inclusive of women and foreigners, along with an increased representation of both in higher education institutions.

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Rites of Passage in Japanese Traditional Culture

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Abstract

The paper examines the rites of passage in Japanese traditional culture from the perspective of semiotic method, a study of signs, symbols and significations. Sign systems of traditional customs and rituals ensure transmission of cultural values and information between and within generations. Based on the analyses of concrete elements and symbolic content of life-cycle rituals of Japanese people, we determine the role and functions of rites of passage in traditional Japanese culture, as well as the relation between archaic and modern elements of such rituals, including nowadays changes in perception and interpretation of the meaning of the ceremonies concerning the rites of passage. More precisely we distinguished three aspects of sign content of rites of passage: syntactic (formal relation of signs within a sign system); semantics (symbolic content of signs); pragmatics (relations of the sign to the receiver, interpreter). Results showed that symbols and signs enclosed in life-cycle rituals and related ceremonies not only enable identification of individuals with community, but also serve as an archiving tool for maintenance and continuity of cultural values and cultural-specific knowledge accumulated over the historical development of the whole Japanese society.

Keywords: rites of passage, semiotics, cultural signs, traditional culture.

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Introduction

「会うは別れの始め」
Meeting is only the beginning of separation
- Japanese saying

The Rite of Passage ritually marks a person's transition from one status (from one role, phase of life, or social status to another**).** Classic parts of rites of passage include main three stages as: separation - the first stage of a Rite of Passage in which individuals are removed from their community or status (separation from normal life); liminal – the stage of a ritual, particularly of a Rite of Passage, in which one has passed out of an old status but not yet entered a new one (on threshold) state of between; and reincorporation - the third phase of a rite of passage during which participants are returned to their community with a new status (reincorporation into society with new status) (Van Gennep, 2004).

Different cultures around the world have rites of passage, and they follow a similar patterns corresponding with important events in human life, like birth, adulthood, marriage, eldership and death.

Research Methodology

We examine Rites of Passage in Japanese traditional culture from the perspective of Semiotic Method. Semiotics is a study of signs, symbols and significations.
The sign systems of traditional customs and rituals, including the Rites of Passage, ensure transmission of cultural values and information between and within generations.

Authors distinguish three aspects of sign content of Rites of Passage: syntactic (formal relation of signs within a sign system); semantics (symbolic content of signs); and pragmatics (relations of the sign to the receiver, interpreter).

「七つまでは神の子」
Before Seven, among the Gods
-Japanese Saying

Rite of Birth in Japanese Culture

Japanese people has its unique ritual to welcome children into the world and integrate them into the community. Traditional birth related rituals and customs can be divided into the following components: pre-maternity customs and beliefs; childbirth rites and socialization ceremonies.

Pre-maternity Customs and Beliefs

Japanese birth related ceremonies are rich of magical and rational components, as praying to the souls of ancestors and the manufacture of amulets, as well as the use of traditional medical knowledge. It is believed that the child begins to live four months before actual birth, i.e. when the soul tamashii appears. That is why even nowadays

the age of Japanese people often counted not from the date of their actual birth, but since the moment of the "invasion of the soul".

First Celebration that takes place during pregnancy is called Obi-iwai - celebration of the maternity band. During the Edo Period (1603-1867), in which infanticide was common, it was forbidden to practice abortion after the celebration of this ceremony. Usually this ceremony is held on Dog's Day, because dogs are said to have an easy delivery. Rice cakes may also be distributed this day, as an announcement of the expected birth.

Childbirth Rites

Japanese birth customs include the special rites for an easy childbirth that is conducted by praying for O-Jizō-Sama or Jizō-san and Kannon Bodhisattva, asking for an easy delivery and easy child-birth. It is believed that the Ubu-Gami, the God of Birth will bring the tama - the soul of a child at the moment of birth.

In ancient Japan, a special birthing hut - Ubu-ya was constructed within the hamlet and new mothers stayed there for 30 days after giving birth. This custom is rooted on the Folk perception of pollution.

On seventeenth day a new-born Japanese bodies are believed to embody godliness, that is why they are dressed completely white. White colour symbolises clean and untarnished state. After the 17th days in age, baby is finally believed to be actual child, rather than gods. When this happens, they make the transition from white attire for different colours.

One of the symbolic rite in Japanese culture is related to the conserving of the umbilical cord. This cord is thought to have a strong link to the well-being of the babies, that is why Japanese parents look after them so carefully.
Birth rites in Japanese culture also include the recuperation stage that constitute an important ritual following the child birth in Japan, when new Japanese mothers often return to their parents' home for a month.

Socialisation ceremonies

First rite of socialization is presented by celebration of O-Sichiya that means a naming ceremony and introduction to the community, and it takes place roughly a week after the new-born enters the world. Once the baby's name is decided, the father will have it handwritten in Japanese calligraphy on the Meimeisho, a so called name certificate. The Meimeisho can be in a different form (scroll, poster and etc.) and it is usually displayed in the house.

Relatives and friends will gather around the whitely dressed newborn and present their gifts or Shugibukuro – a monetary gift in a special envelope. Then the celebratory dinner is served, which compulsorily include two symbolical dishes: Sekihan - a red rice and Tai - sea bream. In Japan, people has been considered that color of red is a lucky color because it associates with the color of the sun, what about the sea bream, the Japanese word for sea bream, tai, sounds similar to the word "mede-tai" (happy, festive, good luck, auspicious). The color of sea bream is also red,

so it has been thought fish of felicity and a necessity for dishes for happy events like naming ceremony. Thus, Naming Ceremony is one of the major celebrations in the life-cycle rites, since the name defines a status of the child in the community of people and is considered to be one of the essential symbols, that distinguish the child from the world of spirits. Therefore, in the first week of its life the child gradually receives the signs of belonging to the social community: first cloth, name and token gifts.

Then follows a Miamairi ceremony - a first Shrine visit, conducted usually a month after the birth, and this rite represents the end of a period when the mother is regarded as polluted. This ceremony is marked with distribution of small gifts of thanks to relatives and neighbours.

Approximately 100 days after the birth, Japanese families conduct a ceremony of kuizome, which means a ritual weaning, when the baby is served a taste of the food, having symbolic meaning of long-life, prosperity and well-being.

Children's Day

In ancient Japan people celebrated Boys' day and Girls' Day separately. The Boys' day was called Tango no Sekku, and was celebrated on the 5th day of the 5th moon in the lunar calendar or Chinese calendar. After Japan switched to the Gregorian calendar, the date was moved to May 5.

While Girls' Day called Dolls festival - Hinamatsuri was celebrated on March 3. In 1948, the government declared this day as a national holiday to celebrate the happiness of all children and to express gratitude toward mothers. Therefore, the holiday was renamed as Children's Day - Kodomo no Hi.

This day's celebrations involved the raising of the carp-shaped flags called koinobori. Carp is closely related to the Japanese national identity and has a deep meaning. It signifies perseverance, due to the fish's ability to swim upstream, never stop moving, and resist simply "going with the flow." Moreover, according to the ancient Chinese legend a carp that swims upstream becomes a dragon. That is why all Japanese families fly koinobori banners in the shape of a carp for each child in their house, especially for boys. Samurai warrior figurines and samurai kabuto helmets are also displayed in homes to inspire strength and bravery.

While a separate holiday called Hinamatsuri or "Dolls' Day" is celebrated for happiness and development of young girls. Even now, on this day girls still receive dolls that had been passed down to their grandmothers and mothers. A set of ornamental dolls called hina-ningyo represent the Emperor, Empress, attendants, and musicians in traditional court dress of the Heian period.

Japanese families generally start to display the dolls in February and take them down immediately after the festival. According to folk beliefs leaving the dolls for a longer period after the end of festival will result in a late marriage for the daughter.

First Birthday celebration

Japanese culture pays a strong attention to the first Birthday of a child, that marks the learning to make first steps. In ancient Japan it was used to tie to the baby's back a bag of rice to make it fall down, during this day Japanese families also made some predictions on baby's future by making it choose certain object.

<div align="right">

「三つ子の魂百まで」
Mitsugo no tamashii hyaku made
The Soul of a Three Year Old Until a Hundred
- Japanese saying

</div>

Shichigosan

Japanese traditional culture has unique celebrations that mark the stage of children's growth and one of the brightest examples of such initiations is Shichigosan. This tradition has more than 300-year history and constitute one of the milestones when the rites of passage were performed. In modern Japan Shichigosan ceremony is officially celebrated on November 15, when children visit the Shrine in traditional kimono for rites of protection and prayers for good fortune.

One can notice that the ceremony Shichigosan, which literally means the ages of 3-5-7 years, present only the odd numbers. According to folk beliefs odd numbers have a sacred meaning and bring good luck based on the yin-yang Chinese philosophy of feminine and masculine force. This ages mark the stage of children's growth.

During the ceremony parents usually ask a nearby shrine to perform a purification rite "Ohararai" and recite a Shinto prayer "Norito" for their children's strong health. The next symbolical rite being held during celebration of Shichigosan is a giving for a child a "chitose ame" – it is a long stick candy given to children celebrating Shichigosan. "Chitose ame" literally means 1,000-year candy and it comes as a pair of white and pink sticks, with symbolical colours indicating good luck, in a paper bag with symbols of longevity and good luck.

It should be noted here that the 3rd year of child is considered as particularly significant, which marks the start of new period in child's life. In middle ages, boys of aristocratic families wore hakama for the first time. Later on this ceremony was conducted at the age of 5, when Samurai children were introduced to Daimyo. The 5-year-old boy was called the Hakama-gi and wore the hakama (the male kimono).

The ceremony of Shichigosan also involved the rite of "Kamioki" – leaving hair, when boys and girls start growing out their hair. Folk belief states that diseases entered the body through the hair, and Japanese people would shave their children's hair until they reach3 years old.

Additionally, Shichigosan ceremony include the rite of "Obotoki" when girls turned 7, parents celebrated the "obitoki" rite, in which their daughters went from using straps to secure their kimono to wearing obi.

Thus, the Shichigosan ceremony marks milestones in Japanese culture when rites of passage were performed for children.

Coming of Age Ceremony

The rite of initiation to adulthood in Japan is called as Coming of the Age ceremony. This adulthood initiation rite had a highest semiotic status in Japanese traditional culture. The earliest official record of Rite of Adulthood – Coming of the Age ceremonies in Japan dates back to the Nara period (710-794 AD). Moreover, in Heian period (794-1185 AD) children were not recognized as officially gendered before they undergone a special ceremony for adulthood: Genpuku for the boys and Mogi for the girls.

Ancient Adulthood Rites for Boys

Adulthood Rites for boys in ancient Japan used to be held around age of 11-15 years old. This initiation rite was called as Genpuku, which is considered to be an important ritual that affected the whole life course of a boy. In ancient times, in the period between early childhood and Genpuku, Japanese boys were called as wakashuu.

Genpuku rite was known as kanrei (cap ceremony) amongst the court nobility of ancient Japan and involved special guidance before initiation rites. Capping ceremony was the main part of Genpuku, which symbolized a ritual clothing ceremony of the child to adulthood wearing. Genpuku rite also involved the visit to the Shrine to be presented with first adult wear.

After Genpuku, Japanese youths were expected to do adult labour, where samurai-class men acquired full warrior status and could fight in open battle. They were offered a samurai helmet and received special hair-style – Sakayaki, symbolizing the ritual offering to Gods.

Thus, Genpuku ceremony consisted of important symbolic element including: adult cloth, new hair style and token gifts, ceremonial court cap – kanmuri in case of initiation of the boys from noble families or samurai helmet, sword and armour in case of samurai family.

Therefore, Genpuku Rite was designed to model necessary qualities and skills in children required in their new adult status.

Ancient initiation rites for girls

Traditional Japanese rites of adulthood for girls was called Mogi that involved certain symbolical ritual elements such as new adult clothing for girls with presenting a token gift as pleated skirt. Girls also blackened their teeth, this rite was called Ohaguro. Initiation rites for girls also included the rite of Hikimayu – removing eyebrows and repainting it in a new make-up. Then girls received a new hairstyle by tying the long hair on a top.

Moreover, girls were taught about new social responsibilities and traditional customs, art and history, as well as the way of being a good wife and mother.

Thus, we can state that main functions of rites of adulthood is to help develop a sense of adult responsibility in children and to help shape responsible and productive community members in an adult society.

Coming of the Age in Modern Japan

In our modern time most of the societies have abandoned the adulthood initiation rites, and symbolical meaning and pragmatic aspect of these rites are being forgotten. Often contemporary transition to adulthood is marked only by the state of reaching of a certain age, that enables a person legally to be regarded as an "adult" person.

For instance, in modern Japan "Coming of Age Ceremony" is officially celebrated on January 15 each year. The ceremony is held primarily at a local level and sponsored by the government. After their 20th young Japanese people become officially adults and receives certain legal rights (rites to vote, manage their own life and etc.). This occasion also corresponds with graduation period, thus marking the end of childhood and start of adulthood.

This occasion in contemporary Japan involves wearing of traditional kimono since the Coming of the Age is an opportunity to dress in echo of old traditions: girls wear Furisode, bright kimono with long sleeves, traditionally designed for unmarried women.

Some adults may visit Shinto shrines for purification ceremonies similar to those held for children at 3-5-7.

Contemporary ceremonies of Seijin-no-hi is a result of long-term evolutionary change of Japanese rite of passage ceremonies, that reflect the change of cultural themes and values, as well as the process of historical adaptation of traditional rituals to a modern setting.

In recent years Japanese society have been questioning the relevance and significance of the very concept of Seijin-nio-hi and the society feels concern about the possible loss of the meaning of Coming of the Age, which is meant for helping youths to smoothly change to adult status and become responsible and mature individuals in an adult community. However, despite of the shift of the practices of celebration of the Coming of the Age, it is certain that Seijin-no-hi will remain a significant part of Japanese traditional culture, and initiation rites of new generations of Japanese people into adulthood status by the ceremonies of Seijin-no-hi will continue into the future.

Rite of Marriage

Shinto Wedding represent a traditional religious ceremony of Japanese culture. However, nowadays the wedding ceremony may contain the elements of traditional Shinto style and western elements. In this paper we will particularly focus on traditional rite of marriage according to Shinto belief.

The current Shinto wedding ceremony is considered to be originated during in Taisho period. Shinto style wedding ceremony is full of symbolic elements ordered by

special rite series. Wedding rite starts with sanshin ceremony, which literally means procession, when ritual musicians and a Shinto maiden lead the bride and groom and the other wedding participants to the shrine. Then follows the special rite of purification - shubatsu-no-gi. At the beginning of the ceremony, a Shinto priest begins the wedding ceremony by the purification ceremony of bride and groom, and all participants; after purification rite the priest announces their marriage to the gods or spirits (*kami*) of the shrine and asks for their blessing, this rite is called as Norito-soujou. After the announcement of the marriage, a Shinto maiden dedicates a sacred dance to the kami – Kaguramai. Wedding ceremony includes also a special symbolical act called Chikai-no-sakazuki, when the bride and groom exchanges nuptial cups of the rice wine that was placed before the kami. This Japanese ritual is known as "san-san-kudo" and has a deep meaning. The rite "san-san-kudo" should be performed by the bride and groom and their parents; each of them drinks 3 times of sake from each of 3 cups. The first 3 represent three couples, the bride and groom, and their parents. The second 3 represent three human flaws: hatred, passion, and ignorance. If we look at the semantics of the term "san-san-kudo", we can find that "ku", or 9 is a number that brings good luck according to folk belief, and "do" means deliverance from the three flaws stated above.

Shinto style wedding ceremony then continues by seishi-soujou, when the groom reads out the marrige vow in Japanese and the bride and groom make offerings of tamagushi to the kami (Tamagushi-hairei) to vow their marriage. And finally, the young couple exchange of rings - yubiwa-no-gi and drinks the rice wine together (Shinzokuhai-no-gi) by marking a strong bond between the couple's relatives, they share the rice wine dedicated to the kami.

Another symbolical component of the wedding ceremony is a rosary with 21 beads that represent the couple, their families and the Buddha all joined on one string to symbolize the union of the families. Wedding ceremony also involves honoring the parents with offers of flowers, a toast, or a letter expressing their love and gratitude.

Additionally, it is common to decorate the Shrine with origami cranes, that symbolize a longevity and prosperity and usually 1,001 gold origami cranes are folded to bring luck, good fortune, longevity, fidelity, and peace to the marriage.

Moreover, the dressing style of the bride also has a rich symbolical meaning. Traditionally Japanese bride wears two kinds of wedding outfits: the shiro, which is a white kimono worn for the ceremony and the uchikake kimono which is a patterned brocade worn at the reception. The hair of the bride is worn in a bun with colorful kanzashi hair accessories. A white wedding hook called the tsuno kakushi finalizes the hair decoration for bride. This tsuno horns symbolizes obedience. The bride also carries a tiny purse (hakoseko), a small encased sword (kaiken), and a fan that is worn in the obi belt that represents happiness and a happy future.

The wedding ceremony is followed by a feast, where different foods are served and all have special meanings, for example lobster might be served because red is a lucky color or clams served with both shells symbolize the couple's union.

Thus, we can observe that Japanese traditional wedding ceremony is a complex system of elements that include ritual acts, material objects of culture as well as

folklore. Every act and ritual of the wedding ceremony is rich of symbolical meaning and deep functional meaning devoted to symbolically protect bride and groom as well as motivate certain culturally prescribed behaviour of the newly marriage couple and their relatives. Moreover, the rites of marriage are devoted to the initiation of the bride and groom to the whole society in a new status as a newly formed family unit.

In recent years western style wedding ceremonies have replaced traditional Shinto wedding rites. Most of the contemporary Japanese weddings present a combination of "traditional Japanese" and "Western" wedding elements, and this trend is playing a significant role in constructing modern Japanese cultural identity, by "elaborating multifaceted and highly commercializes" event in the life of modern Japanese people (Edward, 1989).

Rite of Eldership

Rite of Eldership in Japanese society has a very strong traditional value since the elders represent tradition and wisdom of the past, who as such possess the highest status in all societies and act as a role models for younger generation. In Japanese folk believe it is considered that elders become Ancestors, who link human and God together, and they are often called upon in times of need.

Japanese rites of eldership and ancestor worship is comprised of several birthday celebrations and mortuary traditions.

In Japan people start to celebrate rite of eldership from ages 60 to 111, where each birthday celebration series are named accordingly, particularly 60th Birthday is a Kanreki celebration, the follows 70th Birthday – Koki, 77th – Kiju, 80th – Sanju, 88th – Beiju, 90th – Satsuju, 99th – Hakuju, 111th – Jooju.

Kanreki celebration (60th Birthday) marks first initiation to eldership. Moreover, it marks an auspicious occasion when two zodiac signs of elder's birth year – one in the 10-year cycle and the other in the 12-year cycle – converge again. According to Japanese believe, person who reaches the age of kanreki completes a full circle to attain "rebirth", and during such celebrations one may notice the elderly people's symbolical baby attire – red vest and red cup, like a new-born baby. In earlier times not many Japanese reached that age.

The series of special birthdays in Japanese tradition initiate people to different stages of old age. Therefore, it can be regarded as rites for eldership that are culturally guided by a society.

We can witness how Japanese people continue to conduct Rites of Eldership even after the death of a certain family member. This is done in a tradition of Ancestor Worship.

Rite of Ancestorship

Ancestor worship is constituted of symbolic rituals as food offerings at the family altar to honor the spirit of ancestors. The offerings may include tea, rice, even flowers. The next important component of Ancestor Worship is invitation of Priest from the

family temple to chant a sutra on the monthly death anniversaries of ancestors. Where the Priest play the role of "semiotic mediator" between the family members and ancestors (Peirce, 1940). Third element of ancestor worship is presented by the visits to a family grave, usually during the religious weeks marked by equinoxes and O-Bon festivals conducted in mid-summer. All these rites and customs are devoted to keep alive the memories of ancestors within a family. It should be noted here that memorial rituals for ancestor worship are highly integrated into Japanese daily life experience and still continues to be an important part of Japanese culture. Thus, memorial rituals play two main functions, as it helps to contribute in revealing and understanding one's origins, which constitutes a vital component of self-identity, also it helps to cope with the loss of a loved one and to realize the immortality of life as well as mitigate the pain of aging.

Japanese mortuary rites present a well-defined system of strong cultural guidance, where the perception of life is distinguished into three parts, like the life-transient state-afterlife. In Japanese tradition the nearness of death is symbolically marked by the rite of last water – Matsugo no Mizu, in which next of kin wet the lips of the dying person with water. Water symbolism is presented in almost every culture, for instance in Muslim tradition, the final debt of relatives before the dying person is to serve him/her with a drop of cold water (Holy Zam-zam water or pomegranate juice), which quenches one's thirst. Japanese mortuary tradition includes following rites: a wake, a funeral, a cremation, a bone-picking ceremony, and east flowers. In Japan mortuary rituals continue every 7 days until the 49th day after death, and again on the 100th day. The 49th day ritual is considered as a "turning point", when it is believed that the spirit of the newly deceased (niibon) becomes a new Buddha (nii-Botoke) (Smith, 1979). This rite is accompanied by special feast. After that follows periodic memorial rituals at the 1st, 3rd, 7th, 13th, 17th, 23rd, 27th, 33rd and 50th death anniversaries. All these rites are devoted to ensure the right and smooth guidance of the deceased through different stages of spirit-new Buddha-Buddha, and consequently serve as a Rites of Passage to Ancestorhood.

Social changes in modern Japanese society has its impacts on traditional ancestor worships and mortuary tradition of Japanese people as well as those who practice them, due to the fact that Japanese traditional family system has gone through many transformations. Therefore, nowadays we can observe certain concerns in Japanese society about the possibility of diminishing the tradition of posthumous care because of great decrease of three-generation family system in Japanese society, which is considered to be the key condition for preserving an ancestral worship. In addition, a growing number of people without patrilineal descendants also strengthen these social concerns. As it is known that the tradition of caring for the dead is closely connected to the Japanese ie system, however, we should note that the crucial role of family in ancestor worship has a political origin. Namely, the Meiji Civil Code (1898) specified the rule of succession by the eldest son, and the son stayed with his parents to form three-generation family. The Civil Code also prescribed that ancestral rites, including altar and family grave be a part of ie which should be passed from generation to generation.

Despite those changes and growing concerns Japanese people continue to strongly preserve and culturally guide Rites of Ancestorship.

Conclusion

「門前の小僧習わぬ経を読む」
The environment makes our characters

-Japanese saying

In essence, the system of belief in symbolical death and re-birth is common for any culture, that share four main universal rites and rituals, including Japan: birth that signify the entrance to the life; coming of age that marks the adulthood; marriage that signify the entrance into a new life with a partner and finally, death that marks the stage when people enter the afterlife with the belief of re-birth. All these elements of Rites of Passage supply Japanese culture with a meaning and possess a significant place in Japanese society. In addition, initiation rites themselves possess an archetypical structure, for the same underlying patterns and procedures.

A question arises: What is the role of Rites of Passage in Ethnic identity as a whole and why people continue to follow these rites and rituals from generation to generation?

Here would be our answer: an ethnic identity is a fundamental aspect of the self that includes a sense of membership in an ethnic group as well as attitudes and fillings with regard to that membership. We state that individuals confront their ethnicity for the first time through Rites of Passage and Life-cycle ceremonies and related holidays. Moreover, symbols and signs enclosed in Rites of Passage and related ceremonies not only enable identification of individuals with community, but also serve as an archiving tool for maintenance and continuity of cultural values and cultural-specific knowledge accumulated over the historical development of the whole Japanese society.

Thus, the Rites of Passage with its culturally prescribed elements ensure a certain degree of persistence of core cultural values and beliefs. A sense of ethnic identity tends to increase with age and older group of society serve as main repositories of culture and cultural knowledge.

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Shibata Gô: Filmmaker of a hybrid Japan

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Abstract

Shibata Gô is a Japanese contemporary independent filmmaker. He made only a few movies and yet unfairly unknown. Until recently, attention was paid only to his second long-movie, *Late Bloomer* (Osoi Hito) in 2003 from a very few independent reviews. However, his first film, *NN891102*, released in 1999, and which is also the work from his period of study, exposes an inspired artist upsetting logics of tradition and modernity. Like many others intellectuals, artists and filmmakers, Shibata's works reflect some specific concerns related to Japan. In which way, does Shibata highlight some of these concerns? An answer is closely associated to the representation of characters as hybrid beings, a common notion of unstable identity related to modern Japan that Shibata shares with filmmakers such as Tsukamoto Shinya. Such a figure emphasizes the identity crisis of the Japanese individual resulted from the war, the defeat and the modernization of the country at the cost of the traditional roots. In order to analyze the multiple aspects of this figure, this presentation will especially focus on the very interesting but very little-known *NN891102*, which will provide two significant ways of studying. First, the problematic of forgetting through a man without identity, without history as well as the country dispossessed of its own History. Second, the question of the individual who sees himself as a stranger with the body of a stranger, involving the process of doubling and projection within the unstable body of the movie itself.

Keywords: Japan, cinema, Shibata, doubling, Nagasaki, A-Bomb

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Introduction

Shibata Gô is a Japanese contemporary independent filmmaker. He made only a few movies and yet unfairly unknown. Until recently, attention was paid only to his second long-movie, *Late Bloomer* (*Osoi Hito*) in 2003 from some independent reviews like "The Midnight Eye". However, his first film, *NN891102* (1999), which is also the work from his period of study, exposes a very inspired and complex artist's mind. From the bombing of Nagasaki in 1945 to the dawn of the 2000s, Shibata crystallizes the main anxieties of Japan through a man without identity, without history as well as the country dispossessed of its own History.

Like many others intellectuals, artists and filmmakers, Shibata's works echo specific concerns related to Japanese subconscious threatening a society built on the ashes of the war and defeat. In which way, does Shibata highlight some of these concerns? An answer is closely associated to the thematic area of the hybrid being, a common notion of blurred identity related to modern Japan that Shibata shares with filmmakers such as Tsukamoto Shinya but in his very specific way. Such a figure emphasizes the unstable identity of the Japanese individual resulted from the war, the defeat and the modernization of the country at the cost of the traditional roots. In order to analyze the multiple aspects of this figure, this presentation will especially focus on the very interesting but very little-known *NN891102*, which will provide two significant ways of studying.

The first subject highlighted in the present analysis is the problematic of forgetting. Shibata's hybrid is like the Schrodinger's cat: he exists and in the same time doesn't exist. He is the product of a forgotten and unrecognized history erased from History. The second subject is the question of the individual who sees himself as a stranger with the body of a stranger, involving the figure of *doppelgänger*, the process of doubling and projection within the unstable body of the movie itself.

I – Traces of no existence

NN891102 is Shibata Gô's final work from the period he was studying in Ôsaka, made in 1999. The film focuses on Otonashi Reiichi, who survived the Nagasaki's Atomic bombing in 1945. Since then, he is haunted by the sound of the explosion he believes a magnetic tape recorded at the right moment.

NN891102's title explicitly involves the tragedy of Nagasaki, referring to the date – August the 9th – and the hour – 11h02 am – of the bombing. The film starts itself on "This film has been declassified", followed by two pieces of texts. The first one says "These sounds have been retrieved from Postwar Japan", followed by a shot of the band itself wielding the inscription "NN-八九一一零二". The second text says "And the tape remains blank".

These texts echo some Japanese after-war documentaries such as *A Japanese Tragedy* (*Nihon no higeki*) directed by Kamei Fumio or *The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki* (*Hiroshima, Nagasaki ni okeru genshibakudan no koka*) both in 1946. The last one has been categorized as *maboroshi* ("illusion") et *declassified* as a result of, like Kamei's movie, pressure from multiple censorship acts

ordered by American as well as Japanese authorities. Such a censorship which filmmakers like Ozu or Kurosawa were confronted to directly in their own works. In this postwar period, Ôe wrote in his *Hiroshima Notes* that in an era of frenetic atomic bombs and arms race at the cost of the potential and dramatic mass-destructions involved, what do the Japanese people need to remember?[i] In this context, Ôe echoes the film *The Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki*. Speaking of this movie, Markus Nornes says that "Had the suppression of this film been successful, every single other film about the bombings would be different. More important, our very memory of the events would be radically altered"[ii].

Shibata chooses to base his movie on a very sensitive subject that so few Japanese contemporary movies still speak about like *Women in Mirror* (*Kagami no Onnatachi*), directed by Kijû Yoshida in 2003. His originality is to refer to the Atomic bombing through the noise and in the same time depicts it through an invisible, oppressive and spreading disease. In 1989's *Black Rain* (*Kuroi Ame*), Imamura used similar pattern to portray the latent consequences of radiation through the physical and mental deliquescence of a female *hibakusha* from Hiroshima. In the same context, the sound of the explosion, as the source of Reiichi's physical and mental deliquescence, depicts this pattern of a latent and invisible evil spreading like a disease in every cell of the survivor and leading him in a downward spiral.

After the Atomic Bombing and the end of the war, Reiichi's mother asks her son to lie about Nagasaki and so to deny his connections with the tragedy that occurred. However, Reiichi's youth remains troubled by his growing obsession for the sound of the explosion, leading him to many experiences in order to recreate this sound. But at the cost of his sanity and his physical condition, especially when he gets severely wounded by some explosives he made. From Reiichi's perception of the events, the memory of the Bomb is this only sound surviving inside him while the tape remains blank. The man gets his body marked by History while this History is manipulated and even erased from the official writings and collective memory.

II – Hybrid being

As a proof of a non-existence, the sound, by existing without existing, crystallizes the instability of Reiichi who doesn't know who he is himself. This identity crisis is even emphasized by the figure of the Atomic Bombing about what Jean Epstein used to say that in Hiroshima, in Nagasaki, in Bikini, atomic disintegration brings the proof that everything people could have been imagined about infinitely small concretely exists. As a matter of fact, atomic fission illustrates human fission. Disintegration, psychoanalysis, cinema are three ways to access to a second reality in which reason and logic collapse.

Shibata combines those three methods through human fission fluctuating between identity and non-identity through doubling. The main pattern of these splitting bodies and identities manifest themselves through the scenes involving the paper theater that follows Reiichi through time just like the sound as it narrates a parable of his own life.

Through this theater, Shibata evokes Tezuka Osamu's *Astro Boy* to accentuate the human condition altered by technologies and Atomic Bombing. The story narrated by the theater teller involves a city destroyed by a powerful demon called Plutonium 239.

A fetus inside the womb of his pregnant mother heard the impact of the explosion caused by the demon and was then haunted by this sound at the point his cells become sound-cells, giving birth to a hybrid being.

This theater is also a metaphor of the characters who are doppelgangers of themselves, split individuals, highlighting the enduring presence of the traumatism, the self-locking of the character inside a time disconnected from the reality. A time in which there is no distinction between past, present or future, in which the characters are everyone and no one in the same time. A situation that Deleuze already analyzed in cinema by quoting Fellini who said that "we are constructed in memory; we are simultaneously childhood, adolescence, old age and maturity"[iii].

Through these doubling characters, the film makes these times coexist all together. The most illustrative pattern of this coexistence is the many roles often played by one person. For example, the same actress plays both Reiichi's mother as well as Reiichi's wife. The same actor plays a 60 year-old Reiichi and the enigmatic theater teller. At the end of the movie, Reiichi as a child and Reiichi as an old man appear together on the same frame. Past and future interact in a disconnected present like two ghosts from ghostly times.

As a result, the film itself appears like the inner space of Reiichi's mind bodily crystallized in which the reality is nothing but material projections of his identity crisis. So, the film is the retranscription of a reality blurred and influenced by Reiichi's fantasies. The object of the film highlights a paradox: the sound as the trace of a memory connected to a traumatism from the catastrophe which determined Reiichi. But in regard of a reality tending to forget it, this sound appears like a fantasy. The absence of any material trace of this sound on a blank tape refers to a present of oblivion at the point that oblivion becomes the truth while the reality of the catastrophe becomes a fiction, a fantasy. Reiichi's identity crisis tends to materialize through this conflict between this present of oblivion which wants to forget the reality of the catastrophe through a sound enduring inside the hybrid body of the character.

As a conclusion, through a sensitive subject such as the Atomic past of Japan, Shibata Gô evokes the Japanese unresolved schizophrenia. This schizophrenia is literally embodied by material inner projections which involve a material inner coexistence of all the regions of time "from the point of view of the actual present which each time represents their common limit or the most contracted of them"[iv]. The Atomic fission materializes the three new ways of visualization the inside. In that view, Shibata has strong concerns about Japanese identity built on the oblivion related to Hiroshima's legacy, a legacy of deny. Strong concerns shared by others Japanese filmmakers like Kurosawa Kiyoshi or Tsukamoto Shinya, used to portray people like survivors frozen in a never-ending present without past nor future. However, as a society built on such a legacy, the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not the point of their works. The true concern is the process of repression that lets the individual in an instable and unresolved identity crisis.

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Information Sharing between the Civil Administration and Citizens: An Implementation Proposal of Open Data Strategy in Japanese Local Governments 『

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Abstract
Administrative services in Japan have become diversified as a result of economic growth. However, as this growth has slowed down in recent years, there is now a need to review such conventional administrative service. Hence, in light of such a social climate, the Japanese government has been advocating an open data strategy (referred below as ODS) for administrative information ever since 2012. The aim of this study is to propose policies favorable to the promotion of ODS in local governments. In order to understand the current status of ODS, a survey was carried out based on plans implemented and websites managed by local governments within Tokyo. Additional interviews with local government staff were also conducted. The results showed that half of the local governments reviewed did not adhere to the open data regulation stated in ODS plan. Furthermore, some content and storage locations of information were accessible exclusively by the person in charge, and some data for possible editing or open format were not even available for internal perusal. As policies necessary for the promotion of ODS, this study suggests that information must be circulated openly within each responsible division while a person should be assigned to evaluate whether a piece of information should be made accessible to the public. Apart from creating a division specialized in data-sharing, each governing body should also reorganize itself to allow fluid and prolonged execution of ODS, as well as the initialization of open data measures within the administration. 『

Keywords: Japan, local government, open data, open format, secondary use, policy.

Introduction

Administrative services in Japan have become diversified as a result of economic growth. However, as this growth has decelerated in recent years, there has emerged a need for reviewing such conventional administrative services.

Therefore, the citizens must proactively participate in the development of a new service system so that they can be freed from Japan's traditional view of governing, which tends to "leave all town planning to the administration." Hence, considering such a social climate, the Japanese government has been advocating for an open data strategy (referred below as ODS) for administrative information since 2012.

The Japanese government defined open data that disclose data with machine readable format as well as under secondary use rule. (Ministry of internal affairs and communications, 2012a)

Necessity for ODS

It is assumed that administrative information from national and local governments is shared between the government and its citizens so that citizens can explore necessary government services. Information sharing is an essential element in achieving "autonomy," which constitutes cooperation with the citizenry, whether civil sovereignty in local government or national sovereignty over the nation. This perspective appears prominently in the "fundamental ordinance on local autonomy" for local governments in Japan.

The "fundamental ordinance on local autonomy" is also referred to as the "constitution for local government" because it outlines the basic and supreme laws for local governments. (Tsujiyama, 2002; Tsujiyama, 2003; Kisa&Osaka, 2003).

At the beginning, the ordinance defines citizen sovereignty and civil cooperation and establishes the sharing of administrative information with citizens as a means to achieve its objectives. (Tsujiyama, 2002; Katayama, 2001)

The theoretical framework that can be seen in this ordinance indicates that information sharing with citizens increases the transparency of local government administration, and it is an element of civil sovereignty and civil cooperation.

Two approaches exist to the sharing of administrative information. The first is a method that discloses information through a request of disclosure from the nationals and citizens through an "information disclosure system." The other is an "information provision system," which is a government initiative that provides information under the government's discretion. (Uga, 2004)

As an action that would constitute an "information provision system," Japan is establishing "e-stat," which aggregates governmental statistics for the country. "E-stat" was developed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in 2008 to provide different statistical information on a single website and on which each ministry can publish information separately. Citizens can download from "e-stat" raw data from surveys conducted by government ministries and agencies in XLS and CSV formats.

In 2015, the Cabinet Secretariat created a system that has been named "RESAS." This system will utilize some of the big data that is held in the public and private sectors, such as population estimates and industrial structures, and display them on a map as

graphics. Citizens can download raw data to generate graphics in CSV format as necessary. CSV files are machine readable and can also be used by secondary users.

If the machine readable files are published in this manner, in a format that can be used by secondary users, citizens can prepare various items of information by processing the simple data. In addition, if the raw data as well as a report on a study is published when the study is conducted, citizens can perform their own analyses. ODS should be promoted for civil autonomy.

Method

(1) Survey Subjects on Local Governments

This study proposes policies favorable to the promotion of ODS in local governments. To understand the current status of ODS, a survey was conducted on the basis of plans implemented and websites managed by local governments within Tokyo.

The analysis was conducted in cities within Tokyo. As of April 1, 2016, local governments within Tokyo included 26 cities, 23 special wards, 5 towns, and 8 villages. As these special wards are capable of conducting affairs almost similar to cities, some affairs slightly depend on Tokyo Prefecture. Special wards do not have the same equal rights on autonomy as cities.

Introducing ODS is a matter of national policy; on the other hand, this survey was conducted within local government judgments on the introduction of ODS and was closely related to local autonomy. Therefore, the survey was conducted only in cities.

(2) Survey Subjects on Plans and Websites

Tokyo Prefecture comprises 26 cities. Each of them has its own website and provides a wide variety of information about the city to citizens and people, including plans and surveys.

This survey investigated whether these cities disclosed plans stipulating ODS and whether these cities disclosed information corresponding with ODS.

The plans of a city comprise comprehensive general plans as well as individual plans by the sectors. For example, many cities include local information plans as one of the individual plans. In this survey, individual local information plans were investigated before the general plans.

In addition to the investigation of plans, this survey investigated the formula of these data, as many cities run city websites and disclose information such as population or financial condition.

Moreover, in addition to the aforementioned investigation, an interview to local government staffs in one of the investigated cities was conducted.

(3) Schedule

A survey was conducted in November 2015 and additionally in May 2016. Additional interviews with local government staffs were also conducted in December 2016.

Results and Discussion

(1) Via Investigation

Twelve out of 26 cities had plans stipulating ODS. Within 12 cities, 7 cities stipulated ODS with local information plans, 5 cities stipulated ODS with general plans as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Current status on stipulating ODS in ordinances.

Without stipulation	With stipulation	Total
14 cities	12 cities	26 cities

(The details)

In individual plans: 7 cities

In general plans: 5 cities

Table 2. Current status on the definition of ODS stipulated in the plans of 26 cities in Tokyo.

	Secondary use	Machine-readable data	To promote ODS	Total
With stipulation	6 cities	6 cities	6 cities	12 cities
Without stipulation	6 cities	6 cities	6 cities	12 cities

Table 3. A gross outline of 5-star deployment scheme for Open Data suggested by Tim Berners-Lee.

5-star scheme	Example of data format
1-star	PDF, JPG
2-star	xls, doc
3-star	XML, CSV
4-star	RDF, XML
5-star	LOD, RDF

With regard to this, ODS was stipulated in just half of the city plans, including Tokyo. Within 12 cities, 6 cities were stipulating machine readable data in ODS definition. Six cities stipulated to proceed with ODS, as shown in Table 2.
With regard to this, just half of the cities stipulated the ODS definition as the national government definition; other cities used comprehensive expressions as not to limit explanation of ODS and to avoid having to enforce the national government ODS.

Regarding open data, Tim Berners-Lee suggested a 5-star scheme; the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications introduced his idea. (Lee, 2006; Hausenblas, 2012; Ministry of internal affairs and communications, 2012b)

1-star scheme is the first phase. The key word of this step is open license. Disclosure of human and machine readable data should occur with non-editable data. PDF format data will meet this phase. 2-star scheme is the second phase and the key word of this step is readable human and machine. Add computer editable disclosure to the 1-star requirements. XLS and doc format data will satisfy this phase. 3-star scheme is the third phase with open format as the key. Add open useable format disclosure with every application to the second-phase requirements. XML and CSV format data will meet this phase. 4-star scheme is the fourth phase with universal resource identifier as the key. Web standardized format data is required. RDF and XML will meet this phase. 5-star scheme is the completed phase with 4-star data disclosed under the condition of output communication available.

As the key is linked data, Lod and RDF scheme will satisfy this last phase.

ODS as a national policy is a machine readable data format with open format.

Hence, the 3-star phase and subsequent phases include the machine readable data that can be construed as ODS enforcement.

As a result, 15 local governments disclosed no data in over half of subjects, shown in Table 4. Among them, 10 cities had no plans with described ODS.

Four cities were estimated to be under the 1-star scheme. Three cities were found to proceed to the 2-star phase with population data disclosed by XLS format although numerous data was disclosed by PDF.

Four cities were estimated to be under the 2-star phase and three cities under the 3-star phase. None of the cities were estimated to be under the 4-star phase or the 5-star phase.

This result shows that local governments of only three cities could have submitted ODS as the national policy. ODS is a mission, for hereafter, current status should be said in the starting phase.

Table 4. Implementation status on ODS of 26 cities in Tokyo.

(Unit: city)

	Without data	1-star	2-star	3-star	4-star & 5-star	Total
With stipulation	5	3	2	2	0	12
Without stipulation	10	1	2	1	0	14
Total	15	4	4	3	0	26

(2) Via Interview

The interview revealed that the internal sharing of information within the government, which is the stage before information is shared with the citizens, is currently not being conducted to a satisfactory standard.

The insufficiency of internal information sharing about the plan is a particular problem. In this local government, 32 plans have been developed, all of which have only been shared as PDFs. Before the plan was created, a survey for citizens was

conducted to explore the direction of the plan. However, the raw data of the survey results was not even shared internally within the government.

In addition, the officer responsible in the relevant department had stored the raw data for the population estimates that was used in the plan's development in removable media, and information about the data storage location was not shared internally within that department. Thus, an employee, who was unaware that the raw data for the population estimates existed, notified members of staff from other departments of its absence, then a lot of time was spent in creating another set of population estimates. This is but one example of such instances.

From this hearing, the problem has emerged that information is not being shared internally even within the government, which was the stage before information is provided to citizens.

Although the officer responsible is aware of the importance of sharing information, she/he says she/he is too busy doing her/his own duties to take care of the storage location of departmental information. In particular, there is no way for anyone except for the person responsible to search for data that is not stored in departmental shared folders, which are configured across local area networks. Due to the fact that in local government in Japan, government officials are transferred to different departments approximately every four years, it is likely that if data is created after five years, nobody will know the content or location of that data.

Conclusion

From the investigation, in the current status, 13 cities (approximately 40% of the 23 cities in the before ODS phase) did not prescribe ODS in the city planning. The future direction of the city points to a possibility to procced with ODS in the future, even if no data is disclosed under the current status. Introducing ODS might be doubtful without prescription included in the plans. Local governments in cities without ODS in the plans might take longer to introduce ODS than other cities. Local governments in Tokyo are often evaluated as advanced cities in every aspect, although in reality, disclosure of administrative information on the web is critical.

Furthermore, from additional interviews, some content and storage locations of information were accessible exclusively by the person in charge, and some data for possible editing or open format were not available for internal perusal.

As policies necessary for the promotion of ODS, this study suggests that information must be circulated openly within each responsible division while a person should be assigned to evaluate whether a piece of information should be made accessible to the public.

In addition to creating a division specialized in data sharing, each governing body should also reorganize itself to allow fluid and prolonged execution of ODS as well as the initialization of open data measures within the administration.

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Politeness Strategies among Japanese College Students: Discussion of the Acquisition of Honorifics and Onomatopoeias

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Abstract
In general, learning the proper use of parts of speech peculiar to the Japanese language, such as honorifics and onomatopoeias, often becomes a problem in Japanese language education. Honorifics are considered to be difficult by many Japanese and are used incorrectly on many occasions. Also, onomatopoeias are frequently used in various cartoon and comic books, however, the correct meaning and use of such terms is generally obscured. This study aimed to measure the communication abilities of college students by exploring their knowledge of honorifics and onomatopoeias as well as the connection between the two. A survey on Japanese female college students about the honorifics and onomatopoeias they used on a daily basis was made. In this survey, honorifics were divided into respectful, humble, and polite language, whereas onomatopoeias were grouped by origin. A few typical examples of each expression were provided to evaluate students' understanding of them. Furthermore, a survey on their attitudes toward learning onomatopoeias and honorifics was conducted. According to the survey results, 46% of the students consider honorifics to be the most important aspect of the Japanese language to be learned. Simultaneously, approximately 40% managed to use honorifics correctly, and these students also demonstrated a sound knowledge of onomatopoeias. In communication, students who excelled in negative politeness strategies (like honorifics), which are used by the speaker to maintain distance from the interlocutor, were also proven to be proficient in positive politeness strategies, such as onomatopoeias, which indicate intimacy between the speaker and the listener.

Keywords: politeness strategy, Japan, college student, Japanese language, honorifics, onomatopoeias.

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Introduction

In general, learning the proper use of parts of speech that are peculiar to the Japanese language, such as honorifics and onomatopoeias, can often pose a problem in Japanese language education. Honorifics are considered to be difficult by many Japanese and are used incorrectly on many occasions. Further, while onomatopoeias are frequently used in various cartoons and comic books, the correct meaning(s) and use(s) of such terms are generally obscure.

This study aimed to measure the communication abilities of college students by exploring their knowledge of honorifics and onomatopoeias as well as the connection between the two.

Methods

1. Research subjects: 72 male and female college students (19–20 years old).

2. Survey period: From March 2016 to April 2016

3. Survey method: A questionnaire survey was carried out twice during the survey period mentioned above.

1) The first survey (Survey A)

Questionnaire and survey method: Referring to the "Guidelines of honorific" issued by the Agency of Cultural Affairs (Agency of Cultural Affairs, 2007), five respectful words and eight humble words were selected as the most representative and popular in honorific language. Short sentences using these honorifics erroneously were presented to research subjects, and the subjects were made to correct the sentences.

Regarding the selection of onomatopoeias: (a) the most popular and basic 24 onomatopoeias were selected from the basic Japanese onomatopoeias (70 words) proposed in the literature (Mikami, 2006), (b) from the 92 words used in Japanese elementary school language textbooks (year 1–6) (Okaya, 2015), (c) and from those extracted from ONOMATO-PERA-PERA (for the publication of 1996–2010 years) published in The Daily Yomiuri (Mizuno, 2015). All research subjects were asked to construct correct short sentences using these onomatopoeias.

2) The second survey (Survey B)

Questionnaire and survey method: The author investigated the various sentences that many college students wrote during last 10 years and selected words with a high rate of misuse in conjunction with communication in particular. As a result, 12 honorifics and 18 onomatopoeias (4 degree adverbs, 8 mimetic words for laughter, and 6 adverbs at the time of the oral statement) were selected. For the survey method, all the honorifics and onomatopoeias were shown via short problem sentences, an appropriate word was chosen from them, and was then fitted in the short sentence blanks.

3) Evaluation method

As for the evaluation of the onomatopoeias of survey A, two different types of evaluation methods were adopted. The first evaluation method was employed to determine whether the research subjects fully understood the correct meaning of the

words, and the second was employed to check the knowledge about how to use these words correctly; scoring of these two evaluations were adjusted to be the same. The evaluation results of both Surveys A and B were translated based on 100-point scoring, and the necessary statistical treatments were also carried out.

Results

The correct answer rates concerning honorific language in Survey A are shown in Table 1; relatively large differences can be observed between the correct answer rates of the maximum and the minimum for the honorific language (whole), including respectful and humble languages. The average value of correct answer rates for humble language was significantly low when compared with those of respectful language.

The correlations between the correct answer rates for honorific language and those of respectful language and humble language in Survey A are shown in Table 2. The figures shown in the table are calculated correlation coefficients, and the extremely high value of 0.863 clearly suggests the strong positive correlation between honorific language (whole) and humble language. On the contrary, the correlation between honorific language (whole) and respectful language does not appear to be as strong.

In Table 3, the correct answer rates for onomatopoeias in Survey A were summarized. The averaged value of onomatopoeia use, other than syllable repetition, was considerably high at 92, which undoubtedly reflects the importance of overall usage of onomatopoeias. The "ST" given in Table 3, is the subtotal of "meaning" and "usage".

Table 1. Correct answer rates for honorific language in Survey A.

Items	Honorific language, whole	Respect language	Humble language
Average	57	75	44
Maximum	96	100	100
Minimum	25	20	0

Table 2. Correlations for the correct answer rate
between honorific language and those of respect language and humble language
in Survey A. (Correlation coefficients)

Correlation coefficient	Respect language	Humble language
Honorific language	0.694	0.863

Table 3 Correct answer rate for onomatopoeia use in Survey A.

Items	Onomatopoeia, whole			Syllable repetition			Onomatopoeia*		
	M	U	ST	M ST	U		M ST	U	
Average	83	90	85	88	88	85	79	92	85
Maximum	100	100	98	100	100	100	100 100	100	
Minimum	50	63	60	50	50	54	25	58	42

Abbreviations   M: meaning, U: usage, ST: subtotal (ST=M+U).
* Onomatopoeia other than the syllable repetition.

Table 4. Correlations of correct answer rate of honorific language and those of Onomatopoeias in Survey A (Correlation coefficients).

Honorifics	Correct answer rate of Onomatopoeia								
	Onomatopoeia, whole			Syllable repetition			Onomatopoeia*		
	M	U	ST	M	U	ST	M	U	ST
**Correct answer --	0.336	0.456	0.414	0.307	0.452	0.450	0.286	0.258 0.321	
*** Correct answer --	0.375	0.332	0.367	0.206	0.295	0.304	0.333	0.268 0.351	

Abbreviations   M: meaning, U: usage, ST: subtotal (ST=M+U).
* Onomatopoeia other than the syllable repetition.
** Correct answer rate of honorific language, whole.
*** Correct answer rate of humble language.

Correlations of correct answer rates of honorific language with those of onomatopoeia in Survey A were shown in Table 4. The values given in the table were calculated correlation coefficients, and relatively high values, around 0.45, clearly suggested the relatively strong positive correlation relationship between honorific language (whole) and onomatopoeia (whole, usage). A similar type of relationship between honorific language (whole) and syllable repetition onomatopoeia, especially in case of "usage," were also observed. More importantly, these relatively strong correlations were only observed in the usage of these onomatopoeias, and not observed in their meanings.

The visual confirmation of the correlations between the correct answer rates of honorific language (whole) and those of onomatopoeias (whole, ST), and those between the correct answer rates of honorific language (whole) and those of onomatopoeias (whole, usage) are also shown in Fig.1, and Fig.2, respectively.

As shown in Fig.1, a relatively strong positive correlation (r = 0.414) is observed between honorific language (whole) and onomatopoeias (whole, ST). Similarly, a slightly stronger correlation (r = 0.456) between honorific language (whole) and

onomatopoeias (whole, usage) is shown in Fig.2.

Figure 1. Correlations between the correct answer rates of honorific language (whole) and onomatopoeias (whole, ST).


Fig.2 Correlations between the correct answer rates of honorific language (whole) and onomatopoeias (whole, usage).

Table 5 Correct answer rates of honorific language and onomatopoeias in Survey B.

Items	Honorific language	Onomatopoeia		
		Degree adverb	Mimetic word*	Adverb at**
Average	67	75	25	50
Maximum	100	100	75	100
Minimum	33	0	0	0

* Mimetic word of the laughter.
** Adverb at the time of the oral statement.

Correct answer rates for honorific language and onomatopoeias in Survey B are shown in Table 5. As shown in this table, the differences between the maximum and minimum values observed in onomatopoeias are extremely large as compared with those observed in Survey A (Table 3). The average correct answer rates for onomatopoeia (mimetic word for laughter) were considerably lower than those of onomatopoeia (degree adverb) and onomatopoeia (adverb at the time of the oral statement).

Discussion and Conclusion

Even for Japanese people who are born and raised in Japan, the correct use of honorifics seems to be difficult. In recent years, a few studies on honorifics in relation to politeness have been reported (Murata, 2005; Xu, 2014), and a guidebook of honorifics (respectful language) for foreigners was published in 2016 (O'neill, 2016). However, the importance of Japanese onomatopoeias in the communication of Japanese people was pointed out by various sources. Studies were conducted on the role of onomatopoeias as an important tool for infant language (Miyoshi, 2006) and the changes of the onomatopoeias of laughing and smiling (Nakazato, 2007). An important discussion on sound symbolism and the structure underlying the Japanese onomatopoeia has been published (Hamano, 2014).

In general, the honorifics have been classified into three large groups: respectful language, humble language, and polite language. In 2007, "Guidelines of the honorific" was issued by the Cultural Council (Agency for Cultural Affairs), and humble language and polite language were further divided into two sub-classes; therefore, honorifics are now officially classified into five groups in Japan. However, for the sake of convenience, the conventional three-tier classification is still frequently used. Therefore, this conventional three-tier classification was also employed in this study.

As shown in the results section, regarding the honorifics described in Survey A, there are large differences in the correct answer rates for honorific language between those who know honorifics quite well and those who do not (Table 1). However, regarding the correct answer rate for onomatopoeias (Table 3), smaller differences between the maximum and minimum were observed compared to the case of honorifics. Also, averaged values, especially those observed in case of "usage," were considerably higher than those observed in the case of honorifics; therefore, it could be suggested that although the meanings of onomatopoeias might be not fully understood, the subjects could manage to customarily use these onomatopoeias well.

However, based on the results of Survey B, most of the research subjects seemed to be specifically unaccustomed to onomatopoeia (mimetic word for laughter), and therefore the correct answer rate of onomatopoeia (mimetic word for laughter) showed extremely low values. However, in daily Japanese communication that is based on conversation, the recognition and evaluation of the state of laughter is important to strengthen mutual understanding and relationships.

According to these survey results, many students consider honorifics to be the most important aspect of the Japanese language to be learned and, simultaneously, most of

them managed to use honorifics correctly. These students also demonstrated a sound knowledge of onomatopoeias. In communication, students who excelled in negative politeness strategies (like honorifics), used by the speaker to maintain distance from the interlocutor, were also shown to be proficient in positive politeness strategies, such as onomatopoeias, indicating intimacy between the speaker and the listener. This suggests that they are capable of using the interpersonal function of the Japanese language effectively.

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