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Contents

<i>Alternative Futures for Governance in Burma: 2040</i> Wylma Samaranayake-Robinson	p. 1
<i>Finding the Path for the Deltaic Eco-city: Orchard Settlement in Bangkok and its Vicinity</i> Terdsak Tachakitkachorn	p. 13
<i>Understanding Institutional Change and Persistence to Anticipate Future Livelihoods</i> Tanya Jakimow	p. 24
<i>Survival of the Fittest: An Eclectic Approach to Exploring the Motif of Globality in Pankaj Mishra's Selected Works</i> Mohsen Masoomi	p. 35
<i>Fabricating the Past through Folklore in Ming Cher's Spider Boys</i> Angela Frattarola	p. 47
<i>Where Everyone was Other: Jews in the Yokohama Treaty Port, 1859-1899</i> Chester Proshan	p. 60
<i>The Whereabouts of Conducting Research in Malaysian Setting in Exploring Malay Mothers' Experiences of Having a Child With Cancer: Learning the Cultural Variation from the Past for the Practicality of the Future</i> Nurhafizah Mohd Sukor	p. 76
<i>Communal Political Paradigm after the 2008 Election in Malaysia</i> Noriyuki Segawa	p. 83
<i>Thailand's Responses to CEDAW: 26 years of Women's Human Rights</i> Kanyanattha Ittinitiwut	p. 95
<i>Between Original and Host Societies: the Reconstructed Past of Picture Brides</i> Enyu Lin	p. 108
<i>Future Korean Urban Transformation as the Result of Integration of Urban Administrative District</i> Hyeongkyu Cho	p. 116

- Demographic Studies in Hong Kong: How Cross-border irth Influences Hong Kong's Fertility and Demographic Structure*
Nancy Ling Sze Leung p. 132
- Perceptions and Measurement of Family Welfare In Indonesia: A Qualitative Systematic Review*
Rina Heratri p. 145
- A Study of the Parallel Passages of Hanshi Waizhuan Found in Alfred Forke's Translation of Lunheng*
Pak-ka Chan p. 162
- Iran Studies: Lack of Comprehensive Approach*
Mahdi Faraz
Raziyeh Keivan Ara p. 176
- Effects of Cognitive Styles on a Virtual Learning Companion System as an Adjunct to Classroom Instructions*
Sheng-Wen Hsieh
Min-Ping Wu p. 182
- The Development of Fisher-folk's Livelihood Strategies: A Case Study of the Makassarese of Sulawesi in Indonesia*
Go Iwata p. 192
- "Imagined Innocence Lost: The Performance of Post-Indigeneity in Hosoe Eikoh and Hijikata Tatsumi's Kamaitachi"*
Michael Sakamoto p. 205
- Where is My Bamboo Shoot? A Silent Question from Native People in Northern Lao PDR*
Werapong Mesathan p. 217
- Welfare Effects of Access to Water Services in Cambodia*
Theara Horn p. 221
- Regional Security Complex in the Persian Gulf in the post-Saddam Era: Case of anti-Americanism*
Fatemeh Shayan p. 234

Alternative Futures for Governance in Burma: 2040

Wylma C. Samaranayake-Robinson, Ph.D.

University of Hawaii-Manoa

The logo for the International Association for Asian Studies (iafor) is centered on the page. It features the word "iafor" in a light blue, lowercase, sans-serif font. The text is enclosed within a circular graphic composed of several overlapping, semi-transparent arcs in shades of light blue and light orange, creating a sense of motion or a globe.

Alternative Futures for Governance in Burma: 2040

Wylma C. Samaranayake-Robinson, Ph.D.
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This paper explores my vision of some alternative futures for governance in Burma, specifically what Burma could become by 2040. The scenarios envisioned could serve as a passage for continued dialogue about Burma which could then encourage creative thinking about future governance in Burma, creative insofar as being able to lay aside the insistence of some that a Burma that does not turn into democracy is a Burma that is doomed.

J. N. Pieterse (2001) provides a smorgasbord when it comes to the term democracy, to include participatory democracy, direct democracy, social democracy, associational democracy, substantive democracy, and deliberative democracy (pp. 410-413). Aung San Su Kyi (1995) projects her own ideal when she writes that “the people of Burma view democracy not merely as a form of government, but as an integrated social and ideological system based on respect for the individual,” adding that they just want to be able to go about their own business “freely and peacefully, not doing anybody any harm, just earning a decent living without anxiety and fear” and they just want “basic human rights which would guarantee a tranquil, dignified existence free from want and fear” (p. 173). M. A. Aung Thwin (2002) contends that ideologies related to democracy and human rights are laden with a consolidated western vision that do not always take into account that the most destructive aspect of such democratization is that it invariably means decentralization which, in a non-western context, could encourage social and political anarchy. He reminds that, in Burma, anarchy is feared far more than tyranny, noting that any genuine desire to promote freedom from fear must address issues relevant to Burmese society before assuming the applicability of western value-laden concepts (p. 1). Thant Myint-U (2006), referring to the fear of many in Burma of anarchy that could follow a political revolt by disaffected students, says that anarchy would be the worst possible scenario for Burma’s future.

But, first, what is futures studies? Briefly, futures studies refers to the study of the future with the use of the plural “futures” stressing the element of choice concerning what the future will be like. The term “alternative futures” denotes that the future is not fixed and various possibilities should be explored and one should seek to realize those that seem the most desirable. This characterization by H. Didsbury (1979) about futures studies lends credence to Futurist J. A. Dator’s (2002) emphasis that one’s values are central to and do become a clear consideration at every stage of any futures studies research.

What follows is not an attempt to look into crystal balls, to predict, or to forecast what alternative futures for governance in Burma by 2040 could occur. I primarily explore Dator’s “Four Futures” (1993, 2002) to envision whether Burma, by 2040, will be a nation that (a) is in a state of governance that has shown progress, measured perhaps by market principles, and shown continued, usually “economic,” growth; (b) has folded or collapsed for one or more of a variety of reasons; (c) is disciplined (maintained), in which a future society is seen as organized around some set of overarching values, be it ancient or traditional, or (d) has transformed itself, usually “high-tech” or “high spirit” (become completely different from what is expected or assumed). Dator says all images in all cultures can be lumped into one of these four major generic images of the futures. He discourages favoring one image over any of the others and assuming that one

or more is good, or most likely, or best, or worst case scenario. He adds that the four futures are “generic” and may not work fully for all situations or countries and may require some tweaking or even fusing. I recognize that Burma’s futures cannot be known with absolute certainty and that my engagement of futuristic analytical tools is merely an academic exercise. By 2040, futures completely different from what I present could unfold, depending on what decisions Burma’s stakeholders and outside actors make in the coming decades.

Continuation Scenario: Economic growth has been achieved and sustained.

The year is 2040 and Burma is in a state of governance that has shown continued economic growth. A new generation of military elite afforded more education has emerged to govern Burma. For these up-and-coming leaders, it was a no-brainer to position Burma to follow in the wake of other Asian “tigers” that have progressed, such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Burma’s military government, in the wake of its reelection in 2010, had begun laying the groundwork for this to happen by adopting policies that enabled the nation to “take off” economically. These leaders succeeded in doing this without having to relinquish political control of their nation because of their willingness to permit some Burmese civilians (many of whom had strong business and economic credentials since the early 2000s) to become extremely wealthy and to consider themselves part of the “ruling class.” Their decision to pursue this path to economic development also resulted in the rise of a very comfortable and contented Burmese middle class. At this point, the government does not view as irresolvable the slow emergence of a rich/poor gap in Burmese society. What it considers important is its continuing ties to regional neighbors China and India and its overall better business and investment climates.

Today Burma has transitioned from being a leading rice-producing nation to being demonized for being a large producer of illicit opium. But this scenario for Burma bears in mind that an alternative future does not have to be an extension of the present, but can grow from present possibilities, while illustrating a future that is substantially different from the present. Other economically thriving Asian nations, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, were once impoverished and abysmally conflict-ridden countries. A. Booth and P. Moseley (2003) write that, all over Asia, “military-led governments, displaying scant regard for democratic niceties, have achieved rapid rates of economic growth and structural transformation” (p. 14). So why should not Burma? Why should not Burma too be able to experience an extreme economic makeover in its own time and at its own pace?

The premises for this scenario to unfold are as follow: First, military governance in Burma has remained in place through 2040. Second, Burma’s military government, since early 2000s, began setting the stage for economic growth by consulting with other Asian nations, accepting assistance from regional counterparts, and welcoming multinational corporations in to help achieve a sustainable economic standing. Third, a new breed of military leaders, adamantly committed to Burma attaining higher levels of economic prosperity, has emerged to hold the reins of political and economic power.

In this scenario, by 2040, the military governance has learned lessons from the experiences of the Asian tigers, opened up the market, and held onto its monopoly over power. This monopoly is cushioned by up-and-coming tiers of wealthy and middle-class Burmese citizens and by Burma’s longstanding “patrimonial system of patronage and support involving the military elite” (D. Steinberg, 2006, p. 139). As Steinberg puts it, Burma’s expatriates’ calls for massive demobilization of military are for naught; an unemployed ex-military could be a political danger;

the military's influence is profound; and the military is the nation's economic base. In fact, Steinberg points out that a military career is the number one choice for most families with children (Kyaw Ying Hlaing, et al., 2005, p. 108).

What stance should external and internal actors uphold for this scenario to develop? Externally, the western international community at-large continues to refuse to engage with Burma because Burma fails to meet so-called "democratic" standards. However, what is in Burma's favor is that the world's two most populous Asian giants, China and India, have taken up economic residence in Burma. Once adversarial about a Burma with whom they both share long contiguous boundaries, China and India, by 2040, would be collaborating to carve up Burma as a primary client state. Additionally, ASEAN member nations continue to uphold the principle of non-interference in other sovereign nations. This, coupled with the economic progress Burma has made, make these neighbors more willing to increase levels of trade with Burma and have them continuing to explore and expand business ventures related to the export of Burma's jade and gems and the development of offshore oil and gas.

Internally, while the military government still retains power in Burma, most of its old-school leaders, once trapped in paranoia that outsiders were all out to divide and destroy their nation, will no longer be around. Instead, this concern has been replaced by a military cadre with a different mindset and whose leadership has undergone a metamorphosis that includes admitting that no country can progress by shutting itself in. While these officers remain true to the legacy passed on to them as it relates to upholding Burma's sovereignty at any and at all costs, they are now open to accepting that the time has come for Burma to undergo an economic evolution if they are to catch up with their regional counterparts. Many officeholders have traveled overseas and recognize that their military ambitions and governance staying power depend heavily on their nation's economic growth. They foresee that a growing economy will primarily line their pockets, but will still have enough leftover to trickle down to benefit a core Burmese middle class, whose support will be direly needed to sustain continued military governance and to help keep the army politically powerful beyond 2040. This new Roadmap for The Economy that the military governance has designed has taken into consideration Burma's cultural practices so as to "retain its attractive natural landscape free of the environmental pollution which has marred other Southeast Asian economic and industrial development programs (H. James, 2005, p. 115).

Equally important, the 2040 cadre of military leaders is fully embracing the nexus between education, health, and economic development in their quest to completely eradicate illiteracy. Such strategies run the gamut from increasing the number of monastic primary schools to sending more Burmese students overseas for higher education. James, writing about the traditional importance accorded to education in Burmese culture and the high regard that teachers have always had in Burmese society, states that "policy-makers are exerting every effort to enhance quality education in Myanmar as a key plank in the country's program to re-skill its population, rebuild its economy, and take an active role in international affairs again" (p. 103).

Collapse Scenario: Economic and social disorder ensues.

The year is 2040 and Burma is in a state of governance that has folded or collapsed as a result of the current world disorder. Following an "earth shattering" global economic and environmental collapse over the past decade, Burma too rapidly sinks into economic and social disorder. The military government has been overthrown and unpaid and hungry soldiers, barely able to survive, have deserted their posts and returned to their villages. Without adequate

energy to fuel its modern infrastructure, Burma returns to pre-industrial ways of living and working. The Burmese find it impossible to eke out a living, given the shortage of bare necessities, such as rice, fish, cooking oil, and onions. In the absence of a strong central authority, governance has now devolved to pockets of local and corrupt strongmen, who have surfaced to form a Burmese mafia and who already have begun to hoard scarce resources.

In the early 1970s, D. H. Meadows, et al. (1972) wrote about the limits to growth and raised questions related to the world's population and the impact that economic growth would have on the environment. They concluded that the physical limits to human use of materials and energy were still decades ahead. By the early 1990s, they realized that they had underestimated the extent of these disasters to be and that resources and pollution flows had gone well beyond their limits and human behavior vis-à-vis the earth's natural resources was becoming unsustainable (D. H. Meadows, et al., 1991). More recently, there has been a proliferation of works on the reality of a global economic collapse, to include energy insufficiencies, global warming, sea level rise, and a multitude of other environmental challenges. These warnings have not been heeded by human society and the environment can no longer sustain life in the manner that the world has previously known. Unrestrained population growth has placed unrealistic demands on an earth that scientists have warned is finite.

The premises for this scenario to unfold are as follow: The military government's decades-old xenophobia has backfired on itself and Burma has failed to take notice of the growing evidence for and the widespread worldwide hysteria about collapsing global economic and environmental infrastructures. Burma's military government had grown accustomed to heavily depending on China and India to bail it out of any economic crisis. But Burma has fallen off the radar of both Asian superpowers as they each struggle to fend off the effects that the world's economic disorder is having upon their nations and their mammoth populations.

What stance should external and internal actors uphold for this scenario to develop? Externally, China and India are struggling with little success to maintain their imminent statuses in what is now a collapsing economic and environmental global and regional front. China, an emerging world superpower in the early 2000s, previously had openly defied the international community's criticism of it being a close ally of Burma. In the current environment, with its own political and economic survival in question and faced with its population explosion, it no longer can afford to foster this "Big Brother" role on behalf of Burma. Likewise, the global economic and environmental disorder has had a domino effect on India's gigantic population and Indian leaders are consumed with fighting famine, disease, and massive protests and violence inside their borders. Burma's other regional cohorts are operating in a "dog-eat-dog" world as markets deteriorate and energy resources recede and shun engagement with Burma. So Burma finds itself in the unfavorable situation of having to go it alone and is unable to do so.

Internally, the situation is equally unfavorable. The spillover of the global economic and environmental crisis has made it impossible for the governors of Burma to tackle emerging economic and political problems, together with the rise of ethnic tensions and the proliferation of heroin addicts, to ensure even a scrap of stability in the country. Escalating economic discomforts affect everyone, as well as the once elite military, resulting in the erosion of public support for any form of governance and even in completely eradicating such support. The military government had begun to assume a less prominent, if any, role because of its inability to adequately deliver any goods and services to the populace. Betrayals in the barracks and mistrust and distrust in the ranks have become commonplace. Recurring coups have permitted

only short-lived dictators to emerge. A steady proliferation of military elite, including a new generation of military upstarts into Burmese society, did lead to the temporary formation of a small, wealthy, and powerful coterie becoming the short-time stakeholders of Burma's assets and Burma's nationalism. But a breakdown almost immediately occurred in which all hitherto known critical and previously military-controlled systems fell apart. Society is in great disarray and has become trapped in the spirals of political, economical, and environmental collapse.

In short, governance is non-existent as civil and political rights deteriorate and diverse forms of repressive governance suffocate the people en masse. Many in the populace, especially young thugs, succumb to drugs as their escapism or resort to violence to ensure their survival. These thugs form themselves into scattered pockets of local strongmen who emerge to slowly take advantage of the lawlessness and to hoard what few scarce resources remain. They assume the role of a corrupt mafia that attempts to self-organize the nation from the bottom up and to "govern" in their own limited interests. But this is an unsuccessful venture and governance in Burma, in 2040, collapses.

Disciplined Scenario: Burmese turn to the sangha.

The year is 2040 and Burma is in a state of governance that is disciplined (maintained) around overarching ancient and traditional values espoused by the Buddhist clergy (sangha). In the wake of a literally "earth shattering" global economic and environmental collapse, scattered pockets of local strongmen emerged to form a corrupt mafia and to make unsuccessful attempts, in their own limited self-interests, to govern Burma from the bottom up. But, rather than allow this to happen, the Burmese people, a vast majority of whom are Buddhist, chose instead to return to their historical roots and to turn to ancient and traditional values that have long been upheld by their Buddhist faith and their Buddhist clergy. The sangha is now the effectual ruler of Burma and bases its power on religious and cultural authority. In contrast to the disorder found in other parts of the world, most Burmese are living steady and meaningful spiritual lives in conformity with traditional religious teachings.

The advent of Theravada Buddhism in Burma dates back at least to the Pyu era (first millennium AD) and is described by M. E. Spiro (1978) as the "kammatic Buddhism," or the merit-path-to-salvation. Theravada Buddhism has remained the ideological, social, and religious glue that unites Burma. Aung-Thwin (1979) adds that those in society who are not monks can acquire merit by donating to the religious order and by performing other good deeds, such as building pagodas (temples). What is clear is the integral role that Buddhism and the *sangha* have held for centuries in Burmese society. The *sangha* has not been above playing a role in Burmese politics, when called on to do so by the masses or when drawn to do so by the monks' own consciences. U Maung Maung (1989) records, as early as 1921, Burmese nationalists' pleas to the *sangha* to "not ignore the sufferings of the people while they concentrated single-mindedly on their own spiritual benefit" (p. 15), a plea that led to the *sangha* taking on an active role in Burma's eventual successful ousting of British colonialism. The *sangha* later engaged prominently in the 1988 student movements' failed attempt to bring down military dictatorship and, in September 2007, thousands of monks marched all over Burma to speak out against the economic hardships of the populace. The *sangha* now show the Burmese how to tread the merit-path-to-salvation.

The premises for this scenario to unfold are as follow: The demise of the military government occurred because it could no longer politically or economically sustain the population. Pockets of local strongmen emerged to form a corrupt mafia and they are on the verge of self-organizing

so they can control the Burmese people en masse and govern from the bottom up. But the general populace, recognizing that their nation is on the brink of collapse, is unwilling to accept the disorder they know will ensue. So they turn to the centuries-old cultural continuity they believe can save them even if not economically and politically, at least spiritually, namely, the *sangha*.

What stance should external and internal actors uphold for this scenario to develop? Externally, collapsing global economies and the worldwide deterioration of the environment compound the ability of the military government in Burma to achieve and sustain even a modicum of economic growth. “Chindia” (China and India) and other ASEAN supporters have deserted Burma as irrelevant to their own struggle for survival in a global disorder. Internally, from the village level up, the Burmese band together to perform religious rites and to resume ancient social activities in an autonomous manner. Also, the *sangha* has a structure in place that permeates every village and town. Monastic discipline and religious practices are reintroduced into everyday life and moral and literary education is provided by learned monks to Burma’s youth. Primary-age children learn reading, writing, and religion in monastic schools, as was the practice during the pre-colonialist era, while Burmese teenagers once again eagerly line up to be novices in the monasteries so that someday they could opt to become monks and nuns, if they so chose to do so. Soon, Burmese society gradually resettles into a pre-industrial way of living as they relearn the philosophy of impermanence. They focus unified energies on living simple agrarian lives by sustaining their communal farms and tending to their family gardens. Thereby, the *sangha* once again embodies an ideology that claims universal authority and permits no rival claim of loyalty or conscience. Given this, the trend that follows is an increase in the number of pagodas built with the lives of most revolving around the tenets of Buddhism. Soon a hefty influx of novices recruited into the monasteries results in monks and nuns outnumbering civilians. Perhaps, in this scenario, a career in the monastery now is viewed not just as the number one choice for most families with children, but the only choice they have.

What matters most for the Burmese now is that they have recovered their Burmese-ness and their Buddhism. About the former, Shwe Lu Maung (1989) writes that concepts related to democracy and citizenry have been unable to take roots in Burma because such notions are non-existent among the public at large, but “Burmese-ness” is a psychological concept that all Burmese can relate to (p. 102).

Transformation Scenario: Burma turns into a “Ubiquitous Society.”

The year is 2040 and Burma is in a state of governance that has transformed itself into a technologically-controlled society or, in futures parlance, a “Ubiquitous Society.” Over the past three decades, the military government focused not only on achieving and sustaining economic growth, but sent Burma’s bright scholars abroad for advanced degrees in electronics, biotechnology, and nanotechnology. These young Burmese not only returned avid consumers of high tech products, but led the charge that turned Burma overnight into a leading regional example of a “Ubiquitous Society.” Initially, the military government strongly championed this, believing that the omnipresent embedded electronic chips of a “Ubiquitous Society” would enable them to have even tighter control of their citizens, but young scholars instead used the technology to transform Burma into a non-spatial polity, affiliated electronically with Singapore, South Korea, Japan, and Malaysia, yet without losing touch with their Burmese roots.

Futurists have dubbed the times we live in “the Era of Multiple Transformation” (E. Conish, 2004, p. 9). Technological changes engulf our lives and the interconnectivities between technology and economic and social changes stare us in the face. To gauge to what extent this cybernetic revolution has spilled over into Burma, one only has to consider that the sprouting cyber cafes of today are a far cry from the palm-leaf scribes of yesteryears. But there also are other aspects of the cybernetic revolution that could take on the trappings of high-tech to include the development of artificial intelligence as political and social actors in the future. Ridiculous as it may sound, why should we refrain from imagining robots running around Rangoon within this century?

B. E. Tonn and D. Feldman’s (1995) exploration of non-spatial government is a fine example of how transformational governance could come about. Given advances in telecommunications and information technology, they opine, governments could be populated by people who share a strong affinity with one another, but who do not occupy common spatial boundaries. They describe a world where people can be connected and exhibit organized behavior in cyberspace; where governance can become more specialized; and where this transformation can occur overtime with the help of technology, with the non-spatial governance providing environmental protection, educational opportunities (distance learning), and a range of other human services.

In this scenario, Burma’s transformation occurs in the form of its conversion to what the Futures Literature describes as a U-Society. A U-Society can be depicted as a computers-everywhere-society where information technology is embedded into every aspect of one’s day-to-day living that, in turn, communicate and link one society’s system to other such systems to enable individuals to realize a more transformational lifestyle. Once a U-Society has been established, individuals in that society can be connected worldwide anytime, anywhere, and with anybody and non-spatial living—and non-spatial governance—can become their reality. Dutch Futurist M. Bullinga (2004) describes an “ambient intelligence” that will adapt to our ways, respond to our whims, and even pave the way for automatic law enforcement. Our “intelligent cars” would stop us from speeding, chips in our money would guarantee authenticity, and computerized eyeglasses would be specific to our professions (pp. 32-36). R. Kurzweil (1999) describes merging of man and machine when he wrote that, by 2009, computers would be embedded in our clothes; by 2019, they’d be hidden in our bodies; and, by 2099, human and machine intelligence would be one (pp. 16-21). I. D. Pearson (2000) provided a possible technology timeline: Designer babies by 2010, electronic pets outnumbering organic pets by 2020, emotion chips used to control criminals by 2030, and nuclear fusion used as power source by 2040 (pp. 14-19).

Former Minister of Information and Communications of the Republic of Korea Daeje Chin (World ICT Summit 2005) explained how Korea got to be where it is: “Korea went through a lot of hardships during the Japanese occupation, as well as during the Korean War. But those years of hardship gave us a hungry spirit. We didn’t want to be too far behind. We were far behind in the industrialization era, and catching up was actually very difficult for us” (pp. 1-6). He emphasizes that it was his government’s willingness to invest in setting up a high-speed Internet that lifted off Korea to move forward, to look at the technological changes around the world, to recognize the need to collaborate and cooperate with other technological giants in the region, such as China and Japan, and to set up a technological roadmap for Korea’s vision of its future.

The premises for this scenario to unfold are as follow: Burma’s military government recognizes that it does not want to be left behind. It is aware that one ASEAN neighbor after another has embraced electronic innovations; has capitulated to biotechnology to improve their nation’s

agriculture, health care, manufacturing, and energy resources; and has accepted that nanotechnology is the way to go to enhance national security and fight the war on terrorism, given the capability of its supersensitive sensors to detect chemical and biological agents. Moreover, Japan is reaching out to bring Burma into its U-Community and is only too willing to invest heavily in helping Rangoon leapfrog to state-of-the-art technology. So the military government, already collaborating with “Chindia” (China and India) and with other regional multinational corporations to help it achieve and sustain economic growth, is more open to sending Burmese scholars abroad for advanced degrees in electronic, biotechnology, and nanotechnology.


What stance should external and internal actors uphold for this scenario to develop? Externally, for most of the western world, technological transformations that already have occurred are now viewed as par for the course. There is an expectancy that the pace of changes to come will accelerate. And, for the moment, all eyes are focused on space, the next frontier, with Russians and Chinese considering frequent flyers to Mars. For futurists worldwide, there is an expectancy that “singularity” will strike, singularity being a term used to describe a point in time when current trends go wildly off the charts, so that the future beyond the singularity cannot be envisioned. Although there does not appear to yet be a concise definition of this term, Kurzweil (2005) and others define it as “a future time when societal, scientific, and economic change is so fast we cannot even imagine what will happen from our present perspective,” with the distinctive feature that machine intelligence will have far exceeded and even merged with human intelligence and new definitions of life, nature, and human will take hold—all this in contrast to the commonsense, intuitive, linear view (J. J. Bell, 2003, pp. 18-24). Burmese scholars traveling abroad, in addition to being exposed to the fields of electronics, biotechnology, and nanotechnology, are now exposed to Futures Studies and Futures glossary, including recognizing that “singularity” could become Burma’s reality as much as anyone else’s. Hence, there is no turning back for Burma to go along with technological-control becoming the Burmese Way of Life. Why not? After all, the Burmese are the 21st Century descendants of the 11th Century residents of a sophisticated and bustling metropolis (Pagan).

Internally, a new generation of military officers become more receptive to electronic ways of governance that young Burmese, who have been free to travel abroad, have returned to proselytize. They are more amenable to having a share of, and being a partner in, a world where global corporations dominate, global capitalism is the unchallenged system, and global citizenship in a non-spatial society is up for consideration. Kurzweil (1999) cautions us not to underestimate the changes that will occur in the long term, adding that with the accelerated change of pace that happens nowadays, even a decade can constitute a long-term view and the twenty-first century will equal twenty thousand years of progress at today’s rate of progress; about one thousand times greater than the twentieth century.

Burma has had over three decades to go from governance that restricts the movement of its citizens in physical spaces to one that permits a free for all in virtual spaces. The Burmese are no strangers to the Internet. For years, they have been organizing and picketing on-line, thereby forcing past authoritarian military leaders to resort to draconian methods to control the Web. But in this alternative futures, not only have on-line restrictions lightened up and/or disappeared, but with aid from what is now the Asian Union led by Japan pouring into Burma, Internet access has become affordable and widespread. By 2040, an “anywhere anytime” society governs Burma.

Figure 11

Four Alternative Futures for Burma for 2040



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**Finding the Path for the Deltaic Eco-city:
Orchard settlement in Bangkok and its vicinity**

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Abstract

Bangkok and its vicinity had been developed in the lower basin of Chaophraya Delta, as an orchard settlement, along with the evolution of waterway network since the late sixteenth. The characteristics of settlement and waterways had been developed with the vernacular wisdom based on consideration of the deltaic topographical conditions. After the beginning of unplanned development for decades ago, many water-based districts in the deltaic city of Bangkok has radically changed into a vast non water-based built-up area, especially by a land-filling process for housing and other facilities. This caused a vicious cycle to the living environment of the Delta.

This study has an aim on; (1) summarizing the morphology of orchard settlement, which occupied most of the area of Bangkok and its vicinity, (2) summarizing the impacts from change of the orchard settlement in Bangkok and its vicinity, (3) proposing the solution for proper deltaic living environment.

1. Orchard settlement in Bangkok and its vicinity

1.1 Historical background of orchard

Without the apparent historical document mentioned about the origin of orchard system in the Chaophraya Delta, there is the assumption that an orchard system in the Delta was the integration of two cultivation method. One is an original on-land cultivation method, which could be seen in any part of a high-land area of Thailand. And the other one is a vegetable cultivation process using raised-bed system from Chinaⁱ. However, the features of orchard unit in both places are basically different. The first one is a fruit planting on flat plain in the entire planting area with no orchard unit. And the second one is only vegetable cultivation on a raised-bed farmland. Moreover, the root of raised-bed system could be traced back to thousand years ago in many regionsⁱⁱ. On the other hand, background of the land development for an orchard by raised-bed system, could have deep relation with the background of fruit planting in this region. From the background of fruit planting in the South East Asia sub-continent and Thailand, we could separate the period of fruit planting in the Delta into 3 stages as:

- (1) Native Fruit planting, including Arecaⁱⁱⁱ, Coconut, and Banana^{iv}.
- (2) Fruit planting rooted back to the Southern of Thailand or India, including Durian, Mangoesteen, Mango.
- (3) Fruit planting rooted back to the Northern of Thailand or Chinese, including Orange, Pamelo, Lichi, and Chilly^v

Most of fruits imported from other regions are generally weak to over water supply. Thus, it would be necessary to consolidate polder or raised-bed for these fruits. From the high rate tax and counting by unit not by cultivate area as rice filed^{vi}, since the Ayudhya period, it proved the significant of fruit planting in term of economic agriculture product.




Fig.1- Map shows Bangkok and its vicinity in the Chaophraya Delta

1.2 Morphology of Orchard settlement

Base on the morphological analyzing of waterway features along with the historical background of short-cut waterway for straightening the Chaophraya River, it is clear that orchard settlement was emerged in Bangkok and its vicinity before 1534^{vii}. And the beginning of an orchard settlement could be identified at the brackish water zone, where the center of Bangkok was first established.




Fig.2- North-South Axis Section of the Chaophraya Delta

The Chaophraya Delta, was transformed, at least two times after the last ice age from a part under sea level area of the Gulf of Thailand to the lowland swamp area or the Young delta. Thus, the Delta could be separated in to two main parts of Old Delta and Young Delta. As seen in *Fig.2*, While the Old Delta was a flood plain area with 5-30 meters height over sea level, which mostly developed into paddy fields, the Young Delta was a perennial undeveloped wetland area with 1-3 meters height over sea level^{viii}. Thus, as seen in the whole Delta, the water system in the lower basin of Young Delta has a specific characteristic (*Fig.3*). It has got an influence from (1) the flow of fresh-water from upper watershed area of the Old Delta, and (2) the tide of sea-water from lower coastline area. And between these two systems of water flow, the brackish water zone has emerged at the middle of Young Delta. Coincidentally, the center of orchard settlement in Bangkok and its vicinity also started in this zone.



Paddy field

Orchard

Mangrove

Fig.3- Picture of topographical landscape in the Chaophraya Delta from wetland of mangrove in the coastal area, greenish orchard in the middle of Young Delta area, to paddy field at the territorial area between Old and Young Delta

This formation of orchard settlement could be defined by the distribution of orchard units and waterway network. As seen in *Fig.4*, as the first artificial element for the land reclamation in the Young Delta, “*Khlong*” (Waterway) and “*Kanud*” (orchard unit) were introduced by former settlers who probably moved from the upper Old Delta. “*Khlong*” was developed, as a network, gradually and in an orderly manner according to its size and function. The Primary-*Khlong* was developed from a dead-end natural waterway by excavation to a deeper and longer channel. Then muddy soil from that waterway excavation would be piled up for a higher natural levee or dike, where settlement would be formed. The Sub-*Khlong* was developed to drain water from a back marsh area behind a natural levee or dike. This process was not only used to create land for a new settlement and transportation network, but also provided an area for agricultural production.



Fig.4- Images and models of orchard unit in correlation with the waterway network

“*Kanud*” is the combination of ridges and trenches of raised-bed polder for fruit planting, which is connected to irrigation channel of a Sub-*Khlong*. While ridges have a role in draining oversupply-water, trenches have a role in containing fresh water. With this “*Kanud*”, a plot of land that was replaced on the former unusable wetland area, farmers could operate their fruit plantings. In addition, leaves fallen from fruit plants would be gathered and used as fertilizer in the ditches. This fertilizer would be used for growing plants and dike maintenance. “*Kanud*” is also considered the sanctuary for small fishes or creatures before they leave to an outside waterway. It performs the role of a small ecological system.

2. Impact from changes of orchard settlement to urbanized area

2.1 Impacts from land-filling

There are a lot of papers mentioning about changes and impacts to the orchard settlement in Bangkok and its vicinity. Among these issues, we could take focus on the closest factors to our daily life that caused much to the living environment of the Delta in macro and micro scale. These included Land-filling process for urban development and inappropriate Civil and Building construction, especially construction with covering built-up area by impermeable surface of concrete or asphalt. These processes could be seen in the construction projects at any scale. We could describe impacts from land-filling and covering-by-impermeable-surface process, which usually seen in an urbanized area of the city or local town, as follows;

(a) Impact in Dwelling-unit scale

The collapsing of balance between land and water for living environment of orchard settlement, by depletion of water surface area and replacement by concrete or asphalt surface, has deteriorated a self-restorative ability of living environment that caused a lot of problems to the urbanized area such as; heat island effect, un-recovery urban pollution. This was not taken place only in an urbanized area of the Bangkok, but also in the vicinity areas that were intruded by factory and housing development, which are the by-products of sprawls from a malfunctioned City planning.



Fig.5- Picture shows an intrusion by factories into orchard settlement in Bangkok and its vicinity



Fig.6- Picture shows an intrusion by road construction into orchard settlement in Bangkok and its vicinity

(b) Impact in Neighborhood scale

Land-filling and replacement by impermeable surface in the dwelling-unit scale would be accumulated and finally turned into a big plate of Built-up area. Long before, there were already the Deltaic towns and cities developed by land-filling, such as the Ayudhya city and the Rattanakosin city (Bangkok old city area). These two cities had almost the same scale of their built-up areas, about 5-6 Km², as seen in *Fig.7*. They were too small to block the water circulation in the Sub-region. But, it would cause an unimagined considerable effect to the whole sub-region, if the built-up area of Bangkok and its vicinity was increased 300 times to 1500 Km². This mega plate of built-up area could decrease the ability for water drainage and circulation in the whole sub-region. Moreover, its mega impermeable area would cause a lot effects to the underground Aquifer layer, and have much influence to radical land subsidence. This also led to unusual flood disaster that caused the vicious cycle not only in the urbanized area, but also caused a big damage to agricultural productivity in the surrounding orchard area, including a rapid replacement of orchard units by housing development.




Fig.7- Aerial photographs of Ayudhya and Bangkok Old City in the same scale



Fig.8- Picture shows excavation site of soil supply for land-filling

(c) Impact in Regional scale

As seen in Fig.8, Soil for land filling in the urbanized area was supplied by the excavation of mountain in the high-land area around the Delta. It means that consumption of soil resource for land-filling in the low-land area caused the diminishing of jungle in the mountainous and high-land area. The rapid depletion of jungle and changes in high-land area would have an effect a lot to the capacity of the supportive source of the water supply, and the contribution of primary resource for eco-cycle along these watercourses in the Delta.

2.2 Vicious cycle to orchard settlement

From above explanation about the impact from changes of orchard settlement by land filling; we could summarize this vicious cycle into two stages as follows;

Stage One: Development from the natural context to the well-adapted Deltaic settlement

A traditional settlement was developed through well considering of balance between water and land for living environment. This proved the symbiosis between the human built-up environment and the Nature.

Stage Two: Development from the well-adapted to the abused Deltaic settlement

Shift from the application of traditional orchard system to the misuse of land-filling and replacement by impermeable surface, caused the deterioration to living environment from dwelling-unit to regional scale. It grew worse when this method was disseminated and conventionalized to the whole region, including an architectural education in the university. We could definite this vicious cycle as the self-destructive development of the whole Delta.



Fig.9 – Model of self-destruction by unbalance mono-development and self-adjustment by circulated balance diverse development in the Delta




Fig.10 – Model shows the Othello-Effect (above), and degree of White-Black Othello piece from well-adapted to abused Deltaic settlement in Neighborhood year by year scale (below)



Fig.11 – Picture shows flood in the Young Delta area, which getting worse

As seen in *Fig.10*, this phenomenon could be described metaphorically as the Othello Game. An empty Othello board could be compared to the Deltaic context, and a white Othello piece (WOP) could be compared to the water element and permeable surface, including the Deltaic vernacular architecture, while a black Othello piece (BOP) could be compared to the built-up area by land-filling and impermeable surface. A good balance of half WOP and BOP on the Othello board means the proper combination between orchard settlement and urbanized area. On the other hand, unbalance by over supply of BOP means the collapsing of orchard settlement by misused land-filling and replacement by impermeable surface of urbanized area.

3. Proposal for Eco-deltaic settlement

This paper has proposed two steps for some hints to renovate the proper Deltaic living environment. The first step is to understand the past, and the second step is to apply that into practical design and planning.

3.1 Learning from the traditional

we could summarize the essence of orchard system into the view point of planning as follows;




Fig.12- Model shows steps of evolution in the Chaophraya Delta

(a) Progressive Linkage System of Khlong

The reclamation of marsh area in the Young Delta was conducted through the linear element of Khlong (Waterway). These Khlong could be considered the linear structure of the orchard settlement that both performed as; (1) the leading line being split from the natural waterways or the primary Khlong into non-reclaimed back marsh area, and (2) the linkage of short-cut and connecting watercourse for completion of the whole waterway network. From this idea, it could be considered that the completion of the linkage of Khlong would play a significant role in creating and maintaining the main structural water circulation of the orchard settlement. And it would be the primary structural line before the reclamation by orchard units.

(b) Progressive Membrane System of Kanud

Different from the rice paddy field, Kanud (orchard unit) was the innovation of artificial living-spatial unit that could enable people to perform the agriculture in the lowland area through the whole year. Due to its spatial structure, which conformed by row of ridges and trenches, a back marsh area with muddy terrain would be changed to a place of well-balance combination of (1) permeable land area, which enabled people to make a settlement and planting; and (2) water area, which provided for reservation of fresh-water use in agriculture. With the character of Kanud, which would be gradually expanded one by one like a cell, the land reclamation process of back marsh area along the linkage Khlong could be done by maintaining the balance of land and water area in the whole neighborhood. Without any excessive development, the membrane of Kanud, in both micro and macro scale, could create the inner water circulation in their own block and also could maintain their connection with the outer water circulation through the linkage of Khlong.

3.2 Application of new method

(a) *Process for Self-adjustment Balance System*

An aim for this process is to change the self-destructive development to self-adjustment development by restoration of the balance of whole-product-circulation in the living environment, from dwelling-unit scale, to neighborhood and regional scale. We could reconsider and re-activate the whole-product-circulation in three steps as follows; (1) self-consuming in its own neighborhood, (2) supplying from near-by neighborhood, and (3) re-balancing by supplementary between neighborhoods. Take the process of soil supply for land-filling for example, (1) land-filling for dwelling-units could be accomplished, considering of land-water balance, using soil in its own construction site or soil in its own orchard settlement, (2) insufficient soil for any development in its own neighborhood could be supplemented using soil from nearby neighborhoods or from remote high-land area, as the last choice, (3) orchard neighborhood would have to supply any supplementary to near-by neighborhood, who supplies soil for land-filling, such as providing remains from fruit producing, to re-balance the whole-product-circulation in the sub-region.

(b) *Process for Balancing of land area and water area*

A goal for the solution to get out of this vicious cycle, as mentioned in the explanation about the Othello-Effect, is to recover the balance of WOP and BOP on Othello board by, (1) Hold on an existing WOP, and (2) Insert another WOP for re-overture other BOP. The first one is a passive way for preservation of well-balanced parts, while the second one is an active way for restoration of well-balanced parts. This process is directly related to Architectural and Urban Design. We could re-overture the BOP to WOP by; (1) restoration of dwelling-unit along remaining waterways by initiating of deltaic architecture and landscape, (2) restoration of old filled-up waterways or creation of new waterways.

(c) *Implementation and consideration*

In case of Bangkok and its vicinity, this issue has to be handled as the National Agenda. The Chaophraya Delta Planning, which based on considering of the deltaic topography and the idea of Self-adjustment balance system, has to be settled and reflected from and into; (1) Sub-delta or Basin scale, (2) Sub-Region scale, (3) Neighborhood scale, and (4) Dwelling-unit scale. And the land-water balancing process could be put into practice through; (1) Restoration of the existing waterways, (2) Reconsidering the role of temples in each neighborhood for eco-center that could support the knowledge about neighborhood and regional ecological system, (3) Initiation of the pioneer project for the well-balance land-water deltaic architecture using temples and public facilities. This proposal is still in the first step. It has to be adjusted and improved in cooperation with other knowledge and study. However, without any urgent practical solution, the whole Othello board of the Delta would be filled up by the BOP through the self-destructive development, sooner or later.

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Livelihood Portfolios in Agrarian Andhra Pradesh: The Contribution of a Qualitative Approach to Sustainable Livelihood Analysis

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Livelihood Portfolios in Agrarian Andhra Pradesh: The Contribution of a Qualitative Approach to Sustainable Livelihood Analysis

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Abstract

Many conventional uses of the Sustainable Livelihood Analysis Framework take a largely materialistic and quantitative approach to livelihoods. As such, they often fail to appreciate more comprehensively the factors that result in shifts and continuities in livelihood portfolios both inter- and intra generations. This paper argues that qualitative research that examines livelihoods in a more open, and in-depth fashion, can reveal aspects of livelihoods that are often overlooked in conventional accounts. This allows exploration of three aspects of livelihoods: the world views that frame livelihoods; the institutions that mediate livelihoods; and the economy of practices that shapes status and identity in relation to others. The inclusion of culture and politics enables a more nuanced understanding of livelihoods, and more accurate predictions of their future form.

Introduction

Many of the problems that scientists seek to address today, will manifest most gravely in the future. Central among these are climate change and climate variability, with the formulation of responses occupying much space in research and policy development. Complex issues require responses that bridge disciplinary divides, and the trend has been towards inter-disciplinary research teams that can arrive at adaptation and mitigation strategies at the micro and macro level. This paper makes a case for the contribution of qualitative research methods for understanding agrarian livelihoods in the context of climate variability. It arises from my involvement as part of a research team comprising of agronomists, meteorologists, economists and anthropologists, in both Australia and India, who are seeking to identify adaptation strategies for farmers in Andhra Pradesh.

The Sustainable Livelihood Analysis (SLA) is the central framework through which the project seeks to develop adaptation strategies that are compatible with the resource endowments and livelihood strategies of different social categories. A central deficiency of the SLA is, however, its limitation in providing more than a snapshot of present-day livelihoods (Scoones 2009). It is therefore inadequate to help scientists anticipate the nature of future livelihoods, or the context in which they will be fashioned. This limitation is a crucial defect when developing adaptation strategies to climate variability in rural India, due to a) the rapid pace of change, and b) the likelihood that the most critical threats to livelihoods from climate variability lie ahead (Smit et al 2000).

This presents problems for both social and biophysical scientists working on the project. When developing adaptation strategies for farmers, it is crucial to understand the future characteristics of farmers, their access to resources and their willingness to invest in agriculture. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is dramatic change in the size of landholdings, the relative importance of agriculture in diverse livelihood

strategies, and the availability of workers in auxiliary professions (especially wage labour). Explanations and predictions related to these changes have tended to rely on efficiency criteria, or assume that transformations will follow the precedent set in other contexts. These overlook important factors such as: a) agriculture is often only one livelihood activity in a diverse portfolio (Bebbington 1999); b) land has intangible value beyond that of its productive capacity; and c) people base their livelihood decisions on factors beyond economics, including their idea of what is desirable and possible to pursue. These are contextually specific, and not easily anticipated through reference to the experiences in other countries.

This paper makes a case for increased qualitative research to contribute to our understanding of changes to livelihood portfolios. I argue that greater attention to the cognitive aspects of livelihoods, as well as the institutional context that facilitates or constrains different livelihood strategies, provide much needed nuance to what is often a largely technical, apolitical and materialist analysis of livelihoods. In the process, I develop an analytical framework to livelihoods that can complement more conventional SLA approaches. In conjunction with other approaches and methodologies, this framework can enhance understandings of livelihoods, and help to anticipate their future characteristics across different contexts. In presenting this framework in conference proceedings, I aim to provide the theoretical and conceptual background that inform my analysis of rural livelihoods to be presented.

Dynamic Approaches to Livelihoods

The project 'Approaches to Climate Change Adaptation' is not unusual in using an SLA framework as a tool for analysis, and to develop appropriate adaptation strategies. Since its inception with the work of Chambers and Conway (1992) at the Institute of Development Studies, the concept of sustainable livelihoods and related SLA frameworks have been incorporated into mainstream development, most notably at DFID. Although there are variations, SLA frameworks are based on an understanding of livelihoods comprised of access to assets (or resources/capitals), which is mediated by institutions, and that are employed in the pursuit of different livelihood strategies. The resulting portfolio of activities determines livelihood outcomes for individuals and households. These must be understood within a particular political, social, ecological and economic context (Carney 1998; Ellis 2000; Scoones 1998).

The framework has most often been employed to develop policy and development interventions that can improve livelihood outcomes, or adaptive capacity of a particular target group. Analysis begins with an account of the current resource endowments of different groups, which is then split into five types of capitals: financial, natural, physical, human and social. These are usually elicited through focus groups in the format of participatory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques. From the ensuing portrait of 'strengths and weaknesses', researchers and practitioners develop ways that the 'community' can utilize the resources at their disposal in different, or more efficient livelihood strategies (for example, using water in different ways for agricultural intensification); or identify deficiencies which can be rectified through interventions that build a particular capital (for example the formation of community based organizations to increase social capital). Where institutions are included in the analysis, it is generally in the identification of bottlenecks to access of resources, or in

purposeful institution strengthening/building to deliver more environmentally sustainable livelihood outcomes.

It is perhaps its success as an interventionist tool rather than a purely analytical one, which has reduced what we can learn from subsequent analysis. Tania Murray Li (2007) demonstrates the tendency for development interventions to 'render technical' complex political-social realities. Building upon the insights of Ferguson (1993), she examines how a World Bank project in Indonesia simplified a diverse set of issues as a technical, apolitical problem, to which they could apply a particular program. In order to make deficiencies and improvements both technical and quantifiable, the programme simplified a complex category of 'social capital' into a range of abstract indicators that could be easily captured and compared. Complex social issues were simplified, represented by indicators, and in this way, knowable. This knowledge made the reality they represented manageable, and amenable to intervention.

The same problems are identifiable in conventional SLA frameworks. Although it is considered a 'bottom-up' approach in which people are encouraged to identify capitals and strategies, people need to fit their complex realities into a set of abstract capitals that can then be quantified, and improved. The ensuing analysis obscures more than it reveals, as people's perspectives related to livelihoods cannot find expression within the SLA framework. It treats livelihoods as separate from their social location, based on rational use of resources without reflection on people's worldviews or identities. Resulting analysis has failed to capture the political aspects and power inherent within institutions, focusing instead on the instrumental purposes of institutional strengthening and building. Finally, the result is a snapshot of present day livelihoods, and SLA has largely failed to capture the dynamism of livelihoods, or deal with long-term change (Scoones 2009).

As Scoones (2009) notes in his reflection on SLA, none of these limitations are intrinsic to the approach. There have been inspiring attempts to bring the politics back in to livelihood analysis through a greater focus on institutions (Mehta et al 1998; Leach et al 1998), and to take more seriously people's perspectives and worldviews. As De Haan and Zoomers (2005) argue, both refinements are necessary to go beyond a static snapshot of livelihoods. To capture the dynamism of livelihoods also requires attention to broader social-economic processes located at the micro, meso and macro level (Bagchi et al 1998; Blakie 2002). Unfortunately attention to these three mechanisms—worldviews / meanings, institutions, and broader social and economic process—that mediate livelihoods and that can provide clues as to changing (or continuing) livelihood portfolios, are missing in most conventional accounts.

Before an examination of these three mechanisms and how a qualitative approach can help to examine them, a short clarification of the terms I use. First, I avoid the term livelihood strategy, as it implies that the livelihood activities that people engage in are deliberate and conscious, and therefore infers agency to the individual (De Haan and Zoomers 2005). This overlooks the large number of people who have no choice but to engage in a certain set of activities, making strategy a bit of a misnomer. I therefore use the term livelihood portfolio to refer to the set of activities that people engage in for their livelihood. On a similar note, I also refrain from using livelihood trajectory, although it has wide acceptability in the literature. Trajectory implies a path, a course or a route, in short movement whether it is 'advancement' or going 'backwards'. This

does not give sufficient attention to the households who are stagnant, with successive generations continuing the same livelihood portfolio. As livelihood continuations indicate social reproduction, it is important to equally consider carefully the factors that make people continue doing sets of livelihood activities, alongside those that help or force them to shift.

A Framework for Anticipating Future Livelihood Portfolios

Whether it be shifts or continuations, there have been several attempts to trace shifts in livelihood portfolios over time. Bagchi et al (1998) conducted a longitudinal study using data from Blakie's initial survey in Nepal in 1974-5, updating it in 1996-7 in Nepal, West Bengal and Bihar to capture the livelihood trajectories of 667 households. They define livelihood trajectories as "the consequences of the changing ways in which individuals construct a livelihood over time" (1998: 457). Where the study succeeds is in linking the data from the household level to the broader context, including trying to see how government policy has influenced livelihoods. They argue that livelihood trajectories can

"illuminate the processes of change by revealing the ways in which negotiation, bargaining and struggle can alter circumstances and the ways in which changing circumstances (opportunities and constraints) bring about new patterns of interaction between individuals within and outside the household as they collaborate and struggle to reconcile individual and collective objectives and aspirations"

This largely post facto analysis specifically addresses the broader socio-economic processes that influence livelihood portfolios, and how individual and groups adapt to these processes.

Attention to these broad socio-economic processes and government policy tends, however, to treat interests as existing a priori, rather than being produced through these changing circumstances and interactions. De Haan and Zoomers' (2005) approach to livelihood trajectories and pathways succeeds better in this respect, through their recognition of the importance of decision making. This draws attention to the cognitive aspects that are largely missing in conventional livelihood approaches, acknowledging that people's livelihoods are not just a product of their access to various resources/capitals. As important are people's beliefs and worldviews as to what constitutes a decent, and appropriate livelihood. These positions and identification of interests do not exist apart from the individual, but emerge from their particular subjectivity (Agrawal 2005).

These subject positions are an assemblage of the experiences, practices and identities of the individual (Agrawal 2005). De Haan and Zoomers (2005) argue for the importance of personal signifiers to understand why people make decisions in relation to their livelihoods, including the subjective identification of opportunities and constraints. Personal signifiers are also important to understand aspects of social reproduction. Using Bourdieu's concept of habitus, they argue that class, gender (and caste in the Indian context) affect people's thinking, defining the limits of what is, and is not possible, appropriate, desirable and so on. People belonging to the same social category thereby pursue livelihood activities that are commensurate with their status, resulting in what they term livelihood pathways. The value of this approach is two fold. First, it draws attention to social reproduction, and presents one explanation for

different livelihood opportunities across social groups. Second, and related to this, is that it overcomes the false presentation of livelihood strategies as entirely intentional, for a more realistic account of them as iterative processes of past experiences influencing interpretations and present concerns.

It is the iterative process of people acting in accordance to worldviews, or habitus, that reaffirms social institutions that maintain a particular social structure (Giddens 1979). Intentional and unintentional consequences of action reaffirm structural constraints on behaviour. These are not limited to constraints on decision making, but also have material consequences through access to resources and capitals. De Haan and Zoomers (2005) argue that access is essential to understand differential livelihood outcomes. They take a social exclusion approach to poverty that “portrays poverty as a failure caused by bottlenecks in access to capitals...[and as] a processes in which groups try to monopolize specific opportunities to their own advantage” (2005: 34). Usually it is only the first aspect that is captured in livelihood analysis, and poverty is seen to be reduced (or adaptive capacity increased) through the removal of these bottlenecks, often through institutional mechanisms. The second aspect highlights why this often fails.

In addition to access to capitals, greater attention in SLA frameworks needs to be placed on the processes through which different capitals are assigned a socially constructed value, as well as the practices through which they are substituted or accumulated. Bourdieu treats capital not as something to be acquired by the individual, but in relation to other classes in a ‘field of struggle’. The field of struggles is the space in which investment in different forms of capital is undertaken in ways that seek to maintain or improve the class position of the individual/social group, including the next generation. The ability to do so depends on the volume and composition of the capital, as well as the “instruments of reproduction” in which relative value is maintained or acquired. He provides the example of education in France to show how systemic properties enable higher classes to maintain their position. As lower class people seek to improve their class position through education, qualifications lose their value. Thereby the subjective aspirations that motivate such investment are not matched by the objective realisation of opportunities.

This linking of capitals to class position highlights the interlinking of cognitive elements that determine decision making and the institutional mechanisms that determine access to resources. Institutions are a central component of livelihood frameworks, providing the norms, rules and conventions that regulate behaviour. Ellis (2000:39) states that institutions¹ “are critical mediating factors for livelihoods because they encompass the agencies that inhibit or facilitate the exercise of capabilities and choices by individuals and households”. In application in SLA frameworks however, this broader understanding of how institutions mediate livelihoods is reduced to the distribution of material resources. Institutions, much like interests, are often treated as ‘rational’, mediating access to resources in accordance to efficiency criteria. In this way they shape behaviour (such as resource use) in ways to meet that ‘rational interests’ of participating actors (Ostrom 1990; North 1990). As

¹ Ellis makes a distinction between social relations, institutions and organizations that I do not maintain here. I take a broader definition of institutions that incorporates both formal organizations and informal social relations.

the above analysis suggests, however, this limited understanding ignores cognitive elements, and the socially constructed nature of institutions that are based on, and (re)produce, common sets of meanings.

It is therefore important to be specific about the multiple ways that institutions both constrain and facilitate different livelihood portfolios. It should be clear to the reader that by institutions, I refer to both bureaucratic and socially embedded institutions (in preference to the terms formal and informal) (Cleaver 2002).² Rather than looking at the impact of one institution, it is necessary to determine how a range of institutions mediate the livelihood portfolios of different social categories. People engage with these institutions on both a conscious and unconscious level, and at times strategically use the norms and regulations of a particular institution to further their interests. This helps to bring in agency, as people choose to engage with, or adhere to the norms and rules of institutions that are compatible with their aspirations. At the same time, unconscious engagement, and the non-negotiability of adhering to rules and regulations in the case of some institutions, helps to explain why people fail to recognize, or act on their interests.

Institutions are therefore important mechanisms to understand continuities in livelihood portfolios, as well as to identify opportunities for change. Just as livelihoods cannot be understood in a snapshot, neither can the role of institutions in mediating livelihoods be understood in a static sense. Although there has been an emphasis on institutional stability in the neo-institutional literature, the flow of ideas, norms and discourses has made institutional change much more common than is generally recognized (Campbell 2004). Further, intentional institutional building through the good governance agenda and increasing state interference in populations has meant that bureaucratic institutions reconfigure and are reconfigured by socially embedded institutions. While the emphasis has been on erroneous approaches to intentional institutional building without taking into consideration the social institutional context (Cleaver 2002), equally important is the way that actors use bureaucratic institutions to transform social norms. As Agrawal (2005) points out, participation in these institutions has the potential to reconfigure subjectivities at the individual level, resulting in new interests and worldviews.

The above suggests that to understand how and why livelihood portfolios change (or do not) over time, we need to examine three elements: worldviews and ethos of different social categories; the ways that different institutions constrain or facilitate the pursuit of different livelihood activities; and broader social, economic and political processes. Each element is inter-linked, a product of, as well as contributing to, the other two. To complicate matters further, none of the elements are static, requiring appreciation of the way that they change over time. While the task to unravel these elements is complex, and frankly overwhelming, to not consider these elements in projections of future livelihoods is to give an incomplete account. The next section therefore outlines my approach to examine these elements in the context of agrarian livelihoods in Andhra Pradesh.

² Cleaver distinguishes between the two: "Bureaucratic institutions are those formalised arrangements based on explicit organisational structures, contracts and legal rights, often introduced by governments or development agencies. Socially embedded institutions are those based on culture, social organisation and daily practice, commonly but erroneously referred to as 'informal'" (2002: 13).

Methods and Framework

Two considerations guided my selection of research methods. First, the focus was on the cognitive aspects of livelihoods—the perspectives and meanings that people give their livelihoods was foremost. Second, the approach needed to be open in order to not foreclose important, but potentially overlooked, aspects of people’s livelihoods. The analytical framework was to be applied to the empirical material after it was collected, not drive the collection of the material. The priority was to allow participants to express their thoughts and ideas as freely as possible, while remaining within the general purview of livelihoods. In-depth, semi-structured interviews were most appropriate for this task.

Interviews attempted to capture livelihood activities throughout the lifetime of the respondent, and comparing these to the previous and next generation. The approach was similar to a life history (but with some qualifications as seen below), which are a recognized approach to capture livelihood trajectories. Bagchi et al (1998) used life history alongside village mapping, wealth ranking and a formal randomized sample household survey to capture livelihood trajectories. They use life history to “study the processes of livelihood change, particularly relationships between people” (1998: 466). De Haan and Zoomers similarly used life histories to provide “a deeper layer of beliefs, needs, aspirations and limitations and especially need to be contextualized in relation to power and institutions” (2005: 43). Life histories allow examination of the meanings that people give to their livelihood activities, as well as the way these are embedded in social relations.

Despite these advantages, life histories are a time consuming methodology, requiring rapport and patience from both the respondent and the interviewer (Miles and Crush 1993), taking up to forty hours of interview, to develop rapport and unravel a person’s life over several sessions. We had neither the resources, nor did the respondents have the patience to embark on such a process, especially considering the need to interview across several social categories. The empirical material collected can therefore be more accurately described as ‘life history narratives’: short accounts that relay key moments in a person’s life, or that summarize how a person perceives their life more generally. Interviews took place over two sessions, which we later reduced to one due to problems with recruitment. For each respondent, we recorded between 50 and 145 minutes of interview, with an average being 90 minutes.

Three research investigators conducted the interviews and transcribed and translated them into English. There is an obvious loss of meaning in the translation, and regular workshops were held to discuss important Telugu concepts. Further, as the interviews were essentially ‘guided conversations’, the research investigator had a large role in their production. Interview scripts were therefore *co-created* through the interaction between the interviewer and respondent, rather than the perspectives of the respondent alone. The positionality of the research investigators is therefore crucial to understand the interview scripts (see Jakimow forthcoming for more detail about this process). A guided conversations, the interview transcripts are uneven, with subject matter and tone varying considerably. This did not hinder the objective of the interviews, which was to extract the meanings and perspectives of the respondents, as well as their own understanding of the social, economic and physical context in which they lived

The research investigators interviewed a total of 49 people across two villages in Andhra Pradesh: 28 in Nemmani, Nalgonda district, and 21 in Gangapur, Mahbubnagar district. Nemmani was one of the three villages in Andhra Pradesh that my colleagues selected according to set bio-physical and social characteristics as part of the broader research project. Gangapur was a 'control' village, in the sense that it was not involved in the project, and therefore was not skewed by the relationships established in that village prior. It was similar to Nemmani in terms of proximity to a town, the mix of large and small farmers, and caste composition, but differed in that it was closer to an upgraded highway, had no NGO presence, and was about a third larger in terms of population.

We selected respondents through a mix of purposeful and convenience sampling: purposeful sampling where registers existed with relevant details to aid in selection; and convenience sampling where no such lists existed, or for groups where recruitment was particularly challenging. The sample was divided into large, medium, small and marginal landholdings, landless agricultural labourers and 'others' (where the main source of livelihood was non-agrarian). Within each category, we aimed for half men, half women, and a spread of ages, but skewed towards elderly people. The capricious nature of recruitment meant that this was not always possible, and the compromises we made are evident in table one outlining the sample.

As outlined above, from the interviews I was examining the influence of three sets of mechanisms in livelihood portfolios within, and across generations: meanings/worldviews/ethos; institutions, and; broader social and economic processes. Rarely did respondents express related information or knowledge explicitly, requiring interpretation and contextualisation of the material. This made coding particularly important. I conducted detailed coding of the interview data using NVIVO software. As a separate process, I asked each of the interviews six questions that could uncover more of the implicit and unspoken themes to aid in my analysis. These were:

- a. What are the continuities and shifts in livelihood portfolios, with special attention to inter-generational?
- b. What are the aspirations that people have for themselves, and the next generation?
- c. What constraints have people faced in pursuing livelihoods, or what have been the facilitating factors?

From this information and their accounts, I deciphered the influence of the three mechanisms outlined above, namely:

- d. What are the implicit meanings that have shaped livelihoods?
- e. What are the institutions that have mediated livelihoods and how?
- f. What are the broader processes in play?

As noted, these mechanisms are inter-linked, but necessarily separated for analysis.

These became the constitutive elements that I extracted, through which to identify trends and establish processes across different social categories. Coding in this way allowed me to go beyond the material, to understand the cognitive, social and structural aspects of people's livelihoods. The objective was a more nuanced understanding of why people do particular livelihood activities, and their potential and willingness to do others. Comparison across social categories allowed me to identify livelihood 'pathways' (De Haan and Zoomers 2005), shedding light on processes of

social reproduction and change.

Conclusion

The framework outlined above will be applied to different social categories in Gangapur and Nemmani, Andhra Pradesh, India. The initial categories, based on land, occupation and engagement in agricultural wage labour, are exploratory, and similarities will be examined within and across categories to determine their salience for different livelihood portfolios. Cross categories of age, gender and caste may, for example, be more significant for livelihood portfolios. This requires attention not to any one personal signifier, but to the multitude of subjectivities that influences a person's worldviews and ethos. These complex subjectivities (Ortner 2005) are not static, but change according to people's engagement in different practices (Agrawal 2005) and in response to the changing culture and institutions in which the individual is positioned (Ortner 2005).

This paper has argued for the utility of qualitative research methods to help anticipate the nature of future livelihood portfolios. It has drawn attention to the importance of the cognitive aspects of livelihoods, including worldviews and ethos that drive behaviour; related institutional aspects, highlighting the need to go beyond intentional bureaucratic institutions to socially embedded ones; and attention to the broader political economy, including the economy of practices that shapes the value of different capitals. It has developed a framework to explore these aspects of livelihoods in semi-structured, in-depth interviews. I argue that this framework can be used in conjunction with other methods, including quantitative data analysis, PRA rapid appraisal and ecological systems analysis to project the nature of livelihood shifts and continuities. This can help to answer important questions such as who will be the next generation of labourers and farmers, and what role will agriculture play in increasingly diversified livelihood portfolios.

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Survival of the Fittest: An Eclectic Approach to Exploring the Motif of Globality in Pankaj Mishra's Selected Works

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Survival of the Fittest: An Eclectic Approach to Exploring the Motif of Globality in Pankaj Mishra's Selected Works

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This study reads the selected works of the Indian writer, Pankaj Mishra in the light of an eclectic approach which aims to find the relationship between the phenomenon of globalization and the selected works while exploring the motif of globality in them. One novel, *The Romantics*, and one travel novel, *Butter Chicken in Ludhiana: Travels in Small Town India* are focused on here.

Introduction

Globalization and Globality have been considered as hotly-debated buzzwords in academia for about two decades. At the turn of the present century, these terms have been at the center of attention in many debates relevant to literature and literary studies. Indeed, if it is believed that globalization has many things – including literature – in its grip (Gupta 2009), then it is not surprising to see the representations and outcomes of globalization developing within literature and literary studies since these are part of the same world with which globalization, as a phenomenon, has a reciprocal interaction. Quite reasonably, a practical way to understand the nature of such a relationship is to scrutinize and explore works of literature as they can provide an appropriate ground-work for the reflection of diverse globalization themes within their texts and relevant contexts. There are many writers around the world who contribute in this regard. Indian writers who write in English are, undoubtedly, among those who have one of the greatest contributions in forming building blocks in the development of literature-globalization linkage. For partly exploring the outcomes of the Indian writers' interaction with such contemporary trends, in this paper the literary dimension of globalization and the representation of the existence of a literature of globalization and globalization of literature have been concentrated upon as foreshadowed in Mishra's selected texts as well as through his literary career.

Mishra has started from outside of the long-established European/American metropolitan centers of English literature. Born in 1969 at Jhansi in Uttar Pradesh (North India), Mishra is graduated with a bachelor's degree in commerce from Allahabad University before earning his MA degree in English literature at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. Mishra lived in a village, 14 km north of Simla, before joining Harper Collins India as chief editor. Besides writing books and giving lectures, Mishra writes literary and political essays and reviews for many international newspapers and journals such as *The New Yorker* and *The Guardian*. He has his own distinctive views and concerns regarding literature and globalization as the growing prominence of writers of non-western origin in Europe and America and the rapid process of economic globalization have always been a major concern for Mishra.

Mishra's literary works have revealed many signs of talent and intelligence, while travelling much beyond borders. From a pre-critical standpoint, it might be claimed that the selected texts reveal some signs of the assumed relations between globalization and literature. It has been attempted here to verify the realities of globalization through literary forms such as the novel and travel novel as – given the distinctive nature of their genres – these texts mainly provide the fullest representation of their society (as the real context) and hence of the issues meant to be elaborated and analyzed. In short, the main research questions are:

1. Do the selected works show high quality in their form and content?
2. Can these texts be considered as narratives capable of signifying globalization?
3. Does Mishra implement any specific device to attain a greater readership?
4. Does literary globalization characterize a unique nature of its own?

Method

An *eclectic approach* besides a complementary *theoretical framework* forms the basis of the methodology. Containing a number of theories and ideas, the eclectic approach is exerted as a practical tool for implementing the pattern of the theoretical framework onto the selected works. To explore the motif of globality the selected works are examined by distinguishing their *intra-textual* and *extra-textual* features. For the *intra-textual* scan, the focus has been on the textual characteristics such as the motifs, themes, characters, tones, images, narrations and so on. By inspecting such structural literary elements, the relevance of globalization within the texts is considered. By analyzing the *extra-textual* distinctiveness, the present study has examined the characteristics of the context in which the given texts are located. This, in turn, helps to discern the location of these texts within the larger domain of globalization.

Most fundamental to the theoretical framework, is the spectrum which contains some of the ideas, concepts and disciplines proposed by three contemporary scholars: Ernst Grabovszki,¹ Shashi Deshpande,² and Nico Israel.³ The theoretical framework is shaped through these scholars' relevant contributions on the context of relationship between literature and globalization. Each relevant concept or paradigm from these three pundits takes its appropriate level of significance in relation to each text. Some of the features referred to at this part of the evaluation mostly fit into the *extra-textual* part of the approach as well. Some elements from both the approach and the framework meet when a common denominator (such as language) appears.

Globalization and Literature

It is believed that today all literature is global and a literature of globalization (O'Brien and Szeman 2001). Nico Israel posits that globalization's impact on literature is manifold, with both positive and negative associations. The relation of globalization and literature for Israel is mostly maneuvering in one direction: how literature responds to globalization. But a second and more complex aspect for Israel is what globalization has to do with the very form(s) of contemporary literature (Israel 2004). Accordingly, while approaching the topic of globalization and literature, several broad areas become visible. The probable disciplines can be grouped into at least *three major correlative levels*:

1) At one conceptual level, this relationship mainly engages with literary theory, discipline and criticism. Many studies have managed to fit discussions of globalization within certain established fields of literary studies such as literary Postmodernism and Postcolonialism, since these terms have been on the highest point of agenda during the same post-1970s period in which globalization has extended itself to its current prominence (O'Brien and Szeman 2001). Also disciplines such as world/comparative literature and their bonds with globalization are considered of great value.

2) The second level could be called one of tools/mediums with certain key terms: mass media, literary institutions, English language and translation practice. The media and modern technologies, and the globalization of publishing and literary institutions have made drastic changes in dissemination of various forms of literature. Confirming this great role, Israel asserts that the internet allows ever greater access to literary texts, while the publishing industry has itself become more globalized (and consolidated into multinational media conglomerates). Grabovszki proffers that the processes of communication and creativity, and the study of literature and the changes these areas are now experiencing due to the impact of globalization and new media should be studied contextually. Grabovszki defines globalization as "the intensification of literary relations and of communication including that of artistic, i.e., literary communication and production" (Grabovszki 2002). In the context of an empirical approach to

the situation of globalization and world literature, Grabovszki emphasizes on the same above-mentioned tools.

English language status in the world is another key tool. Modern English, sometimes described as the first global *lingua franca*, is the [dominant](#) international language in many fields. The reasons for such a grand position sound clear as “English [is considered] the language of globalization,” (Fishman 2001). A great part of literary production is created or at least transmitted via global English.

The third important tool/medium is translation practice. Its dynamic function originates in the grand role of translation in practices of world/comparative literature, the rise of English as the international *lingua franca* and the simultaneous increase in the global demand for translations. Translation plays a crucial role within globalization, since one of its primary functions is “to replenish the intertextual resources of a culture (Cronin 2003).

3) The third major level of the relationship includes broad paradigms and methods through which Literary Studies has evoked globalization. This is about reflection of different themes of globalization in literature, and the way “literary texts and the interpretation thereof have been recruited to support or elucidate conceptual positions taken by political and social [or cultural] theorists about globalization (Gupta 2009). Another issue is the uncertainty that if practically there are certain passwords to the world of literary globality. Deshpande mentions some essentials, the most basic of which is the selection of a global language such as English. Having access to Western agents and publishers, the migration of writers, intellectuals and scholars from all over the world to Western capitals and universities and fair marketing are considered as other prerequisites by Deshpande (Deshpande 2003).

Works

Butter Chicken in Ludhiana (1995) is a travelogue that describes the gradual yet profound social and cultural changes taking place in rural Indian towns in the new context of globalization. Hailed as India’s travel writing sensation, this book vividly brings to life nineteen small towns of India, describing them not in exotic or quaint terms, but rather in the frightening new context of modernization and globalization.

The Romantics (1999) is an ironic tale of people longing for fulfillment in cultures other than their own. The central setting is the holy city of Benares and the main protagonist is a young Indian Brahmin intellectual named Samar, who stumbles upon a group of Western dropouts. The ensuing friendship provides Samar with a fresh, more serious look at life, and he begins an erratic journey in search of himself. Through charting his own course in the midst of ancient and modern cultural currents, Samar falls in love with an unavailable French woman, Catherine.

Findings/Results

The Romantics

To review the *intra-textual* features, some formal elements such as Setting, Plot, Narrator, Point of view, Theme, and Characterization were examined to find out what the novel is all about. Also the style, tone, and language of the novel were scrutinized to increase the understanding of the story’s art. The structure is quite simple and resembles that of an essay. While depicting a

romantic view of the changing landscape of the Indian holy city of Benares in the late 1980s and 1990s, Mishra explores different themes of love, grief, loss, self-doubt and emotional stillness, conflict between bookish ideas and desolate reality, class and caste problems, the meeting of East and West, culture clashes, transition and the changes en route for a modern India. The line of the story, told from first person point of view, can be followed without facing serious obstacles, though verbosity and a sort of meandering plot remain to play troublesome. The writer's language is direct, undemanding and lucid, with an uncomplicated diction. His narration is smooth, coherent, thought through and yet absorbing. His characters range from Samar and Miss West to Anand and Rajesh to show cases of dynamic and static attributions.

The overall tone of the narrator and writer overlap in the story. This tone varies in different shades of an indistinguishable color in each sections of the novel. In the first section we observe an earnest, curious, baffled, inquisitive tone. Intimate, happy, passionate, romantic, affectionate and playful are the adjectives which best describe the tone of the writer in the second section of the book. Indifference, hesitation, melancholy, reevaluation, and seclusion reign the atmosphere of the third section. Writer's specific attitude about his narrator, Samar, convinces the readers to accept that his special passivity in the social network around him is the best reaction, no matter if this passivity overwhelms the whole idea of Samar's appeal for defeat, isolation, perception and his sense of abandonment.

To explore the *extra-textual* features, the main focus has been on the major feedbacks evaluating the literary significance, influence and popularity of the novel. It is variously labeled as a *Roman a Clefs* (Nair 2000), a *Bildungsroman* (Santhanam 2000), an autobiographical novel, and as a regional novel. Published in eleven European languages and Hebrew, *The Romantics* wins the *Los Angeles Times* Art Seidenbaum Award for first fiction and becomes short-listed for English fiction at The Crossword Book Award in 2000. Some reviewers believe that Mishra's novel is a "skilful enjoyable but ultimately academic exercise" (Sandhu 2000), while others announce it as a "supernova in the wan firmament of recent fiction" (Arana 2000). Critics mostly praise the writer's straight, clean, unhampered prose which is also intelligent, accomplished and aspiring of a literary status. Mishra's literary agent in England, Gillon Aitken boasts on his great literary powers to say that "the novel is written with great elegance and feeling and with an understated emotional insight reminiscent of Henry James" (Outlook 1999). Nevertheless, Mishra has also been chided for excessiveness in style, verbosity and characters. Lack of emotion is another great snag for the novel, as it is believed that "when Samar goes into exile for seven long years, the reader is baffled. There is nothing in the portrayal of his emotions or his flat and fleeting sexual encounter to show that this is the Grand passion or justify the agony of the Great Rebuffal" (Santhanam 2000). Mishra's style of writing is mainly equated to the characteristics of literary journalism (Nair 2000). Yet a greater common criticism is found with the idea of Indian motifs pandering to Western readers. Mishra is rebuked for giving the Western readers all that they are already used to hearing about India, i.e. dirt, poverty, decay, Sadhus, politics at the university. Mishra is reprimanded because of "oversimplifying his characters," some "topographical inaccuracies throughout the novel" and "the inaccurate depiction of India." (Singh 2000).

Butter Chicken in Ludhiana

To review the *intra-textual* features, some formal elements such as Genre, Itinerary/Setting, Narration/Narrator, and Characterization were examined. Mishra's debut book includes a prologue and a finalizing afterword (2006 Picador). The itinerary and setting become outstanding where Mishra sets up his journey on small towns to represent the smaller cells of a grand community like India. Much like a jigsaw puzzle, once each small picture is put beside one another, the outcomes of these trips then can be formulated; it is only with the big picture in view that one can accomplish a better understanding of the themes and motifs of the book. Though Mishra's travelogue is essentially built upon facts, but there are many points in which travel

literature converges with [essay](#) writing. It is through a lucid, absorbing, and engaging narrative style that he primarily makes his detached observations on the transformations that Indian people and towns have undergone and then at any feasible place makes his own personal comments via a different language. Narration is done from a vantage point and at the same time from inside different societies the narrator visits. The presence of the first person narrator is easily felt from the second paragraph in the introductory prologue, with the first traces of Mishra's stylish satirical standpoints. Indeed, Mishra's style of narration is commonly satiric, ironic and at times full of fun and playful. He uses a descriptive language throughout the travelogue together with this piercing teasing voice to remind us that he has not accustomed to all those themes of poverty, lack of welfare and infrastructures, social and political turbulences and disorders. Also, due to its genre, mainly there exist real individuals or types instead of fictional characters.

To review *extra-textual* features, some of the major reactions on the travelogue were analyzed. Though it is seen as somewhat lacking in focus and direction, the travelogue is hailed as a "classic of Indian non-fiction" (Choudhury 2006), and described as giving a good impression of a fast-changing society. Quoting from Amitava Kumar who says "no other book defines as clearly, and with such troubled irony, our last decade of change," Choudhury adds that "to Mishra, while middle-class Indians show a great desire to embrace the modern, all too often their modernity is only something tacked on to their old lives, such as their participation in consumer culture. It is an ambiguous revolution which has mostly to do with wants and aspirations and very little to do with thought or ideas, and there is often something grasping and pathetic, if not frankly disturbing, about it. The relevance of this argument has not diminished in the decade since *Butter Chicken* was published" (Choudhury 2006). It is also reviewed that Mishra renders many visible contrary currents and new ambivalences through concrete evocations of people and their social voice (Challakere 2005).

Discussion

Mishra's works contain a running critique of the effects of the new era and globalization in India, while focusing on one main love story and on the travels around the subcontinent. Yet apparently Mishra does not link those effects historically to certain '-ism' or '-ization' in the kind of systematic way found with other writers. Instead, everything is done through formal elements such as theme, characterization, narration, etc. Class and caste problems, culture clashes, quest for a better life in a rapidly changing world, the meeting of the East and the West, modernization against tradition become prevalent topics. Various forms of dislocation, disruption, migration and mobility could be traced in both texts with different levels. Understanding the world of the protagonist Samar or (ironically-named) Miss West, Rajesh and the group of bohemian Westerners, involves the readers in a world of ideas and concepts which best clarify the above-mentioned themes. Confrontation of the East and the West is sometimes symbolized in the mind of Samar who reads books from Proust, Schopenhauer and Edmund Wilson and resides in places with strong ties to Eastern religion or philosophy (Benares is an example), or even is symbolized in the name of the character Miss West who has been living in India for a long time. Of course, such East-West meeting is embodied more positively and in a larger scale if we consider how foreigners romanticize the mysteries of India or how Indians romanticize the freedoms of the West. Modernization, tradition and the effects of cultural differences are partly represented in the lifestyle and careers of the characters, too. In this regard, Mark is the character who romanticizes the mysteries of India and is finally absorbed in this infatuation, and Anand is the character who romanticizes the attractions of Paris and is finally overwhelmed in this fancy.

The narrative structure of *The Romantics*, with its dependence on the first person narrator and the technique to let the characters' actions and thoughts speak for them, can be good evidences of Israel's definition of newer forms in the literature of globalization. Also Mishra creates his own form of expression inside the popular genre of travelogue writing where he mixes the

autobiographical memoir arrangements with the registers of travel novel. With an amalgamation of themes, facts, scenes, and characters seasoned with a satirical and humorous voice, Mishra produces a tangible account of a nation's life in the last decade of the twentieth century. The ironical tone employed in the travelogue is organized in accordance with and at the service of a powerful dislocation Mishra implements in his work. Mishra tries to locate himself through the travelogue, so he does it by the act of dislocation at several points in the book. He distances himself from his immediate environment in order to make a better judgment (Deshpande 2003).

Looking through Grabovszki's perspective, it becomes clear that till date Mishra's books, for whatever reason, are not available in the electronic formats. There are a number of online regional or international publishers' homepages to order his books in paperback or hardcover. This shows that the old models of literary communication are still prevalent and literature is yet highly bound up with the traditional medium of *printed book* worldwide. Yet Grabovszki's emphasis on the prerequisite tool of literary institutions and the monopoly of media businesses, enterprises, and publishers finds evidences in Mishra's experiences when he first becomes chief editor with Harper Collins India and later gets his books published at Picador. Mishra himself experiences direct cooperation with media giants which, according to Grabovszki, show an escalating propensity towards the globalization of their operations. Later on, working with some famous global journals and magazines as part of the mass media provides Mishra with more powerful tools to introduce himself and his ideas. Such experiences have brought him wider interactions; some of his involvements and appearances in global issues and his favorite topics, major themes and motifs have been focused upon by the mass media.

Mishra's policy of collaborating with famous West-based agents and publishers evidences Deshpande's emphasis on their function. Through their vast operational scope, such publishers and agents have successfully introduced Mishra's works into various international literary tastes. Mishra has also benefited from what Deshpande posits as the migration of writers, intellectuals and scholars from around the world to the West, who validate and endorse writings from their own countries, while stabilizing their positions in famous Western universities and institutions. Partly related to the noticeable status of the English Indian literature in the world, Mishra takes advantage from the overall endorsements of the earlier Indian migrants. Not limited to diasporic writings all over world, nowadays many great Indian-origin writers are part of major literary movements or mainstreams globally.

The smooth, lucid and yet attractive structure of Mishra's selected works becomes a good testimony for Deshpande's speculation that a sort of varied readership should be considered by the writers. Mishra is rightly one of those citizens of the world who can address people easily, when he presents the unfamiliar in his selected works to make them exotic enough, while removing the unexplainable. As a part of the implemented local color, Mishra inserts Hindi phrases and sentences in his travel novel to add to the taste and flavor of the scenes. Also, in both works there are references to local and regional customs, rituals, habits and daily routines which do not seem redundant at all; the language of these works provides a transparency through which readers can easily identify with the characters in their definite world. Since this sense of belonging to a region does not block the ways to the core of the occasions or events in the novel/travelogue and the ordinary reader is not confused by the world the characters inhabit, then it is fairly judged that Mishra's works become easily accessible to a larger cosmopolitan readership.

Reflected through Deshpande's polemic, the selection of language is considered a clue for reaching to various readers worldwide. To transmit his stories to both local and international readers, Mishra adopts the English language rather than limited local regional ones. Had he written his works in any other language, he would have not got such a great readership so fast. English language medium paves Mishra's way into the global market of writing and makes his

works visible to the world since English is the *lingua franca* and thus a suitable medium for literature as well. Such exposure brings about various consequences, each of which again asserts the significance of *English as the language of globalization*. Through this medium, he manages to deal with the big local/global themes of the story of mankind. However, the function of language is not merely limited to the authority and value of English. Though writing in English removes other limitations such as those with translations, undoubtedly, being translated into other languages is considered as another major reason (or effect) for the wide-ranging reception of Mishra's works. Such a function of translation is truly in close connection and at the center of globalization of literature.

Conclusions

The selected texts can be considered as fine pieces of literature, because of the creative imagination employed in them and because of their formal and thematic structure. Representing various people, cultures and traditions, they display certain qualities through setting, narration, characterization, theme, etc; they can truly be considered works of artistic merit.

The selected works prove to be narratives capable of signifying globalization in ways that can make it meaningful. They convey globalization as being thematized within the text, too. They reflect contemporary matters and crises of globalization more directly. Accordingly, the theory of the existence of a relation between globality, globalization and the selected texts converges here.

Mishra skillfully avails himself of the four mediums (mass media, literary institutions, English language and translation), since these tools seem inevitable components of the modern methods of literary communications. This mechanism has played a significant role in the expansion of the capacity of his readership, as well. Adhering to these mediums could be interpreted as either a premeditated conduct by Mishra or just a routine constituent part of his natural mannerism and style of writing. Whichever the construal, and no matter even if Mishra really uses certain passwords to logon to the global literary market, at least, it can be claimed that he knows about the promising future available in such a milieu.

Mishra is quite knowledgeable about the rules of the game inside global literary market as this is a give-and-take deal: "Local markets for literary fiction remain underdeveloped; the metropolis often holds out the only real possibility of a professional writing career. The metropolitan west, however, has its own expectations from non-western fiction" (Mishra 2009). Mishra asserts that the forces of capitalism, which produce economic inequality globally, would also affect cultural balance on a global scale and therefore there would be no equal access to literature for people in different regions worldwide. Hence, literary globalization may also be considered as a zone of inequalities, but such discriminatory status bears a quite different nature from what we experience in economic or political globalization. Rather, the province of challenges in literary globalization is mostly a zone of diligence and rivalry; the main concern here is about a speculation of *survival of the fittest*.⁴ And this makes a unique characteristic for literary globalization. As a writer who constructs parts of building blocks for the global literature, Mishra takes part in a competition, a demanding struggle which needs much talent and energy. Learning from the past and looking to the future, he presents his works bearing certain qualities. Having excellence of form and expression, and showing qualities of permanency, universality and all-inclusiveness regarding human problems, then these works remain on the literary scene for longer times. They remain in the contest, as far as they keep their readership.

Mishra's presence in the scene of global literature is also indicative of the fact that the center/periphery model – which assumes flowing of power and influence from urban centers in the West to a peripheral developing world – is not essentially applicable to literary globalization. In this new model of literary globalization, no center exists like before; European and American

metropolitan centers are no longer the sole valid hubs in literary sphere. This process of decentralization has been improving on an ascending scale thanks to the innovations in information technology. Arriving from every continent, writers write from wherever possible; no difference whether Mishra is writing his essays at Simla or London. Readers' judgments are not limited to geographical borders any more.

Notes:



1Ernst Grabovszki began his studies in the theory of Comparative Literature and German at the University of Vienna, where he is a lecturer now. He is a freelance author for several magazines, and a publisher. His recent publications include articles in the *Encyclopedia of Contemporary German Culture* (1999), *Makers of Western Culture, 1800-1914: A Biographical Dictionary of Literary Influences* (2000).

2The Indian novelist, Shashi Deshpande received BA in Economics and Law and MA in English Literature. Both her first collection of short stories, *The Legacy* (1978), and her highly praised novel, *The Dark Holds no Terrors* (1980), announced the arrival of a new feminist voice in Indian fiction. Her most accomplished novel, *That Long Silence* (1988) combines bitter realism with subjective exploration, political awareness with Hindu philosophy.

3 **Nico Israel is the Associate Professor at Hunter College, The City University of New York. His areas of expertise include twentieth century U.S. and European literature, colonial and post-colonial literature and theory, and art history and visual culture. Over the last decade he has published academic essays on Conrad, Adorno, Stevens, Beckett, and issues of geography, globalization and ethics. His first book, *Outlandish: Writing between Exile and Diaspora*, was published by Stanford University Press in 2000.**

4*Survival of the fittest* is a term coined by the British philosopher [Herbert Spencer](#). He first used the phrase after reading Charles Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* – in his *Principles of Biology* (1864), in which he drew parallels between his own economic theories and Darwin's biological ones, writing "This survival of the fittest, which I have here sought to express in mechanical terms, is that which Mr. Darwin has called 'natural selection', or the preservation of favored races in the struggle for life.

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Fabricating History through Folklore in Ming Cher's *Spider Boys*

In Ming Cher's *Spider Boys* (1995), a novel about the youth culture of Singapore in 1955, the narrator observes: "The history of Singapore is fabricated by two lawmakers: the Chinese secret societies who use knives and fists among themselves and the British who rule with guns and wits since 1819" (49-50). Recognizing that history is "fabricated" by those in power, Cher presents an alternative narrative for the history of Singapore through his novel. To do this, he draws upon the folklore of Singapore—the unrecorded traditions that unite a people through shared oral tales and a common way of living. We see this attention to folklore in the content of the novel, as it repeatedly demonstrates the pervasiveness and influence of Chinese and Malay folklore within Singaporean culture. Indeed, the daily lives of the novel's characters are infused with rumors of the supernatural as well as proverbs and myths passed on through oral traditions. Yet we also can discern elements of folklore in the form of the novel. Because the novel is written in a mixture of Non-Standard and Singapore Colloquial English, it registers aurally for the reader, making it feel part of an oral tradition. Moreover, the novel presents its own folk heroes and supernatural tall-tales, as it participates in fabricating a specifically Singaporean unofficial historical narrative. This essay will explore how Cher's references to folklore and his formal deployment of the folk genre allow him to bend the boundaries of the realist novel, making *Spider Boys* a significant contribution to the informal recording of Singaporean history and culture.

In one of the opening scenes of *Spider Boys*, the central character and dedicated spider fighter, Kwang, proclaims that he wants, "Freedom from mother's rule!" (6). In this same passage, the narrator describes Kwang as having "small and mean piercing black eyes" with

“anger, scared from crying within, crying freedom” (6). One might suppose from this exclamation that Kwang wants freedom from his mother-tongue or his motherland, symbolized through his oppressive and disciplining mother. Yet, ironically, Kwang’s mother is not a symbol of traditional values and ethnic bonds. Quite the opposite, Kwang’s mother canes him because she wants him to attend school and learn English. Since she cannot read or write, Kwang fools her into thinking he is doing homework, as he recites random English words and letters that come to mind when he is in her presence. One could argue that Kwang is typical in his rebellion against his strict mother; yet his scorn for her goes beyond adolescent rebellion. Though his mother is absent for most of the novel, working away from the home, Kwang defines himself against her, stating: “what my mother hates is what I like” (17). Since his mother is not equated with tradition and the motherland, Kwang is not rebelling from his culture, but from learning the English language and curriculum—a symbol of imperialism and the beginning of the modernization of Singapore. Instead, Kwang (and thus the novel) values his street education—the folk tradition that is passed to Kwang unofficially as he collects, sells, trains and fights his spiders.

This subculture of “spider boys” creates a kind of folk mythology throughout the novel for both the characters and readers. The spiders and their fights are described in inflated detail, making them reminiscent of the grand battles of folk legends. For instance, in a scene that is devoted to a blow by blow recount of a spider fight, the narrator likens the spiders to “warriors in psychedelic armor” doing a “hypnotic war dance” (41). It is this mesmerizing and magical quality that turns this seemingly simple game into a type of folklore for the young characters and readers. Moreover, the instinct and pluck of the spiders are mirrored by the children of the novel, who must battle one another to assure their survival on the streets. Yet spider fighting also offers

the children a sense of community. In fact, if we follow the general definition of folk as “any group of people whatsoever who share at least one common factor,” we can regard the community of “spider boys” as a folk group (Dundes 2). As Kwang wins spider matches, we are told that his “fame [...] spread further to other corners of Singapore”; “His house without mother rule turn into a community center for more spider boys hanging around to court friendship” (64). The folk-group shares stories of spider battles and Kwang becomes a hero to the group because of his ability to pick and train spiders.

The novel itself partakes in the same circulation of stories as the characters, recording the folklife of Singapore.¹ Though the fighting spiders are the central form of folklife represented in the novel, there are also references to food—laksa and “fine coconut chips marinated in brown sugar with pandan leaves” (10, 27), “kite fighting,” called “cross sword in the sky” (56-7), and herbal medicine, each of which can be considered aspects of folklife in 1950s Singapore. The rest of this essay, however, will concern itself with folklore, generally defined as “‘verbal art’—that is, the aesthetic use of spoken words” (Oring 14). This form of storytelling takes central stage in the narrative during the Hungry Ghost Festival, when “Chinese temples in every part of Singapore were busy organizing their annual opera shows of ancient stories to appease the lost souls set free by the King of Hell for a month holiday” (120). As part of this festival, the “blind man” who runs the local temple warns the characters that “‘Ancestor worship is a must’” (120). Indeed, Jan Knappert lists ancestor worship as one of the central aspects of South-East Asian folklore, summarizing that ancestors “are loved, they are prayed to, the people speak to them, sing hymns for them, they put food and other offerings ready for them, often every day, and

¹ Folklife is defined as “the traditional way of life shared by peasant and ethnic communities” (Bronner xi).

many peoples have priests or shamans to perform mediating services in order to keep the ancestors happy and satisfied with the living” (10). In *Spider Boys*, food preparation, joss stick burning and coin tossing accompany the opera and ritual performances of “hired nuns and tankies (mediums)” (121). Though most of the “spider boys” are preoccupied with scrambling for coins, they are all the same attentive to the stories performed.

The narrator lavishly describes the “smoky incense and glowing oil lamps, sounds of bells, cymbals, gongs, and chanting” that take place “before the main alter of life-size Kuan Yin, Goddess of Mercy, and her half-dozen, half-life-size demigods, caste in bronze” (122). Cher’s choice to include a reference to this particular goddess is perhaps significant in a novel where the protagonist’s mother is despised and mothers, in general, are absent. *The New Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology* explains: “Kuan-yin, the goddess of mercy and compassion, was one of the best loved of all Chinese deities and representations of her featured in every home. She was sometimes portrayed as the Gentle Mother, carrying a child in her arms” (389). This popular goddess of unconditional love and protector of children seems a fitting reference in a novel where adults are marginalized and children, many of whom have been orphaned as a result of the Japanese invasion, are forced to survive on their own.

Cher demonstrates how the supernatural beliefs inherent in the folklore of the Hungry Ghost Festival influence the characters of the novel, permeating their everyday life beyond that of formal school lessons. To make this point explicit, Cher has the most studious of the “spider boys,” Ah Seow, have a supernatural experience. We are told from the start that Ah Seow “has a psychic sense developed from ghost and fairy tales in the village” (21); and twice we are reminded that he keeps a “six-inch coffin nail” to defend against Pontianak spirits—a type of

vampire found in Malay and Indonesian folklore (21, 124).² Ah Seow's sense and fear of the supernatural becomes part of the plot of the novel when he has an out-of-body experience during the Hungry Ghost Festival. As Ah Seow and a younger "spider boy," Sachee, look over a moonlit pond, "Ah Seow's psyche felt something wrong. Ghost looking for replacement touches him on Halloween night. Spooky feeling squeezes out unknown sensitivities" (126). Though Ah Seow warns Sachee of the "water ghost," Sachee believes that he is only trying to frighten him (126). It is not until they see that one of their friend's grandmothers—Ah Paw, a "living legend" (130)—has hung herself in a nearby tree that Ah Seow's spirit leaves his body and floats above them all:

He black out into a blinding darkness illuminated by multiplying stardusts, stardusts disappear into total darkness, darkness evaporates into nothingness, nothingness becomes vacuum and voids into an inexhaustible whirlpool, sucking his consciousness into bottomless space. Like the essence of his inner spirit were draining away forever and ever into eternity, haunted by the eternal torture of no control, yearning to stop, yearning to be touch by something, anything! Vegetables, minerals, something to give sensation back, even a dust particle is desirable....Into the realm of untouchable desires yearning to be touchable. Into a mystery trip of ghost world control by fiends. (127-8)

Ah Seow's "astral consciousness" floats away, watches the temple performances and then takes a peek at the actresses changing clothes (128). Eventually, the grieving of his friends brings Ah Seow back to his limp body, though he is unable to re-inhabit his physical self. It is only when

² In his essay on Singaporean horror movies in the 1950s and 1960s, Timothy R. White defines the *pontianak* as "a type of vampire who becomes a beautiful woman when a nail is inserted into the back of its neck" (3); For a lack of a better source, I will also include here the Wikipedia entry: Pontianak "is a type of [vampire](#) in [Malay](#) folklore and [Indonesian mythology](#), similar to the Langsuir. Pontianak are women who died during [childbirth](#) and became [undead](#), seeking revenge and terrorizing villages. The name 'pontianak' is reportedly a corruption of the Indonesian or [Malay](#) '*perempuan mati beranak*', or 'she who has died in childbirth.'"

Sachee tugs at the hanging-woman's corpse that a stench is released, which allows Ah Seow to return to his body.

With this scene, the novel explicitly crosses over from a realist novel that *represents* the influence of folklore on the characters, to a novel that *participates* in generating and circulating folklore. Ah Seow's experience allows Cher to describe the world of ghosts, who long to return to earth. In the above quotation, Cher's prose becomes abstract and slightly awkward as it breaks the boundaries of the otherwise realist novel. Yet, the passages are clearly not meant to be a figment of Ah Seow's imagination. Rather, it is described as an event as real as the spider matches of the novel.

As Ah Seow reenters his body, it is first "freezing cold," but then "burns like dry ice sizzling, mist steams up around it" (130). The mist then turns into water, and he sees "two big carp fishes swimming with their mouths open, singing, 'Human flesh is divine, divine....!'" (130). This is not the first time these carp have spoken in the novel. When Ah Seow first meets Chai's grandmother, a feisty old woman who likes to fondle young boys, she introduces him to her two beloved three-foot-long carp. The narrator relates: "Their relationship spellbounded a fairy tale into the mystic and carry Ah Seow away into the watery world, as if he heard the fish speaking" (31). This is followed by a brief conversation among the fish, in which the female carp wonders what Ah Seow thinks of them, and the other fish tell her to "relax" (31-2). The narrator calls this a "mystical experience," leaving it to the reader to decide if the scene is merely the result of a frightened boy's over-active imagination. What is significant here is that, once again, Cher's prose becomes awkward, as he bends the realist form to include the supernatural elements of the folklore genre. Furthermore, the inclusion of the talking carp resonates within Chinese folklore, reminding the reader of the legend of the carp that persevered in its arduous swim

through the gorges of the Yellow River to Lung Men (Dragon Gate) in order to be transformed into a dragon (Volker 24). This folk legend is also associated with what was once called Boys' Day Festival, a day for celebrating children and their accomplishments. Hence, it is fitting that the carp make repeated cameo appearances in *Spider Boys*, which is predominantly about the coming of age of young boys. Although the carp are depicted in a humorous light, rather than as a serious symbol of the boys' ambition and drive, they nevertheless play a significant role in Ah Seow's journey to maturity and respectability.

Ah Seow is not the only character of the novel to have a supernatural experience. When Chai, a "spider boy" turned gang member, and Chinatown Yeow, the head of a gang of street children, encounter No Nose, an old kite maker who had his nose cut off during the Japanese occupation, No Nose sees "the image of a killer creature jump out of Yeow, lunge at him. Like guarding angel or whatever from the unexplains" (60). No Nose "twist[s] sideways to avoid direct contact" with whatever it is that projects from Yeow, assuring the reader that what he sees is very real to No Nose. This scene demonstrates how certain characters have the ability to sense what is beyond the natural, and how this ability has practical purposes. Aside from No Nose's ability to "hypnotize" Chai momentarily, his vision of Chinatown Yeow's "guarding angel" warns No Nose to avoid a confrontation with him (59, 61).

The above scene also foreshadows Yeow's character, as it is revealed that he wants to manipulate the "spider boys," particularly Kwang, into working for his gang. This is also why Yeow is repeatedly referred to by the narrator as a "wolf" or "lone wolf" (46, 47, 80, 133, 143, 144-5, 188, 198). Echoing the allegorical world of folklore, Chai is often called a "bull" because of his strength (143, 144-5), while the feisty Sachee is called a "monkey" at one point (189) and Kwang is called a "sharkhead" (190). These comparisons with animals put a different light on

the characters, morphing them momentarily into symbols with folkloristic associations. Hence, with the elaborate descriptions of the spider fights, the inclusion of the supernatural and the animal comparisons, we see the novel generating its own sense of folklore. Though the novel is written and not spoken, which is a defining characteristic of folklore, Cher still manages to mingle aspects of Chinese and Malay folklore with the realism of 1950s Singapore.

While some characters are guided by supernatural forces, others gain insight from the folklore that is passed down to them by their elders. The Blind Man of the local temple relates stories to the children, which can be applied to their everyday lives. An obvious example of this is when he tells them the story of how to make a wild tiger run away with only the aid of an umbrella (21). (If nothing else, this story assures that the children will not be caught in the rain without the proper gear.) Yet even seemingly remote folklore can be related to the characters, though the children themselves may not consciously make these connections. Ah Seow, for instance, while looking at a “poster of Three War Gods of Blood Brotherhood,” reflects on the Blind Man’s story, which relates that “Black face Chang Fei is full of brawls with little brains. Red face Kwan Kung has brain and brawls but not cunning. Pale face Lu Pei is less brawls but very cunning brain to become King of the Chu Dynasty through their great blood brotherhood spirit” (29).³ This description resonates with the three “spider boys” that are central to the novel: Chai is all “brawl” as he loses spider-fighting matches to Kwang and instead becomes Chinatown Yeow’s muscle; Ah Seow is book-smart and well-built, but is not street-smart; and

³ This does not exactly follow other representations of the blood brothers. Describing the Hsing T’ien Temple in Taiwan, Jonathan Chamberlain writes: “Kuan Kung, the red-faced God of War, occupies the central alter at the back. He is the most powerful God of the Chinese pantheon. He owes his position to the fact that he embodies to the fullest extent all the virtues of a warrior and knight. He had a strong right arm and acted with utter rectitude at all times. With two blood brothers, Chang Fei and Liu Pei, he carved a place for himself in the history books during a time of great upheaval” (39-40).

Kwang, the hero of the novel and winner of the “Spider Olympic Games,” is the most cunning character, as he is able to outsmart Chinatown Yeow by the end of the narrative. The folklore communicated to the children, thus, is not idle chatter but relates to their real-life situations. According to Elliot Oring, folklore must at its root reflect “ordinary humans living their everyday lives,” stressing “the human and the personal as opposed to the formal and institutional” (16). Subsequently, the stories and legends orally passed on by the Blind Man are one of the main outlets for expression and self-reflection offered to the characters of the novel.

One last form of “verbal art” we see in the novel, which constitutes its own subgenre within folklore, is the proverb.⁴ Most of the proverbs in *Spider Boys* follow a “dipodic” structure, meaning that the proverb is “broken in the middle, so that it consists of two balanced parts” (de Caro 184). Some of them are “a direct statement of a presumed truth,” while others use the more common “metaphorical” form (de Caro 186). For example, “Dragon Wong,” a father of one of the “spider boys,” relates the direct proverb to the boys, “This world is make for people to see. Money is make to be use,” while Chinatown Yeow recalls a “popular saying in secret societies, ‘Nobody is born brave. If you want to come out to roam, you must be, dare to be’” (47-8). Metaphorical proverbs, however, are more frequently found in the novel. Waiting for the right time to lure Kwang into his gang, Chinatown Yeow, foresees that “the fish must grow by itself before he net it” (133-4). Right before this proverb, we are told that Yeow “think like an old man, who has a vision,” emphasizing the notion that “when we use [a proverb] we are appealing to the authority of the ancients and the ancestors” (Cher 133, de Caro 189). It is for this reason that most of the proverbs come from the few elder characters of the novel, such as Yeow’s mentor,

⁴ A proverb is defined as “a traditional statement passed on in fixed form by oral transmission and assumed to convey some ethical or philosophical truth (or some other wise observation about life, the world, or human nature)” (de Caro 184).

Cheong Pak, who, referring to Kwang, tells him, ““Good horse is not easy to catch, be flexible with him...Bend like bamboo against the wind”” (134).

At the start of the novel, Kwang recalls a metaphorical proverb from the Blind Man. He tells Ah Seow, ““Remember the Blind Man always say in his stories? After a fire, if anything live again, it is very strong” (7). If the reader keeps this proverb in mind, the ending of *Spider Boys* is perhaps less depressing. After smoking opium, “Dragon Wong,” accidentally knocks over a kerosene lamp, setting Kwang’s village alight (218). Though we do not know that all the characters survive the fire, we know that Kwang does, leaving us to gather that though we do not know what will come of him, Kwang has come out stronger for all of his struggles.

Thus far, I have discussed the ways in which folklore influences the characters of *Spider Boys*, as well as how the novel itself participates in creating a sense of Singaporean folklore. Before concluding, I would like to consider how the non-standard English of the novel registers aurally for readers, making it sound out like orally transmitted folklore. In one of the only critical essays that I could find on *Spider Boys*, Anthea Fraser Gupta compares the language of the novel to that of Rex Shelley’s *Island in the Centre*. Noting that the cover of the novel presents *Spider Boys* as exhibiting “an authentic ‘exotic’” and “purely Singaporean” voice, she concludes that the novel “is in part the product of a much-traveled writer who has not mastered Standard English and in part, probably, the work of editors who have decided to allow some of the non-standard features to remain to create a spuriously authentic voice” (154, 167).⁵ Although Gupta observes minor elements of Singapore Colloquial English in the dialogue of the novel, she

⁵ To clarify, Gupta claims that whereas Shelley’s novel “uses a range of Englishes in his representation of speech,” including Standard, Non-Standard and Singapore Colloquial English, Cher’s English “is similar to natural patterns found in the speech and writing of English users of relatively low proficiency” (Gupta 158, 160).

ultimately asserts that “neither the narrative nor the dialogue is using Singapore Colloquial English” (161). While I cannot argue with Gupta’s rigorous analysis, there is a distinct difference between the narrator’s English, which is clearly what Gupta calls a “*learner variety*,” and the dialogue of the characters, which does contain some elements of Singapore Colloquial English—the most obvious being the twenty-one “lah”s I counted (160). There is, at the very least, an attempt by Cher to portray two different versions of Non-Standard English. Regardless, what I would like to highlight is how the oscillation between Non-Standard and Singapore Colloquial English causes the reader to switch vocal registers, drawing attention to the auditory quality of the prose. These different versions of English force the reader to listen to the narrative with what Garrett Stewart calls the “reading voice”—the voice we listen to within our auditory imagination when we read.⁶ Though folklore cannot be written, the aural dimension of the English dialects makes the novel approximate the spoken word and thus, the folk genre. But what could be Cher’s purpose for doing this; what does the novel gain from its associations with folklore?

As Singapore modernized at an accelerated rate, folk values, lore and life undoubtedly took on added meaning. Writing on the history of folklore studies, Simon Bronner attests:

Folklore represented the hidden roots from which modern life sprang. Yet folklore and folklife consisted of materials commonly collected in the midst of modern life. They were part of yet apart from modern life. They therefore raised questions of the state of the times and its progressive standards; they were both the basis and the antithesis of modern life. (xii-xiii)

⁶ I borrow the term “reading voice” from Stewart, who in his provocative study holds: “When we read to ourselves, our ears hear nothing. When we read, however, we listen” (11).

The hero of *Spider Boys*, Kwang, rebels from learning English and attending school, as well as following Chinatown Yeow and the Chinese secret societies that he represents. Through his rebellion, we can determine that the novel rejects the “fabrication” of Singaporean history (and hence, identity) offered by both the British and the Chinese. Instead, the novel suggests that in the midst of modernization, Singaporean identity can be found in the folklore of its people. The folklife of spider fighting and the folklore of supernatural experiences, deities, ghosts and proverbs, consistently remind the children of ethical values such as showing respect for another while maintaining self-respect, standing together even in the face of adversity, and following a general code of moral behavior. Though the children go to the movies, read comic books, buy denim jeans, and explore the bustling city, the folklore and folklife of the novel allows them to resist being completely and unquestioningly swept up in the rush of modernization.

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Where Everyone was Other: Jews in the Yokohama Treaty Port, 1859-1899

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The logo for the International Association for Cultural Interchange (iafor) is centered on the page. It features the lowercase letters 'iafor' in a light blue, sans-serif font. The text is enclosed within a circular graphic composed of two overlapping, curved lines. The upper line is a light blue arc, and the lower line is a light red arc, both curving around the text to form a partial circle.

Where Everyone was Other: Jews in the Yokohama Treaty Port, 1859-1899

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The Yokohama Treaty Port (1859-1899) was the main site for international exchange in Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century, having the largest international population.¹ The treaty port drew migrants globally. At least seventeen nationalities were present in the 1880s.² Jews, from the East as well as the West, were among those drawn to Yokohama. What Jews migrated to Yokohama? What was the character and structure of local Jewish ties? How were Jews received by others in the port? How did Jews respond to the ways they were received by others?

Reconstructing the Migration Stream

In 1800 most Jews lived in Europe.³ In 1939 almost half of all Jews lived outside Europe. International migration characterized Jewish experience in the nineteenth century and the opening decades of the twentieth century. Jewish migration to Yokohama was part of this larger collective outflow. As an American military officer serving in the treaty port wrote in 1869 about a ship in the harbor, "Large cargo of Jews on board..."⁴ As another international migrant wrote four years later about traveling from the United States to Japan: "The peculiarity of a sea-voyage across the Pacific is that you get almost all nationalities represented. English, French, Germans, Jews..."⁵ In an earlier study, I treated the demography of Jewish migrants in the treaty port.⁶ For present purposes, the following points help illuminate population features of the migration stream. Resident Jews often numbered around one hundred. Men outnumbered women. Married couples were common. Young adults predominated. But many migrants were middle-age or older. Many migrants were merchants, in retail trade and services or import and export.

Group Ties

Jews brought collective bonds with them. They had a historic identity which provided a basis for coalescing in daily life in Yokohama. The identity was rooted in a sense of mutuality which transcended national borders and served to connect Jews dispersed in the diaspora. As a leading European Jewish newspaper wrote in 1871, "We have sedulously brought the status of the Jews of Japan under the consideration of our readers....no distance is too great, no journey too difficult, to part the children of Israel, from each other 'in spirit.'"⁷ At the same time, Jews in the diaspora were separated by

regional differences in Jewish practices. Jews who migrated to Yokohama were from a number of lands of origin, among them, Alsace, Belgium, Britain France, Germany, Hungary, Moravia, Poland, Portugal, Russia, the United States, and, very likely, Australia, India, and Lithuania.⁸ Both a sense of affinity and particularistic differences operated in shaping Jewish ties in the treaty port.

A window on the differences complicating co-ethnic attachments was local Jewish religious life.⁹ By the early 1870s, Jewish migrants had established a religious congregation and erected a synagogue. Congregants were split, however, over different interpretations of religious law. One dispute, for example, was over the question of whether "...it was against Jewish law to pray for any sick or dying person on the evening of Friday—the commencement of the Sabbath..." In October 1872, the synagogue was sold at auction.

A main expression of group attachments was mutual assistance. Formal amelioration was practiced. The Jewish Benevolent Association of Yokohama was established.¹⁰ Informal help was also given. Migrants wrote to co-ethnics abroad about the treaty port as a prospective place to live. As one migrant wrote in 1866 to a Jewish newspaper in Europe: "...you have news from nearly all parts of the civilized world where our co-religionists dwell; but not having noticed any mention...of the few Jews who live in this distant part of the globe, and who are now daily arriving here from all parts...I think it may be interesting to your numerous readers to hear something of this remote corner of the world."¹¹

Chain migration, among family and friends, was common.¹² Maurice Russell, who arrived in the 1870s from England, was preceded in Yokohama by an uncle. Morris Ginsburg, who arrived in the 1870s from Russia, preceded two brothers. Alexander Marks, an American who wrote in 1866 to the Jewish newspaper in Europe, began his letter: "Myself and brother arrived here six years ago..." The ties of kith and kin became a factor in economic experience, facilitating upward mobility. Maurice Russell joined his uncle in business. Alexander Marks and his brother also were in business together. Julius Witkowski, who was from Poland, and Henri Blum, who was from France, operated a business.

A little more than a decade after the treaty port opened, a local newspaper spoke of there being a "Jewish community" in Yokohama.¹³ A small stream of migrants had indeed settled in the treaty port. Maurice Russell lived in Yokohama fifty years, Julius Witkowski more than twenty years.¹⁴ The migrants interacted with one another as co-

ethnics. Jewish ties were promulgated. An identity emerged which drew on historic attachments in combination with features which were expressive of the particular profile of the stream. The migrants remained engaged with Jews living elsewhere in the diaspora at the same time that they constructed their own Jewish milieu. In the 1860s, one international resident in Yokohama described the mix of migrants in the treaty port this way: “the most curious motely imaginable....”¹⁵ Jews were one group within this “motely.” How were the migrants received by fellow residents—other international migrants and Japanese?

In the Eyes of Others

Treaty ports constituted a new and distinctive cultural space in nineteenth-century Japan.¹⁶ From the mid 1600s to the mid 1800s, Japan had essentially closed itself to other countries. Starting in the 1850s, Western Powers had forced Japan to “open,” through the establishment of treaty ports at Yokohama and a few other “negotiated” sites including Nagasaki and Kobe. Foreign powers, including Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, had wanted access to Japan’s markets and through the treaty port framework Japan, while permitting non-Japanese to live and work in a few coastal cities, was able to keep the remainder of the country largely closed to those from abroad. What was the legal status of Jews in Japan’s treaty ports? Law aside, how were Jews received by their co-residents?

Law was complicated in Yokohama and the other treaty ports. Nationals of foreign nations which entered into the governing treaties were exempt from Japanese law but accountable to law of their respective homeland. Under the treaties, religions from the various foreign signatory nations were to have equal status in the treaty ports. Migrants were free to practice their religions. The treaty between Austro-Hungary and Japan stipulated: “Austro-Hungarian citizens residing in Japan shall be allowed the free exercise of their religion, and for this purpose they shall have the right to erect... suitable places of worship.”¹⁷ Under the governing treaties, nationals of the foreign signatory nations were in principle co-equals. The treaty between Britain and Japan stipulated: “...British...subjects will be allowed free and equal participation in all privileges, immunities, and advantages, that may have been, or may be hereafter, granted by His Majesty the Tycoon of Japan, to the Government or subjects of any other nation.”¹⁸

Jewish migrants, therefore, were not disadvantaged compared with other residents from overseas. Key rights—including place of residence, freedom of movement and economic activity, and political franchise (in port municipal affairs)—with freedom of

religion, were part of the migrants' experience in Yokohama. This reality was very different from what many of the migrants had known in their lands of origin. Legal disabilities had been a historic part of Jewish life in Europe and elsewhere. While disenfranchisement of one kind or another had been especially pronounced in Russia and Eastern Europe, legal intolerance had been the norm in lands further west as well. Jewish emancipation occurred in Britain, in 1858; Austro-Hungary, in 1867; and in Germany, in 1871. Treaty ports in Japan were indeed, under law, new space for Jews. As one publication in the early 1900s described Japan as a site for Jewish migration, "... for...the past forty years there exists in Japan full liberty of conscience."¹⁹

Yokohama, *de jure*, received Jews openly. How were the migrants actually engaged by fellow residents? Within the heterogeneous non-native population, the largest migrant group were Chinese (1887, some 2,300).²⁰ Chinese and Jews interacted. J. Lieberman, who was from Portugal, operated a business which employed at least three Chinese compradors.²¹ Lieberman did business with Chinese in the treaty port. He testified in court, in 1874, about one commercial transaction: "I bought 68,000 from this Chinaman...." It is not known, however, how local Chinese perceived and responded to Jewish migrants. The second largest migrant sub-population were Europeans and Americans of European stock (1887, some 1,500).²² Two noteworthy patterns can be identified for how these individuals received Jewish migrants.

First, "Europeans" brought historic Western negative attitudes towards Jews to Yokohama.²³ As a local newspaper wrote, "...to all intents and purposes we are a Christian community." How much anti-Semitism was present is hard to gauge. Examples of Jews as Other are common in the surviving sources. There is Christian proselytizing. A local Protestant minister wrote about one Jewish resident, he "...strange to say, is a Jew but a most liberal one; indeed, I think he is more of a Christian than a Jew." Another Protestant minister led a service focused on the theme of "Home Missions and the Jews." Jews are typed as unsavory and greedy. A newspaper wrote about the meeting of a local horse racing club: "Where do some of these people come from....Jews...Publicans...." A longtime resident wrote about a Jewish migrant: "He lived in a tastily—fitted up...bungalow....[renting property] as rum-shops...." Two residents observed about local topography: "On one side of the Rifle Range is a well-known treacherous little spot—a deep black bog, that no draining or filling up has ever been able to remove. Smooth and pleasant to look upon as a Jew money-lender, its hold, when once a victim is in its clutches, is as tenacious as that of the usurious Hebrew." In 1871 the American Consul wrote to Washington: there are "about a dozen Jews, who have troubled, and continue to trouble the Consul more [underlining in the original] and

honor America less [underlining in the original] than all the rest of our citizens together.”

In the German Consular Court in 1877 “E.A. Sanders, chief officer of the...brig *Wilhelmine* was charged by Aaron Cohen, a Russian subject and resident of...Yokohama, with having...inflicted a kick on plaintiff...leveled a double-barrelled gun at him, with the words, ‘You—Jew, if you again come on board, I shall shoot you.’”²⁴

Second, and more strikingly, Westerners in Yokohama used images of Jews to make sense of their new and uncharted relations with Japanese.²⁵ Jews as Other led to understanding of Japanese as Other. Fueled by Lost Tribe speculation, some Western migrants claimed Japanese shared Jewish ancestry. As Charles Delong, the American Minister in Japan, who spent time in Yokohama, wrote in 1874 about northern Japanese: their “mode of salutation...is analogous to that of the ancient Hebrews, whilst the beard and physiognomy of the people, in my mind, strongly resembles that nation.” Japanese merchants were equated with Jewish merchants. Rutherford Alcock, the British Minister to Japan, wrote about a purchase he hoped to make from a Japanese merchant on the day the treaty port opened: “Why, what does he mean? He asked six itziboos [for his merchandise]...which I have given, and now he wants twelve! What an extortionate Jew!” A local newspaper wrote in 1879, until about “...ten years ago merchants in Japan were rather a degraded class; they occupied a position similar to that which was held by the Jews in Europe, during the middle ages and it can hardly be expected that they should all possess enough self respect and inherent love of truth for its own sake to speak it when it clashes with their own interest.” The same newspaper wrote in 1890 about a Japanese landlord who had tried to collect back-rent: “Shylock’s pound of flesh has a modern parallel...” Another local newspaper wrote, in 1866: “Buddhism is a semi-Judaism...” An American migrant noted, in Japan, “[t]here is a...legend similar to that of the ‘Wandering Jew.’...old men who wander up and down this empire who have been bidden to remain on earth...[with] white hair and long white beards...they wander on for ages to come. The popular belief places them in the rank of kami [gods] rather than ordinary men.” Jews as “different” helped Western migrants place Japanese as “different.”

How were Jewish migrants received by Japanese? The Japanese authorities did not discriminate against Jews. International migrants worshipped as they wished. Townsend Harris, the first American Minister in Japan, reportedly remarked to a Japanese official: “You permit Budhists, Jews, Mahomedans, and Parsees to come to your country without any ban on their religion.”²⁶ Also, as Japan “opened,” the national government

employed migrants—among them Jews—in various positions. Julius Witkowski apparently first worked in Japan as a teacher.²⁷ After leaving Yokohama, Alexander Marks served as a diplomatic representative of Japan to Australia.²⁸ The Japanese government did business with Jewish migrants. One such Jewish-owned establishment was Samuel Samuel, a large British trading house, with a site in Yokohama. According to an account from 1919, "...the firm took a conspicuous part in the development of the country, and came into closer relationship with the Japanese Government than perhaps any other foreign house...float[ing] loans for the Japanese Government, and...supply[ing], under special arrangements, the material for the construction of the railways and other public works."²⁹ Finally, the Japanese government donated land for foreign burials in Yokohama. In the West, Jews and Christians historically were interred in separate cemeteries. But the Japanese authorities made no distinction between the religions in allotting land.³⁰

Given the "colonial" relations which operated in Yokohama, ordinary Japanese and the international migrants had limited social contact. As a Japanese newspaper wrote in 1885, "It is customary for our countrymen to complain that we are very often regarded by the Western nations as little better than the Formosan savages."³¹ As another Japanese newspaper wrote two years earlier, the international migrant still "regards the Japanese much as he would regard dirt or a savage."³² Jews would not have been distinctive for most Japanese in the port. Two sub-groups within the Japanese population that were aware of Jews were Christian converts and business owners who competed with the establishments of the international migrants. Western missionaries were intolerant of Judaism. A translation of the New Testament, in 1880, by two Yokohama missionaries included "traditional Christian stereotypes of the Jews as legalistic Pharisees, intransigent infidels, and Christ killers...."³³ Thomas Poate, a local Baptist missionary, apparently took no gratification if a "heathen" Japanese converted to Catholicism, not Protestantism, calling in 1880 such a convert a "Greek Jew."³⁴ In 1884 a Japanese newspaper wrote about Christian dominance in the West: "...infidels are prohibited from appointment to official position; and until quite recently England laid a ban upon believers in the Jewish religion...."³⁵

Some Japanese framed economic competition in invidious intergroup terms. As a Japanese newspaper speculated at the close of the treaty port era about potential problems from abroad the country faced: "One is an invasion of Chinese cheap labour; the second, an invasion of Jews; the third, an invasion of Parsees....The character of the Jews is well known....Japan has her trials before her."³⁶ A migrant wrote: "A Japanese contemporary, of a speculative turn of mind, indulges in some interesting reflections on

the wealth of the Rothschilds....if [it]...were brought to Japan...it would supply food, clothing, and shelter for every unit of the people, buy up all the railways, and supply an equipage with two horses to every third man in the Empire!”³⁷

Jewish Migrants Engaging Co-Residents

Faced with an environment closed in some respects and open in others, conditions known from abroad and ones radically new, the migrants made their way in Yokohama through a combination of centripetal and centrifugal behaviors. Group particularity was maintained. At times group boundaries were open. A factor in intergroup relations was which co-residents Jews interacted with. Also other dynamics besides anti-Semitism affected how Jewish migrants interacted with fellow residents.

How did Jews engage other international migrants? Two points suggest themselves. First, Jewish migrants acted to protect their rights—and opportunities—in the local civic arena. Legal equality was embraced. At least two Jewish migrants appearing in consular court proceedings protested that prevailing judicial practices discriminated against Jews. In 1872 Paul Weigart called as a witness in the Imperial Austrian Consular Court “objected to be[ing] sworn and said he belonged to the Jewish persuasion.”³⁸ The presiding judge “cautioned [the] witness that the evidence given by him would not have so much effect as that given by a man who had been duly sworn.” In 1865 L.A. Joseph, from Britain, was summoned by the American Consular Court to appear as a witness on a Saturday. Joseph wrote to the judge: “I have received a summons to appear in your Court...but I regret to say that I shall not be able to do so in consequence of its being my Sabbath-day, which in law (English as well as American) absolves me from appearing....Of course...I shall be able to appear on any other day.”³⁹

Oversight of the foreign cemetery became an issue.⁴⁰ In 1870 at a public meeting apparently only Protestant and Catholic representatives were chosen for the cemetery committee. Jews in attendance protested this development. “...Louis Strauss...made a strong protest against such an arbitrary proceeding...contend[ing]...that as so many nationalities were represented in the place...it would be unfair to choose representatives of two religious sects only.” The final makeup of the committee included “one independent member...two ministers of the Anglican Church...one Catholic priest, and one delegate of the Jewish community.” A local newspaper denied that the original committee had been chosen through, as it put it, “efforts [at] a sectarian colouring.” The newspaper added: “We must confess however that the Jewish party should have been left free to choose their own representative; the imposition of one elected by the whole meeting, instead of by that party alone, was a grave error....”

The press itself became an issue. In 1899 Julius Witkowski wrote to a local newspaper about its coverage: "I ...make the most emphatic protest against the gratuitous and unwarranted insult of Jews who now are in Japan, or may come to Japan...your comments must have the effect to stir up racial antagonism....Former articles...showed the same tendency in such a pronounced way that they were commented upon by your contemporaries...."⁴¹ Local Jews may have boycotted the newspaper over its coverage.⁴²

Second, relations between Jews and the other international migrants were in reality nuanced. Matters such as timing of arrival, local economic conditions, and class interests affected relations. Socioeconomic ties could override national and religious attachments. The Protestant minister mentioned above who praised a Jewish migrant for being more Christian than Jewish was referring to Raphael Schoyer, a successful American merchant.⁴³ In 1865 Schoyer, his Jewish identity publicly known, was elected the first president of the Yokohama foreign municipal council by his fellow property-holders. A Jewish merchant described by a Western military officer as "a gentleman of the Hebrew persuasion....young Israelite....our Jew...." was widely supported by his fellow merchants when he appeared in a court case in 1860.⁴⁴

Julius Witkowski's death sheds light on the complex character of Jewish interaction with other migrants.⁴⁵ As indicated by his letter to the newspaper protesting its alleged anti-Semitism, Witkowski affirmed his Jewish identity in the treaty port. Indeed, an obituary noted: "for many years [he] was the virtual leader among the Jewish community here." At the same time, he was active in the general community. Witkowski had social ties with non-Jews. The executor of his will was a non-Jewish migrant. In the end, the vexed relations between Jews and the other migrants framed Witkowski's experience. A newspaper eulogized him as a "noble Jew." A speaker at the funeral, while offering words of affection and admiration, described Witkowski as "one of [his] ...Hebrew friends...." Witkowski, as a Jew, remained Other for fellow migrants.

How did Jewish migrants engage Japanese? The migrants did not dismiss out of hand the idea of shared lineage with Japanese. In his 1866 letter to a Jewish newspaper in Europe, Alexander Marks wrote: "I have taken considerable trouble to ascertain if there are any Japanese Jews living in the capital (Yeddo), which is 16 English miles from this port, and have come in contact with very intelligent Japanese interpreters and they tell me that there is no such religion in Japan."⁴⁶ Whether Jews felt any affinity with Japanese as outgroups in relation to European-Christian influences is not known. On the one hand, there is evidence of social ties being formulated. Obituaries were found for

five Jewish migrants.⁴⁷ The accounts indicate Japanese mourners attended the funerals. On the other hand, there is evidence that Jews, like other migrants, distanced themselves from Japanese. Alexander Marks wrote: the Japanese government “is anything but a pleasant government to live under, and I feel thankful I was not born a Japanese....”⁴⁸ In 1896 the British minister to Japan wrote: “J. Witkowski came...has been 25 years in Japan....Thinks Japan will be uninhabitable for foreigners when the new Treaties [terminating the treaty ports] come into operation. Distrusts all Japanese.”⁴⁹

The experience of one Jewish migrant, Maurice Russell, illuminates the possible developments and problems Jews faced in interacting with the native population.⁵⁰ In his fifty years in Yokohama, Russell put together a very complex personal world. He was a local burgher, a successful merchant and figure in civic life. Among other community positions, he was treasurer of the Yokohama General Hospital and a member of the cemetery committee. He was active in Yokohama Jewish life, for many years president of the Jewish benevolent association. He also had strong national ties, a “member of the Committee of the Yokohama and Tokyo branch of the Royal Society of St. George, and an active supporter of the...British Association of Japan.” Russell balanced national, class, and ethnoreligious loyalties. To this mix of attachments, Russell added an intimate tie rare for a migrant in the treaty port. Marriage between Japanese and non-Japanese was uncommon in the semi-colonial environment. The Western migrants eschewed such racial intermixing. As one American migrant wrote about a Japanese and English couple, “...it disgusted me that a member of the Anglo-Saxon race should contrive such intimate relations with a Mongolian.” Maurice Russell was married for forty-four years to a Japanese woman, Saida Moyo. The marriage apparently was a happy one. The couple’s gravestone epitaph reads: “Maurice Russell...and his beloved wife, Moyo....” Maurice and Moyo had at least seven children.

In a 1909 interview, when asked about commerce in Japan, Russell responded: “The Japanese do not know how to pass through the vicissitudes...of...industrial development...they do not show that grit so necessary for successful work....Although capital is desirable...it is like the fifth wheel of a coach unless it is accompanied by European supervision...thoroughness, that ‘go’ and vim which foreigners have always shown in the enterprises with which they have been connected in this country.”⁵¹

How did Russell combine his feelings for Moyo with his feelings about Japanese? How did he balance Jewish particularism with his exogamous marriage? How did Maurice and Moyo, as a couple, fit into the migrants’ world? How did they fit into Japanese society? What identities did they pass on to their children?

In 1860 an American migrant described a walk he had taken: “Our coming had been spied by the [Japanese] children....There must have been a hundred following us... talking and shouting...saying...were we English, American, French, or Dutch. And when I said we were Hottentots they repeated the word Hottentot wondering what new nationality this was.”⁵² The treaty port was indeed an exotic amalgam. Within Yokohama the main division was between native and non-native. More than twenty years into the treaty port period a newspaper noted: “It would be difficult to conceive two communities more complete strangers to each other, so far as social intercourse is concerned, than are the Foreigners and Japanese living side by side in Yokohama.”⁵³ William Seward, the former American Secretary of State, in visiting the port in 1870, wrote: “...we are...unprepared for the different constitution of society we find here: instead of one community, two, standing side by side, each independent of the other—the one native, the other foreign.”⁵⁴

But the migrants themselves were split. Economic competition governed local life. In the words of one newspaper: Yokohama was “A business place before everything...”⁵⁵ The writer Lafcadio Hearn noted, “I suppose, after all, that the populations of the Open Ports of the Far East must be much more afflicted with *bourgeoisie* (if I can coin such a word) than any others—partly because composed almost exclusively of the mercantile middle-classes...”⁵⁶ In 1871 the American consul expelled some one hundred so-called “loafers” from the port.⁵⁷ In the words of a contemporary history, “...there was a class of foreigners...always to be found—an eyesore and a shame...”⁵⁸ Cultural difference inflamed—and framed—the economic contestation. As one migrant observed, “There are too many kinds of us....You can’t do much uniting in a community that is Chinese, English, American, German, French, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, Indian, Parsee....Even the white foreigners can’t keep together.”⁵⁹ A newspaper commented: “The effects of the seventeen conflicting [treaty] jurisdictions that impart such a charmingly variegated aspect to the history of legal procedure in Yokohama....change the whole character of commercial dealings....it will not be extravagant to say that the lawlessness of the Scriptural heathen was not much worse than the profusion and confusion of our laws in Yokohama.”⁶⁰ As late as 1880, Chinese many have been excluded from the local chamber of commerce.⁶¹

Jews, with their particularity, joined this agglomeration. They stood out. But so did everyone else. In being different, they fit in the port. Historic ties gave them a means to compete locally and a basis upon which to try to affirm relations with others. As Julius

Witkowski wrote to the local newspaper whose coverage he protested: “You talk about ‘Jewish firms’ as though they represented a special nationality, and that ...shows the current of your ideas. Why not, then, also make a distinction between Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Catholic, Quaker...firms? ‘Jews’ have fought and bled on every battlefield of America and Europe for the countries to which they belonged, and feel themselves as much Americans, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans...as others who pray to the Lord in a different way.”⁶²

Yokohama was a site for complex living arrangements. Reaching out beyond particularity was sometimes a choice made. Maurice Russell chose this path. In the ebb and flow of daily life, intergroup exchange was sometimes forced on individuals. In 1865, while conducting a meeting of the foreign municipal council, Raphael Schoyer fell seriously ill and lay dying.⁶³ The physician called to attend him was the Protestant minister who embraced him as more Christian than Jew—a medical missionary. To live—and die—in the treaty port was an exercise in negotiating Otherness.

The logo for the International Association for Asian Studies (iafor) is centered on the page. It features the lowercase letters "iafor" in a light blue, sans-serif font. The text is enclosed within a circular graphic composed of two overlapping, semi-transparent arcs: a light blue one in the foreground and a light red one behind it, creating a sense of depth and movement.

Notes

Abbreviations

DDK Department of State, United States, Diplomatic Despatches, Japan, Despatches from United States Consuls in Kanagawa, 1861-1897, Record Group 59, File Microcopy 135

DDY Department of State, United States, Diplomatic Despatches, Japan, Despatches from United States Consuls in Yokohama, 1897-1906, Record Group 59, File Microcopy 136

JC *Jewish Chronicle*

JD *Japan Directory* (Tokyo: Yumani Shoboh, 1996)
--various years

JWM *Japan Weekly Mail*

1. The findings presented in this study should be considered work-in-progress as I continue to research the topic. For a useful introduction to the Yokohama Treaty Port, see: Kato, Yuzo, ed., *Yokohama: Past and Present* (Yokohama: Yokohama City University Press, 1990).
2. See, for example: *Irish University Press Area Studies Series, British Parliamentary Papers, Japan, Volume 8, Embassy and Consular Commercial Reports, 1887-92* (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971), 317.
3. For this sentence and the next sentence, see: H.H. Ben-Sasson, ed., *A History of the Jewish People* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 790, 862.
4. Elinor Barnes and James Barnes, eds., *Naval Surgeon: Revolt in Japan, 1868-1869* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1963), 209.
5. Arthur Collins Maclay, *A Budget of Letters from Japan* (London: Ganesha Publishing, 2003), 9.
6. For this sentence and the remainder of the paragraph, see: Chester Proshan, "Economic Mobility and Ethnic Solidarity: Jewish Immigrants in the Yokohama Treaty Port, 1859-1899," (Paper presented at the Nineteenth Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia, Manila, Philippines, November 2006 [paper in conference CD]).
7. *JC*, January 13, 1871, 7.
8. Proshan, "Economic Mobility."
9. For this paragraph, see *JWM*: July 13, 1872, 432; July 20, 1872, 437, 445; August 3, 1872, 483; October 19, 1872, 675.

10. *JD*, 1900, 141.
11. *JC*, March 23, 1866, 5.
12. For this paragraph, see: *The Japan Weekly Chronicle*, October 4, 1923, 477; Lane Earns, "The Shanghai-Nagasaki Judaic Connection, 1859-1924," in Jonathan Goldstein, ed., *The Jews of China*, Volume 1 (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 161; *JD*, 1887, 73; *JC*, March 23, 1866, 5; *The Cyclopedia of Victoria* (Melbourne: Library Council of Victoria, 1988), 289; *The Eastern World*, August 2, 1902, 5; *Present Day Impressions of Japan* (Chicago: The Globe Encyclopedia, 1919), 253.
13. *JWM*, July 20, 1872, 437.
14. *The Japan Weekly Chronicle*, October 4, 1923, 477; *The Eastern World*, August 2, 1902, 5; *JD*, 1881, 54.
15. Hugh Cortazzi, ed., *Mitford's Japan: The Memoirs and Recollections, 1866-1906, of Algernon Bertram Mitford, the first Lord Redesdale* (London: The Athlone Press, 1985), 31.
16. For a valuable introduction to Japan's treaty ports, see: J.D. Hoare, *Japan's Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements: The Uninvited Guests, 1858-1899* (Sandgate, Kent: Japan Library, 1994).
17. *JD*, 1888, 14 [appendix].
18. *Ibid.*, 1872, [appendix, last page, Article XXIII].
19. *American Hebrew*, February 19, 1904, 445 [?], The Harold S. Williams Collection, part 7, the Green subject files (series 1, folders 1-138), reel 10, from the National Library of Australia, *Japan Through Western Eyes: Manuscript Records of Traders, Travellers, Missionaries, and Diplomats*, Adam Matthew Publications, 2004.
20. *Irish University Press Area Studies Series*, 317.
21. For this sentence and the next two sentences, see: *JWM*, October 10, 1874, 816-818.
22. *Irish University Press Area Studies Series*, 317.
23. For this paragraph, see: *JWM*, August 17, 1872, 507; Paul Blum, *Yokohama in 1872* (Tokyo: The Asiatic Society of Japan, 1963), 17, 18; *JWM*, January 2, 1897, 15; *Bell's Life in Yokohama*, September 21, 1878, 2; *Japan Gazette, Yokohama Semi-Centennial*, July 1909, 7; Richard Mounteney Jephson and Edward Pennell Elmhirst, *Our Life in Japan* (Tokyo: Edition Synapse, 2008), 114; DDK, reel 5, C.O. Shepard to Department of State, October 20, 1871.
24. *JWM*, September 29, 1877, 854.
25. For this paragraph, see: *Ibid.*, November 21, 1874, 966; Rutherford Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon*, Volume 1 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 145, 146; *JWM*, March 15, 1879, 316; *Ibid.*, September 27, 1890, 295; *Japan Times*, June 16, 1866, 274; F.G. Notehelfer, ed., *Japan Through American Eyes: The Journal of Francis Hall*,

- Kanagawa and Yokohama, 1859-1866* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 122.
26. George Smith, *Ten Weeks in Japan* (London: Ganesha Publishing, 2002), 326.
27. *The Eastern World*, August 2, 1902, 5.
28. *The Cyclopedia of Victoria*, 289.
29. *Present-Day Impressions of Japan*, 245.
30. Kato, *Yokohama: Past and Present*, 50; also see: *JWM*, May 28, 1870, 230-233.
31. *Ibid.*, October 10, 1885, 344.
32. *Ibid.*, August 11, 1883, 357.
33. David Goodman and Miyazawa, Masanori, *Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 38, 39.
34. Richard Poate Stebbins, *The Japanese Experience: The Missionary Letters of Belle Marsh Poate and Thomas Pratt Poate, 1876-1892* (New York: Peter Lang, 1992), 93, 94.
35. *JWM*, July 12, 1884, 50.
36. *Ibid.*, July 18, 1899, 34.
37. *Ibid.*, March 2, 1895, 243.
38. *Ibid.*, March 30, 1872, 174.
39. *Japan Times*, December 8, 1865, 86.
40. For this paragraph, see: *JC*, August 26, 1870, 7; *JWM*, June 4, 1870, 256.
41. *Ibid.*, July 15, 1899, 63.
42. *Ibid.*, July 15, 1899, 53.
43. For this sentence and the next sentence, see: Blum, *Yokohama*, 17, 18; *Japan Gazette, Yokohama Semi-Centennial*, July 1909, 7; DDK, reel 2, Fisher to Seward, August 26, 1865; *The Japan Times*, September 8, 1865, 2, 3.
44. Edward Barrington de Fonblanque, *Nippon and Pe-che-li* (London: Ganesha Publishing, 2002), 81; Michael Moss, *Seizure by the Japanese, and His Treatment by the Consul-General* (London: William Ridgway, 1863), 170-176 [copy of book seen: British Foreign Office: Japan Correspondence, F. O. 46, Section II, 1868-1890, Volume 119, p. 222 to Volume 122, p. 214, reel 70, Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, Delaware].
45. For this paragraph, see: *JWM*, August 2, 1902, 115; DDY, reel 3, E.C. Bellows to David Hill, July 31, 1902; *The Eastern World*, August 9, 1902, 5.
46. *JC*, March 23, 1866, 5; also see: *Ibid.*, April 16, 1869, 10.
47. For this sentence and the next sentence, see: *JWM*, May 30, 1896, 599; *Ibid.*, October 31, 1896, 483; *Ibid.*, September 4, 1897, 246; *The Eastern World*, August 9, 1902, 5; *JWM*, June 20, 1908, 703.
48. *JC*, March 23, 1866, 5.

49. Ian Ruxton, ed., *The Diaries of Sir Ernest Satow, British Minister in Tokyo (1895-1900): A Diplomat Returns to Japan* (Tokyo: Edition Synapse, 2003), 61.
50. For this paragraph, see: *The Japan Weekly Chronicle*, October 4, 1923, 477, 478; *Japan Gazette, Yokohama Semi-Centennial*, July 1909, 51, 52; M. William Steele and Ichimata, Tamiko, eds., *Clara's Diary: An American Girl in Meiji Japan*, Clara A.N. Whitney (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1979), 54; 小山騰『国際結婚第一号』（講談社、東京都、1995） [see in list of marriages following page 262 marriage #34; I am grateful to Reiko Yumura, adjunct professor, Japanese, Komazawa University, for translating the source]; Patricia McCabe, *Gaijin Bochi: The Foreigners' Cemetery, Yokohama, Japan* (London: British Association for Cemeteries in South Asia, 1994), 279.
51. *Japan Gazette, Yokohama Semi-Centennial*, July 1909, 52.
52. Notehelper, *Japan Through American Eyes*, 111.
53. *JWM*, August 11, 1883, 357.
54. Olive Risley Seward, ed., *William H. Seward's Travels around the World* (New York: D. Appleton, 1873), 38.
55. *JWM*, April 7, 1894, 410.
56. Elizabeth Bislan, ed., *The Japanese Letters of Lafcadio Hearn* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1971), 262.
57. *The Far East*, April 17, 1871, 6; *JWM*, July 20, 1872, 437.
58. John Black, *Young Japan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 98, 99.
59. Clarence Ludlow Brownell, *The Heart of Japan: Glimpses of Life and Nature Far From the Travellers' Track in the Land of the Rising Sun* (London: Methuen, n.d.), 77.
60. *JWM*, December 29, 1883, 836.
61. *Japan Gazette*, February 3, 1880, 2.
62. *JWM*, July 22, 1899, 89.
63. For this sentence and the next sentence, see: DDK, reel 2, Fisher to Seward, August 26, 1865 [see attached obituary].

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The whereabouts of conducting research in Malaysian setting in exploring Malay mothers' experiences of having a child with cancer: Learning the cultural variation from the past for the practicality of the future

Title: The whereabouts of conducting research in Malaysian setting in exploring Malay mothers' experiences of having a child with cancer: Learning the cultural variation from the past for the practicality of the future.

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Abstract

Learning the whereabouts of particular societal context prior to conducting research fieldwork could assist a researcher in terms of respecting and creating cultural awareness and appreciating cultural differences. Thus, in order to study a certain population, for example in relation to the study of exploring the Malay mothers' experiences of having a child with cancer, a researcher needs to be responsive to the issues that require significant attention before making decision to conduct data collection. These include the local customary practices, religious requirements, participants' psychological and emotional well-being and the formality of bureaucratic procedures and protocols. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that prior information or knowledge about these important issues must not dominate a researcher's presupposition and notion of culture in their endeavor to accept new possibilities in that particular context. Taking these issues on board could help the researcher in regards to their level of preparedness and thus could develop necessary skills as well as strategies that need to be taken into consideration when addressing certain issues before data gathering. The information presented in this article was prepared with the hope that it could assist novice researcher, particularly those who attempt to engage in their study in Malaysian Asian society in their quest to learn from the past for the practicality of the future.

Introduction

The statistics reported by the National Cancer Registry of Malaysia have indicated that there is an increased number of cases of childhood cancer in Malaysia. Leukemia is the top prevailing cancer among children in Malaysia (Lim & Halimah, 2004). Although the pediatric oncology in Malaysia has experienced tremendous advancement in terms of cancer multi-faceted treatments and various ways to reduce the impacts of treatment for the past few years (Lim, 2006), childhood cancer is still considered as a traumatic and painful experience not only for the pediatric patients but also for their parents and families. Mothers particularly greatly impacted by their child's cancer as they undertake the main role of caring for the child throughout hospitalization and treatment processes (Eiser, 2005; Moreira, 2008). The researcher of this article is studying the Malay mothers' experiences of having a child with cancer in a teaching hospital in Malaysia.

Mothers especially the Malay, a group of individual who seldom appear in the literature and probably unknown to many, deal with unique and different experiences from those of mothers in Western or of any other Asian country. In fact, conducting fieldwork research in Malaysia involving the Malay mothers required the researcher to take into consideration several important issues such as the Malay's customary practices, religious requirements, mothers' psychological and emotional well being as well as procedural factors which influenced the strategies of sampling, recruitment process and methods to be used in collecting data.

This article attempts to delineate these factors or issues before getting into the field particularly in the Malaysian setting. It is accompanied with the explication of appropriate strategies to address these issues. Hopefully, other researchers will benefit from the information obtained from the interviewing process among Malay mothers who have a child diagnosed with cancer. The information from this data collection process is presented to enlighten the novice researchers about the whereabouts of data collection in Malaysia, particularly in the area of health related studies and researches.

Customary practices

In the pursuit of research, any researchers who intend to conduct a study which involves cross cultural context need to recognise the customary practices of certain group of people that they wish to engage with. In regards to this research, although the researcher is familiar with the language and cultural settings of the Malay in Malaysia, she still needs to be mindful of and be sensitive to the certain customary practices. The Malays observe a set of values and it is important to recognize the significance of these values before approaching the prospective participants for the study.

In terms of the customary practices, the Malays have the desire to please others. Thus, they may find it difficult to say "no" and thus may demonstrate a strong desire to please the researcher. Appropriate strategies need to be addressed so that the researcher ensures participants to have clear understanding of their role and what is expected of them (Abdullah, 1992). In addition, the Malay people in general are not verbally expressive for fear of being insincere or too direct. They tend to be communicating disappointment indirectly to avoid hurting the other party's feelings. An appropriate strategy such as providing non-verbal feedback for the participants should be considered so that the participants do not have to inform the researcher in person of their decision to participate. In addition, it is considerably helpful if the researcher assigns an intermediary to explain briefly on the nature of the research to the participants before they are introduced to the researcher.

In addition, the Malays are generally less candid, open and expressive in communicating their feelings and ideas to others especially with those who are outside their family unit. The aspect of harmony and preserving face are also very important. Attention needs to be given so that these

values are recognised and respected (Salleh, 2005). Hence, strategies aimed at developing the relationship between both parties, such as organizing an informal initial meeting to build good rapport and displaying acts of politeness, can facilitate the interview process.

Another factor to be considered in the Malay's customary practices is the religious ceremonies of the Malays who are mostly Muslim. The Malays have certain days of celebration that require them to gather with their family members and relatives, such as Hari Raya Aidil Fitri and Aidil Adha. On these days, most will return to their hometowns to celebrate. Having an interview during these occasions is considered insensitive and thus should be avoided in order to care for the psychological and emotional state of the mothers. Thus, the researcher needs to make attempts to organize interview sessions outside these festive days.

Moreover, particular consideration needs to be made in terms of establishing rapport and building relationships with the potential participants which will then assist the researcher to 'go extra mile' in order to facilitate the flow of conversation during the actual interviews. The social pleasantries displayed by the researcher are essential particularly among the Malays. According to Abdullah, the Malays are more appreciative of the efforts taken in considering their religion, displaying politeness, being patient and respecting their feelings (Abdullah, 2001, p.19).

In terms of communication, the primary language used in Malaysia is Bahasa Malaysia (the national language of Malaysia) and the secondary language is English. Most likely, the Malay people prefer to speak in Bahasa Malaysia. However, the researcher should let the mothers choose to speak in any language that best suits them as they may sometimes use these two languages interchangeably. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the common type of spoken English in Malaysia is Malaysian English which is not restricted to the grammatical rules of Standard English. Thus, the researcher should be careful not to make assumptions about their level of English proficiency and respect the variations in accent and expressions.

Religious requirement

The researcher must be sensitive to the religious requirement which govern the customs, tradition and life of the Malay in Malaysia. The Malays have a predominately Muslim background and follow the Islamic religious practice in their day-to-day life. For the Malays, Islamic practices play an important role in their social and cultural life. Generally, Islamic laws are followed for marriages, family matters, dress codes, funerals, social relationships and other aspects of a Malay's life (Kling, 1995). For example, in the case of this study, the wife needs to seek permission and blessing from her husband before making the decision to participate in the interview. Hence, the researcher needs to consider this requirement in the recruitment process and explain the necessary steps in getting participants' consent to be involved in the research study.

In addition, The Malays also do not appreciate displays of affection in public places. Thus, the researcher needs to respect these aspects of the religion and be prepared to develop strategies to accommodate them. In a situation where a female researcher intends to interview male participants, it is worthwhile to consider having someone who shares the same gender with the researcher to assist her in the setting of the interview. Furthermore, organising an interview session in a close and private setting between female researcher and male participants for example, is considered inappropriate and insensitive.

Psychological and emotional being of mothers

Given the nature of this study that explores the experiences of Malay mothers who have a child diagnosed with cancer, the researcher needs to be aware of the potential distress in talking to the mothers about their situation in caring for their children. Potential distress refers to the psychological and emotional distress that may be faced by mothers who are involved in the study. In recognizing this issue, any researcher needs to make sure that these mothers are supported by a counselling service if they require it so that they are able to talk about their concerns. The researcher is required to explain to the mothers that it is possible for them to request counselling in the hospital. The mothers and their children can also look for family counselling services if they prefer to do so.

It should be noted, however, the practice of seeking professional help like a counselling service or even a social worker is still not common in Malaysia, unlike in developed countries. Although the role of professionals such as a counsellor or a social worker has been established, it is not openly practiced by the locals in Malaysia (Kinzie, Sushama & Lee, 1972). Mothers from urban areas and with higher educational backgrounds may potentially seek out counselling, but some mothers still abide by traditional and cultural beliefs that do not allow people to talk to others outside their families regarding family affairs and their feelings and therefore may not choose to use the service. They prefer and are allowed to talk about their feelings and problems to those in the immediate family or those related to them such as their parents, relatives or even a religious leader. As this is often done more informally in the family system, the researcher is required to politely advise the mothers to express their feelings to those who they feel most comfortable with instead of using counselling service offered to them.

In addition, as the researcher talks to mothers of children who are receiving treatment for cancer, it is understandable that the mothers are facing emotional distress when caring for their children. During the interview, the mothers might find it difficult to tell and share their stories. The mothers might cry and feel emotionally drained. In this case, the researcher needs to reassure the mothers that it is totally normal and expected for them to feel that way. The mother should be given an opportunity for taking a break or talk to the researcher whenever they are ready to share their stories and continue the interview or reschedule the interview at some other times. These

strategies concerning ethical issues are considered essential in protecting the participants' emotional and psychological beings.

Procedures and protocols

When attempting to engage in a research enterprise in a foreign country, it is essential for any researcher to have a solid understanding of the bureaucratic process and systems operating in certain countries. The researcher's efforts to acquire knowledge and understanding of certain country's systems and how they operate indicate that the researcher is being sensitive and aware of a country's distinctive procedures and protocols.

In relation to this study, the Malaysian settings have a strong respect for authority, status and hierarchy. Thus, a researcher is likely to engage in a manner of courtesy and following the standardized rituals according to his or her rank. The idea of formality is important when addressing a person from a higher rank and those who hold an authority to authorize any request or application (Salleh, 2005). Therefore, in order to conduct research in Malaysia from an overseas institution, the researcher needs to register the research project with the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), the Prime Minister's department of the Malaysian Government. The registration of the research project can be made online and needs to be approved before any research is to be undertaken from an overseas institution. If the research application is approved, a letter of authorization would be released from the EPU to conduct research in Malaysia. With the advancement of information and technology, the forms can be accessed online through the Prime Minister's department, Malaysia.

In terms of gaining access to the fieldwork site, the researcher needs to look for a proposed supervisor from the university hospital. In relation to this study, this means a consultant from the Paediatric Oncology Department needs to monitor the research project. The teaching hospital was chosen for the study because it is one of the renowned public medical centres that provide central facilities for paediatric cancer treatment and procedures in Malaysia. Thus, the researcher could recruit a pool of potential participants in the Paediatric Oncology Department. Initial contact with the potential supervisor should be established 12 months prior to the data collection process.

Once a supervisory role has been established, the researcher needs to complete an application to conduct research form which can be downloaded from the teaching hospital's website. Prior to approval, the teaching hospital Research and Ethics Committee would assess the application in order to safeguard the human subject of any research. Continual communication and feedback are necessary in order to maintain a good flow of information and researcher- supervisor affiliation. In terms of getting the agreement from the Counselling Unit in the teaching hospital to provide counselling referrals, prior contact needs to be made formally so that the mothers are provisioned to get services if they require them.

Conclusion

Understanding the customary practices, religious requirements and procedures of conducting research in Malaysia is important before making a decision to conduct fieldwork research. The efforts made in understanding the local customary practices help one to appreciate the diversity of participants' way of life so that appropriate strategies can be implemented to address any issues that may arise during fieldwork. An equipped knowledge of the bureaucratic procedures and protocols in a country is necessary before embarking on any research project. Furthermore, although a researcher may share the same cultural values, customary practices, language and religion with the participants, he or she still needs to be constantly aware of and respect the cultural variation of these mothers so that the researcher does not imposed any prior assumptions. However, basic understanding of the local culture and customary practices assist the researcher to be aware of the issues that need to be taken into account before partaking the field research. Furthermore, in studying the Malay mothers of children with cancer , further deliberation needs to be kept in mind regarding the emotional and psychological being of the mothers as to ethically safeguard the participants of the study.

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Communal Political Paradigm after the 2008 Election in Malaysia

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Communal Political Paradigm after the 2008 Election in Malaysia

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Introduction

For multi-ethnic Malaysia, the achievement of a cohesive national identity has been a core goal and the development of national integration have been facilitated with various forms over the last five decades. Najib, current Prime Minister, said that efforts to achieve national integration were given priority (*New Straits Times* 7 June 2009). He argued that the Malaysians, people of all races and religions, must think and act beyond the boundaries of ethnicity and race (Ministry of Information, Communication and Culture 2009, 7-9) while he has urged citizens to repair their bridges and tear down the divisive walls that exist among them (*New Straits Times* 31 August 2009).

The Malaysian government has been ruled by the coalition, Alliance (1955-74) and *Barisan Nasional* (BN) (1974-present), which consists of several ethnic parties¹, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO, Malay party)², Malaysia Chinese Association (MCA, Chinese party)³ and Malaysia Indian Congress (MIC, Indian party)⁴, ostensibly representing ethnic interests and identity. The BN coalition government has maintained its legitimacy by balancing the communal demands of the component parties even though the coalition is dominated by UMNO. Like the BN, opposition political parties are also largely ethnic-based and focus on communal-related issues although their communal character has seemed to be moderated under the form of the opposition coalition, the *Pakatan Rakyat* (PR), made up of *Parti Keadilan Rakyat* (PKR)⁵, *Parti Islam Se-Malaysia* (PAS) and Democratic Action Party (DAP). PAS, a Malay based opposition party, has consistently emphasized Islamic issues, especially the establishment of an Islamic state. DAP, a Chinese based opposition party, has emphasized the protection and development of Chinese language and education in line with the idea of 'Malaysian Malaysia'. The significant electoral support for these opposition parties has pressured the BN to be responsive to the demands of various ethnic communities.

Needless to say, this political structure based on ethnicity (ethnic politics) has caused a rise of ethnic identity and thus made the national integration difficult as Tan Chee Beng (1988, 155) argued that the BN system based on ethnic politics tended to widen the communal gap rather than promote national integration. In addition, it has contributed to the creation of complicated decision-making process and made it difficult for the

¹ Made up of thirteen parties, the BN represents almost all of the ethnic communities in Malaysia.

² UMNO was founded in 1946 as a communal party based on protecting Malay interests.


³ In 1949, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) was formed to dispel the suspicion that most Chinese sympathized with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and to protect Chinese interests.

⁴ The Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) was established in 1946 to represent the Indian community.

⁵ *Parti Keadilan Nasional* (Keadilan) was formed by Wan Azizah in 1999. In 2003, through a merger of Keadilan and *Parti Rakyat Malaysia* (PRM), PKR was formed. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister, has been a *de facto* leader. As 31 PKR members of parliament are multiethnic, the party is recognized as a multiethnic party. About 50 per cent of the PKR members are the Malays, and the Chinese constitute 12 per cent, the Indians 23 per cent and other Malaysians 15 per cent (*Malaysiakini* 27 November 2010).

<http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/149313>

government to indicate a consistent policy framework for national integration. Indeed, it has influenced the shaping of socio-cultural policies which are recognised as key areas for promoting a cohesive national identity. Intimately connected to ethnic interests and identity, socio-cultural policies can swing ethnic votes in elections. The government has to balance demands of the component parties within the BN and policy compromises have to be negotiated, because the BN needs Malay and non-Malay votes in elections to maintain its legitimacy. Also, as the BN has traditionally competed against PAS for Malay votes and against DAP for Chinese votes, the coalition government has to be responsive to communal demands of various communities in order to prevent Malay and Chinese votes from being channelled in large numbers to PAS or DAP. As a result, policies have been juggled between assimilationism and multiculturalism (see Figure 1) and the nature of the policies have been ambiguous, incorporating Malay cultural dominance and the recognition of non-Malay cultural rights. Due to their ambiguous nature, the policies have played only a limited role in promoting national integration. It can be understood that this ethnic politics has impeded the development of national integration.



Some political observers have predicted that the 2008 election outcome signals a paradigm shift away from ethnic politics while others raise the possibility that ethnic politics still continue. In this paper, the trajectory and travails of the communal political paradigm will be further examined, by considering the results of the 2008 election and the political manoeuvrings of political parties following the election, to assess whether communal politics has run its course in Malaysia. As whether ethnic politics will be maintained is closely related to the development of national integration, this study would help to indicate the future direction and possibilities of national integration.

Ethnic politics and the 2008 Election

The 2008 election has been referred to as a major political tsunami (Toh 2008, 13) as the BN failed to win a two-thirds majority in parliament. The BN won only 140 of 222 seats in parliament and 51.4 per cent of votes⁶ compared to 198 of 219 seats and 63.8 per cent of votes in the 2004 election (Loh 2007, 8). At the state level, the BN lost control of five states, Kedah, Kelantan, Penang, Perak and Selangor, and the Federal

⁶ <http://www.sinchew-i.com/special/election2008/result.phtml> (14 August 2008)

Territory of Kuala Lumpur. The opposition political coalition, the PR, achieved a remarkable breakthrough with 46.8 per cent of votes. In parliament, the number of PKR seats increased from one in 2004 to 31 while PAS increased from 7 to 23 and DAP from 12 to 28⁷.

Following this electoral tsunami, many political observers predicted that the demise of ethnic politics was underway (Toh 2008, 13-5). The result of the 2008 election is commonly assumed to represent the public rejection of the BN's communal political paradigm (Thomas 2008, 40). The PR advocates a multiethnic agenda based on not ethnic-based but needs-based approach. The PKR, a lone multiethnic party within the PR, manifesto (2008) clearly stated that the party guaranteed the rights and privileges of all Malaysians and rejected Malay preferential policies. The 2008 election was thought of as a 'critical juncture' in Malaysia's political paradigm. However, it is premature to predict that the Malaysian political structure has shifted towards a multiethnic paradigm merely because the PR increased the number of seats. It is significant to examine the direction of ethnic politics by analysing the 2008 election and the moves of several parties after the election.

It is worth noting that parliamentary seats in non-Malay majority constituencies, where the non-Malays account for more than 60 per cent of voters, were won by Chinese parties such as MCA and DAP (see Chart 1). Malay majority constituencies, where more than 60 per cent of total electorates are the Malays, were won by Malay parties such as UMNO and PAS (see Chart 1). This suggests that ethnic politics have not been eliminated altogether. These results can be attributed to the fact that the PR nominated mainly DAP candidates in non-Malay majority constituencies and PAS candidates in Malay majority constituencies. In short, the PR pragmatically adopted ethnic electoral strategies, even though it champions multiracial politics.


Even in Penang where the PR won control of the state, the political culture is still ethnic-based. Ramasamy (Indian Malaysian), the Deputy Chief Minister of Penang and DAP state assembly member of Penang, observed that many Indians assumed that he would be in charge of Indian affairs (*New Straits Times* 17 June 2008). In the by-election in Permatang Pasir, Mohd Salleh (PAS candidate) campaigned with several state DAP leaders to fish for Chinese votes comprising roughly 25 per cent of all voters (*New Straits Times* 23 August 2009).

The PKR's solid performance in multiethnic constituencies, where up to 60 per cent of total electorates are the Malays, is recognized as an indication of the shift away from ethnic politics. It received support from all ethnic communities who were prepared to accept a non-ethnic socio-economic agenda (Toh 2008, 14). Before 2008, the BN received strong electoral support in multiethnic constituencies while opposition such as PAS and DAP received support only in Malay and Chinese majority areas. The BN won 90 to 100 per cent of seat in small Malay majority constituencies, where the Malays account for 50 to 66.6 per cent of voters, and in mixed constituencies, where no ethnic group constitutes the majority of voters (Loh 2007, 9). However, in the 2008 election, the PR, especially PKR, won about half of parliamentary seats in multiethnic constituencies (see Chart 1). The PR won control of Perak, where Malays account for 47.0 per cent, and of Selangor, in which 50.7 per cent are Malays (Khoo Philip 2008, 6).

⁷ <http://thestar.com.my/election2004/results.html> (9 April 2004)

<http://www.sinchew-i.com/special/election2008/result.phtml> (14 August 2008)

Chart 1
Parliament in Peninsular Malaysia:
Opposition Percentage by Ethnic Composition by Party, 2008



(Source) Khoo Philip (2008, 19)

On the other hand, the BN component parties won about half of their seats in multiethnic constituencies (see Chart 1). Many Malaysians still support the BN's communal politics rather than the PKR-led PR's multiethnic agenda. In addition, PKR largely won a seat with only 50-55 per cent of the total votes in multiethnic constituencies while the BN normally won with more than 55 per cent of the votes (see Chart 1). This suggests that support for the BN's ethnic politics remains strong while support for PKR's multiethnic agenda appears contingent. Khoo Philip (2008, 7) believes that these results hint at how hard PKR has to work to consolidate its support.

In addition, examination of the relationship between the electoral strategies and the shift in ethnic votes indicates that BN's weak performance is partly due to its failure to effectively manage ethnic politics. The percentage of Chinese support that swung to the opposition was 30 per cent while the Indian swing vote was 35 per cent (Maznah 2008, 447). As such, the reduced number of BN seats in parliament and state assemblies stemmed from a significant shift of non-Malay support to DAP and PKR.

BN's electoral approach in the lead-up to the 2008 election was to reaffirm Malay dominance and supremacy. In 2005, Hishammuddin Hussein, the UMNO Youth Chief and Education Minister, urged that the New Economic Policy (NEP)⁸, an ethnic-based affirmative action programme (Malay preferential policies) implemented in 1971, should be reapplied (*New Straits Times*, 21 July 2005). To add to the non-Malays angst, Abdullah, the fifth Prime Minister, urged the Malaysians not to question Malay's special rights and privileges (Abdullah 2007). Not surprisingly, the BN's commitment to Malay supremacy resulted in a sharp decrease of MCA, Gerakan⁹ and MIC seats as they had

⁸ The NEP was designed to narrow the socio-economic disparities between the Malays and non-Malays. The first objective of the NEP was 'to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty' (Malaysia 1971, 1). The second was 'to accelerate the process of restructuring Malaysian society to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function' (Malaysia 1971, 1).

⁹ Formed in 1968, the *Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia* (Gerakan) is committed to the pursuit of non-communal politics but, in reality, depends on Chinese votes and is primarily concerned with Chinese interests.

been unable to champion the interests of their ethnic constituencies (Khoo Boo Teik 2008, 6).

In addition, the draconian response to the Hindraf, which called for the improvement of Indians' living standards and the end of Malay preferential policy, has severely eroded non-Malay support for the BN (Thomas 2008, 33). The BN government had not only accused Hindraf leaders of inflaming ethnic tensions but also Capitalising on this Indian anger, PAS, PKR and DAP promised to resolve Indian community concerns (*Malaysiakini*, 3 March 2008)¹⁰.

Unexpectedly, this strategy to commit Malay dominance for securing Malay support backfired, as a significant number of Malays swung to opposition parties. The number of PAS seats in parliament increased dramatically; however, the amount of Malay support for PAS did not increase and the increased number of PAS seats was made possible primarily by non-Malay support (*Malaysiakini*, 18 August 2008)¹¹. Many Malay voters swung to PKR, especially in multiethnic constituencies. Malay voters were angered by the perceived abuse of power by UMNO and the spiralling costs of living. PKR's claim that the NEP had led to the rise of cronyism and corruption and caused disparity within the Malay community also resonated with the Malay community (Ooi 2008, 50 and 51). The PKR's new agenda was expected to deliver greater equitable benefits to the Malay community. As a result, Malay support for the BN fell 14 points to 52 per cent (*New Straits Times* 8 April 2008) although the BN, especially UMNO, still performed well in Malay majority areas and won half the seats in multiethnic constituencies (see Chart 1).

The BN's heavy electoral loss in the 2008 election can be attributed to its failure in securing Malay support while alienating non-Malay support by affirming Malay dominance. In the 2008 election, the BN failed in delicately balancing the interests and grievances of the ethnic communities and effectively managing ethnic politics. If the BN had developed its multicultural stance instead of affirming Malay supremacy, it might have succeeded in securing a two-thirds majority in parliament.

Political Strategies of the BN after the 2008 Election

After the election, the BN has initiated several reforms to revive public support. Most importantly, the BN government has moved towards a multicultural stance. The BN, especially UMNO, has downplayed its Malay dominance stance. In an act of compromise, Najib promised to champion the rights not only of the Malays but also of the non-Malays (*Malaysiakini*, 19 August 2008)¹². After assuming the office of the Prime Minister, Najib introduced the 1 Malaysia concept in the effort to create a Malaysian race. As he argued that 1 Malaysia values and respects the ethnic identities of each race in Malaysia (Ministry of Information, Communication and Culture 2009, 11) and the underlying foundation of the concept is the principle of fairness for all ethnicities (Ministry of Information, Communication and Culture 2009, 12), 1 Malaysia concept has emphasised the national integration through the development of multiculturalism and "unity in diversity".

The government decided to build new non-Malay primary schools, to increase financial

¹⁰ <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/79047>

¹¹ <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/88050>

¹² <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/88061>

aid to non-Malay schools and to recruit teachers to these schools (*New Straits Times*, 4 April, 3 May and 29 May 2008, Malaysia 2010 and Chua Soi Lek 2010). Also, Najib has said that all students, regardless of ethnicity, who satisfied the government requirements, will receive scholarship for either overseas or local universities (*The Star* 10 July 2010)¹³. Responding to Indian complaints of being marginalised, the government formed a special cabinet committee to promote their well-being (*Malaysiakini*, 19 August 2008)¹⁴ and pledged to carry out various programmes for the community (*New Straits Times* 1 April 2009).

These initiatives suggest that there is a shift from an ethnic-based to a needs-based approach and an elevation of multiculturalism. However, Najib has not showed specific details and few concrete policies representing a qualitative shift towards a needs-based approach have materialised. The Malaysians did not feel that there had been any practical change or reform as promised (*Malaysiakini*, 19 January 2009)¹⁵. The shift following the BN's disastrous 2008 electoral performance can be interpreted as an effort to effectively manage ethnic politics and a pragmatic response designed to regain electoral support¹⁶.

In addition, even after the 2008 election, leading to the prediction of the end of ethnic politics, the BN substantially continues to maintain its paradigm of ethnic politics although the BN government has moved towards the development of multiculturalism and introduced the 1 Malaysia concept indicating that each representatives need to transcend ethnic boundaries and extend their services to other ethnic groups (Ministry of Information, Communication and Culture 2009, 19).

UMNO continues to promote itself as the guardian of Malay interests and identity and to champion Malay supremacy in an effort to rebuild its flagging Malay support base. Indeed, Najib has described UMNO as the political platform for the Malays (*The Star* 24 March 2009) and as a party looking after the interests and souls of the Malays (Najib 21 October 2010). In the by-election in Permatang Pauh, Penang in August 2008, UMNO accused Anwar, the icon of the PR and multiethnic agenda, of selling out Malay interests (*Malaysiakini*, 22 August 2008)¹⁷ while UMNO has emphasised that the Malay community has been under the Chinese threat in some by-elections (*Malaysiakini* 18 July 2009, 22 August 2009 and 26 August 2009)¹⁸. Also, UMNO have reaffirmed Malay dominance and supremacy as Najib has guaranteed the special position of the Malays in the 10th Malaysia Plan and the 61st UMNO general assembly (Najib 10 June 2010 and 21 October 2010).

¹³ <http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/7/10/nation/20100710173853&sec=nation>

¹⁴ <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/88061>

¹⁵ <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/96773>

¹⁶ The Tenth Malaysia Plan ensured to continue the Malay preferential stance as a major thrust of Malaysia's economic policy (Malaysia 2010, 165) although the BN government has moved towards the development of multiculturalism and downplayed its Malay dominance stance after the 2008 election. As this plan endorsing Malay preferential policies is seen as a move to pacify Malay voters in light of the stiff opposition towards Najib's multicultural stance (*Malaysia Today* 10 June 2010), several reforms after the election can be recognised as an effort to effectively manage ethnic politics.

¹⁷ <http://malaysiakini.com/news/88365>

¹⁸ <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/111168>

<http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/108757>

<http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/111431>

Similarly, Ong Ka Ting, the former MCA President, promised that MCA would listen to the voice of the Chinese community and safeguard Chinese interests (*New Straits Times* 18 March 2008 and 15 June 2008). Chua Soi Lek (2010), the MCA President, has argued that MCA has been committed to protect the Chinese interests and community. Samy Vellu, the MIC President, has reiterated MIC's status as the representative of the Indian community and commitment to providing a better standard of living for the community (*New Straits Times* 22 June 2008 and 26 July 2008)¹⁹. He also said that it has been our priority to win the support from the Indian masses back (*The Malay Mail* 27 December 2009). It would appear that the BN's communal political style and substance has persisted.

Travails of a Fledgling Multiethnic Coalition, the PR

During the 2008 election, three parties, PKR, PAS and DAP, worked together under the name of *Barisan Rakyat*, and on 1 April 2008, PR was established. The PR has been formed under a multiethnic agenda. Although they have upheld an electoral cooperation in several by-elections after the 2008 election, it has been understood that the PR has merely worked in tandem under the loose construct. Some scholars said that the PR does not have a formal coalition and then not truly exist (*New Straits Times* 17 November 2010)²⁰.

The PR had not presented formal mechanisms in place to coordinate policies for about 20 months after the 2008 election (Welsh 2008). It made people living in the PR-ruled states feel that they did not understand the mid-term and long-term vision and direction of the state governments (*Malaysiakini* 14 July 2009)²¹. Although the PR finally showed a common policy framework in December 2009, it was just the repetition of the 2008 election manifesto and did not include a concrete direction for progress towards the implementation of certain policies. In addition, the PR's policy initiatives have largely been populist. It is the common goal of defeating enemy, the BN, that binds the PR component parties as the slogan in by-elections is 'the road to *Putrajaya* (the government)'. As a result, the PR has been cynically mentioned as the cooperation having no common agenda and being a just marriage of convenience (*New Straits Times* 17 November 2010). The coalition has proven to be fragile.

More importantly, the ideological differences between DAP and PAS is expected to complicate the PR framework. DAP and PAS have to overcome their differences over the Islamic state and 'Malaysian Malaysia'. The question thus remains: Can DAP and PAS work together in the same coalition? How can PAS be effectively seen to represent the interests of non-Muslims? How can DAP lose its image of being a Chinese party? Can DAP and more importantly PAS, recognised as ethnic parties, become parties genuinely adopting the multiethnic agenda?

After the 2008 election, conflicting positions and antagonisms between DAP and PAS have emerged, and the inherent weaknesses of the PR have been exposed. For example, Lim Guan Eng announced that the state government would terminate the NEP while Hadi Awang, the PAS president, pledged that PAS would support and continue the NEP

¹⁹ http://www.mic.org.my/omni/omni/portal/32/a/doViewNews?up=x2f&x2f_newsId=4a3ed72e28922c6f01295d7e46fd00e9

²⁰ http://www.nst.com.my/articles/IsthePakatanRakyatcoalitionforreal_/Article/Article

²¹ <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/108446>

(*New Straits Times* 13 March 2008). There was disagreement on the sale of alcohol in Muslim majority areas in Selangor. Also, in Kedah, demolition of an illegal pig abattoir and the imposition of a 50 per cent Bumiputera quota on new housing developments deteriorated the relationship between PAS and DAP.

In addition, the PR has been suffered from tensions between PAS and DAP over Islamic state and *Hudud* (penal code) issues until now. DAP has called on PAS to accept that Malaysia is a secular state. On the other hand, PAS remains a Malay based party advocating the establishment of an Islamic state although the 2008 PAS Election Manifesto endorsed the multiracial and multiethnic agenda. PAS has not abandoned the concept to establish Islamic state and implement *Hudud*. Husam Musa, PAS Vice-President, asserted that PAS was confident of setting up an Islamic state (*New Straits Times*, 18 March 2008) while Musaddak Ahmad, PAS Youth Head, said that PAS should use the PR to realise the objectives of forming an Islamic state (*New Straits Times*, 5 April 2008).

In the run-up to the by-election in Kuala Trengganu in January 2009, Husam Musa insisted that the party would implement *Hudud* if PR took over the federal government (*Malaysiakini*, 14 January 2009)²². Lim Kit Siang, DAP Parliament Leader, reiterated that *Hudud* was not a PR policy and Karpal Singh, DAP Chairman, said that DAP would pull out of the PR if PAS implemented *Hudud* (*Malaysiakini*, 14 January 2009)²³. However, in December 2010, Hadi Awang said that the PAS would focus on introducing *Hudud* laws in PAS-led states like Kelantan and Kedah (Shazwan 2010)²⁴. Some scholars argued that *Hudud* and Islamic state issues would remain thorny in the PR (*New Straits Times* 2 September 2010) and had the potential to deeply divide the PR. It has been difficult for PAS and DAP to overcome their differences as these parties, fundamentally ethnic-based, have represented ethnic interests and identity as well as endorsed the PR's multiethnic agenda.

After the 2008 election, UMNO and PAS held covert meetings on cooperation for Malay unity and the spreading of Islamic values. Some PAS leaders promoted the Malay unity although Nik Aziz was opposed to any cooperation with UMNO. Perak PAS and Kedah PAS supported the proposed merger of UMNO and PAS and the formation of state coalition governments with UMNO (*New Straits Times* 27 July 2008 and 30 July 2008). Some in PAS believe that they are more able to establish an Islamic state with UMNO than with the PR component parties (*Malaysiakini*, 18 August 2008)²⁵. This suggests that the PAS leadership remains supportive of UMNO's communal paradigm. PKR and DAP criticised the PAS's duplicitous behaviour, as Karpal Singh suggested that the PR should consider whether PAS should be allowed to be a member of the alliance (*New Straits Times* 27 July 2008). Strong pressure from its grassroots led to the PAS leadership affirming that the party would remain in the PR. Indeed, in the by-election in Permatang Pauh, Hadi urged voters to support PKR (*Malaysiakini*, 24 August 2008)²⁶. However, some members in PAS have not abandoned the idea to establish the unity government with the BN, especially UMNO. Hadi has

²² <http://malaysiakini.com/news/96432>

²³ <http://malaysiakini.com/news/96432>, <http://malaysiakini.com/news/96415>

²⁴ <http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/print/malaysia/as-polls-loom-pas-eyes-staggered-islamic-state-rollout/>

²⁵ <http://malaysiakini.com/news/88050>

²⁶ <http://malaysiakini.com/news/88427>

reiterated his proposal for unity talk with UMNO and promoted the dialogue for mutual understanding between PAS Youth and UMNO Youth (*New Straits Times* 3 July 2009).

Even though PAS has not formed state governments with UMNO, PAS has demonstrated that it is not fully committed to a multiethnic agenda²⁷. As even Nik Aziz, who has strongly opposed to the Hadi's proposal to establish the unity government, suggested that all the Malays should belong to one political party, PAS, which is Islamic based in the interest of Malay unity (*Malay Mail* 29 September 2010), PAS has been nothing except for Malay and Islamist party. Some people (Asrul 2010) have thought that UMNO and PAS have sought to establish a Malay-controlled government. As such, the component parties, especially PAS and DAP, within the PR emphasising the multiethnic agenda, have failed in denying communal politics as they have been ethnic-based and a voice of ethnic interests and identity. In short, the multiethnic agenda of the PR coalition remains tenuous.

In addition, the PKR, which has been a leader of multiethnic agenda, has been undermined by intra-party bickering. Some PKR members said that the leadership no longer followed the original objectives of the party's formation and the party's struggles are only for one individual, Anwar (*New Straits Times* 23 August 2009). Zaid Ibrahim, PKR's supreme council member and Federal Territories chief, criticised Anwar, *de facto* leader of PKR, and Azmin Ali, PKR's Vice President, as the source of all problems and weakening of the party. It can be said that its weakening has been disturbing for the direction of PR-led multiethnic agenda.

Conclusion

After the 2008 election, many political observers postulated that the BN's failure in attaining a two-thirds majority in parliament signalled a shift away from communal politics. However, a close examination of the election results and the political manoeuvring of several political parties after the election suggest that this is not necessarily the case.

The BN and PR adopted ethnic electoral strategies in the 2008 election. Many Malaysians still supported the BN's ethnic politics, rather than the PR's multiethnic agenda. BN's heavy loss is partly due to the BN's failure to delicately balance the interests and grievances of the ethnic communities and to effectively manage ethnic politics. In short, it is premature to predict that the Malaysian political structure has shifted towards a multiethnic paradigm merely because the PR increased the number of seats

After the election, the BN has moved towards a multicultural stance, represented in 1 Malaysia concept. However, this shift can be interpreted as a pragmatic response designed to regain electoral support through effectively managing ethnic politics. In addition, the BN has continued its communal political agenda. It is also doubtful whether the PR can maintain its non-communal agenda. The PR has not been able to indicate a clear multiethnic platform addressing the concerns of all ethnic communities since the component parties have their own agendas and ideologies. A mutual distrust and conflicting positions between PAS and DAP and a weak coalition partnership have been exposed. As PAS with strong religious and communal ideology has failed in

²⁷ As Hadi said that PAS would not be a part of the PR's federal government if non-Muslim MPs formed the majority (*New Straits Times* 14 August 2008), PAS continues to be an ethnic party.

denying communal politics, the PR's multiethnic agenda remains tenuous.

As ethnic consciousness remains pervasive in social, political and economic terms, it seems still difficult to implement a multiethnic agenda. The Malaysian political paradigm has yet to qualitatively shift away from ethnic politics. The approach adopted by the BN and PR and voting patterns in the next election will more clearly determine whether a qualitative shift has emerged in Malaysia's political culture.

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Thailand's Responses to CEDAW: 26 Years of Women's Human Rights

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This paper aims to shed light knowledge on the international women's human rights regime by looking to the participation and cooperation of a small male-dominant state of Thailand. In this paper, I explore how this international regime influences the state of Thailand, and the extent of compliance by Thailand with The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Thailand acceded CEDAW on 9 August 1985. There is thus a window of 26 years in which we can investigate the Thai Government's commitment to and promotion of women's human rights.

I limit the scope of this paper by not including the involvement of non-governmental organizations. Second, the aspect of human rights that concerns me in this paper is in regard to empowering women, not human rights generally.

My argument is that although the Thai government has worked on a lot of policy and publications, it still reserves some powerful and influential roles for males, which could imply that the power of the Thai state still in the hands of men. However, I accept the importance of some policy changes and new laws such as The Women Title Act B.E. 2551(2008) (Office of Women's Affairs and Family Development Ministry of Social Development and Human Security 2008). This act might appear of limited and symbolic significance only to outsiders, but to Thais, it represented a momentous change.

This paper has four main parts. First, I discuss the emergence of CEDAW and the monitoring body. Second, in regard to Thailand's response to CEDAW, I discuss the changes made in the government and legal system. Third, I divide the changes that the Thai government has made since access to CEDAW into two main parts: which are first, structural responses and second Legal responses. Finally, I sketch women's situation in Thailand 26 years after it became a party to CEDAW.

I. International CEDAW

CEDAW is considered a global blueprint of women's human rights for both states and individuals with 186 states members around the world. The idea of establishing the convention stems from the international concerns of women for gender equality. The United Nations (UN), at that time, was the only world governmental organization concerned over issues of gender equality; the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) was later established by Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 11(II) of 21 June 1946. The CSW, as a sub-commission of the Commission on Human Rights, dedicated itself exclusively to gender equality and advancement of women around the world. The CSW attempted to define and elaborate the general guarantees of non-discrimination in human rights instruments from a gender perspective. The work of CSW has brought about a number of important declarations and conventions that protect and promote the human rights of women. Between 1949 and 1959, the Commission elaborated of the following conventions.

1. The Convention on the Political Rights of Women, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1952

2. The Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, adopted on 29 January 1957
3. The Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, adopted on 7 November 1962, and
4. The Recommendation on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, adopted on 1 November 1965.

These treaties function to protect and promote women's rights in areas in which the Commission considered them to be particularly vulnerable. On 5 December 1963, the General Assembly approved Resolution 1921 (XVIII), requesting the Economic and Social Council to invite the CSW to prepare a draft declaration that would combine in a single instrument promoting and protecting the equal rights of men and women. This process was supported throughout by women activists within and outside the UN system. The Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women was adopted by the General Assembly on 7 November 1967. In 1974, the working groups within the CSW prepared a single, comprehensive and internationally binding instrument designed to eliminate discrimination against women. This instrument was to be prepared without prejudice to any future recommendations that might be made by the United Nations or its specialized agencies with respect to the preparation of legal instruments to eliminate discrimination against women. The text of CEDAW was formed during 1976, with the extensive deliberations later prepared by a working group of the Third Committee of the General Assembly from 1977 to 1979.

CEDAW was adopted by the General Assembly in 1979 130 votes to 0, with 10 abstentions. Resolution 34/180, in which the General Assembly adopted the Convention, expressed the hope that the Convention would come into force at an early date and requested the Secretary-General to present the text of the Convention to the mid-decade World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women. A year later, at a special ceremony of the Copenhagen Conference on 17 July 1980, 64 States signed the Convention and 2 States submitted their instruments of ratification. CEDAW entered into force as an international treaty on 3 September 1981 more quickly than any previous human rights convention.

Countries that have ratified or acceded to the Convention are legally bound to put its provisions into practice, and to submit national reports to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, at least every 4 years, on measures they have taken to comply with their treaty obligations. These obligations are:

- To incorporate the principle of equality of women and men in their legal system, abolish all discriminatory laws and adopt appropriate ones prohibiting discrimination against women
- To establish tribunals and other public institutions to ensure the effective protection of women against discrimination; and
- to ensure elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by persons, organizations or enterprises (The United Nations 2007) (UN 2010).

However, there is no strong enforcement mechanism of these obligations.

In this paper, I perceive CEDAW as a tool of women's human rights regime. In the international relations field, a number of scholars accept the existence of a "regime", which Stephen Krasner defines as "sets of implicit or explicit principals, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations"(Krasner, 1982). However, it is still unclear if "human rights" are included in "*the sets*", until the "human rights standard" has been put forward as an

important tool of diplomacy. For example, powerful states could use “human rights standard” as an indicator to grant or not grant any priority to less powerful states. It should be noted here that international agreements, international treaties and/or international conventions could be considered as the origins of regimes (Forsythe, 2000).

A way to explain how women’s human rights can become a part of the international regime is to combine women human rights into the main human rights standard, which is globally accepted. In this paper, I argue that women’s human rights is a part of the world regime. This is confirmed by the issue of CEDAW and the states who ratified or accessed it. CEDAW is now the main mechanism for the women’s human rights regime in the international arena (Palley, 1991).

To explain more on the former issue, world affairs from the Cold War have been run by some sets of norms that states respect, one being human rights. Women’s human rights as a part of human rights can be the issue in international arena and could be used as a tool of foreign policy (Forsythe, 2000).

2. Thailand’s responses to CEDAW

Thailand became a party to CEDAW by accession on 9 August 1985 and its Optional Protocol on 20 December 2000. However, due to some existing domestic laws and regulations of Thailand which did not conform to the Convention, Thailand made reservations against seven articles of CEDAW (Chayakul, ChalermSirikul, & Thitipattana, 2003). The seven reservations of Thailand are as follow:

Article 7: The equality to participate in high level of civil service, and to be a member of parliament. This reservation discriminated against Thai women in political life and activities. Previously, Thai women were barred from certain positions, for example, district officers (APWIP 1996, 15).

Article 9 (2): Equality in respect to the nationality of their children. Regarding this reservation, Thai women married to foreigners were unable to claim their children’s nationality as Thai citizens. Beijing

Article 10: Equality in education. At the time of ratification, the rules barred Thai women from entry in some academic institutions, e.g., military schools existed (Asia Pacific Women in Politics Network, 1996).

Regarding the reasons for reservations to Articles 7 and 10, Thailand noted its terms in the first reservation noted above.

Article 11 (b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of the same criteria for selection in matters of employment. At the time, there was unequal payment for jobs of the same value done by Thai women.

Article 15 (3) All contracts and all other private instruments of any kind with a legal effect, which is directed at restricting the legal capacity of women shall be deemed null and void. At the time of ratification, Thai women were unable to gain equal legal capacity to men in order to administer their family property.

Article 16 Equality in marriage and family relations. This article is also on the betrothal and the marriage of a child that shall have no legal effect; all necessary actions shall be taken to specify the minimum age for marriage and to make the marriage registration.

Article 29 1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of

those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.

Because of these seven reservations to CEDAW, Thailand was challenged by other countries and NGOs at international conferences for lacking sincerity in promoting women's status, as contrary to the essence of the Convention (Office of Women's Affairs and Family Development 1998).

Thailand began to withdraw its reservations in 1990, when the government declared withdrew its reservation to CEDAW Article 11(1) and Article 15(3) on 30 October, followed by the withdrawal of Article 9(2) on 8 September 1992, and Article 7 and Article 10 both on 28 November 1995. Thailand still has two remaining reservations to CEDAW, which are Article 16, requiring the state to take appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family, including the right to own and acquire property, and Article 29 on dispute settlement by the International Court of Justice.

After the withdrawal of five Articles of CEDAW, the government declared that it had demonstrated that it was willing to actively comply with the Convention; there were national actions which were implemented along with the Convention framework. The Thai government also claims (Chayakul, ChalermSirikul, & Thitipattana 2003):

1. Thai women can now access all government posts. Formerly, women were excluded from entering some positions such as district governors. Currently, women have been appointed to the posts of provincial governors, district officers and also army generals. However, this is still incomplete because the army will not allow women to enter military school.
2. Equal opportunities to enroll in educational institutions are available. The rules that prevented women from entry into some institutions, such as the Police academy, were overturned.
3. Children are now able to take the nationality of either the father or the mother.
4. Equal pay for jobs of equal value was made possible through the Ministry of Interior's regulations.
5. Women now have the same legal capacity as men regarding administration of their property. Mutual consent from both husband and wife is required for concluding contracts relating to property/ assets acquired after marriage.
6. Finally, the 1997 Constitution was the first constitution of Thailand that clearly upheld the importance of equality between female and male citizens.


3. Thailand Structural and Legal responses

Thailand has changed its administrative system to comply with CEDAW. There is an attempt by the Thai state to give women priority in many cases. Thailand has women sitting in the top tiers of the ministry, for example. Thailand's response to CEDAW can be categorized into two parts:

1. *Structural response*: The Thai government declared that it is a priority to follow all legal agreements and signed conventions. In the case of CEDAW, the Thai cabinet has decided to set up a civil service unit that deals with all kind of issues concerning CEDAW's articles, called the Office of Women's Affairs and Family Development, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security. The main function of this

Office is to promote women's human rights and gender equality and to strengthen family institutions by means of policy formulations, measures and mechanisms. It also encourages and supports public and private units/organizations to implement policies and programs to develop women's potentiality, protection of women's rights, equality and social justice and to promote the stability of the family institution.

Moreover, according to the Cabinet's Approval of 31 July 2001, all Ministries and Departments have to appoint one civil servant (executive level) to be a Chief Gender Equality Officer (CGEO) and establish a Gender Focal Point (GFP) under the supervision of the Civil Service Commission. The main purpose of these two initiatives is to promote gender equality in the Thai Civil Service and to follow CEDAW. The following diagram sets out the structure of the Office.



Source: Office of Women's Affairs and Family Development, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, Thailand

2. *Legal response* (constitutional changes, legislative initiatives). In terms of legal structures, Thailand has promulgated 6 parts of a law in order to promote women's human rights in compliance with CEDAW (Office of Women's Affairs and Family Development Ministry of Social Development and Human Security 2008):

1. Criminal law, section 30. All persons are equal before the law and shall enjoy equal protection under the law. Men and women shall enjoy equal rights. Unjust discrimination against a person on the grounds of the difference in origin, race, language, sex, age, physical or health condition, personal status, economic or social standing, religious belief, education or constitutionally political view, shall not be permitted. Measures determined by the State in order to eliminate obstacle to or to promote persons' ability to exercise their rights and liberties as other persons shall not be deemed as unjust discrimination under paragraph three.

2. Criminal Law, section 80. The State shall protect and develop children and the youth, promote the equality between women and men, and create, reinforce and develop family integrity and the strength of communities (1997).

3. In January 2005, *The Name Act B.E.2548* was amended; Thai married people can now choose their family name. They can maintain their maiden name or use spouse's family name. Married women have the right to change from their husband's family name to their old maiden name (Office of Women's Affairs and Family Development 2008, 1).

4. In September 2007, the Criminal Procedure Code, Additional Revision Act (No.25), was enacted, protecting the right of women defendants in case of being pregnant, delivering child in no more than 3 months to be able to receive protection and alleviated sentence (Office of Women's Affairs and Family Development 2008, 4-7).


5. In September 2007, the Criminal Procedure Code, Additional Revision Act (No.20), was enacted, protecting everyone from being raped by any person. The revised law makes it clear that even married women cannot be raped by their own husband (Office of Women's Affairs and Family Development 2008, 16-18).

6. In February 2008, *The Women's Title Act B.E.2551 (CE 2008)* was enacted, giving Thai women who are married a right to choose to use the title of "Miss" or "Mrs." voluntarily. Also, women whose marriage is terminated can choose to use "Miss" or "Mrs.".

4. 26 Years: many changes, small steps


As I mentioned in the beginning, that I am looking at women in power, especially the proportion of women in parliament, women in senior civil service positions and women leaders in local administrative levels. The Thai government has tried very hard to show that there is no discrimination against women in terms of working and becoming leaders or decision makers. The fact that the Royal Thai Military School has never admitted female students indicates that there still remains a huge gap of power between men and women in this country. Since Thailand is a military state, the military role is very critical in many situations; for example, in every vulnerable situation such as a recent conflict over territory between Thailand and Cambodia, the Thai military (and not, say, the Prime Minister) answered all questions regarding the sovereignty of state. Not admitting women into the royal military school is a large obstacle for women in Thailand in gaining real power, because all generals in the military have to graduate from the Royal Military Academy, not from any other schools. (The position of military doctor is an exception, but that is not a position with power.)

In terms of representatives and members of parliament, almost all women representatives are bound with their family, father or husband, yet the number is still low compared to men in parliament. This is indicated in the next graph.



Source: Report on Thailand Gender-disaggregated Statistics, Office of Women's Affairs and Family Development in collaboration with UNDP.

In looking at women in power in the civil service system, it should be noted that there is no law against women being promoted into senior levels. But the number is very low compared to men. Some scholars have argued that the value placed by Thais in giving leadership power to men is why there are so few women in senior executive levels (Kachacupt 2008). However, following my fieldwork in Thailand in 2010 and interviews with female senior executives themselves, I found that what prevents their promotion is the discrimination outside the legal system that sometimes decreases women's opportunities to be in the top level of the civil service. The following graph shows the number of women and men at the executive level of the Civil Service.



Executives in the civil service by sex, and level

Executives in the civil service	2002					2003				
	number			%		number			%	
	total	male	female	male	female	total	male	female	male	female
Total	455	374	81	82.19	17.80	487	385	102	79.05	20.94
Permanent Secretary C 11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Secretary-General/Director C11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Deputy Permanent Secretary C 10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Deputy Secretary-General/Deputy Director C 10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Director-General, Director, Secretary-General C10	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Deputy Director-General/Deputy Secretary-General/Deputy Director C 9	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Executives in the civil service	2004					2005				
	number			%		number			%	
	total	male	female	male	female	total	male	female	male	female
Total	496	396	100	79.84	20.16	508	397	111	78.15	21.85
Permanent Secretary C 11	19	17	2	89.47	10.53	31	27	4	87.10	12.90
Secretary-General/Director C11	12	11	1	91.67	8.33	12	10	2	83.33	16.67
Deputy Permanent Secretary C 10	53	49	4	92.45	7.55	56	48	8	85.71	14.29
Deputy Secretary-General/Deputy Director C 10	44	30	14	68.18	31.82	42	25	17	59.52	40.48
Director-General, Director, Secretary-General C10	110	94	16	85.45	14.55	112	92	20	82.14	17.86
Deputy Director-General/Deputy Secretary-General/Deputy Director C 9	258	195	63	75.58	24.42	267	205	62	76.78	23.22

Executives in the civil service	2006				
	number			%	
	total	male	female	male	female
Total	510	392	118	76.86	23.14
Permanent Secretary C 11	19	17	2	89.47	10.53
Secretary-General/Director C11	12	10	2	81.82	18.18
Deputy Permanent Secretary C 10	56	44	12	78.57	21.43
Deputy Secretary-General/Deputy Director C 10	43	28	15	65.12	34.88
Director-General, Director, Secretary-General C10	111	92	19	82.88	17.12
Deputy Director-General/Deputy Secretary-General/Deputy Director C 9	269	201	68	74.72	25.28

Source: Report on Thailand Gender-disaggregated Statistics. Office of Women’s Affairs and Family development in collaboration with UNDP

Finally, I believe that when Thailand become a member party of CEDAW, it showed some recognition of the importance of the women’s human rights regime. There has been very slow

progress in promoting women in Thailand over the last 26 years, but progress has been made. However, much remains to be done.



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Title: Between Original and Host Societies: the Reconstructed Past of Picture Brides

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Between Original and Host Societies: the Reconstructed Past of Picture Brides

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In the last few decades, due to the rising number of educated females and the serious gender ratio imbalance in several Asian countries, more and more Asian males are forced to marry foreign brides who mainly come from Southeastern Asia. As the population rates of the new group “foreign brides” soar, we need to deal with some new problems. For example, foreign brides may face communicating difficulties while they try to adapt themselves to different cultures. Qiu in her book *Gender and Migration: Asian Immigrant Brides in Japan and Taiwan* suggests that in order to understand the foreign bride phenomenon, we should undertake a gender and migration research. She suggests that the convenient research on gender and migration issues enables us to investigate foreign bride phenomenon, and even helps us to predicate the possible development in the future (28). Qiu’s idea inspires me to reexamine Japanese picture brides’ experience, which is one of the significant cases of gender and migration research. As there are certain features shared between foreign brides’ and picture brides’ transnational experiences, it may be helpful for contemporary foreign bride research if we study Japanese picture brides’ experiences in the early twentieth century.

“Japanese picture brides” are Japanese women who married Japanese immigrant men and then traveled to America to live with their husbands. Before they arrived in America, picture brides had little knowledge about their future husbands because they only received a photograph and few letters from them. Their marriage was arranged by two families through a go-between. Since most bachelors could not afford the expense of time and money for returning Japan, and some were even at the risk of conscription (Ichioka 342), it was a common and efficient way for Japanese bachelors getting married at that time. The picture bride practice started from the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907, but quickly ended in 1921 because Caucasians attacked that it was “an uncivilized ‘Asiatic’ custom, a throwback as it were to barbarism by which women were wed without regard to morality or love” (Ichioka 355).

Though the picture bride practice was only adopted within a short period of time, it was immensely influential because the arrival of these female immigrants stabilized Japanese immigrant society. Yet, on account of the male-centered approaches, picture brides were neglected in early researches on Japanese immigration. It was not until the mid-1970s that scholars, influenced by feminism, have started to make efforts to reconstruct the life of these female Japanese immigrants in historical and cultural contexts. Initially, picture brides are studied as victims because of “the often traumatic experiences of the brides resonate[s] in both Issei and Nisei fiction” (Davis 36). During the 1990s, scholars such as Rocio G. Davis and Malve von Hassell attempted to break this stereotype. Thus, they reexamined the images

of picture brides in literary works and celebrated picture brides' strong spirit and enduring character as these women confront the multiple oppressions of ethnicity, class, and race in America. Gradually, picture brides' experiences of facing and then overcoming difficulties are viewed from a more positive point of view. It has become an essential process as picture brides try to fit in the American society and reconstruct their new identity.

In the development of the new identity, picture brides are neither completely assimilated to American society nor stubbornly kept their original culture. In fact, they established adaptive strategies to survive in America. While the Japanese past of these immigrant women unceasingly affects, even obstructs, their integration into American society, is it possible that their American experiences reversely influence their conception of the past? I am especially interested in how picture bride "rediscover" their Japanese tradition and original society. How do these picture brides reconsider their past in Japan when living in America? How do the pain and difficulties in America change their Japanese consciousness? Through an analysis of Yoshiko Uchida's novel *Picture Bride* (1987) and Kayo Hatta's film *Picture Bride* (1994), these are some of the questions that I wish to elaborate in this essay.

Though both texts depict the hardship of picture brides, Riyo, the heroine in Kayo Hatta's film presents a much luckier case of picture brides. The film focuses on the plantation society in Hawaii. Riyo comes to Hawaii in order to escape her past in Japan. However, she is frustrated tremendously by the reality in Hawaii, and desires to go back to Japan. Her husband, Matsuji feel guilty about using an old photo, so he does not force Riyo to accept him immediately. The film ends when Riyo eventually accepts her marriage and chooses to live in Hawaii. It concentrates on two central issues of picture bride study: one is the conflicted relationship between picture brides and their husbands. The other is the mutual assistance and affective ties of immigrant Japanese women. Similarly, Yoshiko Uchida's novel contains the description of these two significant elements. It depicts the life of a young picture bride, Hana, from the time she arrives in San Francisco in 1917 to the death of her husband, Taro, in the internment camp during World War II. Yet, it presents more sides of picture brides' tragic experience such as the hostility from white society and the gap between first and second generations. Taken together, these two texts offer complementary visions of picture brides' lives.

First of all, in the novel, Yoshiko Uchida depicts blatant racism at that time. The Anti-Japanese sentiment in America unceasingly influences Japanese immigrants identity. Picture brides, like other Japanese Americans, suffer from the internment and this experience evokes their Japanese consciousness to extreme. However, I will not include racial discrimination in this paper since we have already had rich research on the tension between Japanese American community and white society, the interrelation between Japanese American society and their country of origin needs more attention. Thus, in this paper, I will specially examine how

picture brides' experiences in Japanese American society stimulate them to rebuild their conception of Japanese identity.

Picture bride marriage is rooted in an established custom of Japanese arranged marriages. Generally speaking, women chose to be picture brides for two reasons: their obedience to parents and the economic concerns (Ichioka 345). However, there were still other influencing factors. As Alice Yun Chai believes that "each woman had her own story, often based on individual desires and aspirations, . . . , and each had idiosyncratic circumstances such as premarital pregnancy or being an old maid (126). This extension of Japanese marriage custom ironically becomes the way for these women to escape from their uncomfortable situations in Japan. In Riyo's case, she explicitly expresses her desire to free herself from the infamous familial medical history as she says that "she wishes she could leave behind the ghost of her past and start all over again." In Hana's case, her age makes finding a proper husband become a matter of urgency. She believes that "... this lonely man in America was her means of escaping both the village and the encirclement of her family" (Uchida 4).

Hence, picture bride marriage is in truth a way to fulfill some Japanese girls' escaping desire. On the other hand, it is also "a means of achieving individual goals of adventure, social status enhancement, or a free and independent life" (Chai 126). As an educated woman "with radical ideas about life and the role of women" (Uchida 4), Hana dreams that the status of a wife in America should be higher than that of a traditional Japanese wife. With the pictures of their seeming handsome and prosperous husband, the strong push and pull factors make picture brides have the extremely weak Japanese identity as they decide to go to America. They reveal their determination to be an "American" as we can see how eager Hana is "for a first glimpse of her new *homeland*" (Uchida 6; *italic added*). Riyo even wears the western dress as she arrives in America. Japan, their country of origin becomes the past they wish to leave behind.

However, as they set foot on American soil, their wish is overridden right away. All third-class passengers are firstly taken to the immigration station and questioned by officials. They need to go through the inspections as Hana and Riyo both suggest that they have a physical examination there. Even though they endeavor to start a new life in America, they are unavoidably reconnected with their past in Japan on account of the process of inspection. Furthermore, their American dream shatters when they find their husband are much elder than the photographs and that the material comforts of a new life only an illusion. The severe disappointment is a shared experience of all picture brides. In the film, Riyo cannot accept Matsuji, who is even elder than her father, and regards the marriage as a mistake, while in the novel, Hana is overwhelmed by the fact to be married to an older "shabby" store owner. Additionally, they find that America is not really "a paradise where money is earned with ease." They are expected to work so as to improve their husbands' poor financial situation.

Thus, as they compare the unpredictable difficulties in America with their past in Japan, the later becomes more endurable. Because of the harsh reality, most picture brides doubt their decision to come to America and long to return to Japan. For instance, Riyo straightly expresses her wish to go back Japan and works hard for it. Some may only keep their regrets and doubts in mind like Hana. At the night before wedding day, she thinks that “[p]erhaps she [Hana] had made a terrible mistake in coming to America. In her anxiety to escape the drabness of Oka Village, perhaps she had leaped too far and severed too many roots. Now, like a tree transported beyond its native soil ...” (Uchida 26). As a result, we can see how the disappointments for the reality in the beginning of their American life evoke picture brides to re-identify with their past in Japan.

After the shock of American reality, Japan is no longer a place picture brides desire to escape from, but the homeland they dream to go back. Nevertheless, because of the lack of funds, the fear for embarrassing their family and even the threats of the grooms, going back to Japan seems impossible (Chai 127). Most of them have no alternative but to stay with their husbands in America. Some picture brides, such as Hana, try to escape the gender code in Japan, yet find that they are still demanded to meet the traditional expectation of female roles in Japanese American community. Kiku, another picture bride who comes to America earlier, earnestly reminds Hana of her duties in America: “Just don’t have too many big dreams and you’re less likely to be hurt...you came to America to make Taro Takeda happy...just remember that and don’t expect too much from him or from America” (25). The traditional subordinate role of women is reinforced in Japanese American community. After all, they come to America so as to satisfy the marital need of Japanese bachelors. Picture brides are required to sacrifice their own happiness and to bring satisfactions for their husbands. For instance, when Hana feels uncomfortable in the first love making and even wants to ask Taro to stop in their wedding night, she finally chooses to “[stop] struggling and [accepts] the full urgency of his need.” After all, satisfying her husband’s sexual need is a wife’s duty. In fact, not only their husbands, but all the members in Japanese American community are the oppressors of these immigrant women. They supervised picture brides’ behaviors. For instance, while Hana has secret love with Kitoshi Yamaka, a young friend of her husbands, she is actually watched by the others in the community.

She [Hana]...absently put a hand on Yamaka’s arm. As she did, she felt his hand rest lightly on her thigh..., she caught Henry Toda’s eye. In an instant, she knew that he understand everything....there had a flesh of comprehension in his glazed eyes and he blurted,.... Hana saw Kiku poke Henry under the table. She also saw a look of both compassion and concern on Dr. Kaneda’s face. Did they all know then? All of them? Even Taro? (Uchida 46)

Additionally, in Kayo Hatta’s film, picture brides scorn the news of a runaway picture bride during their break at work. Explicitly, the disloyalty of a picture bride is not acceptable. The elopement is discussed publicly as a gossip as well as a threat to the other picture brides.

However, as picture brides suffer traditional sexual oppression from Japanese American community, they simultaneously endeavor to find positive meaning in their strictly determined gender role. They believe that their self-renunciation for the family is an instrument for self-affirmation. For instance, most picture brides are required to find paid jobs or to help their husbands' low-budget business. When they work hard so as to be "dutiful wives," they actually develop their self-respect and the sense of achievement at the same time since they recognize their work as an indispensable help for family to survive in America. In the novel, as Taro needs to take a journey and leaves Hana alone for the shop management, "she was ... pleased that Taro felt he could leave her in charge of the shop" (Uchida 35). However, from Kana's experience in the film, we find that picture brides can never challenge patriarchy, even with excellent capability for money-making. Earning more money than their husbands may lead to physical abuse when their husbands feel their male superiority is threatened.

Because of their collective experiences and the rampant sexism in the Japanese American community, the bonds among these immigrant women are strengthened. There are abundant examples of their mutual assistance in both texts as Kana teaches Riyo how to earn more money by washing the clothes for the white family and for other Japanese bachelors. In addition, we can also regard the female social network as the basis of empowerment for these women. For example, in the film, to fulfill the traditional Japanese female role as a devoted mother, these picture brides still need to take care of their children during works. There is a tentative camp near their working fields for all children staying and playing. In the name of their duty, picture brides actually hold partial power such as to decide the place of the camp. Thus, as picture brides imitate their female role models, like their mothers or other sisters in Japanese society, they also try to transform their required female duties into an instrument of self-affirmation and self-empowerment.

Though women in the Japanese American community are all closely connected with each other, according to Chai, the intimacy between individuals basically depends on their past since they "[identify] more closely with other women from the same home villages, cities, or towns for ancestral and religious ties, fellowship, mutual aid, and informal network" (131). In fact, picture brides are required to retell their past in Japan first when they desire to be accepted by Japanese American community. For example, as Hana firstly appears in the Japanese immigrant community, Taro introduces her as "Miss Hana Omiya, who comes from Oka Village near Kyoto" and members in the community, especially female members, surround her and "[inquir] her family in Oka Village" (Uchida 15-6). In Riyo's case, retelling the past is rather crucial. She has gradually adapted to the life with Matsuji in Hawaii. However, not until she retells her parent's disgraceful death can she be intimate to Matsuji. The necessity of retelling history also helps Riyo to reconstruct her past. After revealing her

parents' death and then being accepted by Matsuji, She can perform the Japanese rituals of ancestor worship.

Apart from being impelled to retell their past, picture brides also unconsciously recollect their Japanese past in their daily life. For instance, as Hana is busy for her first New Year in America, she remembers those New Years in her home town. "Hana smiled to herself as she remembered, wishing it were possible to store such happiness away to draw on when it was needed" (Uchida 42). Though she also has a very Japanese New Year in the Japanese American community, the New Year in America cannot compete with the old ones, which may have been beatified in the memory. Moreover, she even wishes these beatified recollections can be stored so as to support her to overcome the difficulties in future. Thus, we can see how the life in America stimulates these picture brides to reminisce and reconstruct their past in Japan.

In conclusion, with the analysis of Yoshiko Uchida's novel *Picture Bride* and Kayo Hatta's film *Picture Bride*, we find that not only does their past unceasingly influence their lives in America, their experiences in Japanese American community also reversely affects their conception of and their relationship with their Japanese past. I hope this research can provide a better understanding about how picture brides' relationship with Japan is closely related to their lives in Japanese American community. In addition, since certain transnational experiences of foreign brides are similar to that of picture brides, I also hope this paper can be a beginning for further study of foreign brides' experiences in Asian countries.

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Future Korean Urban Transformation as the result of Integration of Urban Administrative Districts

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ABSTRACT

On July 1 this year, United Changwon City was launched through unity of three different cities, Changwon, Masan and Jinhae. These three cities decided to integrate into united city to relieve the decentralization of individual cities and the improvement of administrative efficiency. Most of all, since these three cities were in a form of conurbation, such an integration seems to have large effect on the decentralization and urban growth.

This study is to predict the directivity of its urban growth from a viewpoint of spatial structure as United Changwon City is newly launched. To make such a prediction, this study carried out spatial analysis by using Space Syntax. Space Syntax is an effective technique in analyzing degree of centralization and decentralization through the morphological analysis.

As a result of the Integration analysis to examine the entire urban structure, the change of urban structure was noticeable after the unity, it was expected that Changwondaero, having shown the highest Integration value before the unity, would still play a significant role after the unity. On the other hand, it was found that some streets, which didn't take an important position at all in the individual cities, would have important positions in the entire spatial structure after the unity. These regions are expected to emerge as new centers of innovation in responding to localized challenges. Accordingly an efficient and fair urban density control policy should be adopted to avoid excessive and unplanned urban development and to induce sustainable urban growth.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background and Purpose of this Study

Since 2009, the autonomic integration of self-governing body administrative districts has been launched in earnest, and at present in Feb. 2010, there are four united self-governing bodies preparing for the operation of integrating administrative districts. Changwon City was already launched as a united city on July 1, 2010. Unity of administrative districts helps reduce the number of government workers and prevent administrative functions from being overlapped, further reducing expenses offered for administrative service. Ultimately, it is expected that the quality of public service will get higher and its efficiency will be improved as well. Of course, there may take place some adverse effect caused by the unity of administrative districts, but through analyses of pros and cons from a viewpoint of public administration science, some self-governing bodies having more pros than cons seem to prepare for unity. Due to such an expectation, some self-governing bodies have already planned to carry out administrative unity, by establishing a team for unity, which will bring about large change to cities and counties ahead of unity.

However, discussions about unity of administrative districts mostly give weight to aspects of public administration science, such as efficiency of administrative service. From a standpoint of urban space, the unity of administrative districts indicates an actual unity of cities that citizens' life zones are combined into one area, and through such a unity of cities, it is expected that the urban spatial structure will fundamentally change as well. Accordingly, it is such an urgent issue to provide guidelines for the change of urban spatial structure, the directivity of future city growth and plans of managing land use by approaching the unity of administrative districts from a viewpoint of urban spatial structure, as united cities start to be launched. If discussions related to unity have been about analyzing pros and cons of integration in the aspect of administrative service so far, self-governing bodies should take a positive preparation attitude by predicting actual change that unity will bring about, from a viewpoint of urban spatial structure. In this aspect, spatial analysis technique is very effective in predicting the change of future spatial structure and the directivity of urban growth.

The purpose of this study can be largely divided into two kinds. One purpose is to analyze the urban spatial structure of individual cities before they were integrated so that the change of spatial structure of a united city according to the unity of administrative districts. The other one is to predict the future spatial structure and

growth change of the united city of Changwon, Masan and Jinhae by using spatial analysis technique, from which guidelines can be provided for the establishment of urban management plans and a quantitative foundation can be suggested to provide evaluations of various city-related policies and alternative plans. By basically applying academic performance to actual cities (Changwon, Masan and Jinhae), this study aims to find out a possibility of working-level application and establish policy suggestions for the future urban management.

1.2 Trend of the Previous Researches

Researches on the development and application of a model to predict the future urban growth were carried out from a viewpoint of urban economics and geographic information system (GIS). Spatial analysis technique provides efficient tools in predicting the future urban growth, and as shown in the picture below, a research can be taken for example that predicted urban growth after Eastern and Western Berlins were united. Unlike lots of economists' expectations in the beginning that the reunification would make CBD of Western Berlin have more influence, the research predicted that the influence of CBD in Western Berlin would get relatively smaller and a new downtown would be formed. In fact, after the reunification of Germany, there were lots of new and active investments made into this area with a great many of new and high buildings, increasing building rents, which indicates the result of spatial analysis was actually right.




Figure 1. Future Urban Growth Research on United Berlin (Jake Dwsyllas(1997))

2. Theoretical Backgrounds

2.1 Outline of Spatial Analysis

In the academic and working-level domain, targeting the space of built environments such as architectural design and urban planning, demand for reasonable design methodology became higher in the mid 20th century, especially thanks to the development of science and technology. Out of them, an academic domain, called 'Spatial Analysis', has performed a remarkable role in evaluating design plans and predicting their future use during the process of design, by describing the characteristics of physical layout of architectural and urban space and predicting spatial potential latent in them. Especially, it features in interpreting the connection characteristics between space and space with a network, while approaching the physical layout of space in the aspect of a network. Based on such a network, spatial analysis technique was first introduced into the field of architecture, with either Graph Theory or Isovist Theory, in the late 1970s, and especially Space Syntax, originated from Graph Theory, has suggested a diversity of analysis techniques so far. Nowadays, Space Syntax is widely

used in various different fields, such as establishment and evaluation of urban design and planning, prediction of spatial use, crime prevention through environmental design, analysis of the transportation, study on the pedestrian movement, planning of the spatial layout and circulation. Space Syntax is expected to provide efficient and reasonable management means for the future city by predicting the directivity of urban growth of the united city and clarifying the advent of a new downtown and the distribution of expected backward areas.

The main indices of Spatial Syntax are Connectivity, Control and Integration. Connectivity explains how many spaces each space is connected to, while Control is defined as the sum of reciprocal number that the Connectivity of adjacent spaces has. These two variables clarify accessibility or centrality each space around each space rather than entire spatial structure, that is, each space has in the level of regional spatial structure. Integration explains accessibility or centrality each space has in the entire spatial structure, and it is estimated by getting the sum of depths till all the other spaces to go through a series of transformations.

2.2 Establishment of An Analytic Frame

In Space Syntax, axial maps are used as a main means of analyzing urban spatial structure, and it is defined as the least set of straight lines which passes through each convex space and makes all axial links. Using axial maps makes it possible to interpret urban spatial structure by converting it into a network system composed of straight lines. On the basis of this, it is possible to quantitatively calculate spatial attribute each line (street) has, that is, integration which shows the accessibility of streets. By selecting Integration and Integration(3) as a main index, centrality and accessibility of each street can be examined. For this, by conducting an axial analysis for each individual city and another axial analysis with a model of the united city combining all the individual cities, it will be examined how the spatial structure of the city has been reorganized in the aspect of accessibility. By predicting the model of urban growth expected according to each period of time through models of spatial structure for each stage, it is expected to provide objective data for the establishment and evaluation of city-related policies and suggest alternative plans as well.

3. The Present Conditions of Unity of Administrative Districts

Before unity, Changwon City had a street network structure based on grid patterns as a

planned city. On the other hand, Masan City shows an urban structure that its street network was arranged in a linear shape along the seashore, and Jinhae City featured in its radial-form street network. Since not only were these three cities adjacent to one another in terms of administrative boundary, but they had showed the phenomenon of co-urbanization since long ago, they were physically connected to one another. Besides, since they were in the same life zone, there were quite frequent and mutual traffic movements among these cities. Therefore, as the new city combining the three cities has an urban structure proper to examine the effect of spatial network model, this spatial analysis technique can provide lots of implications for its urban centrality and range of growth and so on. Especially, to reinforce its accessibility to neighboring cities, there have been lots of discussions about the construction of an urban railway connecting those three cities to one another as well as two tunnels toward Masan and Kimhae.



Figure 2. Location of Three Cities

In addition, as the 39th military division moved from the northwestern part of former Changwon City to Haman Gun, the municipal government established a plan of developing the area into a new administrative town. Besides, as Changwon Central Station was also built there for KTX trains to stop in Changwon, the city is planning to set up a plan of creating a transit railway area around the station. As a seaside town, the former Masan City is planning to attract investment for an industrial or tourism complexes by using reclaimed land, and as a large-scaled development of the old factory areas is about to be completed soon, the urban structure of Masan is expected to

change fundamentally. Moreover, Jinhae has long-term plans of using the old area of Korea Naval Academy for its urban development as well as developing a free economic zone. Likewise, the unity of Changwon, Masan and Jinhae is predicted to have large and fundamental influence on the spatial structure of those three cities. Therefore, it is really necessary to predict through spatial analysis technique how the urban structure of the united city will change in the future.

4. Urban Spatial Analysis before the Unity

4.1 Premise of the Analysis

In this chapter, spatial analysis is carried out on each city before the unity. It is because interpreting urban structures before the unity is needed to investigate the change of urban spatial structure after the unity. Thus, by providing axial maps based on the urban street structure of the former Changwon, Masan and Jinhae, the spatial syntax analysis was carried out. It is premised to provide axial maps by following the central line of roads, based on the road structure of each individual city in June, 2010. Suburb areas of each city, like Eub and Myeon, were not included in the range of spatial analysis. Because those suburb areas were so vast and actually linked to the urban area through routes, they didn't seem to really influence the change of urban structures according to the unity.

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In the meanwhile, axial lines in the map were provided by focusing on the central line of roads. Since those maps were to examine the centrality and adjacency of the entire urban structure, additional buffer zones were not set up. Axial lines were drawn up with AutoCAD2000, which were brought into SCUBE program for analysis to be carried out. The result analyzed was exported with MS Excel. As long as there was no additional mark, the analysis result map was expressed with black and white spectrum (gray scale). Black indicates high numerical values, which became lower toward white as they through gray.

4.2 Space Syntax Analysis of the Former Changwon

After the axial map of the former Changwon was prepared, the analysis was conducted by focusing on Integration indices of Space Syntax. The number of axial lines in the axial map was 3,149, which was the most out of all the three cities.

The average value of Integration for the former Changwon was found to 0.9158, with 0.2539 of the minimum vale, 1.6689 of the maximum value and 0.2211 of the standard deviation. Changwondaero was found to have the highest maximum value, 1.6689, which indicates that it has much higher centrality than North 15 Ro that has the highest Connectivity and Control.

Table 1. Result of Integration Analysis of Former Changwon

Div.	Contents		Note
Index	Integration		
No. of Axes	3,149		
Result of Analysis	Average	0.9158	
	Minimum	0.2539	
	Maximum	1.6689	Changwondaero
	Standard dev.	0.2211	



Figure 3. Spatial Analysis of Former Changwon

4.3 Space Syntax Analysis of the Former Masan

The number of axial lines was 2,524 in the axial map prepared for the former Masan, which was the second most out of all the three cities. With its forms of the original downtown still remained, the former Masan showed a complicated urban structure in part, which made it difficult to grasp its urban structure at a look, so that an analysis tool like Spatial Syntax helps interpret urban structures.

The average value of Integration for the former Masan was found to be 0.6276, with 0.1772 of the minimum value, 0.9526 of the maximum value and 0.1420 of the standard deviation. Habporo (around Dongseo Dong) was found to have the highest Integration value, 0.9526, which indicates that it has a centrality much higher than 315 Eigeogil (around Habseong Dong) having the highest Connectivity and Control.

Table 2. Result of Integration Analysis of Former Masan

Div.	Contents		Note
Index	Integration		
No. of Axes	2,524		
Result of Analysis	Average	0.6276	
	Minimum	0.1772	
	Maximum	0.9526	Habporo
	Standard dev.	0.1420	



Figure 4. Spatial Analysis of Former Masan

4.4 Space Syntax Analysis of the Former Jinhae

The number of axial lines was 2,379 in the axial map for the former Jinhae, which is the fewest one out of all the three cities. Although it has the fewest axial lines, Jinhae is considered to have relatively many axial lines, compared to the urban size. Having been formed during the Japanese ruling era, Jinhae is based on a radial-pattern urban structure, but it is extended into a grid-pattern structure along the seashore. Through analyses of axial maps, such an urban structure can be clearly examined.

The average value of Integration for the former Jinhae was found to be 0.6179, with 0.1693 of the minimum value, 0.9856 of the maximum value and 0.1392 of the standard deviation. Chungchoro was found to have the highest maximum value, 0.9856, which indicates that it has a centrality much higher than Hyeon-nyeo 1 Gil and Daecheon Ro that have rather high Connectivity and Control. All over the city, the areas around

Gyeonghwa Dong were found to have the highest centrality and accessibility.

Table 3. Result of Integration Analysis of Former Jinhae

Div.	Contents		Note
Index	Integration		
No. of Axes	2,379		
Result of Analysis	Average	0.6179	
	Minimum	0.1693	
	Maximum	0.9856	Chungchoro
	Standard dev.	0.1392	



Figure 5. Spatial Analysis of Former Jinhae

4.5 Summary and Interpretation of the Analysis

As for the average value of Integration for the three cities, Changwon showed 0.9158, the highest one, followed by Masan with 0.6276, and then Jinhae with 0.6176, the lowest one. When it comes to streets showing the highest values of Integration in each city, Changwondaero showed 1.6689 in Changwon, Habporo (around Dongseo Dong) 0.9526 in Masan and Jungchoro 0.9856 in Jinhae. Especially, Changwondaero was found to have the highest value of Integration, 1.8223, even when it was compared with the average Integration of each city, which indicates that Changwondaero has a quite

strong centrality, compared to Habporo (around Dongseo Dong) with 1.5178 in Masan and Jungchoro with 1.5905 in Jinhae.

In the former Changwon, Changwondaero, Buk 15 Ro and Buk 16 Ro were found to generally have very high centrality and accessibility. Especially, Changwondaero is the longest road in the entire urban street structure of Changwon, functioning as a very important road in separating residential/commercial areas from industrial areas, so it has a great deal of traffic. That is, the result of analysis was found to really match up with the actual spatial use pattern.

In the former Masan, the areas around Ohdong Dong and Dongseo Dong were found to have the highest centrality and accessibility all over the city. In case of Integration showing the entire spatial structure, areas around Ohdong Dong and Dongseo Dong had high values, but in case of Integration(3) showing the localized spatial structure, the areas around Habseong Dong, Guam Dong and Dongseo Dong were found to have high values, all of which are actually areas active in commercial activity.

In the former Jinhae, the areas around Gyeonghwa Dong were found to have the highest centrality and accessibility. In case of Integration, the areas around Gyeonghwa Dong had high values, but in case of Integration(3), the space along the western Bokgaecheon and the areas around Gyeonghwa Dong were found to have high values. In other words, it was found that the localized spatial structure of Jinhae is divided into two divisions, such as the areas along the western Bokgaecheon and the areas around Gyeonghwa Dong.

5. Prediction of the Urban Structure of United Changwon City

5.1 Space Syntax Analysis of United Changwon

It was found that the average value of Integration for United Changwon City is 0.5177 with 0.1702 of the minimum value, 0.8432 of the maximum value and 0.1122 of the standard deviation. Interestingly, since Changwondaero, having shown the highest maximum value out of all the individual cities before the unity, was found to have the highest maximum value, 0.8432, it is analogized to still play a very important role after the unity. Then, Sogyegogadoro was found to have the second highest maximum value, 0.8144, which indicates that some roads, not having taken an important position at all in each individual city before, will take very important positions in the entire spatial structure after the unity. The road with the third highest maximum value was found to

be Samjeongja IC with 0.8144, which was another road not having taken an important position before. During the analysis of Integration, it was found that the areas functioning as a border between the former Masan and Jinhae would play a very important role after the unity, which also indicates another important change brought by the unity.



Figure 6. Spatial Analysis of united Changwon

Table 4. Result of Integration Analysis of United Changwon

Div.	Contents		Note
Index	Integration		
No. of Axes	8,052		
Result of	Average	0.5177	

Analysis	Minimum	0.1702	
	Maximum	0.8432	Changwondaero
	Standard dev.	0.1122	

5.2 Directivity of the Urban Growth

The future urban growth of United Changwon City, examined through Spatial Syntax, seems to be reinforced much more with the urban status of the former Changwon more improved. In terms of localized connection attribute, it seems that the existing central areas of Changwon, Masan and Jinhae have still taken important positions after the unity. Especially, the former Masan and Jinhae seem to have rather less localized accessibility than Changwon. In this light, the spatial status of the former Changwon will be much more reinforced. Particularly speaking, in the analysis of Integration to figure out the entire change of spatial structure, Changwondaero, which had showed the highest Integration out of all the roads in all the individual cities before the unity, is analogized to still play a very important role after the unity. For instance, vehicle traffic in Changwondaero may increase, and there seems to be more frequent use of the areas of Sogye Square, Seongju Square and Samjeongja IC and so on.

Of course, since the three cities had already interacted with one another as the same simultaneous life zone before the unity, change caused by the unity will not appear radical. However, as the city grows and expands, such change is expected to get clear gradually. For a better downtown management of the former Changwon, it is needed to establish an efficient and fair downtown density management plan to reject an excessive and unplanned urban development and to lead to a sustainable urban growth. Especially, as accessibility and connectivity around Sogye Dong and Samjeongja Dong will increase, it is required to provide an efficient urban management plan by considering this prediction. Furthermore, in case of the areas of Kyungnam University and Jinhae Borough Office that became located at the urban edge somehow as a result of the unity, it is needed to seek for various measures to restore the downtown from a viewpoint of balanced development.

6. Conclusion

As United Changwon City has been launched, this study intends to predict the directivity of urban growth from a viewpoint of spatial structure, while carrying out a

spatial analysis by using Space Syntax. As a result of examining the spatial structure of the city before and after its unity, it was found that Changwondaero showed the highest accessibility and centrality out of all the roads in the three cities before the unity and it would still play a very important role after the unity. On the other hand, Sogyegogadoro and other roads like ones near Samjeongja IC in each individual city, which didn't take an important position at all before, were predicted to take very important positions in the entire spatial structure after the unity. Such streets located in the outskirts before the unity will be key roads connecting to Jinhae and Masan after the unity, so it can be interpreted that the entire accessibility will be higher as well.

Since this study on urban growth was carried out in terms of spatial structure, interpreting the result of analysis should be done only by focusing on the characteristics of spatial structure, and it should be taken into consideration that external conditions, such as policy decisions, were not included in this analysis. It is anticipated that further studies will be conducted on the directivity of urban growth of the united city in the combination of such socioeconomic factors.

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Topic of submission:
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Demographic studies in Hong Kong:
How cross border birth influence Hong Kong's fertility and demographic structure



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Demographic studies in Hong Kong:

How cross border birth influence Hong Kong's fertility and demographic structure

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Introduction

Hong Kong has returned to People's Republic of China (China) on 1st July 1997 and becomes a special administrative region of China. Under the principle of "One country, two systems", Hong Kong Special administrative Region (HKSAR) could remain the capitalist system while the mainland (China) continues with its socialist system. Hong Kong could enjoy a high degree of autonomy, including administrative and legislative powers, an independent judiciary and the right of final adjudication. At the same time, Hong Kong could run her own party, political, economic and financial affairs, and may conclude commercial and cultural agreements with foreign countries and would enjoy "certain rights" in foreign affairsⁱ.

With the high degree of autonomy, resolving population problem is solely Hong Kong's internal responsibility. From 1983, Hong Kong's total fertility rate (TFR) started to decrease continuously, and it fell below 1.0 in 2001. Due to the low fertility, Hong Kong faces a high aging rate. In order to resolve the low fertility and reduce the aging rate, Hong Kong government announced various policies to raise the fertility. From 2004, the TFR showed an upward trend, but the increase has not much to do with the policies, rather it is caused by the large numbers of cross border birth from the mainlandⁱⁱ (mainland Chinese).

The cause of the cross border birth has two main factors. First, the reformation of "Right of abode in Hong Kong" in 2001 permits all Chinese nationals who are born in Hong Kong, even by non Hong Kong citizen parents are entitled to have the right of abode in Hong Kong. Second, the distinct difference between Hong Kong and mainland Chinese citizens in enjoy civil and political rights.

Since Hong Kong is a special administration region, immigration control between Hong Kong and mainland China remain exists even after handover. Both Hong Kong citizens and mainlanders are requested to hold a valid traveling document before crossing the border. Therefore, it is not easy for mainlander to come to Hong Kong for giving birth. However, in 2003, when the central government of China loosens the disembarkation procedure of mainlander to enter Hong Kong, mainlander couples starts to travel to Hong Kong for giving birth. The share of mainlander's born baby raise from 4.6% (2003) to 45.4% (2009) and pose a big issue to Hong Kong population structure.


This paper is going to first analysis the demographic structure of Hong Kong. Then explain how mainlander's cross border birth influences Hong Kong's fertility. Finally, discuss how cross

border birth influence Hong Kong's demographic structure.

Chapter 1 Hong Kong's demographic structure

In 2010, Hong Kong has over 7million population, and a 0.9 population growth rate. The age group structure is 14.0% (aged 0-14, young age group), 74.1% (aged 15-64, working age group) and 11.9% (aged 65 or above, elderly age group). The share of age groups has a significant change between 1961 and 2010. Figure 1 shows the share of each age group. The young age group has undergone a decreasing trend and has a significant falls between 1970s and 1980s. From 2000, it starts to drop under 20%. On the other hand, the elderly age group increased substantially and its share excesses 10% in 1996. For the working age group, it continues to expand and shares over 70% of the population. Since the elderly age group and working age continue to expand, the median age of Hong Kong rise from 31 in 1991 to 36 in 2001 and to 42.8 in 2010. It reflects Hong Kong is rapidly aging.

Figure 1: The share of age groups between 1961 to 2010




* This figure shows the share of age group every 5 years. However, in order to show the latest situation, the data of 2010 is also included in the figure.

Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2011

The decrease of share of the young age group is mainly due to the decline of total fertility rate in Hong Kong. Referring to the TFR trend in Hong Kong between 1971 and 2010 (refer to Figure 2), the TFR decrease from 3.5 (1971) to 1.1 (2010). In other words, the average number of birth per woman decreases from 3 children to 1 child. And between 2001 and 2006, the TFR even drops under 1.0, which implies that one woman even cannot give birth to 1 child on average.


Figure 2: The fertility trend of Hong Kong between 1971 and 2010



Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2011

While TFR continues to decrease, the crude death rate of Hong Kong continues to remain at a stable level (Figure 3). Although it shows an upward trend, compare to Japan (9.83)ⁱⁱⁱ and United States (8.38)^{iv}, crude death rate of Hong Kong is still relatively low.

Figure 3: The crude death rate trend of Hong Kong between 1961 and 2010



Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2011

The sex ratio (number of males per 1000 females) of Hong Kong population decreases continuously from 1087 (1981) to 872 (2010). This is resulted by longer life expectation of females than males and a large inflow of female immigrants. There are also variations in the sex ration by age group. Particularly, there are more females than males in the age group 25-44 (Table 1). One of the reason is that a considerable number of female domestic helpers working in Hong Kong. However, even excluding foreign domestic helpers, there are still more female than male

in the age group 25-44. It is because most of the immigrants migrate to Hong Kong are female (35227 people, 72.5% in 2009) from the mainland China joining their husband in Hong Kong by 'One-way permit' (family reunion immigration policy).

Table 1: Sex ratios by age group, 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2009

Age group / Year	Number of males per 1000 females			
	1996	2001	2006	2009
0-4	1088 (1088)	1086 (1086)	1076 (1076)	1091 (1091)
5-9	1071 (1071)	1074 (1074)	1069 (1069)	1078 (1078)
10-14	1066 (1066)	1060 (1060)	1052 (1052)	1051 (1051)
15-19	1060 (1073)	1058 (1064)	1039 (1040)	1059 (1059)
20-24	990 (1085)	927 (1084)	914 (1038)	920 (993)
25-29	862 (1001)	848 (1027)	803 (1009)	756 (978)
30-34	906 (1002)	784 (929)	771 (915)	720 (897)
35-39	991 (1071)	844 (940)	749 (841)	720 (835)
40-44	1026 (1080)	977 (1054)	834 (893)	787 (864)
45-49	1111 (1141)	1005 (1055)	964 (1008)	893 (939)
50-54	1208 (1216)	1078 (1102)	987 (1013)	979 (1010)
55-59	1185 (1191)	1165 (1178)	1033 (1045)	993 (1008)
60-64	1097 (1098)	1143 (1146)	1097 (1102)	1031 (1037)
65-69	992 (992)	1052 (1052)	1074 (1074)	1116 (1117)
70-74	877 (877)	949 (949)	969 (969)	968 (968)
75-79	768 (768)	790 (790)	855 (855)	913 (913)
80-84	626 (626)	656 (656)	660 (660)	691 (691)
85 or above	409 (409)	453 (453)	456 (456)	459 (459)
Overall	1001 (1048)	956 (1021)	912 (971)	889 (955)

* Numbers in () is the sex ratios excluding foreign domestic helpers.

Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2010

Chapter 2 Hong Kong's fertility and mainlander's cross border birth

2.1 The background of mainlander's cross border birth

After the handover, Hong Kong becomes a city of China, and at the same time, most Hong Kong residents become solely Chinese citizens and hold a Chinese nationality. These changes make Chinese who are born in Hong Kong and was fighting to become Hong Kong residents under the British colonial rule, suddenly entitle to the right of abode in Hong Kong. For example, Chinese nationals who are born in Hong Kong by non Hong Kong resident parents were not entitled to become Hong Kong residents during the colonial period. However, after the handover, according to the birthright citizenship, Chinese who are born in Hong Kong should entitle to be a Hong Kong resident automatically.

This fact leads to a reformation towards the "Right of abode in Hong Kong" in 2001. The renewed 'Right of abode in Hong Kong' permits all Chinese nationals who are born in Hong Kong, even by non-Hong Kong citizen parents are entitled to have the right of abode in Hong Kong. When the reformation starts to valid, Hong Kong government recorded 7810 new born babies are born by mainlander mothers in 2001. And most of the baby's fathers are Hong Kong

residents because of the growth of cross border marriage (usually the husband is Hong Kong resident and the wife is mainland resident). While the cross border birth by mainlander mother increase continuously, the number of babies who are born by non Hong Kong residents parents (mainlander couple) increase speedily. Especially, after the central Chinese government loosens the disembarkation procedure of mainlander to enter Hong Kong in 2003, babies who are born by mainlander parents rise almost in a double (8506 babies in 2002; 10128 babies in 2003). The share of baby born by mainlander mothers rise from 4.6% in 2003, 16.9% in 2005, 27.8% in 2007 and 46.7% in 2009 (Table 2).

Between 2003 and 2006, Hong Kong's hospitals unexpectedly received over 60 thousands mainland mothers to give birth. Unexpected arrival of mainland mothers usually with limited medical records which makes medical care providers find hard to provide appropriate treatment. Facing the risks of helping few health records mothers to deliver baby, most of the hospitals place unexpected mainland mothers in intensive care. This straining Hong Kong's overburdened health-care system. Furthermore, many mainland mothers leave without paying hospital fees and bring a huge financial problem to Hong Kong government. In 2007, Hong Kong government announced that unpaid fees by non-residents exceeded HK\$322 million (US\$ 40 million) between 2002 and 2006 and more than 70% of that was owned by mainlanders.

In order to relief the stress of medical care providers and maintain the basic medical services for Hong Kong residents, Hong Kong government began to impose restriction on mainland expectant mothers to enter Hong Kong from February 2007. Under the new policies, mainland expected mothers are requested to hold a valid booking confirmation document established by Hong Kong Hospitals. And mainland women who are more than 7 months pregnant and without Hong Kong hospital's confirmation are not allowed to enter Hong Kong. At the same time, Hong Kong Hospital Authority increased the charge of non-resident delivery and birth-related hospitalization from minimum HK\$9000 (US\$1154) to HK\$39000 (US\$5000) in public hospitals.

New policies enable Hong Kong hospitals to generate wealth from cross border birth. In 2009, Hong Kong hospitals generated HK\$150 million (US\$ 19 billion) from mainland mothers. However, it did not help to stop mainland mothers to come to give birth. In 2008, there were 33565 babies born by mainland mothers, 5991 babies more than in 2007. In 2009, there were 37253 babies born by mainland mothers, which is 35% more than in 2007 (See Table 2).

Table 2: The share of new born babies by mainland mothers

Year	TFR	Total Number of	Baby born by HK residents parents (including non Chinese residents)	Baby born by mainland mothers			
				Husband is Hong Kong residents	Husband is mainland residents	Others*	subtotal

		live births					
200 1	0.931	48219	40409 (83.8)	7190 (14.9)	620 (1.3)	N.A.	7810 (16.2)
200 2	0.941	48209	39703 (82.4)	7256 (15.1)	1250 (2.6)	N.A.	8506 (17.6)
200 3	0.901	46965	36837 (78.4)	7962 (17.0)	2070 (4.4)	96 (0.2)	10128 (21.6)
200 4	0.922	49796	36587 (73.5)	8896 (17.9)	4102 (8.2)	211 (0.4)	13209 (26.5)
200 5	0.959	57098	37560 (65.8)	9879 (17.3)	9273 (16.2)	386 (0.7)	19538 (34.2)
200 6	0.984	65626	39494 (60.2)	9438 (14.4)	16044 (24.4)	650 (1.0)	26132 (39.8)
200 7	1.025	70394	42820 (60.8)	7989 (11.3)	18816 (26.7)	769 (1.1)	27574 (39.2)
200 8	1.056	78752	45187(57.4)	7228 (9.2)	25269 (32.1)	1068 (1.4)	33565 (42.6)
200 9	1.042	82095	44842 (54.6)	6213 (7.6)	29766 (36.3)	1247 (1.5)	37253 (45.4)

*Others: mainlander mother did not provide the baby's father information during the birth registration.

** Number in () are the share (%) of that group by total number of live births

Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2010

2.2 How mainlanders influence Hong Kong's fertility

Total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime (ages 15-49). It is the sum of all age groups of 5 times each age-specific fertility rates (ASFR). ASFR is the number of live births to women in of time, and the denominator an estimate of the number of person-years lived by women in that same age group expressed as births per 1000 women^{vi}. Since the baby born by Chinese nations in Hong Kong automatically becomes Hong Kong resident, all the new born babies who are born in Hong Kong by mainlander mothers are counted in the 'live births in Hong Kong'. In other words, they are also counted in one of the age-specific fertility rate. However, mainlander mothers usually stay in Hong Kong for a limited period of time (usually within 7 days as the travel visa only valid for 7 days), which will not be counted as Hong Kong's female population. Therefore, the mainlander mother's birth only affected the age-specific fertility rate, but did not have any influence towards the number of women in that specific age group. As a result, with the statistic error, the age-specific fertility rate has a higher rate than it should be, and eventually pushes the TFR to a higher level. Therefore, with the increase of mainlander's birth from 2003, Hong Kong's TFR rise immediately.

Among the mainlander mothers, 2 main groups can be identified. The 1st group is her husband is Hong Kong resident. The 2nd group is her husband is also a mainland resident. The 1st group mothers usually can stay in Hong Kong for longer period as they can apply a family reunion two-way permit^{vii} to travel to Hong Kong. This type of permit allows her to stay in Hong Kong for

maximum 90 days. Their temporary stay is much longer than normal visitors; therefore, this type of mainlander mothers may have a greater chance to be counted in Hong Kong female population. On the other hand, the 2nd group of mothers usually travel to Hong Kong by individual visits two-way permit. Limited by the maximum 7 days of stay, this type of mothers will travel back to mainland as soon as they finished the birth.

Referring to Table 2, the share of live births from Hong Kong residents women (including non-Chinese Hong Kong residents) shows a declining trend while mainlander women's birth have an uprising trend. Although the number of live births by Hong Kong residents has an increasing trend, the large number of mainlander's live births makes Hong Kong resident's share relatively small in size. In 2009, mainlander's share went up to 45.5%; even excluding the 1st group of mothers, the share of mainlander couples still remains 36.3%. This tells that, among the data of calculating TFR, 36.3% babies are mainlander couples born and has pushed the TFR to 1.042. In other words, the TFR or the real TRF of Hong Kong will be at a lower level once the calculation excludes mainlander couple's birth.

Chapter 3 How mainlander cross border birth affect Hong Kong demographic structure


The share of mainlander mother's birth is getting larger, 'Where will those babies stay?' will be an important question towards Hong Kong demographic structure. In 2007 and 2009, Hong Kong Government has conducted a research called 'Assumptions on babies born in Hong Kong to Mainland women'. This research is to figure out where those baby's parents will let the baby stay in Hong Kong after birth or not. The result is, babies born by the 1st group (her husband is Hong Kong resident), 52% of the parents said the baby will stay and grow in Hong Kong after birth. The remaining 48%, 86% of the parents said the baby will be back to mainland immediately after birth but may settle in Hong Kong before the baby become 21 years old. The 2nd group (her husband is also mainland resident), 98% of the parents said they will bring the baby back to mainland immediately after birth and only 2% said the baby will stay in Hong Kong. Among those 98%, only 28% of mainlander couple said they may settle in Hong Kong before the baby become 21 years old.

The government's research tells that most of the babies born by 1nd group mothers are going to settle in Hong Kong before age 21 and become a part of Hong Kong population. Oppositely, most of the babies born by 2nd group mothers are not going to settle in Hong Kong even they are turning to adult. This means that, babies born by 2nd group mother are counted as Hong Kong population only at the year of their birth. For this reason, a sudden contract of the young age group population is predictable.

To proof this prediction with limited data, a comparison between Hong Kong born babies over the past 5 years (sum of 5 years live births of certain years) and population aged 0-4 is done. The data are drawn from official census done by Hong Kong Census and Statistic Department.

Assume there is no immigrant and emigrant, and the mortality rate of aged 0-4 is remains constant. The sum of born babies over the past 5 years will be slightly more than the population aged 0-4 in a given year. It is because population equals to 'birth – death + (immigrant – emigrant)'. The increase or decrease movement of two curves should be the same (as the mortality is given as constant) and will be almost parallel to each other. In figure 4, before 2001 the population of aged 0-4 is more than sum of babies born over the past 5 years, which indicates that there was a large aged 0-4 population inflow. The reason is there was a large inflow of children by One-way permit. From 2002, the situation changed. The Hong Kong born babies over the past 5 years is much more than the population aged 0-4. This is caused by the outflow of population aged 0-4. The curve of Hong Kong born babies over past 5 years rise speedily after 2003 and generate a big gap between population aged 0-4 and born babies over the past 5 years. As a result, when more 2nd group babies are born in Hong Kong, the contraction of the aged 0-4 population will be much greater.

Figure 4: Comparison between Hong Kong born babies over the past 5 years and population aged 0-4



Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2010

Second, the mainlander's cross border birth also affects the growth of child population. Although the TFR is in an uprising trend, most of the mainlander's born babies are not going to settle in Hong Kong before their age of 21. Therefore, even the number of live births increase, the population between ages 1-14 do not expand with a direct proportional. As a result, the population between ages 1-14 continues to contract because of the low birth rate by local Hong Kong residents. Figure 5 and figure 6 shows the population pyramids of 2001 and 2009. Although the live birth in 2009 was 82095, 33876 births more than 2001, the base of the population pyramid of 2009 is much narrower than the population pyramid of 2001.

Figure 5: Hong Kong's Population pyramid of 2001






Figure 6: Hong Kong's Population Pyramid of 2009



Source: Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, 2010

Figure 7 is a hypothesized population pyramid which assumes all the babies born by mainlander couples are going to settle in Hong Kong after their birth. The population pyramid is based on 2009 population, adding the numbers of birth by mainlander couples. When making this assumption population pyramid, various assumptions are made because of limited data. First, the sex ratio of the new births is 1:1. Second, all the mainlander couples born babies are settle in Hong Kong. Third, the child death rate remains zero.

Figure 7: Hypothesized population pyramid



By comparing the population pyramid of 2009 and the hypothesized population pyramid, the base of the assumption population pyramid is much wider than the one in 2009. It reflects that the absence of mainland couples born children leads to a contraction in child population. And when the babies are not going to settle in Hong Kong, their births do not help to solve the low fertility problem of Hong Kong.

Furthermore, the increase in numbers of births does nothing to help to slow down the aging rate. The aging rate is 'elderly population (65 or above) / total population x 100%'. Then, the sudden absence of mainland born babies will decrease the total population, which may speed up the aging rate. However, if all the new born babies settle in Hong Kong, it will help to slow down the aging as the population will increase due to the natural increase.

Conclusion

The reformation of "Right of abode in Hong Kong" in 2001 opens an opportunity for mainlanders to have a change to give their children the 'right of permanent residence in Hong Kong'. After the handover, under the 'One country two systems', the status of Hong Kong is similar to an independent nation even though it officially belongs to China. Hong Kong has her own government, basic law, economic system, foreign affairs and they are totally different to mainland China. Despite the symbol of a nation, Hong Kong permanent residents hold a different passport than mainland residents. Since Hong Kong was a colony of Britain, many European countries allow Hong Kong SAR passport holders to enter their countries without a visa. Therefore, a Hong Kong SAR passport holder can enter over 140 countries or regions without a visa, which is much more than the People's Republic of China passport, 18 countries or regions without a visa.

There are many reasons to persuade mainlanders to give birth in Hong Kong even the cost is very high. One of the main reasons is the one child policy does not apply to Hong Kong. Therefore, mainland couples can have more than 1 child without breaking the laws, as long as the additional child is a Hong Kong permanent resident. Hence, even Hong Kong's public hospitals raised the delivery fee towards non-resident delivery to a minimum HK\$39000 (US\$5000) in 2007, which was almost the same as the average annual salary, CNY 34707 (US\$5000) of Chinese in 2007. The boom of mainlanders going to Hong Kong for deliver baby did not stop.

With the boom of mainlanders coming to Hong Kong to deliver baby, the TFR of Hong Kong rise continuously from 2003 at a high speed, however this does not mean that the aging problem of Hong Kong was solved. Since most of the mainland mothers hold a 7 days valid visa to travel to Hong Kong, their temporary stay are usually not count in the permanent population of Hong Kong or they are not in Hong Kong during the census. Therefore, only the newborn babies born by mainlanders are counted in the census, but the mothers of those babies are not counted. Besides that, according to the "Right of abode in Hong Kong", all Chinese nations who are born in Hong Kong are automatically become Hong Kong permanent resident; the babies who are born by mainlanders will directly count in Hong Kong's live births. As a result, the sudden increase of newborn babies pushes the TFR rise immediately.

At the same time, the mainlanders' births affect the demographic structure of Hong Kong. According to the official research, most of the babies who are born by mainland couples will not settle in Hong Kong after their birth. The absent of babies generate a gap between born population and the real 1 years old population. Although the mainlanders' cross border birth action only have a short history, the absent of children leads to a negative grow of child population and do not help to slow down the aging rate.

To conclude mainlanders cross the border and give births in Hong Kong has helped to raise Hong Kong's TFR. However, the rise of fertility does not help Hong Kong to increase child population and do not help to slow down the aging rate. Although the mainlanders cross border birth action has a very short history, it leads to a huge population issues and affect the population development of Hong Kong.

ⁱ China.org.cn ‘One Country, Two Systems’

ⁱⁱ “mainlander” is a common term uses in Hong Kong and Macau, which refers to residents of mainland China, or recent immigrants from mainland China.

ⁱⁱⁱ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2011 *The World Factbook :Japan* Home page.<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html>, accessed 2011/02/22

^{iv} Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2011 *The World Factbook :United States* Home page.<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html>, accessed 2011/02/22

^v ‘One -way permit’ is a document issued by the People’s Republic of China allowing residents of mainland China too leave the mainland to settle in Hong Kong. This document is limited to family reunion, only family members of Hong Kong residents are eligible to apply.

^{vi} United Nations Population Division, 2008 *World Fertility Data 2008* Homepage.<http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WFD%202008/Metadata/ASFR.html>, accessed 2011/02/26

^{vii} Two-way permit is a document issued to mainland Chinese as entry and exit travel document for purpose of travel to Hong Kong and Macau. The official name of this document is ‘Exit-Entry Permit for Travelling to and from Hong Kong and Macao’. This document has 6 types of exit endorsement. They are ‘individual visits’, ‘family reunion’, ‘business purpose’, ‘for tour group visit’, ‘other purposes of visit’ and ‘multiple exits and entries’ (maximum stay authorized by respective SAR immigration officers). The period of staying in Hong Kong or Macau vary to the type of exit endorsement. Excluding the ‘multiple exits and entries’, ‘family reunion’ has the longest period of stay, maximum 90 days. And usually other types of exit endorsements such as ‘individual visits’ and ‘business purpose’ and ‘group visit’ only can stay in Hong Kong or Macau for a maximum 7 days.

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**Perceptions and Measurement of Family Welfare
in Indonesia:
A Qualitative Systematic Review**

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Topic:
South-East Asian Studies

**Perceptions and Measurement of Family Welfare in
Indonesia:
A Qualitative Systematic Review**

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Abstract

The Indonesia's Family Planning Program has two aims: 1) to promote family planning and 2) to improve or achieve prosperous families. A prosperous family is defined as "a family built through legitimate marriage, capable of fulfilling its own spiritual and material needs, faithful to One Supreme God, with harmonious, balanced, and appropriate relationships among its members, among families, and with the society and the environment". In that context, in 1992 the National Family Planning Coordinating Board (NFPCB) has developed the 'Family Welfare Program', defined as "an effort to mobilise community resources to satisfy physical, spiritual, social and development needs". It has also developed a set of indicators for family welfare measurement that include health, economic, education, religious, and social relations. This paper synthesises findings of studies on the NFPCB's 'Family Welfare Program' with two objectives: 1) to identify perceptions of family welfare among different groups of people; and 2) to assess ways to improve the quality of family welfare measurement. The study results show that family welfare is a complex concept, it is influenced by social, cultural and religious norms. The NFPCB has attempted to accommodate Indonesian people's aspirations for family welfare. However, considering the unique concept on family welfare of each ethnic group across Indonesia, adjustments have to be made to suit it to local contexts and settings.

Introduction

The Indonesian population has been characterised by the large population size and rapid growth. This led to the adoption of a population control policy as part of the development strategy, with the family planning program as

the principal instrument. The Indonesian family planning program has evolved from a private endeavour in 1950s to become a government program in 1970. Since then, the program has been coordinated by the National Family Planning Coordinating Board (NFPCB) and implemented through the government bureaucracy at all administrative levels. The program's goals were to reduce and control population growth and to lay the foundation for the acceptance of the 'Happy and Prosperous Small Family Norm'.

In 1994, the NFPCB launched the "Prosperous Family Movement", which later became known as the "Family Empowerment Programs", with the objective of enhancing families' resilience and prosperity. Subsequently, the NFPCB developed 'Family Enumeration' as a tool for problem identification, planning, and monitoring family welfare programs at grassroots levels.

Few studies have examined perceptions and measurement of family welfare in Indonesia. In the light of this, this paper attempts to: 1) identify perceptions of family welfare among different groups of people; and 2) assess ways to improve the quality of family welfare measurement.

Data and Method

The process of qualitative systematic review comprises four phases: 1) identification of the focus of review; 2) identification of published papers and determination of their relevance; 3) identification and summary of key themes from each paper; 4) comparison of key themes between the papers such that the findings are linked across studies and synthesised into new concepts.

Only a small number of published research concerning the NFPCB's family welfare. A total of 28 studies were identified and 10 studies were included in this review. The broad criteria for inclusion were that studies :

- report the perceptions on family welfare, obtained through direct interviews, either using open methods or using structured questions
- discuss issues on family welfare indicators

- discuss issues on data quality, validity and reliability of family enumeration

Of the 10 studies, 8 were carried out by university researcher and the other two studies were conducted by the NFPCB researcher.

The studies included in the synthesis are:

1. Arsyad, S.A., et al. 2007. *Kajian Indikator Keluarga Sejahtera (A Review of Prosperous Family Indicators)*. NFPCB.
2. Dwiyanto, A., et.al. 1997. *Family Planning, Family Welfare, and Women Activities*. Research Report. Population Study Center. Gadjah Mada University.
3. Faturachman, et al. 1998. 'Validity and Reliability of Family Welfare Measures: An Experiment in Central dan East Java', *Journal of Population*, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 33-55.
4. Rahmadewi et al. 2003. *Studi Evaluasi dan Kelangsungan Pendataan Keluarga (Family Enumeration Evaluation Study)*. NFPCB.
5. Ritonga, A.H., et al. 1998. *Pemberdayaan Nilai Budaya Dalam Rangka Mewujudkan Keluarga Sejahtera Daerah Sumatera Utara (Strengthening Cultural Values in Creating Prosperous Family in North Sumatera)*. Ministry of Education and Culture.
6. Sujarno et al. 1999. *Pemberdayaan Nilai Budaya Dalam Rangka Mewujudkan Keluarga Sejahtera di Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (Strengthening Cultural Values in Creating Prosperous Family in Yogyakarta)*. Ministry of Education and Culture.
7. Sumarti M.C., T. 1999. *Persepsi Kesejahteraan dan Tindakan Kolektif Orang Jawa Dalam Kaitannya dengan Gerakan Masyarakat dalam Pembangunan Keluarga Sejahtera di Pedesaan (Javanese People Perceptions on Prosperity and Their Collective Actions in Relation With Community Movement and Development of Prosperous Families in Villages)*. Bogor Agricultural Institute.

8. Sumarto, S.' et.al. 2004. *Local Monitoring System During the Implementation of Indonesia's Social Safety Net Programs with Special Reference to the BKKBN System*. Paper presented at Poverty and Economic (PEP) Research Network Meeting, Senegal, June 16-20, 2004.
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10. Wardo, et al. 1996. *Keluarga Sejahtera Menurut Sistem Budaya Masyarakat Pedesaan Jawa Tengah (Prosperous Family According to the Cultural System of Rural Communities in Central Java)*. Ministry of Education and Culture.

The Indonesian family planning program

When established in 1970, the Indonesian family planning program's goals were to reduce and control population growth and to lay the foundation for the acceptance of the 'happy and prosperous small family norm'. The specific objectives are stated as follows: 1) to reduce the birth rate; 2) to improve maternal and child welfare; 3) to enhance the people's awareness of population problems; and 4) to improve the quality of Indonesian human resources as an asset to development (State Ministry for Population/NFPCB, 1995). The definition of the 'small-family' norm has continuously changed as a response to people's changing attitudes to family size. Initially, since a large family was still considered desirable, the campaign proposed to limit family size to four, then three, and eventually it became a two-child norm (Suyono et al., 1995). In 1974, a demographic goal was set, i.e. a 50 percent reduction of the 1970 fertility rate by the year 2000 (Suyono & Reese, 1978). This target was already achieved before the target date, as shown by the 1994 Indonesian Demographic and Health Survey (CBS, 1995).

Through its community-based approach, the family planning program was able to enhance the acceptance of the idea of fertility limitation. This was indicated by the increasing contraceptive prevalence rates, where it had reached 61

percent of the currently married women in 2007. The extensive use of contraceptives has led to a sharp decline in the fertility rate, from 5.6 births per woman in 1970 to 2.78 in 1997 and 2.6 in 2007 (CBS, 1998; 2009). These figures reflect the increasing acceptance of the idea of fertility control through family planning by the Indonesian population.

The foundation of the Indonesian family planning program was strengthened by the passage of Law No. 10/1992 regarding "Population Development and the Development of Prosperous Families". This law defines family planning as "Efforts to increase community awareness and participation in creating 'small, happy and prosperous families' through: delaying marriage; regulating birth; enhancing family resilience; and improving family welfare". This law reemphasises the objective of the family planning program, that is to achieve prosperous families. This law also lays the foundation for the 'Prosperous Family Movement', which is aimed at enhancing families' self-reliance in facing the socio-cultural and environmental changes due to development processes (Suyono et al., 1995).

In 2000, in light of the Program of Action of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, the NFPCB took on a new vision and mission statement. The vision was "Quality Families by 2015", while the main mission was to empower and motivate the community to build small and high quality families. Community participation and empowerment, including women's empowerment, are parts of the main strategies (BKKBN, 2001a). In 2007, the NFPCB revised its vision and mission statement. The vision was "All Families Participate in Family Planning Program", while the mission is "Creating Small, Happy and Prosperous Families." The NFPCB uses the term 'prosperous family', but in this paper the term 'prosperous family' and 'family welfare' will be used interchangeably. In 2009, Law No. 10/1992 has been amended by Law No. 52/2009 which gives the NFPCB a broader task regarding population and family planning issues, and change the organization's name into 'National Population dan Family Planning Board'.

The above paradigms reflect that family planning was not viewed merely as a contraceptive delivery service, but a comprehensive program to reduce family size as a means to achieve the ultimate goal of increased family prosperity. In that context, in 1994 the NFPCB launched the “Prosperous Family Movement”. Since then, the NFPCB’s program on family welfare has become part of the government’s program to foster the well-being of Indonesian families, including economic well-being. The NFPCB has also developed a system for monitoring and focusing community action to improve family welfare.

The family planning program was hierarchically organised, from the national down to the village level. In 2004, under the decentralisation laws, the family planning program has been devolved to district governments. Therefore, the responsibilities for planning, financing, and managing family planning programs are transferred to district governments.

Family Enumeration

As part of the ‘Prosperous Family Movement’, the NFPCB has developed a tool for problem identification, planning and monitoring family welfare programs at grassroots levels, known as ‘family enumeration’. In addition, results of family enumeration are also serve as database for planning, evaluation and policy formulation at all administrative levels (BKKBN, 2008).

The NFPCB involved a team of sociologists for developing the indicators for family enumeration. These indicators were developed based on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, i.e. basic needs, physiological needs, development needs, self actualisation. Prosperous family is considered as an outcome of interactions between families and their environments. The structure and the interaction process varies for each family, depends on the family’s development stage. Such process is also influenced by local cultures, norms and values, and existing infrastructures that affect the family’s life, such as education and technology infrastructures (BKKBN, 2001b; Haryanto & Tomagola, 1997).

The family enumeration uses proxy indicators for measuring family welfare. These indicators are used to screen the families and identify each family's 'deficiency' in fulfilling its needs. Since data for family enumeration are collected by community volunteers, the NFPCB tries to make the indicators simple but sensitive and measurable. The NFPCB has been continuously revised the indicators in response to feed back from the field. In the beginning, the family enumeration used 22 indicators, then one indicator was added, but in 2005 two indicators were removed, and since then the family enumeration uses 21 indicators. A family that fails to meet all the indicators for Stage I, the lowest 'prosperous stage', is categorised as a "Pre-Prosperous" family. Similarly for each successive indicator, a negative response serves as a cutting point to determine the stage of prosperity. By using this method, the NFPCB expects all concerned parties can focus their attention on the unfulfilled needs, and design appropriate interventions (BKKBN, 2001b).

The 21 indicators used to classify families based on their 'prosperity stage' are as follow:

- a. 'Pre-prosperous': Families which are still incapable of meeting their minimum basic needs (fail in one of the Prosperous Stage I indicators).
- b. 'Prosperous Stage I':
 1. Family members eat at least two meals a day
 2. Family members have different set of clothes for different occasions
 3. The house roof, floor and walls are in good condition
 4. Family members use health facilities/services for treating illness
 5. Families use family planning facilities to get family planning services
 6. All children aged 7-15 attend school
- c. 'Prosperous Stage II': Indicators no. 1-5 added with:
 7. Family members practice religion regularly
 8. Family members eat eggs/meat/fish at least once a week
 9. Family members get at least one set of new clothes in a year

10. Household density ≥ 8 square meters per person
11. No family illness during the last three months
12. At least one family member has a permanent job
13. All family members aged 10-60 are literate
14. Families with two children or more practice family planning
- d. 'Prosperous Stages III': Indicators no. 1-14 added with:
 15. Family members make efforts to improve religious knowledge
 16. Families have savings from income
 17. All family members eat together at least once a week
 18. Family members take part in community activities
 19. Family members have access to mass media
- e. 'Prosperous Stage III Plus': Indicators no. 1-19 added with:
 20. Family members make contribution/donation to social activities in the community
 21. Family members take an active role in community organisations

The above classification of 'prosperity stages', which is based on a range of social and economic variables, is different from common indicators for family welfare which stress only economic aspects measured by income or expenditure.

Data collected in the family enumeration include:

- 1) Demographic data: number of households, households heads' sex, marital status, and education level, wife's occupation, number of women of reproductive age (15-49 years old), and number of household members by sex and age (<5, 5-6, 7-15, 16-21, >60 years old);
- 2) Family planning data: number of couples of reproductive age, number of couples using and not using contraception, type of contraceptives used, sources of contraceptives (from government or private service points).
- 3) Data on family welfare to identify the 'prosperity level' of the family based on basic, social, psychological and developmental needs variables, i.e.: religious practices, ability to purchase foods, clothes and housing, health and family planning practices, education, employment, savings, access to mass media, access to public

transport, and interaction within and outside the family. Based on these variables, the families are classified as pre-prosperous, prosperous levels I, II, III with III plus as the highest (see Appendix 3 for the indicators of each level).

- 4) Individual data: citizen registration number, name, sex, address, date of birth, educational attainment, occupation, and marital status (BKKBN, 2008).

Results of family enumeration serve as a basis for local communities, family planning fieldworkers, local governments, and the NFPCB to design intervention programs. Results of the enumeration are kept by the volunteers and tabulated upward by the fieldworkers.

Upon finishing data collection, the volunteers are expected to discuss the results with local leaders and draw a plan to help the families improving their family welfare. The volunteers are also supposed to draw a 'family map' at neighbourhood or hamlet level, which gives a picture of contraceptive use and the prosperity stage of each family in the area. Specific symbols and colours are used to represent the contraceptive method used and the prosperity stage of each family. The circle symbolises the prosperity stage while the rectangle indicates the type of contraceptive method (see Appendix 1).

During the economic crisis in the late 1990s, the family welfare register had also been used to identify targets for social safety net and other poverty alleviation programs. The family welfare register has been used by other government institutions and also NGOs since it is the only system which provides data at the 'micro level', with names and addresses of the families. To accommodate this purpose, families belong to the two lowest prosperous stages (Pre-Prosperous and Prosperous Stage I) were divided into two categories to distinguish those of low economic welfare from those whose welfare was low because of life-style choices (BKKBN, 2001b). In 2005, the register changed back to the original format and all data related to poverty are collected by the Central Board of Statistics (BKKBN, 2008).

The devolution of the family planning program to district governments in 2004 brought fundamental changes to the

management of the program. District governments now have the authority to formulate and design their own policies and programs on population and development. However, as the family enumeration system is already in place, the NFPCB expects that local government will maintain it to assist the community in developing and implementing family planning and other programs related to family welfare. This grass-roots level data will enhance community participation as it will allow the community to assess and evaluate its condition and plan suitable intervention programs.

Findings

A. Perceptions on Family Welfare

All studies carried out interviews to collect information regarding perceptions on family welfare or prosperous family. The population of the studies comprises people from all walks of life, with various socio-economic status, both in urban and rural areas, poor and better off villages (among others: community leaders, farmers, traders, village and hamlet headmen, farm and industrial laborers, teachers, health volunteers).

All studies reveal that perceptions on family welfare are subjective to the family's socio-economic characteristics. However, there was an agreement that the main principle of family welfare is the ability of a family to fulfill its basic needs in terms food, clothing and housing, as well as the fulfillment of spiritual needs.

People's perceptions on family welfare are also influenced by cultural and religious norms and values. Legal marriage is considered as a prerequisite for family prosperity (Sujarno, 1999). One woman in Faturachman's study (1998) uses Arabic terms "*sakinah, mawaddah, warohmah* (religious, peaceful, prosperous)" to describe family welfare, while a farm laborer with seven children maintains that 'destiny' plays a role in achieving family prosperity and he has to "accept God's will" or '*ikhlas*' (Warto et al., 1996)

Batak Toba community of North Sumatera have their own indicator for prosperous family, i.e. those who have achieved

'*saur matua*' state, which refers to a certain level of both physical and spiritual states. There are three prerequisites to achieve *saur matua*: having a son who will bear the family name; possessing assets, preferably buffalos and rice fields; and respected by the community (Ritongga et al., 1998). While for Minang community in West Sumatera, family prosperity is measured by the family's contribution or donation to close relatives who are members of the same '*rumah gadang*' or big house (Arsyad et al., 2007)

Along with modernisation process, the traditional perceptions on family welfare have changed. Traditionally, social class is viewed as an important factor for achieving prosperity. Currently, aside from social class, possession of assets is also considered as an important factor for prosperous family (Sumarti, 1999). A farmer stresses the importance of land ownership, particularly rice field, with a minimum of 0.75 hectare (or 1 *bahu*, the traditional measurement for land) which is considered enough to feed a family of 4-5 persons. However, currently no single family in his village owns that size of land. Some well off families in the same village mention owning a car or a motorcycle as means of transportation is also important for families to be prosperous (Warto et al., 1996). A different view was offered by women in Faturchman's study (1998). They did not specifically mention having assets, except home, as necessary to fulfilling their families' needs.

In line with the importance of possession of assets, all studies agree that having a good occupation or a permanent job is important to family welfare. In that context, education is viewed as a means to getting a good job and having a prosperous life. Therefore, children's education is considered to be an important part of a family's welfare. Parents want their children to have a better life than themselves. In addition, savings is also considered as essential in achieving prosperous family.

Family health is also regarded as important for families to be prosperous. Ability to provide nutritious foods, having access to health service facilities, and cleanliness around the house are considered as the keys to good family health

(Faturochman et al., 1998). In this context, having a job is also important to maintain family health.

However, Faturochman's study reveals that defining family welfare was not always an easy task for women. Both poorer and more prosperous women experienced difficulty in defining family welfare.

B. Issues on data quality, validity and reliability

The enumeration process requires the village volunteers to visit all the families in their areas, not only the reproductive age couples. The breadth of the information collected necessitates a certain level of understanding of the matters and skills in collecting such information. Issues of accuracy were often raised regarding the volunteers' capabilities in carrying out the enumeration.

A study that compares results of family enumeration carried out by volunteers and the research team shows different estimates for over half the family welfare indicators (Faturochman, 1998). The study suggests several possible causes for the differences, one of them is due to differences in understanding of the indicators. The study also asserts that the volunteers have a tendency to fill out the forms without visiting the families. They fill in their personal evaluation rather than ask potentially embarrassing questions about income, religion, or eating habits. Another study reveals that in most of its study areas, upon finishing data collection, the volunteers submitted the results to the family planning fieldworkers right away (Rahmadewi et al., 2003). They perceived family enumeration as a 'duty' for the government and did not understand the purpose of it for their own communities.

The NFPCB recognizes the shortcomings in data quality due to limited budget for data collection and supervision. It has invited district governments and other users to collaborate with the field operations by adding funds for supervision, post-enumeration checking and other quality control measures. However, studies conducted in 2003 and 2007 show there were no additional funding from other sources for the enumeration (Arsyad, et al., 2007; Rahmadewi et al., 2003).

With regard to validity and reliability, several studies point out that family enumeration is not sensitive for measuring economic welfare. It is suggested that indicators for family enumeration should be more quantifiable (Arsyad, et al., 2007; Hull, 2001; Rahmadewi et al., 2003). Nevertheless, a study that compares the prosperous family classification with the consumption-based welfare measurement reveals that at district level the NFPCB data to a large extent agrees with the district-based poverty headcount. At household level, however, the result reveals a discrepancy between the two data sets (Sumarto, 2004).

Discussion

Family welfare is a complex concept, it is influenced by social, cultural and religious norms. The NFPCB has attempted to accommodate Indonesian people's concepts of family welfare in developing indicators for family enumeration. However, considering the unique concept on family welfare of each ethnic group across Indonesia, adjustments have to be made to suit it to local contexts and settings. Therefore, data aggregation at higher administrative levels have to be made with caution.

Issue on volunteers' capabilities in carrying out the enumeration need to be addressed since it related not only to data quality but also to the utilisation of family enumeration results. Based on its basic principle, family enumeration data are collected by and for the communities themselves.

To improve the quality of family enumeration as a data source for the government welfare programs, the above issues have to be addressed. Further research to sharpen the indicators need to be carried out. Coordination among line agencies and local governments also need to be strengthened to improve family enumeration field operations.


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
Appendix 1

An Example of a Family Map



Appendix 2

Family Enumeration
Reporting and Recording Mechanism



Title:

A study of the parallel passages of *Hanshi Waizhuan* 韓詩外傳 found in Alfred Forke's translation of *Lunheng* 論衡

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Chinese Studies

The logo for the International Association for Asian Studies (iafor) is centered on the page. It features the lowercase letters 'iafor' in a light blue, sans-serif font. The text is enclosed within a circular graphic composed of several overlapping, semi-transparent arcs in shades of blue and orange, creating a sense of motion or a stylized globe.

Abstract

Alfred Forke was the first scholar who translated the Wang Chong's 王充 *Lunheng* 論衡 into English. His work was published in 1907, prior to the first detailed and complete Chinese commentary the *Lunheng Jiaoshi* 論衡校釋 by Huang Hui 黃暉 published in 1938. Therefore, Alfred Forke was lack of annotations and emendations for his translation work.

Parallel passages are essential for emendation and exegesis of Chinese ancient texts. To translate ancient texts like *Lunheng* or other excavated texts without commentary, parallel passages played an important role. Parallel passages play the contemporary commentaries role of the ancient texts. This can assist the translator to capture the context. Alfred Forke realised this when making the translation. He listed nineteen books quoted by *Lunheng*. But *Lunheng* did not mention *Hanshi Waizhuan* 韓詩外傳 explicitly, Alfred Forke did not always refer to *Hanshi Waizhuan* when he translate *Lunheng*.

This paper is a study of parallel passages of *Hanshi Waizhuan* found in *Lunheng*. The translations by Alfred Forke will be reviewed. In addition, the appropriate methods to translate and research Chinese ancient texts is introduced.

Title: A study of the parallel passages of *Hanshi Waizhuan* 韓詩外傳 found in Alfred Forke's translation of *Lunheng* 論衡

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1 Introduction

Alfred Forke (1867-1944) was the first scholar who translated the Wang Chong's (27-97) 王充 *Lunheng* 論衡 into English. His work was published in 1907, prior to the first detailed and complete Chinese commentary the *Lunheng Jiaoshi* 論衡校釋 by Huang Hui 黃暉 published in 1938.¹ Wang Chong lived in China during the early age of Eastern Han dynasty. His works was long neglected as Alfred Forke said 'A Chinese commentary to the *Lun-hêng* does not exist.'² Although lacking emendation and exegesis, Alfred Forke tried another method to better understand *Lunheng*:

As far as lay in my power, I have endeavoured to trace the sources from which *Wang Ch'ung* has quoted, which has not been an easy task, and I have added such explanatory notes as to enable even persons not knowing Chinese to understand the text.³

Besides the preface, he mentioned the same phenomenon in the postscript of volume II, which was published 4 years after the volume I:

Wang Ch'ung is very fond of quoting the Classics and other old authors, notably the *Analects*, the *Shuking*, and the *Shi-chi*. Since not only his reading often differs from the now authorised text, but his explanations also not seldom disagree with those of modern commentators, I thought it worth while preparing a list of all the quotations I was able to trace, which may be useful for a critique of the old texts.⁴

Alfred Forke tried to use the parallel passages to assist his translations.

Hanshi Waizhuan 韓詩外傳 was one of the books which is mentioned three times in his footnotes,⁵ however, for *Lunheng* did not mention *Hanshi Waizhuan* explicitly, Alfred Forke did not always refer to *Hanshi Waizhuan* when he translates *Lunheng*

¹ 'With the exception of the Autobiography and the two chapters on *Confucius* and *Mencius* translated by *Hutchison* (China Review, vol. VII and VIII) the essays of *Wang Ch'ung* have not been put into any European language before. A Chinese commentary to the *Lun-hêng* does not exist.' See Alfred Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part I. Philosophical Essays of Wang Ch'ung* (New York: Paragon Book Gallery, 1962, unaltered and unabridged reprint of the last (1907) edition), preface, 2.

² Ibid.

³ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part I*, 3.

⁴ Alfred Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part II. Miscellaneous Essays of Wang Ch'ung* (New York: Paragon Book Gallery, 1962, unaltered and unabridged reprint of the last (1911) edition), 420.

⁵ In Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part I*, 352, 369 and 379 respectively.

therefore some valuable resources that Alfred Forke could obtain were missed. This paper is to examine selected parallel passages of *Hanshi Waizhuan* found in *Lunheng* so as to review Alfred Forke's work and introduce appropriate methods to translate and research Chinese ancient texts.

2 Analysis of parallel passages of *Hanshi Waizhuan* found in *Lunheng*

2.1 Details of a story

《論衡·率性》：

凡含血氣者，教之所以異化也。三苗之民，或賢或不肖，堯、舜齊之，恩教加也。⁶

Alfred Forke's translation:

It is by instruction that living beings are transformed. Among the Three *Miao* tribes ([footnote:] The aborigines of China) some were honest, some disreputable. *Yao* and *Shun* made them all alike by conferring the boon of instruction upon them.⁷

The parallel passages can be found in *Hanshi Waizhuan* chapter III paragraph 23:

In the time of *Shun* the state of *Miao* did not submit. They did not submit [because they had] the *Hêng* mountains on their southern [border], the *Min* mountains on their northern [border], the waves of *Tung-t'ing* [lake] to their left, and the waters of *P'êng-li* [lake] to their right; through these they were protected. Because they would not submit, *Yü* asked to attack them, but *Shun* would not agree. He said, "I have not as yet exhausted my teachings." For a long time he gave out his teachings, and the ruler of the *Miao* [finally] asked to submit.

[.....]⁸

Alfred Forke translated the '齊之' as 'made them all alike'. If we look into *Hanshi Waizhuan*, it can be found that the story was about the ruler intending to make the Three *Miao* tribes submitted which was an action about a purpose-oriented teaching. The purpose was highly related to the country, not merely 'made them alike'. Lau Din Cheuk translated the '齊之' found in the '齊之以刑' in *The Analects* as 'keep them in line',⁹ which was accurately reflected the meaning of a purpose-oriented teaching since 'line' implies a standard, which is set by someone, whereas 'alike' does not

⁶ Huang Hui 黃暉, *Lunheng Jiaoshi 論衡校釋* (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2006, reprinted), chapter 2, 78.

⁷ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part I*, 379.

⁸ James Robert Hightower, *Han Shih Wai Chuan. Han Ting's Illustrations of the Didactic Application of the Classic of Songs* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), 104.

⁹ Lau Din Cheuk, *The Analects* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2002, second edition reprinted), book II, 11.

signify such meaning.

2.2 Phrasal difference

《論衡·書虛》：

傳書言：延陵季子出游，見路有遺金。當夏五月，有披裘而薪者。季子呼薪者曰：「取彼地金來。」薪者投鎌於地，瞋目拂手而言曰：「何子居之高，視之下，儀貌之（壯）〔莊〕，¹⁰ 語言之野也？吾當夏五月，披裘而薪，豈取金者哉？」季子謝之，請問姓字。薪者曰：「子皮相之士也！何足語姓名？」¹¹ 遂去不顧。¹²

Alfred Forke's translation:

There is the following narrative:

When *Chi Tse* ([footnote:] A prince of *Wu*, Vol. I, p. 523, Note 1.) of *Yen-ling* ([footnote:] See eod., Note 2.) was once travelling, he saw a piece of gold left on the roadside. It was the fifth month of summer, and there was a man who had put on a fur-coat and was gathering fuel. ([footnote:] This coat was probably the only garment which the man possessed, who seems to have been a sort of a hermit not caring for changes of temperature or worldly affairs.) *Chi Tse* shouted for the fuel-gatherer to fetch him the gold on the ground. ([footnote:] Notice the modern construction 取彼地金來. Cf. p. 104, Note 2.)

The gatherer dropped his sickle, stared at him, and clapping his hands exclaimed, "How haughty you are, and how you look down upon others! Your outward appearance is that of a gentleman, but you talk like a ruffian. Now, in the fifth month of summer I have donned my fur to gather fuel. Why should I take up gold?" ([footnote:] So far the *Pei-wen-yun-fu* under 裘 quotes this story from the *Kao-shih-chuan* of *Huang-Fu Mi*, 3rd cent. A. D.)

Chi Tse apologised and inquired after his name and style, but the fuel-gatherer replied, "You are a student who of human features knows nothing more than the skin. How could I tell you my name and surname?", and he took no further notice of him.¹³

The parallel passages can be find in *Hanshi Waizhuan* chapter X paragraph 18:

Yen-ling Chi-tzū of Wu was out walking in Ch'i. Seeing some money that had been lost [by someone] he called a shepherd to pick it up. The shepherd said, "How is it that you occupy a high position but keep your glance down? Your appearance

¹⁰ Huang Hui annotate, '孫〔人和〕曰：「壯」當作「莊」。「莊」、「野」對文。《韓詩外傳》十作「貌之君子而言之野也」，是其義'. See Hunang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 4, 167.

¹¹ Huang's book was '字' which is a mistake.

¹² Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 4, 167-168.

¹³ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part II*, 240-241.

is noble, but your words are vulgar. If I have a prince who does not act like a prince and friends who do not act like friends, it is like wearing winter furs in the heat of summer. Do you suspect me of being the sort of person who picks up money?"

Yen-ling-tzū realized that he was a sage and politely asked his name. The shepherd said, "You certainly are a superficial fellow. You are not good enough for me to tell you my name." Wherewith he went off. Yen-ling Chi-tzū stood up and kept looking after him until he was out of sight.

[.....]¹⁴

Alfred Forke translated '儀貌之壯' as 'outward appearance is that of a gentleman'. For the original meaning of *Lunheng*, this translation is accurate, but if we examine the *Hanshi Waizhuan*, literal translation of *Lunheng* would be a better choice to reflect its property. Corresponding to '儀貌之壯', there is '貌之君子' in *Hanshi Waizhuan*, Hightower translated as 'appearance is noble'. Compare 'Outward appearance is that of a gentleman' and 'appearance is noble', they are analogous in meaning and structure. However, '壯' (Ma Zong-huo 馬宗霍 said it was a taboo word of '莊') is an adjective whether '君子' is a noun. '儀貌之壯' and '貌之君子' have similar meaning but differ in structure. Understanding and Translation of these two phrases should pay attention on their differences.

On the other hand, *Hanshi Waizhuan* can provide some valuable notes to support Alfred Forke's translation work. Alfred Forke made a footnote to the 'man who had put on a fur-coat and was gathering fuel' when 'it was the fifth month of summer' as 'who seems to have been a sort of a hermit not caring for changes of temperature or worldly affairs'. When we refer to *Hanshi Waizhuan*, the man said, '吾有君不君，有友不友，當暑衣裘'.¹⁵ It was an evidence to proof the man 'not caring for worldly affairs.

Alfred Forke translated '姓字' as 'name and style' and '姓名' as 'name and surname'. There are very accurate. Compared with *Hanshi Waizhuan*, '姓字' was mentioned twice since 姓名 did not exist. Hightower put both in 'name' which were in similar meaning of the original texts but Alfred Forke's translation was better keeping the differences between the two words and their differences to *Hanshi Waizhuan*.

¹⁴ Hightower, *Han Shih Wai Chuan*, 339-340.

¹⁵ Hightower translated as 'if I have a prince who does not act like a prince and friends who do not act like friends, it is like wearing winter furs in the heat of summer.' See Hightower, *Han Shih Wai Chuan*, 339-340.

In my opinion, this first part of this sentence might better put it as the man did not treat ruler as a ruler and did not treat friends as friends.

2.3 Textual order

《論衡·儒增》：

儒書言：「禽息薦百里奚，繆公未聽，〔出〕，禽息（出）當門，¹⁶ 仆頭碎首而死。繆公痛之，乃用百里奚。」¹⁷

Alfred Forke's translation:

The Literati write in their books that *Ch'in Hsi* recommended *Pa Li Hsi* to Duke Mu ([footnote:] Duke *Mu* of *Ch'in*, 658-619 B.C.) who, however, did not pay attention to it. Then *Ch'in Hsi* went out of the front door, bowed down his head, and knocked it on the ground, so that it broke to pieces, and died. This affected Duke *Mu* so deeply, that he took *Po Li Hsi* into his service.¹⁸

The parallel passages can be find in *Hanshi Waizhuan*'s lost works which was quoted in *Hanshu*'s 漢書 Ying Shao 應劭 annotation:

禽息，秦大夫，薦百里奚而不見納。繆公出，當車以頭擊闌，腦乃播出，曰「臣生無補於國而不死也！」繆公感寤而用百里奚，秦以大治。¹⁹

and *Houhanshu*'s 後漢書 Li Xian 李賢 annotations:

《韓詩外傳》曰：「禽息，秦大夫，薦百里奚不見納。繆公出，當車以頭擊闌，腦乃精出，曰：『臣生無補於國，不如死也。』繆公感寤而用百里奚，秦以大化。」²⁰

禽息，秦大夫，薦百里奚而不見納。繆公出，當車以頭擊闌，腦乃播出，曰「臣生無補於國，不如死也。」繆公感寤，而用百里奚，秦以大化。見《韓詩外傳》。²¹

According to the citations by Li Xian, Duke Mu had gone out before Qin Xi bowed down his head, the texts of *Lunheng* may be disordered. The original texts based by Alfred Forke in volume I was 子書百家, Qin Xi was followed by the word '出' rather than the '出' was connected to '繆公未聽'. Different from the case 2.2 above, the original textual order in this case was evidenced by more than one proofs, 'Duke Mu' were always followed by 'went out' in more than one book and three quotations, so that we can be more certain to correct *Lunheng*. This parallel passage shows the textual disorder of nowadays' *Lunheng*.

¹⁶ Huang Hui annotate, '〔出〕當在「聽」字下，傳寫誤也。此言繆公未聽其言而出，禽息當門以止之非言禽息出也'。See Hunang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 8, 371.

¹⁷ Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 8, 371.

¹⁸ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part I*. 502.

¹⁹ Ban Gu 班固, *Hanshu 漢書* (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1964, reprinted), chapter 85, 3476.

²⁰ Fan Ye 范曄, *Houhanshu 後漢書* (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1965), chapter 43, 1466.

²¹ Fan, *Houhanshu*, chapter 76, 2475.

2.4 Supplementary references

《論衡·書虛》：

桓公尊九九之人，拔寧戚於車下，責苞茅不貢，運兵攻楚，九合諸侯，一匡天下，千世一出之主也，而云負婦人於背，虛矣。[.....]桓公思士，作庭燎而夜坐，以思致士，反以白日負婦人見諸侯乎？²²

Alfred Forke's translation:

Duke *Huan* honoured the arithmeticians ([footnote:] 九九之人. A short reference to this fact is found in the *Han-shu, Biography of Mei Fu* chap. 67, p. 9v.) and raised *Ning Ch'i* ([footnote:] A poor cart-driver, who was heard singing and beating the time on the horns of his oxen by Duke *Huan*. He took him into his service, and subsequently made him Privy Councillor. *Giles, Bibl. Dict.* No. 1568.) from his cart. To punish *Ch'u* for not having sent its tribute of reeds and grasses, he invested it with all his forces. ([footnote:] This expedition took place in 656 B.C.) He united the feudal barons, and, quite alone, set the empire in order. He is such a hero as appears only once in a thousand generations. That he should have carried his wife on his back, is nonsense.

[.....]

Duke *Huan* bestowed much thought on the *savants*. He illuminated his palace, and was sitting there at night. By his meditations he attracted the scholars, and how should he have received the princes with his wife on his back during the day?²³

The parallel passages can be find in *Hanshi Waizhuan* chapter III paragraph 18:

Duke Huan of Ch'i set up torches in the courtyard for the sake of gentlemen who might want to come to see him. For a full year no one came. Then [a rustic] from the eastern fields came to see him because of his skill in arithmetic. Duke Huan joked with him, saying, "Is arithmetic sufficient [reason] for an interview?" The villager said, "[I had not thought arithmetic to be sufficient reason for an interview.] I had heard that Your Highness set up torches in his courtyard so as to await gentlemen, and that for a full year not one came. Now the reason that no gentlemen came was that Your Highness is the sage ruler in the empire, and everywhere gentlemen feel they are not adequate to Your Highness. Therefore they do not come. Now arithmetic is but a wretched accomplishment, yet if Your Highness treats me with courtesy, how much the more could those with worthier accomplishments than arithmetic expect! Now Mt. T'ai does not decline pebbles and stones, nor do rivers and oceans refuse small streams—thus have they

²² Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 4, 194, 198-199.

²³ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part II.* 256-257, 259.

accomplished their magnitude. The Ode says,

The ancients had a saying:

Consult the grass and firewood gatherers.

It [speaks of] a great plan.”

Duke Huan approved, and the man was accordingly entertained formally for a full month. From all over gentlemen came leading one another to him. The Ode says,

From the hall they go to the base of the gate house,

And from the sheep to the oxen.

[It speaks of proceeding from the inside to the outside and of] achieving great things from small ones.²⁴

The supplementary notes provided by Alfred Forke cannot explain what kind of people the ‘九九之人’ was. The original text of *Hanshu* 漢書 was ‘齊桓之時有以九九見者，桓公不逆，欲以致大也’. It did not show ‘九九之人’ means arithmeticians. The explanation was found in Yan Shi-gu’s 顏師古 annotation to *Hanshu*, which was ‘九九，算術’. Nevertheless, referring to *Hanshi Waizhuan*, although it did not mention what was ‘九九’ as well, the conversations between Duke Huan and the villager revealed how much Duke Huan urged to all kinds of talents. ‘九九’ should be a junior technique. The story made the contrast between Duke Huan honoured the ‘九九之人’ and await gentleman to show Duke Huan devoted himself on national issues, ‘is such a hero’. *Hanshi Waizhuan* explained, ‘now arithmetic is but a wretched accomplishment, yet if Your Highness treats me with courtesy, how much the more could those with worthier accomplishments than arithmetic expect!’ Referring to *Hanshi Waizhuan*, it becomes clear why *Lunheng* said, ‘by his meditations he attracted the scholars, and how should he have received the princes with his wife on his back during the day?’

If Alfred Forke would like to provide a reference for ‘九九之人’ or quote the full story that *Lunheng* may have based on, *Hanshi Waizhuan* was more detailed and should be more related to *Lunheng* than *Hanshu* was.

3 How did Alfred Forke translate the quotation signs

Apart from detailed analyse of the parallel passages of *Hanshi Waizhuan* found in *Lunheng*, we may pay attention to some signs *Lunheng* used to indicate the quoted works. Refer to 2.2 and 2.3 above, both passages of *Hanshi Waizhuan* were under ‘傳書言’ (2.2) or ‘儒書言’ (2.3). For using as a sign to indicate there maybe a

²⁴ Hightower, *Han Shih Wai Chuan*, 95-96.

quotation works followed, ‘傳書’ were 28 times and ‘儒書’ were 19 times being used.²⁵ Related to *Hanshi Waizhuan*, including 2.2 and 2.3, there were in total 12 signs being used. The followings were the signs and Alfred Forke’s translations:

I 《論衡. 書虛》：傳書言²⁶

There is the following narrative²⁷

II 《論衡. 書虛》：傳書或言²⁸

The books contain another report namely that²⁹

III 《論衡. 實知》：世俗傳³⁰

There is a popular tradition about³¹

Note: For the three signs above, their stories could only be find parallel to *Hanshi Waizhuan* among all of the Chinese ancient texts in pre-Qin and Han dynasties. The number IV to XII were those could be find parallel to *Hanshi Waizhuan* and one or more other texts among all of the Chinese ancient texts in pre-Qin and Han dynasties.

IV 《論衡. 儒增》：儒書言³²

The Literati write in their books that³³

V 《論衡. 無形》：傳稱³⁴

[.....] is reported to³⁵

VI 《論衡. 率性》：世稱³⁶

[.....] is generally reported to³⁷

VII 《論衡. 感虛》：傳書言³⁸

Some books narrate that³⁹

VIII 《論衡. 感虛》：傳書言⁴⁰

We learn from historical books that⁴¹

IX 《論衡. 變動》：或曰⁴²

Some will say⁴³

X 《論衡. 龍虛》：傳又言⁴⁴

²⁵ ‘傳言’ and ‘傳又言’ are excluded.

²⁶ Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 4, 167.

²⁷ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part II*. 240.

²⁸ Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 4, 170.

²⁹ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part II*. 242.

³⁰ Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 26, 1081.

³¹ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part II*. 125.

³² Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 8, 371.

³³ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part I*. 502.

³⁴ Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 2, 64.

³⁵ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part I*. 328.

³⁶ Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 2, 73.

³⁷ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part I*. 376.

³⁸ Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 5, 243.

³⁹ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part II*. 181.

⁴⁰ Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 5, 236.

⁴¹ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part II*. 177.

⁴² Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 15, 656.

⁴³ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part I*. 112.

⁴⁴ Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 6, 282.

The annals go on to say that⁴⁵

XI 《論衡. 語增》：傳語曰⁴⁶

[.....] is reported to⁴⁷

XII 《論衡. 語增》：傳語曰⁴⁸

There is a report that⁴⁹

Except for the unique case ‘儒書言’, which was translated as ‘the Literati write in their books’, Alfred Forke used various terms to translate those signs related to ‘傳’. ‘Report’ was being used 4 times, ‘narrate’ twice, and ‘tradition’, ‘historical books’ and ‘annals’ once respectively. It seems that he preferred to use ‘report’ to translate those signs, because he translated the ‘世稱’ as ‘report’ as well. Alfred Forke took those signs as common phrases used by *Lunheng*, probably has realised that they may be the signs for quotation, but he failed to extract the *Hanshi Waizhuan* behind. For sign X, it was a special case, indeed Alfred Forke knew the story came from *Hanshi Waizhuan* as he stated in the footnote: ‘this story is narrated in the *Han-shih-wai-chuan* 150 B.C.’. Whereas the story before that was from *Lushi Chunqiu* 呂氏春秋 so Alfred Forke translated the ‘傳又言’ as ‘the annals go on to say that’. ‘傳又言’ was before the story from *Lushi Chunqiu*, but it can be understand as indicating all of the stories afterward, which means *Hanshi Waizhuan* was included.

For those signs which we can only find the parallel passages from *Hanshi Waizhuan*, we may understand ‘傳’ as *Hanshi Waizhuan* or other resources that were commonly based by *Hanshi Waizhuan* and *Lunheng*. This case was similar to sign X, which Alfred Forke translated as ‘the annals go on to say that’ to indicate the *Lushi Chunqiu*. But for other signs, understand as ‘report’ is a discreet attitude. If there were other choices, reasons should be clearly indicated since they are all signs of quotation.

4 The appropriate method to translate and research Chinese ancient texts

It is always an arduous challenge to understand Chinese ancient texts. Hence, annotation is written for descendents in order to distinctly show the original meaning. Unfortunately, annotation and commentary do not always exist. Especially for excavated texts, parallel passages in particular played an important role in such cases.

⁴⁵ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part I.* 351-352.

⁴⁶ Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 7, 348.

⁴⁷ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part I.* 487.

⁴⁸ Huang, *Lunheng Jiaoshi*, chapter 7, 352.

⁴⁹ Forke, *Lun-Hêng. Part I.* 489.

Parallel passages play the contemporary commentaries role of the Chinese ancient texts. This can assist the reader to capture the context. According to the English translation works by Alfred Forke, he obviously tried to trace all the *Lunheng*'s quotation. He failed to trace most of the *Hanshi Waizhuan* passages. Nowadays we have more concordances and abundant electronic resources, tracing the sources of quotations become much more convenient. We should stand on the shoulders of giants and make full use of parallel passages.

5 Advantages and restrictions on using parallel passages

There are some notable advantages and restrictions which should be remembered when we make use of the parallel passages into Chinese ancient texts research. The two advantages are about digging out the background of an ancient text.

First, parallel passages are the windows to observe the contemporary common-shared theories and stories, especially within the intellectuals. It is important to the study of philosophical history. The big picture will be obtained through tracing parallel passages. The result should be more objective than merely deducing one or two sorts of philosophers' theories.

Second, parallel passages can reveal the intellectual background, academic training and the kinds of resources that were acquirable or owned by the author. It is crucial to the study of intellectual history as these are the resources that show the author's background of establishing his/her own doctrine.

Parallel passages are very helpful for researchers to comprehend the background. On the other hand, they should be used carefully.

First, when there are parallel passages, the story or the theory is according to something that is not the original work of the quoter. Parallel passages makes it difficult to distinguish which part of the works is from the author and which is not. It results in confusing the original ideas from the author and the common-shared theories.

Second, parallel passages are complicated. In addition to the author's background, some differences between parallel passages are denoting the quoter's own thought. For identical passages, we can tackle the sources of quotation. For passages with slight differences, we can according to the time they were and other evidences to illustrate how the quoters added his/her own ideas when using the story or theory. However, for passages

with extensive differences, it will be difficult to delineate the quoter's own idea and the story or theory he/she quoted. This phenomenon will lead to the quoter's own idea being covered within the quoted passages.

6 Conclusion

It has been a century since Alfred Forke's *Lunheng* was published. There are many annotations and commentaries about *Lunheng* published in this century. Donald Leslie said, 'we can see the need of a new translation'.⁵⁰ Donald Leslie was right but we are still longing for a new translation of *Lunheng* after his appeal published in *T'uong Pao* in 1956. However, instead of criticising Alfred Forke's translation, this paper is to show the essentiality and helpfulness of the parallel passages in understanding the Chinese ancient texts. The method of parallel passages analyses should not be limited to *Lunheng*, but also for any other Chinese ancient texts, given the fact that parallel passages frequently appeared. After reviewing the parallel passages of *Hanshi Waizhuan* found in *Lunheng*, it is clear that if Alfred Forke had made full use of this method, many mistranslations could have been avoided even there was lack of complete commentary. Hence, if we pay attention to the advantages and restrictions, parallel passages are useful tools to unmask the Chinese ancient texts.

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Title: Iran studies: Lack of Comprehensive Approach

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After Iran's revolution since 1979 & constituted of religious government, the political structures, the internal & external policy changed. Islam was at the focal spot of all policies and legitimized all the authority's

political/apolitical actions. Islam was a key word for every thing. In revolutionary conditions, all the universities were closed & Cultural Revolution in university finished after 2 years. Some of the masters & student of universities were dismissed. In this condition, it was obvious that only some religious studies could be acceptable. So a lot of new Islamic topics were added to all universities courses & disciplines, even technical and medical disciplines. Eight coercive war with Iraq & Iran's relations with East and West block, made constrain area for their research inside the Iran, because it was possible that their study was percept as traitorous or protect of foreigners. Though the Islamic Republic tried to Islamize the universities in the first revolution's decade¹, it wasn't successful because the masters who were teaching in Iran's universities were graduated from Europe & USA universities in 1970s & they didn't know any thing about Islamic and revolutionary utopia.

In the beginning of 1980, Iran's sovereignty for rectifying of this shortcoming, constituted some universities like Emam Sadegh, Tarbiyat Modares, etc that they focused on some Islamic course & teach some multidisciplinary that Islam was in the focal spot. These students studied Humanitarian sciences with the Islamic approach, witch approach that until now have its opponents & proponents between the masters and students. In the late of 1980s, the government gave them scholarship and sent them to Europe & Canada to study western or nonreligious sciences. When these collegians returned to Iran, they started teaching in Iran's universities. This group because of both Islamic-philosophical & western theories, today try to make some Iranian-Islamic Theories and solve the government problem with theirs advices. Their relations with sovereignty are in good status.

After 30 years from Iran's Islamic revolution, the last generation of independent masters who graduated from EU & USA universities is near to retired that all universities & institutions are under government's hard constraint and supervision. In the last lawmaking about universities witch was executed from last year, all the new masters of universities & doctoral students are picking up by the science ministry of Iran and the universities haven't any authority for impose their opinion. In the recent years, Iran's sovereignty don't exhort the researcher to study about Iran & also the researcher don't like to study in this field because the government make some problems for their critical researches like dismiss or sooner retired & even detention.

So at the first, we classify the researchers to five categories & after that answer to three questions:

- 1) Witch topics are they studying?
- 2) Which methods do they use for Iran's study?

3) Do the Iran's studies have any impact on the public opinion & government?

Who does Iran's study?

Internal Proponent: This group of researchers tries to answer the governmental requests & wishes. They don't do any thing much more than praise of Islamic governmental actions and criticize all non Islamic-Iranian thought and theories. They are invited to tell their thoughts in TV channels - all TV channels in Iran are governmental - but their studies are erratic and they always corroborate the governmental view. The topics which study are related to government. There are some paradoxes between what they write today & yesterday. Some topics like Islamic-Iranian Theories, Islamic management, Islamic economy, Islamic morality & Justice are their research penchant. Each topic is favor in each presidential period. Most of these topics are so abstract & utopian.

From another side all non Islamic thought & identities aren't accepted and disavowed, though their knowledge about western thoughts & methodologies are so little. They emphasis that Islam can answer to all human requests in all the times and places. They try to find answer from Quran, Hadis & Feghh for today problems. They remind the colonial periods and what UK & USA was done in Iran, so they disavow the relations and they are so anxious because of Iranian's Identity evolution by these connections. Though it seems that this group hasn't any important impact on Iran's leaders & policymaking but their impact on public opinion because of a vast usage of governmental media is arguable. Iran's leaders also use instrumentally from this group for expansion & endorsement of their opinions. In the constraint area of information, this group can influence on mass.

Internal Independent: this group is the most scholars in Iran's studies. They are independent in their speech & written from the government. They are graduated from EU & USA in the late of 1970s. They try to explain theories & emphasize on translating or studies of western written, but also they have their Criticism to some theories. They don't defend from Islamic-Iranian sciences, but also they believe that we most emphasize much more on Societal & Cultural topics.² They don't near to sensitive subject for sovereignty & Islamic structure. Their studies come back to infrastructural societal & cultural sectors like political culture, social class, etc. they emphasize on Theories & Methods. This group are so favor in universities and their relation with government is depends on who is in the presidency. In Iran, most of the government & universities connection are personal and not structural. They don't like to speech in governmental forum or media and also the government doesn't want to

use their advisory views. Their researches use by all their proponents & opponents. Their influences on collegian are widespread.

Internal Moderate: this group has some specific circumstances. From one side they use theories & methods in their studies, and also they have a good knowledge about Islamic thought. On the side, they think that available science can't answer to us and they most present an Islamic-Iranian Approach for our problems. They tell that western models were based on some principles that are so different with our beliefs.³ They interest to research with Islamic approach but they belief to their speech & written. At all, this group has a vast connection with sovereignty and they can acclaim their viewpoint, but since they have some governmental position so they don't like to criticize more. It seems that their opinions are important for sovereignty but these friendly relations are obstacle to declare all the realities.

Iranian Migrants: Most of Iranian, who migrated because of political reasons, couldn't do good researches that show the reality of Iran's equations. Because they left Iran in the special conditions & most of them, some day has been a part of sovereignty. So they try to criticize all the sovereignty actions that can't be true. Some of them haven't any past academic study & only because of their political refuge, they can attract the institutions & research centers attention. The sovereignty named them patricide. But there are some skillful Iranian university masters like Millani, Askari, bashiriyeh, etc who their comprehensive & fundamental researches are useful.

Foreigner researchers: The study of Iran maybe is much more difficult for this group than the others. the lack of connection between Iran's research centers & the world's centers, unfamiliarity of Iran's cultural & ethical complexity, unfamiliarity to Iran's social class and the key role of Mullah's in the society & decision making processes, inattention to religious principal differences between Shaiets - Sonnies and the last inattention to cultural & societal difference between Arabs - Fars, are part of these hard job. Most of their research base on some information that they can gain from who travel to Iran or from cyber space. It seems that their methods can't analysis the whole Iran's internal processes. The researches are about part of society or special class and after that were generalized to whole the society. Also in some research they assumed Iran as other Middle East countries that can't be true.

Conclusion:

If we try to study Iran as a whole with three sections- Political, economical and societal- maybe it is the best way.

In *political section*; first it is so important that we know the Iran's political structures and their roles. Second we must be sensitive on Iran's leaders,

decision makings & decision-making processes. In all these way, religious & revolutionary backgrounds are so effective.

In *societal section*; history of Iran is so important. Rise of urbanization continued after Iran's revolution & we can see that in the cities there are kinds of incongruous between sub-cultures, beliefs & norms which we can see different political actions from them in a short period. Religious were being political from Safaviye era (4 century ago) & we could see that religious & Mullahs had an important role in all contemporary Iranian' movements (constitutional movement, oil nationalize movement from UK, Islamic revolution). Most of Iranian ancient beliefs & opinions come back to governmental & ethnical structures that were dominant from the past witch are so important to Iran's studies.

In *economical section*: Though Iran's economical structure because of its dependence to oil, wasn't study in most of books & articles which we read about Iran, Now at the beginning of Economical reform that Ahmadinejad started from last year, economic will gain a special place in Iran's studies. International sanctions, Omit of subsidy, rise of inflation & reform of Banking and custom infrastructure maybe observe the Iranian's sovereignty with some dissatisfaction.

From *methodological aspect*: we can see some researches because they haven't limitation to travel to Iran, their researches are depends on some news, photo or films witch circulate in the cyber space or some information that they interview with some sovereignty's opponents who live abroad the Iran. Also we see that some institution told that they gain their information from some methods like Tele-Public opinion poll which is so sinister because in Iran and its political conditions, it's irrational to trust to a person who call you and ask to tell your political opinion democratically.⁴ Iran's society is much more complex that every one can analysis its internal situations by the Facebook or Twitter.

It seems that exchange of masters & students, increase of international conferences and easy travel conditions for researchers with comprehensive approach in Iran studies can improve our knowledge & cognition about Iran.

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Effects of Cognitive Styles on a Virtual Learning Companion System as an Adjunct to Classroom Instructions

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ABSTRACT

This study designed a MSN Chatbot System (MCS), as a virtual learning companion to examine how specific application design variables within educational software affect the learning process of subjects as defined by the cognitive continuum of field-dependent (FD), field-independent (FI) and field-mixed (FM) learners. 207 college students participated in a certification project that used MCS as an adjunct to classroom instruction. The study considered to what extent the three guidance methods offered by MCS would affect the learning performance of three cognitive style learners. Each of the three guidance methods available within the MCS was designed to conform to the specific needs of FD, FI or FM learners. Experimental results showed that students who received a matching "guidance method"- "cognitive style" presented a significant improvement in their learning performance.

Keywords

Learning Companion, Chatbot System, Cognitive Styles, Guidance methods

1. Introduction

The convenience and effectiveness of employing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) social media system, such as MSN, in learning activities has grabbed the attention of educators around the globe (Hsu, 2007). P2P social media system and Internet technology enable learners to learn with a variety of digital resources from anywhere in the world at anytime. It is certainly impossible for any instructor to provide 24 hour assistance to the learners in P2P environment. Not only is this not feasible, it is also undesirable. The paradigm shift in education advanced by changing technology has meant that more and more learning is self-guided. This positive social adjustment to a technological change has been manifested in popular P2P social media system. In this form the learner increases their learning efficacy by engaging with a peer virtual learning companion, or a peer, over the Internet in addition to their interaction with their instructor (Chan & Baskin, 1990). The role of a Virtual Learning Companion (VLC) that can be accessed at any time and from almost any location is, and will become an increasingly important component of many educational projects, whether they be based on traditional classroom instruction or completely removed from a formal educational setting.

However, when a different instruction approach or tool, such as VLC, is introduced to learners, learners are often requested to adapt themselves to the new methods without a consideration of their cognitive and affective preferences (Åkerlind & Trevitt, 1999). Hung, Bailey and Jonassen (2003) mentioned that learners may experience frustrations during the transition from an accustomed learning approach to a different one. This frustration is almost inevitable for learners who are uncertain of their roles, their duties and the evaluation methods in their new learning processes at the early stage of transition (Jost, Havard & Smith, 1997), but learners' discomfort

lessens as they become familiar with the new approach and their responsibility in the learning process (Schultz-Ross & Kline, 1999).

One possible solution that reduces the tension created by the transition from the old to the new instruction method is to closely consider individual cognitive differences and incorporate this in the design of the new instructional approach or tool (Graf, Liu, & Kinshuk, 2010; Hall & Bannon, 2006; Hunt, Thomas, & Eagle, 2002). This in turn helps learners appreciate the strengths of the new approach or tool and encourages active involvement and participation. Individual cognitive differences among learners mean that no one instructional approach or tool is appropriate for the array of individual cognitive styles. Contemporary researchers suggest that instructors need to learn a different set of teaching skills for teaching online (Brower, 2003; Easton, 2003). The instructors not only impart knowledge but equally they have to provide learners with adaptive assistance and guidance so that they learn more efficiently (McFadzean, Somersall, & Coker, 1999; McFadzeav & McKenzie, 2001). Drummond (2000) believed that one of the main reasons that situations in which opposite learning effects came into play was the disregard of individual cognitive differences. Dunn and Dunn (1994) found that when the instructional approaches fit individual cognitive differences, it improved not only the student's learning performance but also their attitude toward learning. Any well-designed VLC must be matched to individual cognitive differences so as to increase both the efficacy and the satisfaction of the learning experience.

A well-documented and popular source of individual cognitive difference is the construct of field dependence-independence (FD-I) (Dillon & Gabbard, 1998). FD-I describes learners along a continuum such that individuals at one end are considered to be field-dependent (FD), and individuals at the other end field-independent (FI). Individuals who fall in the middle of the continuum are characterized as field-mixed (FM) (Liu & Reed, 1994). The ramifications, however, of FD-I on the performance of learners interacting with new technologies to accomplish a learning task are not well established, and the results of research studies are still inconclusive (Davis, 1991; Dillon & Gabbard, 1998), and, at times, contradictory. Given the equivocal results, more research effort should be directed toward examining the extent to which instruction approaches are better fitted to one type of learner or another. Undoubtedly, the consideration of individual differences in the studies of P2P social media system may provide not only guidance on how instruction approaches can best be targeted at specific types of learners in the P2P social media system environment, but also clear indications of how instruction approaches fit learners' cognitive styles and better performance can be achieved.

According to the survey of InsightXplorer Ltd. in 2008, the number of Internet users in Taiwan was about 12,582 thousand, within which 10,018 thousand of them used Instant Message (IM), and specially 7,830 thousand of the IM users all used MSN Messenger (62.23% of the Internet users). Because of its popularity, ease of use and recognition factor (Hsu, 2007), this study designs a MCS as VLC. Created specifically for this study, MCS can enhance traditional classroom instruction by offering the instruction approach that is ideally matched to the learner's individual cognitive style.

2. Literature Review

2.1 *Virtual learning companion (VLC)*

It has been more than two decades since VLCs were advocated as an educational adjunct by Chan and Baskin (1990). The concept is a third actor, one beyond the traditional roles of teacher and student, can be a valuable asset in an e-learning environment. Contemporary research conducted by Hsu et al. (2007) has illustrated that the interaction afforded by VLCs increases students' concentration, engagement, and attention by encouraging students to become more immersed in their studies. Numerous other studies (Hiltz & Wellman, 1997; Rovai, 2002; Rovai & Wighting, 2005) have shown that without interaction with other learners satisfaction levels decrease

substantially. The positive relationship between satisfaction levels, based on the interaction of fellow students using a VLC in an e-learning environment, and levels of learning have been established (Arbaugh 2002). A great deal of research (El-Bishouty, Ogata & Yano, 2007; Kim & Baylor, 2006; Hooper, 1992) has illustrated that the human interaction, support and interpretation facilitated by P2P modes integrated into VLCs dramatically increase the quality of learning, both in terms of gains in knowledge and the satisfaction of participants.

Advances in the understanding of cognitive psychology vis-a-vis structured learning environments have also informed the design of VLCs. The manner in which people intake and comprehend information is not universal. That cognitive style varies from student to student means that a VLC that gives the greatest benefit to learners must offer a variety of modes that correspond to various cognitive styles. It has been thoroughly documented that (Renzulli, 1994, Dunn & Dunn, 1994) when the format of instruction is matched to the learner's cognitive style, learners are able to make greater strides in comprehension. This in turn enhances the learner's positive attitude toward the learning project. These two elements, heightened gains in understanding and elevated satisfaction levels, become mutually reinforcing. She and Fisher (2003) stated that the fundamental element in a learning environment is the relationship between instruction methods and learners' cognitive styles. The large body of research that has explored the impact of instruction format on learning success has informed the approach to instruction that educators adopt in a traditional classroom setting. This understanding is equally crucial in the design of a VLC. A VLC that offers users a choice of modes that best matches their cognitive style will allow each student the chance to excel within a given educational project.

2.2 Cognitive style

Cognitive styles defined as "characteristic self-consistencies in information processing that develop in congenial ways around the underlying personality trends" by Messick (1984). Cognitive style is a hypothetical construct. It is the special individual style or method used when engaging in cognitive activities (Witkin & Goodenough, 1981; Riding & Cheema, 1991; Morgan, 1997). Within the field of cognition studies, a continuum defined as field-independence and field-dependence is very prominent. Using this concept to differentiate between cognitive styles has been helpful in designing the fundamental characteristics of advanced educational technologies (Chinien & Boutin, 1992/1993). This division of cognitive styles uses the Embedded Figures Test (EFT) as the measurement instrument to measure the field independency degree of the subjects (Messick, 1962). Field independency of FD-I describes learners along a continuum, such that learners who fall in the two extremes of the continuum are characterized as FD and FI, and learners in the middle are characterized as FM (Liu & Reed, 1994). Field independency is the cognitive characteristic in which the subject overcomes the influence of the irrelevant field elements while recognizing the relevant aspects in a specific situation. The less a person is influenced by the irrelevant elements, the more analytical or FI the person is. Subjects that fall under the other end of the spectrum are more influenced by irrelevant elements and considered more global or FD (Wu, 1987).

Chapelle and Roberts (1986) found that FI learners are not as influenced by social orientation or extrinsic motives as FD learners, and prefer analytical learning and independent study. FI learners believe they can learn more, faster and easier through independent study, whereas FD learners are more influenced by the external environment, social orientation and extrinsic motives. The latter prefer global and collaborative learning, and enjoy the peer guidance which can reduce learning anxiety and foster greater learning interest. Garger and Guild (1984) also found that FD learners prefer a learning environment in which they can interact and discuss with others, and that FI learners prefer a teaching method that is purely a dissemination of the facts.

In short, cognitive style is the individual's form of perception during information processing and is equally apparent in the manner in which an individual approaches and solves a given problem. It is a non-intelligence personal characteristic but it can significantly influence the process and thereby the results of learning. Any comparative discussion of learning performance should consider the influence of cognitive styles.

2.3 Chatbot system

A chatbot system is software that can "chat" with a human user in natural language (Mauldin, 1994). Different terms have been used to denote chatbot systems: machine conversation system, virtual agent and chatterbot. Brennan (2006) defined a chatbot system as "an artificial construct that is designed to converse with human beings using natural language as input and output". The aim of a chatbot system is to simulate a human conversation; the chatbot architecture integrates a language model and computational algorithms to emulate informal communication between a computer and a user. As chatbot systems developed they were increasingly designed as dedicated educational tools. From training medical students (Kerfoot et al, 2006) to language acquisition (Fryer and Carpenter, 2006) to listening comprehension (Robin, 2007) chatbots have been adapted to numerous educational purposes.

3. Research Method

3.1. Experiment design

This study uses the Microsoft technical specialist certification examination (Exam-70620) (Microsoft, 2010), as the basis for the instruction goals and the students' examination results as a measurement tool, to explore how different modes offered by a VLC system in e-learning environments influence learning performance. The experiment consisted of three stages. In the first stage, students received a prior knowledge test of Exam-70620 (Prior-test) and computerized EFT to determine their cognitive styles. In the second stage, the students were divided according to their cognitive styles and were then randomly assigned to one of three guidance methods of VLC. They were then introduced to the MCS in Microsoft certification training project. This project was taught by the same instructor and students were asked to use the VLC system after class. In the final stage, students took the official examination of Exam-70620 (Official-exam) held at PROMETRIC test center.

3.2 Experiment system - MCS

MCS interacts with others either by recognizing certain commands tied to its statistical information gathering or by conversational pattern-matching techniques. MCS can assist instructors in the provision of extra-class assistance for their students. As it is an Internet-based program it is neither limited by location nor time. MCS helps learners practice class content through real-time two-way interaction. The program is designed around a Question and Answer (Q&A) format. If a user chooses an incorrect answer to a given question, MCS provides three modes, a Lecture Mode (LM), a Discussion Mode (DM) and a Mix Mode (MM), that will help users to find and comprehend the correct answer. The LM supplies information and content related to the question that was erroneously answered. When MCS poses a question to the user and the learner gives a wrong answer, MCS will provide the correct answer and a webpage of supplementary related materials that have been prepared by the instructor. The DM provides peer discussion opportunities when learners give erroneous answers. When MCS poses a question to the user and the user subsequently gives a wrong answer, MCS will search the database to find the online learners who have the correct answer and randomly choose some of them to be listed for potential P2P discussion. The learner, at this time, can then choose one of the listed peers and initiate a discussion of the topic in question. MCS will then inquire if the selected peer learner agrees to participate in an interactive discussion and if so, connect them to the discussion

window. The MM combines the LM and DM when learners give erroneous answers.

3.3 The participants

The experiment was conducted at a university in southern Taiwan. Five classes comprised of 207 four different graders and taught by the same teachers participated in this study. They were selected from the students who had participated in the Microsoft certification training project and had not taken the official Microsoft certification examination before. 59.42% of them were male students and 40.58% were female students. At the beginning of the experiment, participants took the EFT to classify their cognitive styles. The main measurement in the EFT included two parts and each part had 16 items in which the subjects attempted to find simple figures embedded in complicated figures within ten minutes. Because the EFT identifies cognitive styles along a continuum which is scored between the ranges of 0 (FD) to 32 (FI) depending on the number of figures traced correctly, this study has followed the statistical procedure of using the upper and lower one third of the EFT scores to identify extreme FD and FI subjects. The grouping of students is presented in Table 1.

Table 1 The students' number of each group

Cognitive styles	Guidance methods of VLC	N
FD	DM	23 69
	LM	23
	MM	23
FI	DM	23 69
	LM	23
	MM	23
FM	DM	23 69
	LM	23
	MM	23

4 Research Results and Discussions

Descriptive statistics of learners' Exam-70620 scores on the prior-test and official-test were shown in Table 2. Since this study discusses how, if any, the variables of different guidance methods offered in a VLC and the variables of learners' cognitive styles affect learning performance which is mean score of official-test. Hence, we used cognitive styles and guidance methods of VLC as independent variables; and learning performance as dependent variable to conduct the two-way ANOVA, as shown in Table 3. The results shown in Table 3 illustrate that both the main effects of cognitive styles ($F=2.134$, $p\text{-value}=0.121$) and guidance methods of VLC ($F=0.258$, $p\text{-value}=0.773$) were not statistically significant. This means that learners with different cognitive styles or guidance methods of VLC did not in themselves produce a significant difference within learning performance. However, the effect of the interaction between cognitive styles and guidance methods of VLC was significant ($F=4.891$, $p\text{-value}=0.001$). This result showed that the cognitive styles or guidance methods of VLC had an interactive effect on learning performance.

Table 2 Descriptive statistics of students' learning performance

Cognitive styles	Guidance methods of VLC	N	Prior-test mean / S.D.	Official-exam mean / S.D.
FD	DM	23	291.739/43.530	760.478/79.909
	LM	23	283.348/45.186	702.957/68.664
	MM	23	287.783/42.167	742.609/88.039
FI	DM	23	291.043/44.276	705.696/67.207

	LM	23	281.217/45.599	766.565/62.882
	MM	23	290.348/43.505	715.217/87.787
FM	DM	23	291.087/42.368	743.130/77.179
	LM	23	289.348/43.522	742.304/60.327
	MM	23	288.913/44.855	775.696/53.201

Table 3 Two-way ANOVA on learners' learning performance

Source	SS	df	MS	F
Cognitive styles	22498.812	2	11249.406	2.134
Guidance methods of VLC	2717.942	2	1358.971	0.258
Cognitive styles × Guidance methods of VLC	103150.20	4	25787.551	4.891***
	3			

***p<0.001,

In order to further understand the interactive effect between cognitive styles and guidance methods of VLC, this study used simple main effect as the post-hoc analysis, as shown in Table 4. It showed that the learning performance of FD learners in DM, LM and MM was significant different (F=3.172, p=0.048). The Fisher's Least Significant Difference (LSD) showed that the learning performance of FD learners in DM (Mean=760.478) was higher than in LM (Mean=702.957) (p=0.016).

The learning performance of FI learners in DM, LM and MM was also significant different (F=4.573, p=0.014). The post hoc test of LSD showed that the learning performance of FI learners in LM (Mean=766.565) was higher than in DM (Mean=705.696) (p=0.006) and MM (Mean=715.217) (p=0.021).

In addition, when the learning mode of the VLC was DM, the learning performance of FD, FI and FM learners was significant different (F=3.208, p=0.047). The LSD test results showed that learning performance of FD learners (Mean=760.478) was higher than that of FI learners (Mean=705.696) (p=0.016).

When the learning mode of the VLC was LM, the learning performance of FD, FI and FM learners was also significant different (F=5.777, p=0.005). The LSD test results showed that the learning performance of FI learners (Mean=766.565) was higher than that of FD learners (Mean=702.957) (p=0.001), and the learning performance of FM learners (Mean=742.304) was higher than FD learners (Mean=702.957) (p=0.041).

When the learning mode of the VLC was MM, the learning performance of FD, FI and FM learners was also significant different (F=3.460, p=0.037). The LSD test results showed that learning performance of FM (Mean=775.696) was higher than that of FI (Mean=715.217) (p=0.011).

Table 4 Summary of simple main effect analysis for learning performance

Source	N	Mean	S. D.	F-value	Post-hoc (LSD)
Guidance methods of VLC					
FD	69	735.348	81.762	3.172*	DM > LM*
FI	69	729.159	77.195	4.573*	LM > DM**, LM > MM*
FM	69	753.710	65.311	2.014	
Cognitive styles					
DM	69	736.435	77.360	3.208*	FD > FI*
LM	69	737.275	68.404	5.777**	FI > FD**, FM > FD*
MM	69	744.507	80.851	3.460*	FM > FI*

*p<0.05, **p<0.01,

These results are similar to the findings of Garger and Guild (1984). Based on Garger and Guild's (1984) suggestions regarding the matching of cognitive styles and guidance methods of VLC, the combination of cognitive styles and guidance methods of VLC was classified into

matched/mismatched groups. Learners who were in the *matched* group were FD learners who were guided by using DM, FI learners who were guided by using LM and FM learners who were guided by using MM. Learners assigned to the *mismatched* group were FD learners who were guided by using lecture or MM, FI learners who were guided by using discussion or MM and FM learners who were guided by using discussion or LM, as shown in Table 5.

Learners' learning performance was compared in terms of the matched/mismatched combination of cognitive styles and guidance methods of VLC. A one-way ANOVA was used to test the matched/mismatched groups. The result suggested that learners involved in the matched groups had significantly better learning performance than those in the mismatched groups ($F=15.448$, $p<0.001$). That is, matching the cognitive styles of learners with the associated guidance methods will significantly improve the learners' scores of Official-exam within a VLC learning context.

Table 5 Descriptive data and ANCOVA of the learning performance

Groups	N	Prior-test mean / S.D.	Official-exam mean / S.D.	F-value
Matched ^a	69	287.290/44.235	767.580/65.579	15.448***
Mismatched ^b	138	288.833/42.800	725.319/76.310	

*** $p<0.001$

^a **Matched Groups:** The students who received the matched guidance method. That is, the group of students with FD style received the "DM" guidance method. Those who are characteristic with FI style received the "LM" guidance method. And, those who are characteristic with FM style received the "MM" guidance method.

^b **Mismatched Groups:** The students who received the mismatched guidance method. That is, the group of students with FD style received the "DM" or "MM" guidance method. Those who are characteristic with FI style received the "LM" or "MM" guidance method. And, those who are characteristic with FM style received the "DM" or "LM" guidance method.

Conclusion

This study considers the design implications for a VLC in terms of satisfying the pedagogical requirements of FI, FD and FM learners. The results obtained through this study strongly confirm previous studies that consider the role of VLC design on learning success (Kraus, Reed and Fitzgerald, 2001). When a VLC allows learners to tailor the mode in which learning occurs to the method that suits their cognitive style they will see an increase in both the amount that is learned and their performance in the learning process. These two elements are mutually reinforcing and in tandem account for some of the elevation. The concept of bolstering learning by understanding the diversity of cognitive styles and then meeting these needs through corresponding teaching styles is not limited to educational technology. The import of the forms that information transfer assumes has been studied in traditional classroom settings. Dunn and Dunn (1994) found that when the instruction and teaching resources correspond to learners' unique cognitive styles, their learning performance will be elevated and their attitude toward learning become more positive. For the study, subjects were relegated to one of two categories matched or mismatched. In actual use the student, regardless of cognitive style, would use both modes to learn. When the student simply wanted to verify a fact they would use the LM, and when they required more clarification they would choose the P2P mode.

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**A Study on the Cultural Values and Network Formation of the Bugis and
Makassarese, Indonesia***

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Topics: Cultural Values, *Siri'*, Network Formation, The Bugis and Makassarese,
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The logo for the International Association for Asian and African Studies (iafor) is centered on the page. It features the lowercase letters 'iafor' in a light blue, sans-serif font. The text is enclosed within a circular graphic composed of two overlapping, semi-transparent arcs: a light blue arc on the left and a light red arc on the right, which together form a partial circle around the text.

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A Study on the Cultural Values and Network Formation of the Bugis and Makassarese, Indonesia

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INTRODUCTION

This paper reconsiders the concept of *siri'* in the Bugis and Makassarese societies in South Sulawesi, Indonesia. In general, *siri'*¹ is translated as either “honor” or “shame” in English, or *kehormatan* or *malu* in Indonesian.

The idea of “honor-shame” is an important cultural value among a wide range of Austronesian peoples in the Asia-Pacific region. In Indonesia, the *siri'* concept that the Bugis and Makassarese people embrace is considered the exemplar of such concepts. For centuries, these people have been known to migrate into vast areas of insular Southeast Asia, and this characteristic is sometimes associated with the concept of *siri'*. However, as argued below, so far, *siri'* has been discussed more in regard to male-female relationships or criminal affairs, in which elopement and the family's reaction to it are highlighted. Similarly, the discussions on social relations in *siri'* usually focus on the family or kin level. The broader scope of social relations in *siri'* has not been explored enough.

If *siri'* is a fundamental principle for the Bugis and Makassarese, can it operate in a scope broader than that of the family or kin? If so, to what extent does social relations in *siri'* go? To answer these questions, previous research on *siri'* will be reviewed and the extent of social relations in *siri'* will be explained. Thereafter, several case examples will be used in an attempt to understand *siri'* as a network formation principle of the Bugis and Makassarese by focusing on the concept of “unite in one *siri'*.”

The Bugis and Makassarese are different ethnic groups, but in this essay, they are regarded as one. This is because both groups acknowledge *siri'* as a value. In South Sulawesi, the Bugis, with a population of approximately 3.3 million, mainly live in the central and northeastern areas, whereas the Makassarese, with a population of about 2 million, mainly live in the southern tip of the peninsula [Badan Pusat Statistik 2000:

¹ The apostrophe (') at the ending of the word is a glottal stop. This word is spelled in different ways; *siri*, *siri'*, or *siriq*.

75]². Besides these, a number of Bugis and Makassarese left their homeland to live in various regions of insular Southeast Asia. South Sulawesi, except for the northern area, was Islamized in the beginning of the seventeenth century, and today, most of the Bugis and Makassarese are Muslims.




Figure1: Map of the Study Area

WHAT IS *SIRI*'?

As mentioned above, *siri*' is a central cultural norm for the Bugis-Makassarese and is usually translated as “honor” or “shame” (*kehormatan* or *malu* in Indonesian). One who

² Other major ethnic groups living in South Sulawesi are the Toraja (population: approx. 0.7 million; most of them are Christians) and the Mandar (population: approx. 0.5 million).

does not have *siri'* is regarded as someone who “lacks human nature” or an “animal,” and if one’s *siri'* is hurt, it must be recovered [Mattulada 1971: 279; Errington 1977: 44; Pelras 1996: 206-208]. *Siri'* can also be the force driving people to achieve success in competition and migration [Abdullah 1985: 52-66].

In the Bugis/Makassarese dictionary, various explanations are given for *siri'*. A Dutch scholar, Matthes, defined *siri'* in his Bugis-Dutch dictionary as “shame” (*beschaamd*), “timidity” (*schroomvallig*), “shyness” (*verlegen*), “humiliation” (*schaamtje*), “sense of honor” (*eergevoel*), “dishonor” (*schande*), and “envy” (*wangunst*) [Matthes 1874: 724]. These meanings are almost the same as those given by a Bugis scholar, La Side: “shyness” (*malu-malu*), “shame” (*malu*), “awe” (*seگان*), “humiliation/dishonor” (*hina/aib*), “envy/jealousy” (*dengki/iri hari*), “self-respect/honor” (*harga diri/kehormatan*), and “morality” (*kesusilaan*) [Side 1977: 25-28]. Likewise, Cense’s Makassarese-Dutch dictionary defines *siri'* as “shame” (*beschaamd*), “dishonor” (*zich te schande gemaakt gevoelend*), “humiliation” (*schaamte*), and “sense of honor” (*eergevoel*) [Cense 1979: 707]. Thus, we see that *siri'* is generally interpreted as “honor” and “shame”; yet, it involves other human characteristics such as “shyness,” “timidity,” “envy,” and “humiliation.”

When *siri'* is mentioned in a formal context, *pesse* (Bug.)/*pacce* (Mak.) is often attached to it as an inseparable concept, as in *siri' na pesse* or *siri' na pacce*. *Pesse/pacce* is usually interpreted as “sympathy for others”; it is a concept complementary to *siri'*³. In the aforementioned Bugis-Dutch and Makassarese-Dutch dictionaries, *pesse/pacce* is defined as “acrid, bitter taste” (*scherp, bijtend van smaak*) [Matthes 1874: 155; Cense 1979: 112].

SIRI' IN ACADEMIC DISCOURSE

The pioneering research on *siri'* was conducted by H.Th.Chabot, a Dutch colonial administrator. He conducted Malinowski-style fieldwork while living in a Makassarese village of Gowa, both before and after the Japanese occupation, until 1950. His monograph “Kinship, Status and Gender in South Celebes” [Chabot 1996(1950)], is a classic ethnography on Makassarese (and even Bugis) society. The third part of his book shows that for the Makassarese, the family’s *siri'* is the most degraded when a female member’s standing, particularly that of a young girl’s, is violated. Elopement or *silariang* (Bug./Mak.) is highlighted as the central cause of damage to a family’s or kin’s *siri'*. Descriptions of the types of elopement, actual cases of *siri'* affairs, and connection between *siri'* and pre-marital relationships are also provided.

³ Bug./Mak. /Ind. are abbreviated forms of Bugis / Makassar / Indonesian.

From the time of elopement until the moment of reconciliation, the relation between the fleeing couple—“one who offended” (*tumanyalla*) and the woman’s family—“one who is humiliated” (*tumasiri*) is strained. Chabot vividly describes the situation when a girl flees from home and the reaction of her male family members.

Frequently, the girl flees around dusk, when an off-hand remark that she is just going out to the well is not suspected, and darkness covers her flight. (*snip*) When the flight is discovered, the young men immediately take action. They search, question the women, arm themselves, and set out on an expedition. They stop at their kin’s houses and ask them *siri*’; that is to say, they ask them to come along and help them in the pursuit. The latter cannot refuse without a loss of honour. ‘If you don’t have a sense of shame, go and borrow some somewhere’, was snapped at someone who hesitated momentarily, and thereupon there could be no more question of hesitation. Only when, after searching for some time, they cannot find a trace do they return home one after the other. [Chabot 1996: 240]

If the male members of the family find the fleeing couple, they will seize the couple, bring them home, and kill them in order to erase the shame of the family. In some cases, a fleeing couple would run into the house of an Imam, an influential person, or kampong head to ensure their safety, because stabbing someone in the house of a leader or high-ranking person is a mark of great discourtesy. As described above, an elopement is great strain onto the fleeing couple and the woman’s family. However, if the couple wants to reconcile with the woman’s family, the man’s side will initiate contact with her brothers. If her father consents to the marriage and later to the reconciliation, the tense relation between *tumanyalla* and *tumasiri*’ is resolved [Chabot 1996: 238-239].

Chabot’s study stressed that *siri*’ is mostly triggered by sexual affairs. Special attention was paid to elopement, and the process from elopement to reconciliation was explained. The following studies concerning *siri*’ in South Sulawesi have been conducted on the basis of Chabot’s study.

Mattulada remarked that an elopement occurs when the man’s side rejects a marriage proposal, or when the amount of wedding expenses demanded by the girl’s family are considered too high. Concerning the latter, the spending money (*doe’panai*’, Mak./*uang belanja*, Ind.) rather than the stand price (*sompa*, Bug./*sunrang*, Mak./*mas kawin*, Ind.) becomes the cardinal factor of an elopement [Mattulada 1971: 275-276].

Among foreign anthropologists who have conducted researches on Bugis society, Susan Millar argued that the manner in which a marriage takes place is regarded as the

manifestation of the social position of an individual and that a woman, especially a girl, represents the *siri'* of her family. Therefore, violation of a woman's standing brings the biggest "shame" to her entire family [Millar 1983: 484]. Similarly, Davies argues that in contemporary Bugis society, a woman is still protected by her family and a young girl is guarded by male family members with care; her movement is restricted in order to avoid problems of *siri'* [Davies 2007: 36].

Jawahir Thontowi explored *siri'* in relation to crime and law, adopting a legal anthropological perspective. His intensive research was based mainly at the district court of Takalar. He pointed out the problems arising from the gap between the implementation of state law and the people's practices of custom law in Indonesia [Thontowi 2007].

Ito, using the statistical data of the police, highlighted the high rates of murder and injurious assaults in South Sulawesi from the 1980s until early 1990s, as compared to other provinces in Indonesia. In South Sulawesi, the annual rate of murder occurrences was 3.17 per 100,000 people (national average 0.55), and the annual rate of injurious assaults was 22.04 per 100,000 people (national average 8.86). Ito argued that this high rate of criminal occurrences in South Sulawesi was related to *siri'* [Ito 1993: 228].

From the arguments so far, it can be summarized that the discussions on *siri'* tended to center on (1) male-female relationship and the reaction to it at the family or kin level and (2) the background of crimes such as murder and injurious assaults.

DISCUSSIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF "UNITE IN ONE SIRI'" AND ITS EXTENT

Previous discussions on *siri'* have tended to concentrate on sexuality and criminal affairs. Even today, issues that damage a woman's standing, especially elopement and extramarital intercourse, invoke great shame in Bugis-Makassarese society. This has been mentioned in recent studies on gender and sexuality in Bugis-Makassarese society [Idrus 2005; Davies 2007: 35-40]. The matters of and conflicts surrounding elopement and extramarital affairs and their bond with the word *siri'* still appear in local newspapers and tabloids published in Makassar. This means that a stereotyped discourse on *siri'* continues even today.

However, if *siri'* is the central norm that underlines the social life of the Bugis-Makassarese, should it not be considered to operate at both the family or kin level and in the broader scope of social relations? So far, few researchers have pointed out that

siri' could operate in a scope broader than that of the family or kin.

Among them was Shelly Errington, who conducted research on the royalty of the Luwu Bugis in the northwestern part of South Sulawesi in the late 1970s. She noted that to determine the basic human relationship for the Bugis is to distinguish people's "relatives/family" (*kalopo*, Bug.) from "strangers/other persons" (*tau laing*, Bug.). This division code is *siri'*; that is, those who can be "in a state of one *siri'*" are *kalopo*, and those who cannot share one *siri'* are *tau laing*. Being "in a state of one *siri'*" is expressed as *masseddi' siri'* in Bugis⁴.

As mentioned earlier, Millar argues that *siri'* emerge most clearly when the status of one of the family members is threatened and there is an inviolable tie of *siri'* binding family members [Millar 1989: 30-31]. A person shares *siri'* with his or her sisters, brothers, parents, spouse, and children, and in diminishing degree with those she/he is less closely related to by birth [Millar 1983: 484]. This point refers to the extent and strength of *siri'* shared in the family, which implies that *siri'* can become a code to bind family members. However, neither Millar nor Errington mentioned *siri'* in the context of the wider range of social relations, as their arguments are limited to the scope of family.

Christian Pelras notes that *siri'* is not just a personal sentiment but also a collective sentiment, where it can be regarded as a token of a group's unity. Therefore, *siri'* often becomes a motivating force in the search for a better social life and success, and local intellectuals have praised it as a virtue [Pelras 1996: 207]. This remark seems important from the viewpoint of *siri'* in the context of the broader social relations, but it has not been argued with an actual case or evidence.

As observed above, while previous researchers have suggested the operation of *siri'* in the broader scope of social relations outside the family level, they have not yet investigated the matter using factual cases.

MASSEDDI SIRI' (UNITE IN ONE SIRI'): FIVE CASE EXAMPLES

In an attempt to explore the social scope of *siri'*, *siri'* that has no connection with man-woman relationships or criminal affairs will be argued here using five case examples. This will help in understanding the social manifestation of *siri'* in a more inclusive way.

⁴ *Mamesa siri'* in the dialect around her research area (*Tae* Dialect) [Errington 1989: 144]. The discussion of her ethnography is centered on royalty, not on *siri'*. The equivalent term in Makassarese is *a'julu siri'*.

Case One: The Makassar War (1666-69)

In the latter half of the seventeenth century, a Bugis aristocrat named Arung Palakka⁵, along with his ally the VOC (Dutch East Indian Company), knocked down the Sultan Hasanuddin-ruled Makassarese Kingdom of Gowa. After the victory, Arung Palakka seized political authority within South Sulawesi. Leonard Andaya, a historian, examines Arung Palakka's struggle in relation to *siri*'.

First, Arung Palakka did not forget that when he was young, his *siri*' was hurt by the Makassarese, and this turned into a lifelong crusade against Gowa. Around 1640, La Ma'darëmmëng, the king of Bone, forced the neighboring countries (Wajo, Soppeng, Mapese, Sawitto, and Bacukiki) to implement Islam rigidly. The countries requested Gowa's help, and Gowa invaded and conquered Bone in 1644. Thus, Bone's status dropped from a tributary to a slave state to Gowa, and all the noblemen of Bone were compelled to move to Makassar. Eleven-year-old Arung Palakka was among them. He felt *siri*' as he watched the Bugis people being abused, and this caused his lifelong antipathy toward Gowa [Andaya 1981: 39-42; 51-52].

Second, Arung Palakka, by conquering Gowa, reestablished the *siri*' of the people of Bone, as well as that of his own (Andaya 1981: 154). After the Makassar War, he affirmed his loyalty to the VOC by sending troops more than once when he was asked for support.

Third, although Andaya did not point this out, the trilateral of the VOC, the Bugis of Bone, and Arung Palakka formed an allied force that "united in one *siri*'" in the face of the same enemy. Since they had common interests, they cooperated with each other to combat Gowa. In this case, the first point is thought to be a personal *Siri*', whereas the second and third points are collective *siri*'.

Case Two: The Rebellion of Kahar Muzakkar (1951–65)

South Sulawesi witnessed great chaos during the 1950s due to the rebellion led by Kahar Muzakkar⁶. Anhar Gonggong notes that the spirit of *siri*' greatly influenced

⁵ Arung Palakka (1635–96) is a Bugis nobleman from Soppeng district. He got out of South Sulawesi around 1660 because he was chased by the Makassar of Gowa. In Buton Island he joined the Dutch. During the Makassar War he led troops from Bone and Soppeng and fought with Gowa mainly on land. After the victory, he was installed as the 16th king of Bone in 1672. His legend is still talked widely in Bugis society even today.

⁶ Kahar Muzakkar(1921-65) was a Bugis soldier from a common family in Luwu. He led a troop from South Sulawesi to fight for the Republic during the independence period. However, his contribution was not rewarded in a military personnel affair, and this caused the rebellion in 1951. After he manifested to

Kahar's behavior, philosophy, and language. His *siri'* was so deeply injured by Sukarno's central government that his guerrilla fighting persisted for fourteen long years (Gonggong 1992: 58-71). One of Errington's informants told her that "when one person is guarding our *siri'*, it's so shameful not to help." As an example, her informant referred to Kahar: "when Kahar was *ripakasiri'* (humiliated) by the government, he was fighting to defend the *siri'* of all the people of South Sulawesi, many felt, and so lots of people felt it would be shameful not to join him." [Errington 1989: 149].

In 1953, Kahar's sworn friend Andi Teriadjeng, who was a high aristocrat with considerable influence in Luwu, died while being embattled without support armies. The fact that Kahar did not send support armies to him disappointed the people of Luwu. This incident, combined with Kahar's anti-feudalism attitude, upset the people, especially the aristocrats who felt that "Kahar cut off the bond of *siri'*" [Magenda 1989: 625-626].

This rebellion could be interpreted as Kahar and his people uniting to fight the government that had brought shame upon them. In local newspapers, *siri'* is sometimes seen in the context of inspiring soccer teams, political campaigns, and so on. Some such cases are presented below.

Case Three: "Between Professionalism and *Siri' Na Pacce*"⁷ [Ujungpandang Ekspres, Dec.14, 2005]

This is the title of an editorial comment in a sports column. It criticizes as well as inspires PSM⁸, a soccer team based in Makassar, whose foreign players moved to other teams.

For the umpteenth time, PSM has been "shamed" by the "foreign" players. Dare this "dunghill cock from the east"⁹ become a pioneer in achieving success without foreign players?

Do you remember SM, who had signed a contract with PSM last season but went back to his home in Minahasa just after it? The same applies to S from Jawa. RF from Uruguay and AH from Camerouns also moved to other teams that offered

join the Darul Islam movement in 1953, his rebellion took the shape of a holy battle. Kahar's force became weaker in the late 1950s, and he was shot to death by the national military in 1965.

⁷ The original Indonesian title is *Antara Profesionalisme dan Siri'na Pacce*.

⁸ The abbreviated name of *Persatuan Sepakbola Makassar* (Ind.).

⁹ The original is *Ayam Jantan dari Timur* (Ind.), a phrase that described the Kingdom of Gowa at the height of prosperity in the first half of the seventeenth century.

higher salaries. It is natural for them to head to well-paid teams because they are professional players. But they are not local men (*putra daerah*, Ind.) so they don't know the principle of South Sulawesi, *siri' na pacce*. A former PSM player GH told us, "Foreign players tend to look for the quality of play, whereas local players give priority to the local spirit (*semangat kedaerahnya*¹⁰, Ind.)." (*snip*)

Whether PSM employs foreign players or not, depends on the manager. Perhaps non-local players need to learn about *siri' na pacce*. Whatever be the condition, PSM should be able to make a breakthrough with its local players. "It's true that the local players still lack experience. But once they are given a chance, they will surely perform to the best of their potential with their spiritual strength," said former PSM player AR.

This comment argues that the "foreign" players value professionalism, but the "local" players have the spirit of *siri' na pacce*. The writer seems to interpret "the local spirit" mentioned by GH as *siri' na pacce*. Here, *siri' na pacce* and "the local spirit" are used as a code to discern the local players from the foreign players. The local players are expected to take the team forward because they have the spirit of *siri' na pacce*. In addition to this editorial, an article to inspire the PSM (including sms postings from readers) is always seen in the local newspapers, and *siri'* (and *pacce*) is also frequently used there.

Case Four: "It Is *Siri'* for Us All to Have Failed in the *Adipura* Contest"¹¹ [Fajar, June 10, 2007]

Adipura is an annual contest sponsored by the government, where a prize is awarded to the cleanest city (*kota*) or regency (*kabupaten*) in each province. The following article is a commentary posted by a citizen on Makassar city's failure in the 2007 contest.

He expresses sadness that Makassar city could not succeed in the contest and was evaluated as dirty. He then asserts, "No matter where you are from, all Makassar citizens must feel *siri'* because we've got an evaluation like this. This failure should serve to motivate us to make a concerted effort to win the prize next year." Then at the end, he emphasizes the importance of recognizing the need for all citizens to keep the surroundings clean.

Here, attention should be paid to the social extent of *siri'*, which is shared by people.

¹⁰ This would be a clerical error. *kedaerahannya* is correct.

¹¹ The original Indonesian title is *Kegagalan Raih Adipura, Siri' Kita Semua*.

The phrase “No matter where you are from...” means that “we Makassar citizens” should have *siri*, not just a particular ethnic group. In other words, the scope of “unite in one *siri*” is all Makassar citizens. An unfavorable *siri* or shame for failing to win the *Adipura* prize should be used to try and restore their “honor” (also *siri*) the next year. In this context, *siri* is like two sides of a coin meaning shame/honor.

Case Five: The Presidential Campaign in 2009: Jusuf Kalla and *Siri*

During the presidential campaign in the first half of 2009, many kinds of phrases (in both Indonesian and Bugis/Makassarese language) floated around South Sulawesi. This was because at that time, Vice President Jusuf Kalla (or JK) of South Sulawesi descent became a presidential candidate. The many phrases and words containing *siri* that were used in the campaign, will be examined here.

When Jusuf Kalla orated to the crowd of thousands on June 11th in Karebosi Square located in the heart of Makassar, he also used the Makassarese language and mentioned *siri*¹²: “Are you all right, everybody? How are you? If you believe in me, I will not make you feel ashamed (*tena kupasiriki*, Mak.)” [Fajar, June 12, 2009]¹³.



Photos: Presidential Campaign Posters in South Sulawesi
(Left: in Gowa, June 29, 2009; Right: in Makassar, June 29, 2009)

A number of campaign posters for Jusuf Kalla in the area used *siri* and *siri' na pacce*. For example, one of the campaign posters above says “PA'SIRI KI...” in the Makassarese language. This means, “show your solidarity, everybody” (to help JK-

¹² Jusuf Kalla is of Bugis origin, born in Bone but fluent in the Makassarese language, perhaps because he lived for a long time in Makassar.

¹³ The original is “*Ngapai, bajik-bajik ngasengji? Apa ntu kareba? Kalau Anda percaya kepada kami, tena kupasiriki.*”

Wiranto). The figures drawn on the poster are Sultan Hasanuddin and Syekh Yusuf, both Indonesian national heroes and favorites among the Makassarese people.

When Jusuf Kalla said, “*tena kupasiri(’)ki*” it meant that he would not make the people of South Sulawesi ashamed, perhaps because he represented the *siri*’/“honor” of the people and area. At the same time, it could be thought that he used *siri*’ to gather more support and sympathy because *siri*’ is a favorite concept among the peoples of South Sulawesi, especially for the Bugis/Makassarese. Also, when the supporters expressed *pa’siri(’)ki* or *siri’ na pacce* for Jusuf Kalla, it was meant to urge other people to join and help. Thus, these words of *siri*’ can become a symbol of the people’s solidarity in their support for Jusuf Kalla.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE SOCIAL RELATIONS IN *SIRI*’

This paper reviews the previous research on *siri*’ and uses several case examples to reevaluate the concept of *siri*’ from a scope of social relations broader than that of the family or kin. By examining these cases in the context of *siri*’, we see that the operational scope of *siri*’ extends beyond the family and kin level to soccer teams, fellow countrymen, ethnic groups, kingdoms, participants of war, and so on. At the same time, people “unite in one *siri*” flexibly depending on the moment and place. Sometimes, people “unite in one *siri*” because their personal *siri*’ is injured, but at other times, people “unite in one *siri*” to cooperate for a common aim. A sphere based on *siri*’ or a network of *masseddi siri*’ can be formed at any social level and not just among kin and family members. Therefore, different kinds of networks that are “united in one *siri*” may be formed at the same time, and a person may participate in more than one network.

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**“Imagined Innocence Lost: The Performance of Post-Indigeneity in Eikoh Hosoe
and Tatsumi Hijikata’s *Kamaitachi*”**

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PREFACE

We live in an age where mass media has overwhelmed our daily lives. Beyond the broadcast saturation and packaged, audio-visual experiences of the late 20th Century, dominant ideologies constantly invade our very bodies through socio-economic dependence on personal communication and computing devices. The post-industrial, service-oriented, commodified body literally consumes its virtual self. We are eating our “selves” alive.

It is for this reason that, for me, butoh performance is an attempt to save lives. It is a legislative bill put forward in a congress of mind, body, and spirit. It is a call to arms against our “selves,” the ones that we are not.

Created a half-century ago by Hijikata Tatsumi with the aid of Ohno Kazuo, two modern dancers searching for a new mode of expressing matter and spirit, butoh was born as a postwar dance form, artistic movement, philosophy, and cultural opposition to the mainstream social order. While developed in numerous forms over the decades, most butoh-based training in some way works to disengage the body from oppressive or domesticated behavior through deconstructing movement, speech, thought, and action. Image-based exercises are designed to literally “break” such patterns, offer a wider view on human nature, and empower practitioners to embody vulnerable, practically “disabled” versions of themselves in order to reclaim their identities in a process of cyclical self-destruction and reintegration. For audiences, these transformed, “broken” beings serve as partially-readable signs of socialization, assembled from damaged codes and presented as disturbing, semi-unconsumable commodities, yet somehow remaining knowable and human.

But where do the forms, the structures, the *inspirations*, for such signs and codes, for such *selves*, come from? Throughout the history of butoh, repeated references have been made to life, death, innate memory, primal states of being, and spirits. People have also taken photographs. A lot of them. So many, in fact, that it’s almost impossible to think of butoh without the way it’s been visually imagined, captured, and expressed. In my experience, I find that photo-representation is one of the most common yet least-discussed influences on butoh practice, specifically how early butoh photo-imagery has contributed to the comprehension, definition, and perceived legitimacy of butoh-based practices.

With this in mind, a flashback to the beginning. My beginning...

Sometime in Fall 1991. Kinokuniya Bookstore, Downtown Los Angeles.

All I can think is that this man is in pain. There's a large book in my hands with a cover photo that I don't understand. An old Japanese man holds a flower, twisted and bent, petals shriveled. His arms and hands curl inward to his concave chest. His shoulder droops low, withering. Twisted, asymmetrical, near to chaos, his body struggles to stay upright. Patchy white makeup covers every inch of his body, as if lived in too long. Bright red lipstick and yellowed teeth, mouth only half-open but somehow feeling agape, as if he has something to say, but instead of coming out through his tongue, the words are oozing, bleeding through pores all over his body.

Over the eyelids, smears of sky blue, desperate for attention, not rooted in attraction, but rather in pity, a long-lost desire to be someone's queen for a day, or an hour, a minute even, an inexorable slide into decay. And those eyes. Surrounded by pure black, thick and messy streaks trailing off to the side, simultaneously hopeful and despairing. He's looking upward, longing, resigned, saintly.

It's obvious. He's dying. You're not supposed to watch this kind of thing happening. I can't keep my eyes off of him. Other customers in the store are beginning to stare at me staring at this book. I've never seen anything so beautiful..

That's what I felt, then. I look at this photo now, and I notice how staged it is. The curve of the flower petals perfectly matching the arc of the lips, the fall of the hair, and the center point in the frame. No tension in the large hands. The dancer's pose seems static, as if tailored and held for the camera. There is still, however, that expression.

Ohno Kazuo sees something. Heaven or God, since he is a devout Christian, opening wide to take in the breath of angels? Or maybe a ghost, a lost or kindred soul that fills him with childlike awe and aged exhaustion. Even after 20 years, I feel a liminal space opening up every time I see this photo. Ohno appears to me intimidated by and anxious for what comes next, and its effect is visceral even now, just as it was when I first stood staring at it in that bookstore. For me, the photo *itself* engenders a sense of liminality. I look at it and have no idea what just happened or what is about to happen.

The image could also be simply a stimulating composition that the photographer, Ethan Hoffman, artfully captured, an instant when cosmic vision was activated in glass, metal, and silver halides. In considering whether a photo is acting upon us or we are acting upon it, we might remember that among the first photographers in history were the competing desires to either frame or depict reality. Passive or active? After 172 years, we assume it's a conscious decision made by every photographer, but, in reality, it's a existential question that may never be resolved, just as after three millennia, most God-fearing worshippers have never reached consensus on whether to live their lives submitting to God's will or doing his bidding.

This supposed binary between passive and active in any engagement with photography is at the core of Roland Barthes's final text, *Camera Lucida*, in which he defines the experience of viewing a photo in terms of the binary of *studium* and *punctum*. *Studium* is the effect of a photo based on its generalizable criteria, references within its place and time, and its supposed facts on cultural, political, aesthetic, or otherwise objective levels. Moreover, because the *studium* is external, it imposes itself upon us: "The Photograph is

violent: not because it shows violent things, but because on each occasion *it fills the sight by force*, and because in it nothing can be refused or transformed.” (Barthes 1981: 91)

Punctum, however, arises out of the workings of our imagination:

Nothing surprising, then, if sometimes, despite its clarity, the *punctum* should be revealed only after the fact, when the photograph is no longer in front of me and I think back on it. I may know better a photograph I remember than a photograph I am looking at, as if direct vision oriented its language wrongly, engaging it in an effort of description which will always miss its point of effect, the *punctum*. (Barthes 1981: 53)

Punctum relies on an image working within one’s self over time as a template within memory upon which one may reflect desires, anxieties, or other emotions. This potential for particular effects within particular viewers makes it idiosyncratic and subjective.

While ostensibly a meditation on photography’s meaning and function, *Camera Lucida* is ultimately driven by Barthes’s nostalgia, loss, and pain around the death of his mother, making the text an intricately reasoned and deeply sorrowful exploration of *subjective truth* as a way to deal with objective reality.

Within the context of the prevalence of subjective forms of expression in the postwar Japanese avant-garde, a similar tension arose in the formative years of butoh. The first butoh artists are like the early jazz artists; they had something to reclaim and a struggle worth fighting because they had been handed a false liberty. In the midst of Japan’s rapid postwar westernization, this reclamation took the form of retooling and reinvention of the body itself. Hijikata led an archaeological expedition to excavate and salvage a damaged, broken, dying, yet still breathing, pre-modern, nativist body and then turn it into something that, in reality, it already was – a myth.

Kinjiki, Hijikata’s now-legendary, sexually-violent, duet performance with Ohno Yoshito, the declaration of independence and forbidden fruit of the butoh movement, premiered in 1959.¹ Legendary not because it was scandalous. Scandal doesn’t reserve a place for you in the pantheon; it only means you exist. To become a legend, it takes settling into a collective imaginary that the members of that collective sooner or later take for granted. It takes myth.

Notorious for proffering contradictory evidence about himself, Hijikata spent most of his adult life spinning a tale that fed his public persona.² In the decade following *Kinjiki*, he became either who he wanted to be or needed to be, what others wanted from him, or, perhaps, all of the above. Hijikata and other trickster figures of the period, such as

¹ Titled after the Mishima novel of the same name, *Kinjiki* featured a teenage male dancer (Yoshito Ohno, 14 year-old son of Butoh co-founder, Kazuo Ohno) virtually strangling a chicken between his legs and another adult dancer (Hijikata) attempting to molest him.

² Some stories are told in a line, but myths are spun, i.e. eternally generated and transformed in a circular process, with no beginning or end point, no highs or lows, no inherent hierarchy. Such stories are also in constant self-reflexive dialogue, turning in on themselves at every moment, but with an unchanging radius, each at a uniform distance from itself, never any further or closer, so never hiding but never revealing, always simply what it is, has been, and will be.

Terayama, Dylan, or Warhol, spent the late 1950s through mid-1960s dissecting and rejecting the totalizing authority of their late modernist forefathers and were finally forced to make a positive statement, to actually say something, by the late 1960s, when, after exploding onto their respective scenes, they took turns imploding within a scene of their own making.

Of course, looking back, to a time when I was barely born in a culture once removed and a country an ocean away, is like staring into a magic lantern, or straining your ear to a broken harmonium, devices for communicating with the beyond to find out where and how the past and future live in the here and now. But you can only perceive faded colors or faint whispers. In other words, *You weren't there, Michael. How could you possibly know what you're talking about?* I don't. That's the point.³

KAMAITACHI

On numerous occasions between 1965 and 1968, two men made their way from Tokyo to the cold, windswept farm plains of the Tohoku region of northern Japan armed with a 35mm Nikon F and black-and-white Kodak film, distant childhood memories, and a vast, improvisational facility for invoking searing, subconscious imagery. One was Hosoe Eikoh, a young photographer freshly minted into the upper echelon of contemporary visual arts after a now legendary photo book collaboration with novelist Mishima Yukio, in which the latter was literally wrapped, laid, lifted, and enthralled within a gorgeous and deathly fantasy world sprung from Hosoe's mind and Mishima's soul.⁴ The other was Hijikata, who, in 1959, had resigned in protest from Japan's National Dance Association after the uproar surrounding *Kinjiki*, and had begun to stake out a career expressly independent of mainstream legitimacy.

The resulting photo essay came to be called *Kamaitachi (Sickle-Weasel)*, after a mythical, invisible beast that hid in wind flurries and attacked unsuspecting passersby on lone roads, cutting and quickly sealing them up before bleeding, so that the injury and pain lay underneath, mysteriously fomenting, agitating, and eating away from within. Since their first exhibition and publication in the late 1960s, the photos have become iconic in art history and served to further shape the careers of both collaborators.

But how is *Kamaitachi*, in Hosoe's words, a "subjective documentary?" How was a sense of both men's childhoods in Tohoku mined and reconstructed in order to create a contemporary, visual-performative expression of folk mythology that also resulted in propagating an iconic mythology around Hijikata himself? What might we say the

³ "Have you ever dreamed of a place...you don't really recall ever having been to...a place that probably doesn't even exist except in your imagination...somewhere far away, half-remembered when you wake up...but when you were there you spoke the language, you knew your way around... That was the 60's. No, it wasn't. Wasn't either. It was '66...early '67. That was all." - Peter Fonda in the film, *The Limey* (1998), written by Lem Dobbs and directed by Stephen Soderbergh

Though I was adopted in 1968, I was born in 1967, which means my birth parents conceived me in Fall 1966 as living proof of this thesis. I was born in the Summer of Love but after the love had already moved on.

⁴ The photo essay was entitled, *Barakei (Ordeal by Roses)*, and originally published in book form by Shueisha in 1963.

photos actually show us? Do the photos themselves possess immanence or does such a quality reside in the eye of beholder?

Looking at the images, we see over three dozen monochrome photos⁵ of Hijikata in various states of embodiment and action. The first handful are in an urban setting, and then, except for a short foray into a photo studio, the images move to an unnamed series of rural villages and farmlands. In all the photos, Hijikata's character lies within the full continuum of the gaze. In interaction with both villagers and city-dwellers, he is alternately depicted as watching, watched, and in implicit observational ("othering") competition with those around him. He is inspected, mocked, kowtowed to, embraced, mourned. He threatens, lurks, ingratiates, seduces, molests, flees, attacks, struggles. He flares devil horns in broad daylight. He hibernates like a hidden demon, or incipient plague, on a shelf in an old barn. He marries a farmgirl child and initiates her eroticism in a field of zinnias. He chases another bride – older, fat, toothless, drunk – who matches his maddened state, step by disjunctive step. He repeatedly flies through the air, the panels of his kimono flaring in every direction, as if transformed into chaos itself. In one of the final images, he careens through a rice paddy with a screaming baby in one arm, the other outstretched, as if clawing the very air that constitutes *and* conceals his uncontrollable, unnamable nature.

Born in the north, but growing up in Tokyo and only living in the countryside for one year as a 12 year-old evacuee during the Tokyo firebombings of 1944-1945, Hosoe recalled, "I liked the landscapes... but I hated the country itself...children playing around the corner would watch me with old, cold eyes...we from the city were thin from hunger. Their laughing expressions were awful...The dark, snowy country seemed to be full of ghosts." (cited in Viala/Masson-Sekine 1988: 191) His impetus for the project was also quite personal:

"I had the strange feeling...that I should not hate the land where my mother was born. If I hated it, I would hate my own mother. *Kamaitachi*, then, is a very personal record of my own memory from boyhood, with all the complex feelings of love and hate from those days in the countryside." (cited in Viala/Masson-Sekine 1988: 192)

Starting in the late 50s, both Hosoe and Hijikata had joined in the avant-garde zeitgeist of questioning their new modern Japanese identity, rooted as it was in the façade and trappings of social commodification and late Modernist individualism. Hijikata came to an upending ethos, what is dark, grotesque, and death-like (i.e. what is rejected and marginalized by a psychically-compromised society) is actually beautiful and full of life.⁶ Among a new breed of Japanese photographers dedicated to personalized images, Hosoe also found his aesthetic voice in stark contrasts of light and dark, especially after witnessing Hijikata's *Kinjiki* premiere, whereupon the two men became collaborators and lifelong friends. Both artists delved into the alienation of late capitalism, Hosoe by

⁵ In 2009, Aperture produced a new trade edition in book form with an additional eight photos never before published. Eikoh Hosoe, *Kamaitachi* (New York: Aperture Foundation, 2009).

⁶ Jean Genet was Hijikata's favorite writer: "Genet, rejected by society, affirms himself as he is, rejecting society in turn, and constructing his own paradoxical ethos (see Genet [1949] 1964). This paradoxical conversion became Hijikata's guiding aesthetic throughout his life: the ugly is the beautiful; death is life (Kurihara 2000: 18)."

forging a visceral style of tenuous self-identity poised between tradition, modernity, and fetishization of the body,⁷ and Hijikata by reveling, vaccine-like, in its tragic schizophrenia as a form of ritualized affliction and cure.

Hijikata, especially, plied the murky waters on society's fringes to find a working method and ready source of material, coming of age through both avant-garde dance and a marginalized economic subculture, working variously as a longshoreman, junk dealer, and other lowly vocations. Unlike Hosoe, Hijikata had only moved to Tokyo full-time in 1952, when he was 24 years old. At this point, his lack of high-level training and asymmetrical physique (one leg was shorter than the other) prevented him from obtaining the career in mainstream modern dance that he aspired to, thus driving him to turn inward and forge new aesthetic criteria. (Kurihara 1996: 17-18) In his early career, he did not publicly consider his rural background as inspiration. In published statements, his surreal references were more urban, anti-capitalist, and criminal:

Eyes intervene in the current generation whose soul too is unable to live merely through the succession of property. I eventually arrive at my material by carefully walking around Tokyo where the generation whose hands made eyes has not altogether died out. (Hijikata 2000: 41)

My dance...is behavior that explicitly flaunts its aimlessness in the face of a production-oriented society. (Hijikata 2000: 44)

I wager reality on a nonsensical vitality that has purged the echo of logic from my body and I dream of the day when I am sent to prison. (Hijikata 2000: 45)

Hijikata created an urban-centric, mental landscape representative of the clash between the dual images of a pre-war, intuitive corporeality and a postwar, industrialized, domesticated body. He spent the period from 1959 to 1968 performing themes of socio-cultural marginalization, with Western-style modernization on one side and, on the other, a dissipating, indigenous, "Japanese" body, newly defined as obsolete at best and criminal at worst. Just as Crapanzano speaks of "imaginative horizons" that feed liminal, dialectic states of being that act as "determinants of...social imaginaries" (Crapanzano 2004: 1-15), so Hijikata's imagined Tokyo was redolent with subliminal, embodied conflict in all directions, upon which he cast his insecurity, hatred, obsession, and desire, a kind of perfect imperfection, lush with rich metaphors for subverting social norms of beauty, quality, and morality.

By the late 1960s, however, Hijikata was reaching the outer limits of this imaginary, which, after all, had been expressly designed to eventually break down under the weight of its own increasing lack of definition. Thus, 15 years after moving to Tokyo and after three years of work on *Kamaitachi*, Hijikata began explicitly utilizing Tohoku references in his work. One might guess that when Hosoe and Hijikata returned to northern Japan together, they arrived with varied agendas: ostensibly, nostalgic excavation and filial reconciliation for Hosoe, and, perhaps, reimagination and re-purposing of visual-corporeal memory for Hijikata.

Thus, the period around *Kamaitachi* represented a bodily shift in Hijikata's festering and fertile hinterland of social marginality from external, typed, and male to internal, biographical, and female. His seminal 1968 performance, *Hijikata Tatsumi to Nihonjin*:

⁷ See *Barakei*, *Man and Woman*, *Kimono*, *Kamaitachi*, and other works from the 1960s.

Nikutai no Hanran (Hijikata Tatsumi and the Japanese: Revolt of the Flesh), was his last to depict a predominantly masculine universe replete with Western dance stereotypes and transgressive behavior. After this and the publication of *Kamaitachi* in 1969, Hijikata moved into an intense period of many years where he developed a lexicon of body imagery and mental states ostensibly inspired by his childhood and also began choreographing women, one of whom, Ashikawa Yoko, became his leading protégé until his death in 1986. Stories of crawling through rice fields, playing with deadly farming tools, fearing mythical beasts, drunken singing by his father, and alleged sale into prostitution of his sister all contributed to the eventual formation of a loosely codified *Butoh-fu* (Butoh language) inspired by a highly idiosyncratic Tohoku imaginary. By the premiere in 1972 of *27 Nights for Four Seasons*, a month of new Tohoku-inspired performances by his dance company, Hijikata was defining himself less by what he was not and did not have and increasingly by what he alleged to have experienced and become. This focus on his indigenous imaginary continued until his death in 1986, when he had just completed a new choreography entitled, *Tohoku Kabuki*, which ostensibly combined fantastic childhood memories with the raw aesthetic of pre-Meiji kabuki, a working class entertainment until appropriation by the government as a late 19th Century, bourgeois reconstruction.

Hijikata's gendered duality may have been foreshadowed in 1960 by his first collaborations with Hosoe, the photo essay, *Man and Woman*. High-contrast, monochrome photos of Hijikata and two female dancers show them mostly in body fragments, with faces, limbs, and torsos forcibly juxtaposed in order to reveal an instinctive sense of gender-based tensions and harmonies. From their first work together, the two men searched intensely for ways to express a wide range of internalized, domesticated, and intuitive subjectivities.⁸ *Kamaitachi*, therefore, was a midpoint of sorts in their mutual progression from rebellion against conventional typologies of physicality, gender, and sexuality to eventual creation of self-styled cosmologies rooted in highly subjectivized body vocabularies.⁹

So is there evidence for these aesthetic shifts in the images themselves? Or do the photos simply stand on their own as powerful works of art, the direct efficacy of which is dependent on the viewer? My own opinion is that both factors are at play. On the one hand, while there is nothing in the photos that specifically communicates the idea that Hosoe and Hijikata are working through childhood traumas, I believe they also contain a clear sense of presencing directly influenced by the environment in each photo. In the city, Hijikata is shown clearly at odds with the other inhabitants and surroundings: under a microscope, fleeing through concrete gardens, alone with children's toys, a devil in the marketplace. In every image, he is at odds with the people and places around him. In the countryside, however, he transforms into practically an elemental force: crawling through shadows, hurtling with the wind, melting into the mud. Villagers alternately mock and then fete him. He eventually joins with two brides in absurd and obsessive matrimony

⁸ Hosoe, for instance, in working with Mishima on the first photos for *Barakei*, wrapped the novelist in a garden hose and made him stand in place while he shot two entire rolls of film in order to "destroy the preconceived ideas about Mishima's image in order to create a *new* Mishima." (Hosoe 2009) Hosoe took credit for all of the image details in the project, which he said evolved entirely from his own imagination, and he took "whole responsibility for everything that is presented in them." (Hosoe 1991: 25)

⁹ For Hosoe, the apotheosis of this work was the photo essay, *Embrace*, published in 1970 and featuring the bodies of many of Hijikata's dancers.

rituals. He dies in captivity, appears again in harvested, denuded fields, and becomes as one with the air and earth, light and darkness.

These gestures, stances, and movements are manufactured entry points, ways of performing, of being, in and of an *imagined, post-indigenous body* that ostensibly cannot help itself from transcending both its rural foundations and urbanized filters to resolve into a tensile, spontaneous lexicon of memory, subjectivity, and presence. I say this body is *imagined* because of its semi-fictional basis and *post-indigenous* because Hijikata posited a nativist, essentialist identity off of its moorings in an early postmodern world not of its own making. Through Hosoe's biographical framework and aesthetic, Hijikata unveiled his own potential for realizing a larger and fuller artistic vision than he had previously attempted. *Kamaitachi* allowed him the freedom to revisualize his roots into a fantastic yet also practical working method that would last until his death two decades later.¹⁰

The commercially and critically successful photos also provided the additional benefit of greater social validation for Hijikata, raising his profile from *enfant terrible* of the Japanese dance world to legitimate cultural practitioner. From the late 1960s onward, Hijikata became not only a respected artist, but a cultural icon as well. His aesthetic principles and choreographic forms pronounced and practiced within this period became the visual basis of the stereotypical Butoh *style* that continues modishly through the present day, both within much of the Japanese and international performance communities and, unfortunately, in the minds of most critics as well.

Hosoe continued onward after *Kamaitachi* to devise both highly-stylized, studio-based abstractions as well as subjective documentaries with other willing subjects. However, this seminal work with Hijikata continues to inspire butoh-based practitioners around the globe and stands, as one longtime, American student described to me, as “image words that tell me everything I need to know about dance.”¹¹

For most practitioners, it is primarily their perception of Hijikata's Tohoku identity, not Hosoe's, that defines *Kamaitachi*. For them, the photos are not so much designed images with *aesthetic* immanence, but rather a source of knowledge, full of *psychic* immanence; a window into the very roots of butoh practice itself. While Hijikata did write down a great deal of working notes, imagery, and poetic, surreal essays, he never published his *butoh-fu* himself or publicly defined butoh in terms of a set and determined training method. Butoh practice is, by definition, an ever-fluid space of individual, idiosyncratic engagement between the psychic and corporeal selves, between mind and body, typically more concerned with the nature of presence and identity than clear formation of artistic expression. Thus, a few dozen photos, a handful of short film clips, and a number of largely oblique public statements are all most butoh practitioners have ever witnessed of Hijikata in the 24 years since his death. This has made *Kamaitachi* a standard reference by default for the self-definition of butoh, mentally repeated by countless students and dancers who accept it as a fundamental part of their collective definition of *who and what*

¹⁰ For example, Natsu Nakajima, one of Hijikata's first students, stated, “Hijikata would tell us: ‘Make the face of an old devil woman, with the right hand in the shape of a horn, and the left hand holding her long hair’...then comes the light of the sun, and the eyes become smaller; then comes the wind, and the eyelids quiver; then you must feel like a stone.” (cited in Viala/Masson-Sekine 1988: 135)

¹¹ Interview with Rosemary Candelario, Los Angeles, CA, 10/23/09.

Hijkata was.

In analyzing butoh photos, especially seminal 1960s images, one might surmise that later generation practitioners often look to these in their desire for gnosis from the roots of butoh itself represented by its founding generation of artists. This desire drives many practitioners to bestow a proto-spiritual legitimacy on such photos as a kind of predominant, sacred text, replete as all sacred texts are with alluring, obfuscatory surfaces, infinite, undefinable depths, and an aching, unresolving physicality.

Returning to *Camera Lucida*, the act of looking to the past in this manner sits between Barthes's contrast of the amateur and professional photographer's gaze: "...it is the amateur...who is the assumption of the professional: for it is he who stands closer to the *noeme* of photography," (Barthes 1981: 99) which Barthes defines as "that-has-been," or "the Intractable" (Barthes 1981: 77), a past existential state in a photo, which he equates with his personal truth. (Barthes 1981: 98) Amateurs look to the past, what exists apart from and despite themselves, and are therefore sentimental, subjective. Professionals look to the future, what can or will exist because of them, and are therefore rational, objective. John Berger states:

Certainty may be instantaneous; doubt requires duration; meaning is born of the two. An instant photographed can only acquire meaning insofar as the viewer can read into it a duration extending beyond itself. When we find a photograph meaningful, we are lending it a past and a future. (Berger/ Mohr 1982)

I believe this is a function of our second nature tendency to interpret and assign a place in our cosmology to everything we see. Thus, butoh practitioners often look to the past in order create their futures, making their relationship with viewed photos a binary between objective and subjective perception. Further, such a binary in photography is representative of, on the one hand, killing and death and, on the other, birth and life. By perceiving facts (Barthes's *studium*), i.e. stasis, we destroy what's there, by nature actually mutable and impermanent. By perceiving idiosyncratic impressions (Barthes's *punctum*), i.e. ambiguous, unstable reality, we generate meaning and even immanence, which arises in the fertile liminal space between the image and our desires.

Jay Hirabayashi, Co-Artistic Director of Kokoro Dance in Vancouver, Canada, recalls such an experience during his early practice in the 1980s:

I had a book of pictures of butoh stuff, and I read Jean Viala, who put out a book, and I read what he said butoh was. The first book was in Japanese, so I couldn't read the text, but the pictures were amazing. So we would look at the pictures, and I had done one workshop. We just decided we would try to do what we imagined butoh was. So I shaved my head, we painted ourselves white. I made some dances where I was moving very slowly. And after, when I finally did get to take Kazuo Ohno's class, he said don't imitate me, and don't use any technique. So I thought that actually when we started we were doing the right thing.¹²

Heyward Bracey, a Los Angeles-based dancer, reveals a similar connection to early photos of Hijkata after hearing a story from his teacher about Hijkata's supposed bodily

¹² Hirabayashi, Jay, from an interview with the author, 3/21/10.

epiphanies upon returning to his home village:

In sharing Hijikata's story he managed to include me somehow in a "lineage" of cultural transmission that had begun barely 40 years ago when Hijikata encountered something more substantial than he had previously known in his work and training as a dancer in the body of his father on the roads of his village. My teacher's way of framing it was that Hijikata had "found his own country.".... Having a rather direct personal connection to a pivotal experience of Hijikata's puts the photographs in a whole other category of experience. When viewing them I'm looking at images that on some level tap into my connection with Hijikata's epiphany, which has had an impact on my own personal and artistic life.¹³

In the conclusion to *Camera Lucida*, Barthes makes a clarion call for subjective truth as the ultimate mode of knowledge production and comprehension of reality when he states, "let us abolish the images, let us save immediate desire... Such are the two ways of the Photograph. The choice is mine: to subject its spectacle to the civilized code of perfect illusions, or to confront it in the wakening of intractable reality." (Barthes 1981: 119) In other words, if photos really are what we make of them, then, in Barthes's words, what we make, what we produce with the labor of our "loving and terrified consciousness," is "ecstasy." (Barthes 1981: 119)

Thus, without consideration of a source like *Kamaitachi* as a sacred text, from where would practitioners draw essential and ongoing inspiration for the endless redefinition and renewal of their practice? As Csordas has postulated, people's active imagination of the sacred in their lives "is defined not by the capacity to have such experiences, but by the human propensity to thematize them as radically other." (Csordas 1988: 34) In other words, our experience of the sacred is often defined by our desire for it in others. Just as diasporic Tibetan Buddhist nationals find immanence (Benjamin's "aura") in any reproduction of the Dalai Lama's photo (Harris 2004: 142), so many butoh-based practitioners find inherent inspiration in *Kamaitachi* photos in books, magazines, museum exhibits, and documentary films. In this way, we "know" Hijikata in the context of *our own* imaginary of his life within his memory space and butoh's postwar roots. For, if Hijikata did not come from his invented, post-indigenous, Tohoku imaginary, how else might we know where we come from?

¹³ Bracey, Heyward. Interview with the author, February 2010.

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Where is my bamboo shoot?
A silence question from native people in Northern Lao PDR.

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Background of an article idea :

I work for the Research Institute for Language and Culture of Asia, Mahidol University, Thailand. My duty have to research about the ethnic groups in Thailand and bordering countries also, so these works make me get a journey on the areas of local people, especially in rural areas both Thailand and Lao PDR.

Then, I had discussed with the native people in northern of Lao PDR in the middle of 2010. He is the Tai Dam (Black Tai ethnicity) in Luangnamtha province. One of the speaking sentence, make me get a question also. He did not ask me with a direct question, but asked himself to the answer for food security. This is the question on 2010!

Tree groups of Lao people in Lao PDR :

Lao PDR official separate the Lao population to be 3 groups. This is divided by the area level as a criterion in isolation.

1. Lao Loum or the Lao people who living in lowland. In general, the Lao Loum are speaking in Tai-Kadai family. They have lifestyle to stay in flat areas or lowland valleys. The Lao Loum comprising the ethnic groups such as: Lao, Phuan, Phuthai, Lue, Tai Dam (black Tai), Tai Daeng (Red Tai), Yuan etc.
2. Lao Theung or Midland Lao, are of Austroasiatic language family. There are many groups of ethnic : Kamu (alternate spelling - Khmu, Khamu, Kammu), Lamet, Katu, Lawa, Lawue, Makong, So, Bru, Mlabri etc
3. Lao Sung or upland Lao. This groups are Miao-Yao or Tibeto-Burman speaking. They grow rice and corn by swidden fields technic. In this group, people are

Culture of food consumption in Lao :

Culture of food consumption in 3 groups of Laos, they consume rice as a staple food and had condiment-things to eat with rice. However, there are variable in detail. They call a different food because individual groups have their own language. How to cook it varies with the raw materials are derived from nature.

Used as food ingredients derived from nature :

1. Type of plant :-

- Local vegetables- There are many kinds of tree or plant that local people used as food. These trees occur naturally.
- Mushrooms- The occur naturally in the wild mushrooms that litter decomposed And deposition and moderate humidity.

- Wild Fruits- In the natural forest. Many tree species that yield Villagers used to make food.
- Bamboo shoots- Bamboo is a plant that generally occur in the Lao PDR..Villagers like to bring ‘bamboo shoot’ from bamboo forest for cooking.

2. Type of animal :-

- Fishes- Many kinds of fish living in the ‘Huai’- a natural small river, River, or lowland rice field in the rain season.
- Frog and ‘Khat’- a small frogs These animals are living in the lowland rice field or the river bank.
- Ueng- a kind of frog which living in the forest with sufficient moisture. Often seen in the early rainy season.
- Ants- Mod Daeng (Red Ant) or Mod Som (Sour Ant) is a kind of ant. It yields a large egg. This type of ant eggs, Laotian (especially the Lao Loum) like to consume.
- Insects- Insects have many kinds of consumption in Laos. Almost all natural insect. Including honey, a product from bees.
- Birds- Various bird species. Laotian consume as food.
- Wild animals – Refers to any animals which living in the natural forest.
- Snakes- Snakes can also be used as food.

People had knowledge of plants that can be used as food. Most plants occur naturally in the local and the seasonal. Livelihood of the villagers, they need to rely on food from the forest. For cooking, for life.

To finding the food from the natural forest is the “Way of Life”. Father or mother goes to search something which can be food. In case the child is old enough to travel with them- the parent, they will take their child to join this event. This is a kind of teaching by doing. Therefore, Villagers are aware that what kind of edible mushroom, what kind of inedible. In addition, their child will get the method or process of catch an animals or insects.

What happened to Laos People and Laos PDR during the past 10 years :

- Changing the natural forest to rubber plantation forests and cultivation of energy crops.
- Making the streets of economy. On the other hand, the forest area are decreased by making streets project also.
- There are foreigners immigrant to stay in Lao PDR more.

- It seems that many foreign immigrants in the Lao PDR. more.(I have no figures to confirm how many person, but from observation and inquiries from native people, with the fact that such)
- A concession area for agriculture agreements or contract farming.
- Global climate change causes a drought.

Look for the future :

What are the following just the basic assumptions of the past. To look for the future. Similary to the future monitor. This predictions may contain errors also.

1. The way of life by finding a collection of forest consumed can not do that anymore since the natural forest has been transformed into rubber plantations.
2. The expansion of population both increasing by local resident themselves and by foreign immigrants. The resources are used a lot. Food resources are not sufficient.
3. Raw materials for food which produced in Lao PDR are exported to overseas markets. So the Lao Land was just only 'place for produce'.
4. New generation Lao can not spend their lifestyle as the old way. Local Lao people have to work for factories or contract farm. The positions of them are workers or labors.
5. The economic gaps between the local Lao people and foreigners who come to live in Laos will be increase.

These are only opinion which thought of as coming from a former base. These things, you think are the problem or not. But from my informant speaking with me, he said "next 10 years, I'm not sure my children can find out the natural bamboo shoot for eat freely or not" This is a silence question from native people.

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Welfare Effects of Access to Water Service in Cambodia*

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Abstract

From data collected by questionnaire survey of three communes in the Kandal province of Cambodia, where public water supply remains inaccessible, this study estimates the demand function for drinking water and finds that the price elasticity is between -0.26 and -0.29. Based on this, and given the price set by the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority, expansion of service would increase per capita water consumption by 9.8 liters per day, increase consumer surplus by 4.6 percent of total expenditure and decrease the number of households surviving on less than 30 liters of water per day by 5.3 percent. A simulation is used to calculate the water price such that the benefit of water connection exceeds the cost.

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Welfare Effects of Access to Water Service in Cambodia

Theara Horn, Osaka University

1- Introduction

Several previous studies find a positive effect of piped water access on welfare metrics such as childhood mortality in India (Guillot and Gupta, 2004) and Egypt (Abou-Ali, 2003), and Gini coefficient and poverty head-count ratio in Cambodia (Basani, Isham and Reilly, 2004). In Cambodia, the proportion of the population served with improved water has expanded in recent years but remains low. In 2008, only 55% of the urban population and 5% of the rural population had access to piped water (WHO/UNICEF, 2010). The households that cannot obtain piped water must make do with surface water, wells, rain water, and the like. Piped water service is supplied by both public and private providers. Small private water supply networks serve some areas where public piped water is not available. Surface water is a main water source for small private networks. These private suppliers do not always comply with physical, chemical and biological standards for treating water before distribution (Baker, 2009). They supply water by truck, rickshaw or small-scale supplying infrastructure. Nevertheless, the water tariff of private suppliers is usually several times higher than public water utilities (Garn et al., 2002). This can be a burden for people living in inaccessible areas, who are typically poorer than those living in accessible areas.

Because of the political instability in the past decades, there are so far only a few development case studies that focus on Cambodia. Among them, Garn et al (2002) conducted a survey of the performance of public and private water utilities, in seven towns and one district in 2002. They found that private utilities provided better service quality than did public utilities, but that private utilities also set higher prices. Basani, Isham and Reilly (2008) use the data collected by Garn et al (2002) to study factors that influence access to water and estimated price and expenditure elasticities of the demand for water consumption. They find that high connection fee is an obstacle for poor people to get access to clean water and that the elasticity of water demand ranges between -0.5 and -0.4. Furthermore, they calculate that, if direct connection were to become available for all households in their sample, the Gini coefficient would decrease by three percent and the poverty head-count ratio would improve by six percent.

This paper estimates the welfare gain using similar methods as in Basani, Isham and Reilly (2004). However, there are three differences. First, this paper estimates the welfare effect of access to pipe water based on consumer surplus gains, increase of water volume consumption and improvements for people living on less than 30 liters per day. In contrast, Basani, Isham and Reilly (2004) focused on changes in Gini coefficient and alleviation of poverty. Second, I also analyze the cost and benefit of the project, based on estimates of consumer surplus, and find a range in which PPWSA can increase its water price and still achieve improved overall welfare. Third, the questionnaire is done in the area around Phnom Penh city which is different from the locations targeted by previous studies.

2- Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority (PPWSA)

Recently, with assistance from the international community and good management, PPWSA has developed its capacity for supplying water services. There have been remarkable improvements in water supply coverage, continuity of service, and revenue collection with acknowledged good management.¹ In 1993, there were 26,881 water connections (a mere 20% coverage), supply duration was 10 hours a day and operation costs were heavily dependent on government subsidies. In 2008, there were 178,150 connections (85% coverage), supply duration was 24 hours a day and operating costs were covered by tariff revenues (Chea, 2009).

PPWSA has undertaken to revise its tariffs in three steps. The first step in June 1997 replaced the previous flat rate with a rate schedule, and the second step in January 2001 raised the rates in each block (See Table 1). The tariff schedule is one in which customers who use more water pay a higher rate. This is one element of the government's Poverty Reduction Policy. In general the industrial customers and higher income households that use more water pay more than do others. And those who use little water, which tend to be low-income households, pay less. The tariff rate in the two lowest blocks is actually below the average cost of supplying water which is 900Riels/m³. The aim has been for PPWSA to extend its service coverage without overlooking the poor and still maintain financial viability. In addition to the graduated tariff schedule, low-income households have also been given discounts on connection fees and on monthly-installment payments. As of 2008, these discounts have been proffered to more than 17,000 new customers. Water supply capacity in provinces surrounding Phnom Penh is still limited, but there is a new project underway to expand PPWSA service to these areas (Chea, 2006). My goal is to predict the economic benefit of this project based on data gleaned from a questionnaire distributed in three communes targeted for extension of water service.

3- The survey

The targets of the survey are three communes in Kandal province, Cambodia: Baekchan, Bakkhaeng, and Praekkompus. The three communes are all in the expansion area but differ in ways relevant to the demand for water services.

The survey was done by face-to-face interviews in the native language (Khmer) in August 2009. The questionnaire consists of three main groups of questions. The first group of questions pertain to the respondents' socio-economic data such as age, number of family members, occupation etc. The second group of questions is about current water usage such as water source and monthly volume of water consumption². The third group of questions is about the

¹ Some awards have been given for the good management and performance of PPWSA, such as ADB Water Prize 2004, Ramon Magsaysay Award 2006, French Medal 2010 (Légion d'Honneur) and the Stockholm Industry Water Award 2010. The reasons of success and some developments of PPWSA can be found in Araral (2008) and Das et al. (2010).

² For some households which buy water from private vendor through rickshaw or truck delivery, we ask number of barrels they buy monthly and calculate with total volume of water purchase by multiplying with storage volume of barrel.

household's monthly expenditures¹ and on what assets the household such as motorbike, television, electric fan, cow etc. In all, 180 households (90% of the planned sample size of 200 households) agreed to be interviewed. The detailed results of the first group of survey questions for each of the three communes are summarized in Table 2.

4- Methodology and Descriptive Statistics

4-1-Demand Function and Elasticity of Substitution

A demand function is estimated to calculate the price and expenditure elasticity of substitution². The water demand function is $Q = Q(\text{expenditure}, \text{waterprice}, Z)$, where Q is volume of water consumption per capita, *expenditure* is monthly expenditure per capita, *waterprice* is the flat-rate price of water paid by a household to buy 1m³ of water volume from a private vendor, and Z is a vector of household characteristics used as control variables. The demand function in log-linear form can be written as:

$$\ln Q_i = \alpha + \beta \ln(\text{expenditure})_i - \gamma \ln(\text{waterprice})_i + \beta_i Z_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where β is expenditure elasticity of substitution, γ is water price elasticity of substitution and ε_i is error term.

4-2-Consumer surplus based on price change

In this paper, the price paid by not-yet-connected households is collected through interview and it is higher than the water price of PPWSA. The Consumer surplus is calculated following the same method as Strand and Walker (2003).

First, the non-stochastic part of equation (1) can be rewritten as

$$\ln Q_i = \alpha + \beta \ln(\text{expenditure})_i - \gamma \ln(\text{waterprice})_i + \beta_i Z_i$$

Rewriting it in this form,

$$\ln Q_i = A(i) - \gamma \ln P_i \quad (2)$$

where $P_i = \text{waterprice}_i$; $A(i) = \alpha + \beta \ln(\text{expenditure})_i + \beta_i Z_i$

$A(i)$ is assumed to be independent among household.

The consumer surplus is obtained as in equation (3), (the calculation is available in Appendix).

$$CS = \frac{P_i Q_i}{1 - \gamma} \left[1 - \left(\frac{P_0}{P_i} \right)^{1 - \gamma} \right] \quad (3)$$

4-3-Cost and Benefit

¹ The household's income is also asked after expenditure, but as most of them are likely understated the amount below the expenditure, the expenditure and asset are used instead of income in this study.

² The expenditure is used instead of income because respondent is likely to understate their income. In the questionnaire, the question on the expenditure is asked before that of income. Surprisingly, households give a lower income than expenditure. Therefore, expenditure data, asset of family and other controlled variables are used. Similar method is also used in Basani et al (2004, 2008)

From equation (3), the total benefit of the project is calculated using average consumer surplus, discount rate and life-span of transmission mains. Suppose that ρ is the discount rate which is equal to long-term interest rate, $0 < \rho < 1$, and t is life-span of water supply main, commonly 50 years.

The present value of connection benefit to each household (PVB) is

$$PVB = \sum_{t=0}^T \frac{CS}{(1+\rho)^t} = \frac{CS \left[1 - \left(\frac{1}{1+\rho} \right)^{T+1} \right]}{1 - \frac{1}{1+\rho}} \cong \frac{CS}{1 - \frac{1}{1+\rho}} = CS \frac{1+\rho}{\rho} \quad (4)$$

The project should be implemented if the cost of connection is less than total present value of project. The current connection fee of PPWSA is around 400,000 Riels (approximate 100USD).

4-4-Descriptive Statistics

The sample size is 180, which is 90% of our target number 200, as some households refused to be interviewed. After removing outliers and incomplete responses from the sample, the sample size is 147. Some households use their own water sources such as wells, for which there is no data on water price and these observations are excluded from the estimation. So, in this study, the data used for estimating the price elasticity in equation (1) is that of the households who buy water from private vendors.

Watervolume is monthly volume consumed per capita. It is the total amount of water consumption by the household divided by the number of household members. *Waterprice* is the amount of money spent to buy 1m^3 of water volume from a private seller. The price differs among the three communes depending on the characteristics of the water source, location or water delivery methods. *Expenditure* is total expense per capita, defined as the ratio of household's monthly expenditure to the number of household member. In this paper, *Expenditure* is used instead of income as most of respondents tend to understate their income relative to their expenses. During the interview, the expenditure is asked before the income. In the estimation, household assets are also used as control variables. These include televisions, electric fans, and the like which may represent the household's wealth (similar method as Basani, Isham and Reilly, 2008). The summary statistics for the variables are in Table3.

5- Estimation Results

The price and expenditure elasticity of water consumption are estimated with two models. In the first model, the only independent variables are water price and total expenditure. In the second model, in addition to price and expenditure, other control variables such as household assets and characteristics are also included. Concerning the multi-collinearity problem, the mean vif value is estimated for both models. For both models, the mean vif value is not more than 1.3, indicating that multi-collinearity is not a problem (See Table4). The Breuch-Pagan test of heteroskedasticity is also conducted and the results validate the assumption of constant

variance for both models. The result of OLS regression demonstrates that price elasticity is between -0.29 and -0.26 and expenditure elasticity is between 0.59 and 0.65 (See Table 4).

My results may be compared with the estimates of Basani, Isham and Reilly (2008) for seven towns and one district. They found that price elasticity was between -0.5 and -0.4 and the expenditure elasticity was around 0.2. My results show that for the households living in the three communes, the price elasticity of demand for piped water is relatively low, possibly reflecting the higher living standard of households in the three communes compared to those in the provincial areas used in the study of Basani, Isham and Reilly (2008).

From the result of both estimation models, the average price elasticity estimated in this paper is -0.275. From this, let us predict the improvement of water consumption conditions and increase in consumer surplus which can be gained if the water is supplied at the current price of PPWSA. With the relatively lower price of PPWSA, the water consumer can save some money and improve water consumption (Table 5). From the result, approximately 4.6% of total expense can be saved from the cheaper water price. Moreover, according to the guidelines of WHO (2005), to meet health standards, the minimum level of water volume needed for each person for drinking, cooking and personal washing is 30 liters per day. Of the 76 households in the sample who bought water from private providers, 23.7% of them live on water less than the standard level. This can reflect the low living standard, high water price or difficulty of access to water. Using the estimated price elasticity, if the water is supplied at the current water price of PPWSA, the percentage of households living under this standard would decrease from 23.7% to 18.4%. Similarly, average water volume per capita would increase from 70.1 liters per day to 79.9 liters per day, a 13.9% increase in water consumption compared with current water consumption bought from private vendors. The percentage improvement can actually be higher than the above results if we take into account improvements in the convenience of water access and improvement in quality in addition to price effects.

Consumer surplus is calculated using equation (3) with average estimated price elasticity in the two models equal to -0.275 and P_0 equal to the current water price of PPWSA. The result shows that the consumer surplus can increase by 4.6% of household total expenditures with current water price of PPWSA.

The present value of connection benefit is calculated using equation (4) with the average consumer surplus discount rate equal to interest rate. The interest rate in Cambodia is fairly high on average, 7.65% per annum in 2008 (ADB 2009) and it slightly fluctuates yearly. As the interest rate is not exactly determined, in the simulation, discount rate evolves from 5% to 20% to calculate the total benefit of connection. Figure 2 presents value of benefit that each household may gain from connection. For example, if the interest rate is 7%, the total present value of benefit from PPWSA service connection with current price is about 3.4 million Riels (approximately 870 USD). Comparing to connection cost of 400,000 Riels (approximately 100USD) for a water meter and 10-meter-long pipe, the total household benefit is several times higher than the cost. That can be even higher if considering the improvement in health when using the well-treated water.

According to population census done by National Institute of Statistics of Cambodia in 2008, population density in Kandal province (i.e. targeted location) is 12.8 times lower than that of Phnom Penh city. As densely populated area may serve with a cheaper water price as cost on network infrastructure can be lower (Estache and Rossi, 2002), we can consider possible price disparity between Phnom Penh city and survey area that may be implemented to cover the cost of infrastructure. Figure 2 presents some results of present value of consumer surplus for various assumed water prices. The simulation is done with some alternative prices: current block-rate PPWSA price, 1.5 times current block-rate PPWSA price, 2 times current block-rate PPWSA price, 2.5 times current block-rate PPWSA price. As the interest rate is fairly high in Cambodia, the discount rate is set to evolve from 5% to 20%.

From the result, we find that, the benefit gain is much higher than the connection cost. With the simulation, the consumer surplus curve shifts down toward the connection cost, just equaling it when the price is approximately 2.5 times current PPWSA. This is one indication of the net social benefit that the current water price bestows on each household. The result can intuitively mean that there is a social benefit if more households were to connect to PPWSA rather than using their own wells. So, the expansion of water supply to surrounding area of Phnom Penh by PPWSA is important to economic development.

6- Conclusion

The paper investigated the benefit of future water service expansion using survey data of water usage in three communes in the area surrounding Phnom Penh city, Cambodia. From the estimation, this study finds that the expansion would increase dwellers' well-being. If Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority were to supply water in those areas at its current block-rate price, it would improve the water consumption and consumer surplus. From this study sample, the expansion of water by PPWSA would decrease the population living below standard water consumption level of 30 liters per day by 5.3 percent, increase average per-capita water consumption by 9.8 liters per day, and increase the purchasing power of household's total expenditures through consumer surplus gain of 4.6 percent.

Further, from the result of simulation of water prices, average benefit to each household of the current PPWSA price is higher than the water connection fee. The benefit becomes similar to connection fee when the price becomes 2.5 times higher than the current price. So, the current PPWSA water price would imply high average benefit per household. Therefore, households would tend to make water connection when there is service expansion to their area at the current price. Further research on willingness-to-pay for water tariff and connection fee at targeted location may be helpful for setting future policy on water price, to make the service accessible until the poorest households.

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Appendix: Consumer Surplus

The calculation follows the same method as Strand and Walker (2003). However, this paper assumes price of PPWSA is lower than current price of private suppliers, (i.e. $P_0 < P_i$).

We have, $\ln Q_i = \alpha + \beta \ln(\text{expenditure})_i - \gamma \ln(\text{waterprice})_i + \beta_i Z_i$ (1)

Rewriting it in this form, $\ln Q_i = A(i) - \gamma \ln P_i$ (2)

where $P_i = \text{waterprice}_i$; $A(i) = \alpha + \beta \ln(\text{expenditure})_i + \beta_i Z_i$

$A(i)$ is assumed to be independent among household.

From (2), we obtain $Q_i = e^{A(i)P_i^{-\gamma}}$ or $P_i^\gamma = e^{A(i)}/Q_i = e^{A(i)}Q_i^{-1}$ (3)


$P_i = e^{\frac{A(i)}{\gamma}} Q_i^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} = a(i) Q_i^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}$ where $a(i) = e^{\frac{A(i)}{\gamma}} = P_i Q_i^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}$ (4)

Because $A(i)$ is assumed to be independent among households, $e^{A(i)}$ and $a(i)$ are also independent. From Figure 1, the consumer surplus (CS) can be calculated by

$CS = \int_{Q_i}^{Q_0} P_i dQ + P_i Q_i - P_0 Q_0$ (5)

where P_i denotes current water price paid to a private vendor and Q_i is volume of current water consumption. P_0 is water price determined by PPWSA, which is expected to be lower than the private vendor's price P_i . And Q_0 is water consumption when price is equal to P_0

Figure1: Consumer Surplus



Replacing P_i of equation (4) into (5), we obtain,

$$\begin{aligned}
 CS &= \int_{Q_i}^{Q_0} a(i) Q_i^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}} dQ + P_i Q_i - P_0 Q_0 \\
 &= a(i) \left[\frac{Q_i^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}+1}}{-\frac{1}{\gamma}+1} \right]_{Q_i}^{Q_0} + P_i Q_i - P_0 Q_0 \\
 &= a(i) \frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1} \left(Q_0^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} - Q_i^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} \right) + P_i Q_i - P_0 Q_0 \\
 &= a(i) \left(Q_0^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} - Q_i^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} \right) + a(i) \frac{1}{\gamma-1} \left(Q_0^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} - Q_i^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} \right) + P_i Q_i - P_0 Q_0 \quad (6)
 \end{aligned}$$

From (4) $P_i = a(i) Q_i^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}$, then $P_i Q_i = a(i) Q_i^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}$

Similarly, when price equals P_0 , $P_0 Q_0 = a(i) Q_0^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}$.

$$\text{Substitute these into (6), we obtain } CS = \frac{a(i)}{\gamma-1} \left(Q_0^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} - Q_i^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} \right) \quad (7)$$

From (4), $a(i) = P_i Q_i^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}$. Substituting this into (7), we get

$$\begin{aligned}
 CS &= \frac{P_i Q_i^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{\gamma-1} \left(Q_0^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} - Q_i^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} \right) = \frac{P_i}{\gamma-1} \left(Q_i^{\frac{1}{\gamma}} Q_0^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}} - Q_i \right) \\
 &= \frac{P_i Q_i}{\gamma-1} \left(\frac{Q_0^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}}{Q_i} - 1 \right) = \frac{P_i Q_i}{1-\gamma} \left(1 - \frac{Q_0^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}}{Q_i} \right) \quad (8)
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{From (3) } P_i^\gamma = e^{A(i)} Q_i^{-1}, \quad e^{A(i)} = \frac{P_i^\gamma}{Q_i^{-1}}$$

As $e^{A(i)}$ is independent from household, we have $e^{A(i)} = e^{A(0)}$.

$$\text{Then, } \frac{P_i^\gamma}{Q_i^{-1}} = \frac{P_0^\gamma}{Q_0^{-1}} \quad \text{or} \quad \frac{Q_0}{Q_i} = \left(\frac{P_0}{P_i} \right)^{-\gamma} \quad (9)$$

Replace (9) into (8), the consumer surplus of household is:

$$CS = \frac{P_i Q_i}{1-\gamma} \left[1 - \left(\frac{P_0}{P_i} \right)^{1-\gamma} \right]$$

Table1: Water tariff of PPWSA

Category	Before June 1997	June 1997		January 2001-Present	
		Block (m ³ /month)	Tariff (Riels/ m ³)	Block (m ³ /month)	Tariff (Riels/ m ³)
Domestic	250 Riels/m ³	≤ 15	300	≤ 7	550
		16-30	620	8-15	770
		31-100	940	16-50	1010
		> 100	1260	> 50	1270
Administrative		Flat rate	940	Flat rate	1030
Commercials	700 Riels/m ³	≤ 100	940	0-100	950
Industrials		101-200	1260	101-200	1150
		201-500	1580	201-500	1350
		> 500	1900	> 500	1450

Source: Ek Sonn Chan (2007)

Table2: Some characteristics of access to water of three communes.

	Baek Chan	Bakkhaeng	Praek Kompus	Total
Percentage of water expense to total expenditure (%)	6.2%	3.2%	6.6%	5.7%
Average monthly water volume per household (m ³ /month)	10.84	11.48	17.88	14.65
Current water price (Riel/m ³)	2915	1796	4500	2770
Buy water from private operator	46	22	13	81
Observation Number	54	37	89	180
Main water source	Pond	River	Well	

Table3: Data Statistics

Variables	Definition	Mean	Std.Dev	Min	Max
Watervolume	Monthly water consumption per capita (m ³)	2.10	1.83	0.16	10
Waterprice	Water tariff paid for 1 of water(Riel/m ³)	2771	1374	380	6250
Expenditure	Monthly total expenditure per capita (10 thousand Riels)	10.7	5.81	0.93	31
TV	Number of television that households owns	1.10	0.57	0	3
Motorbike	Number of motorbike that households owns	1.05	0.81	0	4
Telephone	Number of telephone that households owns	1.68	1.26	0	6
d_toilet	1 if water is used for toilet 0, otherwise	0.64	0.48	0	1
d_commercial	1 if household owns business for which water is used as intermediate good. 0, otherwise.	0.25	0.43	0	1

Table 4: Estimation of Water Demand Function


Dependent Variable: ln(water volume)	Model1	Model2
ln(waterprice)	-0.29** (0.145)	-0.26* (0.155)
ln(expenditure)	0.59*** (0.147)	0.65*** (0.145)
TV		0.20 (0.166)
Motorbike		-0.13 (0.128)
Telephone		0.10* (0.086)
d_commercial		0.48** (0.200)
d_toilet		-0.09 (0.188)
Constant	-4.10** (2.076)	-5.29** (2.144)
Mean vif	1	1.3
Observation	76	76
Adjusted R ²	0.20	0.29

Note: In parentheses is standard errors. (***), (**), (*) present p-value at significance level of 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.

Table 5: The benefit to be gained from PPWSA price comparing with private vendor's

	Flat water price rate of private vendor	Current block rate price of PPWSA
. Percentage of household consuming less than 30 liters per day (%)	23.7	18.4
. Mean water volume per capita (liters/day)	70.1	79.9
. Percentage of increased water consumption volume (%)	-	13.9
. Ratio of consumer surplus gain to total expense (%)	-	4.6

Figure2: Simulation of water price and consumer surplus gain



Regional Security Complex in the Persian Gulf in the post-Saddam Era: Case of anti-Americanism

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Regional Security Complex in the Persian Gulf in the post-Saddam Era: Case of anti-Americanism¹

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Abstract:

The Persian Gulf is one of the main regions in the world due to its geopolitical and strategic features. After the 2003 Iraqi invasion, the security dynamics in this region range from the political, economic, environmental and military to the societal ones. Among numerous security dynamics, I have adopted the case of anti-Americanism. Of specific prominence in this article is that the anti-Americanist sentiments are examined through the sectors of security and securitization as proposed within the Copenhagen School and the Self/Other concept. This article argues that there are several causes of anti-Americanist sentiments ranging from religious and cultural differences to the US inappropriate foreign policy. In this article, the US inappropriate foreign policy is accounted for a relative accommodation in the Persian Gulf region in the post-Saddam era with makes use of process tracing method.

Key words,

The Persian Gulf, anti-Americanism, the Copenhagen School, process tracing method

1. Introduction:

The security dynamics after the 2003 Iraqi invasion emerges as more complex than ever before in the Persian Gulf region owing to the security issues being not just limited to military and political security dynamics. Since the post-Saddam era, the most important security dynamics concern the societal dynamics such as unemployment and migration. In this sense, the 2003 Iraqi invasion has highlighted these security problems more forcefully. The experience of the Iraqi public in 2003 has made the Gulf Cooperation Council publics, the states and the region as a whole incline to a more anti-Americanist outlook in a way not seen before 2003. To this end, the main question is what are the major causal roots of anti-Americanist perspectives in the Persian Gulf in the post-Saddam era?²

By studying existing literature about anti-US attitudes in the Persian Gulf³ and the wider Middle East, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and Donald B. Smith in 1985 published the first collection of writing on *Anti-Americanism in the Third World* in the US. This study examines cases from the Middle East and North Africa, and not receiving a systematic study on anti-Americanism is questionable

¹ This article is based on one of the section of my PhD thesis which is in progress.

² The claim in this article is not that there have not been signs of anti-Americanists perspectives in the region before 2003. Anti-Americanist perspectives have a long history in the Persian Gulf region since the beginning of the US arrival in the region. In a broader perspective, Anti-Americanist attitudes have a long history in the Middle East as well.

³ See for example, Reuven Paz, **Islamists and anti-Americanism**, Middle East studies of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2003, pp. 43-55, John-Franklin Leopard, "Arab Muslim anti-Americanism", Master thesis, Faculty of Army Command and General Staff coll forth leavenworth, www.stormingmedia.US/02/02737A027384.html, accessed 2.15.2007, Abdel Mahdi Abdallah, "Causes of Anti-Americanism in the Arab world: A sociopolitical perspective", **Middle East Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2003, pp. 1-20, and Barry Rubin, "The real root of Arab anti-Americanism", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 81, No. 6, 2002, pp. 73-75.

for the authors.⁴ In 2002, Barry Rubin⁵ portrayed the real roots of Arab anti-Americanism while his research explored how US inappropriate foreign policy had coincided with the internal security problems in the Arab world in the Middle East. Consequently, anti-Americanist sentiments are paths by the ruling elites to distract the minds of people. Turning to the post Iraqi invasion, Wesley argues that the US unilateral policy has led to overreach, but arrogantly ignores the rest of the world where a series of reactions ranging from terrorism to anti-Americanism have emerged. Although the rise in anti-Americanism is significant since the Iraqi invasion, it is hard to find indications that US power has been degraded.⁶ Overall, Wesley has a sophisticated idea of anti-Americanism in the world. However, his idea is narrow and does not enter the phenomenon in the Persian Gulf region and even then he focuses mainly on the state-level viewpoint.

This is not sufficient for the purpose of the causal roots of anti-Americanist sentiments in the post-Saddam era, where societal security problems and uncertainty in everyday life play a major role too. A somewhat similar problem prevails in Baxter and Akbarzadeh's *US Foreign Policy in the Middle East* which otherwise offers us a broad perspective of US foreign policies in the wider Middle East and how they have led to anti-Americanism. While Wesley focuses on anti-Americanism in the world, Baxter and Akbarzadeh concentrate on the Middle East. However, none of these studies have completely managed to cover the causal roots of anti-US views in the Persian Gulf in the post-Saddam era. Therefore, I move beyond existing studies and with a new effort in this paper to conceptualize the causal roots of that phenomenon within the Copenhagen School (CS) theory, securitization theory, and the Self/Other concept as proposed in collective identity theory. I also attempt to configure the opinion polls about anti-Americanist views by accentuating subjectivity, the everyday life theory. I not only trace deeply the main causes of the anti-Americanist perspectives and opinion polls in the region but also shed crucial light on security and identity. I suggest that on one hand the US is seen as a securitized threat in the region by the ruling elites and on the other hand, within the realms of ontological security and collective identity, I explicate on a state's sense of Self⁷ to include a threat of the Other in the shape of the US. My further suggestion is that the inappropriate US foreign policies are the main causes of the rise in anti-US attitudes in the region. However, I do not confine myself to the one cause of anti-US views as Baxter and Akbarzadeh did.

In this paper, I utilize the process tracing method, to study the detailed causal roots of this phenomenon in the Persian Gulf. The dependent variable is the rise in anti-Americanist viewpoints and the independent variables are religion, anti-globalization viewpoints and the inappropriate US policies in the Persian Gulf. Based on the causal plan (Figure 3.1), the chains of causes are connected to one another, however, I focus only on the US inappropriate foreign policy in the region in this article and discuss the additional causal roots elsewhere. Proceeding from the US inappropriate foreign policy, in the first section, I address very briefly the adopted theory and methodology in this article. In the second section, I analyze how the Iraqi invasion has led widely to anti-US perspectives since 2003. In the third section, I analyze the development of the US military bases in the region. These analyses also allow me, in the last section, to determine how the 2003 Iraqi invasion and the development of the US military bases in the post-Saddam era have been inclined to rejection of the US democracy in the region more forcefully.

⁴ Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Donald B. Smith, **Anti-Americanism in the Third World**, New York: Praeger, p. xi.

⁵ Barry Rubin, "The real roots of Arab anti-Americanism", **Foreign Affairs**, Vol. 86, No. 6, pp. 73-85.

⁶ Michael Wesley, "The consequences of anti-Americanism: Does it matter?", in Brendon O'Connor, **Anti-Americanism: in the 21st century**, Oxford: Greenwood press, 2007, p. 221.

⁷ Brent J. Steel, **Ontological security in International Relations**, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, p 30.

2. Theoretical and methodological trends

The theory that I have adopted, includes the Copenhagen School⁸, with its regional security complex theory (RSCT) and securitization, as a grand theory. Further, the middle range theory is the societal sector of security. In '*security*', Buzan and Wæver⁹ opened up the option of further referent object in societal security. The last concept that I utilize is collective identity and application of the Self/Other concept. Further, process tracing as a method for analyzing the data is helpful. Process tracing method recognizes the causal chain and causal mechanism. Among the different options for process tracing, I have chosen Checkel's approach¹⁰ since I can apply the causal mechanism for investigating the causes of security problems in Saudi Arabia. The data is mainly from primary documents by the help of other secondary sources.

3. Anti-Americanist sentiments and the Persian Gulf¹¹:

There are numerous causes of anti-US attitudes in the Persian Gulf ranging from reaction to US policies, hostility to the US secularity or religious belief system, and toppling the pro-US governments in the region. However, I exclude further causes and seek for the manifestation of three main causes on the basis of Figure 3.1 with the help of the process tracing method. To keep shortening in this article, as such raised, I focus the third chain of causes which is the main causes of anti-Americanism in the Persian Gulf since 2003.


The logo for the International Association for Asian Studies (iafor) is centered on the page. It consists of the lowercase letters 'iafor' in a light blue, sans-serif font. The text is surrounded by several overlapping, semi-transparent circular arcs in shades of blue and red, creating a stylized, circular emblem.

⁸ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, **Regions and Powers, the structure of International security**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 40-65.

⁹ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, **Security**, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 34-37.

¹⁰ Jeffrey T Checkel, "Tracing causal mechanisms", **International Studies Review**, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2006. p. 363.

Figure 3.1: Causal plan of the roots of anti-Americanist sentiments in the Persian Gulf



Causal plan was proposed by this author

4. The US foreign policy on the region¹²:

The Iraqi invasion:

The third chain of the causes of the rise in anti-Americanist attitudes (Figure 3.1) is associated with inappropriate US foreign policies in the region from the point of view of the public and the elites in the region. US foreign policies give high grades for their *effects* on anti-Americanist sentiment in the post-Saddam era. This causal chain is highly critical of US policies, which have recently led to anti-Americanism. As for this cause, I turn to the military and political sectors of security by analyzing US policies on the region. The referent object of this causal chain is the regional states and specifically Iraqi people. The strong US military presence in the Persian Gulf and the 2003 Iraqi invasion constitute the two most crucial factors, which I trace as the sub-chain of the causes of US policies in the Persian Gulf. Many scholars argue that the enmity to the US in the GCC states has increased since the Iraqi invasion¹³ and that the GCC states and other states in the region as audiences and securitizationists observe the experience of Iraqi people, whose identity has been threatened since 2003. The US invasion of Iraq has led to a less regional peace and less friendly relationship with the US. Regarding the Arab infuriation, El Shinnawi states that opinion polls in the Arab Peninsula reveal more enmity to the US policies on the region rather than to US values.

Further, by the 2003 Iraqi invasion, Iraqi citizens had not experienced much security or stability and considering ontological security has been threatened by the US. Eight in ten people in the region considered that the Iraqi situation is worse today than it was before 2003¹⁴. On that basis the US inappropriate foreign policies on the region imply that the US identity has been tainted. While the US plans to secure Iraq, President Bush advocates "we wish to secure love instead of hatred in Iraq, coexistence and cooperation instead of cursing each other",¹⁵ however, Mohammed Al Douri – an Iraqi founding member of United Nations¹⁶ – states:

Iraq was being subjected to aggression, which was killing women, children and the elderly. Sanctions, which have lasted for almost 13 years, were also having a terrible effect on the country. The goal of changing the regime in his country, which had been proclaimed by the United States, constituted a blatant violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The humanitarian effect of the war was devastating.

This leads to the point that the US has lost the heart and mind of Arab people because of the war in Iraq. Numerous Arab people in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia reacted against the war in Iraq and anti-US feeling spread in the region¹⁷. The Parliamentary Union of Organization

¹² In line with scale of time, methodologically, I have assessed the time from the strong military presence of the US in the region after the Kuwait invasion by Iraq to the present time.

¹³ John-Franklin Leopard, *Arab Muslim anti-Americanism*, Master thesis, Faculty of army command and general staff coll forth Leavenworth, 14 December 2007, O'Connor, *op.cit*, p. 296.

¹⁴ Mohammed Al Shinawi, "Survey shows majority of Arabs hold negative views of the United States", <http://www.zogby.com/soundbites/ReadClips.cfm?ID=17473>, accessed 28.12.2010.

¹⁵ "The President Bush's news conference with Ibrahim Al-Jafari of Iraq", 24 June 2005, <http://frwebgate6.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=209031108708+22+2+0&WAIAction=retrieve>.

¹⁶ Mohammed Al Douri, 'Statement by Iraqi founding member of the UN, in the UN Security Council, New York, 26 March 2003.

¹⁷ "US and UK lose hearts and minds in Arab world", *Arab News*, 8 April 2003.


of Islamic countries advocate that it is the duty of regional states to help the new Iraqi government in the following way¹⁸:

[We] invite all member states to support efforts of the Iraqi government to restore security and stability to all parts of Iraq, realize national reconciliation, recovery by Iraq of its sovereignty over all its national soil. [We] Reject and condemn all interventions in the internal affairs of Iraq, considered as a blatant violation of all international instruments and norms.

[We] support the efforts of the Iraqi government to put an *end to the presence of foreign forces*, and reactivation of the UN natural role in Iraq [emphasis added].

As a result, not only the Arab documents representing that the experience of Iraqi people as voiceless referent objects since 2003 remains one causes of anti-US sentiments, but also, some western sources and scholars¹⁹ suggest that the hard experience of Iraqi people is a crucial cause for anti-Americanist attitudes. Accompanying the disappointing image of the US²⁰ with US inappropriate foreign policy on the region has been securitized by the ruling elites in the Persian Gulf. Securitization of the US identity since 2003 sheds light on the rise in anti-US attitudes in the Persian Gulf. Figure 5.1.1 illustrates the attitudes towards the US foreign policies on different regions, specifically in the Middle East including the Persian Gulf region:

Figure 4.1: the percentage of the US foreign policy attack since the Iraqi invasion



Source: <http://www.ctlibrary.com/ct/2002/april1/27.80.html>, accessed 22.5.2010.

As Figure 4.1 illustrates the US foreign policy has been attacked more in the Middle East including the Persian Gulf. Not surprisingly, public dissatisfaction with America's Middle East policy is perceived to be the highest in largely Islamic countries such as the Persian Gulf and the GCC states. One observer summarized the Saudi point of view towards the US military presence


¹⁸ The Parliamentary Union of Organization of Islamic Countries, "Cairo declaration", 30-31 January 2008, http://www.puic.org/english/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=68&Itemid=0, accessed 29.12.2010.

¹⁹ Michael M. O'brien, **American failure in Iraq**, The United States: Author House press, 2009, pp239-241., Andrea C. Nakaya, **Iraq**, USA: Greenhaven press, 2004, p 7.

²⁰ Andrew Kohut, "How the US perceived in the Arab and Muslim world", http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?analysis_ID=1001, accessed 13.5.2010.

in the region as: "We want you to be like the wind. We want to feel you, but we don't want to see you"²¹. Figure 4.1.2 illustrates the US foreign policy critics in the region:

Figure 4.2: The US image from 9/11 to the Iraqi invasion



Source: The Pew Global Projects Attitudes, <http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/145.pdf>, p. 13, accessed 28.5.2010.

Figure 4.2 shows US foreign policy has been criticized in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Consequently, based on evidence, I find that US foreign policies are the main *causes* of anti-Americanism in the region, necessarily the securitizationist perspective, rather than religious and cultural differences.

5. Invasion of a part of region (Iraq):

In attempting to establish the true nature of the connection between the 2003 Iraqi invasion and the rise in anti-Americanist feeling, it is worth considering the second sub-chain of the Iraqi invasion of 2003 (Figure 3.1) and examining various here effects. The power of this causal chain is securitization with an existential threat signifying the Iraqi nation in threat and the referent object of the Iraqi nation at stake. With the 2003 Iraqi invasion and the presence of US troops as a factor in the military sector of security in this country, the public and the regional states have become threatened by the US. Additionally, some US troops have taken up the position on the bases of the small states of the GCC states, which I discuss later in this article. US occupation of some parts of the region – that is Iraq - has securitized the US threat by the securitizationist

²¹ John B. Alterman, "The Gulf states and American umbrella", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2000, retrieved from <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue4/jv4n4a8.html>, accessed 25.12.2010.

subscribing to the Iraqi new government and other regional ruling elites. On the other hand, the US has lost many soldiers in the 2003 Iraqi war in William's analysis.²² Table 5.1 illustrates the US human costs at war in Iraq:

Table 5.1: The human costs of war in Iraq for the US

	Total Deaths	Non-Hostile	WIA* RTD**	WIA not RTD***
Combat operations from 19.3.03 to 30.4.03	139	30	116	429
Post combat operations from 1.5.03 to present	2249	883	17749	13516
The US DoD**** civilian	13	4	-	-
Total	4401	917	17865	13945

Abbreviations: *WIA= Wounded in action, **RTD = Returned to duty with 72 hours, ***Not RTD = Not returned to duty within 72 hours. **** DoD = Department of Defense
Source: <http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf>, p1, accessed 14.5.2010.

Not only the US has lost many expenses, servicemen and credibility since 2003 but also the threat echoes in the region where the price of oil has increased²³; the GCC states have consequently become richer; the US banking sector has collapsed; the Persian Gulf public as the audience and the states have become frustrated with the US policies and consequently the securitization of the US threat.

6. The US military bases in the region:

The second sub-chain of inappropriate US policies on the region is the strong US military presence in the Persian Gulf. Having concurred with *how* the US military bases *have caused* the rise of anti-US sentiments since 2003, O'Keefe²⁴ argues:

The US military predominance has been a major source of anti-Americanist sentiments and its bases overseas represent this power. US military diplomacy was the clearest symbol of its hegemony and the most obvious source of anti-US sentiments and the US bases were one of the most identifiable targets of criticism. [emphasis added]


²² Walter E. Williams, *Liberty versus the tyranny of socialism: controversial essays, Vol. 564*, California: Hoover press, 2008, pp 280-281.

²³ US Energy Information Administration, "World crude oil prices", http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_WCO_K_W.htm, accessed 29.12.2010.

²⁴ Michael O'Keefe, "US military bases and anti-Americanism", in Brendon O'Connor, *Anti-Americanism: in the 21st century*, Oxford: Greenwood Publishing, 2007, p. 114.

The development of US military bases caused anti-Americanism and the rise in enmity to the US as proposed in the CS theory. Having discussed that there is the enmity relationship between the US and the regional states, the second challenging question is identity and the US as the Other. The construction of US Otherness is present in its foreign policies on the region. The US military presence has been intensified since the Kuwaiti invasion by Iraq and the US has expanded both military bases in the GCC states, and in Iraq since 2003. While the US closed several military bases in Europe and Asia, new bases have been opened also. Figure 6.1 illustrates the US military bases by location:

Figure 6.1: The US military bases by location



Source: The US Department of Defense, "Base structure report fiscal year 2009 baseline: A summary of Department of Defense' real property inventory", <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/BSR2009Baseline.pdf>, pp. 22-25, accessed 14.5.2010

Concomitantly, numerous of those bases are in the Persian Gulf and the small states of the GCC states. The US bases in Qatar such as Al Udeid, naval bases and the Sheikh Isa air base in Bahrain, many mega and micro bases in Iraq, Almed Al Jaber, Ali Al Salem air bases, Camp Doha in Kuwait, Al Dhafra, and air bases in the Emirates are merely the most important military bases of the US in the region²⁵. However, the Saudi Arabian public resent the military presence of the US in this country. Abdullah Omar – a Saudi Arabian citizen – says that "landing the US in 'our holy lands' reveals one of the sins of royal family"²⁶. And it is the acknowledgement of signs such as the Otherness of the US. Additionally, the Otherness of the US was emphasized by the arrival of the US in Saudi Arabia, which has been opposed by the public and religious powers of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the construction of the US Other was not pursued only through a securitized issue by the regional ruling elites as securitizer and the referent object of political stability of regimes, but through rearticulating the identity as the Other. Here I find identity

²⁵ Bradley L. Bowman, "After Iraq: Future US military posture in the Middle East, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol 31, No 2, 2008, p 81., "Our global infrastructure", <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/dod101/dod101.html>, accessed 15.5.2010.

²⁶ *Idem*.

literature where the relational definition of identity is based on the exclusion of the Other. On these grounds, the threat echoes in the region with demands for the withdrawal of US troops from Saudi Arabia as a way of protecting Arab identity and to exclude the Other in Saudi Arabia. Although Saudi Arabia was hosted US troops for a long time²⁷, they had to leave the country in mid 2003. A major goal of Al Qaeda, as stated by Usama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders, as the further securitizer, is to withdraw US forces from the Arabian Peninsula and in retaliation for the US support of Israel²⁸.

Many Arabs are infuriated with the military presence of the US, which they believe has contributed to the increase in terrorist acts of Al Qaeda, reaching a peak since the Iraqi invasion by securitizing the US threat. On the other hand, the withdrawal of the US troops from Saudi Arabia does not mean that the US force in the Persian Gulf has declined. The US bases in the small states of the Gulf Cooperation Council have helped the US for the Iraqi invasion of 2003²⁹. Therefore, the attitudes towards US military power are disappointing in the Persian Gulf, and the regional states have securitized the US military presence including the military bases and consequently, the rise in anti-US sentiment.

7. Rejecting democracy:

Regarding the analysis above and the remaining chain, I find how the Iraqi invasion and the US military presence *cause* the rejection of the US democracy (Figure 3.1). The importance of this causal chain is due to its operating with securitizationist argument. Moreover, regarding the 2003 Iraqi invasion, the development of US military bases and rejecting democracy have many repercussions for securitization analysis. There are debates in the Persian Gulf countries on the extent to which US democracy is beneficial in the region. The US outlook is that democracy constitutes a path of hope for reform in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East however, general intellectual opinions about the region are reflected in the following way:

Democracy is something eagerly awaited at the popular level in our Middle Eastern [*and the Persian Gulf*] countries. However, it can be dealt no more damaging blows than when the United States raises its democratic banners and slogans. The U.S. occupies a large Arab country (Iraq) and plunders its wealth. It supports the Zionist uproar Palestine. How could anyone believe the U.S. or its claims? Reality always exposes lies. People know very well that the U.S. has been the main supporter and guardian of the dictatorial regimes which have oppressed us. These regimes have maintained their existence in every instance through U.S. support and because of U.S. interests³⁰. [emphasis added]

The promotion of democracy in the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East lingers in the centre of the US foreign policy. However, it remains the paradox of the US-Persian Gulf region relationship. The research of Zogby International³¹ acknowledges:

²⁷ Donald M. Rumsfeld, The Former US Secretary of Defense, Interview in the NBC, meet the press, 20 January 2002.

²⁸ The US Department of Defense, <http://www.defense.gov/news/feb2004/d20040224albahlul.pdf>, p. 2, accessed 28.12.2010.

²⁹ Testimony of Ambassador Edward S. Walker Jr, "US and Oman: strategic partner", 6 March 2006, <http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/030606ewtest.pdf>, p2.

³⁰ Sha'ban quotes in Nadia Oweidat, Cheryl Benard, Dale Stahl, Walid Kildani, Edward O'Connell and Audra K. Grant, "The Kefaya movement: A case study of a grassroots of reform initiative", http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG778.pdf, p. 44, accessed 29.12.2010.

³¹ Abid Mustafa, "Middle East: America's democracy advance puts secularism in retreat", 22.1.2006, <http://www.zogby.com/search/readclips.cfm?ID=12560>, accessed 29.12.2010.

Not only has Bush's democracy drive in the Middle East strengthened political Islam it has also failed to stymie the tide of terrorism which grows more violent by the day. ...This is because the people of the Middle East will never forget or forgive America's unstinting support for Israel, her unflinching support for the brutal Arab dictatorships, her exploitation of their natural resources, her imposition of capitalist solutions and values, and her determined efforts to wage wars against the people of Iraq and other Muslims.

Furthermore "the US act for spreading democracy in the Persian Gulf region (Iraq) has led to a bloody open war"³². Consequently, the regional states have securitized US democracy and anti-Americanists sentiment has developed more. The ruling elites and publics in the Persian Gulf perceive the United States as among the top countries with freedom and democracy for their own people, but "the invasion of Iraq has also served to further destroy the image of the United States in the region as a democracy broker"³³. The Persian Gulf public opinion suggests that US democracy might not be useful for them and that the weak image to US democracy and values made the regional ruling elites securitize the threat of US democracy in the region³⁴. Democracy requires a historical trend and it cannot be prescribed without sufficient preparations³⁵. As a result, in the first experience of the US in the region for democracy in Iraq, it has frustrated the Iraqi people and the regional states. The ethnic diversification, the configuration of the population and the structure of the region represent the crucial factors needing careful attention before establishing democracy in Iraq and in the wider region.

According to the Pew Global attitude projects due to the "disappointing image of the US in the Persian Gulf"³⁶, and Zogby Arab Opinion Survey taken in 2007, 57 per cent of the public in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates have an unfavorable view of the US, and 72 per cent believe that the US shows a great threat to them and 80 per cent hold that the war in Iraq has made the region less secure³⁷.

Regarding the heuristic causal plan in this article and further causes that I discussed elsewhere, my analysis shows that *the US inappropriate foreign policies in the Persian Gulf emerge as the main cause for anti-US standpoints among other causes*³⁸ in the post-Saddam

³² Ibtessam Al Bassam, "A 21st century holocaust", **Arab News**, 5 August 2006.

³³ Oweidat, **op.cit**, p. 45.

³⁴ Sobhi Asila, "Confusing hearts and minds: public opinion in the Arab world", **Arab Insight**, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2007, pp 14-34.

³⁵ Fatemeh Shayan (et al.), The 2003 Iraq invasion and the puzzle of democracy, **Journal of the Middle East Studies**, Vol. 46-47, 2006, pp 21-54.

³⁶ "How the US is perceived in the Arab Muslims world", <http://pewglobal.org/2005/11/10/how-the-united-states-is-perceived-in-the-arab-and-muslim-worlds/>, accessed 15.5.2010.

³⁷ Shibley Telhami, Zogby International 2006 annual Arab public opinion survey, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/speeches/telhami20070208.pdf>, pp 17 and 24, accessed 15.5.2010. It is important to be added that by Obama Presidency, the public opinion has been improved. cf, "The 2009 Arab public opinion poll", <http://www.aaiusa.org/resources/3917/the-2009-arab-public-opinion-poll>, accessed 15.5.2010.

³⁸ Shaun Waterman, "Obama terror reviews avoid world", **The Washington Times**, 21 February 2010., Rubin, **op.cit**, pp 73-85., Rashid Khalidi, "A drumbeating of the Cold War American voice heard", **Al Rai**, 24 March 2009., Ussama Makdisi, "anti-Americanism in the Arab World: an interpretation of a brief history", **The Journal of American history**, Vol 89, No 2, p538., Brendon O'connor, **Anti-Americanism: in twenty one century**, The United States: Greenwood, 2007, p 139., Abdel Mahdi Abdullah, "Causes of anti-Americanism in the Arab world: a socio-political perspective", **Middle East Review of International Affairs**, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp 62-71., Maura Reynolds, "Road map: Bush commitment crucial", **Arab News**, 1 May 2003., "Israel... the interest of the US", **Al Akhbar**, 6 November 2006.

era. On that basis, Pollock, Senior Associate at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy adds that "... the key issues are policies... no matter what the Arab public thinks, and no matter who the next U.S. president turns out to be, American policy in the Middle East (including the Persian Gulf) are unlikely to change"³⁹ [emphasis added].

8. Conclusion

Examining the case of the rise in anti-US perspectives in the Persian Gulf within the framework of the Copenhagen School provides a good grounding for looking at the issue from the point of view of regional elites and specifically the public and securitization of the issue. Of further significance here is that opinion polls open up a mixed window to trace the underlying cause of the anti-Americanist attitude since discussing those causes merely from the elites' perspectives will not be a complete study. Further, considering the most important causes of anti-US perspectives in the Persian Gulf as the inappropriate policies of the US, this evidence is defined in line with the CS literature where the US remains a penetrative power in the region and as portrayed as the *Other*. At the same time, the sectors of societal, political and military security that I have examined trace the roots of the anti-Americanist perspectives in various directions, being either driven by considerations of public opinion and socio-political views. This would be one reason why it might be possible to comment for the future and on the prospects of decreasing anti-US sentiments in the region while the prospects for desecuritization are overshadowed in the post-Saddam era.

Taking out the major cause of anti-Americanism from the Persian Gulf context, one question to ask is 'if the US foreign policies were not the underlying causes of anti-Americanist sentiment in the region in the post-Saddam era, how could the result change?' It might be witnessed that the percentage of acts of terror by Al Qaeda could decrease in the region and in the rest of the world⁴⁰. Al Qaeda members could not use religion and Arab identity as justification for their acts of terror and the US could not have a strong military presence in the region. Further, by intriguing counterfactuals, it is also possible to suggest probing anti-Americanist sentiments in other regions without the causal factors of Islamic, Arab/Persian identity and strong US foreign policies. In these contexts there could be less enmity to the US. According to the analysis in this paper, the policy recommendation is that a careful look at the real *causes* of anti-US attitudes opens up further views into the solutions for the enmity between the regional states in the Persian Gulf and the US.

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³⁹ El Shinnawi, **op.cit.**

⁴⁰ In thirty month before 9/11, the US States Department attributes one act of terror to Al Qaeda however, in thirty months after 9/11 and the beginning of the Iraq invasion, ten acts of terror are attributed to Al Qaeda. Further, in 2009, the US Department acknowledges that Al Qaeda remains the main threat to the US and engaged in plotting against the US. See for example, Audrey Kourth Cronin, "Terrorist attack by Al Qaeda", Congressional Research Service, 31 March 2004, <http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/033104.pdf>, p. 5, accessed 30.12.2010. And, US Department of State, "Country reports on terrorism in 2009", 5 August 2010, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/08/145737.htm>, accessed 30.12.2010.

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