

“The Consciousness Evolution”: Identification and Re-Identification after the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong

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Abstract

Stemmed from the Umbrella Movement in September of 2014, Hong Kong had experienced dramatic social and political changes that people were being “decontaminated” from titling as political apathetic animals which were constructed under the historical manufacturing. The unprecedented integration of politics and society keeps fermenting and one of the most conspicuous narratives in the society is the identity of Hong Kong people. Hong Kong people have undergone an evolution on the consciousness of social identification as many terminologies and corresponding epitomizations have been sprung up: Yellow Ribbon v. Blue Ribbon (Movement identity in the Umbrella Movement), Mainlander v. Hongkonger (Hong Kong identity), Anti-localism v. Localism (Hong Kong identity), Old Lion Rock Spirit v. New Lion Rock Spirit (which symbolizes the core values in Hong Kong) etc.

This study aims at exploring the consciousness and identity evolution on the Hong Kong people, especially revived from the Umbrella Movement in 2014 to 2016. The interplays and correlations between movement identity, Hong Kong identity and so-called local identity would be further examined. On top of that, whereas identification and re-identification is transpiring in the society, this study would further review symbiotic relations between the mentioned identities and corresponding values by delving into several Hong Kong social and political issues.

Keywords: Hong Kong, Social and Political Identity, Consciousness, The Umbrella Movement, Social Movement, Indigeneity

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Introduction

It is ineluctable that to recount the reverberations of the Umbrella Movement in 2014, especially there are ceaseless and considerable altercations on the mutation of the Hong Kong identity after the Umbrella Movement. Undeniably that social movements and related identities interrelate in innumerable ways that more precisely, identities would facilitate social movements while consolidated identities could be the outcome of social movements (Polletta, & Jasper, 2001). By firstly constructing the boundary, communities and perceptions within the action group, catalyzed by the strong collective engagements within the network and organization and hence the shared goals advocated in the action, particular meaning, identification and consensus would be provoked during and after the social movement. Thus, this kind of symbolic integration would foster new or more consolidated identity throughout the process of social movements (Polletta, & Jasper, 2001). This is also stemmed from the differentiation from others or other groups which are already realized and perceived via symbols, practices and rituals by the external actors (Calhoun, 1994; Porta, & Diani, 2006). Thus, the solidarity of the construction of movement identity during the 79-day Umbrella Movement, hence, has ignited the orientation, inclination, and further consolidation on political identity of Hong Kong people. It also prompted a consciousness evolution on the value reconfiguration in Hong Kong society by experiencing communal political, social and cultural practices in the imaged community during the Umbrella Movement.

The Intermixture of Hong Kong Identity

The main populations before 1970s in Hong Kong were mainly the refugees from Mainland China and they perceived Hong Kong as a place for survival and stability. After 1970s, half of the people living in Hong Kong were born locally and they discerned Hong Kong as home. This combination within the community preliminarily skeletonized the intermixture of the identity of Hong Kong people. The “hybridization” of Hong Kong identity could be demonstrated via the polls conducted by The University of Hong Kong in every half year (Figure 1).

Year	Hongkonger (%)	Both (%)	Chinese (%)
Aug 1997	35	45	19
Feb 2000	38	43	14
Dec 2003	25	39	33
June 2010	25	46	28
Dec 2010	36	42	21
June 2011	44	32	24
Dec 2011	44	44	17
June 2012	46	35	19
Dec 2012	28	50	21
June 2013	40	37	23
Dec 2013	35	43	22
June 2014	41	39	20
Dec 2014	43	40	18
June 2015	36	41	22
Dec 2015	40	40	18
June 2016	42	38	18

Figure 1: The Intermixture of Hong Kong Identity 1997-2016

Source: Public Opinion Program, The University of Hong Kong
<https://www.hkpop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/>

Apparently about 40% respondents identified themselves both the Hongkongers and Chinese after 1997 handover, on that account, there was a significant mergence of local identity and national identity. In the meanwhile, though there were variations on both identifications throughout 19 years, Hong Kong people averagely regarded themselves as purely HongKongers more than as purely Chinese. This was the circumstance what Brewer characterized as Dual Identity, which portrayed as ‘a kind of joint membership which emerges to serve needs of distinctiveness and also inclusion’ (Brewer, 1999, p.190). Hong Kong people, undeniably, are all regarded as the ethnicity of Chinese. However, the historical and political development as a British colony, Hong Kong people were exposed to an independent and local cultural settings, practices and values via different language, narrative, history, living habits, routines, collective memory, lifestyle, convention etc. (Chan, 2000; Fung, 2004). Hongkonger-Chinese Dual Identity is illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Dual Identity Perceived by Hong Kong People

Brewer (1991) has conceptualized the dynamic nature of social identity which is stemmed from ‘the need for inclusion and assimilation’ and ‘the need for differentiation from others’ (Brewer, 1991; Brewer, 1999). Applying Hong Kong’s

situation to this model, the dual identity expresses its intention to ‘differentiate from non-Chinese HongKongers and the mainland Chinese’ (Brewer, 1999, p.192), i.e. dual identity in Hong Kong catalogues people who were born and live in Hong Kong with Chinese ethnicity. Simultaneously nurturing by the historical and political development, Chow (2015) denoted that the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 was the watershed to unfold the self-realization process on identity of Hong Kong people. Except being the residents of Hong Kong, after the 1997 handover, Hong Kong people would also become the citizens of China institutionally, but not consciously, behaviorally and even politically (Chow, 2015, p.72). Hong Kong has undergone 150 years substantial British colonial governance and was granted high-degree of administrative, economic and social self-sufficiency governance. Under this ‘network of public politics’ (Tilly, 2007), Hong Kong was an institutional form of quasi-sovereign state which was incorporated by Hong Kong citizenry. Hong Kong people have also tasted the period of indigenization and construction of Hong Kong unique identity from 1970s after the left-wing riot in 1967 (Wu, 2016). The reality was, to a certain extent, Hong Kong was an independent social polity. Ergo, Chinese Central People’s Government aimed at undermining the undercurrent treachery of Hong Kong people towards Chinese authority, more precisely, after 2003 July 1st Rally which half a million Hong Kong people protested against the national security legislation. Cheung (2012) outlined Beijing’s strategies to domesticate Hong Kong by constitutional, political, social and economic integrations (Appendix 1). Chinese Central People’s Government expressly dedicated economic and political resources to restore the national sentiment among Hong Kong youth as to reassemble Hong Kong people’s national identity. National Education has been a highlighted session in policy address; HKSAR Government subsidized more secondary students (from 5,000 to 37,000) to participate exchange program with Mainland China; National Education Centre has been set up in 2004 as to strengthen national thought and beliefs among teachers and students (Cheung, 2012). All patriotic and national elements have been instilled and packaged as national education curriculum in 2014 which was finally retracted by an occupation-oriented collective action (details please refer to next session). Chinese Central People’s Government intends to solidify the identity of Hong Kong people as ‘nested identities’ (Brewer, 1999, p.190), i.e. Chinese national identity is superordinate and the regional identity is regarded as a subgroup, as one of her political achievements in Hong Kong (Figure 3):



Figure 3: Nested Identities of Hong Kong People Perceived by CCP Government

However, it seems that there is an unrelenting local identification among Hong Kong youths which was proved by the survey conducted by Undergrad (學苑) operated

under the Student Union of The University of Hong Kong: 62% advocated Hong Kong is a nation, 28% supported Hong Kong should be an independent entity, and 51% and 64% were in favor of independence without Beijing's recognition and with Beijing's recognition respectively (Undergrad, 2015).

Value Articulation and Re-articulation via Collective Actions

Before British colonial government foregrounded the importance of striking identity of Hong Kong people in 1970s, the refugee mentality and its social consequences brimmed over the society. People perceived Hong Kong as a harbor of refuge for pure survival. They did not have to pay any intentions to public affairs, citizen duties and constitutional changes as they assumed that they were not involved in any political and social aspects of this place (Lam, 2012). Concurrently, British colonial government tried to avoid involving Hong Kong people in political issues as to prevent any possible complications on her governance. This perfect interplay between the government and her people diverted the social and political needs to pursuing tangible goals: economic development and social stability. In the course of time those became Hong Kong values: Money-making, personal development, individualism, social stability etc. These values were conceptualized as 'Lion Rock Spirit'¹ which underscored the struggle to survive, industrious and stamina, hardworking, without-complaints, money-oriented etc. Howbeit, since the 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) which caused 299 Hong Kong people died, Hong Kong people increased the awareness of public and community cooperation, people's integrity and consciousness of collectivity and they started to embrace post-materialist values which could be well-epitomized in collective actions. 6 crucial collective actions from 2006-2014 in Hong Kong would be further analyzed in the perspective of political and social value articulation.

Cheng (2016) has already summarized characteristics of these 6 collection actions and they are illustrated in Figure 4 (Cheng , 2016, p.11) and Figure 5 (Cheng , 2016, p.13):




Figure 4: Scale and Resilience of Critical Events in Hong Kong, 2006-2014

Cheng (2016) discovered that there were 19-fold and 14-fold increases in the number of participants in the events during the period of 2006-2010 and 2010-2014

¹ Note: 'Lion Rock Spirit' was well-illustrated in the lyrics of the theme song from the 1970s TV series 'Under the Lion Rock':

"Of one mind in pursuit of our dream. All discord set aside, with one heart on the same bright quest. Hand in hand to the ends of the earth. Side by side we overcome ills." (Chugani, 2016, April 5)

respectively. Averagely, there were 67 days occurrence of those collective actions, the longest lasted 122 days and the shortest lasted 43 days.

Event	Field performance	Party reaction	State decision
Preserving Star Ferry Pier	<i>occupation</i> hunger strike heritage tour	Legco inquiry Unanimous consent	Pier demolished
Preserving Queen's Pier	<i>occupation</i> concert heritage tour	Legco inquiry Subcommittee hearing Bipartisan split	Pier demolished
Anti-express railway link	<i>siege</i> "prostrating walk" sit-in	"	Railway budget passed; affected village rebuilt
Anti-national education curriculum	<i>occupation</i> hunger strike student strike	"	Curriculum retracted
Protesting North-East Development Plan	<i>siege</i> blockades bazaar	"	Development zone minimized
Reissuing free-to-air television licence	<i>occupation</i> hunger strike satire	"	Licence denied

Figure 5: Details of Critical Events in Hong Kong, 2006-2014

The main repertoires were occupation and laying siege to a particular building with symbolic meaning such as Central Government Complex or Legislative Council or the places had to be protected, for example, the pier.

Event	Contrast Values	Value Articulation
Preserving Star Ferry Pier	Development (Individualism) V. Heritage Conservation (Collectivism)	Sense of Belonging
Preserving Queen's Pier	Development (Individualism) V. Heritage Conservation (Collectivism)	Sense of Belonging
Anti-express railway link	Economic Development and Economic Integration V. Communal, Community and Minority Development	Questioned the dominance of China over HK affairs and the money-making philosophy
Anti-national education curriculum	Political Autonomy V. Integration (Intervention) with Mainland China	Questioned the dominance of China over HK affairs and against the imposition of national identity to Hong Kong students
Protesting North-East Development Plan	Economic Development and Economic Integration V. Communal, Community and Minority Development	questioned the dominance of China over HK affairs and the money-making philosophy
Reissuing free-to-air Television license	Transparency V. Backroom Deals	Procedural Fairness

Figure 6: Value Articulation in Critical Events in Hong Kong, 2006-2014

The protestors have unambiguously expressed the rationales and the needs to preserve the historical and symbolic heritages in Hong Kong in both collective actions of preserving Star Ferry Pier and Queen's Pier. People took hunger strike and occupied

the piers as to oppose the demolition of the piers for traffic development (hence, the economic development), as they cherished the collective memories and sense of belonging in Hong Kong. Antipathy always existed when government officials reemphasized any demolitions of Hong Kong heritage as a means to boost economy. The underlining value articulation was advocating collectivism, which did mean a big contrast to the proto-value of Hong Kong, i.e. economic development, money-making and individualism.

In the case of anti-express railway link and protesting north-east development plan, protestors gave utterance to an equitable city development and revitalized communal community in Hong Kong. They were against the sacrifice of small villages, domestic farming industry and the natural environment in the New Territories as to make way for the railway linking Mainland China and Hong Kong and over and above that, the shrouded 'Mainlandization' and cross-boundary interaction were strongly resisted and people were looking for an equilibrium between national and regional economic and social homogenization.

After the anti-national education curriculum occupation in 2012, HKSAR Chief Executive CY Leung announced to defer the commencement of Moral and National Education (MNE) implementation in primary and secondary education after 90,000 people participated in 7.29 Anti-brainwashing Rally and 120,000 people enveloped around Central Government Offices whipped up by a student group Scholarism. This protest unquestionably enhanced the political capital and political efficacy among the activists, thus, triggered more Hong Kong youths to engage in politics and elections. HKSAR government opted to generate political discourse via formal education, aiming at engendering a 'unilateral top-down indoctrination of Chinese nationalism' and reinforced national identity (Chan, 2014, p.27). This imposition of national identity was firmly rejected by teachers' group and students' group such as Parents' Concern and Scholarism (Cheng, 2016, p.11), as education should be the final battlefield of political autonomy against Mainland China.

There was public outcry against HKSAR government denied HKTV a free-to-air television license, though HKTV has proved that it had the potentiality to produce high-quality TV programs. Protestors and Ricky Wong, the president of HKTV, criticized the procedural fairness and interrogated the transparency of the mechanism of licensing. To some extent, protestors concluded that there was political examination or judgement on the whole issuing process as some of the TV programs produced by HKTV criticized HKSAR government and Mainland China government either in direct or indirect way.

Hong Kong people realized the essentiality of post materialistic values and actualized their inclinations through participating in collective actions in the last 10 years. These collective actions signified their ambition to restore the humanity which was oblivious in the past, concurrently, they were eager to replace the friability and the unrepresentativeness in the nowadays Hong Kong's distorted and obstreperous political institutions and situations.

“The Consciousness Evolution”: The Significance and the Power of Movement Identity in the Umbrella Movement

The color yellow and umbrella both were the symbolic signifiers of pro-occupiers during the 79-day movement. The significance of color was emanated from the color revolutions during the early 2000 and the umbrellas were used as the-only protection against pepper spray from police at the beginning of the Umbrella Movement (Eagleton, Nov 4, 2014). The representativeness of these “identifiers” (Porta, & Diani, 2006, p.108) did associate with the rationale (The determination towards the injustice and unequal political development in Hong Kong) and the repertoire (Non-violence and civil disobedience originally advocated by Occupy Central with Love and Peace - OCLP Website). People, who supported the occupation movement, would wear a little yellow ribbon on their t-shirts as to manifest their political perspectives and sentiments for the Umbrella Movement even they did not have time to occupy the street during the movement. Those symbols and codes could be regarded as the cultural resources articulating the values and rationales behind the movement and thus formed a new movement identity for the Hong Kong people. They called this identity as “Yellow-Ribbon”.

This object-oriented identity was distinctive and identifiable which could be regarded as extremely significant and effective when the “Blue-Ribbon” came to light. Undeniably, the prominence of “Blue-Ribbon” mimicked the movement identity by attaching a contrary colored ribbon as identifier. “Blue-Ribbons” were employed by the pro-establishment camp and coincidentally, HKSAR government has supported their action (even included violence) publicly (Law, March 4, 2015). This intention of creating “Blue-Ribbons” was, in reality that some of the Hong Kong people who did not support the occupy movement and to goad on conflicts between the Yellows and the Blues, in order to stir up the Yellows and derail the non-violent track which Yellows originally promoted. By pinpointing the economic sustainability and safeguarding the rule of law in Hong Kong, Blues asserted that the occupation was a hindrance to any economic developments and will affect the tourist industry in Hong Kong. Indeed, “Blue-Ribbons” were tempted to “perform” violently when they intended to have conflict with the “Yellow-Ribbon”, and this was a thorough dissimilitude to the value and rationale of “Yellow-Ribbon”. The emergence of “Blue-Ribbons”, hence, accommodated a political and social context for strengthening the original movement identity and legitimating their further political existence and continuance.

After the Umbrella Movement, the significances and the impacts on the identity formulated from the Umbrella Movement were stretched out. Hong Kong people have undergone an evolution on the cognizance of social and political identification which firstly, they reserved the courageousness to express their political orientation that they have experienced in the Umbrella Movement and secondly, particular identity has replaced the movement identity as to shore up and sustain the ideologies after the movement. Thus, localism has become the main narrative of Hong Kong identity to underscore the protection of local resources, cultures, traditions, core values, social and political system as to oppose any kinds of erosion/intervention from Mainland China. This narrative of localism/local identity provided a more recognizable and salient alternative for the original hybridized identity. Local identity was framed as a new identity as to resist the modus operandi of Mainland China, for instance, the

influx of Mainlanders snapping up necessities, real estates, places in universities (Cheung, 2012) and PRC's game rule has monopolized any possible business opportunity in Hong Kong (Fong, 2014). This new identity was being nurtured and reinforced by the chronic 'mainlandization', the social movement dynamics, political exasperation and long-term indeterminate identity. This new identity narrative was eventually realized, integrated and hammered out in the Umbrella Movement, i.e. experiences and values that gestated the nitty-gritty for the local identity. This local identity is not a newly-discovered identity but a precious one to be protected from any destruction and distortion (Pang, 2016), and with a more salient and solid boundary.




Figure 7: Consolidation: From Nested Identities to Dual Identities by Introducing Hong Kong Local Identity in Hong Kong

The strength and furtherance of local identity could be evidenced by New Territories East by-election on 28 February 2016. Hong Kong Indigenous is a political party established in Jan 2015 and is regarded as radical nativist or 'localist' (Ngo, 2 Feb 2016). The members are mainly post-90s youths and they oppose the increased influence of Mainland China and the Beijing government's involvement in Hong Kong. They always involved in protests and engaged into violent clashes with police such as Mongkok Riot. However, 24-year-old member Edward Leung Tin-kei ran for the New Territories East by-election, unexpectedly Leung got 66,524 votes, about 15 % of the total votes (Wikipedia, 3 August 2016). This better-than-expected result was considered a big boost for the localism ideology they advocated, simultaneously, the result served as the evidence that localism could be a receptive political orientation with high political capital though Leung always involved in public violence.

A survey conducted by Department of Journalism and Communication of The Chinese University of Hong Kong indicated that 36% respondents supported localism among the 5 given choices (Pro-establishment, Pro-democracy, Moderate, Localism, No comments). The respondents claimed that localism could prevent 'mainlandization' (58%) and they already dissatisfied with pro-democracy camp (55%) and admitted that they supported Hong Kong self-governance (52%) (U-beat Magazine, 2016). The elevation of civic capital via establishing civil society under the blossoming of education, participation in social and political affairs and humanity values, Hong Kong people would eager to have further demands on the compatibility of institutional development and hence the further participation in politics including the institutionalized ones, e.g. elections. People questioned against the legitimacy and the accountability of the HKSAR government as she allowed continuous increases of economic, social and political intervention measures raised from Mainland authority which entirely demonstrated the "blurring of physical, social, cultural and

psychological border between Mainland China and Hong Kong” (Ma, 2015, p.47). Those integration measures not only dismantled the imagined boundaries with Mainland in geographical sense and in the political sphere, but also violated the cultural formation of Hong Kong and its original relationship with Mainland (Ip, 2016, p.411). The seed of local consciousness and identity began to sprout as to restore the imaged borderline between Hong Kong and Mainland China socially, culturally, politically and even economically.

“The Consciousness Evolution”: Value re-configuration in the society

Ideologies which were upheld in the Umbrella Movement such as morality, responsibility and obligation, localism, shouldering, public interests (Cheng, & Yuen, 2015) veritably stemmed from the series of collective actions which have accumulated the cultural symbols, political consciousness, social spaces, realizations and values for any further possible social movements and kept fermenting in the society. The Umbrella Movement served as a platform to actualize the ideological battle in the society, precisely, the struggle between traditional Hong Kong value or mentality and New Hong Kong value. The Umbrella Movement gave Hong Kong people a chance to experience ‘new political community’ with ‘isonomy’ and a ‘new social formation’ (Pang, 2016, p.184). The new generation was deeply skeptical about The ‘Lion Rock Spirit’ when Hong Kong was already morphing into a society full of conundrum. The participants in the Umbrella Movement invented ‘New Lion Rock Spirit’ which did not aim at overthrowing the traditional ones, but by stressing the importance of collectivism, justice, fairness, public interest and local interest would be the antidote for the deadlock situation in Hong Kong, and concomitantly, cherish the local characteristics and being distinguishable with other PRC cities (Pang, 2016). During the Umbrella Movement, The Chinese University of Hong Kong released survey findings to evaluate the public views on Hong Kong’s core values.

	Do you agree that this is Hong Kong’s core value?	The most important Hong Kong’s core value is:
	Strongly Agreed / Agreed	
Rule of law	92.7%	(1) 22.9%
Just and corruption-free	92.3%	(3) 15.3%
Social stability	88.2%	
Freedom	88.1%	(2) 20.8%
Peace and benevolence	87.4%	
Safeguard individual property	86.5%	
Level playing field	86.3%	
Family	84.3%	
Democracy	83.2%	(4) 11.1%
Diversity and tolerance	79.8%	
Market economy	76.5%	

Figure 8: Hong Kong’s Core Values Survey (Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, CUHK, October 30, 2014)

Within 11 randomly chosen HK's core values, over 90% of the 804 respondents strongly agreed or agreed that 'rule of law' (92.7%) and 'just and corruption-free' (92.3%) were the core values of Hong Kong. A portion of respondents declared that the most important Hong Kong's core values were 'rule of law' (22.9%), 'freedom' (20.8%) 'just and corruption-free' (15.3%) and 'democracy' (11.1%). This survey served as a barometer to reflect what Hong Kong people care, need and desire, hence, there is glaring contradiction to the ideology of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the actuality of CCP authority: Rule of man, not free (Freedom House, 2016), corrupted² and authoritarianism. The promotion of 'New Lion Rock Spirit' could be the most legitimate and efficacious resistance to further be sinicized by Mainland China. Firstly, money-making mentality would be utilized by China to exert political and social intervention under the name of 'mutual economic development'. Moreover, Hong Kong hitherto is a significant international economic and financial center which implies the economic and social system of Hong Kong is legitimized internationally. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, independent judicial system, institutionalized anti-corruption mechanism etc. could not be sacrificed as they are essential pillars of maintaining international status. For instance, the shrinking of freedom of press in Hong Kong is still significant³. Justice, fairness, public and local interest as well as procedural transparency would be the sacrosanct values to safeguard Hong Kong's international reputation and assimilation from CCP authority.

Conclusion

It was inescapable that there would be instability and inconsistency in the society if the political institutions are incongruent with the political culture in the society (Almond, & Verba, 1989, p.20). Through a series of collective actions, political capital has been stockpiled within the civil society and the percipience of improving the society has been realized among Hong Kong people. The Umbrella Movement brought forth a reality that Hong Kong had to resuscitate a new identity narrative with new value articulation, as to dovetail with the over-integrated political and social circumstance in Hong Kong. This new narrative – the local identity and the 'New Lion Rock Spirit' would reinforce each other if further 'Mainlandization' and continuous degradation on Hong Kong local interest emerge.

Further Remark

A Lever Game: Democracy V. Identity V. Intervention

Renowned scholar Larry Diamond has reviewed the readiness for democracy in Hong Kong by taking 3 conditions to be considered: The condition for sustaining democracy, the political culture of the society, the power relations outside the

² According the Corruption Perception Index 2015, China ranked 83 while Hong Kong ranked 18 among 186 countries and territories. A country or territory's score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) (Transparency International, 2015).

³ Refer to 2016 World Press Freedom Index, Hong Kong ranked 69 among 180 countries and territories. Report clearly mentioned that 'The media are still able to cover sensitive stories involving the local government and Mainland China, but the need to fight to protect their editorial positions from Beijing's influence is increasingly noticeable. The purchase of Hong Kong media by Chinese Internet companies such as the Internet giant Alibaba is extremely disturbing. The most outspoken journalists, such as those working for the Apple Daily newspaper, are exposed to violence by the Chinese Communist Party's henchmen.' (Reporters without Borders, 2016)

system's control will permit it to become a democracy (Diamond, 2016, p.335). Diamond argued that Hong Kong was ready for democracy but the only constraint was from Beijing which "framed and interpreted the conditions and it said HKSAR was still not yet ready" (p.335, & p.340). After the handover in 1997, Hong Kong has inescapably joined the lever game with Mainland China. This stalemate between democracy in Hong Kong, the identity of Hong Kong people and China's intervention would be expectedly enduring if China insists on intervening Hong Kong without self-constraint or without reviewing the social and political reality in Hong Kong. The local identity in Hong Kong would gradually be expanded, solidified and espoused through further engaging in social movements, local politics and civil society as firstly, the endeavor to pursue democracy in Hong Kong would never exterminate and secondly, the unceasing intervention from Mainland would finally reach (or already reached) the bottom-line of Hong Kong people.

Appendix 1 (Cheung, 2012, p.327-328):

Beijing's strategy toward Hong Kong after 2003 has the following key elements:

- Emphasizing its constitutional authority and exercising its influence in directing the path of Hong Kong's political development;
- Shaping Hong Kong's governance through a variety of control mechanisms;
- Displaying pragmatism in dealing with the pro-democracy forces over constitutional reform in order to achieve compromise while dividing up such opponents;
- Expanding the united front and political support network in favor of the Mainland, including the grooming of the second generation of Hong Kong's tycoons and elites as political players;
- Prompting the HKSAR government to promote patriotism and national education; and
- Supporting Hong Kong's economic integration with the Mainland economy in order to ensure its prosperity and reduce social and economic discontents, especially when the Taiwan question is still not resolved.

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