Mutual Distrust between China and Japan and the Locked Sino-Japanese Relations

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A Brief Background of Sino-Japanese Relations with Mutual Distrust

Having inevitably been geographic neighbours of each other for thousands of years, the two giants in East Asia—China and Japan continue harvesting bittersweet fruits from the bilateral relations. For most of time in their history, the bilateral relations between China and Japan are considered to be positive. Though there have not been the mature international society or diplomatic relationship, the two countries are connected to some extent. The cultural exchanges and communications were supposed to be the most significant interaction in the relations. Since the science and technology and even the culture of China was comparatively advanced in the long period in ancient time, the major pattern of communication between China and Japan was that Japan sending students and envoys to China to learn different kinds of knowledge. In this way, it could be reasonable to see that the two states with close culture—such as Chinese characters in Japanese languages and the styles of architecture—could share a harmonious relationship. There are also different arguments on the way in which China and Japan could keep peaceful relations with each other. Due to the lack of effective transportations and information, the interactions between different states were quite limited so that disputes and wars were not easy to take place.

The pure exchanges and communications between the two countries had changed into the invasion of semi-colonial and lagging China by a modern Japan since the end of 19th century. In the beginning of its imperial era, Japan had achieved many of its goals of national interests in China as well as other Western states. The rise of Japanese militarism was then followed by the overall war between Japan and China as a part of the World War II which created a series of problems affecting the bilateral relations till now. The war led to millions of deaths and injuries in both countries and ruined the process of modernization. Moreover, the confrontation between the communist and capitalist camps made the timely reconciliation not possible as the two countries got involved in different ideological groups. It was not until in 1972 that China and Japan finally realized the normalization of official relationship—most of which should be owed to the re-engagement between the US and China.

Different from the situation with a deeper trust among European states such as France and Germany, the bilateral relationship between China and Japan does not go that smoothly. There was indeed a period of wonderful time of nearly two decades between the two states after the 1972 normalization. As soon as the normalization was achieved, the relationship between China and Japan warmed up rapidly. Though the two states did not form an alliance, the political atmosphere was overall positive, both on the intergovernmental level and the social level. Both the two states distrusted Soviet Union in the Cold War era, which might bring them together sharing a common strategic goal.
However, the trust between China and Japan was not stable. The political relations between China and Japan have been controversial since several decades ago. The status of the possible rivalry between the two states has not transformed into the mature friendship or the more cooperative relations even after the end of the Cold War. It is a worrying fact that the two most powerful actors in East Asia are experiencing an unstable relationship with more disputes and conflicts of interests.

Different from the situation with a deeper trust among European states such as France and Germany after the WW2, the bilateral relationship between China and Japan does not go that smoothly. After the down of Soviet Union, fiercer frictions on the disputes on the problems left unsettled during the normalization process were observed. The disputes on historical legacies soon emerged as the obstacles of the bilateral relations. With the growth of China’s economic and military power, the Sino-Japanese relationship in the beginning of the 21st century has witnessed a wider scope of problems including both historical legacies and the strategic confrontations or competitions. Series of disputes existing in the Sino-Japanese relations occur occasionally with the tough attempts of cooperation, which could be interpreted as the lack of bilateral trust between China and Japan.

The Theoretical Discussion on Trust/Distrust in International Relations

There have always been academic debates on the theories of trust and distrust in international relations. There would be two approaches of trust including both the interest-oriented and morality-oriented ways on understanding the notion. Both Eric M. Uslaner and Brain C. Rathbun have introduced the ‘strategic trust’ and ‘moralistic trust’. I would to some extent agree with the adoption of these ideas in Sino-Japanese relations—with some modifications and rejections as well. In terms of the trust/distrust between China and Japan, ‘strategic trust on strategic issues’ and ‘moral and political trustworthy’ would be the two approaches.

Strategic trust is a kind of assessment on the possibility to reduce the alert of others on harming the interests or even to realize a double win cooperative relationship. On the contrary, strategic distrust would turn into the worry about being damaged on the interests. It is more likely to be in the realist view of the world of anarchy that every single participant would have to be intensive and nervous on others in consideration of the security of themselves. The definition of moral trust here would be the judgements of normal values on whether another state tends to follow the international laws and principles in international relations.

One of the most important theoretical frameworks would be that strategic and moral trust/distrust could be interpreted as strategic calculations driven by rationality of states vs normative values in international relations.
By distinguishing the two terms of “norms” and “rational choice”, the thesis is using the narrative definition of them. Norms would refer to the normative assumptions and related behaviours, or what can be called moral norms. The rational choice assumption refers to the rationality of non-moral factors among states which means that countries would act in certain ways to grasp the benefits of cooperation among them. Exploring if trust complies with any characteristics of the two options will identify the way in which trust works in international relations.

As Kacowicz (2005, p.18) cites McElroy (1992, p.31), “a moral norm can be defined as a behavioural prescription that is universal in the claims it makes and that involves a view of the actors’ own interest, but from the point of view of the others’ interests.” In international relations, this would be the issue on whether countries would place the interests of others at a crucial place. The definition of trust from Hardin and other scholars might have similar essence with it that trust means that countries believe that their national interests will not be harmed by others in international relations. Though this is a generalized definition, there is the consistency between two notions. The moral norms in international relations represent the good wills of interstate behaviours. Trusting others in their nature, or even as Uslaner (2002) argues, holding the belief that other states should be trusted is the activity that obeys the moral norms and in correspond with the internal quality of “oughtness”. (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891) Hence, this certain kind of trust could be regarded as a moral norm. However, the political fact in international relations (or to be more optimistic, in the international society) shows that no essential institutions actually could support the moral requirement though following these principles might have been accepted as an universal value. The competitions of national interests highlight the significance of the other kind of trust and rationality within it.

As stated above, the thesis suggests that the rationality of countries will play an important role in international relations. If the moral norms and moral trust are irrational, does it mean that trust would not exist between states? It could hardly to say no on this question that trust could also be a rational choice for countries. The controversy lies in the gap between the sources of trust—moral motivation and information-based motivation. A country would trust another in international affairs according to the information it owns. Trusting others under this circumstance would be beneficial due to its characteristics of rationality. This is what will be discussed in the following sections as strategic trust—also mentioned by Uslaner (2001, 2002) and Rathbun (2009). One simple case of this kind of trust is that if a country trusts one of its neighbour states as it has enough empirical evidences to prove another’s harmless attitude and goals, the cost of military spending on the boundary will be reduced. In this way, trust might also be the result of rationality. Therefore, it will be important to understand how International Relations theories see the sources of trust in terms of normative behaviours and rationality.
The basic hypothesis of this research would be that both China and Japan would distrust each other on strategic and moral issues. At the same time, the two states have different priorities. Japan’s priority would be on the strategic issues of the rise of China as a potential threat. China’s distrust would focus more on the moral issues of history disputes. Japan’s secondary concern would be the moral distrust on China. To be specific, Japan distrusts China’s nature of being a responsible actor in international society. China’s secondary concern would be that Japan’s alliance with the US and the potential attempt to revive as a military power would become strategic challenge for China.

China and Japan has formed a mutual distrust situation in both the fields of strategic and moral issues. The source of the ‘locked’ status would be the asymmetries in bilateral distrust, which has formed a vicious circle. Although both the two states have their specific issues of distrust in both the two fields, they have different focuses and emphasises. From the Chinese perspective, the distrust on the moral issues of Japan should be the top concern. For Japan the situation is just opposite. The most significant trust crisis is the distrust on strategic issues. Under this circumstance, the logic evidence of forming the asymmetries should be that both the two states treat their own top concern as the key issue in the bilateral relations and they could hardly trust the other due to dozens of reasons (caused by the other), which means the requests of them on the main concerns have not been satisfied; meanwhile, the top concern of the other (country B) seems to be quite ‘normal’ in the perspective of itself (country A) which does not need to be modified to satisfy country B’s request. Besides, the main focuses of the two states are not at the same level while the issues on the same level differs from each other in the fields. It could be understood better with the table above.

**Case Study on Mutual Strategic and Moral Distrust**

There have been cases to verify the hypothesis on this structure of China-Japan mutual distrust. For Japan’s part, the strategic distrust could be reflected on the maritime disputes and the moral distrust on China’s international identity. For China’s distrust on Japan, the strategic cases would be on the US-Japan alliance and the moral cases of Yasukuni Shrine dispute.

In terms of the debate between normative relations and rationality of states, strategic trust and distrust will show its existence in the rational choice and the following foreign policies and actions. As rational actors, countries will have to consider the existing political realities and make predictions in responsible for its national interests including national security. Therefore, if there is either a lack of transparency or the clear rivalry activities of the other actor, the uncertainty would lead to distrust and other reactions. On the other hand, both the rationality of states and the approach of following international norms would require states to take actions with lower risks and costs to solve the problems and disputes. Even if a country values the normative
actions in international relations, the norm-breaking activities from the other actors would lead to the judgment of distrust. Therefore, the trend of trust and distrust could be identified in official and governmental documents including statements, records of press meetings, speeches and so on.

How to identify trust and distrust in these cases would be a methodological question. A discourse analysis method is suitable in measuring trust between countries. It would be extremely difficult to reach the materials and procedures behind the stage in the processes of foreign policy making. Therefore, both clear attitudes and behaviours of countries would be the way to approach to the status of trust and distrust. The discourse—no matter the governmental statements or the VIP speeches—would be meaningful as the official position as well as the guidance of foreign policies. The question would be what the standards are to identify trust and distrust in the discourse. There have been debates on the relationship between cooperation and trust, which has been proved that one could not equal to another, while in many cases cooperation could still be regarded as an important sign of trust. In terms of distrust between states, most negative discourse and behaviours could be regarded as distrust between states. What should be taken into consideration carefully is the difference between not to trust and distrust. There is a significant difference between not to trust and distrust that distrust refers to the category on the prediction of potential damage on national interest or dignity. At the same time, not to trust might have not reached such a negative level that actors have no positive or negative interactions and neither trust nor distrust would define the relationship. Therefore, the qualitative judgment on trust and distrust would rely on the discourse with certain attributes. On the other hand, there will be strong or weak levels of status of trust and distrust. Whether the certain discourse is emotionally strong or weak will with no doubt help in understanding the levels of trust and distrust between states.

Japan’s Strategic Distrust on China
This paper tries to interpret distrust through explaining the discourse and activities of the two states. There will be quantitative data to verify the hypotheses. In terms of Japan’s strategic distrust on China, I have collected 27 documents (see appendix) published on MOFA of Japan’s website related to Japan-China maritime disputes. The general statistics of distrust discourse used in these documents is like this shown in the table. What can be concluded from the statistics would be that Japan clearly distrusts China on strategic issues. The appearances of “distrust” usage is much more than the “trust” ones (225-12). The most often usage of discourse are “Topple/change/challenge the status quo/ existing order (by force)” (31 times), “Escalation/escalate” (21 times), “(profoundly/extremely) dangerous” (18 times), “Unilateral/unilaterally” (17 times), “(extremely) provocative actions” (14 times), “(strong) protest” (28 times), “deep concerns” (22 times), and “Cannot/could not accept/ unacceptable” (18 times). A clear status of distrust could be observed through the comparison between distrust and trust discourse (see the table).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Words or sentences</th>
<th>Nature</th>
<th>Trust or distrust</th>
<th>Times of appearance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Topple/change/challenge the status quo/ existing order (by force)</td>
<td>Description of China’s activity</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escalation/escalate</td>
<td>Description of China’s activity</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(profoundly/extremely) dangerous</td>
<td>Description of China’s activity</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unilateral/unilaterally</td>
<td>Description of China’s activity</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(extremely) provocative actions</td>
<td>Description of China’s activity</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(extremely) regrettable</td>
<td>Description of China’s activity</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>(unduly) infringe the freedom</td>
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<td>distrust</td>
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</tr>
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<td>have serious impacts/serious problem</td>
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<td>distrust</td>
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<tr>
<td>cause unintended consequences</td>
<td>Description of China’s activity</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not transparent/ lacking transparency</td>
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<tr>
<td>have no validity</td>
<td>Description of China’s activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>does not follow the instructed procedures</td>
<td>Description of China’s activity</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intrusions</td>
<td>Description of China’s activity</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>extremely damaging</td>
<td>Description of China’s activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>lead to an unexpected occurrence of accidents</td>
<td>Description of China’s activity</td>
<td>distrust</td>
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<td>deeply deplorable</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>incorrect and entirely irrelevant</td>
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<td>Added up</td>
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<td>Japan’s attitude/Description of China’s activity</td>
<td>distrust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Added up</td>
<td>Description of China’s activity</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>trust</td>
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<td>Urge China to revoke</td>
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<td>Request China to fulfill its responsibility</td>
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<td>request a sincere response</td>
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<td>relationships</td>
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<td>(strongly) demand the prevention</td>
<td>Japan’s attitude</td>
<td>distrust</td>
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<td>will not tolerate</td>
<td>Japan’s attitude</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have strong doubts</td>
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<td>distrust</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>we would like China to provide thorough</td>
<td>Japan’s attitude</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>explanations</td>
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<tr>
<td>cannot at all accept China’s assertion</td>
<td>Japan’s attitude</td>
<td>distrust</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>overreaction</td>
<td>Japan’s attitude</td>
<td>distrust</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan is ready to maintain close communications with China in an effort to ease tensions.</td>
<td>Japan’s attitude</td>
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<tr>
<td>Added up</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trust</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>distrust</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trust</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Japan’s Moral Distrust on China**

In terms of Japan’s moral distrust on China, it is currently the secondary concern of the Japanese side. The moral trust and distrust would be based on whether moral norms could be respected. The moral norms in international relations represent the good wills of interstate behaviours. Therefore, if the expectation of one actor on its moral interests to be respected could not be fulfilled or even be threatened or damaged, moral distrust would be generated. Based on this theoretical framework, the standard of judging moral trust and distrust would be clear that certain discourse should be interpreted in terms of the principles of international moral norms.
There have been less discussions or criticism on moral issues from the Japanese official channel compared with the strategic issues. It is reasonable that firstly, these moral issues are not that crucial as strategic calculations, and in most cases countries might not take the risk of damaging bilateral relations to criticize another on its moral behaviours. Therefore, public opinion might reflect the overall distrust more clearly. For example, I will introduce some data from The 10th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll to verify the moral distrust.

In terms of the question of Reasons for Negative Impressions towards China, there are answers like “China’s action incompatible with international rules” (55.1%), “Criticism of Japan over historical issues” (52.2%), “Chinese media’s anti-Japan coverage” (41.1%), “Can’t understand Chinese people’s patriotic acts and views” (28.7%), “Different Political System” (25.7%) and “Chinese people’s entrenched nationalism” (18.4%) which are selected by the Japanese people. These are definitely the issues of normative values in international relations. When China fails to follow the values which are generally accepted by Japan, moral distrust would occur.

Another typical case might be reflected in the form of political correctness issue in international relations. To be specific, as China rejects the universal value such as western democratic system and human rights, which are also the core values of Japan, it would receive doubts and distrust. There would be arguments that the arc of freedom and prosperity raised by Japan was an example of distrusting China on these ideology issues.

Therefore, with these empirical evidences, it would be reasonable to say that Japan indeed distrusts China on strategic and moral issues and at the same time, strategic calculation would the priority within the two.

**China’s Moral Distrust on Japan**

On the other hand, China distrusts Japan on both strategic and moral issues as well. The theoretical framework would be similar with that of Japan’s part while the hypothesis being different that China is focusing more on the moral issues. The moral issues from the Chinese perspective would be the history disputes. One of the typical cases would be the Yasukuni Shrine issue as an example.

From China’s perspective, respecting the history especially the history of invading another state should be a basic normative value in international relations. Since Japan failed to do so, China’s moral distrust is created. China worries about Japan’s ambiguous attitudes toward the history issues for the assumption that Japan is intentionally avoiding the responsibility. Although Japan repeated its attitude of introspection in many occasions, its activities could ruin the words viewed by China. On one hand, the activities of politicians such as the Prime Minister visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and the possibility of abandoning the past Murayama Statement will increase the worry of China on whether Japan is trying to regain its ‘glory’ in the
Empire era. It is reasonable that this possibility is unacceptable for China which has always been treating itself as the victim of the war. On the other hand, despite of the concern on the Japanese government, the influences on the civil society from the activities are also crucial. The key issue would be that the future generations might have a different understanding on the history of the war. This concern origins from the activities of ‘whitewashing’ the history from the Chinese perspective. Therefore, China’s moral distrust on Japan could be understood as the distrust on Japan’s claims on its introspection and the possible future of Japan reviving its militarism.

Let’s take the Yasukuni Shrine case as an example. The last time when Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine was on 26/12/2013. From then to May 2014, there had been at least 14 documents recording the speeches of Chinese high level politicians (including Foreign Minister, Foreign Ministry Spokesman, and Ambassador to Japan and so on) and a great amount of other documents on lower levels discussing the Yasukuni Shrine issue. According to the quantitative calculation, the Chinese side had expressed its distrust on Japan through the usage of diplomatic discourse with very strong emotional expression. 79 appearances of distrust discourse would prove that the Yasukuni Shrine issue keeps being a core concern of China. Among these words and sentences, ‘Deny and even whitewash the history of invading others’ (10 times), ‘Challenge international / post-war order’ (9 times), ‘Wrong words and deeds’ (6 times), ‘Create obstacles’ (5 times), ‘Strongly condemn / protest’ (5 times), ‘Challenge the historical conclusions’ (4 times), ‘cause vigilance’ (4 times), ‘firmly oppose’ (4 times), ‘Damage bilateral relations’ (4 times) are the most frequently used discourse. There are significant characteristics showing that the discourse from high-level Chinese channels could explain the attitudes towards the Japanese side on historical disputes. Firstly, the essence of history disputes could be interpreted as its judgement that Japan would not follow the normative values of respecting history. Secondly, the amount of appearances was huge. Thirdly, many of the discourse are emotionally strong, which are unusual to be observed in diplomatic consequences if no serious problems existing. With these characteristics, distrust could be observed.

**China’s Strategic Distrust on Japan**

There would also be explanations on the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations from the perspective of China’s strategic distrust on Japan. Although the strategic distrust is not the priority for China, it still exists as a problem. To be specific, China’s strategic calculations on Japan would be the assumptions on whether Japan is reviving as a military power and / or will balance against China with the US-Japan alliance.

For a long period of time after the normalization of bilateral relations in 1972, especially before the 21st century, the strategic concerns would not be the core focus of China in its relationship with Japan. Although the Cold War might have caused tensions between the two former rivalries, the common external threat of Soviet Union was regarded as the main problem in the regional relations. Therefore, the two
states have experienced the ‘honeymoon’ and stable period in bilateral relations. At the same time, based on the rationality of states, the strategic trust / distrust would rely on the rational calculation of whether the other state could be a strategic threat for its own national interests. In this way, it is reasonable that China could have fewer strategic disputes with Japan in that certain period because there were fewer conflicts on national interests considering the huge gap between the comprehensive national power and goals of the two states.

However, the situation would be quite different in the recent years. Firstly, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there would be no common threats for China and Japan so that they might pay more attention on each other—as they are the two most powerful regional actors. Moreover, the rise of the China has greatly changed the comparison of national power in this region. China would have settled the strategic goals that match its national power while Japan would modify its foreign policies to deal with the rise of China. In this way, the main strategies of Japan, including seeking for a position as a normal state and strengthening the alliance with the US could cause distrust from China.

There will also be empirical evidences showing that strategic distrust would be the secondary concern of China. On one hand, there are existing discourse and activities of China showing its concerns including refusing to accept Japan as a permanent member of UN Security Council in 2005 and upgrading its military force especially its navy as a strategic plan. On the other hand, it would have to be admitted that the direct and indirect discourse from the Chinese side would be much fewer than the moral distrust ones.

An Evaluation on the Hypothesis of Asymmetric Mutual Distrust and the ‘Locked’ Sino-Japanese Relations

If we go back to the asymmetric framework of bilateral distrust, we could have several key findings. Firstly, the different core concerns in this structure would lead to the ‘locked’ China-Japan relations. This would lead to a basic question of how would distrust shape interstate relations. States, as the main actors in international relations, should always be responsible for the national interests. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult for one state to make compromises before its own concerns being dealt with by the other actor. However, in the China-Japan relations case, the priori concerns of the two states are not in the same fields and not at the same level. Japan’s distrust on strategic issues would not be the ‘serious problem’ for China and China’s distrust on moral issues would not be a core concern for Japan. Both the two states might not take actions to solve the problems of distrust from the other state without its own concerns being dealt with in the first place. In this way, both the two states would not tend to take unilateral actions to break the locked relationship.
The other core issue would be how the bilateral relations would affect the status of trust/ distrust between states. Staying in the status of mutual distrust, the states would tend to be more conservative. When incidents and problems occur in bilateral relations, the relations might get worsen because of distrust. At the same time, in the negative bilateral relations, the worries and concerns would be ‘verified’ when problems and incidents occur so that the status of distrust would go deeper. Therefore, the vicious circle would be created: every actor wants its own priorities to be handled firstly while not taking the first step to satisfy another state. As the priorities of Japan and China are not at the same level, it would be extremely difficult to find the comprehensive solutions to fit the demands of both the two states at the same time.

Whether Japan and China could find a way to get rid of the locked status relationship and the mutual distrust would be a question. Although it is extremely difficult to predict what actions the two states would take, there are some facts which are clear for us. Firstly, the second and third largest economies cannot just keep the relations in the current status—they are interdependent and have to cooperate in sustainable economic growth and regional affairs, which would be the interests for the whole international community. Secondly, the process of unlocking the relationship would be accompanied by the process of building mutual trust. Building trust would be a tough job between states, however, with no doubt the positive future of Sino-Japanese relationship would be based on solving the distrust issues. We can observe that the leaderships of the two states have successfully achieved highest level summits for 2 times in 2015. Although the summits might not be that successful, the communications could help on reducing misreading and misunderstandings. The locked China-Japan relations would last for a long time until the top concerns receive solutions, which seem not to come in the foreseeable future.
Bibliography


Appendix: the documents collected from MOFA and China’s Foreign Ministry website


Courtesy Call on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe by U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page4e_000050.html


Statements made by H.E. Mr. Kazuo Kodama, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN in exercise of the right of reply, following the statement made by H.E. Mr. Yang Jiechi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China at the General Debate of the 67th Session of the UN General Assembly on 27 September, 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un2012/un_0928.html

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Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hua Chunying,
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http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ch/fyrbt_602243/t1121139.shtml

Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei,

Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hua Chunying,

Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hua Chunying,

Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang,

Yang Jiechi’s speech on Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ch/zyxw_602251/t1112727.shtml

Wang Yi summoned the Japanese ambassador to launch the strong protest on Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ch/zyxw_602251/t1112220.shtml

Press Conference by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang,

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