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A Neoclassical Realist Account for Abe’s Attempt at the Constitutional Revision

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Abstract
Why did Japan recently begin a serious attempt to revise/reinterpret the constitution to allow the right to collective self-defence in the early 2010s? This is a serious research puzzle for the researchers of Japan’s International Relations. The primary aim of this paper is to put forward an alternative, yet theoretically rigorous explanation for it. The existing literature fails to explain why such an attempt was made in the early 2010s, not after the cold war or 9/11 when seemingly a window of opportunity was given. Nevertheless, Abe’s administration set it as a political agenda despite the absence of an apparent sea change in the international system. This paper employs a neoclassical realist approach with four ‘intervening variables’ – leaders’ image, domestic institutions, strategic culture and state-society relations. I argue that these variables mediate the influence of the international structure and are more effective in explaining the puzzle than structural realism and constructivism. Up until the second Abe administration started, a unique structure of domestic institutions and unpopularity of security policy that did not help in getting voters prevented the government from setting the constitutional reinterpretation. However, the LDP’s defeat of election in 2009 that led the unification of the party and Abe’s tactic manoeuvre of stabilising the government through another policy area such as ‘Abenomics’ as an effective election strategy finally enabled the cabinet to pursue the reinterpretation. This paper also sets itself apart from other studies of Japan’s international relations because of its rigorous theoretical application.

Keywords: Japan’s security, the constitution, Abe, collective self-defence
Introduction

Japan’s recent attempt to reinterpret/revise the constitution to allow the right of collective self-defence in the early 2010s is a puzzle for Japan’s International Relations scholars. From the realist perspective, it could have done so since the 1990s – posing a question as to the delay of response. On the other hand, constructivism cannot offer a satisfactory explanation regarding this somewhat radical attempt. Nevertheless, Abe’s administration set it as a political agenda despite the absence of an apparent sea change in the international system. This paper employs a neoclassical realist approach with four ‘intervening variables’ – leaders’ image, domestic institutions, strategic culture and state-society relations. I argue that these variables mediate the influence of the international structure and are more effective in explaining the puzzle than structural realism and constructivism. The purpose of this paper is to bridge the gap between structural realism and constructivism through the application of Neoclassical Realism. The paper finds that the constitution plays a crucial role in channelling international and domestic politics where contentious views, powers and institutions interact to construct a policy. It also specifically aims to address the conditions under which the constitutional reinterpretation takes place through the case of collective self-defence. This paper also sets itself apart from other studies of Japan’s international relations because of its rigorous theoretical application while maintaining an explanatory power.

Unanswered puzzles

Researchers in the field of Japan’s have long tried to examine under what conditions Japan’s response to the international system fluctuate - accelerate and decelerate the velocity - and whether there is a limit on the upward trend of remilitarization (Christopher W. Hughes, 2015b). It is true that on the contrary to the realist expectation, Japan did not quite well adjust to the change in the international system, which attributes to its characterisation of ‘structural anomaly’ (Waltz, 1979). Despite the apparent presence of threats of North Korea since the mid-1990s, Japan did not pursue any hard-balancing strategy. Nor did it take any practical measures to contain the initial phase of the rise of China at the same time. Japan did not pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and it does not possess any offensive weaponry as well as the military – only the quasi-military in the form of the Self-Defence Force with the strict prohibition of the use of force (Kliman, 2006). What it did instead was to upgrade defensive capability with strengthening the security alliance with the US (A. Oros & Tatsumi, 2010). It was not until 2010s efforts began to be made when the Cabinet invoked the constitutional revision to allow the collective self-defence to cope with both threats through the bilateral security cooperation with the US with the use of force (Christopher W. Hughes, 2015a, 2016). Given the clear absence of a realist-type of behaviour, it is as if ‘the lost decades’ in the security arena, giving a puzzle and frustration to realists with somewhat limited ‘remilitarisation’.

 Nonetheless, the puzzle has yet to be adequately addressed by other conventional IR theories or Foreign Policy Studies (FPS). Constructivism offers an explanation regarding the ‘complete absence of balancing behaviour’ in the 1990s. The so-called anti-militarism and its socially and legally institutionalisation had effectively prevented Japan from pursuing ‘normalcy’ with its static nature of norms, identity and culture (Berger, 1996; Katzenstein, 2008). Such a thesis notwithstanding, the
weakness surfaced together with the upward trend of defence upgrade with internationally expanded SDF roles. Indeed, it cannot capture a sense of radicalism that is most prominent when the constitutional reinterpretation took place to allow the right of collective self-defence for the wider participation in the international security with a possibility of use of force overseas (Catalinac, 2016).

FPS offers some keys to understand the internal dynamics of the delayed and limited response to the structure. Some argue conditions of security policy development is constituted by domestic political reforms and leadership (Shinoda, 2013a; Uchiyama, 2013). The enhanced authority of the prime minister and centralization of power on the cabinet has made it easier to push forward once-controversial security agenda such as the constitutional revision, adding up the explanatory power to the realist paradigm (Richard J Samuels & Schoff, 2014). On the other hand, the limited development can be made sense of the notion that the ‘pulling-buck’ influence of the public on such sensitive issues has been a major hindrance together with the rigidity of the constitution regarding the procedure of the revision (Hagström, 2010). The revision requires two-thirds seats of both houses with a national referendum – more than 50% of votes should be in favour. However, we are yet to confirm the causal mechanism between structural forces and a particular policy outcome. These studies may often end up a single case study with the absence of relevance to wider theoretical debate or generalisability.

In sum, the bigger research question we have is ‘why Japan’s response to the international system has not been as first as one would expect and even if it tried, why the response is limited’. This is a rather tricky question, particularly because the answer seems to lay middle ground between realist and constructivist interpretations. Moreover, a rough attempt with the lack of theoretical rigour may lose as solid a predictive value as it should have, whereas strict adherence to conventional IR theories does not come with sufficient explanatory power. FPS – albeit highlighting key perspectives – often lacks a theoretical relevance in the field of IR. In the next section, I would argue that in order to overcome the individual weaknesses and incorporate valuable insights into a theoretical framework, Neoclassical Realism will pave the way for establishing a theoretically rigorous framework with both predictive and explanatory values.

Neoclassical Realism and its application

Neoclassical Realism is helpful in comprehending the interplay between the international system and the domestic politics. In particular, this section not only sketches out the theoretical framework and analytical model but also argues that the constitutional reinterpretation serves as a channel between them within which ‘intervening variables’ interact to construct a policy outcome.

Neoclassical Realism shares a fundamental assumption of Structural Realism in that it assumes that structural force is by far the most influential in shaping a state behaviour (Lobell, Ripsman, & Taliaferro, 2009). However, it radically differs from neorealism in the sense that structural force is not exclusively determinant, rather the influence is mitigated by ‘intervening variables’ to incorporate domestic politics (Ripsman, Taliaferro, & Lobell, 2016). Therefore, the complexity of domestic politics in security policy-making can be effectively analysed within a realist paradigm (Rathbun, 2008).
The intervening variables include ‘leaders’ image’, ‘strategic culture’ ‘domestic institutions’ and ‘state-society relation’. As the definition of these will be discussed more in depth later, these variables can pave the way for accommodating the strength of FPS and constructivism. The former’s emphasis on institutions and leadership and the latter’s focus on norms and identity can be analysed through the concept of intervening variables.

Centred on the constitutional interpretation as a policy making process, the intervening variables helps understand and examine the causal mechanism between a cause (structural force) and an outcome (the allowance of the right of collective self-defence). First, domestic institutions refer to regulations and laws which determine a policy making process and hence delineating who are the key actors in policy making (Ripsman et al., 2016). For instance, as decision-making authority, the prime minister and the cabinet office are the highest bodies (Shinoda, 2013b). The structure of policy planning can be both from the cabinet or bureaucracy (George, 2012). Furthermore, the constitutional reinterpretation requires two-thirds approval in both houses. Thus, it helps determine and identify “institutionally who matters when”. Second variables are concerned ‘leaders’ image’ that what policy vision each key actor holds (Snyder, 2002). In order to analyse, the third variable – strategic culture – comes into play in that it serves as an analytical tool to examine the second variable. The existing literature suggests there are broadly four distinctive strategic cultures in Japan – normalist, US ally, UN-peace keeper and pacifist (Akimoto, 2013; Richard J. Samuels, 2007). Often in tandem with revisionism, normalist idea pursues the revision of the constitution to upgrade the SDF to the military with independence from the US (Soeya, Tadokoro, & Welch, 2011). The US ally sees the security alliance as a critical means to achieve security, while UN-centrists relish the thought of peace promotion through the UN-led missions or idea. Last, pacifism, albeit far less prominent, emphasise the rather backwards idea and stick to the original interpretation of the Pacifist Constitution – even not acknowledging the existence of the SDF and hesitate PKOs. The last variable is ‘state-society relations’ which examine the power relations within the domestic institutions – the public, coalition partner and opposition parties (Zakaria, 1998). For example, the government as of 2012 held a majority with the Komeitō, which is however opposed to the idea of ‘militarization’ and hence an extensive negotiation or compromise is necessary for the policy making (Robertson, 2013). The same goes for the opposition parties and the public. These groups might influence a policy plan and result in adjustment or abortive attempt of policy implementation (Midford, 2006).
Thus, drawing an overall causal mechanism between a cause and outcome with intervening variables starts with structural force as a cause – the rise of China and North Korea. These are perceived by the leaders’ image that is analysed through the lens of strategic culture to explain why a particular policy plan (collective self-defence) came up with the initial analysis of domestic intuitions to identify the key actors. However, as discussed, such a policy initiative might have to be compromised towards its making and implementation by the coalition partner, opposition parties and the public, which is to be examined by state-society relations to add a theoretically rigorous explanation to a particular policy outcome with rich empirical data. The relation and interaction of all of these can be showed as Figure 1.

Before moving on the actual application of Neoclassical Realism to Japan, it is imperative to situate the current interpretation(s) of the Constitution in the historical context so that we can assess how the allowance of collective self-defence as a policy outcome has relevance with the past. Furthermore, it helps to visualise the connection of the constitutional interpretation with security policy and posture, which enables us to grasp with the implication and of the future trajectory of it through the reinterpretation.

**The interpretation of the Pacifist Constitution: the accumulation of the past and indicator for the future**

By comparing the so-called pacifist constitution - seemingly even renounces the right of individual self-defence - to activities allowed by the right of collective defence, one can notice the fact that the upward trend of the security policy development in Japan can be a fundamental overturn of the Pacifist stance. The means for the expansion of the SDF role is the accumulation of the constitutional reinterpretations. Referring to Article 51 of the 1945 United Nations Charter, the right of collective self-defence is to defend other countries with the use of force (United Nations, 1945). Article 9 – the Pacifist clause – is as follows
“ARTICLE 9. (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.”

On the other hand, the current enactment of laws in 2015 to allow the right of collective self-defence, for instance, will allow the SDF to protect the US military with the possibility of the use of force through the Ballistic Missile Defence. How can it be possible to come thus far from the Pacifist Constitution through the interpretation? The short answer is the accumulation of the past constitutional reinterpretations to expand and enlarge Japan’s security role little by little. The Japanese government made otherwise unconstitutional decisions possible by institutionalising and legitimising interpretation into laws. To connect the dots for this seemingly inexplicable discrepancy between the Constitution and the allowance of collective self-defence is no mean feat given the length of the paper. Nevertheless, even sketching out does help to understand at least the dynamics of the past development, leading to the enactment of laws to allow the right of collective self-defence.

First, there was a need to legitimise the existence of the SDF – created under the US pressure in the aftermath of Korean War in 1954. This was achieved by interpreting that (individual) self-defence does exclude the minimum degree of military force for only self-defence in Japan’s sovereign territory – such as the direct military attack on Japan’s soil. This had rendered any SDF activities overseas and joint missions impossible. Since then, delineating the scope of ‘self-defence’ has been intensively negotiated and redefined with the tactical maneuver of the conditions to allow the use of force – an attack to fundamentally overturn of Japanese citizens’ constitutional right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and there is no other way of repelling the attack. Although this interpretation is predicated upon the assumption that such an attack is directly towards Japan, the enactment of law concerning the situations in ‘areas surrounding Japan’ (shūhen jitai hō), largely stretches the scope of the SDF, including sea and air. Furthermore, the PKO law in 1992 and anti-terrorism law in 2001 allowed the longstanding taboo to dispatch the SDF overseas to provide logistical support with no use of force. Therefore, to put it simply, the allowance of collective self-defence is a necessary step to enhance security capacity for further international security contribution. This is because the right of collective defence is a next step for expanding the definition of self-defence from areas surrounding Japan to the wider geopolitical arena and enlarging legal capacity for SDF’s activities overseas. From the historical vantage point, the current enactment of the right collective self-defence is neither ‘radical’ as is the widely purported media coverage nor the product of Abe’s efforts. Since the current security policy is the accumulations of the past interpretations, the progression of them serves as an indicator for the future as well. In the following section, the paper analyses the conditions regarding the constitutional reinterpretation in the case of collective self-defence with a Neoclassical Realist lens.
Neoclassical Realist account of the constitutional reinterpretation

Structural forces

There has been a presence of potential threats since the 1990s. Since 1994, North Korea has consistently shown hostility and launched some missile tests. Given the proximity to Japan and the range of its missiles, the perception of threat has increased substantially (A. Oros, L., 2017). Moreover, the double-digit growth of defence spending in China with the ambiguity of its purpose has imposed serious concerns on Japan’s policy makers (Ministry of Defense, 2014). In tandem with such growth, the relative decline of the US has been conspicuous, which has played a crucial role in providing security with Japan through the nuclear umbrella (Watanabe, 2016). A number of ways to address these threats exist, such as balancing strategy, increasing the military capabilities and strengthening the alliance with enhanced interoperability (Christopher W. Hughes, 2016). However, none of these is properly advocated due to the limits of constitutions. As discussed, the constitutional reinterpretation is a key to responding them. However, I would argue that the process of constitutional reinterpretation is a step-by-step and hence a time-consuming process, accounting for the delayed response that shall be explained through the intervening variables.

Domestic institutions – determining the key players

The close examination of the policy-making process of security policy and the relevant constitutional interpretation reveals the complexity and interrelated web of authority and power concentration. Regarding the policy planning phase, the cabinet law – revised in the early 2000s, states that the prime minister and the cabinet are primarily responsible for policy planning. Technically it would be entirely possible for the prime minister takes the initiative for policy planning. This is most represented by Abe’s establishment of Anpo Hösei Kon (the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of Legal Bases for Security) as a policy planning body to initiate the constitutional reinterpretation/revision in 2006 that was re-evoked when Abe returned to his premiership in 2012 (Iwama, 2013). Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are closely related to policy planning process, the voice of which is transferred through the relevant ministers (Hook, 2011). The upgrade of ministerial level from the Defence Agency in 2007 has given the authority to the Ministry in planning defence policy (George, 2012), while the MOFA has its own policy planning body such as Japan-US Security Treaty Division (Fukuyama, 2013). This suggests that an extensive coordination and negotiation might be necessary. A case in point is Hatoyama’s attempt at relocating the US Air Base in Futenma where conflictive interests between the prime minister and MOFA and MOD appeared in a rather conspicuous manner (C. W. Hughes, 2012; Lipsy & Scheiner, 2012; Shinoda, 2012). The responsibility for drafting relevant laws as a policy lies in the hands of the ministries. As each minister represents their ministry and the cabinet decision, if the ruling party takes the form of coalition, ministers from the coalition party also has to agree on the decision. Therefore, overlapping authorities requires a broader consensus accommodating interests of each governing body to reach an initial decision, known as ‘the cabinet decision’, which is in line with the characterization of ‘collective decision-making’ (Pempel, 1982)
What complicates more is the constitutional reinterpretation process as a policy-making phase. Since the process of enactment of laws has to go through the “examination-work” by the Legislative Bureau – what is famously knows as ‘hō no banniing” (the guardian of law) (Sakata & Kawaguchi, 2014). Moreover, in general, the enactment of law has to be approved by more than half of the members at both Upper and Lower houses (Neary, 2002). As of 2012, the LDP only held a majority in the Lower House, suggesting the potential abandonment of policy initiatives by the rejection of the Upper House – although in some case, the Lower House can override the decision of the Upper House. However, this also suggests that if a policy initiative is not supported by the members of the ruling party, holding a majority does not necessarily lead to the enactment of law. Furthermore, the Diet law adopts (150 days with the right to extend the period once) a period within which the Diet must reach a decision. Otherwise, a policy plan is discarded (House of Representatives).

Therefore, institutionally there are several conditions to enact a law as a security policy. First, arguably there may need a consensus in the Cabinet, the coalition party, ruling party, MOFA and MOD. Second, the consensus is turned into law that has to be approved by the Legislative Bureau. Third, the ruling party has to have a majority in both houses. Fourth, a decision concerning the submitted law at the Diet has to be settled within the period of 150 days.

Leaders’ image – different strategic culture but consensus on collective self-defence

As discussed, the key policy-making actors are the prime minister, the cabinet members (including the coalition party), MOD and MOFA. In this section, their leaders’ image is individually analysed concerning strategic culture. Prime Minister Abe’s image is closely linked with both the normalist view with his revisionist stance. As publicly opined, Abe’s ultimate aim is to revise the constitution to upgrade the SDF to the military and to reconcile historical issues (Kakizaki, 2015). When it comes to the cabinet members, the eradication of the tradition largely helped him to choose like-minded ministers. In the past, where the cabinet members were chosen based on the factional basis, it was hard to reach a consensus at the Cabinet in the first place (Uchiyama, 2013). Furthermore, Mikuriya (2015) argues that the catastrophic defeat of the 2009 general election against the DPJ has led the unification of the LDP and its members. For the MOD which has dedicated itself to legitimising the existence of the SDF, in general, an expansion of the SDF’s role is in favour (Eldridge, 2017). Since the US security alliance has paved the way for the constitutional reinterpretation and enlargement of the SDF activities, arguably the MOD is leant towards ‘US ally’ as a strategic culture. The same goes for the MOFA where apparently both ‘economic’ and ‘security’ factions exist (George, 2012). Berger, Mochizuki, and Tsuchiyama (2007) argue that the MOFA plays a crucial role in reconciling the conflictive interests with the US economically, and hence the strengthening the US alliance may reduce the need for economic compromise in return of security burden. Komeitō is the only party advocates Pacifism and strict opposition to wider active cooperation to the international security. Arguably the biggest obstacle for the constitutional reinterpretation is the Legislative Bureau. Due to the nature of its role to ensure the constitutional consistency of the proposed law, it, by definition, sticks to the Pacifist Constitution and hence Pacifism. In sum, in policy planning phase, it is necessary to reach an agreement with Komeitō and the Legislative Bureau in one way or another.
In policy enactment phase, much depends on the ‘political situation’ such as election and the government stability that are to be discussed through the variable of state-society relations in the following section.

**State-society relations – the opposition dynamics weakened institutionally**

Arguably the biggest adjustment was made through the negotiation with the Legislative Bureau and the Komeitō to allow the right of collective self-defence. Initial ideas were already established through the Abe-led research council, known as Anpo Hōsei Kon where why and how the collective self-defence should be allowed given the current strategic environment (Asahi Shimbun Seijibu, 2015). When this document written by the Council was submitted to the Legislative Bureau, it was rejected. In response, Abe employed the taboo-like means – appointing Abe’s like-minded, Komatsu Ichirō as the Chief of Legislative Bureau (Nikkei, 2013). Although this does not mean the negotiation became easier, it rather aimed to make the negotiation within the Bureau with Komatsu as a de facto insider so that the Legislative Bureau should provide a framework which both allows the right of collective self-defence and keeps the constitutional consistency. This is where the limited degree of collective defence was the main constitutional basis for the reinterpretation (Asahi, 2015b). The Legislative Bureau, in the end, agreed with the right of collective self-defence by stretching the conditions of self-defence force to the collective one. That is, due to the aggravating strategic environment, the minimum degree of self-defence is reduced to extend to the collective self-defence. Therefore, it means Japan could not evoke the right of collective self-defence unless attack to its ally may potentially cause harm to Japan’s territory as well.

Although institutionally the Komeitō became weak due to the consistent LDP’s victory of the general election in 2013 and 2014, Komeitō has close linkage with the religious group, Sōka Gakkai. It has long held the stance of pacifism and hence showed the firm stance of being against the collective self-defence. However, the negotiation, in the end, found the compromise with which both parties agree. Since Komeitō has the principle of “the sanctity of life”, it was compromised to add another condition that collective self-defence is allowed when there is an attack to fundamentally overturn of Japanese citizens’ constitutional right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness (Yomiuri, 2013). This led to the cabinet decision with the agreement of both the Legislative Bureau and Komeitō.

The remaining step was to push forward the bill at the Diet for which the LDP aimed to be institutionally able to enact the bill through the consistent victory of the election to secure enough seats. Abenomics – one of Abe’s key economic policy – has come in handy. Abe’s tactical manoeuvre of the election to turn the focal point to the evaluation of Abenomics, controversial bills of collective self-defence was tactically absent in the election campaign on purpose (Saltzman, 2015).

As expected, the cabinet decision was faced with extensive criticism and backlash from the citizens who were against the right to collective self-defence, followed by the drop of the public support rate of Abe (Yomiuri, 2015). In particular, the activities of opposition were intensified, followed by the memorial day of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs in August (Tokyo Shimbun, 2014). Abe decided not to take the issue forward immediately after the decision because of the concerns that immediate action
or discussion would exacerbate the opposition from the public. The debate between the LDP and New Komeitō stopped since the issue of the cabinet decision, not to mention bringing up it at the Diet meeting. This may have to do with the coming local election and the election of the governor of Okinawa, for which both parties cooperate (Asahi Shimbun Seijibu, 2015). According to the evidence, there was a broad consensus within the LDP, including Abe that the controversy and opposition would wane soon after time passes (Asahi, 2015a). Therefore, waiting for an opportunity was the choice Abe made, and energy was focused on further stabilising the government.

Abe announced the dissolution of the Diet in October in 2014 and call for a general election for extending the premiership. The LDP made the new taxation scheme and the evaluation of ‘Abenomics’ focal points of the election, and the issue of the right to collective self-defence was not on the manifesto or stated by the Abe when it comes to the election (Nikkei, 2014). The dissolution of the Diet is often initiated by a motion of no confidence or used as a de facto referendum. However, as there was not explicit account as to why the dissolution took place, the media called the call for an election as ‘Taigi naki Kaisan’ (the dissolution with no justification). As a result, despite the lowest turnout of the number of votes since the war, the LDP and the New Komeitō in total gained 324 seats in the lower house, securing two-thirds of seats (Yomiuri, 2014). Moreover, the weakening of the opposition parties helped the situation. Unlike before, there were no longer ‘ideologically’ complete opposite parties such as the former socialist party. The main opposition parties, DPJ and Ishin no Tō were both in fact not necessarily disagree with the constitutional reinterpretation, the DPJ’s opposition has much to do with the aim to reduce the popularity of the LDP to gain more seats. In the end, with the resources gained by the election, there was institutionally not much to do to overturn the policy making process by the opposition or the public. Despite severe demos of the public and harsh critique from the opposition parties, the bills were enacted to allow the collective self-defence in September 2015.

Conclusion

The application of Neoclassical Realism to the case of Japan, particularly the constitutional reinterpretation reveals that there are a number of causal mechanisms between structural force (cause) and the constitutional reinterpretation (outcome). In particular, the constitutional reinterpretation is a quintessential example to serve as a channel between international and domestic politics and an analytical lens to examine the interplay. The institutional obstacles with the constraints of the past interpretation give reasons as to why structural forces hitherto had not been properly reflected in an outcome. The examination of domestic institutions illuminates the difficulty to reach a consensus due to the nature of ideological difference and the role played by the Legislative Bureau. Moreover, as the constitutional reinterpretation regarding the SDF is still not welcomed by the public so that securing political stability through other means seems imperative to divert the attention of publicly unwelcomed policy and wriggle out of and keep at bay the opposition parties. Despite such an ordeal, it is also hard to deny that the public opposition has arguably waned, compounded by the disenchanted and weakened opposition parties, which helped pave the way for pushing for the legislative bills. These particularities – be it temporarily or not – account of what is referred to ‘radicalism’ in security policy development in Japan.
Although much depends on the domestic political situations, Japan’s security policy will be further expanded and enlarged through future constitutional reinterpretation or possibly the revision – making Japan lean towards more of a neo-realist type of behaviour. If this happens, the period of the post-cold war and the time of revising the constitutions will be characterised as ‘a slow, yet fundamental transformation into a normal country’ with the possibility of escalated tensions in the Asia-Pacific – the second Cold War.

Moreover, what is crucial to capture an overall trend of Japan’s security policy is the accumulation of the constantly evolving constitutional reinterpretations – to the policy makers, the collective self-defence is a logical extension in adjusting to the aggravating strategic environment. Therefore, the case study analysed in this paper elucidates a critical juncture where ‘incrementalism’ meets ‘particularities’ or what one might call ‘radicalism’ by highlighting conditions under which constitutional reinterpretation takes place to have a substantial impact on security policy in Japan. While some attribute the constitutional reinterpretation to Abe’s ideological stance and leadership, this paper puts forward that political particularities on an incremental foundation of the interpretations are largely responsible for, whereby Abe with his leadership and ideology works as a ‘last piece’ to complete the process. All in all, the conclusion departs from the existing literature that often drives a wedge between incrementalism and radicalism or constructivism and realism, in that it incorporates these contested debates into a single theoretical framework while preserving predictive values.

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The 1970s Global Food Crisis and the Securitization of Food in Japan

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Abstract
During the Allied Occupation, Japan imported notable amount of agricultural products from the United States through the food aid program, and even once it regained its independence, it continued to be a major market for the U.S. However, the world food crisis in the early 1970s highlighted the fragility of its food supply system and the risks linked to the high dependence on a single supplier. This led Japanese authorities to redefine the concept of national 'food security' and promote a supply diversification strategy, through investments and aid programs in the so-called 'new agricultural countries'. This article examines the impact of the 1970s global food crisis on Japan's national security discourse and on Japan's international relations. Drawing upon 'securitization theory' and 'food regime theory', this paper attempts to analyze how the 'food dependence' threat was perceived and how this perception influenced diplomatic and policy decisions of Japan's government. It will be suggested that these decisions highly influenced not only Japan's diplomatic relations but played also an important role in the transformation of the postwar international food regime.

Keywords: Japan's food security, Japan's international relations, Food regimes, Securitization, non-traditional security.
1. Introduction: Japan's "food problem"

Food security has been a crucial issue in Japan's postwar politics, as the food self-sufficiency rate of the country has constantly declined since 1945, reaching the 39% in 2015, the lowest percentage among industrialized countries (MAFF, 2015). However, this is by no means a new situation. Concerns about food supplies have been a constant element of Japanese politics since the country opened its ports to world trade in the second half of 1800s. During the first decades of Meiji period, agriculture was the dominant sector in Japanese economy and food products accounted for over one third of total volume of exports, but, by the beginning of 1890s, Japan found itself obliged to increase food imports as it was witnessing a typical Malthusian situation, with the population increasing beyond agricultural productivity (Kawashima, 2010, p. 26 and p.165).

After the colonization of Taiwan in 1895 and Korea in 1910, Japanese authorities decided to build an empire that was self-sufficient in raw materials, including food, in order to limit dependence on food imports. As such, Korea and Taiwan were transformed into Japan's "agricultural appendages" (Ho, 1984, p. 350). The Japanese strategy significantly altered the agricultural sector of these territories, shifting them towards export-oriented food production. Consequently, in the period between 1918 and 1932, rice transfers from Korea and Taiwan rose from 38.8% to 63.2% and from 15.4% to 25.0% respectively, whereas imports from other areas decreased from 45.8% to 11.8% (Francks, 2007, p. 170).

The defeat in 1945 put an end to this system and Japan was occupied by the Allied Forces. During this time, Japan imported notable amount of agricultural products from the United States under the food aid program, and even once it regained its independence in 1952, it continued to be a major market for the U.S.

However, the world food crisis that broke out at the beginning of 1970s brought back to Japan memories of the first years of the postwar period, when it lost access to the resources from colonies, on which it highly depended. This situation pushed Japanese authorities to develop a new strategy aimed at guaranteeing a stable and secure source of food supply, through a redefinition of the concept of "food security".

This paper examines the impact of the 1970s global food crisis on Japan's national security discourse and on Japan's international relations. In particular, drawing upon "securitization theory" and "food regime theory", it will be analyzed how the "food dependence" threat was perceived by Japanese authorities and how this perception influenced diplomatic and policy decisions. It will be suggested that these decisions highly influenced not only Japan's diplomatic relations but played also an important role in the transformation of the postwar international food regime.

2. Theoretical framework: 'Food regimes' theory and 'securitization' theory

Food regime theory was first developed by agrarian sociologists Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989). A simple definition of "food regime" is given by Friedmann, who describes the concept as a
"rule-governed structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale" (Friedmann, 1993, p. 30). The key innovation of this theory has been the capability to situate the dynamics of the agri-food sector in a world-historical perspective. Friedmann and McMichael identified three global food regimes in history.1 The first food regime, also called "colonial diasporic food regime", covers the period between 1870 and 1930,2 when, within a general rhetoric of free trade and the system of the gold standard, European countries imported cheap tropical products such as sugar, coffee, tea and tropical oils, from their colonies and from settler states like the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, in exchange for capital and manufactured goods (Friedmann, 1992, p. 242). The second food regime, called "mercantile food regime", started in the 1950s and lasted until the 1973 food crisis. This regime saw the emergence of the United States as the new world agricultural power, thanks to the results of agricultural policy implemented after the economic depression in the 1930s that increased American production, thus generating food surpluses. In order to dispose of agricultural surpluses, "food aid" was created as a policy instrument. Foreign economic aid was based on the role of the dollar under the Bretton Woods monetary system. Within this system, the U.S. started to distribute food surpluses to countries that were facing food shortages, such as Europe with the Marshall Plan or Japan. Food aid was not only a solution to the domestic agricultural situation; it also served as a foreign policy instrument. Particularly in the context of Cold War rivalry with the U.S.S.R., it was used as an instrument of containment, by strengthening ties with recipient countries (Friedmann, 1993, pp. 39-42).

During the second food regime, Japan became highly dependent on agricultural imports from the United States. The loss of its colonies meant for Japan the loss of its principal sources of food and the Japanese experienced a situation of deprivation and sacrifice. At the beginning, mass starvation was not considered a priority problem by the U.S. government and Japanese alone were made responsible for avoiding "acute economic distress" (Fuchs, 2007). However, in May 1946, when several protests demanding for food spread quickly around the country, Washington agreed to dispatch several ships of rice and wheat to Japan. But it was the emergence of the Cold War, around 1947, which led to a significant change in the international arena, and also influenced the American occupation strategy in the archipelago. The U.S. sought to bring Japan into the anti-Soviet line of defense in Asia and gradually abandoned the policy of constraining the

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Japanese economy. The U.S. helped Japan through two aid-programs: the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) program and the Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Areas (EROA) program. These two programs provided Japan with food, raw materials and machinery.

Even once the occupation ended, Japan continued to import agricultural goods from the U.S. through food aids. On March 8, 1954, the two governments signed the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, under Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 for the sale of American surplus wheat, valued at $50 million. On July 7, 1954, the U.S. promulgated the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, also known as Public Law 480 or PL480 and Japan signed two agreements with the United States under this law. The first was signed on May 31, 1955 and provided for sales of wheat and barley, as well as tobacco and cotton, valued at $85 million. The second was signed on February 10, 1956 and provided agricultural commodities worth $65.8 million. The aim of these agreements was twofold: on the one hand, it enabled the U.S. to dispose of its agricultural surpluses and Japan to buy the food needed at a convenient price; on the other hand, the agreements strengthened the military alliance between the two countries, allowing the United States to build up military infrastructure at the U.S. bases in Japan and allowing Japan to rebuild its arms industry. Between 1954 and 1964, Japan received $445 million in PL480 food aid and imported $10.8 billion of food from conventional trading channels (Moen, 1999: 35). As such, Japan became the number one importer of U.S. food and its food self-sufficiency rate started to decline steadily.

As we will see more in details later, the second food regime entered into crisis in 1973, when the world faced the biggest food crisis since 1945. In 1972, in the climate of détente, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. made a deal over the sale of wheat and other grain commodities. This deal created an unexpected shortage of grain on the international market, noticeably pushing food prices up (Luttrell, 1973). As such, the main feature of the second food regime - food surpluses - disappeared and a new regime emerged. There is some debate in the literature about the contours of the third food regime (Friedmann, 2009; Pechlaner and Otero, 2009). However, two characteristics deeply distinguish this regime from the previous one: (1) the emergence of new centres of food production in developing countries (mostly in Latin America and Asia), the so-called "new agricultural countries" (N.A.C.s); and (2) the creation of new commercial relations led by transnational agribusiness corporations that have undercut the ability of single states to regulate their domestic agriculture and trade (McMichael, 1992).

"Security" has been defined as an "essentially contested concept" (Buzan, 1983, p. 6), because it is not objectively definable and inherently disputed. For long time,
the discipline of International Relations has associated the concept exclusively with the territorial and political integrity of the state (Walt, 1991). In this sense, these studies focused mainly on the so-called "traditional" threat, e.g. "military". During the 1980s, Critical Studies have challenged this understanding, suggesting that there are other "non-traditional" threats such as environmental degradation, economic recessions and population growth that cannot be dealt with the traditional way.

The Copenhagen School has played a fundamental role in broadening the concept of security after the Cold War. The scholars of the School basically argued that threats to national security should not only be conceived in military terms, rather they should be securitized by the relevant actor before it can be regarded as security issue. (Waever, 1989, p 107). In that context, the School has developed a framework that can be applied in all areas by focusing on the process of classifying a threat, named "theory of securitization" (Waever, 1989, 1995; Buzan, de Wilde, Waever, 1998). The School first define the security issue as a problem presented as an existential threat to an object to be determined. According to them, securitization is "radically constructivist" and does not question what threat really is; rather, the constructivist approach takes a security issue as if made by act of securitization. In other words, the scholars of the School underline that: "When a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is 'normal politics', we have a case of securitization" (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998, p. 25). However, presenting something as an existential threat is not a securitization. Only when the issue is accepted by the audience and emergency measures are authorized to fight that threat does the issue becomes entirely securitized. (Buzan, People, State, Fear, p. 46). In this way, every issue can be transformed into an existential threat and it can become the justification to extraordinary measures by the state or other securitizing actor.

The "food regime theory" and the "securitization theory" are particularly useful to assess and understand the impact of 1970s food crisis on Japan's food security policies. The historical framework offered by food regime theory will help to reveal the main features of the international food system and to understand Japanese food dependence from an international perspective and how Japan contributed to the maintenance and the change of this system. At the same time, the "securitization theory" will be used to describe the process by which Japanese authorities have securitized the food issue, making the food dependence from imports a threat to Japan's national food security.

3. The 1970s food crisis

At the start of the 1970s, the American economy was hampered by a strong inflation. On August 15th 1971, president Richard Nixon announced the New Economic Policy, which ended dollar convertibility to gold and implemented a price control system. The New Economic Policy marked the beginning of the end of the Bretton Woods international monetary system and temporarily halted inflation (U.S. Department of State. Office of Historians). However, from January 1973, consumer prices grew considerably as result of the growth of foodstuffs prices. This increase was connected to the rise in meat consumption in Europe and
Japan that, in turn, provoked an increase in world demand of grains for fodder.

But, there was another important event in 1972 that had a significant impact on the global relations of food trade and that is remembered with the name of "the Great Grain Robbery": it is the grain deal between the U.S. and the U.R.S.S., signed on July 1972. According to the food regime theory, this deal can be considered as the main cause of the crisis of the postwar food regime (Friedmann, 1993, p. 99). Because of a bad harvest, at the beginning of 1970s, the Soviet Union were obliged to ask help to the United States, the main grain producers in the world at that time.

Taking advantage of the ongoing process of détente, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger used agricultural exports as a major instrument for furthering both farm and foreign policy interests, and building a new U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship. In July and August 1972 six U.S. export companies contracted with Exportkhleb (the Russian trading agency) to sell over 400 million bushels of U.S. wheat valued at about 700 million dollar. Each contract was fixed price, calling for shipment of U.S. wheat from the 1972-73 crop (USDA, 1974, p. 6). To facilitate the sale of U.S. grains, the United States and the Soviet Union signed on July 8, 1972, "the largest long-term commercial trade purchase agreement ever made between two countries" and the U.R.S.S. agreed to buy a total of $750 million worth of American grain during the three-year period beginning August 1, 1972 (U.S. Government, 1972, p. 1142). The sales would make the Soviet Union the second largest purchaser of American grain, just after Japan (USDA, 1972, p. 145). Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saw this agreement as "a major step forward in the conclusion of more comprehensive arrangements in other fields as well" (U.S. Government, 1972, p. 1144). However, the hope for a more comprehensive collaboration quickly faded away. The U.S.S.R. purchased the entire contracted $750 million worth of grain in the first year of the agreement, using its credits to the fullest extent possible. Then, using its hard currency reserve, Moscow bought nearly $500 million of additional grain. As result in 1972-73 crop year, the Soviet Union bought around 30 million metric tons of grain, which amounted to three quarters of all commercially traded grain in the world at that time (Friedmann, 1993, p. 40). The scale of this transaction was so high that it created a sudden shortage in American grain surpluses, which were the pivot of the postwar international food regime. Moreover, world food production declined because of poor weather conditions worldwide. The consequences were devastating for American economy as the surplus shortage sent grain prices soaring, pushing the inflation up. For this reason, the U.S. government was to pay large grain companies $333 million in export subsidies and over $46 million in shipping subsidies to help move the grain to the U.S.S.R (Porter, 1984, p. 6).

As a response to this crisis, Nixon administration imposed several export embargoes on agricultural goods between 1973 and 1975. In particular, on June 27, 1973, Secretary of commerce Fredrick B. Dent, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz, declared "the most dramatic food policy decision of 1973" (Destler, 1978, p. 627): a complete, temporary embargo on American exports of soybeans, cottonseeds, and other agricultural products. In the intentions of the government, this decision had the only purpose of controlling food prices at home. However, though it proved to be short-lived, it had serious negative impact on American foreign policy. The so-called "soybean embargo" "challenged the
credibility of the U.S. commitment to free trade among nations and its reputation as a reliable supplier of farm products and the government's failure to communicate to its allies its intentions to impose restrictions raised serious doubts in Europe and Japan (USGAO, 1974, p. 7).

The post-war food regime based on American surpluses had come to an end.

4. The impact of the crisis on Japan and its response: "resource diplomacy" and "comprehensive security"

The 1973 embargo on soybean exports affected Japan significantly, as over 90% of the imported soy came from the U.S., while Japan accounted for over 20% of American soybean exports (USITC, 1983: 5). The day after the announcement of the embargo, the Minister of Agriculture of Japan, Sakarauchi Toshio, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ōhira Masayoshi, called the U.S. ambassador in Japan, Robert Ingersoll, to discuss about soybean embargo. They specifically requested Japan be permitted to receive all of the 660 thousands tons of soybeans on contract for shipment to Japan between July and September of that year (US Department of State, 2005a). Sakurauchi also said that the soybean issue was most worrisome because it revived fears about U.S.-Japan trade problems that might seriously damage relations between the two countries (Ibidem). Ingersoll, for his part, replied that the U.S. would have tried to meet Japan's demand for a stable supply of soybeans and he also mentioned that the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz had stated that "he would give special consideration to agricultural exports to Japan" (Shurtleff, History of soybeans, p. 1711).

As previously mentioned, the embargo proved to be short-lived since it lasted only a few days - from June 27 to July 2 - and it was soon replaced by a system of export control until October of the same year. From a mere agricultural and economic point of view, the embargo did not change Japanese food imports nor did it provoke an increase in food prices, but the psychological effects were notable. For the first time in the post-war period, Japan understood the fragility of its food supply system and the risks associated to heavy dependence on a single supplier. In early 1974, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, during a five-days visit in Japan, announced that the embargo on soybean exports was a mistake and that the U.S. "should never impose an embargo again" (U.S. Department of State, 2005b). Also President Nixon admitted that the embargo "might have been good for domestic politics" but it was "disastrous" in terms of foreign policy, impairing relationship with Japan (U.S. Department of State, 2011, Memorandum 179). President Ford as well, during the visit of Japan's Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei in Washington on September 21, 1974, and on his visit in Tokyo, on November 19, 1974, assured Japanese that U.S. was a reliable supplier (Ibidem: Memorandum 195 and 198). On August 12, 1975, Earl Butz encountered in Washington, DC his Japanese counterpart, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Abe Shintarō. The document that emerged from this meeting, known as the "Butz-Abe gentlemen's agreement", sought to improve the stability of U.S.-Japanese agricultural trade relations by setting minimum annual quantities of wheat, feed grains, and soybeans that the United States would supply to Japan in the following three years. The approximate amount was 3 million metric tons of wheat, 3 million tons of soybeans, and 8 million tons of feed grains (USDA, 2009, p. 11). From the U.S.
point of view, the Butz-Abe gentlemen's agreement served to attempt to restore Japan's confidence in U.S.'s reliability as a supplier of agricultural products. However, as we have already pointed out, the embargo had a deep and lasting psychological effect.

Japanese government was not only concerned about the economic aspect of food dependency, but it was worried also about the use of food as a political and diplomatic weapon by the United States. In the August of 1974, a month before the World Food Conference held in Rome, a report from CIA came to the conclusion that "the U.S.'s near-monopoly position as food exporter would have an enormous, though not easily definable, impact on international relations [and] (i)t could give the U.S. a measure of power it had never had before" (CIA, 1974, p. 39). The Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, as well, declared: "Food is a weapon. It is now one of the principal tools in our negotiating kit" (Weinstein, 1975).

The 1970s crises (food and energetic) brought back to Japan memories of the first years of the postwar period, when it lost access to the resources from colonies, on which it highly depended. This situation led the then Prime Minister, Tanaka Kakuei, to pursue a more proactive foreign policy, going beyond the framework of bilateralism with the United States. From the point of view of agricultural and food imports, Japan launched an independent and vigorous campaign of "resource diplomacy", as a way to re-establish its access to these vital supplies. The Japanese government thus decided to launch a food diversification strategy, encouraging joint public-private ventures to consolidate alternative food sources. During the 1970s and the 1980s, Japan applied the principle of kaihatsu-yunyū (literally "development and imports") for Official Development Assistance (ODA) projects. One of the main purpose of "resource diplomacy" was to enhance "comprehensive security". These two concepts have been the subject of a vast and rich literature but they have seldom been applied to food imports and food security, as most of these studies have focused on oil and energy imports (Nakajima, 2015; Shiratori, 2015; Morse, 1981). Hereafter, we will attempt to analyze the two concepts from the point of view of Japan's food security policies.

The concept of "comprehensive security" broadened the traditional meaning of "security", putting emphasis on economic and diplomatic means for pursuing national security. As it was pointed out, Japan was an "economic giant" but with a big limitation of resources. The expression "comprehensive security" emerged in Japan at the beginning of 1970s, when the oil and food crises enhanced the perception of insecurity due to the a high dependence from external markets.

During the 1970s, many governmental reports about the redifinition of national security were published. But it was in 1978, when prime minister Ōhira established the Research Group for Comprehensive Security, that it was systematically developed. In 1980, the Group published its final report (Report on Comprehensive Security). The report put the accent on the changes that took

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5 Among them, we can cite these reports published by the Minister of Industry and Trade: 'A vision on the resource problem (shigen gaikō no tenbō), 1971; 'Our country economic security (wagakuni keizai anzen hoshō), 1974; 'Research about Japan's economic security (Nihon keizai sekyūritei ni kan suru kenkyū), 1974.

6 The full text in Japanese is available at:
place in the international system since World War II, and also sought to widen the concept of national security. The report suggested that national security needed to be considered as «the protection of people's life from external threats» and not only as the protection from military invasion. In this perspective, the report mentioned six areas of national security, and one of these was food security. According to the report, the main threats to Japan's national food security were: interruption of food supplies (such as embargoes), bad harvests in producing countries, bad diplomatic relations between producing and consuming countries, increasing of world population. The report suggested that, in order to achieve national food security, it was not sufficient to increase national production and to have good relations with producing countries, but Japan should have also diversified its food suppliers, by investing in the so-called "new agricultural countries (N.A.Cs)" through direct investments and development aids, increasing world food production.

In the light of this document, it is easy to understand how "resource diplomacy" was an instrument used by Japanese government for achieving national food security. Japanese authorities used ODA funds to promote agricultural development in developing countries (Hilmann and Rotherberg, 1988, pp. 46-7) and, through tax incentives, the government tried to help Japanese agribusiness corporations to invest in these countries in order to produce food to import to Japan (Hongo and Hosono, 2012, p. 3). The most famous of these projects is probably the PRODECER, a 22-year program started in 1979 for the development of soybean production in Cerrado, a vast area in central Brazil. The Japanese government provided 28 billion yen of ODA for the transformation of over 334,000 hectares of Cerrado into soybean farmland. Thanks to Japanese investments, in few years, Brazil became one the principal producers of soybean and recently it has become the first soybean exporter in the world, pushing the U.S. at the second place (FAOSTAT).

5. Conclusion

After the defeat in 1945 and the loss of its colonies, Japan became highly dependent on food and agricultural imports from the United States. But it was only in 1973, after the soybean embargo, that Japanese authorities started to consider this dependency as a threat and to securitize the food issue. As it has been pointed out, the embargo never affected Japan's supply nor there was any kind of food shortage, for this reason in this article we claimed that the threat posed by the embargo - and, more in general, by the dependency from food imports - was more a perception than a real one.

Through the development of the concept of "comprehensive security", the government made food security an integral part of the strategy to ensure national security. As we have seen, the "resource diplomacy" was the instrument implemented to achieve the "comprehensive security". In particular, from the point of view of food security, Japan played a primary role in the transformation

of the international system of food trade and tried to preserve its own food security by the diversification of food supplies and investment in new food production in every corner of the globe, posing a major challenge to U.S. supremacy in food exports. This last aspect will undoubtedly merit consideration for further research.
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