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**Fostering Moral Competence with KMDD® (Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion) - New Opportunity for Moral & Democratic Education**

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**Abstract**

*Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion* (KMDD®) introduced by Professor Dr Georg Lind from University of Konstanz, Germany, is one of the most effective and well-documented methods of fostering moral development, namely moral competence which is defined as the ability to solve problems and conflicts on the basis of universal moral principles through thinking and discussion, instead of using violence, deceit and force. KMDD® is based on the idea of providing discursive situations in which people would find themselves respected valuing members of a democratic society. Every KMDD® session must always be embedded in positive emotions, atmosphere of open communication, mutual respect and empathy. KMDD® is not just a training of some social skills. With KMDD® morality and democracy can be taught effectively and sustainably. It can be used in all ages, all cultures and religions for training of pupils, students, teachers and educators. After just one or two sessions of *Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion* a measurable and sustainable effect occurs which can be examined with the *Moral Competence Test* (MCT®). The test has been designed to measure the effectiveness of the method, but not for measuring personal morality (individual morality cannot be judged with external standards). KMDD® is recognized in over forty countries all over the world where it is used to promote morality and democracy among people through discussion and cooperation. KMDD® is supported by research studies and certification programs which ensure its high quality and confirm its high educational potential.

Keywords: *Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion*, KMDD®, moral competence, Dual-Aspect Model of Moral Behavior, moral development
Introduction

Promoting moral and democratic development and fostering moral competence is one of the most urgent tasks of education all over the world. Recent studies examining the importance of moral education for the general development points out its practical character which is in accordance with the theory of virtues. It defines personal morality as the ability which can be shaped by appropriate stimulation and which leads to a certain interpersonal competencies connected with human relationships. It requires the ability to deal with everyday moral dilemmas and to implement behaviors compatible with individual moral reasoning and emotions. Even the social-cognitive theories of moral development primarily focused on the role of cognitive factors in the process of shaping individual morality and the restructuring of moral reasoning patterns do not perceive cognition as the one and the only factor sufficient to achieve this goal (Kohlberg & Mayer 1972). Proper moral development cannot consist only of cognitive structure shaping, and therefore - moral reasoning ability. This conclusion has become the starting point for establishing many educational methods dedicated to support moral development focusing not only on its cognitive aspect. At present, one of the most and well-studied, but at the same time relatively unknown method of fostering moral development not based exclusively on cognitive development is Konstanz Method of Dilemma-Discussion (KMDD®). It was designed in Germany by Georg Lind at the University of Konstanz. Learning experiences related to participation in KMDD® discussions support - as it is suggested by the author - moral competence, which should be understood as the ability to make decisions and moral judgments and to act in concert with them (Lind 2002). Lind claims that KMDD® supports not only moral but also democratic competence. It is a part of moral behavior consistent with cognitive and affective components, as well as with the whole context of democratic principles of social cohesion that define human behavior in the social world. In other words, moral competence is the ability to apply moral judgments in the decision-making practice of everyday life within democratic society. Just as it is difficult to imagine moral behavior impassively subordinated only to the sphere of thinking, it is equally difficult to imagine a morally important situation assuming only a simple calculation of profits and losses as a basis for choosing a specific action by an experienced moral subject. Life practice shows a different tendency. We cannot deny the existence of moral dilemmas in everyday life. Morality in the most practical sense consists of making choices in face of moral dilemmas and behaving morally in accordance with our choices. We have to deal with dilemmas relatively more often than we think. Choice is never a simple result of a quantitative comparison of the given alternatives. It results from complex cognitive and affective processes that take into account the whole social and communicative context of democratic coexistence. On this issue, G. Lind refers to the communication theory of Jürgen Habermas and his proposal of the definition of democratic discourse through non-violent communication acts (Habermas 1984). Moral development is subject to learning processes by performing specific actions in the practice of everyday life (Lind 2002). Thus, G. Lind's concept fulfill all demands of John Dewey's progressive pedagogy for which education was an inherent part of democratization processes (Dewey 1916). The assumption of the existence of the ability to shape moral competence through specific educational influences based on democratic principles and communication skills is the basis of the Konstanz Method of the Dilemma Discussion (KMDD®). It is a response to the urgent need for moral-democratic education in postmodern fluid reality where successful promotion of moral competence is one of the major
challenges. KMDD® method may be considered as a result of the polemics with well-known studies by Moshe Blatt and Lawrence Kohlberg (1975) on discussing moral dilemmas at schools. M. Blatt and L. Kohlberg, have hypothesized that the most effective support of moral development of a young person could be accomplished by presenting him/her some moral conflicts involving thinking structures of a higher level than the present stage of his/her moral reasoning level. Presented dilemma cannot exceed the cognitive ability of the student, but must be also a specific challenge that he/she will be able to handle with. G. Lind challenges the homogeneity of M. Blatt and L. Kohlberg's assumptions and suggests a model which simultaneously supports two aspects of moral and democratic behavior: cognitive and affective. It is described by the Dual-Aspect Model of Moral Behavior.

**Georg Lind's Dual-Aspect Model of Moral Behavior and Educational Theory of Morality**

KMDD® method is based on the Dual-Aspect Model of Moral Behavior, also called the theory of two aspects or the two-sided theory of moral action (Lind 1985, 2000). Within his theory, Lind proposes a thesis of the highest importance of moral competence for the overall moral development, but not only in its cognitive but also affective aspect (e.g. ideals, attitudes, emotions) (Lind 2016). Moral competence is a tendency of man to participate in common communication space without using of strength or mutual violence. Lind's theory criticises the classical cognitive-developmental approach, which considers the cognitive-structural aspects largely independent of affective factors. G. Lind, by referring to the J. Piaget's cognitive-affective parallelism, questions the primacy of the cognitive structure over the affective aspect in the model of moral behavior. He assumes that cognitive and affective factors are two inseparable and always coexisting aspects of every human moral behavior (Lind 1985). They are not even separate components that develop in parallel way, as James Rest have proposed (Rest 1973, 1979). These aspects cannot be separated, neither from behavior nor from one another. Lind argues his conviction in reference to Jean Piaget's (1981) approach, which have pointed to the importance of the individual's own activity in the process of development, and further emphasized the importance of qualitative changes in thinking over changes at the structural level of reasoning. These changes manifest throughout two aspects of one phenomenon (moral behavior): emotions (motives, orientations, attitudes, ideas) and cognition (moral competence/moral judgment competence). While creating this concept, G. Lind was leaning on L. Kohlberg's definition that claims moral judgment competence is the capacity to make decisions and judgments which are moral (i.e., based on internal principles) and to act in accordance which such judgments (Kohlberg 1964, p. 425). Lind saw this breakthrough within the understanding of morality as something derived from attitudes and values acquired through learning and from something biologically or culturally determined. This way of defining moral competence guarantees a parallel understanding of moral behavior as a derivative of the accepted and internalized moral principles, rather than the processes of adapting to external norms (in the cognitive and developmental approach it was introduced as the socio-moral perspective). Thus affective, cognitive and behavioral aspects have been integrated by Lind within the definition of moral competence which describes it as the ability to solve problems and conflicts on the basis of universal moral principles through thinking and discussion, instead of using violence, deceit and force (Lind 2016, p. 45). In terms of practice, this implies the ability of the subject to reflect
thoughtfully and conduct an adequate discourse. The practical dimension of that systematic view on moral development introduced by G. Lind is Konstanz Method of Dilemma-Discussion - KMDD®. Long-term studies on the Dual-Aspect Model of Moral Behavior have shown that moral development and moral behavior can be fostered through educational interventions (Lind 2004, 2008, 2011). This became the basis for the formulation of Lind's Educational Theory of Morality (Bildungstheorie der Moralentwicklung). G. Lind believes that moral development requires more than understanding and adapting to general social norms (by learning). Moral competence is more required since it allows the individual to apply moral principles to specific events and to resolve moral conflicts in situations of incompatibility of everyday practice (Lind 2002). Competence is a concept broader than the ability. It refers not only to learning processes of what has not been known before, but also to the wider context of already known reasoning and more familiar relationships or actions (motivational processes, past experiences, abilities or individual emotionality). Hence, the concept of competence is strongly embedded in a practical and dynamic context. Therefore, moral competence can be stimulated by appropriately adapted educational interventions. However, they cannot be identical with the knowledge which is just one of many aspects of competence. According to G. Lind the absence of proper moral education can lead to the regression in moral development of an individual (Lind 2000). The cognitive-development approach does not take it into any consideration. The response of G. Lind to the question of how moral development can be fostered is the KMDD® method (Lind 2010). Although the method itself originally evolved from the dilemma discussions proposed by M. Blatt and L. Kohlberg, after many years of research and numerous modifications made by G. Lind and other scholars KMDD® became relatively independent from cognitive-developmental approach. Most of the research and educational programs are aimed at stimulating justice based moral reasoning. For G. Lind it is much more important to argue with judgments that oppose one's own opinion than to deal with a dilemma just representing higher level of moral thinking of a certain kind. The purpose of discussion in the KMDD® method is not only to stimulate moral reasoning, but at the same time to promote moral and democratic competences which reinforces democratic society in many different ways. In real life situations, the declarative level of moral development does not count as much as the practical ability to deal with a particular moral problem. The fact that someone is very keen on the issue of freedom or democracy does not mean that he or she is guided by the principles that characterize his or her reasoning. Moral-democratic competences are more than conflict resolution techniques and more than good interpersonal skills. Such abilities are also very useful, but they cannot replace what G. Lind describes as inter-subjective consensus on mutually recognized ethical foundations and empathic understanding of each other for genuine co-operation. Development of such competences is a problem of most of educational systems all over the world, regardless of local socio-cultural determinants (Lind 1986, 2016). Overcoming the need to defend one's position and making a step into cooperation between people during the discussion is a great challenge for global and local moral education worldwide.

What is Konstanz Method of Dilemma-Discussion?

Konstanz Method of Dilemma Discussion - KMDD® - is a method supporting ethical and moral-democratic education. Its most distinctive feature is the idea of constructive, discursive and dialogical learning as its aim (Lind & Nowak 2015).
Constructivism as a leading idea of the KMDD® method lies in the teacher's obligation to prepare an educational moral dilemma that will be made-to-measure to the group of debaters, then to present the dilemma to this group. During the main discussion - paradoxically - teacher's participation is just minimal. The teacher during the session is only a moderator who keeps two simple rules in charge (rule # 1: everything can be said but no persons must be judged positively or negatively; rule # 2: ping-pong: the person who spoke last picks a respondent from the opposite side) and also keeps the chronology of the KMDD® session (each session contains of nine phases). Constructivism is also included in the contribution of participants to the process itself. The KMDD® dialogue encourages participants to look at the root of the problem and to discover the fundamental moral principles within interacting with each other dialogically (Lind 2016). This is particularly worth emphasizing that the presence of practical aspect in the programs for teaching ethics is far too small. Mostly theoretical content of the curricula of ethics may be the reason of the low effectiveness of the educational impact of ethics in general. Based on abstract philosophical assumptions ethics does not activate at a sufficient degree the cognitive-affective ability of schoolchildren, and therefore does not support the understanding of the essence of democratic principles shaping real social relations which goes hand in hand with social, moral and democratic practice. It can be said that ethics taught only as a theory increases the amount of knowledge but does not impact on moral competence and moral sensitivity of an individual. It can be also compared to the formation of propositional knowledge (know-what) growth of which does not necessarily lead to the development of practical skills (know-how) (Ryle 2009). Competencies can, however, be successfully shaped, within the support of a special didactic space and principles developed step by step by J. Piaget, L. Kohlberg and G. Lind. To create such a space qualified teachers specialized in modern, interactive teaching methods are needed. It is about supporting practical skills, not the internal morality understood as knowledge of moral principles, which - in fact - are mostly external. In this regard also academic discourse does not produce expected results. KMDD® is one of the few tools that the teacher can use to promote the moral development of his students without acting as a parent, psychologist, therapist or a confessor or someone who just knows the best. At the same time, KMDD® is one of the most developed teaching and learning methods supporting social and moral development of an individual and of whole groups at once. It is based not only on a well-established theory, but on many years of experiences in numerous research programs. It is also based on formalized certification processes that allows for a consistent increase of the quality of interaction provided by the certificate owners. G. Lind has developed a KMDD® model benchmark, as well as a series of KMDD® training and certification procedures. One of the most important is Moral Competence Test - MCT® which is used to evaluate the KMDD® effectiveness (Lind 2008). None of the methods currently used to support moral development have been found of similar facilities. An example of a high level of refinement can be any individual KMDD® session. It should last for 90 minutes and not repeat more often than once every 2-6 weeks. It should contain parts (nine phases) arranged by alternating work rhythm (affective excitation, peaceful rational phases, individual and group work in oral and written form). At the beginning it includes a professional oral presentation of the moral dilemma (educational semi-real dilemma story about a certain character dealing with the situation of hard moral decision to make). After that, participants declare do they see any dilemma in the story and vote "for" or "against" the decision made by the protagonist of the presented story. This is accompanied by a split into
quadruple teams developing the strongest arguments for their chosen option. The most important phase is a proper discussion based on two principles (the aforementioned two rules/principles). It comes with redefining of positions and a moment in which one can change his mind about the original evaluation of the behavior of the character of the dilemma. In this phase each group also votes for the best argument of the opposite group, which supports the ability to perceive values in arguments which are not in accordance with our own opinion. KMDD® session finishes with reflection, additional questions and the group feedback. Throughout the whole session the teacher-moderator watches over the length of the phases and helps debaters to keep the rules of the discussion. It is worth mentioning that the discussion during the KMDD® session always contains a semi-real dilemma (hypothetical dilemma). It is in accordance with L. Kohlberg's proposal. "Semi-real" means the lack of any particular connection with the actual personal situation of the debaters taking part in the discussion. However, this must be a probable dilemma, as far as possible. Creating a good dilemma is a difficult and demanding task for a teacher. It is also important to present it to a group of listeners in a certain way which is somehow dramatic, but not based totally on theatrical emotions. G. Lind believes that the key matter is the ability to build dramatic tension in the listener (skillfully manipulating pauses) and awakening the ability to identify with the protagonist of a dilemma faced by the choice between the moral rational exclusions. Giving a certain name to a protagonist makes him/her unique for every listener. Each participant develops an individual cognitive representation of the protagonist of the discussed dilemma. The story must stimulate intellectually and emotionally, but the emotions caused by the dilemma must not interfere with the process of rational thinking. Balancing the proportion of both aspects also depends on the teacher's skills. The teacher-moderator must remember to shape emotions as a support factor, not as a barrier to the success of the whole discussion. This is why the dilemma should be short enough to make it easy to tell naturally. Due to the process of building dramatic tension during the presentation of the dilemma, it should not be read from a sheet of paper, but told as a story. On the other hand, its adequacy depends also on the degree of comprehensibility for the audience (Lind 2016). The benefits of participating in the KMDD® sessions are the subject of many positive opinions from the scientific community. It is currently the only method which integral part contains of the Moral Competence Test - MCT® that measures its effectiveness (Bardzinski, Szopka, 2011).

Moral Competence Test (MCT®) - effectiveness verification and research

KMDD® has been enriched by G. Lind with the technique that measures its effectiveness. The technique designed exclusively for this purpose is the Moral Competence Test (MCT®, formerly known as the Moral Judgment Test - MJT®) (Lind 2008). It allows for simultaneous measurement of moral orientation and moral competence. Lind's idea is mainly based on the experimental approach to psychological measurement, meaning that it refers to an individual pattern of behavior rather than a general tendency that can be transferred to a generalized trial (Lind 2004). The MCT® contains two short dilemma stories ("worker's dilemma" and "doctor's dilemma"), about people who must make hard moral choice. Both dilemmas were selected because of the reference to the highly demanding moral principles of the 5th and 6th Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning development (Lind 2000). Each story contains information about the protagonist's decision, so it is not required for the test taker to make own choice. The task is to judge whether the decision taken by the
protagonist was correct or not (evaluation of another person's conduct). Every test taker must confront six different arguments "for" and six different arguments "against" the decision of the protagonist. Arguments represent six moral orientations distinguished by L. Kohlberg (1984). The MCT® is subordinated to the idea of three degrees of difficulty for the individual: first the individual must refer to the arguments "for" and "against", but not to claim to be personally "for" or "against". At the same time he/she must differentiate the arguments according to their moral rank. Low moral competence will manifest itself at this level with easy acceptance of arguments supporting a personal position, regardless of the value (inner quality) of the given arguments in general. On the third level of difficulty the participant must differentiate the opposite arguments according to his or her own assessment of the protagonist's behavior, which can be a serious problem because of a possible cognitive imbalance. In MCT® the individual level of moral competence is expressed by the value of the index: C-score (competence score), which refers to the ability of making moral judgments by taking into account the moral value of the arguments themselves, without referring to other factors such as conformity with social expectations (conformism). The C-score index ranges from 1-100, where it can be differentiated within the scale between low (1-9), medium (10-29), high (30-49), and very high (over 50) level of moral competence. This allows for cross-group and intra-group comparisons of the obtained C-scores on the basis of multidimensional repetitive (pretest/posttest) and by using e.g. multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). So far, a great number of studies have been conducted with MCT®. It shows that it is an effective tool with high research potential. Longitudinal German studies (Lind 1986) on KMDD® with MCT® tool shows not only the correspondence with the results of the original American studies by L. Kohlberg, but also the positive correlation between the level of moral competence and the number of years of education. The last correlation was confirmed by G. Lind in study, which involved 780 adolescents, between 14 and 21 years of age (Lind 2000). Young people who did not continue their education respectively have represented a regression in the development of moral competence. There has been no similar trend while the adequate continuity of education was maintained. The positive impact of higher education (studies) on the level of moral reasoning and moral competence was also confirmed (Pascarella 1991). This influence is independent of cultural diversity. M. Schillinger in her intercultural studies has confirmed the positive correlation between education and moral competence in Brazil and Germany (Schillinger 2006). One of the biggest long-term research study with using MCT® was introduced by the FORM project funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft with a range of 4000 students from Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Poland. Polish students participated in the research three times in 1977-1983 (Bargel, Markiewicz & Peisert 1982). One of the goals was to determine the level of moral competence of students in the above countries. The results have shown that, regardless of political and ideological background, Polish students represented the same moral orientations as those found in other Western European countries participating in the study. Nevertheless, in case of Polish students between 1977 and 1982 a rapid increase in the level of moral competence was recorded followed by a sharp decline. At the same time, German students were characterized by small but steady increase in the level of moral competence. Perhaps this tendency was influenced by the process of democratization in the 1970s, followed by violent socio-political changes in Poland. The results have become the basis for further discussion by Lind on the phenomenon of regression in moral development (Lind 1986, 2000). MCT® studies on the effectiveness of KMDD®
interventions have been conducted not only on students. One of the groups included in the research project were prisoners. It appears that KMDD® has been successful in both processes of education and rehabilitation (Hammerling, 2014).

Conclusion

Moral-democratic education is one of the greatest challenges of modern teaching systems. Preparing a young person for participation in civil society, working in a democratic exchange of social capital, and presenting an appropriate sensitivity to ethical problems that accompany it is a difficult task. However, it turns out that it is not impossible. Teaching, or rather education, should focus on practical skills, competences, abilities. Especially when it comes to assessing available opportunities and making the right choices. The need to stimulate moral competences is one of the greatest challenges of education. Referring to the classic results of L. Kohlberg on discussing moral dilemmas during school lessons, it is assumed that supporting the moral development of a young person may be based on presenting moral dilemmas in order to stimulate his/her reasoning. However, it should be kept in mind that the stimulation of reasoning does not fully convey the notion of moral development. Currently, one of the most widely studied and described methods of stimulating moral development through dilemma discussion is Konstanz Method of Dilemma-Discussion (KMDD®), introduced by Prof. Georg Lind from the University of Konstanz, Germany. Educational experiences related to KMDD® classes support moral competence which can be described as the ability to make moral decisions and to act in concert with them, as well as the ability to solve problems and mitigate conflicts based on internal moral principles and through joint deliberation and discussion instead of using violence and deceit. The KMDD® method is grounded in the original theory of Dual-Aspect Model of Moral Behavior. Professor Lind argues that the stimulation of moral competence should be based not only on cognitive but also affective aspect. They cannot be separated. This assumption significantly influences the structure of a single KMDD® session. Each session consists of nine phases during which thinking and emotions are alternately stimulated. This keeps the average level of excitement that helps to foster moral competence without involving unnecessary emotions. During each session participants take turns working on their own and together. This enables both: personal reflection and co-operation with others in order to modify individual position. So far the method has gained recognition in more than forty countries around the world and its popularity continues to grow. The effectiveness of the KMDD® method is confirmed by numerous studies. Prof. Georg Lind provides a strict certification process for users and teachers of KMDD® which helps to maintain its high quality.
References


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Living the Rhetoric of Dialogue: An Ecumenical Challenge

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Abstract
“Dialogue is a manner of acting, an attitude; a spirit which guides one’s conduct. It implies concern, respect, and hospitality toward the other. It leaves room for the other person’s identity, modes of expression, and values. Dialogue is thus the norm and necessary manner of every form of Christian mission, as well as of every aspect of it, whether one speaks of simple presence and witness, service, or direct proclamation” (Code of Canon Law, can. 787.1).

Inspired by Raimundo Pannikar’s The Rhetoric of Dialogue\(^1\), this paper is an attempt to gather thoughts and reflections on interfaith dialogue. Ecumenical Theology challenges everyone to tread the path leading to universal sense of brotherhood. People of goodwill, regardless of religious affiliation could very well work together for a common purpose, and have mutual commitment to the people’s struggle for justice and peace, likewise be in solidarity with one another in matters pertaining to protection of human rights and sublime respect for human dignity. Basically, the focus of this presentation shall be on the essence of dialogue and the way it could be done. There shall be an exposition of presuppositions to and theological bases of an inter-religious dialogue as well as a discussion of its viability and attitudinal constraints. The following precepts shall likewise be reflected upon: right to religious freedom; relationships of respect and love; dialogue of salvation; positive and constructive dialogue; universal presence of the Holy Spirit, dialogue of life and fruits of dialogue among others.

Keywords: interreligious dialogue, mutual respect, human dignity
Introduction

“The four higher religions that were alive in the age in which Toynbee was living were four variations on a single theme, and that, if all the four components of this heavenly music of the spheres would be audible on earth simultaneously, and with equal clarity, to one pair of human ears, the happy hearer would find himself listening, not to a discord, but to a harmony.”

Ecumenism and interfaith dialogue are instruments that shall help create such a harmony. Ecumenical Theology is one of the many avenues and disciplines that could pave the way to deeper insights, wider horizons and better perspective. Opportunities and experiences of shared reflections and interaction with brothers and sisters from other faith traditions do help a lot in discovering the praxis of theological discussions. Such experiences when welcomed with genuine openness can only be personally and spiritually enriching. It will be affirmed that men and women, regardless of race and religion could very well work together for a common purpose, and have mutual commitment to the promotion of common good, and be in solidarity with one another towards the universal quest for justice and peace.

This paper explores the possibilities of genuine dialogue. There is no intention of discussing actual dialogues that might have transpired nor describe other religions or Christianity.

At the end, the researcher shall include some reflections on and reactions to the challenge of a dialogue as presented by several proponents.

Dialogue in Perspective

Etymologically, the word dialogue simply means “conversation,” although in Western Intellectual history its dominant meaning has been “a piece of work cast in the form of a conversation.” Eliade (1987) presents various types of dialogue:

a) Discursive Dialogue (previously debate or discussion) involves meeting, listening and discussion on the level of mutual competent intellectual inquiry.

b) Human Dialogue on the existential foundations and assumes that it is possible for human beings to meet purely and simply as human beings, irrespective of the beliefs that separate them.

c) Secular Dialogue stresses that where there are tasks to be performed in the world, believers in different creeds may share in a program of joint action, without regard to their respective convictions.

d) Spiritual Dialogue does not focus on debate and discussions, but prayer and meditation; in recent years it has given rise to a considerable number of ashrams and meditation centers in East and West alike.

Dialogue is also referred to as a sustained conversation between parties who are not saying the same thing and who recognize and respect the differences, the contradictions and the mutual exclusions, between their various ways of thinking. The object of this dialogue is understanding and appreciation, leading to further reflection upon the implication for one’s own position of the convictions and sensitivities of the other traditions. It could also mean the exchange of experience and understanding
between two or more partners with the intention that all partners grow in experience and understanding.5

Interreligious Dialogue

Interreligious dialogue, according to the Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales (2002), includes simply living as good neighbours with those of other religions, or working together in matters of common concern, such as in issues of justice, peace, the integrity of creation and so forth. It includes a willingness, according to circumstances, to try to understand better the religion of one’s neighbours, and to experience something of their religious life and culture. In other words, dialogue is above all a frame of mind, an attitude.

Forms of Dialogue


a) The dialogue of life, where every person recognizes the beauty of life, where people openly accept to live in and foster the genuine spirit of brotherhood and building community, sharing their hopes and fears, joys and sorrows, their human frailties and strengths; all believing in the basic respect for the gift of one’s life.
b) The dialogue of action, in which Christians and others collaborate for humanitarian causes, upholding the rights of the last, the lost and the least, promoting holistic and sustainable development and working for the liberation of the destitute from the bondage of poverty, ignorance and any form of oppression.
c) The dialogue of theological exchange, where acquisition of knowledge is fuelled by the desire to serve mankind and glorify the Transcendent, where theologians seek to deepen their understanding and appreciation of their respective religious beliefs, traditions, values and practices inherent and important to various faith communities.
d) The dialogue of religious experience, where persons, regardless of affiliation open their doors to welcome guests who are willing to share the same sentiments and experience of the Divine; where persons, convinced about their own religious traditions, are willing to be exposed in their affective domains, sharing their spiritual thoughts and narratives, enriching each other with ways of communicating, praying, meditating and encountering the Deity.

The challenge of difference, people that decide to engage in any form of dialogue are prepared and mature enough to know and understand that they are meeting followers of another religion therefore, these followers definitely differ in many facets and convictions. Genuine dialogue can only take place in an atmosphere of mutual love and respect. The challenge of difference then is subsumed to an attitude of openness and joy in meeting brothers and sisters.

The Challenge of Pluralism

Pluralism has been a byword in the world of ecumenism and interreligious dialogue. Pluralism is both a gift and a challenge. A gift that offers opportunities to creative discoveries, learning and growing together; a challenge that poses questions to one’s
own convictions, a challenge that invites crucial introspection. Pluralism paves the way to co-existence among diverse cultures, beliefs, religions, philosophies and worldviews. Guided by these, the Catholic Church in particular must be at the frontline in promoting respect for pluralism, in upholding everyone’s right to freedom from coercion and any form of persecution and prejudice and defend the universal value of common good.

The Church’s Call to Dialogue

The Church is mandated to spread the good news of God’s love and offer of salvation. The Church then has the moral obligation to reach out to all brethren across borders, race and language. The Church believes in the unity of human race, that we all share but one life and every human being aspires to live in peace and harmony. On this premise, the Church continues to call everyone to dialogue, especially recognizing that the Truth of God’s love is found in the hearts of men and women, holiness is in all religions and the spirit of goodness transcends differences in doctrines and practices.

Dialogue and the Evangelising Mission of the Church

Interreligious dialogue is part and parcel of the Church’s evangelising mission. The mission of bringing the Good News of Christ’s love and offer of salvation can only be achieved when there is authentic speaking and listening, when communication takes place and dialogue becomes the intrinsic attitude.

Foundational Teachings

(The Catholic Bishops Conference of England and Wales, 2002)

The Right to Religious Freedom
By virtue of every human being’s innate dignity, no one may be coerced to embrace or defy a faith tradition. The right to religious freedom must be upheld at all times and across all places in the world.

Relationships of Respect and Love
All men and women, across nations and cultures share a universal understanding and appreciation of mutual respect and love. Each one has the basic desire and capacity for these basic values.

Eagerness for Dialogue
Men and women of goodwill, across religions can and must manifest the desire to pursue interreligious dialogue for the sake of world peace and harmony among nations.

Dialogue of Salvation
Interreligious dialogue is grounded on the premise that the Almighty embraces all His children and desires that each one receives the gift of salvation, meant for all.
Positive and Constructive Dialogue
Any dialogue may come to fruition when the motivations and strategies are positive and constructive, when the goal is to build bridges and not to put up higher walls of division, when diversity is seen as an opportunity to unite and not an invitation to attack.

Dialogue and Proclamation
Proclamation of God’s transcendent goodness and providence must break the barriers of pride and conceit, God’s love must overrule bias and prejudice that cause much more hatred and division, and the same powerful and salvific love must open the hearts of men and women to seeing the beauty and goodness in every human being.

Universal Presence of the Holy Spirit
The Holy Spirit is not confined in one religion or race. The power of the Holy Spirit is made visible when love, compassion, respect for human dignity, common good, justice and peace are prevalent. All genuine religions believe in and foster these universal manifestations of the Holy Spirit.

Dialogue of Life
Each person has just one life. This life has to be respected, nurtured and protected. Before even getting into interreligious dialogue, persons can simply come as proponents of one beautiful life. A life that is a gift and a gift becomes as such only when shared.

Collaborating with Other Religions
On issues of global warming, peaceful coexistence, respect for human dignity, eradicating poverty, active non-violence, education and health—all religions are one in wanting what is best for humankind. These are stepping stones to working in solidarity with other religions, for which there is no reason not to collaborate nor be indifferent.

Dialogue must Continue
Dialogue is a process, more than an output. Certain results might be achieved at a certain stage, yet the process will have to be sustained. The goals of dialogue are not just cognitive constructs but more of attitudinal expressions and of behavioural manifestations. Hence, leaders must take into account a very crucial dialogue in words and actions, providing wisdom and accompaniment, support and appreciation of efforts no matter how simple they may be.

Presuppositions of a Dialogue
Paul Knitter (1985) advances three general presuppositions that may create conditions for the very possibility of inter-religious dialogue. These he said, contain further theological premises that are necessary if the general presuppositions are to be honestly affirmed and practiced. These theological premises are the attitudes or what he called “hypothesis” – that all the partners in the dialogue must recognize in their own theology before they can begin, much less carry out, a conversation with a believer of another faith:
a.) **Dialogue must be based on personal religious experience and firm truth claims.**

Knitter pointed out that the very nature of inter-religious dialogue demands that it be conducted by religious persons, those who can attest that they have experienced the love, mercy and goodness of a Transcendent Being. Without personal religious experience, there is no possibility of entering into a conversation with other persons, for there will be no springboard to work on. A person who truly encountered the Holy is convinced that other beings may have gone through the same experience of encounter with the Holy.

This view has a connection with Toynbee’s theory of **Common Essence** which asserted that there are essential counsels and truths, and there are no nonessential practices and proposition. He said “if we can look behind the nonessentials of each religion, we will find that the inner core, the essential experience and insight of all of them is essentially the same. Toynbee was attempting the difficult task of distilling the common faith experience from the amalgam of beliefs and practices. He called this essence or common experience, a sense of the “spiritual presence” within all reality.

b.) **Dialogue must be based on the recognition of the truth in all religions**, the ability to recognize this truth must be grounded in the hypothesis of a common ground and goal for all religions. Dialogue also requires that the partners do not just hear but sincerely listen to each other. Authentic listening to what the other one is sharing manifests understanding, acceptance and openness. This entails humility in recognizing the fact that no one has a monopoly of the truth. The other person has definitely something to say. These presuppositions suggest that men and women recognize that the partners share a common ground that each religion enters into a relationship with an ultimate being, that the partners have a share in the experience of a divine presence, that they share the same fullness and emptiness, that they take inspiration from Someone whose goodness overwhelms everyone. The common goal is to promote unity of mankind and together get rid of threats to dignity of human life. This common goal springs from every human being’s innate goodness, that power which naturally pushes him to dream and achieve.

Toynbee calls the foregoing presupposition as **Common Purpose**. He asserted that each man struggles to overcome intrinsic limitations and imperfections not merely of human life but of all life on the face of the earth, likewise struggles with selfishness, with what he called “man worship”. Man naturally seeks for something more, quest to believe and trust that someone who is beyond all forces of the universe. He expressed the commonsense views of many today when he concluded that this common task facing all religions is the reason why they should recognize their common essence, the one spiritual reality that animates them all.

Moltmann (in Hick, 1980) went beyond listening, he said that Christians can only talk about their particular mission if they take note of and respect the different missions of other religions. They can only enter usefully into dialogue with them if they do not merely want to communicate something but to receive the identity of one’s own faith on the one hand, but on the other it requires a feeling of one’s own incompleteness and a real sense of need for fellowship with the other. This is the only way in which interest in another religion comes into being, a “creative need for the other”. After all, it is always true that no man is an island.
c.) **Dialogue must be based on openness to the possibility of genuine change/conversion**\(^{11}\). As partners enter into a dialogue, they actually open themselves to possibilities that will either affirm or negate something about what they believe in. True dialogue opens the path to new insights, new learning. This means the “old ones” may be and could be unlearned. Dialogue can be occasions for renewal, for some changes, for new reflections. Knitter established that the conversion that each partner seeks is not primarily conversion to one’s own belief or religion, but conversion to God’s Truth.

The foregoing constructs are affirmed by Paul Tillich’s (in Johnson, 1990) several ground rules in order to make a dialogue fruitful. It first presupposes that both partners acknowledge the value of the other’s religious conviction (as based ultimately on a revelatory experience), so that they consider the dialogue worthwhile; second, it presupposes that each of them is able to represent his own religious basis with conviction, so that the dialogue is a serious confrontation; third, it presupposes a common ground which makes both dialogue and conflicts possible; and fourth, the openness of both sides to criticism directed against their own religious basis\(^{12}\).

**Theological Basis of Inter-Faith Dialogue**

John Taylor (in Hick, 1980), one of the many proponents of interfaith dialogue came up with some theological bases of dialogue\(^{13}\). These are:

a) **Appreciation must precede reconciliation of ideas.** On a premise that every human being finds it difficult to sustain contradictions and live with them, Taylor reiterated that it takes a high degree of maturity to let the opposites co-exist without pretending that they can be made conflicts with one’s own without itching to bring about a premature and naïve accommodation. Further, he said that one has to appreciate the reason for their opposition, grant its integrity and deal honestly with its challenge, without surrendering any of one’s own integrity or diminishing the content of one’s examined convictions. Inter-faith dialogue can be a clear praxis of loving one’s own enemies. The loving may be manifested through the efforts of listening, understanding, recognizing and appreciating the others’ set of beliefs which may be a contradiction to one’s personal conviction.

b) **Past isolation has bred ignorance and suspicion.** Historical events of persecution, aggression, domination and survival justify isolation and counter attacks. Taylor pointed out that one of the bitter fruits of this long history of non-communication is the tendency in every religious culture to read deliberate hostility into the quiet innocent attitudes of people of another faith. These bits of history deserve ample consideration if dialogue is to be realized. The by-products of past isolation, namely ignorance and suspicion may be dismissed as they are untrue and by the fact that true or not, the suspicion are part of the data of many relationships.

c) **Each religion is a tradition of response by ordinary people.** Dialogue seeks a new beginning. People cannot always hold on to the pains of history. There is a need to let go of the past, so that the future may be welcomed. Taylor believes that religion is to be thought as a people’s particular tradition of response to the reality which the Holy Spirit of God had set before their eyes. Everybody would agree that God’s self-
revelation and self-giving is consistent for all, but that different peoples have responded and taught others to respond to what the spirit of God through the events of their history and the vision of their prophets made them aware of. Likewise, there is a need to recognize that every religion’s tradition includes the response of disobedience as well as the response of obedience. Thus, every living faith is found to be in a continual process of renewal and purification while at the same time it conserves the tradition and transmits it as something recognizable the same. The foregoing implies that as dialogue begins, it will be discovered that the same word carries an entirely different cluster of meaning in the different traditions and at times be found out that quite different words are used to mean the same thing.

d) The open, inclusive view in Christian Theology. Theologians have expressed affirmation of the fact that all persons can find within themselves a natural openness to the Infinite, to the More, to Mystery. Taylor construed that there has always been in the Jewish-Christian tradition another more inclusive view of the wideness of God’s grace and redemption. That God’s gift of salvation is offered to all mankind, across all religions. Rahner’s inclusivism explicates that Christ exists within other religions that God’s love is poured out in a universal salvific will.14

Pannikar describes inclusivism as an attitude that has a certain quality of magnanimity and grandeur in it. He concluded that man can follow his own path and need not condemn the other. He can even enter into communication with all other ways of life and if he happens to have the real experience of inclusivity, he may be at peace not only with himself but with all other human and divine ways as well. One can be concrete in his allegiance and universal in outlook. Further, the most plausible condition for the claim to truth of one’s own tradition is to affirm at the same time that it includes at different levels all that there is truth wherever it exists. The inclusivistic attitude will tend to reinterpret things in such a way as to make them not only palatable but also assimilable.15

e) Christians claim an absolute centrality for Jesus Christ. It is the nature of religious experience to put into the believer’s hands a key which is absolute and irreducible. With minds open to recognize the reality of the experience of divine grace and salvation within all the faiths of mankind, it can be said that what God did through Jesus Christ is the one act which it was always necessary that he should accomplish in time and at the right time if he was to be the God who throughout time is accessible and present to every human being in Judgment and mercy, grace and truth.

f) Every religion has its “jealousies”. Taylor conceived the idea of jealousies referring to certain points in every religion concerning which the believers are inwardly compelled to claim a universal significance and finality; examples include: the Muslim conviction that the Holy Qu’ran is not just another revelation but is God’s last word, the Jewish conviction that Israel’s covenant and her attachment to the Holy land has a central significance in the determinate purpose of God; the Christian conviction that in the life and death and resurrection of Jesus, God acted decisively for all mankind.

Every profound encounter with God is with a jealous God. This means, having experienced God in that way, no other God will do. These perceptions are undeniably valid. But given a deep mutual respect for one another’s irreducible conviction, this
does not bring our discourse to a standstill. A genuine dialogue will not be promoted by the belief of each partner that the ultimate and deepest insight into the truth nevertheless lays on his side.

g) Some experiences have to be absolute and universalized. What makes the first apostolic witnesses so remarkable is that, as they thought out the implications of the response they had been compelled to make to Jesus, they refused to retreat any part of that response or diminish the claims they were making for him, even when it began to appear that their response and their claims were in conflict will all the accepted ideas about God. The first four centuries of the Christian Church is a logical following-out of the implications of an original experience which they were not prepared to deny.

h) We must expose our experience to one another's questioning. If interfaith dialogue is to become sincere and deep, we have to expose one another to the ways in which, within our separate households of faith, we wrestle with the questions that other religions put to us. Besides letting one another know the absolutes in their own faith that may not be surrendered, the partners in the dialogue must also give serious reflection to the critique which each inevitably brings to bear upon the convictions of the other, however painful and disturbing this may be. If we have this humble attitude of one who is seeking for the real meaning of what he believes, and for the real face of the one in whom he believes, dialogue will be easy with the faithful of other religions.

Obstacles to Dialogue

Already on a purely human level, it is not easy to practice dialogue. Interreligious dialogue is even more difficult. It is important to be aware of the obstacles which may arise. Some would apply equally to members of all religious traditions and impede the success of dialogue. Others may affect some religious traditions more specifically and make it difficult for a process of dialogue to be initiated. Some of the more important obstacles will be mentioned here.

Human Factors

a) Insufficient knowledge and understanding of one’s own faith.
b) Insufficient knowledge and understanding of the beliefs and practices of other religions, leading to self-sufficiency, apathy and misrepresentation.
c) Socio-political factors or some burdens of the past that continue to negate the gift of dialogue.
d) Misinterpretation and lack of understanding of the meaning of terms such as conversion and dialogue, etc.
e) Indifference, immaturity, lack of openness leading to defensive/aggressive attitudes.
f) A lack of appreciation for the intrinsic value of interreligious dialogue.
g) Lack of trust and suspicion about the other’s motives in dialogue.
h) A divisive attitude and an uncompromising stance when expressing religious convictions.
i) Intolerance, which is often aggravated by association with political, economic, racial and ethnic factors, a lack of reciprocity in dialogue which can lead to frustration.
j) Certain characteristics prevalent at the moment: like materialism, distortion of values, religious indifference, and the emergence of new religious sects that create confusion and give rise to new problems.

**Dialogue Based on a New Model of Truth**

The foregoing presupposition and theological bases of interfaith dialogue led to and may be summarized through Paul Knitter’s theory of a New Model of Truth. The theologian established that genuine dialogue may be reached if the partners would look from a different perspective: that they do not limit themselves within the confines of the truth that they live up to.

**The Former Model**

This operates on the principles of contradictions. This states that of two propositions, one of which is affirmed and the other, negated; one must be true and the other false. The truth is defined through exclusion, giving absolute quality to whatever has been defined to be true, all the other alternatives are excluded. In terms of religion, there is one religion accepted to be true and all the others are excluded.

**The New Model**

The truth will no longer be identified by its ability to exclude or absorb others. Rather, what is true will reveal itself mainly by its ability to relate to other expressions of truth and to grow through these relationships—truth defined not by exclusion but by relation. The new model reflects what our pluralistic world is discovering: no truth can stand alone; no truth can be totally unchangeable. Truth, by its very nature, needs other truth. Truth without other truth cannot be unique; it cannot exist. Truth, therefore, “prove itself” not by triumphing over all other truth but by testing its ability to interact with other truth—that is, to teach and be taught by them, to include and be included by them. More importantly; the model of truth—through—relationship allows each religion to be unique, such uniqueness can even be called—if we are willing to redefine our terms—absolute. Absoluteness is defined and established not by the ability of a religion to exclude or include others, but by its ability to relate to others, to speak to and listen to others in genuine dialogue.

As we deepen our awareness of what we have encountered in our faith experience, as we search after the hidden face of God, we realize that every discovery, every insight, must be corrected or balanced by its opposite. As we discover the personality of God, we realize that God is beyond personality. As we penetrate into the immanence of divinity we become aware of its transcendence. As we awaken to the “already” of God’s kingdom in this world, we become ever more conscious of its “not yet”. Every belief, every doctrinal claim, must therefore be clarified and corrected by its beliefs that, at first sight, claim the contrary. Realizing all these we are disposed to look on different religions with their “contrary” experiences and beliefs not as adversaries but as potential partners.

**Conclusion**

The theology of interfaith dialogue is a trend that had been set and the message is getting across all religions of the world—dialogue is not only a faddish concept, it is
one of the glaring signs of the times. It is a need of contemporary men and women that has to be addressed.

Knitter’s new model of truth exemplifies that the greatness of a truth is its capacity to relate with others truths, not in its capacity to exclude or stand superior over the other. If only men and women will hold on to this new model of truth, this would certainly be a lot better world. Interreligious dialogue explores new paths to certain realities: to the truth of other faiths; to the need for genuine dialogue; to the challenge of entering into somebody else’s faith expression/experiences; to the long history of apathy, and yes, even to the flaws of Christianity. There has long been claim for superiority; there has been arrogance and varied manifestations of exclusivism. Now is the time to take each other as a brother and a sister, in its deepest sense.

The challenge at hand is to respond to the call of unity. There is more reason to unite than to fight. As the new model of truth proposes – we can work hand in hand as partners in the pursuit of a common purpose and as inspired by that common essence.

Notes


5 Knitter, Paul ibid. p.207.

6 Ibid. p.207.

7 Ibid. p. 38.

8 Ibid. p.208.

9 Ibid. p.40.

10 Hick, John. Ibid. p.204.

11 Knitter, Paul. Ibid. p.211.


13 cited by John, Hick. Ibid. p. 212-231.

15 Pannikar, Raimundo, ibid. p. xvi.

16 Knitter, Paul. Ibid. p. 219-222.
References


Porphyry, An Anti-Christian Plotinian Platonist

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Abstract
Porphyry, the Phoenician polymath, having studied with Plotinus when he was thirty years old, was a well-known Hellenic philosopher, an opponent of Christianity, and was born in Tyre, in the Roman Empire. We know of his anti-Christian ideology and of his defence of traditional Roman religions, by means of a fragment of his Adversus Christianos. This work incurred controversy among early Christians. His Adversus Christianos has been served as a critique of Christianity and a defence of the worship of the traditional gods, so it is inevitable that his texts involved Biblical culture and religious Hellenism. Augustine, in his De Civitate Dei 10. 28, reproves Porphyry for wasting so much time in learning the theurgic arts and rites. This paper does not inquire into whether Porphyry’s philosophical monistic theology is shown in Plotinus’ Enneads, but focuses on his anti-Christian thought through the fragments that we have, particularly Augustine’s De Civitate Dei.

Keywords: Christianity, demons, neo-Platonist, Porphyry, theurgy

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Hic est Dei cultus, haec vera religio,  
haec recta pietas, haec tantum Deo debita  
servitus. (Augustine, De Civitate Dei, X. 3)

Porphyry of Tyre (c. 232-310 A.D.) was the most important anti-Christian Hellenic philosopher in the fourth century of the Roman Empire. Nowadays we know of his anti-Christian thought not only through Augustine’s works, such as De Civitate Dei and De Consensu Evangelistarum, but also by means of his own fragments, albeit his Adversus Christianos, which was banned and condemned by Emperor Constantine the Great, was burnt by the emperor Theodosius II and Valentinian III in 448 C.E. and we can get partial understanding of his anti-Christian thought through the surviving fragments.

The importance of understanding Porphyry’s philosophy is that his anti-Christian and anti-Gnostic stance can both help us to understand Augustinian theology and the crisis of the collapse of the language and literature of Greece and the traditional Roman religion that occurred in the fourth century; that is, the uprising of new ideologies was a lethal threat to Paganism or Hellenism in the end of the third century and the early fourth century, thereby his anti-Christianity or his attitude to the new movement not only highlighted the conflicts between Greek and Roman polytheism and Galilaean monotheism, but also manifested the failure of the integrity of classical culture into Christianity and the anxiety of cutting off Greek paideia, from which his beliefs and faith sprang. Although he exhausted his ability to defend pagan Greek philosophy, Plato’s Academy was finally closed by the emperor Justinian in 529 and his philosophical ideologies were in decline. Classical culture, which was the common property of those who spoke and used the Greek language in the Roman Empire, was permanently replaced by the new movement, and the triumph of Christianity spread across many countries and endured.

1. Porphyry in ‘Vita Plotini’

Porphyry, a Neo-Platonic who is almost forgotten by the world, was the Christians’ prominent and heavyweight foe. He antagonised them through his defence of Hellenic paideia, though he became a victim himself, as most of that work which challenged and rebutted Christianity has not survived. Although our Porphyrian cup does not

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1 According to Eusebius and Jerome, Adversus Christianos comprised fifteen books, which dealt with historical and literary problems in the Bible. Berchman, Robert M. (translated with notes, 2005), Porphyry against the Christians, (the Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill) p. 4.
4 Porphyry said that ‘there were in his time many Christians and others, and sectarians who had abandoned the old philosophy, men of the schools of Adelphius and Aculinus, who possessed a great many treatises of Alexander the Libyan and Philocomus and Demostratus and Lydus, and produced revelations by Zoroaster and Zostrianus and Nicotheus and Allogenes and Messus and other people of the kind, deceived themselves and deceiving many, alleging that Plato had not penetrated to the depths of intelligible reality.’ (16. 1-10)
5 A lot of educated men, such as Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius of Caesarea and Origen, who spoke Greek, thought that classical culture was their common property. Anthony Meredith, ‘Porphyry and Julian against the Christians’ in the ANKW II 23.2, p.1139.
6 Berchman, Robert M., Porphyry against the Christians, p. 11.
overflow with his surviving wisdom, we do at least have the Sententiae, the four books on Abstinence and principally, ‘Vita Plotini’ in the Ennead I and the ‘Vitae Sophistarum’ of Eunapius.7

In ‘Vita Plotini’ (4. 5-10, 4. 65) Porphyry told us that he and his friend Antonius of Rhodes left Greece to meet the fifty nine year-old Plotinus, who was writing his treatises, and Porphyry was thirty years old in the tenth year of the emperor Gallienus, so it is probable that he was born in 232 in Tyre.8 He studied for six years with Plotinus, who entrusted him to edit his writings, and became his closest friend. (5. 5-60, 7. 50)

Porphyry himself opposed Zoroaster and wrote much to refute his teachings. (16. 10-15)9 When in his sixty-eighth year, he once suffered the experience of demonic possession, while this had happened to Plotinus four times. (23. 10-15) Augustine in his De Civitate Dei reproves Porphyry for dumbly practising the theurgic arts and rites. (X. ix., xxvii.) The most serious mistake that Porphyry made, as Augustine revealed, was in directing others to the theurgists. (De Civ. Dei X. xxvii.) Because of his own theurgic practice he was never able to know Christ, claimed Augustine. (De Civ. Dei X. xxviii.) Also, Augustine fulminated that Porphyry’s judgements were wavering between philosophy and superstition or mystic rites. (De Civ. Dei X. ix.) From another point of view, the debate between Porphyry and the Christian philosophers, such as Augustine, is the polemics of pagan henotheistic spectrum and Christian monotheistic gamut, i.e. the disputes between pagans and Christians and between Hellenistic paideia and Christian faith.

According to Andrew Smith, Porphyry became a polymath during the time he stayed with Longinus, from whom he learnt philology and turned to promote the ascendancy of philosophy over religion and superstition when he stayed with Plotinus; however, after Plotinus passed away he again devoted himself to superstition.11 It follows that the principle training of Porphyry’s anti-Christian arguments was based upon the Bible and upon literature by Longinus and philosophy by way of Plotinus.

Andrew Smith jumps to Porphyry’s defence over his ideological waywardness by pointing out that the only firm evidence we have of Porphyry ever changing his mind

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7 Cf. Ibid., p. 1125.
8 Ibid.
9 According to William Enfield, Plotinus and Porphyry regarded Zoroaster as a heretic. Amelius and Porphyry have shown by many arguments that the doctrine of Zostrianus was derived from Zorosaster. It implied that prior to the uprising of Christian doctrine in the Roman Empire, the Gnostics spoke against the Grecian philosophy. So at that time the opponents of Neo-Platonists were the Gnostics and the Christians; and their tasks were to defend Platonic doctrine and to preserve the classical paideia. William Enfield (2012), The History of Philosophy from Earliest Periods: Drawn up from Brucher’s Historia Critica Philosophiae, p.376 (London: Printed for Thomas Tegg). Cf. Mark Edwards (2006), Culture and Philosophy in the Age of Plotinus, p. 147 (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd).
10 Neo-Platonists, such as Plotinus and Porphyry, hold that the One (to hen) is the supreme deity, which does not exclude the existence of other deities. Plotinus claims that the One is the Father of the nous and of the psyche in the way that the concept of ‘henotheism’ is different from that of ‘monotheism’.
comes from his own hand, in ‘Vita Plotini’ 18. He was initially stumped by Plotinus’ arguments so wrote a paper in refutation. Only with difficulty did he come to finally understand Plotinus’ doctrine and published a further paper to recant. In ‘Vita Plotini’ 13 he says that he persisted for three days in asking Plotinus about the soul’s connection with the body and when a man demanded him to put their discussions into a treatise, he was rejected by Plotinus on the grounds that he was not able to solve Porphyry’s difficulties, and was therefore unable to put them into a treatise. Smith suggests that the significance of these two incidents has been overblown in the matter of Porphyry’s “apparent dogmatic contradiction”. Hence Andrew Smith, in contrast to Porphyry’s teacher Longinus (who highlighted a mistake in Porphyry’s changeability of views), (‘Vita Plotini’ 20. 90-95) explains Porphyry’s apparent changeability of his philosophical thoughts, and contradictions with these two incidents cannot be founded. In fact, it is by these incidents that Plotinus’ meticulous attitude to scholarship and vigorous desire for truth is revealed.

Furthermore, in ‘Vita Plotini’ 18 Porphyry tried to defend Plotinus, who was accused both of plagiarizing Numenius’ views and of despising him as a peddler of drivel. He tells us that Plotinus was slow to make evident his logical coherence of his discourse causing him to be misunderstood. He himself, and along with Longinus13, suffered a similar experience when he engaged in philosophical inquiry with him. To expand on the example above, when he disagreed with Plotinus concerning the thesis of whether or not the object of thought existed outside the intellect, he wrote an essay to oppose him. After Amelius14 (under the demand of Plotinus) read it to him, he asked Amelius to discuss with Porphyry concerning his assertion, since Porphyry misconstrued their conversations. After he comprehended Plotinus’ points of view by means of debate with Amelius, he not only renounced his previous consideration, but also believed in the authenticity of Plotinus’ writings, and that he did not plagiarise. Thus, Plotinus is to be assured his place in posterity, thanks to the force of his student Porphyry’s endorsement.15

He further tells us that his Greek name is Basileus, which was translated from what in his native language was Malcus (his father’s name) by Amelius. His teacher Longinus

12 Ibid., p. 722.
13 According to Porphyry, Longinus, being similar to him, misjudged Plotinus’s philosophy and did not make clarification of his misapprehension with Plotinus. Porphyry said that Longinus misjudged Plotinus because he did not really comprehend Plotinus’ ‘usual manner of expressing himself’. (‘Vita Plotini’ 20. 5) So he never changed his mind, and from this point of view he was dissimilar to him. (‘Vita Plotini’ 19-20). Porphyry held that he himself was misunderstood because he imitated Plotinus’ philosophical writing style, which might cause his readers to misconstrue his philosophical thoughts. (‘Vita Plotini’ 21. 15)
14 Amelius Gerntilianus was the best printer of the time and Plotinus’s chief assistant and studied with Plotinus for eighteen years. (Vita Plotini, 1. 10, 4. 5 and footnote 2). According to Porphyry, Amelius spent a lot of time to investigate Numenius’ philosophy and collected all his works and learnt most of them by heart. It might reasonably follow that Plotinus asked him to deliberate the controversy with Porphyry. (Vita Plotini, 3. 40-45) It is interesting why Plotinus did not trust in Amelius, who stayed with him longer than Porphyry, as he did in the latter. For further information about him, please refer to ‘Vita Plotini’, footnote 2, p. 3. Plotinus (1966), Ennead I: Porphyry on Plotinus, with an English translation by Armstrong (England/London: Loeb Classical Library).
continued to use his father’s name, calling him Malcus. (‘Vita Plotini’, 17, 10) He also told us that he studied regularly the Platonists Ammonius and Origen for a very long time. (‘Vita Plotini’ 20.40) And here we have to be careful not to enter the realms of confusion because although we know that Porphyry was educated in, and understood, the core message of Christianity, through the works of Origen the Christian, there is some doubt as to whether this Origen is the same person as his Platonist teacher.

2. Porphyry’s animadversion upon the Christians

As is shown, Porphyry was ‘a considerably influential scholar’, especially in his contribution to Plotinus’ Enneads. We are aware of Porphyry’s importance through the impact of his book Isagoge (Introduction), which has been translated into Syriac, Latin, Armenian and Arabic, and which was a students’ text book in philosophy. So we cannot neglect his philosophical impression in the world of Arabic logic and philosophy and the development of thought in the Middle Ages.

However, as we have seen above, Porphyry’s Adversus Christianos was burnt, so we have no unaffected and genuine sources with which to confirm the few fragments of original writings that we have. Porphyry was not the first opponent of early Christianity, he chose to follow in the footsteps of Celsus to attack Christianity with the help of the Bible and from the perspective of classical culture and philosophy. The destiny of his persistence in upholding the traditional Greco-Roman beliefs and faiths was doomed to be all disparagement and excoriation. Augustine holds that Porphyry became such a victim because he was ashamed to acknowledge that God, our Christ, is the Principle. He said,

Our Platonist21, however, has not acknowledged Him as the Principle; otherwise, he would recognize Him as the purifier, for, certainly, the Principle is neither the flesh nor the human soul in Christ; it is the Word by which all things were made. (De Civitate Dei, X, 24)

Augustine insinuates that Porphyry did not admit that he was a sinner, that he did not know Him as the Principle of creatures nor further understood the possibility of resurrection of the tripartite of our spirit, soul and body by means of purification. On the contrary, he, being influenced by Platonic philosophy, thought that only when the soul is completely dispossessed of the body, could it enjoy perfect happiness. (De

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16 It is said that Longinus held different philosophical views from that of Plotinus. For further knowledge of him, please refer to ‘Vita Plotini’, footnote 1, pp. 50-51. Ibid.
21 Here Augustine refers the term Platonist to Porphyry, it is interesting that Augustine calls him thus, not a Christian opponent.
In brief, from Augustine’s point of view, Porphyry was ignorant about God or Christian paideia; and his criticism of Christianity was out of prejudice and bias, but he did not go so far as to accuse Porphyry of heresy. However, if we are to adopt Augustine’s definition of the term ‘religio’22, which means ‘the worship of God’ (cultum Dei, De Civitate Dei, X. 1), that is, we collect together to worship God because of our love for Him; (Augustine, De Civitate Dei, X. 3) Porphyry stands guilty of blasphemy against the God of the Christians, for he himself practised theurgy.

Jerome also says that Porphyry’s attack on the Gospel not only showed that he is ignorant but also a criminal, because he, on the one hand, essayed to demonstrate the evangelist Matthew to be guilty of falsehood23, and that Peter was reprimanded by Paul for not going out immediately to evangelise, on the other.24 Evidently, Jerome holds that Porphyry made illegitimate comment on Scripture, since what he said was not out of truth therein, but out of distortion of its pivotal spirit.

Eusebius of Caesarea in his Praeparatio Evangelica says that Porphyry attacked Christians and was an advocate of demons.25 However, Porphyry’s anti-Christian attitude is understandable. He not only confronted the perceived threat of rising Christianity, but also endeavoured to retrieve the imminent disintegration of Hellenic paideia and to rescue his practice of theurgy or of divination; that is, he understood both ‘demons and sacrifice’26. Thus, he regarded the Christian paideia as a subculture, which was deemed as a threat to Hellenism. So, he held that the god worshipped by Jews was the second god, and that the first god was the Good.27 Furthermore, he minimized Christ and ridiculed Christians, whose God is inferior to the Jewish one,28 since Christ, who was viewed only as a man not (also) as a God, was crucified by the Jews. As for the Christians who believed in Him, he thought that they only blindly worshipped Him, never knowing the truth.29 Obviously, Porphyry was not only anti-Christian, but anti-Christ as well. Augustine politely and gently says that Porphyry was the ‘most learned of all philosophers and the better enemy of Christianity’, (De Civitate Dei 19.22) since he both knew and discoursed on the pivotal values of Christianity. However, Jerome, being not as polite as Augustine, describes Porphyry as a dog, barking against the Christians and Scripture.30 It follows that for some Christian philosophers the name of Porphyry was explicit as the symbol of both anti-Christian thought and the Antichrist itself; Augustine and Jerome in their works use his name to refute and ridicule the attitude of anti-Christian philosophers.

22 The verb ‘religio’ is ‘relegere’, instead of ‘religāre’ (to fasten, to tie). See Augustine De Civitate Dei, X. 3.
23 Berchman, Robert M., ‘73 Commentarii in Danielem, 1’, pp. 157-158. Jerome is an important source for Porphyry’s Adversus Christianos, see footnote 22, Ibid.
26 Andre Nance (2002), ‘Porphyry: The Man and His Demons’, in The McGill Journal of Classical Studies, Vol. II: 37-57, p. 38. According to Andre, the term ‘demon’ is often used to distinguish ‘an intermediary being’ from ‘evil spirit’. He further points out that Porphyry’s “demons” include both intermediaries and evil spirits. Ibid., footnote 4. Andre further points out that sacrifice was beneficial to the Roman State; and Diocletian would rely on sacrifice to seek imperial stability. So during his reign Christians were persecuted. Ibid., p. 49.
28 Ibid., ‘4 De Philosophia ex Oraculis Haurienda’, p. 125.
29 Ibid., pp. 126-127.
According to Epiphanius, he was described as a ‘terrible, dreadful snake of Jewish pedigree’. Porphyry, opposing the rise of Christianity, was doomed to be decried as Satan. However, from another point of view, he was blameworthy, since his writings prompted the Emperor Diocletian to take action and persecute the Christians, who were deemed as the obstruction to sacrifice. Mark Edwards remarks that Porphyry, whether approving of Diocletian’s policy or not, was of the view that Christians and Greeks were implacably opposed, and could not co-exist under the same laws. It appears that in that time Porphyry had some influence with the emperor on formulating religious laws for the empire. Thus, it was not only a battle between the values of Classical and Christian paideia, but also a political struggle between authority and faith. It follows that Porphyry’s writings in Adversus Christianos were inflammatory, so it was appropriately burnt. In brief, for the majority of Christians, Porphyry was both a threat and a heretic. And his role reversed from perpetrator to victim because both parties are deprived of true religious tolerance.

Conclusion

Porphyry had many adversaries, from whom we know his anti-Christ and anti-Christian thoughts. So how profound is the truth of their criticism is still a question. And if we understand Porphyry’s motive of attacking Christianity as a part of his attempted rescue of classical paideia, we will pay due reverence to his desire (Eros) for the preservation of the legacy of ancient paideia with his life.

Augustine and Porphyry, these two influential and contradictory icons in historical philosophy, devoted themselves to different paths, the former to bestow himself as the servant of Christ, and the latter to the by then hopeless defence of Greek paideia. They both contributed themselves to the pursuit of the truth in divergent directions and were responsible for their own achievements. So their philosophical roles have huge differences.

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31 Ibid., ‘28 Panarion Haeresium 51.8’, p. 144. In the footnote 28 Berchman says that this fragment that Epiphanius’s criticism is not derived directly from Porphyry’s Against the Christians.
33 Mark Edwards (2006), Culture and Philosophy in the Age of Plotinus, p. 146.
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Arguing About Religious Identity and the No True Scotsman Fallacy

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Abstract
Anthony Flew critiqued a particular argumentative manoeuvre he dubbed, “The No True Scotsman Move”, where a speaker redefines an original claim by inserting the term “true” as an attributive adjective thereby restricting the extension of their first assertion. It is often appealed to in religious-apologetic diatribe. One non-academic book on fallacies names it “The No True Christian Fallacy”, suggesting that those who commit this fallacy do so to illicitly defend a particular ideal religious identity. Often the charge of “No True Scotsman fallacy!” is invoked in strong eristic and sectarian contexts. Blamers score points by demonstrating that the opponent who commits this fallacy is evasive, prejudiced, and fails in their epistemic duty – since they refuse to accept falsifying evidence against their beliefs. In this paper I apply a heavy dose of the principle of charity and defend the individual who commits this fallacy and try to show they have something worthwhile to say. I critique the theory of the No True Scotsman Move in debates invoking religious identity. I argue that it is often mistaken to attribute the fallacy to others because of the presumption of a simplistic Aristotelian category theory of class membership. I favor a prototype theory of classification where the alleged committer of the fallacy is thinking about an ideal religious exemplar. If my argument succeeds I have defended this individual by showing that they were only trying to clarify what they originally meant by inserting “true”.

Keywords: No True Scotsman move, manoeuvre, religious identity, Antony Flew, argument, fallacy
Introduction

What the philosopher Antony Flew dubbed, ‘The No True Scotsman Move’ (Flew, 1975) has grown exponentially, cited in many blogs, religious and atheist apologetic web-pages, and other forms of social media. It has become a social epidemic, one which I argue, is destructive to dialogue and reasonable tolerance. Antony Flew never called it a fallacy, nor do scholars working in the fields of philosophy or informal logic. Nevertheless, the ‘move’ has transformed into ‘The No True Scotsman’ (NTS) fallacy where arguers use it as a tool, if not, a weapon, to reproach their opponent – proving them wrong on the basis that they have committed this ‘fallacy’ and failing in their epistemic duty of being open-minded to consider objections to their cherished views. Most of the discussion surrounding the No True Scotsman Move, or fallacy is naive as are most explanations of logical fallacies on the web. It is time to put this alleged fallacy to bed perhaps keeping a more articulate and nuanced understanding of Flew’s Move in certain contexts.

What I aim to do particularly in this presentation is to defend the Speaker who allegedly has committed the move/fallacy. When a speaker says to another, “you have committed a fallacy”, the conversation usually stops, or at least moves in another direction. I defend the Speaker by applying a heavy dose of the principle of charity, a principle whereby the hearer should as far as possible, interpret their interlocutor as making a stronger case than a weaker one. Due to space limitations I am unable to look at particular alleged cases of the No True Scotsman Fallacy. There are also more important reasons why I am unable to do this since the proliferation of this particular fallacy on the web is so broad and variable that we are no longer able to grasp what the essential features of this fallacy are. To put it more bluntly and Socratically, I do not want to consider actual cases of the fallacy because until we know for sure what the essential features of the fallacy are, we will not be able to identify what is the NTS fallacy and what isn’t. Rather, I give a formal explanation of the move/fallacy so that we can at least know when the fallacy obtains on the basis of the essential features, according to its original author.

Antony Flew’s No True Scotsman Move

The basic dialogic structure of the NTS move goes like this, explained in terms of Flew’s imaginary Scot. A person who self-identifies as Scottish utters the following statement after hearing about a terrible crime by an Englishman,

(U1). No Scot would do such a thing.

Another person then responds with a counterexample to this claim, along the lines of,

(Uh). I know of so-and-so, a Scot who has done the exact same thing.

The original speaker then utters the modified statement,

(U2). No true Scot would do such a thing.

For the sake of easy reference, I refer to the first and second utterance of the speaker, (the one who is charged of committing the fallacy or illicit manoeuvre), as U1 and U2
respectively: utterance 1 and utterance 2. The response by the interlocutor is nominated as *Uh* – the hearer’s utterance. This individual raises the counterexample to U1. To distinguish between Speaker and Hearer is a standard convention in the philosophy of language. In this instance, the Hearer also makes a claim, hence Uh.

U1 is considered a universal claim in the form of an E-proposition, (that is, an E-proposition according to the logical square of opposition) - *No S is P*. On Flew’s understanding, the hearer who utters Uh directly points to a counterexample by way of an I-proposition, *Here is an S who does P*. Since E and I propositions are contradictory, one must be true and the other false. The default view is that the speaker has uttered a falsehood while the hearer has uttered a truth. Flew’s narrative, in the voice of the hearer who points to the counterexample, rebukes the original speaker, since the move from U1 to U2 is a redefinition which evades falsification.

These concepts, evasion and falsification are important to Flew’s analysis of the NTS move. Indeed, the chapter in Flew (1975) which introduces the move is named exactly that, “Evasion and Falsification.” The background to this view was the popular perspective at the time in English speaking philosophy: verificationism in linguistic meaning, and falsificationism in science.

It is thought by Flew that the move from U1 to U2 transforms a fairly average, synthetic and contingent truth, (U1) into an analytic statement that is necessarily true, (U2). Given the analyticity of the new claim uttered by the speaker, it is a tautology, it “says nothing” and most importantly, no evidence can be bought against it in the same way that there can be no counterexample to the claim, *bachelors are unmarried males*. We search in vain, of course, to find a bachelor who is married.

To be sure, and as mentioned, very few, if any, serious academic texts call Flew’s move a fallacy. Instead it is an illicit dialogic manoeuvre resulting in a Persuasive Definition, (PD). C.L. Stevenson first wrote on PDs in the 1930’s and there has been much written since by philosophers and informal logicians since. Stevenson does not say that persuasive definitions are fallacious but they are illicit in some circumstances, (Stevenson, 1938). That is, persuasive definitions are not always to be avoided. On this point, I’ll add in passing that if the academic literature argues that the NTS move is a form of persuasive definition, and if persuasive definitions are not always problematic, then it might follow with some *prima facie* assurance that not all NTSMs are problematic. But what is meant to be wrong with the illicit- kind of persuasive definition? The problem with these is that they disguise an argument beneath a definition.

Persuasive definitions are frequently taught in critical thinking courses and text books. For example, Trudy Govier’s text explains a persuasive definition as, “… a stipulative definition disguised as a claim or as a reportive definition. In a persuasive definition there is an attempt to change attitudes by keeping the emotional connotations of a word while altering its applications”. (Govier, 2009).

The comparison between Flew’s NTS move and persuasive definitions is easy to see because of the insertion of the adjective *true* in the speaker’s second utterance. Govier explains this where, “terms such as *real, true, authentic, and genuine* are often elements of persuasive definitions. If someone claims that modern art is not true
art because true art must depict objects realistically, he is using a premise based on a persuasive definition of “art.”…But he offers no reasons to support that conception. Instead of reasons, he offers a disguised definition. Often when persuasive definitions are used, important issues are at stake, (Govier, 2009).

More technically, Stevenson and more recent commentators explain how persuasive definitions roughly work in terms of Frege’s sense and reference distinction. In the more popular kinds of persuasive definitions, the redefinition keeps the sense, (or emotive meaning) of the term, but narrows the class of reference. In Flew’s example the speaker’s manoeuvre from U1 to U2 keeps the normal sense of the term “Scot” but narrows the extension to exclude the counterexample – the one who acts inappropriately, he who is not a Scot after all. This is called high-redefinition when the extension class is narrowed.

I note Govier’s last statement where she says that when persuasive definitions are used, important issues are at stake and I view this as a means to ameliorate the disagreement between the speaker and the hearer. For indeed, in the alleged cases of NTS moves and fallacies, the noun that is modified by true, etc., is usually a social kind or human category like religion, nationality, political persuasion, or race. Here is another example of a persuasive definition, or at least what some have thought is a persuasive definition: if a person calls out another saying she cannot be a feminist and pro-life at the same time, the speaker is committing a persuasive definition since the term, ‘feminist’ has kept its emotive meaning, but the extension of the term is narrowed to include only, presumably, pro-choice feminists. That is, a feminist is one who, by definition, cannot be pro-life through a particular theory or ideology. There is no convincing reason why the persuasive definition is not committed in the opposite direction. Persuasive definitions do not take sides between ideologies, only sides of the speakers within an ideology who commit them.

It is not always clear whether there is even any argument in alleged cases of NTS moves, fallacies or persuasive definitions. But an illicit persuasive definition is meant to disguise an argument. It is not clear to this author that in Flew’s example, or the feminist example there is any argument or dialogic reasoning taking place. One may be just expressing an opinion. Remembering Govier’s suggestion that when persuasive definitions occur, important issues are at stake, I argue that it is far better for the participants in the dialogue to continue the conversation, or argument about just what exactly constitutes a particular case of the social kind under discussion instead of blaming the other for faulty reasoning. I have in mind conversations that carry forth among lay-people like, “oh, why do you think I can’t be a feminist and pro-life at the same time?” Or, our original speaker answering back, “You think he is a Scot? Why do you think that? What is your definition? Wearing a kilt is not enough”.

I make this observation to make the point then to leave it alone: that in abstracted explanations of NTS moves or fallacies, the hearer who points to a counterexample might just as well be begging the question in favor of his or her position as strongly as the one they are bringing the charge against. After all, who is to say, what is a feminist? What is a Scot? What is an Australian? It is not as if there are agreed and uncontroversial necessary and sufficient conditions for these social kinds. The matter may differ when it comes to religion since often soteriological or ecclesiastic
doctrines determine true membership within a religion. Religious identity is a much more complicated social kind, inviting in most circumstances an understanding of kinds determined by the divine.

My Argument

My aim is to defend the speaker against the blame of committing an illicit NTS move, NTS fallacy, or persuasive definition. My reasoning is as follows, where according to the NTS theory of Flew,

- **Evasion** is the fundamental crime committed by the speaker, (since the evasion sidesteps falsifying evidence).
- Evasion depends on **Redefinition**.
- The redefinition is committed by moving from U1 to U2, from a synthetic/contingent utterance to an analytic/necessary truth.
- Therefore, if it can be shown that the speaker makes no such redefinitional manoeuvre, or a less serious kind of move, the charge of evasion should collapse.

Whether the NTS move is illicit or not, fallacious or not, the fallacy is not structural but dynamic. That is, it is an informal fallacy (allegedly) where the speaker strategically manoeuvres to avoid losing “the argument”. The fallacy is not to do with form or structure as in, for example, the formal fallacy of affirming the consequent. Instead everything that is meant to be wrong with the NTS is the new posture the speaker takes when redefining a term with *true*.

To resist the charge of redefinition is also to resist the charge of the more serious crime of evasion. The most simple way of doing this is to interpret the speaker more charitably where U1 and U2 amount to saying the same thing, or saying two things that are close enough semantically without the **synthetically-true** to **analytically-true** shift. I believe there are ways we can understand the speaker as not committing a redefinition:

1. Analyzing and evaluating the role of the attributive adjective *real, true, genuine*, etc., inserted in the speaker’s second utterance, U2 No *true* X.
2. Analyzing and evaluating the head noun in the utterances. What is the philosophical *kind* of X, natural, artificial, or social?
3. Analyzing and evaluating the illocutionary intent of the speaker on the basis of the copula that completes the predication. Is the illocutionary intent as indicated by the copula verb indicative, subjunctive, or modal? In other words, is the speaker’s utterance descriptive or normative?

I have touched on point (2) where it was previously said that most of the alleged cases of the NTSM or fallacy are about social kinds which are by nature intrinsically controversial. Due to space limitations I leave this factor in favor of discussing the other two key points. The strongest being the question of the role or purpose of the interpolated *true* in (1). This is where, I believe, the fundamental disagreement obtains between the speakers in the dialogue. For the hearer, who points demonstratively to the counterexample, understands the interpolated *true*, truth functionally. It is almost as if the hearer makes the speaker mean, *a true Scot is by*
definition, one who does not put sugar on his porridge where true strengthens the predicate to make it a necessary condition of being a Scot. In the parlance of philosophy of language theorists, this is a descriptivist account of meaning where being a Scot instantiates a collection of conditions.

If we can find another way to understand the interpolated true which does not transform a contingent statement into a necessary truth, this should give us points in favor of the speaker. Some recent scholarship understands terms like true, real, genuine, which are adjectives in the attributive position, as intersective adjectives. They cannot be converted to the predicative position as subjective adjectives can, (and thus should not be understood truth-functionally). An example of such an intersective adjective/noun combination is “white wine”. To refer to “white wine” is not to also say, that “wine is white”. To be clear, it might look as if this is possible but the predicate, “…is white” now speaks of the literal colour of wine, (which it is not, it’s clear with a yellowish tint). This “whine is white” does not refer to the kind of wine – white wine over red wine. Putting this another way, the white in “white wine” is syncategorematic. It has no independent meaning apart from its association with the noun it prefixes. As “white wine” is a term that cannot be reduced to its component parts predicatively, I argue the same (in the right contexts) goes for true Scot. If “true” is intersective then we are unable to meaningfully reduce the sentence, “Angus is a true Scot” to “Angus is a Scot” and “Angus is true.” The last statement does not make sense.

What then could true Scot refer to if it also is not an element in a truth-functional expression? I suggest the role of true, genuine, or real, amounts to an expression of a good example over a bad example in the speaker’s mind. A true Scot is a good Scot. Understood this way, true Scot is an exemplar in the speaker’s mind which suggests that there can be other Scots who are not good exemplars.

The direction this discussion takes is to posit that a proto-type theory of graded-membership is a better way of interpreting the speaker’s utterances in alleged cases of NTS moves and fallacies. This is a controversial claim to which I am unable to devote the time in discussing the relative merits of classical category theory versus prototypes. It is clear however, that Flew and the hearer approach the speaker’s utterances assuming a classical category theory where each member of a set must instantiate exactly the same necessary conditions as each other member. Moreover, one either passes or fails the necessary condition test; one is either a Scot or not a Scot. This seems a rather oversimplification, to say the least. The NTS move and fallacy is wholly parasitic on this assumption: that the categories in each of the speaker’s mind are classically categorical where the predicates (puts sugar on their porridge, etc.), form a set of descriptions. Again, why should the speaker share this ontological commitment of classical categories and descriptions which form essential properties? Given the speakers in the dialogue tend to break off the conversation when the charge of NTS fallacy is raised, this is some evidence that they are not even on the same page, as far as logical commitments go.

The second point (2) above follows naturally from the previous point made about the referent of true X. As the speaker is referring to a good or virtuous example of the social kind in question, the mood of the copula-verb should be modal or descriptive and is better understood as would, should, or ought instead of the indicative is. This
will be explained by an analogous example by combining points (1) and (2) already made. When we think of something about our own national identity and hear an exclamation that, “Peter is un-Australian”, what are we to think? The claim is to render Peter unworthy of Australian citizenship formally or informally understood. What might be surprising is that the locution, “Peter is un-Australian” only makes sense if Peter is, in some sense, Australian! In other words, both of these sub-statements can be true at the same time: (i). “Peter is Australian” and but (ii). “Peter does not act as an Australian should” or, “Peter is Australian and un-Australian”. Here negation does not contradict or provide a refutation of a universal generalization. It makes little sense in everyday language to claim that, for example, “Peter is un-Australian” when Peter is American.

Peter has to be both Australian and un-Australian at the same time, but in different senses. To return to the NTS move or fallacy, a better way to interpret the speaker along these lines might be, “OK though you pick him out as Scottish, he does not act as a Scot should; he is not a good Scot, a true Scot”. Yes, this is a value judgment on the part of the speaker but the disagreement between speakers in alleged NTS moves or fallacies are exactly question of values. The literature on social kinds leans towards understanding social kinds in these evaluative ways. Francesco Guala writes that social or human kinds “seem to be dependent on human classificatory practices…unlike natural kinds, social kinds depend crucially on our attitudes towards them (Guala, 2014). Khalidi summaries three further positions as follows: John Searle’s position that social kinds are, “ontologically subjective since they depend on human mental attitudes…”; Ian Hacking: social kinds “are interactive and can change in response to our attitudes towards them”; P.Griffiths: social kinds are, “fundamentally evaluative or normative in nature,” (cited in Khalidi, 2013). Schiappa (2003) makes similar claims, all consistent with Trudy Govier’s remark about persuasive definitions, that they occur when important issues are at stake.

Returning to my argument wherein I aim to justify the position that there is no real difference between the speakers first and second utterance. The syntactical move, if it can be considered as a move at all is merely to hedge or to precisify what the speaker had in mind originally. The second true X utterance need not be understood as a new claim where the speaker’s original utterance U1 can be paraphrased as, a good Scot does not do such a thing.

Is there a way to understand the speaker and hearer as making statements that are not contradictory so as to defend the speaker against the charge of evading falsification through high-redefinition? I understand speaker’s second claim, No true S would P not as a Universal Negative proposition commonly understood as an E-proposition, but as a Particular Negative O-proposition. The speaker seems to be saying, “that is not a true Scot – the one that you have pointed to, to contradict me.” On the basis of the logical square of opposition with its A, E, I, and O propositions, if the interlocuter and speaker are making I and O propositions respectively then both can be true since they are sub-contraries of each other. Therefore, it is possible that some Scots put sugar on their porridge and some Scots do not, but those who do not are the truer, better Scot. Or in the parlance of the Prototype theorist Eleanor Rosch, he is a real Scotty Scot.
Arguing About Religious Identity: Essentialism versus Constructivism

Most of the above can be applied, *mutatis mutandis* to cases of disputes in disagreement about religious identity. I make the provisional observation that intra-religious disagreement about religious identity is often, at least in the Judeo-Christian traditions, a matter of doctrinal orthodoxy where one Anglican deems another as not being properly Christian, or Anglican because of a failure of belief. On the other hand, inter-religious disagreement about religious identity tends to be about orthopraxy, for what is observable, and what counts as important whether one is truly Christian, Moslem, Buddhist, or Atheist, is what they do. Hence, I speculate that inter-religious/secular disputes that invoke the NTS move or fallacy blame the other for bringing up an example of a believer, or atheist, who fails in their behavior of being good. For example, to consider that atheists can be good without God or revealed religion, and to point to Stalin as a counterexample is to show demonstratively that some atheists are not good.

The NTS move or fallacy in religious argument *depends* on essentialism about religion. This is because Flew’s narration and the position of the hearer presume a Descriptive/truth-functional account of essential properties, (a true Scot is one who does not put sugar on his porridge). I do not argue against essentialism about religious identity *per se* but wish to avoid the further complication involving individuals with different perspectives of essentialism merely arguing from their own essentialist standpoint. Essentialism is a problem, but not the problem; disagreement about what is essential is the problem that motivates the argument. An over-simplified dichotomy is to pit essentialism against social constructivism but this results in a dilemma. As mentioned, the NTS move/fallacy obtains because of essentialist attitudes but the other horn of the dilemma may be even more undesirable for some, where constructivism leads to a slippery slope to the view that religious identity is just “in our heads” and can be created and taken away by just thinking about it. Outlined this way, essentialism is too rigid while constructivism too liberal. Is there a way of avoiding this dilemma?

Religious Exemplarism

Linda Zagzebski has constructed an exemplarist virtue theory (Zagzebski, 2010) using the general Kripke/Putnam account of direct reference of natural kind terms, (avoiding descriptivism). Ian James Kidd has also created approaches to understanding religious exemplarism in particular, (Kidd, 2016). In what is also known as the causal theory of reference, natural kind terms like “water” and “gold” refer to the same thing in each case when indexed by a demonstrative such as “that” just as long as there is a proper chain of communication between speakers. This chain of communication should reach back far enough to the original baptism of the object or kind, with the name. What is important for our discussion is that speakers do not need to know the proper descriptive conditions that refer to these objects. A speaker can use the term “water” to correctly refer to H₂O without knowing that water is H₂O. The nature of water is discovered empirically but once discovered is deemed a necessary truth that water is H₂O. Hence, we can have necessary/a posteriori truths.
What is interesting is that on the Kripke/Putnam account, as Zagzebski remarks, “we do not need to know the nature of the referent, and yet we know how to construct a definition that links up with its nature,” (Zagzebski, 2010). This should seem familiar at least in terms of the speaker who allegedly commits the NTS move/fallacy. He knows that so-and-so is a Scot but does not necessarily know what it is that makes him one. It makes little difference to him, therefore, when a pesky observer raises a counter-example by way of another Scot who supposedly instantiates some property thought to be impossibly Scottish. The speaker is not defining a Scot by descriptive content but evaluating what is a good Scot.

Zagzebski constructs her moral theory along these Kripke/Putnam ideas where moral concepts “are anchored in exemplars of moral goodness, direct reference to which are foundational in the theory. Good persons are persons like that, just as gold is stuff like that. Picking out exemplars can fix the reference of the term, “good person” without the use of descriptive content.” (Zagzebski, 2010). Zagzebski’s theory goes a bit further than I require since it is a theory of moral concepts grounded in exemplars who are the “most imitable”. They are most imitable "because they are most admirable" where admiration is the emotion learnt through the emotions of other individuals. For the purposes of going between the horns of the essentialist/constructivist dilemma, I believe that what I have already alluded to from Linda Zagzebski’s moral exemplarist theory can be transformed as a way for disputants in religious arguments about identity to know that a particular person in an exemplar, good role model, without knowing what it is about them that makes them such. By identification with the speaker over religious identity, the proto-typical example is a religious exemplar in his or her mind. The outsider along the periphery is still religious but a bad example. This is to view the radius of a prototype-circle as a gradient of good X to bad X rather than a categorial exclusion of either X or non-X. For example, a good Catholic might be Mother Teresa, a bad Catholic might be a bad Pope from history. Yet they are still Catholic in the same way that robins are good examples of birds, and ostriches are not so good examples of birds yet there is no contention despite this difference that both robins and ostriches are considered birds by competent speakers.

An objection to my use of the Zagzebski/Kidd approach was made by Stephen E. Gregg, (in conversation, 5th July, 2017), where my configuration of the religious prototype/exemplar is still a case of essentialism. With this point, presumably the bias we have in society and religions towards the virtuous, the good, and the orthodox renders us intolerant to outliers and radicals who exemplify another set of conditions. This is a very good objection to which I can only respond now by stating that the prototypical religious exemplars we have are “voted in” by the societies and cultures in which religions are formed. In other words, my appeal is just ad populum – to the masses. I have no other answer yet beyond this since my appeal to a causal-historical account of direct reference presupposes a social ad populum appeal.

Conclusion

I have not provided any evidence for my claim that the uses and abuses of the No True Scotsman move, or fallacy, are divisive. Space does not permit me to demonstrate this but I urge the reader to casually search the world wide web for this “fallacy”, especially when indexed with religious terms. It is used too often in the
unfortunate role resembling Lakoff’s ‘Argument is War’ metaphor - thrown at others to win arguments about religion. The NTS always concerns, in some way, an individual’s true identity. My argument is to resist the manoeuvre where the speaker commits a redefinition that evades falsification. If it can be understood in some way that the speaker does not commit a fallacy or illicit move, the argument can continue. The speakers may never agree due to their differing values but I consider it more worthwhile and conducive of mutual respect through difference, than a full-stop and a Socratic puzzlement where each speaker wonders just what happened when one is blamed of committing the No True Scotsman fallacy.
References


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Categories, Causality, and Numbers: The Problem of Metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason

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Abstract
We hypothesize that the conundrums in regard to mathematics and quantum mechanics have derived from the same source, i.e., Kant’s metaphysics which rests on geometry in virtue of science. It has been found that metaphysica naturalis would be the key to cope with the conundrums in regard to Kant’s metaphysics and mathematics.

Keywords: Categories, Causality, Geometry, Numbers, Metaphysics
**Introduction**

In regard to quantum mechanics, it is said that “the laws of quantum mechanics dictate that in the absence of measurement, neither of the particles possesses a definite spin until one of the two speeding entangled particles is measured. Once a measurement of one particle is made, the state of the other changes instantaneously, even if the particles are separated by vast distances! Einstein believed this ‘spooky action at a distance’ was nonsense. His own special theory of relativity held that nothing could travel faster than light, so there was no way for two particles to communicate with each other instantaneously from opposite sides of the universe…We arrive at a paradox, a logical inconsistency…We must be making some mistake – but where? …Indeed, we might never know the solutions to these puzzles” (HOSSENFELDER 2015: 47-49). When and where humans made mistake is the issue which we try to tackle here, though our inquiry into it is in the stage of hypothesis. We hypothesize that there are two reasons why humans have made mistakes: 1) they abstract from things which appear in the world of sense, and think of the product of the abstraction in the light of geometry: 2) this way of thinking started in the ancient Greek world, indicating that this mistake has a history of more than two millennium. In this regard, if we try to solve this problem, we might have to go back to the world before geometry and mathematics, as a science, appeared among humans, i.e., to primordial times (YAMAMOTO 2017a: 19-37, YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70). Since we think that the conundrums in regard to metaphysics, mathematics and physics have originated from the same root of mistake, and that the solution of the conundrums would potentially cause a fundamental change among humans’ mentality and psychology, hopefully, for the better, we have begun to try to solve them (YAMAMOTO 2016: 87-100, YAMAMOTO 2017a: 19-37, YAMAMOTO 2017b: 72-81, YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70).

**Metaphysical Axioms and Mathematical Axioms**

We have already made “synthetic *a priori* propositions” (B73) on the ground of metaphysics in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (YAMAMOTO 2016: 87-100, YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70). When it has been found that the synthetic *a priori* propositions are correspondent to the “universal cognitions *a priori*” (A300) – “a cognition from a principle” (B357) – we have presented them as metaphysical axioms (YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70). Mathematics has been thought to ground in axioms (HILBERT 1902: 437-479, HILBERT 1950: 1-22). However, when Peano makes a proposition in regard to axioms (RUSSELL 1920: 1-12), they seem to exemplify his “synthetic propositions” (A33). Do Peano axioms hold true? Provided the “presupposition” (A681/B709) in regard to “the three primitive ideas in Peano’s arithmetic…0, number, successor,…” (RUSSELL 1920: 1-12) signifies the “universal cognitions *a priori*” (A300), these statements should be regarded as axioms. However, when we examine these axioms, we note that these axioms are not commensurable with metaphysical axioms (YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70). If we try to dovetail Peano axioms for natural numbers with metaphysical axioms for our “real number: 0, i² = -1, and 1” (YAMAMOTO 2017b: 72-81, YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70), the axioms are to be paraphrased as follows (YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70).

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* B73 designates the pagination of the standard German edition of Kant’s works, as indicated by means of marginal numbers in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Cambridge University Press, 1999). All citations are the same.
• Axiom One: 0 is a real number.
• Axiom Two: Every real number has a successor.
• Axiom Three: 0 can be the successor of any real number.
• Axiom Four: Even if the successor of \( x \) equals the successor of \( y \), \( x \) does not necessarily equal \( y \).
• Axiom Five: If a statement is true of 0, and if the truth of that statement for a number implies its truth for the successor of that number, then the statement is true for every real number.

We think that Peano axioms, which are to be commensurate with metaphysical axioms, can determine something true concerning “the three primitive ideas in Peano’s arithmetic…0, number, successor,…” (RUSSELL 1920: 1-12). These axioms indicate that 1) 0 is to signify nullity in space-time – space-time itself – while number to signify infinite steps of alteration of filled space-elapsing time or its consummation or nullity in space-time; 2) succession is to signify the alteration from nullity in space-time to a part of filled space-elapsing time or from a part of filled space-elapsing time to empty space-nullified time, i.e., nullity in space-time, suggesting that 1) \( i^2 = -1 \) is to signify infinite steps of alteration of space-time itself – quantum – between filled-elapsing and empty-nullified, 2) 0 = nullity in space-time – space-time itself – is to permeate filled space-elapsing time, 3) \( i^2 = -1 \) is to come across its cessation any time before the consummation of itself as number 1 (YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70).

Why does the contrariety between mathematical axioms and metaphysical axioms – the problem for mathematics – occur? We think that the root of the problem for mathematics resides in Kant’s metaphysics (YAMAMOTO 2017a: 19-37, YAMAMOTO 2017b: 72-81, YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70). What kind of problem do mathematics and Kant’s metaphysics have in common? It is geometry, on which Kant’s metaphysics rests. Kant’s so-called antinomy of pure reason in the system of cosmological ideas derives from geometry (YAMAMOTO 2017b: 72-81). In order to solve the problem of antinomy of pure reason, Kant has to think of the “regulative principle of reason” (A517/B545) and his “thing in itself” (YAMAMOTO 2016: 87-100, YAMAMOTO 2017a: 19-37). However, “thing in itself” is thought to signify an epistemological naught. Why do “all propositions of geometry” (A47) lead Kant to the antinomy of pure reason? In geometry, this kind of thing happens: “with two straight lines no space at all can be enclosed, thus no figure is possible, and try to derive it from the concept of straight lines and the number two; or take the proposition that a figure is possible with three straight lines, and in the same way try to derive it from these concepts. All of your effort is in vain, and you see yourself forced to take refuge in intuition, as indeed geometry always does” (B65-A48). Kant, who says that “geometry is a science that determines the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori. What then must the representation of space be for such a cognition of it to be possible? It must originally be intuition; for from a mere concept no propositions can be drawn that go beyond the concept, which, however, happens in geometry” (B40-B41), seems to have firmly believed in geometry while harboring an indelible doubt about it on account of the fact that it seems impossible to derive a figure from the concept of straight lines and the number two. Since “empirical intuitions” (A229) or “empirical synthesis” or “empirical cognition” (A229) must be entirely separated from a thing in itself in Kant’s metaphysics because of ethics (YAMAMOTO 2016: 87-100), geometry lures Kant to think of “the
properties of space synthetically and yet a priori” (B40) – “its transcendental ideality” (A28) – according to the geometrical way of thinking (YAMAMOTO 2017a: 19-37, YAMAMOTO 2017b: 72-81, YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70). However, when Kant noticed that geometry incessantly leads him to the abyss of the antinomy of pure reason, he, who thinks that the transcendental ideality of space is “nothing as soon as we leave out the condition of the possibility of all experience, and take it as something that grounds the things in themselves” (A28), cannot but try to solve the conundrum by means of thinking the “regulative principle of reason” and his “thing in itself” as the condition of the transcendental ideality of space in place of geometry whose “condition of the possibility of all experience” is already left out (YAMAMOTO 2016: 87-100, YAMAMOTO 2017a: 19-37). We think that one cannot attain to space itself through geometry since it has a fundamental defect. When Kant reveals his way of thinking in regard to geometry, saying, “this intuition must be encountered in us a priori, i.e., prior to all perception of an object, thus it must be pure, not empirical intuition” (B41), we have to say, in an opposite manner, that 1) we must encounter an object a priori prior to all perception of an object; 2) then we will perceive an object through pure intuition affected by the sensation of nullity – empirical intuition – and synthesis of apprehension. What is this object? It is an object itself, i.e., death itself – nullity in space-time. On the contrary, Kant’s “thing in itself” (A676/B704) is meant to be an epistemological naught, as he himself repeatedly implies, saying, “One mistakes the significance of this idea right away if one takes it to be the assertion, or even only the presupposition, of an actual thing to which one would think of ascribing the ground for the systematic constitution of the world; rather, one leaves it entirely open what sort of constitution in itself this ground, which eludes our concepts, might have,…” (A681/B709). If one tries to ground metaphysics in epistemological naught, it is absolutely wrong. We must ground metaphysics in the transcendental analytic (YAMAMOTO 2016: 87-100, YAMAMOTO 2017a: 19-37).

We can solve the problem derived from geometry by means of cognizing nullity in space-time – death itself – through pure intuition affected by the sensation of nullity – empirical intuition – and synthesis of apprehension (YAMAMOTO 2016: 87-100, YAMAMOTO 2017a: 19-37), which would enable us to attain the pure concepts of the understanding or synthetic a priori cognition. Since, in “all propositions of geometry,” there are always points or lines or numbers along with nullity in space-time, transcendental ideality of space and time always comprises points or lines or numbers. The cohabitation of nullity with points or lines or numbers in Kant’s transcendental ideality of space and time leads Kant to the conundrum – the antinomy of pure reason. He has to erase points or lines or numbers in the transcendental ideality of space and time drawn from geometry. Kant explicate how to solve it, saying, “as far as concerns the void that one might think of outside of the field of possible experience (the world), this does not belong to the jurisdiction of the mere understanding, which only decides about questions concerning the use of given appearances for empirical cognition, and it is a problem for ideal reason, which goes beyond the sphere of a possible experience and would judge about what surrounds and bounds this, and must therefore be considered in the transcendental dialectic” (A229-B282). Thus, Kant’s solution is to rely on “transcendental dialectic” (in other words, merely thinking of a thing in itself). Kant himself explain why he resorts to transcendental dialectic, saying, “The principle of continuity forbade any leap in the series of appearances (alterations) (in mundo non datur saltus), but also any gap or
cleft between two appearances in the sum of all empirical intuitions in space (non
datur hiatus)” (B281-A219). This is absolutely wrong. Humans are to meet nullity in
space-time in experience or in possible experience, which would enable them to reach
“the principle of continuity” through empirical intuition or empirical synthesis or
empirical cognition. We do not have to seek the encounter. It comes to us on its own
necessarily and universally. What is this? It is death itself – disappearance of what
appeared. We have to think that 1) appearance signifies filled space-elapsing time
while the disappearance of what appeared signifies empty space-nullified time, i.e.,
nullity in space-time, 2) nullity in space-time – space-time itself – permeates filled
space-elapsing time. We think that it is nullity in space-time that would enable
humans to cognize appearances in filled space-elapsing time. This is our
transcendental ideality of space-time – “transcendental ideality of appearances”
(A506/B534). We need not resort to the “transcendental dialectic” in regard to the
issues of “the principle of continuity” (B281) and “the void” (A229) since we can
think of the void – nullity in space-time – inside “of the field of possible experience
(the world)” (A229).

Since our “universal propositions” (B358) – metaphysical axioms – signify “universal
cognitions a priori,” they can serve as the major premise in a syllogism.

1. Our metaphysical axioms – “a cognition from a principle” (B357) – signifies “the
category (which constitutes its unity) insofar as it is universal and rests on a rule a
priori” (A138/B177-A178).

2. “Every syllogism is a form of derivation of a cognition from a principle” (B357).
When “a cognition from a principle” belongs among the categories, it corresponds
to the “categorical syllogisms” (A406). Therefore, “a cognition from a principle”
– nullity in space-time – works as the major premise in categorical syllogisms,
stating “the relation of a predicate to a subject” (B433), i.e., that nullity in
space-time – space-time itself – permeates a subject.

3. Since the major premise – nullity in space-time – “always gives a concept such
that everything subsumed under its condition can be cognized from it according
to a principle” (B357), humans’ cognition can ground in nullity in space-time,
indicating that it has “the reality (i.e., objective validity)” (A28) of space and time,
which is necessary and universal. Kant says in regard to “the reality (i.e.,
objective validity)” of time, that “time is a necessary representation that grounds
all intuition….In it alone is all actuality of appearances possible” (A31),
suggesting that time itself is “other subjective representation related to something
external that could be called a priori objective” (A28).

What is the major premise in regard to Kant’s metaphysics or mathematics? The
answer is that while it is Kant’s “thing in itself” in regard to his metaphysics, it is “all
propositions of geometry” in regard to mathematics. What kind of problem happens
in Kant’s metaphysics or in mathematics? As indicated above, in Kant’s metaphysics:
“thing in itself” – mere thought – signifies an epistemological naught while in
mathematics: there are always points or lines or numbers along with nullity. We think
that, if nullity in space-time is introduced in accordance with “an a priori intuition”
(B40) or “pure intuition” (A21), it would neutralize the conundrum, which
unavoidably occurs in “all propositions of geometry.” It means that space can be
enclosed with two straight lines and a figure is possible, if “figures in space” are
under the aegis of “pure a priori imagination” (A142). The so-called “imaginary
number” \( i^2 = -1 \) in mathematics can be thought to pertain to “pure a priori imagination” or “pure a priori intuition” (A77). In our metaphysics, the imaginary number \( i^2 = -1 \) is commensurate with “one that is also merely empirical, i.e., a proposition of experience” (A47), which can “contain necessity and absolute universality.” In this regard, the “imaginary number” \( i^2 = -1 \) is regarded to be a “real number,” while a “real number” in mathematics is to be an “imaginary number” except 0 or 1 (YAMAMOTO 2017b: 72-81, YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70). We think that Peano axioms, in commensurate with metaphysical axioms, indicate that 1) \( i^2 = -1 \) is to signify infinite steps of alteration of space-time itself, 2) \( 0 = \text{nullity in space-time} \) – space-time itself – is to permeate filled space-elapsing time, which is on the way of infinite steps of alteration to its consummation as number 1. Since our “real numbers 0, \( i^2 = -1 \), and 1” are supposed to signify “everything real in appearance” (B214) which “has for the same quality its degree (of resistance or of weight) which, without diminution of the extensive magnitude or amount, can become infinitely smaller until it is transformed into emptiness and disappears” (B216), we can make more axiomatic propositions in regard to these numbers that 1) the property which belongs to 0, namely nullity in space-time is followed by the property which belongs to “imaginary number” \( i^2 = -1 \), namely filled space-elapsing time – quantum – 2) when the property which belongs to “imaginary number” \( i^2 = -1 \) attains the property which belongs to 1, it plunges into nullity in space-time, i.e., into the property which belongs to 0 (YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70).

**Categories, Causality and Numbers**

Furthermore, we can deduce from Peano-metaphysical axioms more “universal propositions” as follows (YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70):

1. All alteration as a transition of a thing from one state to another signifies: 1) an alteration of a part of filled space-elapsing time to empty space-nullified time; 2) a passing out of a part of filled space-elapsing time into a part of filled space-elapsing time as the succession of the states itself; 3) an alteration of empty space-nullified time to a part of filled space-elapsing time.
2. It is impossible for a part of filled space-elapsing time and another part of filled space-elapsing time to be at the same point in the same instance.
3. It is possible for a part of empty space-nullified time and another part of empty space-nullified time to be at the same point in the same instance – nullity in space-time – if points and instances are conjured up in nullity in space-time.
4. The form of appearance, which alterability concerns, is filled-elapsing or empty-nullified, while their cause is in the unalterable – space-time itself.
5. All appearances arise in a spontaneity, which could start to act from itself, without needing to be preceded by any other cause that in turn determines it to action according to the law of causal connection.
6. The synthesis of the manifold part of space-time itself is successive, and thus contains a series.
7. The synthesis of the manifold part of space-time itself takes place in the manifold of sensibility – filled space-elapsing time.
8. Succession, subordination and coordination which take place in filled space-elapsing time affect the world-whole.
These metaphysical axioms would provide us a clue to comprehending “the principle of causality” (A247) by means of “the Transcendental Analytic” (A246/B303), which, in an opposite manner to what Kant refers to (A246/B303-A247), has these important results: either that “the understanding can never accomplish *a priori* anything more than to anticipate an object of experience or possible experience in general, and, since that which is not appearance itself cannot be an object of experience or possible experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects in themselves are given to us” (YAMAMOTO 2017a: 19-37) or that “the understanding can never accomplish empirically anything more than to anticipate the form of experience or possible experience in general, and, since that which is not appearance itself cannot be the form of experience or possible experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone the form is given to us.” We think that since 1) “the laws of appearances in nature” (B164) agree “with the understanding and its *a priori* form, i.e., its faculty of combining the manifold in general” (B164) and 2) “appearances themselves” agree “with the form of sensible intuition *a priori*” (B164), an object of experience or possible experience which the understanding can anticipate *a priori* and the form of experience or possible experience which the understanding can anticipate empirically correspond to “categories.” Since, in our transcendental analytic, an object of experience or possible experience, i.e., death itself is homogeneous with the form of experience or possible experience, i.e., nullity in space-time, metaphysical axioms are to signify the “transcendental deduction” (B159), in which the “possibility as *a priori* cognitions of objects of an intuition in general was exhibited” (B159), spawning “the possibility of cognizing *a priori* through categories whatever objects may come before our senses” (B159). We think that “natural or real numbers” in mathematics signify an object of possible experience which the understanding can anticipate *a priori* or the form of possible experience which the understanding can anticipate empirically. We have to note that mathematical axioms and natural or real numbers in mathematics, which rest on geometry, state something pertaining to an *a priori* anticipation of an object of possible experience or empirical anticipation of the form of possible experience, while metaphysical axioms and our “real numbers 0, $i^2 = -1$, and 1” (YAMAMOTO 2017b: 72-81, YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70), which rest on the law of nature, state something pertaining to an *a priori* anticipation of an object of experience, or empirical anticipation of the form of experience. Furthermore, we say that since our “real numbers 0, $i^2 = -1$, and 1” are to pertain to “the continuum” which “has the next cardinal number beyond that of the countable assemblage,” they signify “the cardinal number of the continuum” (HILBERT 1902: 437-479). Therefore, it can be said that our “cardinal numbers 0, $i^2 = -1$, and 1” are to be “real numbers,” while natural or real numbers in mathematics except 0 or 1 are to be “imaginary numbers” (YAMAMOTO 2017b: 72-81, YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70).
Fig. 1. The scheme which, Kant thinks, is the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding. (A) Table of Logical Functions. (B) Table of Categories. (A70/B95)

When natural or real numbers in mathematics are thought to pertain to an object of possible experience or the form of possible experience, they might be empty provided the “possible experience” and the understanding remain contingent. In order to prop up natural or real numbers in mathematics, Kant has to resort to “logical functions of thinking” (B159) and “all categories” which “are grounded on logical functions in judgments” (B131). Kant seems to expect that the “logical functions of thinking” and “all categories” which “are grounded on logical functions in judgments” would give him “the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding” (A70/B95) – numbers. However, when Kant separates “an object of experience which the understanding can anticipate a priori” from “the form of experience which the understanding can anticipate empirically,” he cannot but resort to “transcendental dialectic (in other words, merely thinking of a thing in itself).” This is wrong. We have to think that “thing in itself” pertains to “an object of experience or possible experience which the understanding can anticipate a priori and the form of experience or possible experience which the understanding can anticipate empirically.” The scheme in Fig.1, which is expected to be the clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding, is empty on account of the fact that Kant’s “thing in itself” is thought to be an epistemological naught. On the contrary, metaphysical axioms teach that “an object of experience or possible experience which the understanding can anticipate a priori and the form of experience or possible experience which the understanding can anticipate empirically” is nothing but nullity in space-time, i.e., space-time itself. Only on this cognition, the "Table of Categories" (B106) in Fig. 1 is to become “uncommonly useful, indeed indispensable in the theoretical part of philosophy for completely outlining the plan for the whole of a science insofar as it rests on a priori concepts, and dividing it mathematically in accordance with determinate principles,...” (B109). When Kant reveals his idea concerning the Table of Categories, saying, “this table, which contains four classes of concepts of the understanding, can first be split into two divisions, the first of which is concerned with objects of intuition (pure as well as empirical), the second of which, however, is directed at the existence of these objects (either in relation to each other or to the understanding). I will call the first class the mathematical categories, the second, the dynamical ones” (B110), we think that Kant’s way of thinking that “the first class the mathematical categories, the second, the dynamical ones” is wrong. When Kant says, “insofar as it rests on a priori concepts, and dividing it mathematically in accordance with determinate principles,...” (B109), we have to say that the first class belongs among the dynamical categories or metaphysical categories,
while the second are the mathematical ones. Why Kant has made this mistake can be seen in his saying, “As one sees, the first class has no correlates, which are to be met with only in the second class. Yet this difference must have a ground in the nature of the understanding” (B110). On the contrary to Kant, we see that both the first class and the second class have correlates: nullity in space-time – space-time itself (YAMAMOTO 2017a: 19-37, YAMAMOTO 2017b: 72-81, YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70). Therefore, there is no difference “in the nature of the understanding” between the first class and the second class. In our metaphysics, “the nature of the understanding” is commensurate with understanding the correlates in the first class and the second class by means of cognizing nullity in space-time through pure intuition affected by the sensation of nullity – empirical intuition – and synthesis of apprehension (YAMAMOTO 2017a: 19-37). “This difference” (B110) appears to have a ground in the way of thinking: a way of thinking resorting to “logical functions of thinking” and “all categories” which “are grounded on logical functions in judgments – metaphysical deduction (B159) – or a way of thinking resorting to “logical functions of thinking” and “all categories” which are grounded on transcendental analytic – transcendental deduction (B159). However, since “all categories” are to be grounded on transcendental analytic (the understanding) and deduction (logical functions of thinking), “this table, which contains four classes of concepts of the understanding” (B110), does not have “this difference” but appears to have “this difference.”

Kant explains why the Table of Logical Functions is indispensable for “the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding” (A70/B95), saying, “The manifold that is given in a sensible intuition necessarily belongs under the original synthetic unity of apperception, since through this alone is the unity of the intuition possible. That action of the understanding, however, through which the manifold of given representations (whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments. Therefore all manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in regard to one of the logical functions for judgment, by means of which, namely, it is brought to a consciousness in general. But now the categories are nothing other than these very functions for judging, insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined with regard to them. Thus the manifold in a given intuition also necessarily stands under categories” (B143). From our viewpoint, these enigmatic remarks indicate four things; 1) the manifold that is given in a sensible intuition necessarily belongs under “consciousness of itself (apperception)” (B68) and the apperception necessarily stands under the law of nature, 2) since the manifold of given representations – intuitions or concepts – stand under an apperception in general, and an apperception performs the action of the understanding, intuitions or concepts stand under the law of nature and “a perception itself” (A180) endowed with the faculty of “the synthetic a priori cognition” (A14/B28), 3) since “the synthetic a priori cognition” is brought to a consciousness in general through the logical function of judgments, all manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical intuition, i.e., nullity in space-time or space-time itself, is determined in regard to “a perception itself” endowed with the faculty of “the synthetic a priori cognition,” by means of the logical functions for judgment, 4) since all manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical intuition, belong among “a perception itself” endowed with the faculty of “the synthetic a priori cognition” – categories – the manifold in a given intuition also necessarily stands under categories. We asserts that “categories,” which are to arise through the
function of the synthetic *a priori* cognition within “the standing and lasting I (of pure apperception)” (A123) or “consciousness of itself (apperception)” (B68), are the determination of the manifold of a given intuition, leading the original unity of apperception to the understanding, through the logical function of judgments, that the manifold of a given intuition exists as objects themselves. When “the manifold in a given intuition also necessarily stands under categories” (B143), can we say that the manifold of a given intuition, which exists as an object, also necessarily stand under numbers?

When Kant says in regard to the Table of Categories that “allness (totality) is nothing other than plurality considered as a unity, limitation is nothing other than reality combined with negation, community is the causality of a substance in the reciprocal determination of others, finally necessity is nothing other than the existence that is given by possibility itself” (B111), and furthermore says in regard to number that “the concept of a number (which belongs to the category of allness) is not always possible wherever the concepts of multitude and of unity are” (B111), we have to say, in an opposite manner to him, that “the concept of a number (which belongs to the category of allness) is always possible since allness (totality) is nothing other than plurality considered as a unity and countable as a number.” Here, a unity must be thought to be a part of nullity in space-time – a part of space-time itself – under the condition that it is possible for “the standing and lasting I (of pure apperception)” (A123) or “consciousness of itself (apperception)” (B68) to conjure up *a priori* the limitation for space-time itself. Is it possible? Yes, it is possible, which Kant suggests, saying, “The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is only possible through limitations of a single time grounding it. The original representation, time, must therefore be given as unlimited” (A32-B48). While nullity in space-time, i.e., space-time itself signifies “the *a priori* concepts of space and time” (B57), which are not “creatures of the imagination, the origin of which must really be sought in experience, out of whose abstracted relations imagination has made something that, to be sure, contains what is general in them, but that cannot occur without the restrictions that nature has attached to them” (B57), a part of nullity in space-time or a part of space-time itself – “the schema of sensible concepts (such as figures in space)” (B181-A142) – is “a monogram of pure *a priori* intuition” (A142) or a product “of the imagination, the origin of which must really be sought in experience, out of whose abstracted relations imagination has made something that, to be sure, contains what is general in them, but that cannot occur without the restrictions that nature has attached to them” (B57). While nullity in space-time or space-time itself is to be cognized upon encountering a disappearance of a thing which appeared, a part of nullity in space-time or a part of space-time itself – “the schema of sensible concepts (such as figures in space)” (B181-A142) – can be thought to lie within the field of possible experience. Since “nowhere beyond the field of possible experience can there be any synthetic *a priori* principles” (A248-B305), and all of cognitions in regard to our “cardinal numbers 0, \(i^2 = -1\), and 1” and natural or real numbers in mathematics can be thought to “lie in the entirety of all possible experience” (A146), we would say that numbers, including our “cardinal numbers 0, \(i^2 = -1\), and 1” and “natural or real numbers” in mathematics, signify “synthetic *a priori* principles” (B305). When Kant says in regard to numbers, “The pure schema of magnitude (*quantitatis*), however, as a concept of the understanding, is number, which is a representation that summarizes the successive addition of one (homogenous) unit to another. Thus number is nothing other than the unity of the
synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general” (B182-A143), we entirely agree with him, thinking that the “pure schema of magnitude (quantitatis)” or “(homogeneous) unit” – number – signifies a figure among nullity in space-time, whose image is conjured up in humans’ brain in virtue of “mathematical-transcendental ideas” (A529/B557). Since “appearances themselves” (A104) – empty space-nullified time or filled space-elapsing time – is commensurate with “the transcendental ideality of appearances” (A506/B534), they would last forever irrespective of the existence of humans on this planet. In regard to “mathematical axioms” (A300) – numbers – we have already said that “since ‘nowhere beyond the field of possible experience can there be any synthetic a priori principles’ (A248-B305), ‘all of our cognitions’ (A146), which ‘lie in the entirety of all possible experience’ (A146), can be enhanced to ‘synthetic a priori principles’ (B305), i.e., ‘transcendental truth, which precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible’ (A146)” (YAMAMOTO 2017c: 57-70). In addition, we would say that “all of our cognitions,” which can be enhanced to “synthetic a priori principles,” belong among categories.

Since a likeness of things which appear in the world of sense or “an analogy of experience” (A180) can be “assumed as a quantum discretum, the multiplicity of units in it is determined; hence it is always equal to a number” (A527/B555). Is a number, which is equivalent to a figure among nullity in space-time – “a concept of the understanding” or “the pure schema of magnitude (quantitatis)” – different from a number, which is supposed to be equivalent to “a likeness of things which appear in the world of sense” or “the multiplicity of units” in something which can be assumed as a quantum discretum? No, they are not different, but the same. The former number – “a representation that summarizes the successive addition of one (homogenous) unit to another” (B182) – signifies quantum continuum (A527/B555) in terms of nullity in space-time, while the latter number, which signifies quantum continuum, appears to be quantum discretum under the assumption that a thing signifies quantum discretum. We must say that a number, i.e., quantum continuum is homogeneous with “the appearance as quantum continuum” (A527/B555) – a number. However, when geometry and mathematics, as a science, have appeared among humans, inserting points or lines or numbers into nullity in space-time (EUCLID 2002:1-36), a number – quantum continuum – has been alienated from “the appearance as quantum continuum” (A527/B555). Natural numbers in primordial times – categories – have ceased to signify “the transcendental ideality of appearances,” resulting in lapsing into “numerical formulas” (B206) – the “transcendental principle of the mathematics of appearances” (B206). We think that the conundrums in regard to mathematics and Kant’s metaphysics originate in this alienation of numbers from “the transcendental ideality of appearances” while this alienation enabled humans to metamorphose “natural numbers in primordial times” – categories – into “natural or real numbers” in mathematics, enhancing them to “synthetic a priori principles” (B305), i.e., “transcendental truth, which precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible” (A146). However, because Kant annuls “mathematical-transcendental ideas” (A529/B557) by means of the “transcendental dialectic” (B282), it follows that “a likeness of things which appear in the world of sense” or “the multiplicity of units” cannot be assumed as quantum discretum any more. We think that insofar as the “mathematical-transcendental ideas” rest on Kant’s “thing in itself” (A676/B704), “natural or real numbers” in mathematics cannot have the properties of categories. “Numerical formulas” (B206) cease to signify the “transcendental principle of the
mathematics of appearances” (B206). Here, “pure reason” which “has no other aim than the absolute totality of synthesis on the side of conditions” (A336) or “reason” which “has nothing to do with absolute completeness from the side of the conditioned” (A336) intrudes, and tries to rescue them. Since a number – a figure among nullity in space-time, whose image is conjured up in humans’ brain – can be enhanced to “regulative principle of reason” (A517/B545) by means of the function of “reason” which “relates itself only to the use of the understanding…in order to prescribe the direction toward a certain unity of which the understanding has no concept” (B383), “numerical formulas” would last as a likeness of things which appear in the world of sense or “an analogy of experience” (A180) insofar humans exist on this planet. Furthermore, we would say that once numbers including our “cardinal numbers 0, \(i^2 = -1\), and 1” and natural or real numbers in mathematics have been set to ground in transcendental analytic, they would last forever as “synthetic a priori principles,” i.e., “transcendental truth” irrespective of the existence of humans on this planet. We think that while our “cardinal numbers 0, \(i^2 = -1\), and 1” are to stand under “transcendental deduction” (B159), natural or real numbers in mathematics are to stand under “transcendental deduction” (B159) and “metaphysical deduction” in which “the origin of the a priori categories in general was established through their complete coincidence with the universal logical functions of thinking” (B159). Therefore, what Kant says in regard to “the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas” (A506/B534) can be rephrased, in an opposite manner, as follows: “one cannot draw from this antinomy a utility, dogmatic or critical and doctrinal utility, namely that of thereby proving indirectly the transcendental ideality of appearances, since someone has enough in the direct proof in the Transcendental Aesthetic – space-time itself. The proof would not consist in this spurious dilemma.”

Following the scheme in the Table of Categories, which ordains that “community is the causality of a substance in the reciprocal determination of others, finally necessity is nothing other than the existence that is given by possibility itself” (B111), we have to deal with the issue of “community (reciprocity)” (A144) in “allness (totality),” i.e., “plurality considered as a unity” (B111) since “the schema of community (reciprocity), or of the reciprocal causality of substances with regard to their accidents, is the simultaneity of the determinations of the one with those of the other, in accordance with a general rule” (A144-B184). Kant’s discourse would lead us to an astonishing finding in regard to the issue of causality. Accordingly he says, “since the parts of space are not subordinated to one another but are coordinated with one another, one part is not the condition of the possibility of another, and space, unlike time, does not in itself constitute a series. Yet the synthesis of the manifold parts of space, through which we apprehend it, is nevertheless successive, and thus occurs in time and contains a series” (B439). From our viewpoint, this enigmatic remark indicates seven things: 1) since there are no parts of space in space itself – nullity in space – space, as space itself, is not “subordinated to one another” and are not “coordinated with one another” (B439): 2) therefore, space, as space itself, does not constitute a series: 3) since there are filled spaces as manifold parts of space itself, the manifold parts of space itself are subordinated to one another or are coordinated with one another: 4) therefore, a filled space – a manifold part – can be the condition of the possibility of another part, and filled space, like elapsing time, does in itself constitute a series: 5) the synthesis of the manifold part of space itself (synthesis of filled space or of a filled space and empty space) is “successive, and thus occurs in time and contains a series” (B439): 6) since the synthesis takes place in the manifold of
sensibility, succession, subordination and coordination pertain to filled space-elapsing
time: 7) since the world-whole consists of all appearances – filled space-elapsing time
and nullity in space-time – succession, subordination and coordination which take
place in filled space-elapsing time would affect the world-whole. Following what
Kant says (B112), contrarily, we have to say that “a similar connection is thought of
in an entirety of things, since one is subordinated, as effect, under another, as the
cause of its existence, or coordinated with the other simultaneously and reciprocally
as cause with regard to its determination.” What does this mean? It means that “the
members of the division exclude each other and yet are connected in one sphere, so in
the latter case the parts are represented as ones to which existence (as substances)
pertains to each exclusively of the others, and which are yet connected in one whole”
(B113). We think that “the members of the division” signifies categories, through
which it would become possible for us to cognize “whatever objects may come before
our senses,…as far as the laws of their combination are concerned” (B159). This
metaphysical causality must be the ground on which mathematical axioms rest. We
feel that mathematical axioms, in commensurate with metaphysical axioms, would be
the clue to solve the conundrum in regard to Hilbert’s mathematical problems posed
in 1900 (HILBERT 1902: 437-479). Apparently, our “cardinals 0, \(i^2 = -1\), and 1”
show a resemblance to the issue of Cantor’s “transfinite numbers” (CANTOR 1955:
85-201) and “the cardinal number of the continuum” (HILBERT 1902: 437-479) or
Riemann zeta function and prime numbers (RIEMANN 2005: 865-876, RIEMANN
2005: 876-885). The conundrums in regard to mathematics (HILBERT 1902:
437-479) and quantum mechanics (EINSTEIN et al. 1935: 777-780) seem to have
derived from the same source, i.e., Kant’s metaphysics which rests on geometry in
virtue of science. We think that “metaphysica naturalis” (B21) would be the key to
cope with the conundrums in regard to Kant’s metaphysics and mathematics. When
Kant, in all likelihood having the “Leibnizian monadology” (A274) or “Leibniz’s
famous doctrine of space and time” (A275) in mind, criticizes the philosopher, saying,
“only the philosopher expresses himself somewhat more determinately in saying that
in all alterations in the world the substance remains and only the accidents change.
But I nowhere find even the attempt at a proof of this so obviously synthetic
proposition, indeed it only rarely stands, as it deserves to, at the head of the pure and
completely a priori laws of nature. In fact the proposition that substance persists is
tautological” (A184), we would say that “in all alterations in the world the substance
remains and only the accidents change in conjunction with the substance. We find a
proof of this so obviously synthetic a priori proposition, indeed it only stands, as it
deserves to, at the head of the pure and completely a priori laws of nature. In fact the
proposition is that substance persists tautologically.” We believe that this so
obviously synthetic a priori proposition, which stands at the head of the pure and
completely a priori laws of nature, corresponds to metaphysica naturalis.
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Abstract

Abstract philosophy is best explained through effective metaphors. Ancient Indian mythology and classical dance are reflective of this; having been integral to the propagation of philosophical thought from one generation to another. Over centuries, both these mediums have simultaneously evolved by virtue of being influenced by the prevalent socio-cultural scene. And the perspectives that we have therein developed reflect our cultural and spiritual evolution.

We trace the evolution of such perspective through the popular tale of Savitri from the Mahabharata. Classical dance is an effective medium to portray the details of the story but is not limited to it. The use of theatrical elements within the framework of classical dance allows the artiste to intersperse dramatization with narratives of philosophy - be it the poetry of Sufi-mystic Rumi or verses from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad; be it the magnum work of Sri Aurobindo in explaining the abstraction of ‘Savitri’ or the modern philosophy of 20th century thinkers like Rabindranath Tagore. The presentation format of classical dance today has evolved to allow a dialogue between theatre, classical movement and thought. It provides a deeper connect and understanding of the metaphors that these stories signify. By exploring the multitude of opportunities that this provides in delving into ancient wisdom, one is able to present a multi-dimensional vision of Indian mythology to the current generation. And in this juxtaposition of literal and metaphorical, lies our narrative of spiritual growth and cultural identity.

Keywords: Philosophy, Indian mythology, Classical Dance, Savitri, Narrative.
Introduction

The Ultimate truth is evasive to most. Ancient theologians and philosophers attempted to understand the nature of this evasive truth. Some succeeded and articulated their questions, critiques and commentaries. Scriptures, authors of which may be known or unknown contain within them insights of these great philosophers. Steeped in philosophical significance, these scriptures too remain esoteric to many our understanding.

To be able to grasp the depth of meaning in even a small part of these scriptures is no mean task. Metaphorical descriptions therefore, are an important tool. In safeguarding and protecting to posterity what these great minds have understood, and in disseminating philosophy that the common man might otherwise fail to understand, metaphors have played a significant role in understanding abstract philosophy. In this context, Indian mythology, a predominantly oral tradition of story-telling has traversed several generations as a carrier of philosophical thought. (Fourth Series of the Proceedings of the Friesian School, 2016-17)

While the essence of philosophy was safely encased within the core of these stories, the superficial layers of these stories have gone through much evolution. This is an evolution that is reflective of the evolving socio-cultural and politico-economic norms over time. The form of the story as it stands today is reflective, therefore of our current standing with respect to our cultural and spiritual evolution. We must revel in the current version of the stories as we understand them today. At the same time, to be able to peel back the layers that then reveal the philosophy that is contained within, must be our ultimate endeavour.

And enabling us on this journey of understanding is yet another facet of Indian cultural heritage- the classical arts- music and dance. As a form of temple worship to the presiding deity, the songs sung and danced by the devadasis were replete with metaphorical significance. Sadir, as it was known and practiced, evolved with time, travelling from the temple to the courts of kings and then to present day proscenium gaining its current recognition as Bharatanatyam (Soneji. D, 2011). This evolutionary path has also been greatly influenced by the political and cultural changes that the sub-continent has experienced over time. If today, the grammar of Bharatanatyam allows an artiste to explore contemporary thought and subjects like deforestation or climate change, it continues to simultaneously nurture the philosophical core of ancient scripture, music and poetry.

The Story of Savitri

The Story of Savitri first appears in Chapter three of the Vana Parva (Book of Forest) within the grand Epic Tale of the Mahabharata. The Pativrata Mahatmya Parva describes a conversation between the exiled King Yudishtra and Sage Markandeya. "Is there a woman more righteous than Draupadi", asks Yudishtra for in his eyes, Draupadi's virtues were second to none. In reply, Sage Markandeya tells him the story of Savitri.

Born to King Ashwapati and Queen Malavi after much prayers to the Sun God, Savitri was the epitome of grace, beauty and intellect. Accomplished in her
knowledge of literature, arts, administration and warfare, there was no one who equaled her brilliance and humility. At marriageable age, King Ashwapati worries if he can find a match for her. He then asks her to set forth and travel and find a match for herself. Savitri sets off on a journey, accompanied by a friend. She stops by the hermitage of a saint and meets the exiled prince Satyavan, son of Blind king Dyumatsena. They fall in love and Savitri returns to tell her father that she has chosen her partner for life. Sage Narada, prophecies that Satyavan is destined to die within a year and so a marriage now would mean that Savitri would be widowed too soon. Savitri, however, is adamant, and proceeds to marry Satyavan. She gives up her life at the royal palace and lives with the exiled King, Queen and Satyavan in the forest. A year passes by in happy matrimony. As the destined day arrives, Savitri takes on a penance so severe that her austerities would baffle even the most austere of sages. Standing on one leg, for days on end, she would pray to save the life of her husband. But time waits for none- that is the rule of the cosmos. Yama, the Lord of death appears to take Satyavan's life as he is cutting firewood. Savitri's austerities have given her the power to 'see' Yama. He is amused at this power that she has acquired and her ability to follow him. Impressed by her virtuosity, he grants her 3 boons, except the life of her husband. Savitri in her first 2 wishes asks that her exiled parents-in-law be reinstated and that they regain vision. She asks that her parents be blessed with an heir to the throne. As a final boon, she asks that her lineage be prosperous, tricking Yama into blessing her with a child. Yama, in a hurry, agrees and proceeds, only to be stopped by Savitri. He realises that he has been tricked into restoring Satyavan's life. He blesses her for her intelligence, perseverance and love. (Monier Williams, 1868; Ganguli K.M., 2003)

The story of Savitri although initially appearing in text, is one of many tales that have been handed down generations in the oral format of story-telling. With this unique format, the details of the stories may have undergone several changes and many versions of the story abound to this date.

**Interpretation**

At a very basic level of understanding, Savitri epitomises love and dedication towards her husband and her marriage. The festival of *Karadaiyan Nombu* celebrated in some communities of South India marks the day on which Savitri concluded her penance and worship to the Goddess Katyayani. The rituals and practices followed within this festival mark a woman's prayers for a long married life and for the well-being of her husband.

At another level of understanding, the story of Savitri serves as a template to explore our current understanding of several concepts- destiny, love, sacrifice, wit, etc. The story serves as a template to also juxtapose thoughts and opinions expounded by philosophers far removed by geography and contemporary thinkers. It provides an opportunity to compare the virtues of selfless love as is described in the story with the concept of love as explained by Sufi mystic poet Rumi, for example. Mortal understanding of life and death is limited. In the story Savitri 'fights' Death to save her love. 20th century poet and philosopher, Sri Rabindranath Tagore (1916), explains the duality of life and death in very objective and philosophical terms. Can these concepts be superimposed to lend us a better understanding? An excerpt from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (Ch 4.4.5) states the very nature of the Soul and proclaims
that one's deepest driving desire is the root cause of one's destiny. Does this definition tie in with the interpretation of Sri Aurobindo? In his magnum work of this story of Savitri, Sri Aurobindo (1954) dwells on the abstract metaphors that these characters signify. Satyavan signifies the truth of being that has fallen dead to ignorance. Dyumatsena, his father has been blinded by ignorance and has been therefore banished from the kingdom of 'glory'. Ashwapati, Savitri's father is considered to be the King of Tapasya or concentrated focussed energy- a meditative state that could lead one onto the path of realisation. 'Savitri' is the divine word and goddess who has descended to save the truth of being.

**Classical dance, mythology and metaphors**

The story of Savitri has been presented to audiences through performance in the classical idiom of dance. In most cases, the literal and descriptive parts of the story have alone been explored. Beyond the story, the underlying messages and metaphors that the story signifies are as important to showcase in performance. The grammar of Bharatanatyam or any other classical dance form does not limit our potential to showcase these metaphors. At the same time, the aesthetics of explaining and deliberating on the various commentaries in performance must be taken into consideration when attempting to include them into the classical dance format. In this regard, the introduction of theatrical elements within the framework of classical dance has opened up a new dimension to story-telling, narration and exchange of ideas between performer and audience. Even though classical dance is contained within certain parameters that codify it, there is an inherent fluidic nature that allows the performer to explore the added dimensions of theatre and poetry.

**Conclusion**

Each of these stories are of phenomenal significance in understanding not just abstract philosophy but also to trace the evolution of structured thought and deliberation over centuries. In current times, given that we have the increased ability to search and access these stories in addition to texts, critiques and commentaries, it must be our endeavour to delve deeper into these narratives. It must also be our endeavour to respectfully evolve methods to disseminate what we learn. Be it in the form of classical dance, dance-theatre or yet another unique form, the treasure house of Indian mythology and cultural heritage holds within it much that can be explored. And in our attempt will lie our own journey of spiritual growth and understanding.
References

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Personal Identity and Wholeness: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Reflection on Mission

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Abstract
The aim of this essay is to argue the way the fundamental aspects of von Balthasar’s distinctive theological aesthetic and dramatic model of human personal identity and wholeness fit together around his key perception of ‘mission’.

Based on the perspective of von Balthasar’s theological thought, a human being becomes a ‘unique person’ when encountering God in contemplative seeing. It is within contemplative seeing that one comes into contact with one’s ‘Idea’, which is realized when one’s personal identity is fully developed, and which it is one’s ‘life form’, a life telos received from God, to conform to. Thus, in this essay I will show that how the fundamental components of von Balthasar’s distinctive theological aesthetic and dramatic model of human personal identity and wholeness fit together around his core concept of ‘mission’. I argue that one’s personal identity is offered with one’s mission, and so that it is impossible for an individual to obtain an identity by anyone apart from God. What is needed to bring a human life to fulfilment—to become ‘whole’—is the acquisition of one’s specific ‘personhood’, which is given to one, along with one’s mission, by God.

Keywords: mission, personal identity, personality, wholeness, integration
Introduction

Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905–1988) was a Swiss theologian and one of the most important Catholic theologians in the twentieth century. He wrote over one hundred books and hundreds of articles; incredibly prolific and diverse. Most of his adult life was dedicated to writing on themes spanning theology, philosophy, literature, art, history and ethics. His most significant work consists of fifteen volumes in which he unfolds God’s revelation in consonance with the characteristics befitting him: the beautiful, the good and the true: The Glory of the Lord (Herrlichkeit, 1961–1969), Theo-Drama (Theodramatik, 1973–1983) and Theo-Logic (Theologik, 1985–1987) (von Balthasar, 1993, pp. 111–119).

In von Balthasar's view, each human individual comes with a telos. This understanding is in essence Christological. He believes that Christ is the telos, the 'ultimate model' (Barrett, 2009, p. 257). His theology fits this mode in that personal mission ‘is attained by externally following Christ and internally becoming like Christ’ (Barrett, 2009, p. 195). He is convinced that, to reach completion, every individual must achieve his/her telos. That is by means of contemplating that individual becomes readily available to God, who then unveils to someone the objective of his/her life. This revealing calls for the individual obtaining a divinely-given ‘mission’, making an individual a ‘person’ (von Balthasar, 1992, p. 207).

Put differently, each human individual results in becoming a unique person, as she/he in contemplative seeing encounters God. In Theo-Drama vol. II, von Balthasar remarks, ‘No one is enraptured without returning, from this encounter, with a personal mission’ (von Balthasar, 1990, p. 31). This theo-dramatic narrative upholds Christ as the supreme life norm and promotes ‘mission’ as a form of Christian life.

It is by means of a person existing in compliance alongside his/her mission he/she could be content, in which he/she achieves this by becoming increasingly Christ-like. People, as von Balthasar writes:

should consistently apply all his natural capabilities, to make certain that within this surrender to God’s service he might find their particular substantial satisfaction as being a portion of an indicates exceeding his natural and defective potentialities. It’s through this that his nature is unfailingly held of capabilities exceeding beyond those proper engrossed, in so doing enabled so you can get truly victorious. Within it, too, man finally (in faith) will involve and attention of themselves, as the mission itself consists of a Christ-like form, an application comparable to the word or logos. The person well intentioned to his mission fulfils their own personal being, although he could never come across this archetype and ideal of themselves by going through towards the greatest centre of his nature, his super-ego or his depths of the mind, or by examining their own tendencies, aspirations, talent and potentialities. (von Balthasar, 1961, p. 48f)

Christ is the true form of mission (von Balthasar, 1998, pp. 392–393). The Christ-like form, for von Balthasar, is the supra-form, which is the archetype of all earthly life forms, which not only is the absolute and supreme oneness, but also embraces the plentiful and rich otherness, which includes the whole of human history. Von
Balthasar here uses the word ‘form’ to mean

the ideal archetypal image, in Christ, from the redeemed and believing man, and, as a result, also his true individual self, in accordance with that the Father now looks upon and appraises him, and by that they, like a believer, is called to live. (von Balthasar, 1961, p. 48)

When it comes to a God-given mission, Christians cannot ignore the role of holiness. There is a critical influence on von Balthasar’s conception of human holiness, as he notes:

The mission which each individual receives contains because it’s foundation essentially the kind of holiness which they are granted as well as is needed of them. Their living by using this mission is comparable while using holiness that’s succumbed appropriate measure and that’s achievable with this person. (Henrici, 1989, pp. 306–350)

For von Balthasar, by following one’s mission, one becomes Christ-like in some sense. He uses holiness to express what one’s mission consists in. ‘The path to holiness—to sainthood—is not principally one of withdrawal from all the contingent aspects of personhood...but doing things that are uniquely one’s own to do’ (Quash, 2007, p. 21). Thus, one in so doing demonstrates human holiness is of enormous apologetic significance towards the Christian belief. In following one’s mission, one’s behaviour runs into an exceptional change. It is the observability from the transformed behaviour that gives the potential for discerning holiness.

The Lifestyle of Holiness

The fundamental attributes that comes with living an existence of human holiness, von Balthasar proposes, offers a universal type considering that the potential of human holiness is offered within the human relationship to God.

For von Balthasar, the fundamental aspect of the lifestyle of human holiness: such as, that it is the satisfaction of God’s will (von Balthasar, 1990, pp. 189–334). Thus, based on von Balthasar, the satisfaction of God’s will may be the only legitimate manifestation of human holiness. Furthermore, the purpose of fulfilling God’s will is the essence of what the significance of ‘mission’ for von Balthasar. In addition, a true life change is the correct reaction to one’s mission, because it is the will of God—and to be Christ-like, our obedient response must follow the way of the obedient Son to his Father. Then, on von Balthasar’s consideration, how God’s will is adopted is as simple as getting a personal relationship to Christ.

In so far as a personal relationship to Christ is how God’s will is adopted and practiced in a personal mission, then it is constitutive of an individual’s holiness. In von Balthasar’s view God’s will is revealed to one using the discovery of one’s Idea. For one’s Idea resides in Christ, God’s will reveals to a person who is contemplative seeing/prayer with Christ as its object. However, for von Balthasar, the understanding prudently of human holiness is always that following God’s will is not a private spiritual practice, it requires naturally engages actions directed towards others. In other words, when we say that what von Balthasar thinks is phenomenologically
noticeable, it always marks a connection between the expression of human holiness and the other regarding actions performed in obedience to God’s will.

Plainly, on von Balthasar’s assumption, human holiness is not that need to have considering being an ideal that is achieved in finishing one’s mission by means of retrospective assessment of one’s life. Instead, living a life of human holiness is possible, and it can be lived with the procedure of right after one’s mission. Having said that, to live in holiness, a person must experience a critical transform. The needed prerequisite for following one’s mission and as a consequence living a holy life, in von Balthasar’s view, is the ‘death’ of one’s ‘personality’. It is the prerequisite for opening oneself to God’s will that succeeding one’s mission requires that one’s personality ‘die’. Of course, in order to obtain a better understanding of this perspective, it should be put in a broad context that the Christian life bears the mark of Christ’s death (von Balthasar, 1998, p. 327). In death one can put a particular ‘stamp’ on one’s existence (Nichols, 2000, p. 219). Von Balthasar elucidates that Christ’s death undergirds all death; the Son’s death ‘is redemptive only insofar as it manifests the ultimate horizon of meaning, which is God’s all embracing trinitarian love’ (von Balthasar, 1998, p. 331). Christ’s death displays the fulfilment of his mission through his obedience to God’s will within Trinitarian love, which offers a schemata to interpret the meaning of the death of one’s personality and one’s personal identity.

Personal Identity

Von Balthasar shows that just God can grant a person him/her identity, she/he also believes only God can grant a person his/her mission. Even though the situations that representatives or agents are frequently sent on missions by others whom they are to do something with respect to, this is not usually the way we consider someone’s mission. Von Balthasar’s perception of ‘mission’ is different from that getting a mission in the sense of getting ‘an unshakeable inner conviction that ... [one] should do or propose something’ (von Balthasar, 1990, p. 154). He believes that it is impossible for an individual to obtain an identity by anybody apart from God. For him no one can give himself a mission is the fact that one’s personal identity is offered with one’s mission. His understanding of a life’s mission is much more like the way we view another’s representative or agent. However, von Balthasar’s perception of ‘mission’ would be that the individual sent on his/her mission will, like a free agent, think about, plan and test it (von Balthasar, 1992, pp. 154, 168).

Putting the meaning of the term ‘person’ in the context of ancient Greek theatre, it originally meant ‘mask’, after which came to achieve the extra concept of ‘role’. Thus, in his Theo-Drama vol. III, von Balthasar discusses the connection of ‘person’ and ‘mission’ by way of equating ‘mission’ with a ‘role’. As he says:

within the identity of Jesus’ person and mission, we have the conclusion component superiority of what’s meant with a dramatic ‘character’ ... Within the scenario of Jesus Christ, we have, within the relation to real existence, the truth of what is found on the stage, that is, the utter and total identification from the character as a consequence of his utter and entire performance of his mission. Thus, in theo-drama, he isn’t just the principal personality however the model for those other actors and the one that provides them their very own
identity as figures. (von Balthasar, 1990, p. 201)

As Jesus unveiled God by means of his ‘role’ (his mission) and because Christ grants to everyone her mission and identity, then ‘those who’ve been personalized with the roles they’ve been granted may also share be part of his [Jesus’] purpose of revealing God’ (von Balthasar, 1990, p. 258). To some extent, briefly, those who live out their missions will disclose holiness.

Living out one’s mission is not simply living based on a self-given endeavour, nor is it just carrying a natural inclination. The need that a shift happens from ‘personality’ to ‘person’—quite simply, as to a person is in God’s Idea, that is uncovered inside a personal relationship to Christ. As we have mentioned the idea of the ‘death’ of one’s ‘personality’, what should die within the ‘personality’ is ‘untruth’, which means exactly what is against God. Briefly, the ‘personality’ should be cleansed of these things for a person to achieve the situation of ‘personhood’. Von Balthasar causes it to be obvious that ‘personhood’ is just achieved when one’s own ‘truth’ is equivalent to God’s ‘truth’.

For von Balthasar, as truth is crucial, then the same with humility. Humility is vitally significant because it clues that the person is becoming so corresponded to Christ that the superficial figures from the ‘personality’ happen to be overcome so much that God’s will could be unveiled within the person. A moderate individual is just as she is in God’s Idea. Moreover, in approaching to her Idea, a person experiences an improvement of growing personal integration.

**Human Holiness and Personal Integration**

Von Balthasar reflects personal integration in the results of conforming to one’s individual Idea. This thought opens to a way of approaching the type and probability of human holiness. In his treatise ‘The Perfectibility of Man’ (von Balthasar, 1982, pp. 43–72), von Balthasar deals with this issue of the perfectibility of persons. Two vital assertions come in this treatise: firstly, von Balthasar asserts that the issue of the perfectibility of people is actually an issue of the possible wholeness; and secondly, he proposes that what is in due course at concern is the prospect of redemption.

In this treatise, von Balthasar begins with a description of ‘that which mediates itself to itself’ to raise the issue of self-awareness (von Balthasar, 1982, p. 76). This self-awareness, in von Balthasar’s evaluation, is an essential among people and all that other creatures. Besides, he points out a fact that key to the situation of human is the necessary tension in human’s being between the infinite and finite. The possible explanations of the tension between the infinite and finite, for von Balthasar, cannot be achieved by human reason, but only be given by being himself, revealing himself from himself. He then states that when they exist as limited (finite) beings in a limited (finite) world, each is open to what is unlimited (infinite)—namely, God (Scola, 1991, pp. 30–38). For von Balthasar, this openness for people to what is limitless further distinguishes them from all of other creatures.

Von Balthasar realized that human beings are composed of two significantly different substances: spirit and nature. For von Balthasar, the wholeness of people can be possible is due to human’s openness towards the infinite. As he writes, ‘the more we
hand ourselves over to God...the more fully human we become and the more sensitive to others and to the whole of created reality’ (Pinckaers, 1995, p. 90). For this reason, he assumes that the substances of spirit and nature must be united in a relationship—that is, simultaneously the foundation and final purpose of the two substances (von Balthasar, 1982, p. 79f). In von Balthasar’s view, this is a relationship with God that meets the human’s deepest needs and makes it possible for us to conceive the potential for human wholeness. However, this perspective leaves a question that one may doubt: can a human being be a whole (von Balthasar, 1982, p. 81)?

To answer the question above, we should consider von Balthasar’s views on the mystery of being and wholeness of human being. Compared with the natural world, human being is superior. The idea that human being is superior is based on that human’s reason allows them the possibility to transcend nature and reach for wholeness. To some extent, the book of Genesis provides powerful evidence that this is so. However, von Balthasar argues that if the assumption that human is actually being wholeness is only based on the comparison between human and nature, then we would be ignoring the ‘person’ of human’s nature (von Balthasar, 1967, p. 44). Human being is not only a natural being but also a personal being. Namely, human has individual and historical existence. The fact that human’s natural existence, in von Balthasar’s view, is a part of the whole existence of all things in the cosmos means human’s existence has a type of absolute universality. However, the existence of the individual personhood of human indicates absolute uniqueness. ‘Both in his natural being and in his personal being man finds his completion and his happiness only in communion with another human being’ (von Balthasar, 1967, p. 45) That is, it is necessarily open to the whole world with the task of participation to establish the world. Nevertheless, again how can human be a whole? Von Balthasar here points it out:

Neither the other person as the beloved, chosen one, nor the universe as a place of work and achievement, nor the unattainable totality of all persons answers man’s deepest needs. Ultimately, it is only Absolute Being, itself spiritual and personal, that can do that, beyond the difference between the personal (as absolute uniqueness) and being (as absolute universality and totality). Within man no transition is possible between the two poles. (von Balthasar, 1967, p. 46)

**The Strategy to Integration**

Von Balthasar writes that a person ‘manifests something uncompletable which points beyond himself to some type of integration – undiscoverable to him by himself alone – that is formally suggested for the regards to God’ (von Balthasar, 1982, p. 82). To assert that the potential of human integration exists inside a purely formal way enables von Balthasar to carry the content of the integration remains open by God. Von Balthasar insists this content ‘must remain open, when the relationship between God and man will be determined and formed in dramatic dialogue by God alone’ (von Balthasar, 1982, p. 82). In ‘The Perfectibility of Man’, von Balthasar (1982) reveals human ‘perfection’ as ‘wholeness’ or, namely, ‘integration’. Based on his Christocentric view, such integration can only be performed by means of a relationship with God.
To achieve human’s integration, von Balthasar proposes the way of revelation or the way of love. The ‘revelation’ and ‘love’ are mainly based on God’s revelation and His salvation plan. Von Balthasar claims that it is only through Jesus Christ that the way from fragments to wholeness can be really revealed to us (von Balthasar, 1967, p. 62). By claiming this, he argues that it is because:

the salvation event occurred in history, that God does not set a sign or speak a word to man, but uses man [Jesus] in all his existential doubtfulness and fragility and imperfectability as the language in which he expresses the world of redemptive wholeness. (von Balthasar, 1967, p. 63)

With the thought of integration in mind, von Balthasar writes:

hence, the man Jesus, whose existence is this sign and word of God to the world, had to live out simultaneously the temporal, tragic separating distance and its conquest through (Augustinian) elective obedience to the choosing will of the Eternal Father, in order to realize mysteriously the essentially irrefragable wholeness within the essentially uncompletable fragmentary. (von Balthasar, 1967, p. 63)

As the author of the book of Hebrews in the New Testament, Jesus could really experience the true meaning of anthropology and can legitimately therefore solve the issue of human’s existence (von Balthasar, 1967, p. 63). As von Balthasar writes, ‘he is, in a historical sense, the ‘Son of Man’, a man who was really born and really died, a man who [was] like all men’ (von Balthasar, 1967, p. 65). And, it is because of that only through Jesus Christ, as fully man and fully God, as the highest form of revelation, can the unreachable abyss between finite human and infinite God be overcome (von Balthasar, 1967, p. 65).

Integration within a Mission

Now we should consider von Balthasar’s understanding of integration and his perception of ‘mission’. It is in following one’s mission that one involves attaining an integrated existence. In von Balthasar’s view, what it takes to cultivate an individual life to satisfaction is his/her ‘personhood’, which is provided to him/her together with his/her mission by God. We have seen that neither personhood nor mission is just given at birth. Instead, they are given when a person enters a proper relationship to God. It is, for von Balthasar, the necessary outcome of an encounter with God that one gets one’s mission.

Once a person enters the proper relationship with God and encounters God, he/she, according to von Balthasar, lives in a divine drama with the awareness of a personal mission. Moreover, behind every action must lay that internal gift, that initial and essential renunciation of oneself in service to one’s mission. For von Balthasar, every action bears testimony to the divine. Although the fundamental significance of these actions remains hidden to us, this is only the result of our finitude: ‘In this transient world, it may seem that the wind has blown [these testimonies] away, but all testimony is eternal in God’ (von Balthasar, 1997, p. 265).

It is among von Balthasar’s principal contentions that some people are given their
Idea by God. In von Balthasar’s view, human’s Idea, which is given by God, is actualized when one’s personal identity is full-grown. For von Balthasar, the Idea that is exclusive to every individual is one striving to become actualized. When one is offered an individual identity together with one’s mission, that identity is offered within a developing form. It develops only as one lives out one’s mission, for keeping with one’s mission is the strategies by that one’s Idea is actualized. That is to say, for von Balthasar, living out one’s mission is the means by which one turns into a full-grown person, which is an integrated one.

All the characteristics of mission we have discussed above share the specific form of Christ. In von Balthasar’s view, mission, ‘specifically created for and personalized to each individual’, is ‘always a kind of participation, through grace, within the unique, universal mission of Jesus’ (von Balthasar, 1992, p. 249). The Christ-form has the power to ‘illumine the perceiving person’ (von Balthasar, 2009, p. 454). The visibility of the form of Christ completes God’s self-expression. For von Balthasar, the form of Christ is the definitive and determinant form of God in the world; this is because the Word of God is both the divinity which expresses and reveals itself in the Trinity’s eternity and in the economy of time and the man Jesus Christ, who is the Incarnation of that divinity. He is Word as a flesh; a visible flesh, which in its human totality and in the life-figure in which it exists is the concrete presentation of this Word (von Balthasar, 2009, p. 148).

For von Balthasar, due to the visibility of the form, the interior light of the form, the oneness of the form, and the otherness of the form, Christ is the form and measure of human’s mission. Christ’s form of human action provides the measure by which we judge human action. Christians seek to ‘attune’ their form to the measure of Christ because Christ is both at once. Von Balthasar explicates that ‘There is between his mission and his existence a perfect concordance: these two things “are in tune”’ (von Balthasar, 2009, p. 456). The significance being that only based on the form of Christ being visible can the humans who encountered the resurrecting Christ see the form; similarly, it is only on the basis of the visibility of the form that humans’ lives can be changed. More precisely, it is only by the humans undergoing such a terrific satisfaction with their mission can they grasp the significance of the form of Christ and therefore can their lives be changed and integrated.

Moreover, while living out one’s mission leads one to achieve one’s own personal growth and development, it unites one with other people in the greater whole. In doing this, the integration achieved by following one’s mission embraces a twofold-facet: one concerning internal and the yet the other pertaining to external integration. Mission is not an element that only fits to the individual’s existence; living out one’s mission communicates one to others. Due to the facts that mission underlies the plurality of human existences and directs them to some extent of unity, following one’s mission requires the individual within an immutable dedication to worldly authenticity. People may incline straightforwardly to propose that human holiness is showed in personal integration, however, von Balthasar is way from promoting an approach of human holiness which advocates denial of, and flight from, life reality (Sheldrake, 1987, pp. 28–31). We receive and we respond.
Conclusion

We have seen in this essay that in von Balthasar’s view, each human individual comes with a telos. He believes that Christ is the telos, the ultimate model. His theology fits this mode in that personal mission is achieved by following Christ and becoming like Christ. He is convinced that, human holiness—displayed with the living from a mission that agrees with Christ’s—offers in the world a noticeable expression from the image of Christ. This means that, human holiness show what it is accustomed to becoming conformed to Christ.

We then have showed that living out one’s mission is not simply living based on a self-given endeavour, nor is it just carrying a natural inclination. For von Balthasar, the need that a shift happens from ‘personality’ to ‘person’ as to a person is in God’s Idea, which is disclosed inside a personal relationship to Christ. We concluded that a moderate individual is just as a person is in God’s Idea. Moreover, in approaching to a person’s Idea, a person experiences an improvement of personal identity and perfecting integration.

In a nutshell, mission, as von Balthasar proposes, specifically given by God for and personalized to each person, is always a kind of participation, by grace, within the unique and universal mission of Jesus. The characteristics of mission share the specific form of Christ. According to von Balthasar’s understanding, only based on the form of Christ being visible can humans who encountered the resurrecting Christ see the form and humans’ lives be changed and integrated. Human holiness is showed in personal integration, on a Balthasarian portrayal; nonetheless, following one’s mission always requires the individual within a commitment to worldly reality.
References


On Eric Voegelin’s (1901-1985) Totalitarianism and Gnosticism: Gnosticism as the Essence of Modernity

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Abstract

This paper is part of a master’s thesis in progress. The chosen theme arises from the need to understand the relation that the political philosopher makes between totalitarianism and ideologies, Gnosticism and modernity. For this research, two basic concepts proposed by his philosophical-political theory will be used as fundamental theoretical base: political religions and Gnosticism. Voegelin used the concept of political religions as one of the initial elements of his analysis of twentieth-century political movements - notably National Socialism in Germany and Stalinist socialism. With extensive work and career as a scholar, he took on the task of investigating the deep origins of the political ideologies of his time. His project was being outlined through criticism of the ideologies of his time and research for spiritual causes of it. He investigated the symbolism in history in order to recover the formative experiences that gave rise to them, introducing the idea of Gnosticism as the essence of modernity. The author's claim that modern ideological movements reflect a tendency to immanentize Christian eschatology instigates a broader understanding of the phenomenon. This topic is extremely current and pertinent to the Religious Studies, a field that allows the investigation of religion and its interfaces with historical, political, philosophical and psychological bias, among others, possibly opening perspectives to understanding totalitarianism and its repercussion in the contemporary world.

Keywords: Eric Voegelin. Totalitarianism. Gnosticism. Modernity. Political religions.
Introduction

Facing some challenges and legacies of modernity, especially regarding the understanding of totalitarian movements and political ideologies of the twentieth century, there is still much to be researched due to its complexity.

Professionals from several areas, from their own epistemologies and methodologies, such as psychologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, political scientists, have sought and still seek answers to such a prevalence of evil – seen, perhaps unprecedented in its proportion – in the history of humankind, facing totalitarianism, especially National Socialism (1933-1945) in Germany and Stalinist Socialism (1924-1953) in the former USSR.

Among them, the philosopher and political scientist, who is still little known in the Brazilian academia, who brought instigating and extensive contribution to the theme of totalitarian ideologies and phenomena, is Eric Voegelin, to whom will be referenced in particular.

Regarding Eric Voegelin

The political philosopher Erich Hermann Wilhelm Vögelin, or just Eric Voegelin, as he became known, was born on January third, 1901, in the city of Cologne, Germany. As Henriques (2010, p. 31) expresses “he was born with the 20th century”, the century of great technological advances and at the same time of great wars.

His father, Otto Stefan Voegelin, was German, a civil engineer and Lutheran, and his mother, Elisabet Ruehl Voegelin, Viennese, Catholic, raising one daughter along with Eric.

They lived in the city of Cologne until Voegelin was about 4 years old in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, west region of Germany divided by the Rhine. In his book Anamnesis (2009), Voegelin refers to the marks that this region of the Rhine River, its histories, fairy tales, and his own experiences exerted on his personality.

His family moved to Vienna, Austria, when Voegelin was 10 years old, and there he finished high school, having studied eight years of Latin, six years of English and two years of Italia, besides having had extracurricular lessons in elementary French. From this time, he quotes one teacher in particular: Otto Kraus, journalist and interested in Adolf Adler’s psychoanalytic approach. He confesses that studying Hamlet for a semester, from the perspective of Alfred Adler’s psychology of superiority – Geltung – was particularly memorable (VOEGELIN, 2015c).

In 1919, he studied Political Science at the Law School of the University of Vienna, having as mentors: Othmar Spann, the Austrian economist and sociologist who introduced him to the most profound studies of philosophy; and Hans Kelsen, the Austrian Jurist author of the Austrian Constitution of 1920 and the Pure Theory of Law, of whom he became an assistant. Sandoz (2010) emphasizes the importance of this double contribution in Voegelin’s formation:
This was a considerable feat, since Kelsen’s and Spann’s philosophical positions were viewed as incompatible. Spann’s seminars introduced Voegelin to the serious study of the Classic philosophy of Plato and Aristotle and to the German idealist systems of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Hegel e Schelling. (SANDOZ, 2000, p. 35).

On vacation between 1921 and 1922 he got a scholarship in Oxford to improve his English, and graduated from the University in 1922, presenting the thesis (“Reciprocal influences and duplication”). Henriques says that “We can perceive the tension between the individualist and universalistic doctrines of society that will emerge in his future research.” (HENRIQUES, 2010, p. 33-34).

Voegelin got a scholarship from the Rockefeller Foundation for the period from 1924 to 1926, having gone to the United States to study in the universities of Columbia, Harvard and Wisconsin. He reports that this experience was a rupture in his intellectual development, enabling him to open his perspectives to the world; he learned about the English tradition of “common sense”, which he took as a philosophy of life, perceiving its importance “to the cohesion of society.” (VOEGELIN, 2015c, p. 56). He realized that this tradition was not present in his native land, and only to a lesser extent in France.

Another significant difference in the US was the lack of Kantian influence in intellectual debates, which he had been used to in Europe. In America, Voegelin found that Christian tradition and classical culture were taken into account, free of Heidegger’s influences. On this, he comments that “such a plurality of worlds had a devastating effect” on him. (VOEGELIN, 2015c, p. 61).

However, Voegelin (2015c) confesses that he was heavily influenced by the thinking of George Santayana, Spanish philosopher, poet and essayist, who Voegelin considered as a great philosopher, sensible to the spiritual matters without been linked to dogmas.

Having had the scholarship extended for another year, he went to Paris to study at Sorbonne. At that time Paris was receiving large numbers of Russian refugees. He decided to learn the language to study political documents, as well as French literature and philosophy. Studying Paul Valéry, he noticed that his lucretian philosophy was similar to Jorge Santayana’s. (VOEGELIN, 2015c, p. 64).

In 1929, he became Privatdozent (professor) of State Theory and Sociology at the University of Vienna; in 1932 he got married to the Viennese Elisabeth (Lissy) Onken, and became a naturalized “Austrian in 1934” (HENRIQUES, 2010, p. 52).

Continuing his research, he began to write about law theory and power theory to develop a Staatslehre (2016), a State Theory, which required a chapter on political ideas. He reported that he had to abandon this entire Project and start studying on the issue of race, once National-Socialism began to emerge. He made two books about this, and realizes...
[...] that political theory, especially when analyzing ideologies, must be based on Classic and Christian philosophy. (VOEGELIN, 2015c, p. 69-70).

From the researched material, three books were published, Race and State, (in two volumes) and The history of the race idea: from Ray to Carus, both from 1933.

Hitler’s proclamation as a chancellor on January 30th, 1933, followed by the “Authorization Act” of March, which granted him full legislative powers, and the political crisis and Austrian civil war in 1934 propitiated the book The Authoritarian State of 1936. According to Voegelin, it was his “[...] first serious attempt to study ideologies from both sides, right and left [...]”. (VOEGELIN, 2015c, p.73). This book was a watershed moment in his relationship with his former master Kelsen.

Apart from these influences, the Russian revolution was also decisive for the construction of his political theory, realizing that the whole of the events combined together precipitated his research:

> The stimuli for going deeper into the matter were provided by political events. Obviously, when you live in a time dominated by the recent Communist revolution in Russia, Marxism (and behind Marxism the work of Marx) becomes a matter of some importance for a political scientist. I began to get interested in the problem of the ideologies. The second great stimulus was, of course, provided by the raise of Fascism and National Socialism. (VOEGELIN, 2011, p. 52).

Henriques (2010, p. 56) emphasizes that the 1936 book makes “an historical juridical analyses of the Austrian constitution”, highlighting the difference between Voegelin’s proposition of an Authoritarian State perception, in relation to the Democratic State proposed by Kelsen, and the Neutral or Total State of Carl Schmitt.

Afterwards, he publishes Political Religions and introduces the idea of Gnosticism.

**The Political Religions and Gnosticism**

At Christmas of 1938, Voegelin (2002) publishes Political Religions. In this book, the concept of political religion is used as one of the initial elements of his analysis of the political movements of the twentieth century.

By introducing the term, he point out a religious perspective on the political ideologies of his time. Drawing on studies of political symbolism, he traces the earliest political religion of civilization - Egypt and its worship of the Sun god -, especially the worship of Akhenaton, in which the sun is worshiped for being “the life-spreading power” and as a symbol of sacred emanation. He goes on, following the rupture of the Augustinian conception of Christian society by the Cistercian abbot Joachim of Fiore (~1130 - 1202), who applies “the Trinity symbol to the course of history” (VOEGELIN, 1987, p. 87) up to modernity.
With the annexation of Austria by Hitler - the Anschluss - Voegelin and his books became a great threat to the regime. He was fired from the University of Vienna and realized he was going to be arrested. Thus, he quickly prepared to emigrate, first going through Switzerland, where his wife met him before and they headed to the United States. His books were destroyed by the Nazis, but fortunately their copies can still be found in his complete works. The book Political Religions was reissued in 1929 in Stockholm.

Federici (2011) comments that for this reissue, Voegelin wrote a new preface in which he addressed Thomas Mann, in response to his accusation that Voegelin hadn’t been “sufficiently critical of the Nazis”. Voegelin reaffirmed his “opposition to collectivism” by arguing that ethical debate, alone, would not provide all the answers to the deeper problem – and is not just about the rupture of “ethically reprehensible actions” – because the central issue is the Evil itself.

In Political Religions (2002), Voegelin departs from the Augustinian perception and affirms that National Socialism should be observed through the prism of Evil in the world. Not in a deficient way or as some negative conduct, but as a true substance and force that acts in the world; and emphasizes that one cannot fight against this satanic force with morality or feelings of humanity.

He further contends that it is not possible to understand man’s life in the political community without including the bodily, spiritual and religious dimensions; in the same way, the political language turns into a symbolic penetration of the mundane human experience through a transcendent and divine experience. (VOEGELIN, 2002).

Voegelin (2002) observes that symbolic and transcendent aspects have influenced the mass attitudes and manifestations of ideologies and totalitarian movements. He proposes that it is the loss of the experience of transcendence that leads to dehumanization; and the attempt of immanentization is what favours the idea of a “pneumopathological humanity”, (VOEGELIN, 2008, p. 145) a spiritual disease in which “the emphasis is transferred to the experience of the world of things, in the space-time existence.” (VOEGELIN, 2008, p. 339).

He states that the suppression of these transcendent religious symbols bring new symbols, that emerge from the scientific language and take their place. (VOGELIN, 2010, p. 69). To depict this, Voegelin cites one of the most sacred symbols from the political realm and divine realm – the sacred emanation:

a) present in the solar myth from Egypt, it appears in Dante’s Monarchie;

b) likewise, it also appears with Louis XIV, who called himself the ‘Sun King’, in a similar way to God;

c) with Jean Bodin, the French jurist, adept in the divine right of the kings theory from which he radiates his power.

Therefore, it is necessary to look for the symbolic forms of representation of experience.
The proposal of comprehension of the totalitarian phenomena initially advanced by Voegelin, originating from political religions, searching for existing symbols in collective representations, has as an addition the idea of gnosticism as the essence of modernity.

Voegelin (2015c) mentions that in the 1940s and 1950s, he noticed the “existence of other representations beyond the classic philosophy and revealed Cristianity simbolisms, that some specialists called as gnostics” (VOGELIN, 2015c, p. 105). The reading of the introduction of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s book (1905-1988) – a Swiss priest, considered to be one of the greatest theologians of the twentieth century –, published in 1937 and named Prometheus, awoke him to the Gnosticism question and its application to modern ideological phenomena. He discovered that the idea of Gnosticism in continuity in the modern era, was perceived by other authors of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, such as in the 1935 work of Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792-1869), a German theologian and historian. In his book The Christian Gnosis or the Christian Religious Philosophy in Its Historical Development, Baur traced the history of gnosticism “from the first Gnose of Antiquityk” through the Medieval Age, the religion philosophy of Jackob Böhme, Schelling, Schleiermacher and Hegel.” (VOGELIN, 2015c, p. 105).

Studies about Gnosticism gained momentum with other authors, and Voegelin emphasized the existence of the research by Henri Charles Puech (Paris), Gilles Quispel (Utrecht) and Carl Gustav Jung (Zurich) on the subject. Gnosticism, having, therefore, a central role in Voegelin’s analysis of modernity, portrays six primary characteristics (FEDERICI, 2011, p. 90):

1. A “Gnostic is dissatisfied with his situation.” Voegelin notes that this is not unusual or limited to Gnostics;

2. Gnostics respond to this dissatisfaction, not by finding fault in human nature (Voegelin notes that “Gnostics are not inclined to discover that human beings in general and they themselves in particular are inadequate”) but rather by claiming that “the world is poorly organized” and that if “something is not as it should be, then the fault is to be found in the wickedness of the world.”;

3. Gnostics believe that “salvation from the evil of the world is possible.”;

4. Thus Gnostics believe that the world can be fixed and that “from a wretched world a good one must evolve historically.”;

5. This evolutionary change is possible because “a change in the order of being lies in the realm of human action, that this salvation act is possible through man’s own efforts.”;

6. The Gnostic must therefore work toward “the construction of a formula for self and world salvation” and this will be made evident in “the Gnostic’s readiness to come forward as a prophet who will proclaim his knowledge about the salvation of mankind.”;
However, studies on Gnosticism applied to modern ideologies probably opened up new research and perspectives, which Voegelin diligently addressed. His later works, *Order and History* (2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2010), in five volumes, bring new challenges to the understanding of modern totalitarian phenomena.

**Conclusion**

Renowned author in international academic environments, Eric Voegelin’s thinking is still little explored in Brazil. His extensive work is the fruit of a lifetime dedicated to research, addressing the political, philosophical, transcendental aspects, trying to fight totalitarian ideologies and regimes, proposing answers to the challenges of modernity.

Facts narrated in his biography point directly to the influence, on his research, of the historical and political moment in which he lived, regarding the theme of modern totalitarian movements.

His initial research focused on the concept of political religions, bringing reflections on the aspect of religious symbolism *on the intramundane*. The attempt to apply in modernity, the symbolism proposed by Joachim de Fiore on the Third Kingdom, shows, according to the author, the deep connection between the political and religious phenomena.

What makes the author question himself on “how can a civilization, progress and decline at the same time” (VOEGELIN, 1982, p. 98) propelled him to search for answers and truth, throughout his 84 years.

The intention with this work is to open the question to a greater understanding of the subject, and does not pretend to exhaust the theme. It may even contribute to elucidate some flaws on the topic of Gnosticism according to Voegelin pointed out by some authors.

The theme of *Gnosticism* as the essence of modernity deserves to be researched; once applied to totalitarianism, it points to an attempt to “immanentize the eschaton”, that is, a salvationist attempt by a leader who believes in being anointed, to produce paradise on Earth.

Voegelin coined a term to express the spiritual disease, the main symptom of which is to omit an element of reality in order to create a new world fantasy: *Pneumopatology*.

This is one of the challenges that modernity leaves as a legacy, and such sphinx enigma, awaits to be revealed.

Seeking a final image for this work, synchronicity happened, and the crucial image that connects this words and the research was found: *Akhenaten as the Sphinx, worshipping Aton.*
Figure 1: Akhenaten as the Sphinx worshipping Aten (or Aton)  
(Hans Ollermann, 22 jan. 2008)
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The Complaint of Rumi’s Reed: It’s Significance as the Identity of Man in the Concept of Existence

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Abstract
The Quran opens with “In the Name of God the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate”. Muslims read this verse in their daily life, in prayer, before eating and even before driving. For the Muslims this verse is not only a way of life that is rooted in tradition, but also it signifies a cosmological and ontological statement of existence. In the Unity of Existences school of thought, the world is created as a manifestation of God’s All-Merciful name which itself is a manifestation of His own creative will. Rumi, the mystical Sufi poet expressed this idea in the opening couplet of his magnum opus, the Mathnawi: “listen to the reed how it tells a tale, complaining of separations”. In this paper I will explain how to relate the couplet to the given verse of the Quran and from it we will understand its conception of ethics. Later on, with the given structure, we shall apply it as a response to some philosophical questions such as the problem of evil and design argument; and also scientific challenges to theism such as the big bang theory and the evolution theory as well as the formulated ethic will be compared to moral relativism, consequentialism, and utilitarianism.

Keywords: Meta-ethics, Religion, Islam, Cosmology
Introduction

The subject that I will speak of here involve the metaphysic interpretation of the opening verse of the Mathnawi by the mystical poet Rumi as a commentary to the opening verse of the Quran. The Mathnawi, is known to be as the interpretation of the Quran by the Sufis. (Rumi, 2004) Nonetheless, even known as the interpretation of the Quran, the Mathnawi will not be itself without through the Hadis, the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. In fact Rumi himself said of his Mathnawi as the ‘root of the root of the root’ of religion. Not as “the root of the root of religion”, denoting itself as at the third level of interpreting the truth from a religious doctrine point of view. (Rumi, 2004) In other words, the Hadis is known as the main interpretation of the Quran, and later followed by the Mathnawi.

The main inspiration for this paper I had derived from the work of one of the foremost Turkish scholar on Rumi, Abdulbaki Golpinarli. The son of the final generation of genuine Mawlawiyah Dervish from the Ottoman period, Abdulbaki Golpinarli is considered as the most authoritative scholar on Rumi in the current period of the Republic of Turkey. Born in 1900 in Istanbul, he spent a portion of his childhood in a Sufi lodge in Istanbul where he studied Arabic and Persian and later on traveled around Turkey as a teacher. His academic career as a university lecturer was short, as he retired rather at young age after he was accused by the government for inappropriate conduct in legal matters. After his early retirement, Golpinarli spent most of his time until his death writing books and doing translations from the works of Rumi and Yunus Emre. He died in 1982 in Istanbul. (Akun, 1996)

Abdulbaki Golpinarli wrote a ‘huge’ three volumes of commentary on the Mathnawi. His commentary of the first 18 verses of the Mathnawi contains important ideas that summarized the metaphysic world-view of Islam, and perhaps in my humble opinion, a great introduction for those who are new to learn about Rumi’s thought in a nutshell. The first 18 verses of the Mathnawi is known as the door to the Mathnawi. In fact it was the only verses that is hand written by Rumi who already composed it in his heart and remembers it. The rest of the Mathnawi was recorded in writings by Rumi’s student, Husam Chalabi as Rumi circling a pole and recites the poems out of ecstasy. (Turkmen, 2002) Stating this fact, the first 18 verses shares the same ontology importance to the Mathnawi as the Surah Fatihah (Opening Chapter) to the Quran. In other words, as the Fatihah chapter is the summary of the Quran, the 18 verses will be the summary of the Mathnawi. As the Mathnawi is the commentary of the Quran, in deduction, the first 18 verses is the commentary of the Fatihah. However, according to Imam Ali, the whole Fatihah chapter is summarized in the first verse, the Basmala, that reads “Bismillahirrahmanirrahim” – “In the Name of God Most Compassionate Most Merciful”. The Basmala on the other hand, as according to Imam Ali, is summarized in the dot on the letter “Ba”. (Baldock, 2014) In his commentary of the Mathnawi, Abdulbaki Golpinarli noticed the first letter of both the Quran and the Mathnawi is the letter “Ba”. The Mathnawi starts with “Bishnev in ney chun shikayet mi kuned” – “Listen to this reed how it complains”. Abdulbaki Golpinarli in his commentary did not further discussed the importance of this similarity, however he did not dismiss the importance of the “Ba” letter, which is the first Arabic letter. (1985) This case has prompted me to assume that, or rather to make a hypothesis that, the first couplet of the Mathnawi, “Bishnev in ney chun shikayet mi kuned. Ez judayeha hikayet mi kuned” – “Listen to the reed how it complains, how it
tells a story of a separation” as the commentary of the first verse of the Quran, “Bismillahirrahmanirrahim” – “In the Name of God Most Compassionate Most Merciful”.

The Unity of Existence School of Thought

In the Unity of Existence school of thought, although we say that the Creator and the Creations are in one existence, we are not saying that they are the same as that would be Pantheism, nor we are saying that is one is a ‘small’ part of the other as that would be Panentheism, rather we are saying that these two are completely different two entities but one is dependable on the other. In this case, the world of creation is dependable on the Creator – as even though the created world is created after it does not become independent itself. (Golpinarli, 1985) If the world of creation becomes independent itself for one moment, that moment itself it is not a created thing in metaphysical sense but rather an independent existence itself. Therefore we insist that the Creator is an independent existence, hence in a metaphysical sense, it the only thing that is Real, while the world of creation is completely dependable and subjected to the Creator. Because of it being dependable itself in existence, it is an Attribute. (Al-Attas, 1995; Izutsu, 2007) To illustrate this idea better, let’s imagine, a man has a shadow. The shadow is not the man, as the man himself. The shadow is completely dependable on the man, although it is not the man. If the man disappears, the shadow too will disappear. However, if the shadow disappears, it is ridiculous to say that the man will disappear too. Therefore, as we are saying that the man is the real object, and we refer the shadow as the man’s attribute.

For the Sufis, the world is created out of God’s own creative expression; as based on the hadith, that God says: “I am a hidden treasure, I am desired to be known, so I created creations that they may know Me”. When God says “I” in that context its already indicates that God is a unique self individual, with a free-will of Self-expressing Himself. However, the “I” is not God, but rather it is God’s own attribute – like man who says “I”, his self identification is the attribute of him being aware of himself. (Izutsu, 2007) As God is the originator of the universe, God also is the end of the creation of the universe as the purpose of creation is for Him to be known. Human as the greatest creation is created for this purpose, to know God. We say human as the greatest of creation because human know God through both of His Names that originates good and evil. (Al-Ghazali, 2007) Human is created of two souls. (Al-Attas, 1995) In Rumi’s language, human is like a donkey with angel’s wing. (Arberry, 2006) In other words, human are composed of the rational soul and the animal soul. The rational soul through knowledge will know God’s “The Most Beautiful” name (Al-Jamil) whereas the animal soul, through ignorance will know God’s “The Most Mighty” name (Al-Jalal). The reason we come to this conclusion is that because, is that Al-Jamil and Al-Jalal in essence are not the opposite, but the effect that they produce are different. (Wan Daud, 1998) With knowledge, human are tend to be humble towards God and witnessing god’s creation in awe (the effect of Al-Jamil), whereas, in ignorance, man tend to be arrogant, forgotten who their real selves. Within this arrogance, man will feel comfortable to disrespect others and take things for granted, and because of this man tend to harm others or to oppress them. Arrogance which is the result of ignorance does not separate from fear. This thinking is conformed in many Western thinking tradition especially noted by Hobbes and other school of realist, where man constantly live in fear due to uncertainty in
The fear or the uncertainty ultimately will be the force that humble man, and this may take in the form of regret in this world or the after world (the effect of Al-Jalal). (Al-Attas, 1995)

The Connection

The ‘reed’ is the symbol of the perfect man – a man who posses the knowledge, that makes him great. The right attitude for others toward a learned man is to be humble, and by humble, Rumi started his Mathnawi with the word “listen” for no man can actually listen if he is too full of pride. (Golpinarli, 1985) “Listen”, the first word in Mahtnawi is not accidental, for the first Quranic word that is revealed to Prophet Muhammad is “read”. Both of the actions, “listen” and “read” are actions of “input” – what I mean by this is that, these actions are tool to perceive and acquire knowledge. The first step to acquire knowledge is the need for knowledge – like a desire, and this is impossible if man at first does not realizes that he is in ignorance. Even if man is comfortable and satisfied with the amount of knowledge he has, he must not be too comfortable with himself as man is made to be forgetful.

The knowledge that we are speaking of here is not simply knowledge as ‘information’, but rather it is the consciousness of God. The consciousness of God is not simply the act of thinking of God, but to know Him through life, the purpose of his act of creation at the first place. As time passes humans go through many consciousness and within this consciousness the desire to reach happiness teaches man to accept of his strength, weakness and with right judgment of what is necessary and what is unnecessary, which become his ethical code. Through happiness and sadness; through fear and security; through thankfulness and regrets; through heaven and hell, man learns the greatness that belongs to God. With this awareness or without awareness, man is living in this purpose, which is to know God; the only difference is amongst man is when they are aware of this. The most general acceptance of this is when man left the world after death. However, for certain men, they have this awareness while they are in this world, and this what may the Prophet meant when he said “die, before you die”.

As man always in the mode of knowing God, the process itself is called Love. Love as defined by Plato is union,(2015) and knowledge as defined by Al-Ghazali is the union of the knower and the known.(2010) As man starts to know God better, he is in union with Him in deeper level. But God, is completely unknowable except to Himself.(Arberry, 2006) If God is knowable then it is not God. Hence for this fact, the flame of love for the lover of God is always in flame and this inextinguishable flame is the complaint of the reed about a separation, between creation and the creator that always exists.

According to another great Anatolian philosopher-mystic, Ibn Arabi, the world is like a body and the perfect man is the soul.(Chittick, 1982) Like when the body is dead after the soul left the body, the world too is destroyed when there is no the Perfect Man left. Our dependency in existence is already known as ‘love’ (ashq) and it is the effect of God’s name “The Most Merciful” (Ar-Rahman) as God is independent – (the real existent), and our existence is dependable on Him, for He is Merciful and to express that He created us as His lovers. When Rumi said “listen to this reed how it complains, telling a story of a separation”, God already answered him
through the revelation given to Prophet Muhammad roughly 600 years before Rumi was born, as “In the Name of God The Most Merciful, The Most Compassionate”.

The metaphysic structure of Rumi’s thought that I have presented so far, is perceived to be ridiculous for some because of anti-theism scientific discoveries. I am myself, not a biologist nor a physicist, nor I am a metaphysician, I am not qualified to discuss the matter that I am about to bring up. However as a student, and for the purpose of this conference I must stated that for Rumi, scientific truth and metaphysic truth is inseparable, as they are organically linked together.(2004) Therefore to embrace this approach in one’s intellectual activity, one must be able to put the scientific theories (or discoveries) in the proper ontological place of the metaphysic sphere, although the theories might be proven wrong later.(Nasr, 1997) The result might show a different conclusion, nonetheless, it does not betray the scientific effort and culture.

**Possible Anti-Theistic Criticisms and Theological Aristotelian Answers**

For the metaphysic deniers the universe is created out of randomness. However governed by natural laws life is made to be possible. The first randomness would be under the law of quantum physic, the accidental clash of the positive and the negative particles created a space, which eventually the starting of time and the beginning of existence. This randomness that cause expansion of space and time, from warm energy cool down out into mass like dust and from this dust the earth was came to be in existence.(Hawking, 2010) The presence of certain chemical properties and with the right temperature on earth made water possible to exist and there from the first living being in the form of fish came to existence. It is considered to be alive because it is able to move, grow, and reproduce and sense of the need to survive present in them. In other words, they do have consciousness. Out of pressure and the need to survive, the fish reach the land and in order to adapt the need for change biologically is programmed in their gene will be passed down to their offspring to be manifested. The process continues in millions of years until human takes place in existence.(FORA.tv, 2011) The brief narrative that I have provided, briefly in a sketch explains the existence of human from the big bang and through evolution. Their ‘truth’ in this narrative is not about the question “why?” but rather about the question “how?” The question “how?” has no concern about the future, as oppose the question “why?” because the question “how?” is only concerned about the present with no other aim, which according to Rumi is rooted in arrogance in the form of heedlessness.(Arberry, 2006) However, in order to answer the question “why?”, the question “how?” is not necessary neglected. Whilst the answer to the question “how” might undergo changes or improvement, the answer to the question “why?” will never change.

Another challenge to theistic metaphysic is the philosophical problem for the apprehension of God. The weakness in the design argument and the problem of evil have created a vacuum for the mind to accept this God that is worthy to be worshipped and whose rules and laws to be obeyed. When God is difficult to be accepted, randomness will be a stronger conclusion and the spirit of humanity that is based on visible kindness become the principle of ethic and moral code. Supported by Kant’s universal duty and the urge of liberation modeled by the spirit of utilitarianism as suggested by Mills, humans are racing to produce what is the most beautiful
consequence, be it in economic, politic and the environment. The progress of humanity in this term is tremendous. Nonetheless, the “why?” question should not be left unattended. Some may find contention on the “how?” question but some may not. If there is any little benefit of this paper for this particular conference, it will be my humble attempt to realign the scientific and philosophical issues according to the metaphysic structure provided of our discussion on Rumi’s legacy.

The positive and negative particles that started he big bang should not be taken as an independent existence. We must note that the real object is the “particle”. The being of positive and negative denotes its attributes, as positive and negative are adjectives. Adjective ontologically is not an independent existence; they are predicates that attach to object. If we apply Aristotelian metaphysic and analytic on the big bang theory, human’s consciousness would suggest there is an Intelligent being who is responsible for the bang. The reason is, for Aristotle, no greater should come out of the weaker, as it should be the other way round. Human despite able to act freely is not subjected to randomness. Humans able to organize, making plans and able execute actions to reach their desired objectives. Furthermore, a constrain to randomness is not definition of free-will, as free-will is greater than randomness for free-will is about absolute control. In other words, the energy of free-will must reflect the existence of the law that allows it to exist. The theory I suggested here is in line with Kant’s cosmology of existence that explains the relationship of God and the universe based on the a priori nature aesthetic judgment in man. (Kant, 2008) The only difference between the Kant’s deity and Rumi’s would be that Rumi’s God is an active being as proven by man being active himself. Furthermore in our discussed our Metaphysic frame-view in this context, our consciousness is made to experience the bigger consciousness, which is God Himself. If this is the case then there is a weakness in the evolution theory. However, I am not denying the theory completely, rather I would suggest that the theory is only applicable to the plant and the animal kingdom, not the human kingdom with having the option that the evolution theory might be flaw as a whole. There is a distinction between human and animal and that is the intellect. Although the biologists would argue that there is a slight in DNA differences between human and chimp that makes human as extremely intelligent than the animals, we must be more pragmatic to come to this conclusion. The biologists have classified species into genus, and the modern humans are the only survivor species of the homo genus. The Home species are descendent from the ape. Cousins for the human species are including chimpanzees and bonobos. (Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason & Science, 2009) The biologists argue that to find the first human is a fruitless effort, because evolution takes millions years of process and the changing occurring within that frame. To find the first creature to be in the human shape is utterly impossible to be recorded. (FORA.tv, 2011) We do not agree with the biologists simply due to them limiting their observation on the physical matter. We also disagree with their deduction and hypothesis. All four kingdoms, minerals, plants, animals and humans share the same basic element of chemical properties. All of them are made of carbon, hydrogen and ultimately as atoms of neutrons and electrons. Nonetheless, the attributes they possess are different. While the minerals are considered to be non-living, plants are restricted to the growth and reproduction, while the animals have the capacity to move whilst humans have the greatest attribute or power, which is “thinking”. However I am not saying that a non-thinking human is not a human, but rather the “potential” made possible due to the components that made up its being. If matters in existence are arranged in natural laws that allows the
study of chemistry and physics made possible, it means that the natural law has the potential of ‘thinking’ exists in it even before the human brain is in physical existence; if not, matters cannot be arranged to produce this effect (thinking). “Thinking” we argue is the most powerful attribute because it does not only involves problem solving, but also the power to understand and to create. Therefore, if we apply Aristotle’s metaphysic again on this matter, the thinking potential precedes any other potentiality of existence. That is why in Islamic metaphysic world-view, the first creation is the Light of Muhammad.(Golpinarli, 1985) The Light of Muhammad according to Rumi, under Aristotle’s glossary, is the highest Active Intellect that governs the other active intellects. (Rumi, 2004) In other words when it concerns to the human soul, the rational soul is greater than the physical body. The act of thinking is possible because of the consciousness of an individual being, as Descartes says “I think therefore I am”, so we cannot agree with the biologists that the first human being cannot be recorded as an individual being, as the first existent of thinking being to be actualizes in physical existence must be in term of in the body of a man with an individual consciousness; hence the first man is able to be recorded. (In the Abrahamic faith, this man would be Adam.) Given this narrative argument, we come to a conclusion that, although human species shared many physical and biological similarities with apes, they are not in the same genus. Relating to metaphysic world-view that we have, we must insist that because the first man has great consciousness as a human that relates himself to the universe, the body which his soul inhibits must be an original body as whole, if not his consciousness must descends from the consciousness of an ape, which we argue is in lesser degree, and this is in our Aristotelian calculation is not possible.

The spirit of human kindness, if we turn on the news is tremendous; despite there are conflicts like politic interests. The noble duty of being kind and generous itself, with the ambition of counting the number of people to gain happiness, awareness of injustice is clear and the spirit where human take actions are clear, although there are subtle injustice in politics and economics. The challenges to the established philosophy for ethics in the West is lack of preparation of psychological strength. The reason I said this is because, it is the principle of the Western philosophy to come with a thought that is expected to be universal right even with challenges arguments it faces is subjected to flaws to understand them correctly. However in certain cases, an ideology that carries the opposite magnitude is considered to be the ‘enemy’. When one belief or expectation is forced on the other, a form rebellion to emerge should be expected. When scarifies were made for the hope of a returning kindness, the feeling of betrayal becomes the seed of negative thoughts. That is why the remedies and solutions provided by psychology is found to be very similar with spirituality, such as focusing the thought on positive matters and accepting the flaws on others by not demanding too much out of them. However, without the bigger picture in the mind frame to only practicing kindness without expectation can be exhausting. Under the metaphysic view we discussed, every comfort we have is a pleasure whilst every pain a trial. In every situation, action arose from intention covers the purpose of ethic in life. The act of kindness is not psychologically understood as scarifies, instead, it is considered as an act of generous, that comes willingly from the heart in order to see the The Most Generous (Ar-Raheem) manifests in our consciousness. In the time of trial on the other hand, is an opportunity for us to remember that arrogance belongs to God alone and with this consciousness inspired us to be nicer and kinder to other beings as a respect to the Creator who created them. While Kant’s noble duty is
restricted to the Universal Maxim, Rumi’s ethic is open to interpretation in order to manifest God’s names in the consciousness and to catch oneself if one living his life in sincerity. Mill’s utilitarianism is unfavorable for some because question such as, is the murder one is justified for the lives of five people? The disturbing question is a challenge. In the beginning part of the Mathnawi, Rumi answered this question by justifying the murder of an injustice man initiated by a just king. (Rumi, 2004) The murder is done not out of the King’s lust, instead it is the manifestation of God being the All-Wise (Al-Hakm). This is the principle of the saying that goes like this, “the death of a learned man is worse than the death of a village of ignorant people”. Therefore, the greater good is not within the count of a human body, but which aspect of God that is needed to be manifest for each individual beings in their own experience as reflected in the saying of God that “my mercy precede my wrath”. That is why prayer for Rumi is important. Therefore the God in Islam, although it is separate being from the creation, it is not completely alien, hence it very relatable on the personal level of an individual being. Unlike the concept of the God that is criticized by anti-theists, for the Sufis, life as a worship, is not about restrain one’s individual freedom for another being (God), but rather, the living of life in the moment, regardless by making mistakes or not making mistakes, in observing God’s manifestation of Himself in the consciousness. Therefore, moral relativism under this metaphysic view is utterly not true, because moral relativism justifies multiple dimension of truths. If this the case, then existence is not possible, as multiple truths cannot be in one existence. Therefore, we insist that, despite the presence of different cultures and religions in our world, the consciousness of every human being regarding existence is the same although in different level of intensity.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to explore the rarely discussed Islamic metaphysic world-view. Often, Islam is understood as what is observed. But these observers failed to acknowledge that if either these Muslims really understood their religion as how they should understand. If the observers argue that it is religion themselves – the belief of it – the reason these poor people are in ignorance; they must consider too if these religions too actually necessary in the development of human civilization at the first place. My intention in writing this paper is that to show that there is an advanced understanding of the world that is worth to be explored or even criticized. Just because of one bad apple, a worthy world-view that is associated with the institute should not be buried away. The Islamic metaphysic world-view that I presented in this paper is not new, even perhaps, it is not in details as it should justly be presented. However I do provided an original suggestive narrative of a philosophical interpretation by a mystic of a religious doctrine. I said ‘suggestive’ because it does not represent the original mystic’s intellect, but rather, my own assumption of what is necessary valid. The mystic I am mentioning here is none other than the mystic poet Rumi, and the religious doctrine that I am talking about here is the first verse of the Quran, proclaiming that God is All-Merciful.

From the world view that we have discussed, we can see that certain philosophical key concept that is understood in modern Western world is not applicable to the Muslim understanding. The design argument, problem of evil, big bang theory, evolution theory, the infinite regress argument, universal maxim and utilitarianism, are alien concepts to the Muslim thought. Therefore the judgment of Islam as a whole
in a just manner is not possible if the judgment is limited to foreign prism. The Muslims themselves on the other hand must understand their own tradition properly as well as foreign concepts and thoughts in order to distinguish and clarify what is proper and necessary.

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References


