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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Problem of Dualism: The Self as a Cultural Exaptation</td>
<td>Israel Salas Llanas</td>
<td>pp. 1 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implication of Critical Thinking for Applied Ethics in Science and Technology</td>
<td>Diana P. L. Sham</td>
<td>pp. 11 - 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute Totality, Causality, and Quantum: The Problem of Metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason</td>
<td>Kazuhiko Yamamoto</td>
<td>pp. 23 - 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Razor's Edge: For an Explanation on 'Identity' In Timaeus</td>
<td>Ya Du</td>
<td>pp. 37 - 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Highness, Mr. Policeman: The Taiwanese Perception of the Policeman during the Japanese Colonial Rule</td>
<td>Min-Chia Young</td>
<td>pp. 45 - 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Education of Lifelong Learning in Taiwan Weixin Shengjiao I</td>
<td>Ching University</td>
<td>pp. 69 - 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ching University</td>
<td>Li-Yueh Chen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen-Mei Li</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion, Politics and Ethics: Moral and Ethical Dilemmas Confronting Faith-based Organizations and Africa in the 21st Century -Another View</td>
<td>Sylvester Chima</td>
<td>pp. 81 - 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding and Practice of Informed Consent by Professional Nurses in South Africa: An Empirical Study-Brief Report</td>
<td>Sylvester Chima</td>
<td>pp. 89 - 102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Problem of Dualism: The Self as a Cultural Exaptation

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Abstract
The human mind has undergone a complex evolution throughout the history of our genus, Homo. The brain structures and processes that make this mental activity possible have been the result of a series of evolutionary patterns not only biological but also cultural, so it is possible to assume that consciousness did not emerge with the same characteristics in our predecessors. One of the most distinctive features that seems to reflect the conscious image of the archaic man is the absence of a dualistic interpretation of reality. This apparition stem from our analytical mind as an exaptation, commonly assigned to the activity of the left hemisphere which is attributed to play a greater role in linguistic activity.

This paper introduces the idea that, along with other abilities such as linguistic predisposition, spatial perception and pattern recognition, human beings are also born with an innate tendency to interpret and represent the surrounding world in antithetical terms, i.e., in antinomies. This leads to the notion of a conscious Self, a trait with which human beings are not born, but it is developed from the ripening of cortical structures in interaction with the environment. This illusory perception of a Self also conditions scientific activity, giving birth to a new form of knowledge that attributes a new value judgment to man and life.

Keywords: antinomies, consciousness, dualism, Self
The Tao and The Ten Thousand Things

In *Tao Te Ching*, Lau Tzu wrote:

The way that can be told is not the eternal Way. The word that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao.
Unnamed, It is the source of heaven and earth. Named, It is the Mother of all things.
He who is ever without desires sees Its spiritual essence. He who is ever under desire sees only Its limits.
These two, differing in name, are the same in origin. They are the mystery of mysteries. This is the door of spiritual life (Lao Tzu, 2016, p. 17).

In Tao, the “Mother of all things” is the beginning:

The Way produced the One; the One produced the Two; the Two produced the Three; the Three produced all beings (Lao Tzu, 2016, p. 47).

As for the Pythagoreans the inception was the *monad* (from the Greek μονάς, “unity”), Lao Tzu conceives the Tao as the supreme unity, and it is from this unity that the dualistic division of “heaven and earth” is reached. Thus, unity prevails as the principle of its philosophy, as a sign of tranquility and stability, while duality is difference, ambiguity and uncertainty. That is why each of the “all beings” are composed of contradictory principles that are an essential part for themselves. The “all beings” are born from that division and reach their stillness returning to their root in the extreme void, to the Tao. The regress to the origin supposes to overcome this division. In Taoist myth, this division depicts the evolution of human consciousness, endowing man with an analytical, sequential and logical mind that substitutes myths for reason as the true engine of knowledge.

The Self as a Cultural Exaptation

The concept of Self seems to be conditioned by socio-cultural factors. For some authors, the Self is not an innate idea, but a notion that has had an anthropological development:

The idea of ‘self’ (*moi*). Each one of us finds it natural, clearly determined in the depths of his consciousness, completely furnished with the fundamentals of the morality which flows from it […] My subject is entirely different, and independent of this. It is one relating to social history (Mauss, 1985, pp. 1-3).

To cite a few examples. In Canada, the *Ojibwa*, an indigenous tribe of nomadic hunters that live in the South of Lake Winnipeg, make no distinction between human and animals, as well as between myths and reality, or the natural and the supernatural. In Africa, among the *Bantu*, there is no idea of Self as an independent reality, but the human is intimately linked to the family and ancestral spirits forming part of a chain of vital forces. In Oceania, the *Gahuku-gama*, a tribe that lives in the Easter Highlands of Papua New Guinea, perceive no difference between the soul and the body, as well as between the individual and the group. The same happens with the *Bimin-kuskusmin*, a community that inhabits in the mountainous region of the West.
Sepik, which do not distinguish between spirit and matter. In Micronesia, the Ifaluk also do not possess such distinction, just as they do not distinguish between the conscious and unconscious mind. As in different societies, different religions promote different interpretations of Self. In West, the distinction between Self and world is very accentuated and the individual is seen as a separate entity from the rest of the physical world. On the other hand, in East, in philosophies like Buddhism, the perception of Self is understood as an illusion, since nothing is permanent. In Hinduism, the soul, or Self, is not something separate, but together with Brahman, the universal consciousness, both constitute the unity of the world. And in Taoism, Yin and Yang are not antinomic principles, as they are understood in West, but they are complementary.

From an anthropological view it is known that in primitive human communities there was a conception of the subject, or Self, essentially sociocentric, that is to say, tied to the clan or tribe and, of course, much less egocentric than in modern societies. In accordance with Jung, for the archaic man everything is animated, in the sense that everything that is observed possesses a soul (Jung, 1970). This primitive mentality would be nothing more than another way of apprehending the world. It would not be so much to know the world in logical-analytical terms, but to apprehend it emotionally, to unite mystically with it. It is for this reason that in primitive communities it is difficult to trace the contours of Self, to define the boundaries between human and nature, which can be so strong as to almost completely annul the differences that sensible perception finds in the various forms of existence. For Cantoni, both worlds, the emotional and the logical-analytical one, coexist in the modern man:

Not only does participationalist and mythical thinking continually penetrate in scientific and rational thought, and rational thought confers theoretical form to myth, but in the end both visions give us, on the one hand, the dry and scaly universe of mathematical and, on the other, the irresponsible universe of emotion and fantasy. Primitive thinking is the historical reality in which the participatory thinking is best concretized and manifested, but our spiritual experience, individual and collective, is still very much moving today in participation\(^1\) (Cantoni, 1968, p. 18).

Although for Cantoni, primitive communities were pre-logical, what it seems evident if the primitive man was not inclined to face reality in an analytical way, but to live within the totality of its mysterious forces. Unlike logical reasoning that avoids contradiction, the pre-logical and mystical mind is, above all, indifferent to the logical criteria. So, in this mystic world, the boundaries between the subjective and the objective, between dreams and reality, between the material sphere and the spiritual sphere vanish.

The cultural permeability of our species largely reflects our rational and dualistic view of the world, a capacity that is subsequently circumscribed in our logical-analytical reasoning. In the same way, it is plausible to suppose that this dualistic view is an innate predisposition that has been accentuated by the development of human natural language, since it is not limited to being a mere tool of communication, but also a

\(^1\) Translation mine.
powerful means of representation of our body and the world that extraordinarily maximize our self-conscious abilities.

**Neurognostic Structures in Dualistic Brain**

In the second half of the twentieth century, the American psychiatrist Eugene G. d'Aquili, founder of biogenetic structuralism, postulated the existence of a neurognostic structure that allowed the division of reality by opposition of contraries. D’Aquili baptized it as the “binary operator” (d'Aquili, 1978, 1983) and located it in the lower parietal lobe of the left hemisphere, a region where important aspects of language are regulated (e.g., motor control of the speech apparatus, logical-mathematical information management, verbal memory, grammar, organization of syntax, phonetic discrimination, etc.). According to d'Aquili, this operator tends to ripen in the early stages of the toddler development until cancel the sense of wholeness, and thus, to perceive the information of the environment in logical-analytical terms. If so, the emerging dualistic reasoning in our phylogenetic trajectory would largely explain our ability to project a mental construct of the world into antinomies, which are nothing more than artificial categories constructed by a part of our brain architecture. This leads us to presuppose that language as well as logical reasoning and the symbolic sequencing of mathematics involve dualistic filters through which we interpret and represent our knowledge, and later, we project outwards our inner representation of the world, previously structured in artificial antagonisms.

Before d'Aquili, other contemporary researchers had already suggested that an injury in the lower region of the parietal lobe, specifically where d'Aquili located his binary operator, prevented the subject from forming antonyms due to being the area that regulates associative operations. As Geschwind asserts: “In man [...] this new 'association area of association areas' now frees man from the dominant pattern of sensory-limbic associations and allows cross-modal associations involving non-limbic modalities” (Geschwind, 1965, pp. 106-107).

Another interesting feature of primitive man would be a tendency to perceive specific images along with a certain aversion towards abstract reasoning. For d'Aquili, this type of abstract reasoning would also be located in the left hemisphere, also called the “dominant hemisphere”. In primitive man, optical memory would have greatly developed and everything would be expressed in spatial relationships. This spatial relationship may have been rooted in a corporeal experience with the perceptible reality (counting with fingers, measuring with arms, hands, or feet), and later this scheme of measurement evolved until it reached a verbal structure and, finally, a writing form. It seems plausible to assume that in primitive man the non-dominant hemisphere was more important than in modern one. The same can be said about language. This would be very poor in logical and conceptual elements, so it would be structured on an asymptotic scheme where the word would not be separated from the object that it designates, making it understandable only through the ostensive gesture that accompanied it. Similarly, it is not unreasonable to presuppose that the travel of long distances by our nomadic ancestors might influence in some way in our sequencing of time within a pre-linguistic stage.
In relation to its ontogeny, the toddler is not born with the notion of Self. In early years of life, the infant is in an undifferentiated state of fusion with the world, that is, without self-consciousness. The progress of the sensory-motor intelligence leads to the construction of an objective universe, in which the body itself appears as an element among the others, and to which the inner life, located in that body, is opposed. As Piaget showed, it is from the age of two or three that subjective impression emerges and differentiates itself from the rest of reality and confronts it (Piaget, 1950). Similarly, there are parallels between the mentality of primitive man and the mentality of the toddler. At least so do authors, such as Simmel, who suggests that the distinction between the subjective mind and the world of objects must belong to a relatively late stage in the history of mankind (Simmel, 1950).

Piaget reported this in his study of cognitive development in infants and held that the idea of Self is subject to an ontogenetic development and that the egoic representation of the environment, and thus the division of reality into antinomies, does not develop until reaching a certain age.

At a perceptual and sensorimotor level, the construction of the practical object, so slow and laborious, presupposes a preliminary stage in the course of which there is no delimitation between the subject and the objects. Therefore, no object is permanent and, as a consequence, no subject is aware of itself as a subject: the universe, then, is dualistic, everything that is felt and perceived is put into an alone plane, without distinction between an external world and an inner world (Piaget, 1950, p. 275).

So, this ontogenetic development of Self is not innate, but is gradually developed. In its first stage of development, the infant acts driven by subcortical basic reflexes of the stimulus-response type, and as his cerebral cortex develops and there is an increase in the development of his cognitive structures, he begins to acquire the capacity of representation of objects and with it the capacity to represent himself in the environment perceiving himself as a unit independent of the rest. In this first stage the infant is egocentric, that is, he is not able to attribute mental states to other people, and is unable to understand thoughts that are different from his own. This capacity develops in the second stage, and it is precisely here when the infant acquires an image of himself, that is, a supposed consciousness of Self.

Thus, for Piaget the ability of the infant to represent himself in space in his first developmental phase occurs before any form of language use. So, if we assume that logical reasoning and mathematical sequencing are linguistic structures, one might presuppose that logical-symbolic reality derives from language. Since logic and mathematics are linguistic structures that underlie the pillars of modern science, it would be inferred that science is based primarily on an egoic consciousness where the distinction of the world in antinomies is present. This prevailing dualistic thinking that operates through this epistemic Self could explain why, faced with a fractal vision of reality, there is a hopeless intuitive desire in human beings to achieve unity in the world. Bringing in the words of the American Psychiatrist H. S. Sullivan, quoted by Hadley: “The emphasized individuality of each of us, our self, is the true mother of all illusions, the fruitful source of preconceived ideas that invalidate almost all our efforts to understand the world” (Hadley, 1942, p. 133).
The idea of Self as a separate entity from the physical world is not present innately in our brain, so this division is something that is acquired gradually due to the capacity for accommodation and assimilation of certain biological structures. In the early stages of development, the sense of Self is not fully developed, being accentuated by the maturation of the ego in the phase of formal operations. We acquire the capacity to transcend reality, symbolic reasoning is included in the processes of reasoning and our thoughts are not limited exclusively to the present time, since we are capable to develop abstract reasoning and constructing and verifying hypothesis exhaustively and systematically. In the last stage of this phase the idea of Self is born and with it the awakening of an egoic consciousness that imposes a new filter on our perception of the world based on antithetical terms. Moreover, syntax and recursive reasoning also play a crucial role.

**Language as the Stage of Dualistic Reasoning**

The *Enûma Elish*, a Babylonian poem from the 13th century BC that tells the origin of the world, narrates:

> When the sky above was not named,  
> And the earth beneath did not yet bear a name,  
> And the primeval Apsû, who begat them,  
> And chaos, Tiamat, the mother of them both,  
> Their waters were mingled together,  
> And no field was formed, no marsh was to be seen;  
> When of the gods none had been called into being,  
> And none bore a name, and no destinies were ordained;  
> Then were created the gods in the midst of heaven,  
> Lahmu and Lahamu were called into being (Sanders, 2016, p. 6).

In the Babylonian myth the act of creation is profoundly connected to language, to the word. This personification of the word as a creator is also found in other ancestral cultures. In Memphis theology in ancient Egypt, Ptah creates the world with his mind and with the power of the word. In the Psalms (Ps. 33: 6) of the Christian Old Testament: “By the word [logos] of the Lord the heavens were made, and by the breath of his mouth all their host”; as well as at the beginning of the Gospel of St. John: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”. The word appears as a way of creation, as the self-expression of God’s own being. Also, in the ancient Vedic scriptures of India, language is considered one of the vital cosmic forces in creation. Prajapati, the Vedic deity presiding over procreation and the protection of life, pronounces the first words: “Om Bhūr Bhuvah Svāh”, creating the Earth, the Sun and Heavens. But not only in the myths of ancient civilizations the word is found as a cosmogonic and theogonic element. In Micronesia, in the mythology of the Marshall Islands, the islands were created by the word of Lowakalle. In Samoan mythology, in the beginning there was nothing, but Tangaroa ordered a stone to split into two, and then the Earth was created. And, for San, a tribe of indigenous hunter-gatherer bushmen of Southern Africa, the supreme God is Cagn that created all things by verbal orders: the Sun, the Moon, the stars, the wind, mountains and animals.
In all these myths, language appears as one of the fundamental cosmic forces. The word suggests an approach between man and God as well as a link between the physical and the represented world. This emergence of language is accompanied at the same time by a dualistic view of reality where the act of creation becomes the true engine of knowledge, necessary to give meaning to linguistic expressions.

Human natural language is not only an instrument for communication, but also a powerful means of interpretation and representation of the world and ourselves. It seems as if these dualistic filters were somehow bound to language, for there is a certain sequentiality in time, just as it exists in language and in conscious thought. This also leads us to presuppose that the concepts of time and space are nothing but fictions driven largely by a growing linguistic development.

As far as language is concerned, the linguistic capacity takes place, so far as we know, in two brain regions: the Broca area, located in the frontal lobe, the third frontal gyrus as the motor area of language, and the Wernicke area in the temporal gyrus, at the junction between the temporal, parietal and occipital lobes as the sensory area of language. This linguistic development occupies regions that in the right hemisphere (also called non-dominant) regulate the perception of visual and audio-spatial tasks, which seems to be of gestalt nature. The studies conclude that the division of labor in the brain is that the left hemisphere deals with the tasks of verbal, sequential, temporal, digital, logical-analytical and/or rational processing; while the right hemisphere would be non-verbal, intuitive, emotional. Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, quotes the German linguist Carl Abel in the following:

Let thus suppose, if such an obvious piece of nonsense can be imagined, that German the word [stark] “strong” meant both “strong” and “weak”; that in Berlin the noun [Licht] “light” was used to mean both “light” and “darkness”; that one Munich citizen called beer [Bier] “beer”, while another used the same word to speak of water […] In view of these and many similar cases of antithetical meaning it is beyond doubt that in one language at least there as a large number of words that denoted at once a thing and its opposite (Freud, 1957, p. 156).

And later:

It is clear that everything on this planet is relative and has an independent existence only in so far as it is differentiated in respect of its relations to other things […] Since the concept of strength could not be formed except as a contrary to weakness, the word denoting “strong” contained a simultaneous recollection of “weak”, as the thing by means of which it first came into existence. […] Man was not in fact able to acquire his oldest and simplest concepts except as contraries to their contraries, and only learnt by degrees to separate the two sides of an antithesis and think of one without conscious comparison with the other (Op. cit., pp. 157-158).

With these examples, Abel seeks to explain the conceptual becoming as well as the division into antinomies of some words present in the most primitive stages of language, suggesting that this antithesis indicates the emergence of a dualistic reasoning in archaic communities.
Following Abel, it seems obvious that much of our concepts are born by way of comparison. This can be observed in the early stages of writing where the conceptual attribution of meaning used the so-called determinative images, which served as conceptual reinforcement to the characters. In the case of the Old Egyptian, when the Egyptian word *ken* had to mean “strong”, after its written sound alphabetically the image of an erect and armed little man was placed; when the same word had to mean “weak”, after the character that contained the sound the image of a small man crouched in attitude of abandonment appeared. Similarly, most of the other ambiguous words were accompanied by explanatory images.

Freud also quotes the philosopher Alexander Bain, who argues:

> The essential relativity of all knowledge, thought or consciousness cannot but show itself in language. If everything that we can know is viewed as a transition from something else, every experience must have two sides; and either every name must have a double meaning, or else for every meaning there must be two names (*Op. cit.*, p. 159).

In addition to the examples cited above, we can include cases as in Latin, where *altus* means “high” and “deep” or *sacer*, “sacred” and “cursed”. Words such as *clamare*, “shout”, and *clam*, “silent”; *succus*, “dry”, and *succus*, “juice”. In German, *boden* means both “attic” and “floor”, *bös*, “bad”, is close connected with *bass*, “good”. In Old Saxon we find *bat*, “good”, in contrast to the English word *bad*. In contemporary English, *to lock* is in contrast to the German word *loch*, “hole”; and the German *kleben*, “to cling, to stick”, with the English word *to cleave*. Also in German, the word *stumm*, “silent”, and *stimme*, “voice”, etc. Or the German term *mit*, that corresponds with the English term *with*, originally meant both “with” and “without”; or the German word *wider*, “against”, and *wieder*, “together with”.

**Conclusion**

The notion of Self is a fiction that we tell ourselves in a moment of our personal development, since it becomes decisive in adaptive terms. However, this fictitious Self is not such a real fiction, so it implies a necessary division in a moment of our life to adopt an egocentric consciousness, a division in which we become into an independent entity separated from the rest of the world, a conclusion as false as the ancient belief that the Earth was the center of the universe.

Having a brain structure responsible for the division of the world in antinomies, artificial categories that we use to describe the world we live in, affects crucially our way of reasoning in science. The analytical and logical-mathematical mentality of the left hemisphere is dualistic by nature and has nothing to do with the holistic view that characterizes the activity of the right hemisphere, much more connected with the limbic system. Consequently, this dualistic reasoning is only a small part of the brain activity, most probably as the result of the recent history from the phylogenetic point of view and that serves to analyze the world by dividing it into opposites. However, this materialization of Self that occurs especially in Western culture as an extreme form of individualism is strongly conditioned by the language. This development of Self as something separated from a presumed external reality configures the basic
structure of our mental scheme which is generated through the socio-cultural environment where the individual is inscribed.

In any case, the Self pays an expensive tribute to the knowledge given by the dualistic reasoning. It loses the paradise. The human being stops being part of a whole and happens to become a part limited in time and space, abandoned, alienated from nature, lonely and orphaned. The consciousness of the existence of a primordial unity is divided into two equal and opposite forces, originating a dualistic thought that separates the world into opposite terms: good and evil, Heaven and Earth, and so on. This suggests that in the ancestral memory of mankind there is a desperate attempt to recover that lost unity, a return to the Greek *pleroma*. This yearning remains dormant in natural human language, emerging from myths that place man on his way to paradise.
References


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**Implication of Critical Thinking for Applied Ethics in Science and Technology**

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**Abstract**

As science and technology are descriptive, it is difficult for the undergraduates in Department of Science and Technology (DST) to learn Applied Ethics, which is of a completely different but philosophical approach in making moral judgment by applying Kant’s moral theory, or theories of Utilitarianism, Contractarianism and Euthanasia, etc. Therefore, exploring reflective, interactive but practical method through fostering critical thinking in teaching Applied Ethics to students from DST is necessary. Since the introduction of critical thinking based upon revised Bloom’s Taxonomy (Anderson & Krathwohl (Eds), 2001) and ethical reasoning (MacKinnon, 2012) in the first lesson, two classes of Yr. 2 major in Financial Mathematics, DST in BNU-HKBU United International College, have been trained to spend half an hour in each 3-hr session for brainstorming and discussion of various issues through critical thinking (Scriven & Paul, 1987) and ethical reasoning, and then present their ethical judgments in written or oral form. In the last two weeks, each group has to hand in a set of PowerPoints focused on any issues in science and technology selected by themselves through application of various ethical theories in moral decision making and then have their individual oral presentation. At the end of the course, each student is asked to answer a questionnaire modified from the one concerning critical thinking on ESL writing designed by Sham (2016) to evaluate the efficacy and establishment of critical thinking undergone through the six stages in Bloom’s taxonomy and ethical reasoning in Applied Ethics in Science and Technology.

Keywords: critical thinking, ethical reasoning, Applied Ethics, brainstorming, moral judgment
Introduction

As science and technology are descriptive, it is difficult for the undergraduates in Department of Science and Technology (DST) to learn Applied Ethics, which is a distinct category of ethical philosophy dealing with difficult moral questions and controversial moral issues that people actually face in their lives by judging whether they are good or bad, right or wrong, just or unjust. We have to use a completely different but philosophical approach in making moral judgment as a value, positive or negative, must to be placed in any normative judgment for evaluation. For making good and sound moral arguments, there must be true and valid premises and reasons given for the conclusion. Meanwhile, it is necessary to apply various famous philosophy and ethical theories, such as Plato’s philosophy, Kant’s moral theory, or theories of Utilitarianism, Contractarianism and Euthanasia, etc. in ethical reasoning and moral decision making. In order to make teaching and learning the course more interesting and effective, exploring reflective, interactive but practical method through fostering critical thinking in teaching Applied Ethics to students from DST is necessary.

Bloom’s Taxonomy and ethical reasoning

According to the definition by Scriven and Paul (1987), “critical thinking” is “the intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action” (as cited in Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2009). Comparatively speaking, revised Bloom’s Taxonomy best fits this definition as the hierarchical approach representing someone can involve a set of skills for organizing ideas, detecting inconsistencies, and solving problems logically and systematically after analyzing and evaluating alternative possibilities in different stages of thought process. Before taking any action, someone having critical thinking does not simply accept any arguments without questioning and making reasoned judgments based on evidence.

Fig 1. Revised Bloom’s Taxonomy (Anderson, L. W. and Krathwohl, D. R., 2001)

The hierarchy of revised Bloom’s taxonomy consists of six levels representing different forms of thinking in an active process. Firstly, there are describing, finding, identifying, listing, retrieving, naming, locating and recognizing in the layer of Remembering. Secondly, subcategories such as classifying, explaining, inferring, comparing, paraphrasing and summarizing are found in Understanding. Thirdly, implementing, carrying out, using or executing is consisted in the category of Applying. Fourthly, the activities including attributing, comparing, deconstructing, integrating and organizing are in Analyzing. Furthermore, the action of critiquing, detecting, checking, experimenting, hypothesizing, judging, monitoring and testing may be involved in the level of Evaluation. Finally, constructing, inventing, devising, generating, planning and producing are activated in the highest level of Creating.

The method and participants

In the first lesson, 75 participants from two classes of Yr. 2 major in Financial Mathematics (FM), DST in BNU-HKBU United International College learned critical thinking based upon revised Bloom’s Taxonomy (Anderson & Krathwohl (Eds), 2001) and ethical reasoning (MacKinnon, 2012). After 2-hr lecturing, they have been trained to spend half an hour to three quarters in each 3-hr session for brainstorming and discussion of various issues through critical thinking (Scriven & Paul, 1987) and ethical reasoning, and then present their ethical judgments in written or oral form. In the last two weeks, each group has to hand in a set of PowerPoints focused on any issues in finance, science and technology selected by themselves through application of various ethical theories in moral decision making and then they present as a group member individually. At the end of the course, each of the 75 participants answer a questionnaire modified from the one concerning critical thinking on ESL writing designed by Sham (2016) to evaluate the efficacy and establishment of critical thinking undergone through the six stages in Bloom’s taxonomy and ethical reasoning in Applied Ethics in Science and Technology.

The questionnaire

In order to estimate whether the Yr. 2 undergraduates have gone through the six stages of critical thinking process of revised Bloom’s Taxonomy in learning Applied Ethics in Science and Technology, and overall, the critical thinking in ethical judgments has been developed, a questionnaire modified from Sham (2016) has been designed. In the questionnaire, the statements are categorized into six levels orderly each includes three isolating sentences as last part for overall only contains two independent statements. Each questionnaire consists of 20 sentences. The participants have to choose an option for each sentence in the questionnaire which combines 5 points scale including 5=SA (Strongly Agree); 4=A (Agree); 3=N (Neither Agree nor Disagree); 2=D (Disagree); 1=SD (Strongly Disagree). The statements of the questionnaire arranged according to the six stages are presented as follows:

1. Remember
   1. You first remember the terms & ethical theories taught.
   2. The content, structure, and grammar of the samples are recalled.
   3. You’ve learned from the mistakes & comments of the previous oral/writing tasks.
II. Understand
4. You have the ability to interpret the topics, issues, controversies & dilemmas.
5. Through group discussion, you understand the task from different views
6. By comparing & contrast facts and information, you determine the meaning.

III. Apply
7. The knowledge & philosophy from recall and understanding can be applied to the present discussion or task.
8. In brainstorming, you can use strategies, concepts, and theories to encounter a given issue.
9. You are able to employ the previously learned theories and knowledge in the present discussion, report or essay writing.

IV. Analyze
10. You can analyze and break the material into its constituent parts.
11. The pattern how different parts related to one another is detected.
12. An overall structure or the purpose of the written or oral presentation is found.

V. Evaluate
13. Concerning an argument, you list pros and cons in order to have a balance of both sides.
14. In making ethical judgments, you set up criteria for the defense of different views.
15. You can make choices through evaluation based on reasoned argument in group discussion.

VI. Create
16. You are able to put the elements together after brainstorming
17. Afterwards, you draw the conclusion to generate a novel, coherent report or essay.
18. Finally, you create and hand in an original writing product & ppts for oral presentation.

VII. Overall
19. You are able to think and present in a clear and logical manner for Applied Ethics.
20. This part establishes and enhances your critical thinking for ethical judgments.
Results and Discussion

Based upon Table 1, the number of Financial Mathematics (FM) students answering the questionnaires is 75. The maximum scores of all statements are 5 as strongly agree, whereas the minimums vary, either 2, disagree, or 3, neither agree nor disagree. For the evaluation of development of critical thinking in Applied Ethics, the maximums of 5 for the questions of all stages demonstrates that the majority of participants strongly agree that they have experienced all levels of revised Bloom’s taxonomy in class.

While 2 are the minimums of all questions in Remembering, Creating and Overall, the minimums for Q4 and Q6 in Understanding, and Q12 in Analyzing is also 2. It indicates that a small number of learners have found difficulties not only in different levels including Remembering, Creating and Overall, but also disagree that they have the ability to interpret the topics, issues, controversies and dilemmas. By comparing and contrasting facts and information, they disagree that they could determine the meaning. In analyzing stage, they disagree that an overall structure or the purpose of the written or oral presentation is found.

Meanwhile, some FM students neither agree nor disagree the statements in Applying and Evaluating, as well as Q5 in Understanding, Q10 and Q11 in Analyzing by given 3. That means they do not have any opinion in the levels of Applying and Evaluating. And also they are neutral that they understand the task from different views through

| Table 1. Financial Mathematics Students’ Evaluation of Development of Critical Thinking in Applied Ethics |
|-----------------|-----|-----|------|------|-------|------|
|                | N   | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Std. Deviation | Variance |
| I. Remember    |     |         |         |      |                 |         |
| Q1             | 75  | 2.0     | 5.0     | 4.093| .6813           | .464    |
| Q2             | 75  | 2.0     | 5.0     | 4.093| .6189           | .383    |
| Q3             | 75  | 2.0     | 5.0     | 4.053| .7333           | .538    |
| II. Understand |     |         |         |      |                 |         |
| Q4             | 75  | 2.0     | 5.0     | 4.147| .6915           | .478    |
| Q5             | 75  | 3.0     | 5.0     | 4.333| .6224           | .387    |
| Q6             | 75  | 2.0     | 5.0     | 4.200| .6576           | .432    |
| III. Apply     |     |         |         |      |                 |         |
| Q7             | 75  | 3.0     | 5.0     | 4.107| .6892           | .475    |
| Q8             | 75  | 3.0     | 5.0     | 4.227| .6488           | .421    |
| Q9             | 75  | 3.0     | 5.0     | 4.200| .7166           | .514    |
| IV. Analyze    |     |         |         |      |                 |         |
| Q10            | 75  | 3.0     | 5.0     | 4.173| .5783           | .334    |
| Q11            | 75  | 3.0     | 5.0     | 4.133| .6224           | .387    |
| Q12            | 75  | 2.0     | 5.0     | 4.213| .6429           | .413    |
| V. Evaluate    |     |         |         |      |                 |         |
| Q13            | 75  | 3.0     | 5.0     | 4.333| .5774           | .333    |
| Q14            | 75  | 3.0     | 5.0     | 4.333| .5774           | .333    |
| Q15            | 74  | 3.0     | 5.0     | 4.243| .5688           | .324    |
| VI. Create     |     |         |         |      |                 |         |
| Q16            | 75  | 2.0     | 5.0     | 4.200| .6975           | .486    |
| Q17            | 74  | 2.0     | 5.0     | 4.135| .6889           | .475    |
| Q18            | 74  | 2.0     | 5.0     | 4.243| .6985           | .488    |
| VII. Overall   |     |         |         |      |                 |         |
| Q19            | 75  | 2.0     | 5.0     | 4.200| .7166           | .514    |
| Q20            | 75  | 2.0     | 5.0     | 4.187| .6513           | .424    |
group discussion. In the Analyzing level, they neither agree nor disagree that they can analyze and break the material into its constituent parts and detect the pattern how different parts related to one another.

As the means of the 20 questions are between 4.053 and 4.333, all above 4, which are very high, shows that the majority of participants agrees or strong agrees that they have undergone through the six stages of revised Bloom’s Taxonomy including Remembering, Understanding, Applying, Analyzing, Evaluating and Creating with Overall fostering and applying critical thinking in the Applied Ethics in Science and Technology.

Representing the result of Q19, the distribution of the population in the above pie (Graph 1) shows that 36% of FM students strongly agree, 49.33% agree and 13.33% neither agree nor disagree they are able to think and present in a logical manner for Applied Ethics, but a very small percentage of 1.33% disagree. It is clear that the large majority benefits from the learning process of Applied Ethics in Science and Technology through the revised Bloom’s taxonomy for thinking and presenting logically, while the learners could justify the difficult issues and controversies in life with ethical reasoning systematically.
The distribution of the population of the second pie (Graph 2) is based on the result of Q20: 30.67% of the FM learners strongly agree, 58.67% agree, 9.33% neither agree nor disagree that brainstorming through group discussion, reports and presentation enhance the establishment of their critical thinking for ethical judgments, whereas only 1.33% disagree. Overall, the majority of participants have found that their critical thinking has been fostered and established through the class activities including brainstorming and group discussion, writing reports and oral presentation. Comparing the two graphs, it is similar that both statements supported by the vast majority with slight difference as 36% strongly agree, 49.33% agree, 13.33% neither agree nor disagree in the first graph, and 30.67% of the FM learners strongly agree, 58.67% agree, 9.33% neither agree nor disagree in second pie. Whereas, there is a small percentage of 1.33% disagree in both graphs. In other words, most FM students have established critical thinking undergone through the six levels in revised Bloom’s taxonomy for Applied Ethics, and are able to apply their critical thinking as well as moral reasoning to present in a logical manner for making ethical judgments.
In comparison, the average of males in development of critical thinking based on the 20 statements in six stages with overall in the questionnaire of 75 FM participants is 4.13, and the average of females is 4.27 presented in the above bars (Graph 3), which demonstrates there is no significant difference between male and female FM students on the development of critical thinking in Applied Ethics in Science and Technology.

**Conclusion**

Based upon the results, two classes of Financial Mathematics (FM) students have undergone through the six stages according to revised Bloom’s Taxonomy for implication of critical thinking in making moral judgments for different issues or controversies. Overall, they are able to think and present in a logical manner for Applied Ethics as well as have found that their critical thinking has been built in ethical decision making through the class activities including brainstorming and group discussion, writing reports and oral presentation.

As the FM participants learnt the revised Bloom’s taxonomy in the first lesson, most of them enjoyed and benefited from brainstorming and group discussion in Applied Ethics, which is apart from the traditional methods. On the other hand, they agreed that group discussion and brainstorming helps blooming of critical thinking through the hierarchy - Remember, Understand, Apply, Analyze, Evaluate, and Create. As a result, they have widened their scope with more fun after brainstorming and better learning with practices in implementing critical thought are generally more interesting. The positive results of critical thinking in this research align with the findings of critical thinking in ESL education by Davidson (1994, 1995) and Sham (2016).

In conclusion, the students build their own thought through defense of different ideas, understanding of logic, and evaluation of judgments for solving problems through group discussion and brainstorming. Meanwhile, they have clear, independent and rational thinking before they make ethical judgments. Therefore, implication of critical thinking employing revised Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001) in Applied Ethics is creative and effective. Once they have established critical thinking
and ethical reasoning, they can benefit from it in solving moral problems, handling dilemmas, and facing controversies of different ethical issues efficiently in their future life.

As recommended, teaching and learning Applied Ethics, especially in Department of Science and Technology (DST), is better to create more opportunities for brainstorming and interactions in group discussion about different moral issues by implication of critical thinking. Based upon the theories and principles of Plato, Kant and different schools, the learners could find out the best solutions for the ethical problems and controversies undergone through the hierarchy of revised Bloom’s taxonomy.
References


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Abstract
Kant’s metaphysics which says that the absolute whole of magnitude has nothing to do with any possible experience presses him to think of a thing in itself, which is merely intelligible. The difficulty is related to the issue of the absolute totality of series of conditions in connection with the issue of the absolute magnitude of the series in the world of sense, which looms as the antinomy of pure reasons. Is it possible to solve this problem in such a way that we can comprehend transcendental aesthetics and the world-whole through empirical intuition and synthesis in accordance with experience or possible experience? Our ‘transcendental analytic,’ grounded on the law of nature, has shown that 1) the absolute unity of the thinking subject and the absolutely unconditioned in a series of given conditions signify nullity in space-time, i.e., quantum; and 2) a being of all beings signifies space-time itself, i.e., quantum, suggesting that the understanding can never accomplish a priori anything more than to anticipate an object of experience or of possible experience. Our transcendental analytic, which is grounded on Kant’s metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason, would potentially lead us to an alternative view of the universe in conjunction with quantum mechanics.

Key words: Possible Experience, Absolute Totality, Causality, Quantum
Introduction

Kant, who firmly believes that the universal principles of ethics have to flow merely from his concepts of reason (A480/B508), launched an experiment which was expected to prove the pure principles of reason: “that absolutely no concepts” that “contain anything empirical” must enter into “the complete estimation of synthetic a priori cognition,” or “that the a priori cognition be entirely pure” (A14/B28). However, when an intractable problem concerning “the absolute magnitude of the series in this world” (A516/B544) arises, Kant has nothing but to think that “the only thing left to us is the validity of the principle of reason as a rule for the continuation and magnitude of a possible experience, once its invalidity as a constitutive principle of appearances in themselves has been adequately demonstrated” (A516/B544). While Kant tries to adequately demonstrate the invalidity of a constitutive principle of reason, we think that he has failed. Kant has missed, unwittingly or wittingly, a crucial point, which might enable him to demonstrate its validity. So far we have clarified that: 1) in experience or in possible experience, we can ascribe sequences of an occurrence in which something happens that previously existed, to death itself – object in itself – which belongs to the category of the pure concepts of the understanding: 2) appearances themselves signify things in themselves, i.e., filled space-elapsing time or empty space-nullified time: 3) space-time itself – nullity in space-time – inheres in appearances themselves, suggesting that the standing and lasting I of pure apperception – the manifold of sensible intuition – exists in nullity in space-time, while it appears in filled space-elapsing time: 4) upon disappearance of the manifold of sensible intuition in death, filled space-elapsing time is neutralized, and it would vanish in nullity in space-time – “an a priori intuition” (B40) – returning to space-time itself: 5) for this reason, intuitions’ condition belongs to one and the same series of intuitions, i.e., space-time itself: 6) “the schema of necessity” (A145) signifies space-time itself and the form of appearances in terms of ‘filled-elapsing’ or ‘empty-nullified, which correspond to “the existence of an object at all times” (A145): 7) since a “necessary being” (A560/B588) could “occur as a condition of the existence of appearances in the world of sense” (A560/B588), a necessary being could exist as filled space-elapsing time, which appears distinct from empty space-nullified time, i.e., nullity in space-time: 8) since alterability concerns only the determinations of appearances themselves, space-time itself is the unalterable, i.e., the cause: 9) since “all appearances, considered extensively as well as intensively, are continuous magnitudes” (A171), “the proposition that all alteration (transition of a thing from one state into another) is also continuous” (A171-B213) is proved easily (YAMAMOTO 2016: 87-100, YAMAMOTO 2017: 19-37). Furthermore, our transcendental analytic has these results: 1) all manifold of sensible intuition contains “a necessary relation” (B132), i.e., space-time itself: 2) the representation of ‘a necessary relation’ – “pure intuition” (A21) or “an a priori intuition” (B40) – signifies space-time itself: 3) ‘a necessary relation’ manifests itself in the entire dissolution of the “thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness” (A111-A112) – death – which occurs necessarily and universally; and 4) the dissolution of the ‘thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness’ is “an act of spontaneity” (B132). We have to note again that this manifold – the entire dissolution of the ‘thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness’ – is to be encountered in the same subject – the “I think” – in experience or in possible experience as a result of “an act of spontaneity” (B132). Here, ‘possible experience’ – the possibility of death – indicates its “possibility itself” (B294), in which its “possibility as a priori cognitions of objects of an intuition in general was exhibited” (B159). Since the
representation ‘I think’ – “the transcendental unity of self-consciousness” (B132) – is homogeneous with ‘pure apperception’ which signifies “the thoroughgoing identity of oneself in all possible representations” (A116) which “grounds empirical consciousness a priori” (A116), our metaphysics implies that the representation ‘I think,’ which can accompany all others, is to cognize “through categories whatever objects may come before our senses” (B159). In this context we comprehend that a human, as the representation ‘I think,’ senses, intuits and cognizes all appearances themselves in virtue of filled space-elapsing time or nullity in space-time through empirical intuition and synthesis. Thus, we rescue Kant’s metaphysics from the abyss of emptiness, in which he does not comprehend something, which would be represented in him as possibility (YAMAMOTO 2017: 19-37). We have shown that 1) “the absolute unity of the thinking subject” (A335) and “the absolutely unconditioned in a series of given conditions” (A335) signify nullity in space-time, i.e., quantum; and 2) “a being of all beings” (A336) signifies space-time itself, i.e., quantum. The discourse we have made so far, which is grounded on Kant’s metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason, would potentially lead us to an alternative view of the universe in conjunction with quantum mechanics. Therefore, we should begin to address these issues.

An A Priori Intuition and Geometry

Previously we clarified that: 1) space-time itself – nullity in space-time – is the matter, namely “that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation” (A20): 2) ‘filled-elapsing’ or ‘empty-nullified’ is “that which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations” (A20) (YAMAMOTO 2017: 19-37). It is clear that one, which intuits the manifold of appearance ‘as ordered in certain relations,’ contains “a necessary relation” (B132), i.e., the matter (YAMAMOTO 2017: 19-37). We have to clarify that in what context the representation of ‘a necessary relation’ manifests itself as “pure intuition” (A21) or “an a priori intuition” (B40), in the entire dissolution of the “thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness” (A111-A112) – death – which occurs necessarily and universally. We have to note that ‘an a priori intuition’ can be thought to contain “an infinite set of representations within itself” (B40). Furthermore, Kant gives us a hint, saying: “Time and space are accordingly two sources of cognition, from which different synthetic cognitions can be drawn a priori,...” (B55-A39): “Those, however, who assert the absolute reality of space and time, whether they assumes it to be subsisting or only inhering, must themselves come into conflict with the principles of experience. For if they decide in favor of the first (which is generally the position of the mathematical investigators of nature), then they must assume two eternal and infinite selfsubsisting non-entities (space and time), which exists (yet without there being anything real) only in order to comprehend everything real within themselves. If they adopt the second position (as do some metaphysicians of nature), and hold space and time to be relations of appearances (next to or successive to one another) that are abstracted from experience though confusedly represented in this abstraction,...and on this view the a priori concepts of space and time are only creatures of the imagination, the origin of which must really be sought in experience, out of whose abstracted relations imagination has made something that, to be sure, contains what is general in them but that cannot occur without the restrictions that nature has attached to them” (B56-A40-B57). We have to pay attention to the fact that, according to Kant, ‘the mathematical investigators of nature’ assume that ‘two eternal and infinite selfsubsisting
non-entities (space and time)’ exists ‘without there being anything real,’ while ‘some metaphysicians of nature’ other than Kant think that: 1) the a priori concepts of space and time – space itself and time itself – are yielded in the imagination; 2) the origin of this imagination is to be sought in experience; and that 3) the imagination has made something ‘that cannot occur without the restrictions that nature has attached to them,’ with the use of the ‘abstracted relations’ discerned in experience. Is there any difference between ‘the mathematical investigators of nature’ who assume space and time to be self-subsisting or ‘some metaphysicians of nature’ other than Kant who assume them to be only inhering, while both are asserting the absolute reality of space and time? We think that they are not different but the same, on account of the fact that: 1) we can assert the reality of space and time through our perception of the real, which is to be cognized in experience or in possible experience: 2) space-time itself signifies nullity in space-time – the matter – which is homogeneous with “two eternal and infinite self-subsisting non-entities” (B56): 3) the imagination spawns a priori concepts of space and time – space-time itself – which occurs in concurrence with “the restrictions that nature has attached to them” (B57), namely death itself. Because a priori concepts of space and time – space-time itself – are restricted by nature, it follows that ‘two eternal and infinite self-subsisting non-entities (space and time)’ is equivalent to space-time itself. As indicated above, space-time manifests itself in the entire dissolution of the ‘thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness’ – death – which occurs necessarily and universally. Following our transcendental analytic, we have to think that ‘two eternal and infinite self-subsisting non-entities (space and time)’ signify ‘eternal and infinite self-subsisting nullity in space-time.’ Apparently, what we say here may sound contradictory on account of the fact that ‘non-entity’ self-subsists as nullity in space-time. However, seeing that nullity in space-time is restricted by nature, we assert, on the grounds of our transcendental analytic, that nullity in space-time signifies entity, the representation of which is “an a priori intuition” which contains “an infinite set of representations within itself” (B40). We think that “thing in itself” (A676/B704) – “a mere idea that cannot be represented in concreto at all” (A683/B711) – is to be represented, through “the restrictions that nature has attached to them” (B57), as an a priori intuition which pertains to nullity in space-time, i.e., space-time itself. We think that while an a priori intuition signifies nullity in space-time, pure intuition or empirical intuition pertains to filled space-elapsing time, implying that space-time itself, which subsists as nullity in space-time, inheres at the same time in appearance. We should like to say, in an opposite manner to what Kant refers to (A110) concerning “the restrictions that nature has attached to them” (B57), that ‘There is only one experience, in which all perceptions are represented as in the representation of thoroughgoing and law-like connection, just as there is only one space and time, in which all appearances and being or non-being take place. If one speaks of different experiences, they are “perceptions themselves” (B219) insofar as they belong to one and the same universal experience – death itself. The thoroughgoing and a priori unity of perceptions – nullity in space-time – is precisely what constitutes experience or possible experience, and it is nothing other than the empirical unity of the appearances in accordance with concepts.’ This signifies the “empirical unity of consciousness, through association of the representations” (B139-B140), which is entirely necessary. Furthermore, in relation to this issue, we have to add, in an opposite manner to what Kant refers to (A118), saying, ‘the transcendental unity of apperception, whose component is “an a priori intuition” (B40), is related to the synthesis of imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility of all composition of the manifold in a cognition. The productive synthesis
of the imagination cannot take place \textit{a priori}; for the productive synthesis rests on conditions of experience or possible experience. The productive synthesis of the imagination prior to apperception is the ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially that of experience or of possible experience. Now we call the synthesis of the manifold in imagination empirical if, with distinction of the intuitions, it concerns nothing but the connection of the manifold \textit{a priori}, and the unity of this synthesis is called transcendental if it is represented as necessary \textit{a priori} in relation to the original unity of apperception. Now since the latter is the ground of the possibility of all cognitions, the transcendental unity of the synthesis of the imagination pertains to all possible cognition, through which all objects of possible experience must be represented \textit{a priori}.

This discourse indicates that “the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination prior to apperception” (A118) need to take place \textit{a priori}, as “the ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially that of experience” (A118). What is the product of “the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination” (A118)? In Kant’s metaphysics, it is nothing but his “thing in itself” (A676/B704). The product of our pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination, which, we think, takes place in conjunction with time, which could “precede the objects as a determination or order attaching to the things themselves as their condition and be cognized and intuited \textit{a priori} through synthetic propositions” (A33), is nothing but nullity in space-time, i.e., the pure concept of the understanding. We think that “the transcendental unity of the synthesis of the imagination” (A118) signifies a human, who is represented as filled space-elapsing time, in which space-time itself – nullity in space-time – inheres. In view of the fact that filled space-elapsing time is homogeneous with empirical intuition, while nullity in space-time is with “an \textit{a priori} manifold in pure intuition” (A138/B177) – an \textit{a priori} intuition – it becomes clear that the “distinction of the intuitions” (A118) means the alteration of “intuitions themselves” (B160) from pure intuition to ‘an \textit{a priori} intuition,’ which is to take place at the point of “the connection of the manifold \textit{a priori}” (A118), i.e., at the point of the alteration from filled space-elapsing time to empty space-nullified time. Since ‘death’ – the pure concept of the understanding – which is yielded through the productive synthesis of the imagination, belongs, as “the thoroughgoing and \textit{a priori} unity of perceptions,” to “one and the same universal experience” (A110), we have to think that “the transcendental unity of the synthesis of the imagination” (A118), which comprises pure intuition, \textit{an \textit{a priori} intuition} and pure concept of the understanding – “intuitions themselves” (B160) and “perceptions themselves” (B219) – is “the ground of the possibility of all cognition” (A118), especially that of experience or of possible experience.

Seeing Kant’s negative remarks toward ‘the mathematical investigators of nature’ and ‘some metaphysicians of nature,’ we say that Kant’s position is that 1) he does not “assume two eternal and infinite self-subsisting non-entities (space and time), which exists (yet without there being anything real)” (B56), 2) he does not “hold space and time to be relations of appearances (next to or successive to one another) that are abstracted from experience” (A40-B57). This position clearly shows us how erroneously Kant comprehends space and time. First, Kant thinks that ‘two eternal and infinite self-subsisting non-entities’ have nothing to do with anything real. Second, Kant thinks that “relations of appearances (next to or successive to one another) that are abstracted from experience” (A40-B57) has little relevance because they are “confusedly represented in this abstraction” (B57). What kinds of abstraction can be thought to be relevant with no confusion from Kant’s viewpoint? It is the abstraction
that can “occur without the restrictions that nature has attached to them” (B57). How
does the abstraction occur without the restrictions that nature has attached to them?
Kant has already answered it, saying “There is no other way than through concepts or
through intuitions, both of which, however, are given, as such, a priori or a posteriori.
The latter, namely empirical concepts, together with that on which they are grounded,
empirical intuition, cannot yield any synthetic proposition except one that is also
merely empirical, i.e., a proposition of experience; thus it can never contain necessity
and absolute universality of the sort that is nevertheless characteristic of all
propositions of geometry” (A47). On the contrary, we think that since “the
transcendental unity of apperception” (A118) – ‘the transcendental unity of the
synthesis of the imagination’ – has arisen with “intuitions themselves” (B160) and
“perceptions themselves” (B219), it can make a ‘proposition of experience’ which can
“contain necessity and absolute universality” (A47) – nullity in space-time –
space-time itself. There are crucial differences among our ‘proposition of experience,’
“all propositions of geometry” (A47) and Kant’s “synthetic proposition” (A47). In “all
propositions of geometry” (A47), something like this could occur: “with two straight
lines no space at all can be enclosed, thus no figure is possible, and try to derive it
from the concept of straight lines and the number two;…” (B65). In contrast to this, in
our ‘proposition of experience,’ an a priori intuition or pure intuition could occur with
no straight lines and no number two or three. Space can be enclosed, and thus, the
figure is possible here as a “synthetic proposition” (A47), which is “one that is also
merely empirical, i.e., a proposition of experience” (A47). In the case of “all
propositions of geometry” (A47), all of Kant’s effort is in vain, forcing him “to take
refuge in intuition” (B65). What does this mean? We think that, here, if nullity in
space-time is introduced in accordance with an a priori intuition or pure intuition, it
might neutralize the conundrum, which unavoidably occurs in “all propositions of
geometry” (A47). It means that space can be enclosed with two straight lines and
figure is possible, if “figures in space” (A142) are under the aegis of “pure a priori
imagination” (A142). The so-called ‘imaginary number’ $i^2 = -1$ in mathematics can be
thought to pertain to “pure a priori imagination” (A142) or “a pure a priori intuition”
(A48). In our metaphysics, the ‘imaginary number’ $i^2 = -1$ is commensurate with “one
that is also merely empirical, i.e., a proposition of experience” (A47), which can
“contain necessity and absolute universality (A47). In this regard, ‘imaginary number’
$i^2 = -1$ is regarded to be ‘real number,’ while a ‘real number’ in mathematics is to be
an ‘imaginary number’ except ‘0 or 1.’ Kant’s metaphysics is entirely different from
our transcendental analytic on account of the fact that we need not use geometry or
mathematics in order to have “figures in space” (A142) since “an a priori intuition”
(B40) or pure intuition can be thought to signify nullity in space-time – space-time
itself – with no straight lines and no number, while Kant has to perennially deal with
such issue as: “with two straight lines no space at all can be enclosed, thus no figure is
possible, and try to derive it from the concept of straight lines and the number two;…”
(B65). It seems that since Kant cannot tolerate the situation, he takes refuge in his
“pure a priori intuition” (A48) in terms of “thing in itself” (A676/B704). We have
already answered Kant’s question, which says “Since the propositions of geometry are
cognized synthetically a priori and with apodictic certainty, I ask: Whence do you
take such propositions, and on what does our understanding rely in attaining to such
absolutely necessary and universally valid truth?” (B64-A47). We have attained it
through nullity in space-time, i.e., the pure concept of the understanding
(YAMAMOTO 2016: 87-100, YAMAMOTO 2017: 19-37). We agree with Kant, who
says that the mathematical investigators of nature and some metaphysicians of nature
“can neither offer any ground for the possibility of a priori mathematical cognitions (since they lack a true and objectively valid a priori intuition), nor can they bring the propositions of experience into necessary accord with those assertions” (B57-A41). Kant, seeing that their “ground for the possibility of a priori mathematical cognitions” (B57) is “distinct from the intellectual synthesis without any imagination merely through the understanding” (B152), brings up ‘thing in itself,’ making his “synthetic proposition” (A47). This “thing in itself” (A676/B704) is assumed to make it possible to attain to “a priori mathematical cognitions” (B57) or “synthetic a priori cognition” (A204). We think that what Kant asserts concerning this issue, which says, “On our theory of the true constitution of these two original forms of sensibility both difficulties are remedied” (B58) is not tenable. Kant’s attempt to remedy the difficulties by means of merely giving “object a priori in intuition” (A48), and grounding “synthetic proposition on this” (A48) is empty, as Kant himself repeatedly implies (A142, A147-B187, A154, A159-B199-A160, A236-B296-A237, A241-A242-B300, A297, B354-A298, B380, B389, A336, A468/B496-A469/B497, A477/B505, A478/B506, A479/B507, A482/B510, A506/B534, A537/B565, A558/B586, A565/B593-A566/B594, A566/B594-A567/B595, A642/B670, A644/B672-A645/B673, A644/B672, A646/B674, A647/B675, A669/B697, A676/B704, A678/B706-A679/B707, A681/B709). Kant’s metaphysics is grounded on the fact that 1) “I can nevertheless assume such an incomprehensible being, the object of a mere idea, relative to the world of sense, though not in itself “(A677/B705); and 2) the “dynamical series” (A531/B559) are assumed to have “the thoroughly conditioned character” (A531/B559). Kant, in an attempt to make “the thoroughly conditioned character” appear to be “connected with a condition that is empirically unconditioned” (A531/B559), even thinks up “pure synthesis” (B104), or “synthesis, considered in itself alone” (B153), which is assumed to be capable of yielding the pure concept of the understanding or “itself determining sensibility internally” (B153). This is Kant’s pure reason, but not ours. We think that “the unconditioned totality” (A531/B559) which, Kant thinks, is to arise through the synthesis of the ‘dynamical series’ is entirely different from our “cosmological ideas dealing merely with mathematically unconditioned unity” (A532/B560) – space-time itself (nullity in space-time) – which is represented by an a priori intuition or pure intuition.

A Thing = A, Which is Something = B, and Causality

Kant makes remarks concerning “a merely logical principle,” which would be proved to be crucial for directing our discourse, saying, “There is, however, still one formula of this famous principle, although denuded of all content and merely formal, which contains a synthesis that is incautiously and entirely unnecessarily mixed into it. This is: ‘It is impossible for something to be and not to be at the same time.’ In addition to the fact that apodictic certainty is superfluously appended to this (by means of the word ‘impossible’), which must yet be understood from the proposition itself, the proposition is affected by the condition of time, and as it were says: ‘A thing = A, which is something = B, cannot at the same time be non-B, although it can easily be both (B as well as non-B) in succession.’… Now the principle of contradiction, as a merely logical principle, must not limit its claims to temporal relations. Hence such a formula is entirely contrary to its aim. The misunderstanding results merely from our first abstracting a predicate of a thing from its concept and subsequently connecting its opposite with this predicate, which never yields a contradiction with the subject,
but only with the predicate that is combined with it synthetically, and indeed only when both the first and the second predicate are affirmed at the same time” (A152-B192-A153). Kant, acknowledging that “no cognition can be opposed to it without annihilating itself” (B191), utters negative words toward it, saying that while this principle is a conditio sine qua non, it is not “a determining ground of the truth of our cognition” (B191-A152). He adds, saying “Since we now really have to do only with the synthetic part of our cognition, we will, to be sure, always be careful not to act contrary to this inviolable principle, but we cannot expect any advice from it in regard to the truth of this sort of cognition” (A152). These remarks sound astounding and ridiculous, since we think that we can expect the most important advice from it in regard to the truth of our cognition when we have to do with the empirical part of our cognition. We think that 1) all appearances themselves signify ‘filled space-elapsing time’ or ‘empty space-nullified time,’ 2) ‘filled space-elapsing time’ cannot at the same time be ‘empty space-nullified time.’ Therefore, we would say that such a proposition as “A thing = A, which is something = B, cannot at the same time be non-B’ should be formulated such as that ‘appearance itself = appearance, which is filled space-elapsing time, cannot at the same time be non-appearance itself, i.e., empty space-nullified time.’ Since empty space-nullified time is commensurate with nullity in space-time, which permeates ‘appearance itself = appearance,’ nullity in space-time – space-time itself – can at the same time be ‘appearance itself = appearance,’ without being affected by the condition of time. Therefore, we would say, ‘It is possible for something to be and not to be at the same time,’ and ‘A thing = A, which is something = B, can at the same time be non-B.’ Of course it is axiomatic that: 1) it is impossible for a part of filled space-elapsing time and another part of filled space-elapsing time to be at the same point in the same instance, 2) it is possible for a part of empty space-nullified time and another part of empty space-nullified time to be at the same point in the same instance – nullity in space-time – if points and instances are conjured up in nullity in space-time.

In relation to this issue, it is critically important for us to clarify how we cognize, through empirical intuition and “synthesis of apprehension” (B164), the transition of space-time itself from filled space-elapsing time to empty space-nullified time and how we cognize the space-time itself on the grounds for the “constitutive principle of reason” (A509/B537). In regard to this principle, we have to say, in an opposite manner to what Kant says (A509/B537), that it is ‘a principle of the greatest continuation and extension of possible experience, in accordance with which empirical boundary as nullity in space-time would hold as an absolute boundary.’ Though a part of the discourse has been already made (YAMAMOTO 2016: 87-100, YAMAMOTO 2017: 19-37), we will deal with these issues again in an attempt to make it more explicit. When Kant makes remarks in regard to “how in general anything can be altered” (B252), saying “how it is possible that upon a state in one point of time an opposite one could follow in the next – of these we have a priori not the least concept. For this acquaintance with actual forces is required, which can only be given empirically, e.g., acquaintance with moving forces, or, what comes to the same thing, with certain successive appearances (as motions) which indicate such forces. But the form of such an alteration, the condition under which alone it, as the arising of another state, can occur (whatever the content, i.e., the state, that is altered might be), consequently the succession of the states itself (that which has happened), can still be considered a priori according to the law of causality and the conditions of time” (B252-A207), we agree with Kant. We have already made a discourse
concerning the origin of humanity, saying: ‘we have to take note that ‘empirical intuition’ does not necessarily correspond to ‘empirical intuition and synthesis,’ on account of the fact that synthesis signifies “an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, “in distinction from sensibility” (B130). We think that this act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, in distinction from sensibility, signifies the origin of humanity itself’ (YAMAMOTO 2017: 19-37): ‘When the standing and lasting I of pure apperception could acquire the concept of death – the pure concepts of understanding – through empirical intuition and synthesis of apprehension, upon encountering the *phenomena* of disappearance, it emerged as a human. In other words, when it cognized nullity in space-time, which already resides in them, it emerged in the representation of space-time itself, and began to exist as a human” (YAMAMOTO 2017: 19-37). We think that once a living thing could arise as a human through the acquaintance with actual forces, i.e., “*realitates phaenomena*” (B329), he or she would be able to transmit the pure concepts of the understanding to their posterity with language, and teach it as *phaenomena* with “the unity of the categories” (A249). Therefore, we can say that, of “how in general anything can be altered” (B252), we have ample concepts, which are given *a priori*.

In regard to the alteration and causality, we have clarified that 1) all alteration as a transition of a thing from one state to another signifies the transition from a state of appearance to a state of disappearance, or from a state of disappearance to a state of appearance, and 2) the form of appearance, which alterability concerns, is ‘filled-elapsing’ or ‘empty-nullified,’ while their cause is in the unalterable – space-time itself (YAMAMOTO 2017: 19-37). In regard to alteration and causality, Kant has made an enigmatic and contradictory discourse, saying “If a substance passes out of a state *a* into another state *b*, then the point in time of the latter is different from the point in time of the first state and follows it. Likewise the second state as a reality (in the appearance) is also distinguished from the first, in which it did not yet exist, as *b* is distinguished from zero; i.e., if the state *b* differs from the state *a* even only in magnitude, then the alteration would be an arising of *b* – *a*, which did not exist in the prior state, and with regard to which the latter = *a*” (B253-A208). On the grounds of what we have already clarified, we think that Kant’s statement indicates four things: 1) a state *a* signifies space-time itself, while another state *b* signifies filled space-elapsing time: 2) the second state – filled space-elapsing time – as a reality in the appearance, should be distinguished from the first – space-time itself – as a reality in nullity in space-time: 3) intensive magnitude of the state *b* is distinguished from zero, while the state *a* has intensive magnitude, which is zero: 4) the state *b* and the state *a* have extensive magnitude “in which the representation of the parts makes possible the representation of the whole” (A162). Thinking like that, we entirely agree with what Kant refers to here. In this context, it comes out that space-time itself – the cause which is unalterable – spawns the transition from a state of disappearance to a state of appearance, which is correspondent to the transition of space-time itself from ‘empty-nullified’ to ‘filled-elapsing.’ This is not contradictory on account of the fact that since space-time itself permeates filled space-elapsing time, the unalterable always inheres. Here, Kant seems to be making a discourse concerning only the arising of the manifold of appearance in the world of sense from nullity in space-time. In addition, we would say that we have a concept of causality in regard to a transition of space-time itself from ‘filled-elapsing’ to ‘empty-nullified.’ We have an “acquaintance with actual forces…which can only be given empirically” (A207), or “what comes to the same thing, with certain successive appearances (as motions)”
Therefore, we can draw from this acquaintance, the concept of causality in terms of “how it is possible that upon a state in one point of time an opposite one could follow in the next” (B252-A207), which is correspondent to a transition of space-time itself from ‘filled-elapsing’ to ‘empty-nullified.’ Furthermore, there could be additional causality, which is, according to Kant, “the form of such an alteration, the condition under which alone it, as the arising of another state, can occur …, consequently the succession of the states itself (that which has happened), can still be considered a priori according to the law of causality and the conditions of time” (A207). Therefore, here, we have to make a discourse about causality.

Kant again gives us a hint for the direction of discourse, which could enable us to comprehend, in transcendental analytic, the causality. It says, “In respect of what happens, one can think of causality in only two ways: either according to nature or from freedom. The first is the connection of a state with a preceding one in the world of sense upon which that state follows according to a rule. Now since the causality of appearances rests on temporal conditions, and the preceding state, if it always existed, could not have produced any effect that first arose in time, the causality of the cause of what happens or arises has also arisen, and according to the principle of understanding it in turn needs a cause. By freedom in the cosmological sense, on the contrary, I understand the faculty of beginning a state from itself; the causality of which does not in turn stand under another cause determining it in time in accordance with the law of nature” (A532/B560-A533/B561). We think that when a substance passes out of a state $a$ into another state $b$, there are three modes of alteration: 1) an alteration of a part of filled space-elapsing time to empty space-nullified time: 2) a passing out of a part of filled space-elapsing time into a part of filled space-elapsing time as “the succession of the states itself” (A207): 3) an alteration of empty space-nullified time to a part of filled space-elapsing time. It is clear that “the causality of appearances” in these alterations or a passing out stands under temporal conditions. In the alteration of empty space-nullified time to a part of filled space-elapsing time, the preceding state could not have produced any effect that first arose in time since it is always nullity in space-time. This means that “the causality of the cause of what happens or arises” (A532/B560) is not necessary, indicating that, according to Kant’s principle of understanding, it does not have a cause. On the contrary, according to our principle of understanding, it needs not a cause since space-time itself, namely nullity in space-time is the cause itself. Therefore, we should say that “the causality of appearances” (A532/B560) is commensurate with “beginning a state from itself” (A533/B561). In other words, the manifold of appearance would arise in “a spontaneity, which could start to act from itself, without needing to be preceded by any other cause that in turn determines it to action according to the law of causal connection” (A533/B561).

Then we have to clarify ‘the causality of disappearances’ and the causality of “the succession of the states itself” (A207). Again, Kant gives us a hint, saying, “For according to the principle of causality actions are always the primary ground of all change of appearances, and therefore cannot lie in a subject that itself changes, since otherwise further actions and another subject, which determines this change, would be required. Now on this account action, as a sufficient empirical criterion, proves substantiality without it being necessary for me first to seek out its persistence through compared perceptions, a way in which the completeness that is requisite for the quantity and strict universality of the concept could not be attained. For that the
primary subject of the causality of all arising and perishing cannot itself arise and perish (in the field of appearances) is a certain inference, which leads to empirical necessity and persistence in existence, consequently to the concept of a substance as appearance” (A205-B251-A206). Here Kant has candidly confessed that he cannot seek out the persistence of action “through compared perceptions” (B251), indicating that he has missed the crucial one – perishing “in the field of appearances” (B251). In the case of living things, ‘perishing’ is equivalent to death itself. From our viewpoint, this enigmatic remark indicates five things: 1) while it is clear that “actions are always the primary ground of all change of appearances” (A205), they always come to a part of filled space-elapsing time from another part of filled space-elapsing time: 2) since it cannot “lie in a subject that itself changes” (A205), “further actions and another subject” (A205) – another part of filled space-elapsing time – which determines this change, would be required: 3) “through compared perceptions” (B251), it is possible to attain “the completeness that is requisite for the quantity and strict universality of the concept” (B251): 4) since “the primary subject of the causality of all arising and perishing” (B251) corresponds to space-time itself, it “cannot itself arise and perish” (B251): 5) since “empirical necessity and persistence in existence” (B251) signify filled space-elapsing time or empty space-nullified time, it leads “consequently to the concept of a substance as appearance” (A206) – space-time itself. Therefore, when Kant says, “Now there is no existence that could be cognized as necessary under the condition of other given appearances except the existence of effects from given causes in accordance with laws of causality. Thus it is not the existence of things (substances) but of their state of which alone we can cognize the necessity, and moreover only from other states, which are given in perception, in accordance with empirical laws of causality” (A227-B280), we entirely agree with him, thinking that 1) the “existence that could be cognized as necessary under the condition of other given appearances” (A227) corresponds to “effects from given causes in accordance with laws of causality” (A227): 2) “the existence of effects” (A227) is cognized as necessary in the alteration of a part of filled space-elapsing time to empty space-nullified time through empirical intuition and synthesis of apprehension: 3) effects come as a result of alteration of “states, that are given in perception” (B280) – the alteration of a part of filled space-elapsing time to empty space-nullified time or the alteration of empty space-nullified time to a part of filled space-elapsing time. Kant has already shown us a direction to proceed in order to attain the concept of causality, saying, “The schema of the cause and of the causality of a thing in general is the real upon which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows. It therefore consists in the succession of the manifold insofar as it is subject to a rule” (A144): “Necessity therefore concerns only the relations of appearances in accordance with the dynamical law of causality, and the possibility grounded upon it of inferring a priori from some given existence (a cause) to another existence (the effect). Everything that happens is hypothetically necessary; that is a principle that subjects alteration in the world to a law, i.e., a rule of necessary existence, without which not even nature itself would obtain” (B280-A228). Acknowledging Kant’s admonition in regard to the issue of causality, which says, “we cognize only the necessity of effects in nature, the cause of which are given to us, and the mark of necessity in existence does not reach beyond the field of possible experience…” (B280), we would begin to address this issue, thinking, in opposition to what Kant says (B280), that ‘in this it does hold of the existence of things, as substances, since these can be regarded as empirical effects, or as something that happens and arises.’
In regard to “the schema of the cause and of the causality of a thing in general… the real” (A144), we have already clarified that 1) perception, hence experience, is possible that would prove an entire presence of everything real in disappearance, i.e., a proof of empty space or of empty time can be drawn from experience or from possible experience: 2) the entire presence of the real in disappearance can be perceived in possible experience of death, and, it can be deduced from any single disappearance, from the difference in the degree of reality: 3) thus, humans perceive “the real, which corresponds to sensations in general, in opposition to the negation = o” (B217) or in conformity with the negation = o: 4) appearances themselves, which signify filled space-elapsing time or nullity in space-time that is given a priori, constitutes “the sensation (as matter of perception)” (A167-B209) – quantum (YAMAMOTO 2017: 19-37). Thus, we have clarified that “the schema of the cause and of the causality of a thing in general” (A144) grounds in “realities in appearance (realitas phaenomenon)” (A265), which “can certainly be in opposition with each other and, united in the same subject, one can partly or wholly destroy the consequence of the other” (B321). Then we have to clarify the necessary “relations of appearances in accordance with the dynamical law of causality” (B280-A228) – “everything that happens is hypothetically necessary” (A228). Kant provides us an invaluable and indispensable hint, which would enable us to penetrate into the causality, thereby putting it on the grounds of the constitutive principle of reason. Accordingly, Kant says, “Now I call that magnitude which can only be apprehended as a unity, and in which multiplicity can only be represented through approximation to negation = o, intensive magnitude. Thus every reality in the appearance has intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree. If one regards this reality as cause (whether of the sensation or of another reality in appearance, e.g., an alteration), then one calls the degree of reality as cause a ‘moment,’ e.g., the moment of gravity, because, indeed, the degree designates only that magnitude the apprehension of which is not successive but instantaneous” (B210-A169). From our viewpoint, this enigmatic remark indicates six things: 1) the world-whole – a unity – signifies magnitude: 2) this world-whole – magnitude – is commensurate with space-time itself, namely nullity in space-time, in which multiplicity can have intensive magnitude, which makes them approximate to negation = o: 3) nullity in space-time pertains to “every reality in the appearance” – multiplicity in the world-whole: 4) intensive magnitude, which is making an approximation to negation = o – nullity in space-time – signifies “the moment of gravity,” which is the cause: 5) intensive magnitude – a degree – is to be apprehended instantaneously upon the dissolution of a part of filled space-elapsing time – a diminution of the multiplicity: 6) magnitude signifies extensive magnitude, cognized as nullity in space-time in accordance with experience of death or its “possibility itself” (B294), or intensive magnitude – a degree – which is to be apprehended instantaneously in an alteration of “the sensation (as matter of perception)” (A167-B209) or of the “realities in appearance (realitas phaenomenon)” (A265). The result of the transcendental analytic corresponds to the aforementioned discourse that nullity in space-time – space-time itself – permeates filled space-elapsing time as a cause.

Then, following the scheme in the “Table of Categories” (B106), which ordains that “allness (totality) is nothing other than plurality considered as a unity, limitation is nothing other than reality combined with negation, community is the causality of a substance in the reciprocal determination of others, finally necessity is nothing other than the existence that is given by possibility itself” (B111), we have to deal with the
issue of community (reciprocity) in ‘allness (totality),’ i.e., ‘plurality considered as a unity’ since “The schema of community (reciprocity), or of the reciprocal causality of substances with regard to their accidents, is the simultaneity of the determinations of the one with those of the other, in accordance with a general rule” (A144-B184). Kant’s discourse would lead us to an astonishing finding in regard to the issue of causality. Accordingly he says, “since the parts of space are not subordinated to one another but are coordinated with one another, one part is not the condition of the possibility of another, and space, unlike time, does not in itself constitute a series. Yet the synthesis of the manifold parts of space, through which we apprehend it, is nevertheless successive, and thus occurs in time and contains a series” (B439). From our viewpoint, this enigmatic remark indicates seven things: 1) since there are no parts of space in space itself – nullity in space – space, as space itself, is not “subordinated to one another” and are not “coordinated with one another” (B439): 2) therefore, space, as space itself, does not constitute a series: 3) since there are ‘filled spaces’ as manifold parts of space itself, the manifold parts of space itself are subordinated to one another or are coordinated with one another: 4) therefore, a ‘filled space’ – a manifold part – can be the condition of the possibility of another part, and ‘filled space,’ like ‘elapsing time,’ does in itself constitute a series: 5) the synthesis of the manifold part of space itself (synthesis of ‘filled space’ or of a ‘filled space’ and empty space) is “successive, and thus occurs in time and contains a series” (B439): 6) since the synthesis takes place in the manifold of sensibility, ‘succession,’ ‘subordination’ and ‘coordination’ pertain to filled space-elapsing time: 7) since the world-whole consists of all appearances – filled space-elapsing time and nullity in space-time – ‘succession,’ ‘subordination’ and ‘coordination’ which take place in filled space-elapsing time would affect the world-whole. Following what Kant says (B112), contrarily, we have to say, ‘Now a similar connection is thought of in an entirety of things, since one is subordinated, as effect, under another, as the cause of its existence, or coordinated with the other simultaneously and reciprocally as cause with regard to its determination.’ What does this mean? It means that “the members of the division exclude each other and yet are connected in one sphere, so in the latter case the parts are represented as ones to which existence (as substances) pertains to each exclusively of the others, and which are yet connected in one whole” (B113). We think that “the members of the division” signifies categories, through which it would become possible for us to cognize “whatever objects may come before our senses,…as far as laws of their combination are concerned” (B159). When Einstein asserts that there is a serious defect in quantum mechanics (Einstein et al. 1935: 777-780), we feel that our transcendental analytic, grounded on Kant’s metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason, might give us an inkling into the solution of this conundrum. This issue will be addressed in our following discourse.
References


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A Razor's Edge: For an Explanation on 'Identity' In Timaeus

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Abstract
In Katha-Upanishad, a razor’s edge was compared to an extremely sharp path to manifest ‘atman’, the ultimate eternal Being permeating over the universe and inner Self of individuals. It discloses the arduousness of self-knowing, also reveals that an approach to one’s identification with the atman lies on a seemingly impassable point. Nevertheless, difficulties could be owed to the relation between oneself and the Time. Instead of leaning to the separation of past, present and future or indulging in restless flux of material, the ‘edge’ implies a de-antagonistic situation where any presupposed divisions are not dissolved but involved in, meanwhile, people can struggle to recognize and reside in soul oneness among and over entire diverse appearances. This paper intends to explain how ‘a razor’s edge’ in Katha-Upanishad inspires an understanding of ‘identity’ in Timaeus. In Timaeus, the unchanging self-sufficient Being is original, Time and celestial bodies in regular motions are images of Being. Identity, which maintains at a permanent present, accomplishes itself by incorporating a timeless essence and images within temporality. Thus, for human beings whose nature is a concealment of the eternity of Being or the universal soul, the way of achieving at one’s identity, of nourishing oneself in accord with the universal order, appears to be passing over the ‘edge’, that entails an imitation of divinity and an internal whole residence at the permanent present.

Keywords: a razor’s edge; Katha-Upanishad; identity; Timaeus.
Upanishads, from which the spirit of Philosophy and Hinduism of India stems, contains a variety of philosophical ideas. One of the primary themes that Upanishads illuminates is the origin of the universe, or the ultimate substance of being, this issue also could be found in Katha Upanishad. Katha begins with a dialogue about the enigma of death, and turns into a discussion about “truth”, it suggests a way that is possible for people to be aware of the truth through atman. However, reaching the atman seems to be a difficult process, “The saint said, pursuing the highest and the truest light is on a narrow and arduous way which if full of danger, just as a razor’s edge”. Going through the razor’s edge becomes a metaphor accounting for the hardness of realizing the atman for people.

How the metaphor of a razor’s edge in Katha Upanishad could be instructive for catching the meaning of ‘identity’ in Plato’s Timaeus? A few questions might be related to this topic. The first is what does the razor’s edge mean in Katha Upanishad? Next is concerned about identity in Timaeus, and the last one may focus on how it is possible to construct a sort of correlation between the metaphor of razor’s edge and the issue of identity. Concerned with these questions, this article will try to explain the possibility of such an interrelationship between the metaphor and the issue of ‘identity’ in Timaeus.

A razor’s edge

According to Katha Upanishad, atman is not only the ultimate reason of the universe, but also is a wise and immortal inner self, or the soul of individuals. As it is said in Katha, atman is oneness, that means atman of the universe is identical with the atman in human, the realization of atman entails a way of seeking for truth, which is to be conscious of the identification of atman. Atman exists without birth or death, without displaying or disappearance, it is prior to and superior over any else, it is permanent and transcend over the past and the future, so it is immortal and timeless and it is separated and independent from the “body” that is mortal undoubtedly. Atman conceals itself all of the world, it could be tiny without any separable parts, at the same time, it also could be great with unmeasured vastness to involve the cosmos. People who can recognize the atman hidden in the universe as well as in their own and perform with it will rescue themselves from unhappiness and misery, in order to obtain spiritual liberation. That means, a person whoever has realized atman and made oneself identical with the atman will be immortal. How to know and to seize atman? Neither general knowledge nor intelligences will be able to help people to realize atman, the only way to achieve at atman lies in the depth of heart, which depends on a process of self–knowing which equals to a kind of identification of one and one’s true inner self, as well as an identification of human being and Brahma who serves as the creator of universe, that could be translated by an identification of one’s soul with the atman of the universe, or the order created by Brahma.

1 Katha Upanishad, Translated by Pingshi, Buddhist Culture, China, 2003, Vol.4, p.26
2 Ibid, pp.25-28
It is a fact that Katha Upanishad insisted a dichotomy between experimental world and spiritual world, between temporal flux and eternal essence, accordingly, there exists two kinds of pleasures attracting one’s atman, one is rooted in the cheerfulness of spiritual world, another comes from senses and sensibilities. It is said in Katha Upanishad that people who indulgent themselves in sensible pleasures of exterior world, are those who just believe in one life without afterlife and live from death to death, so they exclude themselves from atman. Nevertheless, Atman, as eternal and unchanging inner self, has no beginning or end, cannot be known from sounds, views, smells, tastes of phenomenon world, or cannot be reflected, since atman transcends over all the presences in visible world and surpasses the reason, it is the movement of self controlling in interior self arrives at atman. So In Katha-Upanishad, a razor’s edge was compared to an extremely sharp path to manifest atman, the ultimate eternal Being permeating over the universe and inner Self of individuals.

A process of knowing atman is a narrow and arduous way, like passing the razor’s edge, which is sharp and dangerous. The razor’s edge discloses the arduousness of self-knowing, also reveals that the approach to one’s identification with the atman lies on a seemly impassable point, since it is hardly for people to find a standpoint over the edge, even to go through it. In details, the difficulty firstly starts from oneself. For an individual, The Atman, the inner self seems to occupy the highest place. We could find a hierarchy in spiritual sphere, which presents a lowest level from senses to will, reason, atman of a person, and its apex is atman of the universe. Concerning about the relationship, Katha provides a metaphor of chariot, which has been interpreted later by Plato in Phaedrus and generally known by us. In Katha, Atman serves as the commander of the chariot, whereas the body is just the chariot. The reason act as a driver, senses as a horse, will as the rein of the horse, and a road as the condition of human desires. In a word, Atman plays itself as the soul’s dominator, but it shows itself in an opaque way, that’s to say, it often transforms itself according to materials in visible world, it deforms its oneness to multiple phenomena. Upon the multiplicity, only people who is able to look into one’s inner self, and take care of one’s soul, would get at the atman and go towards eternal happiness. Whoever extricates oneself from the fetter of one’s body, one will realize the atman in order to be immortal.

Essentially speaking, difficulties as passing the razor’s edge could be owed to a relation between human being and Time, which signifies how does our self-knowing proceed during the passing of time. As people are caught in temporal flux, forced by passions and desires, they have lost themselves always as an “exterior self”, who is not able to bear one’s authenticity. However, In Atman, there is no splitting of past, present and future, no separation of time, all is in one, the atman is oneness itself. Instead of leaning to the separation of past, present and future or indulging in restless flux of materials, the ‘edge’ implies a de-antagonistic situation where any presupposed divisions are not dissolved but involved in, meanwhile, people can struggle to recognize and reside in soul oneness among and over entire diverse appearances. In other words, going through the razor’s edge is sticking to a spontaneous consciousness of one’s being in all “present”, when the soul has a sole sentiment about existence, without keeping nostalgias in past or projecting in future which is not yet to come, without superficial desires for more stuffs that are sufficient
to decrease people to be a tyrant of themselves, to live always outside of themselves and to be alienated self. If it is possible, such a state in which people enjoy a sort of self-sufficient in each present moment, could be called wholeness and oneness in the soul. It looks like “collect yourself” mentioned by Montaigne, who believed that knowing oneself implies a great of pleasure of living in oneself properly, our barbarous illness rests on getting rid of our being, and the true inner self according to the divine and natural order. But the difference lies in that, for Montaigne, the goal of knowing oneself is just prepared for secular life, for nature, rather than for being identified with highest atman in terms of religious belief, whereas, in Katha Upanishad, the way of arriving at the atman entails inherently an individual inner experience of religious self-resolving, that is also a philosophical self-knowing with hardness and obstructions.

Identity in Timaeus

As the same as Katha Upanishad, Timaeus presents a dialogue where Plato explores into the universe’s beginning and the attributes of our world. A sensible sphere and an intelligible sphere juxtaposed there, respectively refers to opinions and eidos, images and idea, a changing and transient world and a permanent and true world, the multiple and the one, the becoming and the being. The creator makes an animate and self-sufficient perfect being, the universe, whose movement is self-motivated at a given place, and an invisible soul has been settled in it working as a master. But as we known, it is admitted by researchers and readers that Timaeus is one of Plato’s most intriguing dialogues with artfully strangeness, and that under the appearance of his discourse on cosmology, there are lots of insightful scenes to be seen. As Kalkavage pointed out that “In the Timaeus not merely a repository of Greek science but an occasion for their own thinking about the power of myth, the nature of the soul, history and politics, wholeness and the love of beauty, the human fascination with origins, the will to order, and the prospects of physical science for giving an adequate account of the world and man’s place in the world”, the issue of ‘identity’ is not only refers to a description of the perfect idea or eidos of the cosmos as a permanent and self-identical Being that just could be known by intellectual power, by reason, but also is concerned about the soul, the order of interior self of individuals who are living in the world.

According to the nature of this eternal being, reason and harmonious order are incorporated into its soul, and the soul permeates into sameness, differences and being, three parts of which will be divided in proportion and then constitutes each sensible things, that are just copies of that original eternal being. Further more, for this great being, its eternality discloses that it is timeless, only “the present” describes what the being is, because the being is inherently equipped with an permanent identity, so it is not necessary to be proved its persistence during the elapse of time. Whereas, “past” and “future” are only related to sensible things in what Plato called as a becoming sphere. That means, since the unchanging self-sufficient Being is original, time is workable for becoming, Time and celestial bodies in regular motions are dynamic.

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3 Peter Kalkavage, Preface of Plato’s Timaeus, Focus Publishing, 2001, p.x
images of Being. Identity, which maintains at a permanent present, accomplishes itself by incorporating a timeless essence and images within temporality. In Sophist, identity is “that which is in its being” suffusing all that is motionless and in a state of motion. The spacing of time stems from the becoming world forms as the images of the original, and the wholeness of present also has been divided to past, present and future.

After the universe has been created with time and celestial body as its images, the creator initiated to construct gods and human beings. In human, the soul will partake the soul of universe with decreased purity, but has been informed with the essence of universe as well as the knowledge about the order of universe, meantime, individuals’ body which is produced by gods will be mortal. Order is embodied within the universe, but also acts as the aim of soul’s movement of individuals. In each person, the soul could exists in different ways, the sacred form is arranged to be closed to our brain and is imbued with vigor, courage and rationality, while the secular and mortal form which is inclined to be filled with desires, passions, fears and sufferings seems to be set below the head, however, in human nature, there is a kind of harmony, that would help to instruct irrationality to go back to the order. In short, order regulates the motion of the universe and everyone’s soul all the time.

People noticed an obvious contrast about the relationship between the body and the soul in Timaeus and Plato’s other dialogue like Phaedo, where the body is depreciated as an irrational object and will be kept away from the soul’s seeking to be itself, Timaeus presented an impression that the body, the soul and their interaction had contributed to an antagonism of rationality and irrationality, that implies a process of self-knowing. “Our rationality is not exhibited simply in rational contemplation in disregard of the influence of the body, but in the pursuit of a composite life of soul and body. Caring for the self extends to caring for the entire tripartite soul, not just the intellect, also involves caring for the body.” In other words, the soul at least has to deal with both exterior and interior conditions of itself, with body and with the three parts of itself, and order is the modest admeasurement.

Penetrating through the surface of self-knowing

For human beings whose nature is a concealment of the eternity of Being or the universal soul, the way of achieving at one’s identity appears to nourish oneself in accord with the universal order. Although human being partakes the reduced simplicity of the soul of great being and is engraved in mind an inscription about the perfect order of the universe, we still exist in a fleeting life without escaping from all ephemeral things, if we ask ourselves “what am I”, there might be a variety of answers, “I am a thinking thing” for Descartes seems to be obstructed for people who are seeking for the identity in a real life, rather than in a pure rational sphere. For

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Plato, just as what he has illustrated in the Republic, justice finally lies in the order of one’s soul which should comply with the order of the universe, the true being, or the identity of individuals perhaps fail to avoid the change and transience in sensible world, but the order is always given as an orientation, and as an self-enlightenment. Thus, identity looks like more a processing rather than a closed object, it is not transparent, but needs us to penetrate through the surface of living, and to explore in a way of self-knowing. In this sense, it appears to be passing over the ‘edge’, that entails an imitation of divinity and an internal whole residence at the permanent present.

In Katha Upanishad, seeking for atman interprets the accomplishment of identity in a religious sense, and the process seems like going through the razor’s edge, transcending over the passage of time, and the goal of seeking finally lies at the wholeness and oneness of the soul, which depends on one’s serious self-knowing in a changing world. It might be found in Timaeus that the realization of identity does not rely on one kind of religion, but its essence seems to be a motion of self-knowing as well, in which the soul of individuals should be maintain itself in the exterior and material sphere, with pursuing its self purification in the right present, rather than fleeing from the body. Seem from this dimension, it is possible to construct a corresponding understanding between the implication of a razor's edge in Katha Upanishad and 'Identity' In Timaeus.
Reference


Katha Upanishad, Translated by Pingshi, Buddhist Culture, China, 2003.

Your Highness, Mr. Policeman: The Taiwanese Perception of the Policeman during the Japanese Colonial Rule

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Abstract
This article examines the image of the policeman when Taiwan was under Japanese rule (1895-1945) through textual and linguistic analysis. It focuses on the process of how a foreign authority was transformed from a law abiding public servant to a ruthless mighty tyrant in the name of gaining full control and access to a land that was yet to be civilized. In contrast with the process of Taiwanese democratic reform when legitimate law enforcement has failed to cease the rising crime rate, some Taiwanese start to look back to the peaceful colonial period with nostalgia, that is, when the nation was ruled under Your Highness, Mr. Policeman.

Keywords: Japanese rule, Taiwan, police
The Early Law Enforcement in Chinese Society

The earliest law enforcement agency known in China is called *Situ*, which dates back to the time of Xia dynasty (ca. 2100-1600 B.C.).¹ According to the *Shangshu* (Book of Documents) (ca. 11th cent-770 B.C.), *Situ* is the Minister of Instruction, who navigates the legal system, holding responsibilities for the laws and orders in the society.²

However, the name and title of the law enforcement officer or agency changes accordingly from then on. Therefore, we have names, such as the *Siming*, *Sibao*, *Siji* of the Spring and Autumn Period (770-476 B.C.), *Zhongwei* of the Qin dynasty (221-206 B.C.), *Zhijinwu* of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), *Sili xiaowei* of the Wei, Jin and Northern and Southern dynasties dynasty (220-589), *Zuoyou wuwei* of the Sui dynasty (581-618), *Zuoyou jinwuwei* of the Tang and Song dynasty (618-1279), *Jingxunyuan* of the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), *Bingma zhihuisi* of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), and *Tongling yamen* of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) in various times.³

Although the names of these organizations vary from time to time, they all belong to a constituted body of persons empowered by the state to enforce the law, maintain order and provide a range of social services for the community, that is to say, the popular conceptions of police work in modern society.⁴

**Police and Community Control System in Taiwan during the Japanese Colonial Rule**

Following the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, the Japanese soon took over the jurisdiction of Taiwan. However the takeover was encountered by a myriad of armed resistances.⁵ Fearing for further armed resistance to jeopardize their ruling, the Japanese colonial administration began to impose strict regulations for ultimate dominance and control over the islanders. Two major impositions were deemed as being of high priority to lord over the Taiwanese populace. One was the institutionalizing of a policing system in local administration to structure a colonial spatiality; the other was the shaping of an invented identity to fortify the Japanese imperial spirit.

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⁴ For the popular concepts about the character of police work, see Egon Bittner, *The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: a review of background factors, current practices, and possible role models* (Chevy Chase: National Institute of Mental Health, Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency, 1970), 6-14.
The restructuring of Taiwan into different self-rule bounded geo-spatial territories, supervised by highly regulated household registration and advanced police force was the Japanese empire’s way to institutionalize a hierarchical network, which aimed to penetrate and gain full control of the Taiwanese everyday life. This centralized framework was deemed by the Japanese as a necessity for sustaining their colonial rule, that is, a power, which could serve as a control mechanism, a base for local administration, and a vehicle for wartime mobilization. However, the empire’s appropriation of the control mechanism went far beyond its mere defense mechanism and the endorsement of excessive force to the police further pushed this lowest ranking civil servant’s jurisdiction to an extreme that no law was above him. Henceforth, the colonial police became the highest authority of all time and was addressed by the public mass as “Emperor” or “Your Highness” honorifically.

The Omnipotence and Omnipresence of the Colonial Police

To most Taiwanese the image of a police officer during the Japanese colonial times was like a watchtower behind the darkness of closed eyes or a Holy Buddha (namo da pusa 南無大菩薩), who sat aloft with the world spreading out below awaited for his inspection (Figure 1). This dual aspect view of the colonial police perception, to certain extent, could be deemed as a reflection of the Taiwanese fear towards the imperial ruler’s superior technical and scientific innovations, which could simultaneously deprive and empower their rights, needs and privileges. To be exact, prior to the Japanese colonial period, the living standard of the Taiwanese society was hardly adequate. With the help of modern technologies that the Japanese brought in, the overall social condition, such as environmental hygiene, public health and educational level of the Taiwanese communities had significantly improved. That is to say, with the help of modern technologies, the colonial police played a decisive role in exercising the imperial ruler’s disciplinary power over various administrative works locally and nationally. These public affairs, to an extent, had permeated all aspects of the Taiwanese community as well as their daily life depicting the omnipotent and omnipresent nature of the colonial policemen, be they junsa 巡查 (police patrolman), who were almost all Japanese or junsaho 巡查補 (assistant patrolman), the police supplemental force who were mostly Taiwanese.

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6 The idea was borrowed from Caroline Ts’ai, see her “One Kind of Control: The Hoko System in Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1990), especially Part One to Part Three.
7 The original description is tianshe huangdi 田舍皇帝, literally emperor of the farmers or local tyrant, see “Dui jingcha de bufa xingwei yao yanzhong jiuban le” (Do Something about the Police Misconducts), Taiwan minbao (Taiwan People News), 1 April, 1925.
8 In an Exhibition of Police and Sanitation held in Taipei, 1925, an image of a policeman associated with various powers of Buddha, named “Holy Police Buddha” (namo jingcha da pusa 南無警察大菩薩), was used to describe and show the power and authority of the colonial police. See Chiang Yu-Lin, “Namo jingcha da pusa: rizhi shiqi taipei jingcha weisheng zhanlanhui zhong de jingcha xingxiang” (Buddha Police: the Image of the Police in the Taipei Police and Hygiene Exhibition during the Japanese Colonial Governance), Faxue pinglun, 112 (2009), 1-44.
9 In terms of the education system and religious belief, the Japanese colonial government implemented a policy of compulsory primary education as a mechanism for facilitating the colonial control. They also promoted the existing Buddhist religion and adopted certain Taiwanese popular culture, such as having the deities painted in gold, trying to accelerate the assimilation of the Taiwanese culture into the Japanese one. That is to say, the Taiwanese, though were not explicitly content at being colonized by the Japanese, could still acknowledge the miraculous impacts of this “exotic ethnic group”. See Tai Wen-Feng, “Huafan weishen: fanzai shen xinyang de kaocha” (The Research of Savages became the Deities Belief of Chinese), (Master diss., National University of Tainan, 2012), 67-78.
10 Ibid.
11 According to an official police study, the patrolsmen in Taiwan spent a total of 459,962 hours or 57,494 days in assisting general administrative works in 1931. See Taiwan sotokufu keisatsukyoku ed., Taiwan no keisatsu (The Police in Taiwan), (Taipei: Taiwan sotokufu keisatsukyoku, 1937), 109-115.
Figure 1: An image entitled the Holy Police Buddha shown on a Police and Hygiene Exhibition organized by the Taipei Police in 1925 best exemplifies the omnipotent and omnipresent nature of a colonial police officer. In the poster, a rank-and-file policeman holds a rosary in his left hand and a sword in the right, exercising his disciplinary power with double standards. Source: Washisu, Rizhi shiqi taiwan, 548.

The ubiquitously rendering of the police disciplinary power, then served as a community watchtower, constantly exerting a consciousness of permanent visibility as a form of surveillance system in the mind of the Taiwanese. This surveillance control system could be deemed as a replica of Jeremy Bentham’s panoptic construction, where no bars, chains or heavy locks were needed for a dominant control mechanism. That is, a mechanism, which assured that the one being observed would be controlled and contained at any moment without excessive forces (Figure 2). Therefore, in the eyes of the Taiwanese, this miraculous deed could only be the act of god or a divine being, that is, the Lord or Your Highness.

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12 For the mechanism of the panopticon, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), 195-228.
Figure 2: A conceptual plan of the panopticon by J. Bentham depicts the major effect of the penitentiary, which is to induce the inmate into a state of conscious and permanent visibility making sure the functioning of a dominant control mechanism. Source: Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985), plate 3 and 4.

Henceforth, the colonial police officer became the only lord (*daren* 大人) the Taiwanese had ever seen and known. This was due to the fact that most imperial rulers had never laid their feet on this petty island. This omnipresent lord was hence like an extension of the sovereign’s body revered, adored and feared by all in the Taiwanese popular culture. Therefore, he could, on the one hand, be a dedicated public servant, constantly engaging in crime prevention promotions, as shown in the poster of the 1925 Taiwan Exhibition (Figure 3), and a man of mercy, willing to fight for the right of the public mass even at the cost of his own life, as the case of the 嘉義 County policeman, Morikawa Seijiro (Figure 4).

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13 Chen Jialing, “Riju shiqi taiwan duanpian xiaoshuo zhong de jingcha miaoxie” (The Descriptions of Colonial Policemen in the Taiwanese Novels and Fictions during the Japanese Occupation) (Master diss., National Chengchi University, 2002), 15.

Figure 3: One poster from the 1925 Police and Hygiene Exhibition depicts the police as a faithful public servant, working hand in hand with the general public in any crime prevention activities. Source: Washisu, *Rizhi shiqi taiwan*, 557.

Figure 4: The police patrolman of Chiayi County, Morikawa Seijiro was deified by the villagers and honored as *Yiaigong* (The Duke of Justice and Mercy) after his death. Source: Ye, “Cong taiwan rizhi shiqi”, 202.

He could, on the other hand, be a tyranny of minority, having the right to detect and correct a layman’s “misconducts” with randomly generated excuses, such as accusing
an innocent vendor’s scale of being inaccurate when he did not like the pricing,\textsuperscript{15} assuming an ox cart of being a vehicle for transporting cargo only when he did not like to see any person riding on it,\textsuperscript{16} or declaring a permit of being compulsory for fishing in the creeks when he felt like it.\textsuperscript{17} All of these accusations were invented and perfected under the dominant power of the mighty lawman. To further populate his extreme power, this “Holy Majesty” could even do his jobs with excessive force and without any excuse at all.

The demarcation of the ruler and ruled became obvious when excessive power was superimposed to reduce a human’s awareness of himself/herself, and as such he/she could easily be manipulated and exploited by the dominating party at will. Therefore, it was perfectly normal for a police officer to slap a child if he was too terrified to answer questions, rope a man if he had a rice cake for no specific reason, and trash a widow’s house if she forgot to close the door.\textsuperscript{18} These raging feelings against certain vulnerable groups were then justified, warranted and merged into collective unconscious as righteous deeds, which ultimately attributed to the building of an police empire, where the sole representative of power and authority was the Lord Police (\textit{keisatsu daijin 警察大人}). Under this geo-spatial framework, the police officer was the lord, the role model and the only civilized one. The rest were merely lesser human beings or barbarians needed to be educated and tamed.\textsuperscript{19} The impact of the police as a monarch, a dictator and a scoundrel had even gone further to the first few decades of the Republic of China, when the best way to stop children from screaming and crying was to tell them that “the police is around”.\textsuperscript{20}

**The Policing System in the Republic of China, Taiwan**

When Taiwan was restored to the Republic of China sovereignty in 1945, the policing system (National Police Service) was ruled by the Taiwan Provincial Administration Office, which was later renamed as National Police Agency in 1947.\textsuperscript{21} With the Chinese Nationalist one-party rule, the declaration of martial law was fully implemented from 1949 to 1980, and the Taiwanese were forced to live under strict military commands. This was the time justified by the Nationalist Party as a period for 戰地政務 (Battlefield Government Administration), which combined the rulings of political party, government administration and military system in one.\textsuperscript{22} Hence, the police force was under the jurisdiction of the military force with even more power

\textsuperscript{15} Lai He, \textit{Laihe ji} (The Collected Works of Lai He), (Taipei: Qianwei chuban she, 1999), 55-65.
\textsuperscript{16} Lu Heruo, „Niuche“ (Ox Cart), in \textit{Lu heruo xiaoshuo quanji} (The Complete Works of Lu Heruo), (Zhonghe: INK yinke chuban youxian gongsi, 2006), 81.
\textsuperscript{19} The Japanese regarded themselves as the civilized and the Taiwanese as the uncivilized, who could only learn from harsh punishments. Corporal punishment was preferred by the colonial rulers as a term of imprisonment to the Taiwanese was associated with relaxation and pleasure, which meant free labor, free accommodation and free meal. See Chu Huei-Chu, “Zhumin de guixun yu jiaohua: rizhi shiqi taiwan xiaoshuo zhong de jingmin guanxi” (Disciplining and Cultivating the Colonized: Literary Representations of Ethnic Relations between Japanese Policemen and Taiwanese People), \textit{Taiwan wenxue yanjiu xuebao} (Journal of Taiwan Literary Studies), 10 (2010), 122 and 127. In Li Li’s words, the Japanese colonial police system in Taiwan differed significantly from their homeland in its confluence and diversification, making it a centralized administrative and executive body, that is, “Police Monopoly” (jingcha zhengzhi 警察政治), see Li Li, \textit{Riju taiwan shiqi jingcha zhida yanju} (The Study of the Police System during the Japanese Colonial Period), (Taipei: Cross-Strait Academy, 2007), 161.
\textsuperscript{21} Zhang Guangmeng and Sang Weiming, “Taiwan bainian jingcha zhishe zhi huiyu yu zhanwang” (A Hundred Years of the Taiwanese Policing System in Retrospect and Prospect), \textit{Jingxue congkan}, 44, No. 4 (2014), 3.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 4.
than its predecessor of the Japanese ruler. Hence, a police officer could arrest, detain and prosecute anyone with absolute authority. This was a time when the police was used by the ruling party (Nationalists) as a hitman or terminator to monitor and eradicate those Taiwanese who shared a different political view or had a different mindset against their ruling. During this “White Terror” period, any one could be perceived as a potential threat and labeled as bandits or spies working for the Communist Party, including a translator working on a Popeye comic strip (Figure 5).

Figure 7: A comic strip depicts the protagonist, Popeye, delivering a speech on a soap box. He started by saying “Fellow…”, which was purposelessly translated into quanguo junmin tongbao 全國軍民同胞, a favorable phrase often used at the beginning of the then National Party leader, Chiang Kai-shek’s speech. The translator was then arrested for treason and sentenced to 12 years in prison. Source: She, “Boyang yu boyang an”, 110.

After the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwan underwent a series of democratic reforms, which granted the localities the power to appoint their own police chiefs, the major task of police works then shifted from imposing law and order with absolute authority to improving public services with professionalism, dedication and most importantly, a good attitude. These humble gestures, according to a former Police Commissioner, would eventually meet the rising crime rate and social disorder as an inevitable consequence of a democratic process. As a result, the police officers have become the socially disadvantaged group, harshly criticized and monitored by mass media and public opinion. Amidst those criticisms, one voice was heard, especially the words from those who had been through the Japanese colonial period, expressing their affection of the orderly society under the Japanese rule, a time when doors need

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23 Most of the Commissioner of Police during this period came from military background, see Zhang and Sang, “Taiwan bainian”, 3-4.
25 For the incident, see Shen Chao-Chun, “Bo Yang yu boyang an: cong xinwen pingyi dao baise kongbu de tantao” (Bo Yang and His Political Case of Injustice: The Research on the White Terror and News Commentary), (Master diss., Soochow University, 2006).
26 Chen Yapeng, “Cai yingwe: jingcha buzaishi weiquan de yanshen ershi renmin de gongpu” (Police Were No Longer the Extension of Power and Authority But the Public Servants), Pingguo ribao (Apple Daily), 27 October 2016 and Ligun Cao, Lanying Huang and Ivan Y. Sun, Policing in Taiwan: From Authoritarianism to Democracy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 34.
28 Yang and He, “Jingcha ye zhishi”, 122. To name a few of these criticisms, see Li Yixin, “Xianfan gao jingcha, zaixun dizhi saorao jiaren” (A Suspect Sued a Police Officer and Harassed his Family), Lianhe bao (United Daily News), 9 November 2016, Huang Zhaorong, “Xiang wuneng jiu wuneng, xiang youneng jiu youneng” (To Be Competent or Incompetent That Is the Question), Ziyou shibao (Liberty Times), 17 January 2015, and Lin Zhiqing, Huang Zhongyu and Lu Renqin, “Fujiazi huidao zhuai jing” (A Police Was Chased by a Rich Kid with Knife), Pingguo ribao, 12 July 2011.
not be bolted at night.²⁹

These words might seem oddly appropriate for people who had gone through the extreme dominance and control period of the Japanese rule. Nonetheless, these expressions could also be deemed as a reflection of the gradual erosion of social order in Taiwan. This downgrading social condition, to most Taiwanese, is the result of the incompetent police force, which has failed to sustain crime prevention and crime eradication.³⁰ Especially for the people of older generation, who tend to equate an orderly society with a powerful and dominant policing system, the incompetence and vacillation of the current police force is just unbearable.³¹

**Conclusion**

A brief outline of the evolution of Chinese policing in Taiwan has shown us that the Taiwanese perception of the police has its origin from the almighty dictatorial ruler of the Japanese colonial period. This could be attributed to the successful incorporation of modern surveillance techniques and domestic intelligence networks. The implementation was obvious for the building of an omnipotent and omnipresent police force to gain full control of the Taiwanese public as well as the initiation of police monopoly that lasted for over fifty years.

The succeeding Nationalist Party further accumulated the power of this dominant control system to prosecute those who were against them or were perceived as a threat from the Communist Party, turning the nation into a period of “White Terror” for nearly forty years. The police was hence regarded as the hitman of the ruling party feared and awed by the public. With the birth of modern democratic movement, the Taiwanese police department has also gone through different structural reforms. The image of the police has gradually turned from a mighty lord into a general government employee with the sole purpose of serving the public. This humble servant has then become the target of mass media, heavily monitored and criticized by the public’s eyes. Among these screenings, issues of social disorder were frequently mentioned and attributed to the incompetence of the police force, turning certain generations start to look back to the peaceful colonial period with nostalgia, that is, an affection mitigating the trauma resulted from the dominance and control agenda of the Japanese rule.

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Justice and the Rise of China: A Philosophical Approach

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Abstract
The rise of China as an economic superpower has in recent years aroused concerns from Western countries. This research addresses two issues that pertain to China’s potential rise. First, if China is to become a global superpower, what normative principles should be adopted by her in interacting with other countries in the world? Second, are the socio-political processes underlying China’s growth consistent with those normative principles? I argue that answers to these questions require the building up of a model of global justice by which to understand and evaluate China’s peculiar economic development. In the first part of this study, I consider a few post-Rawlsian models of global justice, and judge that they fail to provide criteria by which to evaluate China’s economic expansion around the world. I propose a new model known as the “Human Nature Theories” model, and suggest how it can be used to derive reasonable expectations of China from other countries’ perspectives. In the second part, I quote some empirical evidences which indicate that China so far has not met these expectations, mainly because of the problem of “anti-political machine” in the governance of its megacities. I conclude by saying that China’s rise as a superpower requires the endorsement of a moral orientation other than the liberal-utilitarian one which it currently takes.

Keywords: China; Global Justice; John Rawls; Human Nature
Introduction

1.1 The problem: What does China’s rise mean for the West?

As illustrated by China’s rise as an economic superpower, there are indeed signs that the U.S-led global economic system is fundamentally changing. In a recently published U.S. government report, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence predicts that China will overtake the U.S. in 2030, and become the world’s largest national economy. This research addresses two issues that pertain to China’s potential rise. First, in virtue of what socio-political processes is it possible for China to overtake the U.S. as a global power? Second, if China is to become a global superpower, what normative principles should be adopted to guide China’s interaction with other countries in the world?

Answers to the above questions no doubt will touch on an overlapping area between sociology and political philosophy, as it has become increasingly evident that the alleged rise of China poses a problem of international justice for liberal democratic states. How might it be possible that a state like China, not being governed by constitutional democracy, maintains a stable relationship with Western countries while taking a more dominant role in world politics? Some decades before, when John Rawls published his The Law of Peoples (1999), it appeared to him that such a relationship could only exist between liberal and ‘decent’ (but non-liberal) peoples, and yet no real-world example of any decent peoples could yet be found at his time. Our current situation apparently encourages some speculation on the possibility of China’s being such a decent people. I argue that, in view of China’s peculiar economic domination over the world, which is not likely to result in war, there are strong sociological and ethical reasons why tolerance between it and the West is something desirable, and yet this tolerance can no longer be understood as “liberal tolerance” when the idea of global justice is on focus.

1.2 Outline of the research

The present research consists of two parts: the first one aims at building up a model of global justice on the basis of recent works on political philosophy, and the second one at applying this model to case of China’s rise. In the first part (section 2), I am concerned primarily with reviewing the philosophical models of international/global justice as inspired by Rawlsian theory. Noting the difficulties with these models, I propose a new model by which I claim to be an improvement of the former models, called ‘the human nature theories’ model. On this new model, I suggest, the re-introduction of the notion human nature can help us to see China’s predicament in a new light.

In the second part of the study (section 3), I seek to explain why massive political interventions of China’s economic behaviour from the West are unlikely to take place. My hypothesis is that the discontents with the means by which China transforms itself into an economic superpower are, from many countries’ perspective, not justifiable by any political theory they currently accept. They fall, to be sure, outside the domains of
human rights and democracy because China actively engages itself in *demoralizing* and *depoliticizing* the governance of its megacities. Empirical evidences have been quoted, on the other hand, to show that these megacities are only superficially neo-liberal, and China’s mode of governance implies contradictions with some widely shared views of human nature. I then conclude that Western countries cannot take consistently a stance of liberal tolerance towards China, and yet they may look for a non-liberal conception of human nature which corrects the ideologies of both China and themselves.

2. A Normative Framework of Global Justice

2.1 Development of Rawls’ Theory

Published in the early 1970s, Rawls’ *A Theory of Justice* (1971) is commonly known as a classic in contemporary political philosophy. The interesting thing about this work, nevertheless, is that its recognized merits (such as its rediscovery of a normative theory of justice) are far outgrown by the controversies that it has attracted. Basically, there are lots of disagreements over the concept of the person presupposed by his theory, given the elements of individualism and collectivism which appear to be embraced by the theory. For my purposes here, what is notable about Rawlsian theory is that it does not allow any reference to the metaphysics of the person, or any putative theory of human nature. Such a feature, I argue, makes his theory of international justice developed in the 1990s a very unsatisfactory one.

Let us, however, examine in some more details Rawls’ moral constructivism in order that his project be fully understood. The early interest of Rawls was to set out the formal conditions under which a moral decision can be vindicated (1950), and these conditions became the basis of the theoretical concept of ‘the original position’ which appeared later in *A Theory of Justice*. Briefly put, on the original position hypothesis, people are able to arrive at a most reasonable conception of justice given the condition that they are deprived of knowledge of their identities, but not the general knowledge of their society. In this way, Rawls is confident that a conception of justice will be chosen by rational persons unanimously. The very motivation of using this theoretical construct is simply to rule out the effects of people’s self-interests and metaphysical beliefs on their judgment of social justice. It thus is clear why in his fully formed theory of justice, Rawls keeps reminding us that no ethical and religious presumptions should bias our acceptance of the principles of justice.

Understood this way, Rawls’ theory is similar to the Enlightenment naturalists’ view that justice is merely an artificial device by which to deal with people’s conflicts of interests. This view is evident in Rawls’ ideas of ‘Kantian Constructivism’ (1980) and the ‘political and non-metaphysical’ conception of justice as fairness (1985). For him, justice need be constructed, despite the fact that the debate over human nature has continued for more than two hundred years and is not likely to end in the future. The idea of justice has nothing to do with truth, but the need to secure public agreement. But then there are some fatal confusions here: Is the avoidance of metaphysics equivalent to the avoidance of the talk of human nature? If no metaphysics of the
person can help us to arrive at political agreement, can some naturalist theories of human nature help at all? I will return to these questions shortly.

2.2 From international justice to global justice

Since Rawls’ project is a constructivist (or anti-realist) one, we certainly can imagine how citizens of a society can arrive at certain principles of justice by following his original position hypothesis. They are asked to imagine themselves deprived of their metaphysical beliefs, and then come to consider what all parties would take to be justice in that situation. Thus we should have no difficulty in thinking that people living in a liberal democracy (say, the U.S.) agree with Rawls’ two principles of justice if they disregard their own religious and philosophical backgrounds. The agreement to follow these principles is said to be based on their ‘overlapping consensus’, but not truth. Difficulties arise, however, as we consider the possibility of arriving at such an agreement between people from different societies around the world. Is an agreement possible if all individual persons in the world are supposed to be parties in the original position? Or should we consider each party in the original position a local community, a nation, a race, or a culture?

The interesting move of Rawls in the late 1990s was this: he considered that justice around the world as a matter of stable collaboration between peoples (groups of people with different ethnic, cultural, racial, or national backgrounds), and that justice so conceived is governed by ‘the law of peoples’. Previously, his project was to propose a political conception of justice capable of explaining why individuals with different comprehensive worldviews can live peacefully in a liberal democratic society, viz., why political stability is possible in such a society. Now he became convinced that a wider political conception of justice should be able to explain why massive political sanctions or wars between different ethnic groups or countries would not frequently take place. In this light, he used the idea of ‘Society of Peoples’ to characterize an idealized cooperative entity for the whole world. Since followers of the Law of Peoples are self-contained units with their own governments, what Rawls had in mind should be the idea of ‘international justice’ and not ‘transnational justice’. It may be suggested that Rawls basically wanted to take tolerance between liberal and non-liberal regimes as a premise, and so the remaining construction of his model of international justice was not meant to be critical of a non-intervention policy in international affairs. This, of course, is the reason why many critics find the development of Rawls’ theory disappointing. For tolerance between people in a liberal society simply has no analogy with tolerance between ‘peoples’: one is based on the overlapping consensus of people in a pluralistic society, the other not. For a non-liberal people, the suppression of their comprehensive religious or moral doctrines is the very reason for war.

In Rawls’ theory of international justice, now we come up with a second ‘original position’ which in which all the peoples are treated fairly, and yet the distributive arrangement in each of the peoples is out of the question. What the representative of the liberal people should do is to deliberate with the other representatives the terms of international collaboration, assuming that the liberal ideal is just as good as, say, an
Islamic ideal, provided that the basic ‘humanitarian conditions’ are satisfied. In practice, it also means a non-intervention policy by and large. There is no point of complaining that some countries (such as the U.S. and China) are extremely rich, while people from the Third World have not even enough to survive. A global redistribution of resources will never be recommended if all the peoples consistently follow the law that they fairly set up together.

2.3 Alternative approaches

The discussion above indicates some limitations of applying Rawlsian theory to the case of global justice. Firstly, already constrained by the need for a moderately non-intervention policy in international affairs, the theory suggests that very little can be done in the name of global justice other than the so-called ‘humanitarian actions’. Secondly, consistent with his previous work on social justice, there is an essential suppression of the talk of human nature in Rawls’ new model of international justice. In this way, it is not clear what the model can recommend for those serious conflicts caused by people’s different cultural and religious identities, as the recent rise of international terrorism suggests. Thirdly, and more relevant for our purposes, how might we conceptualize a situation where both human and natural resources are unduly exploited when all the peoples are contended with the present distributive pattern? How might economic superpowers’ behavior be restrained when we are concerned only with each people’s fundamental interests, not the globe itself? Without a single and overriding hypothesis of what is good for the species homo sapiens, we probably will end up ruining the world collectively, while seeing no problem with the fairness of the social contract made among the peoples.

These questions give rise to some alternative approaches to global justice, which I find worth considering but in need of improvement. Before turning to them, it should be noted that Rawls’ theory fulfils part of the expectation of the ancient Greek theorists of justice, in that it pertains to the ideal of social harmony as the motivation of social justice. But Plato and Aristotle notably could have a better theory of global justice than Rawls, because they were all sensitive to the idea that beyond the agreement between individuals, justice must also concern the relationship between human beings and the world. Eventually, justice implies the harmonious relationships not only between the individuals, and also between man and nature. By this light, we can come up with the communitarian conception of justice much promoted Charles Taylor (1989; 2007) and Michael Sandel (1982; 2007; 2009). Communitarianism contends that any viable conception of justice must presuppose a common conception of the good life shared by the members of a community. It also argues that reluctance to engage in the debate over the nature of the human person can only weaken this common conception, in that it encourages individuals to engage in any form of life they deem to be good. But what communitarians promote are usually the communal ties within a local community, as a result of which they are more concerned with a particularist rather than global ethics. So the problem becomes how their political view can become available for, say, people from Eastern cultures as an agenda for the good life.
By contrast, there is a universalist approach as recently found in the works on utilitarianism and cosmopolitanism. What they have in common is the simple assumption that the world is one, and that it is simply a moral mistake to divide it up and favor some groups of its citizens. The utilitarian view, as advocated by Singer (2002), is that ethnic favoritism and patriotism are largely due to the poverty of people’s imagination, so much so that they see a big difference between their obligations to people from different ethnicities. If we are to be rational and consistent, global justice should more likely consist in a sort of radical equality for all persons in the world, as though we are living in one single community. What it cannot allow, thus, is that we discard an impartial and universal principle of utility just because some peoples (or countries) do not accept it. To do so is to deny the reality of the oneness of the global community, and to legitimate the fact of global coercion, so it is argued.

On a similar line of thought, Pogge also argues against Rawls’ model of international justice, but by appealing to the concepts of fairness and universal human rights. His view, commonly called ‘cosmopolitanism’, is that ‘the demands of justice derive from an equal concern or duty of fairness that we owe in principle to all our fellow human beings, and the institutions to which standards of justice can be applied are instruments for the fulfillment of that duty’ (Nagel, 2005: 119). Pogge (2001) also urges us to think that Third World countries’ poverty is as a rule caused by their rulers’ international borrowing privileges, which in return lead to some cheap sales of their countries’ resources to First World countries. And the so-called humanitarian assistance from the First World, the argument continues, merely covers up the fact that it is the First World people which owe the Third World people. Westerners’ tolerance of the unlawful behavior of some undemocratic regimes in fact contributes to the domination of super-nations. So both empirically and conceptually, justice is about how to defend the victimized people’s rights from a global perspective.

2.4 The ‘Human Nature Theories’ model

The communitarian, utilitarian, cosmopolitan views of global justice all merit our attention as remedies of Rawls’ moral constructivism. What they all agree is that behind the idea of justice, there is a realm of moral truth on which people’s acceptance of a certain political arrangement is grounded. And yet what these three theories offer are very diverse understandings of human nature. Clearly, then, those realist positions tend to conflict with each other, and we cannot easily adjudicate their disagreement. Theoretically speaking, they will give us some very concrete guides to attaining a just global community, if only we can decide which of them is true. But we simply have no means to decide on that matter. And this apparently encourages a reversal to Rawls’ constructivist approach.

I propose a way out. In what follows I shall outline a new model of global justice, which is based on the recognition of the connection between justice and human nature. But I argue that the previous theories mentioned above have gone wrong in presuming that a theory of human nature must be comprehensive, when in fact we can only hope to find a number of partial theories which work together to guide our sense of justice.
qua global citizens. The model which I favor is notably found in the renowned studies on human nature by Leslie Stevenson and his colleagues. (Stevenson, Haberman and Wright, 2013). Stevenson suggests that the solution of any problem with life requires a diagnosis of what is wrong with our society. Such a diagnosis can be derived from some background worldview or an ideology; and if this background view is formulated systematically and consistently, we will come up with a theory of human nature. A theory of human nature must have metaphysical assumptions, and it also makes narrower claims about essential features of man and society. Out of these assumptions and claims we can get diagnosis of our social problems, as well the prescription for how human life should be lived. So it is no surprise that there are rival theories of human nature even within the Western culture. The rivalry is all to be expected because their metaphysical assumptions just will not be dropped because of the change of experience. Even so, it is important to point out that the theories also make empirical claims, and have certain logical characters. Thus they need not be viewed as merely doctrines which are immune from critical evaluation. So the best strategy to study human nature is to start with a number of widely accepted theories of human nature, and assume that they can modified in light of what can be learned from other theories. Eventually, we may expect to find out that all theories are right in some ways; and that through some critical revisions of them, it is possible to merge them. This approach requires us not to start with one single theory and defend it all along.

If we apply these ideas to the topic of justice, we may have no more reason to believe that a theory of global justice must avoid the talk of human nature. Instead, we should assume that the global character of justice depends on the assumption that we are more or less the same kind of living organism, that we tend to have similar desires and aversions that our fellows can comprehend, and that they respond in ways that we can anticipate. It is a hard question how similar we are qua human beings, but both empirical and conceptual works can help us to work out a general picture. If this is true, maybe community, equality, liberty and happiness are all universal values that human beings should embrace, and the requirement of justice is that they need be balanced in such a way that a person’s life be functioning well. There is, in effect, no question of their priorities over each other, as the previous theories falsely pose. All we need to do is to specify the conditions of a normal human life with the help of the partial theories, and examine how different ways of balancing our human values contribute to its flourishing or deterioration. The ‘Human Nature Theories’ approach, in short, urge us to embrace as many human nature theories as possible, and to show by empirical studies why a particular political arrangement is problematic from the perspectives of most, if not all, of these theories.

Following this model, I reject the very idea of liberal tolerance in the topic of global justice. It is not true that tolerance towards the behavior of other countries, or peoples, is necessary when no universal human nature can be found. And it is also not true that we can criticize them because there are some abstract rights we find them violating. Rather, empirical studies will show what is it like for their people to take the behavior as unjust, and how such perception coincide with ours. We may think of a few terms in which such a judgment can be made: the quality of life, mental health, basic living
necessities, means for subsistence...so on and so forth. There may be terms which remain controversial (such as filial piety and radical freedom); and for practical reasons we shall avoiding using them.

3. Governing Megacities: the Case of China

3.1 From global justice back to internal affairs

Having endorsed an anti-Rawlsian approach to global justice, I shall now turn to some empirical studies about China’s style of governance, which I take to be in need of improvement from the ethical point of view. These studies concern what scholars call the governance of ‘megacities’ or ‘global cites’ in China. To be sure, it has long been noted that urban regimes can be active promoters of economic development rather being a mere provider of social services. In what follows, I will focus on the Chinese household registration system (the hukou system), and add to these literatures by showing how a state-enforced system of unfree labor is a crucial aspect of urban capitalist growth in China. This study will serve to illustrate how that Western countries’ tolerant attitude towards China’s economic expansion constitutes a problem from the perspective of global justice, as it is not even consistent with the theories of human nature that both Chinese and Westerners accept.

3.2 The Chinese “anti-politics machine”

Within greater China, the most widely discussed case of intercity competition is that between Hong Kong and Shanghai. Since the 1990s Shanghai has meteorically resurfaced as one of China’s key financial centers while Hong Kong experienced a series of economic setbacks from 1997 to 2003 during which the city was hit with the East Asian financial crisis, the burst of the dot-com bubble and the SARS epidemics. Hong Kong has long played the role of a metropolitan command center that coordinates the flow of finance capital and economic activities between China and the rest of the world. However, the contrast in the economic fortunes between Hong Kong and Shanghai in the last decade has spurred a debate about the possible replacement of the former by the latter as the region’s top global city (Hong Kong Trade Development Council Research Department, 2001; Li, X., and Stender, N. A., 2002; Meyer, D, R., 2004)).

To achieve “global city” status, many urban regimes engage in a promotional campaign that aims at attracting multinational corporations (MNCs) to set up regional headquarters in their cities. One strategy that cities adopt to market themselves as the preferred site of specialized service operation is the construction of hardware; such as the building of the tallest skyscraper in the world, a state of the art airport and the introduction of high speed magnetic train. Besides the creation of a built environment that is conducive for MNC activities, the competition to be the region’s global city also entails adopting a new mode of governance.

In their study of Post-Fordist urban development in North America and Western Europe, Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore argue that as cities vie with one another to
attract investment in order to generate high-value added business activities, these cities are transformed into “institutional laboratories for neoliberal experiments” (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 368). Cities in the greater China region are undergoing a similar transformation. The race to improve “competitiveness” entails the implementation of a neoliberal policy agenda that reduces welfare spending, deregulates the market and privatizes public services. But given the current hype about China’s emergence as the world’s economic powerhouse, there is relatively little critique of the neoliberal turn that many Chinese cities have undertaken.

The discourse on the competitiveness of Chinese cities includes research reports by business consultants, academics, government officials and journalists. These writings take for granted the goal of attaining global city status and accept without challenge the “need” of neoliberal reform. The focus of these literatures is primarily on the strengths and weaknesses of these different cities and on ways to improve the competitiveness of particular cities (Magretta 1998; Dunn 2005; Tung and Ng 2006). These works are uncritical in so far as they do not explain how the social and political pre-conditions that enable urban capitalism in Chinese cities to emerge are produced. More specifically, they do not address how state power is used to maintain a system of unfree labor and reproduce a specific type of rural-urban relation that is necessary for Chinese urban capitalist development.

The Chinese urban growth complex can also be characterized as an “anti-politics machine” (Ferguson, 1990). To be sure, politics are not completely taken out of the Chinese case, since Western media is replete with reminders of human rights violation and “undemocratic” practices by the Chinese state even though similar abuses of political power are also common among Western allies such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Despite their condemnation of the Chinese political system, these critics are nonetheless “anti-political” since they glorify the country’s capitalist reform while ignoring how the very same political system is what makes capitalist development in China possible in the first place. Economic growth in Chinese cities today is dependent on migrant workers from the countryside. A state-enforced household registration system that separates the Chinese working into two segments---one urban and one rural---illustrates how the disciplinary power of the state facilitate the production and reproduction of Chinese urban capitalism.

3.3 Rural migrant workers and blocked mobility

One undesirable consequence of inter-city competition is the problem of ‘forced and bonded labour’, as is facilitated by the so-called hukou, or household registration system. (Chan, 2000: 262). China’s household registration system originates in the planned socialist economic period and it allows urban governments to distribute rights and welfare only to legal urban residents. During this current round of capitalist development in China, the hukou system no longer blocks rural migrants’ movement to the cities. But it does not mean that they have the same rights and freedom as the urbanites. For example, they can still obtain official approval for their activities in the city by acquiring a variety of permits, to name a few---Temporary Residency Permit, Work Permit, Rental House Safety Permit, Marriage and Birth Permit, Business
Permit…etc. However, even with all these permits they are still not entitled to local government subsidies and insurance benefits because of their lack of hukou. For example, migrants’ children have to pay more for their education in the cities. Besides inequality in the distribution of public goods, there is another form of inequality between rural migrants and urban residents that is more relevant to the analysis here—the exclusion of migrant workers from jobs that require a local hukou.

Lots of job positions in state-owned firms, the local government and even in business owned by multinational corporations are given only to people with a local hukou. Rural migrants have a more restricted job mobility than their urban counterparts; the lack of a hukou makes them ineligible to apply for certain jobs even if they qualify in all the other aspects. Unlike urban workers, rural migrant workers experience occupational confinement since they are excluded from certain job positions and their occupational choices are restricted within a certain number of job categories.

Rural migrant workers are locked into an employment relationship not merely because of the de jure restrictions, but also because factory management is taking advantage of the system. One strategy that factory management employs is to help rural migrant workers pay for their temporary work permits as an advance of their wages. Many factories also ask the workers to pay a deposit (yajin) when they are hired. Worker who intend to reclaim the deposits are then made to stay regardless of the working conditions of the factories (Chan, 2000: 263). Another strategy taken by some factories, though illegal, is the confiscation of the workers’ identity cards. Many workers are not able to leave their employers without their consents because of the need to reclaim their identity cards. Irregular pay schedule and not paying workers their wages in full are other strategies that factory management uses. Workers also remain with their employers because they hope to recover their back wages. (Chan and Zhu 2003: 564).

3.4 Rural migrant workers as unfree labor

Examples of labor systems based on violence or state coercion are slavery and serfdom, which are also referred to as unfree labor. Workers in these systems are considered unfree since they are coerced into labor by the state or powerful social classes through threats of violence. On the other hand, free wage laborers, for example the proletariat, are free in the sense of being free from extra-economic coercion and are compelled to work only because of economic pressure.

Under the contemporary household registration system, Chinese rural migrant workers are also not “free”. First, the system has formal restrictions on the type of jobs that rural migrants can apply for. As a result, rural migrants enjoy less freedom in job mobility than their urban counterparts. Secondly, as Chan’s research shows, the household registration system also places rural migrants in a particular vulnerable position because of their lack of equal citizenship rights (Solinger, 1999). Some factory owners are able to exploit the situation and retain their rural migrant workers as bonded labor.
The Chinese urban growth complex is composed of government officials, academics, journalists and MNC business consultants. Together they constitute an “anti-politics machine” since they fail to note how state power and other forms of coercion are part and parcel of Chinese urban growth. The above discussion shows how the exercise of state power creates a low-cost rural labor force for urban development. The attendant vulnerability of these rural workers also increases the disciplinary power of the employers. If the above analysis is right, then it is problematic to criticize Chinese state coercion while glorifying Chinese capitalist development. This is an untenable position because, as it is shown in the Chinese case, capitalism does not necessitate democratic practices but is dependent and maintained by state coercion. And the capitalization of China is so strong a demand from transnational enterprises that we may question who should take responsibility for the problem of forced labor just raised above. In fact, there are a great number of stakeholders to be considered, so much so that the problem is no longer a local one.

4. Conclusion: Right and wrong across borders

The rise of China, arguably, is a complicated issue; and it seems not fruitful to attack it on the orthodox grounds given by nationalists and human rights advocates of the West. My suggestion, by contrast, is that its problematic aspect consists in a certain kind of injustice, which is global in the sense that the Western world plays a role in it. But since I have said that a case of global injustice must be due to the violation of human nature, I now will have to say why the state coercion of migrant workers in China is problematic on the best theories of human nature we know. As should be clear now, the above analysis does not explain the matter in terms of some abstract values like communality, utility, or liberty. What it shows is that the prospective of a better form of human life is closed by the ‘urban growth machine’. There is, moreover, in the Western countries’ defense of China’s capitalism a false appeal to the democratization of its megacities. What pertains to the political control of the migrant workers’ mobility is the urge for the economic growth, which in turn makes it hard to see how they are provided with the resources necessary for a ‘normal’ human life. Having said that, political sanctions from the West are in fact very unlikely to take place, as the kind of capitalist ideology that Western countries can criticize is in fact strongly held by themselves. And even if de facto sanctions exist, the motivation behind them is far from being a moral consciousness that we may treasure. This may be a familiar Marxist theme. But many other theories—such as Freudianism, Christianity, Confucianism, or even Darwinism—can agree with it too. Ironically, the pre-condition for a sense of global justice here is perhaps not Western countries’ willingness to intervene with China’s ‘internal affairs’, but their openness to a critique of their own value systems.
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Abstract
From the mid of the 1980s to 1990s, the political and economic environment have been found an important change in Taiwan. In 1991, the President of the Republic of China, Mr. Lee Teng-hui, declared the abolition of the “Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion”. Under the pace of democratization, the government is becoming more open in religious and educational policies and allows people to create new religions and set up new universities. Therefore, an embryonic form of new religion named Weixin Shengjiao was found in 1983. In 1994, The President of Republic of China Mr. Lee Teng-Hui declared the educational policy to address the importance of lifelong education. The founder of Weixin Shengjiao Grand master Huan Yuan responded to UNESCO and the national educational policy for lifelong learning by saying: “Everyone has a fundamental right to education.” In 1994, I Ching University was established as a pioneer of lifelong education in Taiwan to spread Chinese cultural orthodoxy of the heart method of the I-Ching and Feng-Shui. However, declining birthrate and population aging have impacted the education industry in Taiwan. This study uses the case study method and resource based view theory to find out the competitive advantages of I Ching University and explores how it offers an ideal religious education of lifelong learning to fulfill the vision of world peace.

Keywords: Religion education, Lifelong learning, I-Ching, Feng-Shui
Introduction

In the mid-1980s to the 1990s in Taiwan, there has been a critical change in the political and economic environment. In 1991, the President of the Republic of China, Mr. Lee Teng-hui, declared the abolition of the “Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion”. This makes Taiwan’s politics more democratic. In 1996, the first direct Presidential election was held; in 2000, political party alternation took place for the first time. In the 1980s and 1990s, Taiwan actively promoted economic liberalization and developed technology-intensive and information industries. Meanwhile, Taiwan strived to become Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center and the professional operations center for manufacturing, transportation and professional service. As a result, Taiwan’s economy has gradually entered a mature stage. In the field of education, the Executive Yuan Education Reform Review Committee proposed “Education Reform: General Counsel Report” on October 2, 1996 suggesting increasing university enrollment capacity, founding high schools and universities extensively, and promoting multiple entrance program to ease the pressure to advanced study.

Under the pace of democratization, the government is becoming more open in religious and educational policies and allows people to create new religions and set up new universities as long as good social customs are not violated. Therefore, under this circumstance, the embryonic form of a new religion came into being in 1983. Later, the religion was named “Weixin Shengjiao” as it was well-developed. In 1994, President Lee Teng-hui made a clear policy statement on “lifelong education”: “The idea of lifelong education is to confirm that everyone has his need for education in every stage of life and aims to establish a learning society”. Therefore, the founder of Weixin Shengjiao, Zen Master Hunyuan suggested that everyone deserve a basic right of learning. In the same year, I Ching University was founded and began to offer lifelong learning to carry forward Chinese culture and to advocate I Ching learning. In the history of education in R.O.C., I Ching University is a pioneer promoting lifelong learning with its founding purpose of cultivating talents, revitalizing people’s morals, refining ambitions, and creating universal harmony.

However, declining birthrate and population aging have impacted the education industry. The leaders and managers at all levels of educational institutes, from kindergarten to university and the national education authorities are all concerned about this issue and search for solutions. I Ching University mainly offers non-degreed lifelong education but is affected as well. However, even facing the changes and challenges in the educational environment, I Ching University can still break through adversity and develop into such a large-scale institute. It must have its competitive advantages. This study uses the case study method and resource based view theory to find out the competitive advantages of I Ching University and explores how it offers an ideal religious education of lifelong learning to fulfill the vision of world peace.

Literature review

Resource based view

Wernerfelt (1984) first proposed a shift in analyzing organizations from a focus of product-market to that of a resource position. He defined a resource to be “anything
which could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a given firm” (p.172). Resource based view (RBV) is useful in determining whether a firm’s strategy will create value and also enables the organization to conceive and implement strategies for improving efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 1991). RBV focuses on the access or development of idiosyncratic resources and competencies that lead to competitive advantage which sustains over the long term. (Barney, 1991). Resources are classified as tangible (including financial and physical resources), intangible (including reputation, technology, and organizational resources), or personnel-based (including culture, training, commitment, loyalty and knowledge) (Grant, 1991). However, the researches on resource have been focused more specially on “strategic resources” (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). Strategic resources are those resources that (1) have value, such that they can leveraged to increase customer value or cut costs; (2) are rare, such that competitors do not have access to the same or a very similar resource to compete away the value; and (3) are difficult to substitute and (or) imitate, which allows the organization to stay ahead of competitors (Barney, 1991).

Religious education

What is so-called religious education? As to the word “religion”, Zen Master Hunyuan states that “religion, not relating to gods nor spirits, not mysterious, is the development of each person’s spirituality and wisdom. It is compassionate and inspires everyone’s inner heart. The world will become peaceful when people are enlightened and realize that their hearts are the manifestation of gods and buddhas. The world will be peaceful because people respect each other.” Zen Master Hunyuan claims that “Heaven and earth establishes (Zhong), sages set doctrines (Jiao) and all are generated, namely “religion” (Zhong Jiao). We educate in line with sages’ enlightened experience and doctrines”. Moreover, Zen Master Hunyuan instructed what so-called “education” is by a couplet posted Weixin Shengjiao Hsien Fo Temple, “a celestial being nets a basket; heart is the king of pure land of Buddha”. He thinks “education” is magnanimous and realizes all phenomena. We must respect and value all beings as sages, teach them in accordance with their aptitude and help them fulfill their achievement and behave with great dignity. We also need to teach all beings to perceive each moment in the future till reaching enlightenment. Zen Master Hunyuan pointed out that “a celestial being nets a basket” means inviting all walks of life to contribute their wisdom to the society. Meanwhile, “heart is the king of pure land of Buddha” implies that pure land of Buddha is a palace of wisdom. Weixin Shengjiao is an open-minded platform for cultivating talents. Therefore, Zen Master Hunyuan proposed that the aim of I Ching University supported by Weixin Shengjiao is to raise and cultivate talented people. Zen Master Hunyuan states that Xian (賢) means the great inner wisdom embedded in everyone’s heart. The idea of “raise and cultivate talented people” is to respect everyone in the world, cultivate them and treat them as sages. It does not matter if they are princes, military or political leaders, tradesmen or porters. Therefore, for the purposes of carrying forward dharma and benefiting all beings, we should accumulate wisdom and strive to cultivate, support and retain talents.

The Religious Education and Competitive Advantage of I Ching University

This study used the case study method and resource based view theory to study how I
Ching University offers an ideal lifelong learning of religious education to fulfill the vision of world peace and finally find out its competitive advantages. This study found that the core of religious education offered by I Ching University lies in five kinds of education: (1) moral education, (2) life education, (3) environmental education, (4) filial piety education and (5) culture education. The philosophy of Li Ji, Liyun Datong (Book of Rites, Chapter of Great Harmony) is the core value of these five kinds of education. In 2007 Zen Master Hunyuan began to interpret Li Ji, Liyun Datong (Book of Rites, Chapter of Great Harmony) in a meditative way. He pointed out that Li Ji, Liyun Datong (Book of Rites, Chapter of Great Harmony) is Confucius’ supreme heart method of ruling country, family and career. It is also a heart method for our inner uneasiness and dissatisfaction. Confucius realized the greatness of Liyun Datong (Chapter of Great Harmony); that is why it has been passed down to the present. Then, the Father of Republic of China, Mr. Chung Shan Sun promoted to the whole world. “Li Ji, Liyun Datong is a heaven way, a method of pacifying human mind, which is a truth derived from ancient sages’ experience of enlightenment. It is an excellent classic for us to practice, to found a nation, and to fulfill world peace. It brings hopes to Chinese descendants in the future. Li Ji, Liyun Datong is great wisdom which points out the direction for governing a nation, and the method to manage our mind, family, career, society and nation. If everyone can understand Liyun Datong, I believe that the world will be peaceful.” “Modern life and social phenomena are both inseparable from the word li (etiquette)”. In Liyun Datong, etiquette is the main idea and the first priority. Li (etiquette) is applicable to managing our life, changing our destiny, and enhancing the harmony of society. Therefore, to establish everyone’s dignity is the most important for us to carry forward the truth of Liyun Datong.

The five core values of religious lifelong education established by I Ching University are elaborated as follows:

**Moral education**
In moral education, Zen Master Hunyuan argues that “morality is built on the basis of security and peace”. This means that the problems in the family finance, such as unemployment and the financial difficulties in companies will result in safety problems and furthermore affect the whole society and country. Therefore, people’s morality would be developed only if people feel safe and peaceful and make a good living. As said in Guan Yan Biography, “full food warehouse enables society to acquire etiquette; wealth enables men to be courteous”. Therefore, in the year Guisi (2013), in the Weixin Shengjiao Jiujiu Religious Assembly, Zen Master Hunyuan preached the public: “the heart method of Weixin Shengjiao leads everyone to the path of peaceful mind by creating ‘benefits’ through I-Ching Feng-Shui of cultural orthodoxy. You will have a clear conscience as long as your family and career are stable and safe. Realizing ourselves’ inner Buddha quality (self-heart Buddha), stabilizing our family and bringing harmony to our surroundings are all the method of achieving Buddhahood and the Way”.

This study found that I Ching University considers that business management is fundamental to people’s livelihood in human economy. If an enterprise has a crisis, the society will become chaotic and have moral related problems. Therefore, I Ching University has established the world Taiwan business services association to serve enterprises. Zen Master Hunyuan points out if a company, a factory or a residential...
place follows the principles of Feng Shui, then the employees will have a secure life and finance, and thus be able to create a peaceful and prosperous society.

**Life education**

In life education, I Ching University teaches how to achieve peace of mind. Zen Master Hunyuan taught the public *Liji, Liyun Datong* (Book of Rites, Chapter of Great Harmony): “Etiquette promotes great harmony. Etiquette comes from trustworthiness, and vice versa. For cultivating oneself, raising a family, governing a country, and attaining the world peace, the most important driving force is etiquette. Without etiquette, there will be chaos in the family, society, company, and country”. Etiquette is built on the basis of wisdom; therefore, a courtesy man will inspect his own heart and treat others with etiquette. That is the best way to calm one’s mind. Zen Master Hunyuan points out: “Gui Gu Xian Shi Wang Chan Lao Zu (鬼谷仙師王禪老祖) said ‘destiny, no destiny to be made, but only to follow the law of cause and effect, luck, no luck to be made, but only to be accumulated by merits, appearance, no appearance to be shown, but only to be reflected by heart’. This is a very profound philosophy. Blessing and merits are accumulated through self-cultivation and self-sufficiency. People born into the world should be thankful and full of gratitude. People should cherish and continue to manage their relationship, and establish good connection with others for future life. People should contribute to the worldly harmony and be kind. No one should be arrogant. Scholars, farmers, artisans, and businessmen all have their own strength, expertise and destiny. Everyone needs to do his duty and has devotion to learn. “Do not have merciless relationship with others nor bond to any enmity and hatred. A person must establish good relationship with others. He needs to understand that something good that he achieves is his responsibility; on the other hand, if he does wrong things, then he needs to reflect and repent. Reflection and repentance are not only the greatest assets within us, but also the source of vitality”.

In order to implement life education, I Ching University organizes a program, “Teacher Counseling Camp” in summer vacation for school teachers from different levels of institutes all over the world. At present, the credit hours of the program have been recognized by The Senior Secondary School and Lower and Kindergarten Levels, the Ministry of Education, R.O.C. The life education of I Ching is the main axis of the courses. It aims to help the teachers understand more about themselves, learn how to teach in line with students’ aptitude and guide them to the right path of life. The heart method of I-Ching Feng-Shui of Chinese culture is applied to help the teachers establish the right concept of life education and conduct student counseling sessions. The previous related studies have indicated that studying I-Ching has significant effects on improving teachers’ performance on teaching and student counseling after they participated in a seminar of I Ching Life Education (Chen, Li & Lin, 2016).

**Environmental education**

This study found that the environmental education of the I Ching University is “the education of I-Ching and Feng-Shui”, emphasizing that all the construction in natural environment must meet the principles of Feng-Shui. It teaches the public to respect nature. Zen Master Hunyuan stated that “People may not believe in Feng-Shui, but actually have been shrouded in the bliss of Feng-Shui”. Zen Master Hunyuan interpreted *Liji, Liyun Datong* (Book of Rites, Chapter of Great Harmony) in a
meditative way and pointed out: “mountains and rivers are teachers. All things are our teachers as well. The presence of mountains and rivers of the earth is to educate us. We should be thankful to mountains, rivers, air, Feng-Shui, etc for their teachings. All changes in the mountains and rivers have deep connotations. We need to be part of nature, into nature, and to realize nature. That is education and learning”. Hence, the environmental education of I Ching University considers that human beings living between heaven and earth should express their gratitude to nature and treat nature with a modest talent’s attitude suggested in I-Ching.

Zen Master Hunyuan said: “Now the social chaos is caused by wrong Feng-Shui. Today, the Chinese cultural orthodoxy – I-Ching and Feng-Shui is the driving force for peaceful mind and stable family, society and country”. Therefore, for environmental education, I Ching University offers the summer seminar of Architecture Design and Feng-Shui to students from the departments of architecture, landscape, civil engineering, interior design, urban planning or related departments in the world every year. After the one-month intensive training course, prospective architects, civil engineers, interior designers, or public government urban planning servants are expected to understand the importance of I-Ching Feng-Shui study to the environmental protection on the earth. Meanwhile, the university hosts the study program of architectural space and aesthetic design for the project, ‘Teachers Participating in Public or Private Enterprise Service’ sponsored by the Ministry of Education for the vocational high school teachers. After studying in the camp, school teachers, especially in the fields of construction, landscape and interior design will acquire the essence of I-Ching Feng-Shui and apply it to their teachings to help students establish the idea of protecting the earth.

Filial piety education
Filial piety connects family which develops into a clan, society and country. It is the most important asset of the Chinese nation. The concept of filial piety of the Chinese nation began with respecting ancestors and was inferred from the ancestral worships. Then, the respect was extended from the deceased ancestors to the beloved parents. *Er Ya, Shi Xun* says “being nice to parents is filial piety”. In *I-Ching, Shuo Gua*, it denotes “Qian, heaven, is called father; Kun, earth, is called mother”. *Xiao Jing, Sheng Zi Zhang* says “of all (creatures with their different) natures produced by Heaven and Earth, man is the noblest. Of all the actions of man there is none greater than filial piety”. In summary, filial piety is a natural expression of children to their parents, showing the spirit of repaying their origins. In *Xiao Jing, Kai Zong Ming Yi Zhang*, Confucius says “now filial piety is the root of all virtues, and the stem out of which grows all moral teachings”. It is obvious that filial piety is the foundation of all morality and is the source of all education.

This study found that I Ching University held the “Chinese Jointed Ancestors Worship Ceremony” to implement filial piety education and to lead the public to express their retrospection, repentance and recollection to their ancestors. The ceremony is to pacify our ancestral spirits and release the bond of enmity. The ultimate goals are to help Chinese ancestral spirits return to Nantian Pure Land and be reborn to Western Pure Land, and eventually to achieve universal peace. Therefore, the study found that I Ching University had held “Chinese Jointed Ancestors Worship Ceremony” on January 1, 2004 for the first time, followed by 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 in National Taiwan Sport University Gymnasium.
According to the author’s field observation, spirit tablets and offerings were set up in the altar of “Chinese Jointed Ancestors Worship Ceremony” for Chinese ancestors of 15,615 surnames, the dead in 3,762 wars, 917 emperors of Chinese dynasties, 124 Japanese emperors and their dependents since Xu Fu in Qin dynasty, considered the Chinese blood, migrated to Japan, 202 kings and their dependents since the descendants of Chiyou, one of the Chinese three ancestors, migrated to Korea, and the dead in 816 wars in the world. I Ching University held religious rituals to call the spirits to the ceremony to receive their descendants’ offerings and worship.

Cultural education
In the promotion of cultural education, I Ching University is committed to promoting ‘Children’s Classic Reading Education’ (兒童讀經教育 Ertong Dujing Jiaoyu). The so-called Du Jing (literally, read classic) is the abbreviation of Du Song Jing Dian (literally, read recite classic book). Du (reading) means ‘learn by heart’ and implies reading long-lasting and valuable classics. It is a kind of teaching process which takes advantage of children’s good memory and enables them to recite classics by reading repeatedly (Wang Caigui, 1994).

In the promotion of cultural education, I Ching University is committed to “children’s I-Ching study”. I Ching University focuses on children’s learning of I-Ching to develop children’s potential great wisdom. Therefore, I-Ching has been planned in Children’s basic education, and the university has established ‘Center of Children’s I Ching Study’. Zen Master Hunyuan believes that basic education is necessary to strengthen a country and harmonize a society. The primary education is the beginning of formal education for everyone. The success or failure of school education also affects the future of a country. Chinese culture–I Ching, is the key and the only way to cultivate inner wisdom. It can be seen from previous studies that children significantly improved their temperament, enhanced their lifelong learning abilities and inhibited their bullying behavior (Chen, Li, Lin & Lin, 2015).

The Competitive Advantage of I Ching University
The competitive advantage of an organization is a powerful engine to promote itself. This study adopted the definition of organizational resources, classification and elements proposed by Grant (1991) and Barney (1991) and found that I Ching University has five competitive advantages, which are: (1) a complete education system, (2) Chinese cultural orthodoxy–Weixin Dao Zang (唯心道藏), (3) complete faculty education system, (4) complete learning network, (5) the application of media and information technology. Therefore, I Ching University has the five competitive advantages which enable itself to promote the five core values of the religious education. The five competitive advantages are as follows:

Complete education system
Zen Master Hunyuan stated that “Weixin Shengjiao employs educational system and cultural documentation to educate the public for the goal of cultivating talents. Now, I Ching University has established a complete education system which offers lifelong education, academic education, and international education. I Ching University has integrated the ideas of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism into I Ching Feng Shui of Chinese culture. The university offers lifelong education, academic education and international education to accomplish the cores of Weixin Shengjiao’s religious
education—moral education, life education, environmental education, filial piety education and cultural education to achieve the goal of world peace by ‘spiritual practice for the nation’ and ‘pray for the people’. According to a study which investigated the students of I Ching University who participated in the lifelong learning of religious education, the empirical results indicated that the main motivations of learning were their intention of social contribution and interest of knowledge. Their motivations brought significant improvement on their family and life satisfaction, and the wellbeing (Chen, Li & Lin, 2015; Chen, Li & Lin, 2015). Therefore, from this viewpoint, no other general university has established such a complete educational system as I Ching University has. That is the advantage of ‘value and rare’ suggested by RBV.

**Chinese cultural orthodoxy—Weixin Daozang**

Weixin Daozang is the teachings of Wang Chan Lao Chu and has been preached by Zen Master Hunyuan since 1982. Zen Master Hunyuan’s teachings have been assembled into books and published. Till October 2012, there have been more than 15,615 books; the teachings still continue and are being assembled. Zen Master Hunyuan pointed out: “the lineage of Weixin Daozang began with Kunlun civilization, about fourteen thousand and five hundred years ago...... Today, the wisdom of Danzang is the heavenly secrets manifested in the world in 21st century. The Gui Gu Immortal Master Wang Chan Lao Chu descended to combine with Human to reorganize Chinese cultural orthodoxy and create a beacon to the world peace”. As a result, Weixin Daozang lays a solid foundation for lifelong religious education. Therefore, from this point of view, in the Chinese cultural orthodoxy – the inheritance of the heart method of I-Ching Feng-Shui, I Ching University documented the wisdom of the Chinese ancient sages, which is referred to Zen Master Hunyuan’s statement: “Weixin Shengjiao employs cultural records to educate the public and to raise talents”. I Ching university has complete self-developed teaching materials; from the perspective of quantity and scope of coverage, no other educational institute can compete. This advantage is so-called ‘difficult to substitute’ of Resource-Based View.

**Unique and complete faculty education system**

In order to cultivate the faculty of I Ching University to implement the educational philosophies of “my doctrine is that of an all-pervading unity” and “one pure lineage”. In November 1990, Zen Master Hunyuan started cultivating talents through “academy education” and later established Weixin master program, Weixin doctoral program and faculty education program for teacher training. The faculty members of I Ching University are selected from the students who study in its own educational system. Then, the selected students will be cultivated before engaging in teaching. The faculty cultivation of I Ching University is different that of general university outside the world. The faculty members of a general university usually earn degrees first, and then start their teaching career. That is the advantage of ‘uniqueness’ mentioned in RBV.

**Complete learning network**

I Ching University, with the concept of “Taiwan as a university, a district or county as a branch, a living room as a classroom, and a television as a blackboard”, practices the idea of religious lifelong education and hopes to promote Chinese culture all over
Taiwan and the world. “Community” is the most basic living unit of human beings; it is not abstract nor theoretical. Each community has its unique lifestyle and humanities. Community life is a kind of sharing, communion and co-governance. The community is a group of people who live in a certain geographical area, and have a common relationship, social assistance and service system (Shu Cheng, 1998).

Therefore, this paper found that I Ching University had set up the community education to make up for the current lack of school education in order to implement the lifelong learning advocates’ words, “everyone learns everywhere from time to time, and learns everything”. In 1995, the lifelong education started with learning within communities and gradually was expanded to regional classes. This is likened to the whisk in Wang Chan Lao Chu’s hand of which each thread is emitted to each area. That means ‘dharma’, the wisdom of ancient Chinese sages and the heart method of I-Ching Feng-Shui of Chinese culture, is propagated according to local humanities and socio-economic characteristics. The lifelong education has carried forward the heart method of Feng Shui of Chinese culture. Up to now, I Ching University has 42 learning hubs in Taiwan and 33 classrooms in communities. Overseas classrooms have been set up in Hong Kong, Vietnam, Japan, Spain, Los Angeles and New York, Toronto, Canada, etc. Up to now, I Ching university has more than 60,000 students totally. Therefore, in the point of view, no other university delivers education to all communities as I Ching University does. This is ‘value and rare’ mentioned in RBV.

The application of media and information technology
Meanwhile, Weixin TV station has been founded in the volunteering career system, broadcasting 24 hours a day. New it has developed into a network TV station. All courses offered by I Ching University can be watched globally as long as there is an internet service. The concept of open educational resources was presented in the 2002 UNESCO International Conference Forum. It is mainly about organizing high-quality teaching materials and resources into digital materials on the Internet for the public to share and learn without any charge. In order to help overseas students who can not learn face to face in the classroom, I Ching University has established Cloud Classroom (Cloud classroom http://mbsb.tw). Overseas students can register online and study without time constraints. The idea of setting up Cloud Classroom of I Ching Feng Shui and Weixiin TV station is consistent with UNESCO’s thinking model and educational resource sharing. It will promote the understanding and recognition of Chinese culture, help to create a harmonious society and fulfill the world peace. From this point of view, there is no other university does the way I Ching University does in terms of utilizing its resources of media and information technology to extend its education abroad. This is the value and uniqueness of the resource-based view.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the paper found that I Ching University is committed to carrying forward I Ching Feng Shui of Chinese culture all over Taiwan and the world to reach the ultimate goal of social tranquility and the world peace. This is in line with UNESCO’s national education policy for lifelong learning and learning society. Likewise, the goal of I Ching University is the same as that of UNESCO’s international lifelong education, ‘world peace’. Weixin Shengjiao I Ching
University utilizes its five competitive advantages. This study found that Weixin Shengjiao combines I Ching Feng Shui of Chinese culture with Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and the thought of Chinese hundred schools. Weixin Shengjiao implements and applies them to the core of religious education – moral education, life education, environmental education, filial piety education and cultural education in terms of the three dimensions of lifelong learning at I Ching University: lifelong education, academic education and international education.

Zen Master Hunyuan pointed out that the education of I Ching University is broad, providing human beings a consistent way to back to Pure Land for each stage, from birth, childhood, adolescence, early adulthood, midlife, mature adulthood late adulthood and finally to death. Therefore, the religious education of I Ching University aims to develop human virtue and wisdom to let everyone live, learn, work and grow in a peaceful and safe environment. That is the ultimate goal of I Ching University, raising and cultivating talents. Finally, the purpose of I Ching University is to nurture talents. Its ultimate goal is to build a polite society as described in Liji, Liyun Datong (Book of Rites, Chapter of Great Harmony) which says Thus evil scheming is repressed, and robbers, thieves and other lawless elements fail to arise. So that outer doors do not have to be shut. This is called the Age of Great Harmony”. This is the true meaning of the religious education of I Ching University.
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Religion, Politics and Ethics: Moral and Ethical Dilemmas Confronting Faith-based Organizations and Africa in the 21st Century - Another View

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Abstract

Religion plays a predominant role in Africans spiritual worldview and belief systems. However, this affinity for religion has often been exploited in an unethical manner by political demagogues, religionists, and ‘surrogates with interests of their own’. Africans’ religious proclivity is often misused as a pretext for colonization or perpetuation of poor leadership and governance in African states, by introducing dominant foreign religions and ideology into traditional societies. These interference with the African cultural ethos led to ‘things falling apart’ with abandonment of the African spiritual worldview. This paper argues that in this season of anomie, characterized by failure of the usual social and ethical standards in many African states, it may be time for Africans to embark on a journey of rediscovery regarding the African moral and existential philosophies of good character, tolerance, brotherhood, and communalism; exemplified by the philosophy of Ubuntu, lately replaced by the Western ideology of rugged individualism and sometimes the extremist ideology of annihilation of ‘the other’ as practised by extremist religious groups such as ISIS and Boko Haram. One could argue that while Western intellectual tradition and industrialization, may have introduced modern technologies and development to Africa, the natural affinity to religion and need for developmental aid, predicated by poor leadership and corruption, should not be used as an excuse for the re-colonization of the African mind, through the mechanism of faith-based organizations (FBOs), which have re-emerged as new partners in international development. This may stall the advance of democratic ideals and perpetuate the cycles of underdevelopment, poverty, and marginalization of African peoples.

Keywords: Africa, Religion, Politics, Ethics, Faith-based organizations, Morals, Philosophy
Introduction

Faith based organizations (FBOs), which can be described as “formal organizations whose identity and mission are self-consciously derived from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual traditions” (Berger, 2003). FBOs have recently re-emerged as new partners in international development. International organizations such as the World Bank, WHO, UNESCO, DFID and USAID, involved in providing aid to developing countries have in recent times endeavoured to channel some of their development aid through FBOs (James, 2009). This renewed interest in FBOs have been fuelled by observations such as: “...one cannot fight poverty without tending to people’s spiritual dimensions...” and “…the enormous political voice of faith communities and their equally significant role in delivering social services suggests that they are critical development partners and agents of change” (James, 2009). Moreover, religious leaders and institutions appear to have more trusted in developing countries (James, 2009). Advocates of increased aid for developing African countries argue that “for African states to become more effective, they need to understand what it is about religion that builds enormous loyalty in adherents, creates infrastructural benefits, collects tithes and taxes and fosters a sense of belonging that builds material and spiritual benefit” (Alolo, 2007). It has also been observed that the worldview of the most in Africans is rooted in religion and spirituality, with up to 99.5% of Africans being religious, and large numbers converting to Christianity and Islam. (Alolo, 2007; Dan Fulani, 2001; Kitause & Achunike, 2013, Mbiti, 1969, Mbiti, 1970;)

However, it must be noted that while religious entities have assisted with provision of healthcare services and education to underserved populations (James, 2009; Kagawa, 2012), perhaps based on benevolence, morals values and altruism, the religious worldview of Africans and their intense spirituality may have been exploited in an unethical manner. The introduction of Christianity and Islam into Africa was accomplished with strong paternalism (Chima, 2009), and hegemony which required complete abandonment of the African spiritual worldview and African traditional religions (ATR), medicine, and belief systems (Chima, 2015). (Achebe, 1967; Alolo, 2007, Dan Fulani 2001) Thereby causing things to fall apart in African traditional societies with the advent of colonialism (Achebe, 1967; Dan Fulani, 2001; Dronen, 2005; Mbiti, 1967). The introduction of foreign religions into Africa and other developing countries while purportedly based on the best interests of the natives, might have been morally contaminated by the ‘myth of the disinterested other’, whereby ‘surrogates with interests of their own’ misused religion in advancing their own personal interests and objectives whether it be colonization, apartheid, slavery or religious expansionism. The control and domination of native populations have often been accomplished by unethical means such as trickery, deception or by introducing modern benefits such as healthcare, education, etc. which recipient populations have been unable to resist due to their vulnerability. (Achebe, 1967; Dan Fulani, 2001; Dronen, 2005) This ‘race for souls’ in Africa and elsewhere by competing religious entities and denominations have also been accompanied by traditional religious rivalry resulting in many forms of ‘structural violence’ including wars, terrorism, etc. (Chima, Mduluza & Kipkemboi, 2013; Galtung, 1990), “recognizable in the forms of annihilation of the ‘other’, of forced assimilation of individual historical identities, of presupposed uniqueness of a falsely universalizing thought” (Cacciatore 2011, Chima, 2015). This is consistent with the Marxist interpretation of religion
based on a self-interest theory, whereby religion is used as an ideological tool by the ruling class to maintain political control and domination of the oppressed, ‘the opium of the people’. (Dronen, 2005; Cacciatore, 2011). The concept of “religion as an opiate not only implied sedation from the pain of a life of exploitation, but also suggests a systematic and strategic attempt to deaden or absorb any critical impulse to liberation” (Cacciatore 2011, Chima 2015). This longing for escape from a life of suffering and pain by marginalized and oppressed peoples can be visualized in a popular rap song which goes repeats the anthem “I gotta make it to heaven, for going through hell... I hope I make it to heaven...” (Jackson et al, 2003; Chima 2015). This longing for escape by the poor and oppressed is exploited by religionists by painting a picture based on faith and belief in a better life, summarized by a quotation from (Wittgenstein’s, 1963): “A picture held us captive, and we could not free ourselves from it as it is inexorably repeated in our language.”

It is this picture and promise of a better life which keeps adherents enthralled by faith and belief in things unseen. Therefore, “religion is not simply an idea, but [becomes] a medium of transmission and control, with its own organizations, networks, and mnemotechnic devices of indoctrination [and] remembrance” (Cacciatore, 2011).

Discussion

While it is recognized that religion and faith have an enormous capacity for good, there is also the alternative view that ‘faith can be misused to justify violence’ according to the Archbishop of Canterbury (Welby, 2013). Others have suggested that “we should realise that there is good religion, bad religion, and very bad religion” (Berger 3). Accordingly, FBOs have been described as heterogeneous religious entities produced by very different world faiths with radically different interpretations of faith in differing cultural, social, geographic, political and historical contexts (Berger, 2003; Olarinmoye, 2012). Based on their different objectives or functionality, FBOs have been classified into a five–fold typology ranging from faith based representative organizations or apex bodies to faith based radical, illegal or terrorist organizations which promote radical or militant forms of faith identity or engage in armed struggle or violent acts justified on the grounds of faith (Olarinmoye, 2012). Recent examples of such extremists FBOs include ISIS, Boko Haram etc. Many recent conflicts in Africa, Europe and America can be traced to religious intolerance and extremism. Other moral and ethical dilemmas and controversies surrounding religion including FBOs are shown in Table 1. Based on these observations, opponents of the new protections and liberalism given to religious and faith based entities in Europe have argued that the extra protections given to faith based entities are likely to lead to increasing conflicts within the Western cultural values and the secular arrangements of European liberal democracies (Grayling, 2007; Nazir-Ali, 2014). Some of these concerns have manifested in the recent bombings in France, England and USA, which have been perpetrated by extremist FBOs. In Africa, current challenges facing FBOs include their ability to practice faith in a non-paternalistic and hegemonic manner, within domination of the local populations and annihilation of African traditional religions. Ideally, faith should not be misused as a means of exercising control over traditional communities because of their vulnerability. Vulnerability is defined by the UNAIDS as the inability to obtain alternative means of healthcare, poverty low education, etc. (Chima, 2007). FBOs should be encouraged to provide aid in an inclusive, non-discriminatory and non-judgmental manner. Faith
should also not be used to induce intolerance and incitement against other religious points of view. The liberal ideology which allows Western population groups to either accept or reject religion leading to dwindling numbers of churchgoers and practicing religionists must also be encouraged in African communities to avoid double standards and stigmatization especially against individuals who choose to practice traditional religions or no religion at all. The inherent competition between Christianity and Islam in Africa has perpetuated conflicts in places such as CAR, Sudan, DRC and Nigeria, leading to a negation of the stated objectives of development assistance in Africa. FBOs in recent times have also been challenged by their financial needs and poor management practices, leading to instances where their faith-based activities and direction maybe dictated by funders, rather than organizational mission or religious doctrine (Ahmed, 2009).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I.</th>
<th><strong>Dual psychology of ‘Victimhood and domination’</strong></th>
<th>Whereby some religions apply the dual psychology of victimhood and domination to advance their religious objectives and point of view</th>
<th>❖</th>
<th>Here everything that is done to one religion is ‘bad’ and everything that is done to the other religion is ‘good’ regardless of the consequences or objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| II. | **Conflicts between science and religion** | a. Roman Catholic doctrine on use of condoms and contraceptives  
   b. Jehovah Witness doctrine on blood transfusion  
   c. Some traditional religious doctrines against organ transplantation | i. | Conflicts with public health goal of controlling HIV-AIDS, STDs, family planning and population growth  
   ii. Both (b & c) maybe in conflict with the goals of medicine, science and society, which consists in beneficence and preservation of life |
| III. | **Conflicts between politics and religion** | ‘multiculturalism’ and religious inclusion in Europe | ❖ | This has potential to impact on liberal democratic processes and governance in Europe and elsewhere |
| IV. | **Ethical and moral conflict between ‘best interests’ vs. ‘altruism’** | Moral conflicts between the ‘myths of the disinterested other’ and ‘surrogates with interests of their own’ vs. ‘best interests’ of vulnerable population groups and religious and moral altruism | ❖ | Whereby some religionists have falsely hijacked the moral altruism and benevolence of religion to enhance their individual self-interest e.g. colonialism, slavery, apartheid |
| V. | **Conflicts between and within religions** | Conflict between different denominations, sects and religious ideologies has the potential to degenerate into extremism and violence, whereby religion is misused for violence | ❖ | Many ongoing and past wars in Africa, Middle East, and Europe e.g. Sudan, CAR, Bosnia, etc. can be traced to religious extremism and conflicts between different religious ideologies |
| VI. | **Conflicts between ‘mainstream’ religions v. ‘minor’ traditional religions** | Here mainstream religions like Judeo-Christianity and Islam have come to dominate non-mainstream religious groups e.g. ATRs | ❖ | Domination of religious worldview by ‘mainstream’ religions has led to the marginalization and cultural domination of believers in non-mainstream religions e.g. traditional African societies and ATRs |
| VII. | **Financial conflict between religious entities, their funders and believers** | a) Commercialization of religion  
   b) Financial difficulties facing some religious organizations including FBOS | i. | Commercialization of religion in Africa, USA and elsewhere by some televangelists and Pentecostal churches have led to exploitation of believers e.g. in Nigeria many new breed evangelists own private jets at the expense of their poor constituents  
   ii. Arguably financial difficulties affecting some religious entities including FBOS may lead to a situation where religious and moral objectives are dictated by the goals of funders rather than religious or moral altruism |
| VIII. | **Dual psychology of ‘Victimhood and domination’** | Whereby some religions apply the dual psychology of victimhood and domination to advance their religious objectives and point of view | ❖ | Here everything that is done to one religion is ‘bad’ and everything that is done to the other religion is ‘good’ regardless of the consequences or objectives |

**Table 1: Some current moral dilemmas between religion and society**
Conclusion

Opportunities for FBOs to participate in developmental aid exist in areas such as providing services for emerging middle income countries in Africa where life expectancy is increasing and the socio-demographic characteristics of the population have become more westernized. With the increasing quality of life and improved life expectancy, diseases of the aged will increase in previously unprepared populations. In such cases FBOs may need to shift their objectives from providing only curative health care services to the poor to include providing services such as homes for the aged, orphans as well as hospices for people with chronic diseases and long-term disability. Furthermore, FBOs can be of great assistance in the fight against HIV-AIDS in Africa through encouraging culturally acceptable options such as male circumcision in accordance with traditional belief systems such as practiced in South Africa. There may also be a need for a paradigm shift in the religious doctrine of some religious denominations on issues such as use of condoms, contraceptives for family planning, and organ and tissue donation. This should be done in a non-doctrinaire manner, which respects the human rights and dignity of the local populations and their cultural values. For example, African ethical philosophy is based on the principles of ‘sumus ergo sum’ or we are, therefore I am, whereby the needs of community are placed above individual needs (Chima, 2013). in contrast with the rugged individualism of western liberal societies (Chima, 2015; Metz, 2010). Therefore, there is a need to encourage culturally sensitive approaches to funding and developmental aid activities by international organizations supporting FBOs. There should be a positive effort to inculcate African traditional philosophies of Ubuntu, tolerance, brotherhood and communality, rather than individualism (Chima 2015b, Metz 2010). Recommended therapeutic regimes for rehabilitation or treatment should include African belief systems and traditional medicine considering that an estimated 80% of Africans still patronize traditional healers regardless their religious beliefs or inclination (Chima, Mduluza & Kipkemboi, 2013). Finally, FBOs should not be used a Trojan horse towards neo-colonialism, cultural domination, hegemony, or the re-colonization of the African mind.
References


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Understanding and Practice of Informed Consent by Professional Nurses in South Africa: An Empirical Study-Brief Report

Sylvester Chima, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

Abstract

Background: Informed consent (IC) is a legal and ethical doctrine, constitutionally protected in South Africa by rights to bodily integrity, privacy, and self-determination. The National Health Act 2003 codified requirements for IC; stipulating that healthcare professionals (HCPs) must inform patients about diagnosis, treatment risks, benefits, options, and right of refusal, while taking into consideration patients language and literacy levels. However, multicultural societies are challenged by problems of poverty, education, language, and cultural ethos, which may influence IC practice.

Methods: This was a cross-sectional quantitative study using semi-structured questionnaires at randomly selected public hospitals in Durban city. Data analyzed with SPSS, used descriptive statistics and chi-squared tests to compare results between nurses, doctors, and patients. Local RECs and IC approved the study was obtained from all participants.

Results: Three hundred fifty-five (355) registered nurses completed the study. Majority female (92%), with 1-41 years professional experience. Information disclosed by nurses included diagnosis (77%); treatment options (68%); benefits (71%), risks (69%), recommended treatment (65%). Inconsistencies observed between nurses and patients included non-disclosure of right of refusal, treatment options and risks (25-41%). Nurses’ knowledge of basic laws like age of consent was deficient, (30%) accuracy.

Conclusions: This study showed that professional nurses in South Africa are deficient in knowledge of local regulations regarding IC, and would benefit from additional training in healthcare law and ethics. Barriers to IC include language, education, and workload. Provision of trained interpreters will minimize language barriers, reduce nurses’ workload, and improve overall quality of healthcare service delivery.

Keywords: Informed consent, nurses, ethics, law, medical practice, South Africa
Introduction

Informed consent (IC) is a legal and ethical doctrine derived from the principle of respect for autonomy and is constitutionally protected in South Africa through the rights to bodily integrity, privacy and self-determination. (The Constitution of South Africa, 1996). To enhance transparency of consent regulations in South Africa, the National Health Act (NHA) (South Africa Government Gazette, 2003) codified requirements for IC by stipulating that healthcare professionals (HCPs) must inform patients about diagnosis, risks, benefits, treatment options, and the right of treatment refusal, while taking into consideration patients’ language and literacy levels. Further, a South African High Court decision in the case of (Castell v De Greeff, 1994) impacted on South African medical jurisprudence; leading to a shift from the paternalistic ‘reasonable doctor’ to a ‘prudent patient’ and ‘material risks’ standards regarding information disclosure. Arguably, a key domain of transparency in healthcare involves the open sharing of information and shared healthcare decision-making between HCPs and patients. It has been suggested that it is very important to understand that transparency in healthcare begins with the process of informed consent whereby a HCP and patient engage in open and transparent conversation regarding IC which should include discussion about the diagnosis, risks, benefits of treatment, alternatives to the recommended treatment if any, costs, risks of refusing treatment, and right of refusal. (Mayer, 2012). This is followed by an opportunity to ask questions prior to ‘consent’ i.e. acceptance or rejection of recommended treatment by the patient. It has been argued that transparency in medical practice begins with respect for autonomy and IC, although many physicians still view IC as a ‘bureaucratic legalism’ which may interfere with patient care (Brody, 1989). Some have suggested that IC should be understood as a fundamental aspect of good healthcare practice whereby any doctor not possessing skills to obtain valid consent, could be considered as lacking essential skills for modern medical practice. To enhance transparency of IC regulations in South Africa, the NHA (South Africa, 2003) codified requirements for IC by stipulating that HCPs must inform patients about diagnosis, risks, benefits, treatment options, and the right of treatment refusal, at a language and literacy level understandable to the patient. The NHA further requires that the information disclosed must include: (a) The range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally available to the user; b) The benefits, risks, and consequences generally associated with each option; and (c) The user’s right to refuse health services and explain the implications, risks, and obligations of such refusal. The law further requires that every health care provider must inform a user of: “the user’s health status except in circumstances where there is substantial evidence that the disclosure of the user’s health status would be contrary to the best interests of the user”. Section 7 of the NHA provides some exceptions to IC where it stipulates that health services may not be provided to a healthcare user without the user’s informed consent unless-

1. The user is unable to give informed consent and such consent is given by a person-
   (a) Mandated by the user in writing to grant consent on his or her behalf; or
   (b) Authorized to give such consent in terms of any law or court order; or where
2. The user is unable to give informed consent and no person is mandated or authorized to give such consent.
Historical Background to Informed Consent in South Africa

According to Ferdinand van Oosten, patients consent, as a requirement for all lawful medical interventions, is a well-established principle in South African common law (Van Oosten, 1989). The earliest leading cases in this area were the cases of (Stoffberg v Elliot, 1923) and (Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal, 1957). More recently in the case of (Castell v De Greef, 1994), the judgment of Ackerman J seems to have established the doctrine of informed consent within South African medical jurisprudence (Van Oosten, 1995). Further the South African Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) revisited this judgement and doctrine in (Broude v McIntosh, 1998) but did not overrule this decision despite some technical reservations (Carstens & Pearmain, 2007); thereby reaffirming the doctrine of informed consent as part of South African medical law. I have previously asserted that informed consent before medical procedures is constitutionally protected right in South Africa (Chima, 2013). This was further illustrated in the case of (Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa, 2002), where the police wanted a court order to compel an accused person to undergo a surgical procedure to obtain a bullet to be used as evidence in a prosecution. The court asserted that such and order would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights to a fair trial, bodily integrity, and privacy. The consequences of the decision of the Court in (Castell v De Greef, 1994) on South African medical jurisprudence were that the following principles were generally adopted (Van Oosten, 1995):

1. A shift from medical paternalism to patient autonomy.
3. A shift in disclosure to the ‘material risk’ standard, where the level of disclosure required is what a reasonable patient would consider pertinent/important before making a healthcare decision
4. The Court appears to place the patients’ informed consent within the framework of *volenti non fit injuria* or voluntary assumption of risk rather than delict (Van Oosten, 1995).

Standards of information disclosure

One of the more contested areas of medico-legal jurisprudence is in standard of information disclosure required for informed consent. In other words, how much information should be disclosed by the treating physician or healthcare professional to the patient for informed consent to be considered valid? On this consideration, there are two contesting schools of thought. On the one hand, there is the ‘reasonable doctor standard’ based on English common law as outlined by McNair J in (Bolam v Friern Health Management Committee, 1957) and generally known as the *Bolam* principle, which states that:

A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with the practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of men skilled in that particular art… putting it the other way round, a doctor is not negligent, if he is acting with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion that takes a contrary view.
It has been argued that English courts have opted for a paternalistic approach by following the reasonable doctor standard which bases disclosure on the clinical judgement/ accepted practice/substantial risk/normal/usual risk principles (Van Oosten, 1991), as established in (Bolam v Friern Health Management Committee, 1957) and reaffirmed by the House of Lords in (Sidaway v Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem Hospital, 1985), where Lord Templeman said:

> At the end of the day the doctor bearing in mind the best interests of the patient and bearing in mind the patients right to information which will enable the patient to make a balanced judgement, must decide what information should be given to the patient, and what terms that information should be couched… (Sidaway, 1985)

This idea of abridged information disclosure has since been applied in several court cases such as (Chatterton v Gerson, 1981) where Bristow J said that patients should be informed in ‘broad terms’, thereby implying that not all information is required and the nature and amount of it to be disclosed to a patient would be based on reasonable doctor-standard rather than on the requirements of the patient. Lord Scarman in Sidaway argued for a ‘prudent patient standard’ as practiced in other jurisdictions such as Canada, USA, and even Germany when he said: “It was a strange conclusion if our courts should be led to conclude that our law…should permit doctors to determine in what circumstances...a duty arose to warn.” (Sidaway v Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem Hospital, 1985).

**What makes informed consent valid?**

1. **Information disclosure:** provision of adequate information
2. **Competence:** capacity to understand that information
3. **Voluntariness:** decision making in the absence of coercion or deception
4. **Comprehension:** understanding of information provided
5. **Consent:** agreement to the proposed procedure/treatment or participation in a research study. Therefore, informing the patient must not be simply a ritual recitation of the contents of a written document. Rather the healthcare professional or researcher must convey the information, whether orally or in writing, in language that suits the individual’s level of understanding (Tekola et al., 2009).

**Socio-cultural Issues Impacting on the Practice of Informed Consent in South Africa**

The socio-cultural milieu of South Africa shows that about 25%- 30% of the population is unemployed, with low labor force participation rate of 54% compared to a global average of 69% (Vollgraaff, 2011). Therefore, basic health care is unaffordable for most of the local South African population (Chima, 2015). There are also historical inequities within population groups with some authors asserting that ‘informed consent is light years away from the black South Africans’ (Mhlongo & Mdingi, 1997). Further, there is a dichotomy in the organization of the South African healthcare system, which is dual in nature consisting of private hospitals/medical practice which is patronized by the fewer patients (20%) who have health insurance or financial means to pay for private healthcare services, compared with the public
health services which accounts for the majority (80%) of indigent patients and citizens (KwaZulu-Natal Department of Health, 2010).

**Impact of socio-cultural factors on informed consent practice in South Africa**

This evident dichotomy in health services may influence the practice of informed consent in South Africa. Furthermore, most African societies being culturally complex and paternalistic in nature may require that consent or approval be obtained from community elders/extended family members, or men as heads of households before the actual patients/human subjects can provide consent (Irabor & Omonzejele, 2007). The challenge here then is to ensure that informed consent is truly voluntary and that community or surrogate consent is not substituted for individuals’ consent, which ideally should be obtained voluntarily in the absence of coercion (Ijsselmuiden & Faden, 1999).

**Methods**

**Study rationale-justifications for using empirical methods to study informed consent**

Sulmasy and Sugarman (2001) have described two potential reasons for studying the actual conduct of a group with regards to compliance with moral and ethical dilemmas.

(a) To describe compliance with existing moral norms and
(b) To determine whether policies and procedures designed to operationalize certain moral norms have been successful (Chima, 2013; Sulmasy & Sugarman, 2001).

Other empirical studies have shown that people generally have problems in understanding the risks and benefits of medical treatment and decision making, and this could impact on the actual application of the existing law (Musschenga, 1999). For example, a study by means of a questionnaire on Dutch nurses charged with taking care of nursing home resident with due respect for their libertarian rights and, respect for autonomy revealed that the nurses were not complying with the existing regulations (van Theil & van Delden, 1997). Based on the above observations, it has been suggested by that to guide action; ethical guidelines must be based on reality and should be formulated in such a way that it is continuous with accepted moral norms (Birnbacher, 1999). Others have suggested that empirical ethics should be used to defend or criticize concrete moral principles or practices rather than make general claims about moral concepts (De Vries & Gordijn, 2009). Consequently, in recent times, applied ethicists have shifted towards combining empirical, especially social scientific research with normative ethical analysis. Proponents of this approach called ‘empirical ethics’ have argued that the study of people’s actual moral beliefs, behaviour and reasoning should be the starting point of ethics. It has also been acknowledged that the methodologies of the social sciences, especially quantitative and qualitative research, using surveys, interviews and questionnaires is probably the best way to map the reality of people’s actual moral norms (Borry, Schotsmans, & Dierickx, 2004). However, complex multicultural societies in Africa and elsewhere are inherently challenged by problems of poverty, poor education, language, and
unfamiliarity with libertarian rights-based autonomy, cultural issues, and the power asymmetry between doctors and patients. Some of which could impact on the practice of IC. To evaluate whether the quality of IC practiced by HCPs in South Africa is consistent with current local laws and international standards, I conducted an empirical study to evaluate the clinical practice of IC by HCPs at local hospitals. The general objective of this study was to establish whether informed consent is obtained from patients prior to involvement in clinical procedures in South Africa. Specifically, I wanted to establish whether:

1. Sufficient information is provided to patients in clinical practice before consent is sought.
2. Patients involved in clinical procedures understand the information given.
3. Consent is obtained from patients voluntarily.
4. Whether informed consent provided by patients in clinical practice in South Africa is legally and ethically valid

Research design: The study design was a descriptive cross sectional study in contemporary clinical practice settings. This is because the time between procuring informed consent and treatment is very short and patients are normally in hospital for a limited time. The descriptive approach allowed doctors, nurses, and patients to describe their experience with the informed consent process as it is, thereby bringing out the required information. Further I employed the technique of “triangulation” in this study which has been defined as “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon” (Denzin, 1978). The original purpose of triangulation was to seek confirmation of apparent findings- consistency. More recently it has also been used for completeness purposes. In this study, I have applied the method of data triangulation which involves the use of multiple data sources in the study to get diverse views to aid in validating the conclusions, therefore in this study I applied time triangulation, space triangulation, and person triangulation.

Study location: This study was carried out at selected public hospitals within EThekwini metropolitan municipality district in KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa, and its environs. EThekwini municipality comprises a major urban city (Durban) and semi-urban areas (townships) with a population of around 3.2 million people (2010 estimate) (Statistics South Africa, 2011). Based on data from KZN department of Health, there are 17 public hospitals in EThekwini district municipality (KZN Department of Health 2011). According to Terre-Blanche (2008) 30% of the population is adequate when conducting a descriptive study (Terre-Blanche, Durkheim & Painter, 2008). Based on these criteria, 6 provincial/public hospitals were finally included in this study.

Target populations: This was a simultaneous study involving patients, medical doctors, and professional nurses at selected provincial hospitals within EThekwini municipality KZN were targeted for the study. All medical doctors and professional nurses within the randomly selected hospitals were given an opportunity to participate in the study.

Sampling procedures: Multi-stage stratified random sampling was used to select participating hospitals. Purposeful sampling was used to include the two central tertiary hospitals within the district because they contain the largest number of
medical doctors including specialists as well as professional nurses. The rest of the public hospitals within the municipality district were randomly sampled. A total of 5 hospitals from Durban and one outlying hospital in nearby Pietermaritzburg with rotating surgical registrars from Durban were included in the study. Therefore, a total of 6 provincial/public hospitals were included in the study population.

**Sample size:** Preliminary sample size for each group of study participants was calculated using a web based sample size calculator by Raosoft ® (http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html), based on the formula for sample size and margin of error. Using this freely available software the estimated sample size for each category of participants was calculated. In this case, an estimate of 373 professional nurses were needed to complete the study at a 95% confidence level.

**Inclusion & exclusion criteria for nurses:** There are 3 categories of registered nurses in South Africa, professional nurses, staff nurses and nursing auxiliaries (South African Nursing Council (SANC), 2012). A professional nurse sometimes called a nursing sister is an individual who has completed a minimum 4-year degree programme at university or tertiary institution, and are certified competent to practice comprehensive nursing and midwifery. An enrolled or staff nurse is a registered nurse with a minimum of 2-years tertiary nursing education, while an auxiliary nurse has 1 year of nursing education. In this study only nurses in the categories of professional nurse and enrolled nurse were included (SANC, 2012).

**Research instruments and data analysis:** Data was collected using self-administered questionnaires for healthcare professionals and face-to-face interviews for patients. Two separate open and close-ended questionnaires were applied to patients and healthcare professionals respectively. Doctors and nurses were evaluated using the same questionnaire in English language. The data from questionnaires was captured and subsequently analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS v.21 IBM, 2012). Distribution and collection of questionnaires were conducted with the assistance 3 trained research assistants. Preliminary data from the questionnaire was captured into SPSS by a trained research assistant and this was further validated by the principal investigator and a qualified biostatistician. Descriptive statistics such as proportions, median, mode and interquartile range were be used to summarize the data. The scores for information disclosure, capacity comprehension, and volition of informed consent were worked out from the responses

**Ethical considerations:** Ethical approval was obtained from a University of South Africa (UNISA) Research Ethics Committee and the KZN Department of Health Research Ethics committee. Additional approval was obtained from the management of each selected hospital prior to distribution of the questionnaire. Finally, all participants were given a full information disclosure prior to providing signed informed consent.

**Conclusions**

**Main Findings**

**Demographics:** A total of 355 nurses completed this study. Majority of participating nurses were female (92%) with a median age of 39 years, range (22-62). Nurses had
between 1 to 41 years of professional experience (median = 9). Majority were professional nurses (85%), remainder were enrolled/staff nurses (15%) Figure 1. Professional nurses, a.k.a nursing sisters had a minimum of 4-years University education or degrees in Nursing, while enrolled nurses’ a.k.a staff nurses had a minimum of 2 years Diploma. Auxiliary nurses, nursing students, and enrolled nursing assistants (ENAs) were excluded from the study (SANC, 2012). Nurses from all major hospital clinical departments as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 1: Nurses by professional category

Figure 2: Clinical domains and departments of participating nurses
Information disclosed by nurses to patients: Information reportedly disclosed by nurses included diagnosis (77%); treatment options (68%); recommended treatment (65%); risks of refusing recommended treatment (69%); treatment benefits (71%); and right of refusal (67%). Triangulation of data revealed some inconsistencies between claimed disclosures between nurses and patients as previously reported (Chima, 2015). For example, patients reported that they were informed about diagnosis (81%), risks (57%), and benefits of treatment (61%). However, fewer were informed about treatment options (41%), recommended treatment (28%), and right of refusal (25%). Similarly, patients claimed that informed consent was IC was obtained verbally in 73% of cases while nurses only 8% of nurses reported obtaining consent verbally. Another interesting inconsistent observation involving nurses was the fact previously reported by doctors that interpreters were used in communicating with patients in 72% of cases when obtaining IC (Chima, 2013). On the other hand, patients reported that interpreters were involved in only 3.5% of clinical encounters (Chima, 2015). This inconsistency cannot be readily explained; however, it could be due to the practice of ‘cultural brokerage’, whereby nurses maybe used to ‘translate, mediate and negotiate on behalf of patients’ (Jezewski, 1990). In this situation, the patient may not readily recognize or relate this to the use of interpreter while a doctor or nurse may report otherwise.

Barriers to informed consent reported by nurses: Major challenges to obtaining IC reported by doctors and nurses included language barriers, time constraints, lack of administrative support e.g. interpreters, and patients’ educational level. Tests of significance using Mann-Whitney U test showed that the ‘lack of administrative support e.g. interpreters’ was statistically significant across different clinical specialties (p ≤ 0.013). The barriers to informed consent was previously reported for doctors (Chima, 2013). A comparison of doctors and nurses is shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Doctors</th>
<th>Nurses</th>
<th>Median score</th>
<th>P-value (Mann-Whitney U Test)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Constraints</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>2.00/3.00</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Load</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>3.00/2.00</td>
<td>0.171</td>
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<tr>
<td>Language difficulties</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>2.00/1.00</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of administrative support, (E.g. Interpreters)</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>4.00/3.00</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural barriers</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>5.00/3.00</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of education</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>4.00/3.00</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical paternalism (Doctor knows best)</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>7.00/6.00</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: p-values calculated using Independent samples Mann-Whitney U test; significance level = 0.05
Table 1: Challenges to informed consent (Doctors vs. Nurses)
**Time Spent on Informed Consent:** Majority of nurses (41%) reported spending about 5-10 minutes on the IC process, consistent 53% of doctors as previously reported (Chima, 2013). Another 24% of nurses spent 10-20 minutes, while 16% spent less than 5 minutes on IC as shown in Figure 3. When asked if this amount of time was sufficient, majority of nurses 52% answered affirmatively, while 41% responded negatively.

![Figure 3: Time spent on informed consent by nurses](image)

**General knowledge of IC by healthcare professionals:** Questions pertaining to general knowledge of IC regulations in South Africa such as ‘age of consent to treatment’ and ‘legal age of eligibility for termination of pregnancy’ in terms of (Choice on termination of pregnancy Act, 1996) were inserted into the questionnaires for to gauge the level of general knowledge of HCPs regarding local laws. Results showed that only 71% of doctors and 30% of nurses could correctly identify the age of consent for routine medical treatment. Similarly, only 30% of doctors and 8% of nurses knew age of consent for termination of pregnancy. Further, to compare IC knowledge across occupational ranks of doctors and nurses using quantitative means, I developed an Informed Consent Aggregate Score (ICAS) (Chima, 2013). Comparison of ICAS scores between doctors and nurses ICAS showed that nurses scored lower than doctors with a median score of 8 versus 10. This difference was statistically significant (p ≤ 0.001). However, there was no significant difference in knowledge level between professional nurses with 4 years’ degree or more, and enrolled nurses with a minimum of 2 years nursing diploma.

**Implications of these findings**

This study shows that nurses practicing in South Africa are generally aware of the importance of informed consent in clinical practice, although not all adhered to the key elements as specified in the (NHA, 2003), or are familiar with the requirements based on international standards. Generally South African nurses understand the basic
elements of informed consent such as comprehension, capacity, information disclosure and volition. However large percentages of professional nurses are still unaware of general changes in South African law, such as the age of consent to treatment or the age at which a woman can request for termination of pregnancy. This study also confirmed that majority of patients utilizing South African public hospitals are vulnerable because of their indigence and lack of alternative means of obtaining healthcare. However, the study also indicated that despite their evident vulnerability, most patients in Africa are generally aware of their right to information disclosure, human rights and dignity in healthcare as previously reported (Chima, 2015).

Limitations of the study

Potential limitations to this study include the fact that it was carried out in and urban metropolitan municipality in South Africa (Durban), with an arguably better educated and more knowledgeable population group by South African standards. It is possible that a similar study in a rural location in South Africa may yield a different result. It is also unclear whether a study in a more cosmopolitan South African city such as Cape Town or Johannesburg with different population demographics may or may not produce a different result. Finally, it is also possible that similar studies on patients utilizing private healthcare services may produce a different result because it has been suggested that doctors in private healthcare setting in Greece are more likely to provide detailed information to patients (Falagas et al. 2009).

Conclusion and recommendations

This study identified the major cultural factors militating against IC practice in this setting as language barriers, poverty, and poor communication skills by HCWs, consistent with findings from studies from other multicultural and multilingual settings South Africa (Schlemmer & Mash 2006) and USA (Flores, 2006). One can conclude that there is need to further educate patients and HCWs on patients’ rights and the legal requirements of IC. There is a need for further training of nurses on improved communication skills and ethics and healthcare law. This will enhance the healthcare professional-patient relationship, patient’s rights, and human dignity. Future research should focus on informed and shared healthcare decision-making to improve preventive healthcare services in Africa. Finally, more continuing education programmes should be initiated to further educate South African healthcare workers on the key elements of informed consent to meet required international standards and local laws. There is also a need for an interpreter ‘corps to aid local language translation and improve patient understanding, improve informed consent practices amongst local populations, reduce the burden on nurses who have to play the dual role of interpreters and caregivers. This will help to minimize nurses’ workload and reduce HCP attrition and improve the overall quality of healthcare service delivery.

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