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‘To Give is to Receive’ The Merits of Ka-UPOD: An Investment with Bountiful Gains

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Abstract
‘To give is to receive’ is a phrase everyone is familiar with. For minor seminarians, it may be a way of life for them. Service and community life are critical in the early years in the training and aspiration of future priests. Supporting an integral formation, a contextualized Peer Facilitation Program entitled Ka-UPOD was facilitated to 20 minor seminarians in a 12-week duration. They underwent various modules that sought to enhance the vital aspects of their personalities. Aimed at establishing an eidetic description of the selected minor seminarians of their concept of the Peer Facilitation Program, this study employed the phenomenological approach in order to capture the essence of the program to the selections. While a journal is being maintained, a focus group discussion was also facilitated. The field texts were subjected using the Collaizi’s method. The critical friend technique and member checking procedure were also employed in order to attain a triangular consensus of data. The study resulted with the Clover Leaf of Giving-Receiving model of the Peer Facilitation Program.

Keywords: peer facilitation, qualitative design, phenomenology, minor seminarians
Introduction

Valuing and promoting integral approaches to seminary formation, this study explores the richness and the gains that a contextualized peer facilitation program contributes to the participants. According to Husserl (1970) as cited in Wojnar & Swanson (2007), Phenomenology refers to the science of essence of consciousness focused on defining the concept of intentionality and meaning of lived experience from the person point of view. In this type of qualitative inquiry, the essence is the nature of the question asked. Meaning is the focus and the collective description is the product realized. As an important supplement to the scientific method, Phenomenology describes the individual’s immediate experience.

The personal experiences are sources of data and the conclusions emerge at once. It enhances confidence that the merits of the study can be generalized, hence, can be applied to other settings and other people. Phenomenology may lead us into areas that might otherwise go unnoticed. The information may be useful enough to formulate further hypothesis. The use of interview is the mainstay of qualitative method. One of the modes of analysis in this method is thematization. According to Santis and Ugarizza (2000), a theme serves as the entity that brings meaning and identity to a recurrent experience and its variant manifestations. A theme therefore captures and unifies the nature or basis of the experience into a meaningful whole.

Method

Design

The study employed the qualitative research design. According to Aliyev, Tekinalp, Ulker & Edizer (2012), qualitative research is a variety of scientific investigation that tries to answer questions, collect data, and produce findings. This type of research is particularly effective in getting culturally specific information about the values, thoughts, manners, and social contexts of specific people. Its focus is understanding the phenomena through a tableau of various human experiences. Specifically, phenomenological approach was utilized in order to know and understand the noeses of Ka-UPOD Program in the lives of selected minor seminarians. Phenomenology study refers to the science of essence of consciousness focused on defining the concept of intentionality and meaning of lived experience from the person point of view (Husserl, 1970 as cited by Wojnar & Swanson, 2007).

Aside from collecting empirical data, that is data that are observable or experienced (Myers & Hansen, 2006), through quantitative measures, this study acknowledges the richness as well of delving into qualitative measures. Here the data explore the meaning of the particular experience/s. This method asks what is Ka-UPOD PF Program for the peer themselves. Having this qualitative design enhances confidence that the merits of this study can be generalized, hence, can be applied to other settings and other people. As an important supplement to the scientific method, the phenomenological approach can lead researchers into areas that might otherwise go unnoticed and is useful to formulate further hypothesis.
Selection

Patton (2002) as cited by De Guzman & Fabian (2008) posited that in qualitative inquiry no rules are used for sample size. The sample size depends on what one wants to know about the purpose of the inquiry, what is at stake, what shall be useful, what shall have credibility and what can be done with available time and resources.” (p.244) The selections who underwent the program were asked to share the impact of Ka-UPOD program they have experienced for twelve (12) weeks. Twenty (20) selections, from 2nd – 4th year level and were enrolled during the time of the research in St. Pius X Seminary, took part in this study. Aliyev, Tekinalp, Ulker & Edizer (2012) defines qualitative research as an inquiry that focuses on studies that are in depth and therefore smaller samples can be used.

In essence qualitative research is an exploration of a research question or situation in depth. In this study, forty (40) seminarians met the criteria and they were randomly assigned in the experimental and control groups. The control group continued the usual seminary formation while the experimental group underwent the KA-UPOD Program for twelve (12) consecutive weeks. The selections from the experimental group were also asked to maintain a journal of their experiences during and after the program. They were given guide questions on how they see the meaning of the program in their lives and they also took part in the focus group discussions.

Procedure

The researchers provided the participants from the experimental group guide questions in order to gather information on how they view the implemented Peer Facilitation Program. The researchers also conducted a semi-structured interview as a follow up from what they have written in their journals. The interview was done in the most convenient time of the participants and the questions were done in English but the participants may respond through their local dialect and or with any language they were most comfortable with. Each interview was done at approximately 30 – 45 minutes. Moreover, this semi structured interview allowed the researchers to validate his interpretations with the context of the responses of the participants.

Data Collecting Tools

In order to gather data for the research, application forms with demographic information of the selections were collected from the selections. They were asked to maintain a journal, which answers the questions on the aide memoir. The aide memoir, validated by experts on the field, asked questions on how the selections view the Ka-UPOD program and how it affects their way of life. A focus group discussion was also facilitated as a follow-up from what they have written in their journals. The discussion was done in the most convenient time of the selections and the questions were done in English but they were given the option to respond through their local or vernacular dialect and or with any language they were most comfortable with. The focus group discussion approximately lasted for 30 – 45 minutes. This discussion allowed the validation of interpretations from the context of the responses of the selections.
Mode of Analysis

Merriam (1998) and Marshall & Rossman (1989) as cited by Maldonado (2011) contend that data collection and analysis must be a simultaneous process in qualitative research. They claim that qualitative data analysis entails classifying things, persons, and events and the properties that characterize them. The Coliaizzi (1978) method of phenomenology uses Husserlian phenomenology to describe the essential structure of a phenomenon in its analysis. Since the study focused in finding the meaning of the experiences of the selections in the Ka-UPOD Program, the Colaizzi’s data analysis method would be the appropriate technique. This technique involved the following steps: First, the researchers collected all journal reflections and significant statements were extracted. Next, the statements were read over several times and meanings were then given. From the language of the participants (emic), the researchers converted them into their language (etic). Subsequently, the meanings were organized into theme categories.

These categories capture and unify the nature or basis of the experience into a meaningful whole. The initial theme categories were subjected into preliminary analysis. In this stage, Calimag & de Guzman (2010) described that the researchers sought to describe ‘how’ (noeses) the phenomena expresses itself and ‘what’ (noema) the phenomenon is. Then, the researchers integrated the findings into rich and exhaustive descriptions of the lived experiences. The field texts obtained were subjected into cool and warm analysis. The themes were validated through cross-referencing the answers of the selections in the focus group discussion from the researchers’ interpreted results of their lived experiences. Triangulations from different data sources such as the member checking procedure and critical friend technique were used for the justification of the themes.

Findings

From the experiences of the selections on a 12-week Ka-UPOD Program, significant meanings of the program emerged. These themes served as the meaning of the program to the selections. Moreover these would also reflect how the program affected their way of life.

Findings in this phenomenological study are illustrated in the Clover Leaf of Giving – Receiving Model (see Fig. 1) of the selections. The model emerged from the significant statements coming from their journal entries and responses during the focus group discussion.
Ka-UPOD as a Contextualized Peer Facilitation Program (Meaning and Explanation of the Program)

Ka-UPOD is the name that best signifies the meaning, context and relevance of the contextualized peer facilitation program. The program was named as such in order to make it more appropriate to the participants in terms of their formation and background. The program, being contextualized, indigenized and culture-based, banks on research evidences and empirical literature. Ashwin (2006) posited that those who facilitate the growth of others learn and benefit twice.

As construed in this paper, Ka-UPOD is the acronym for the following:

- **K**a - companion (kasama) [in]
- **U** - Understanding of Self (Intrapersonal Self-Construal) [through becoming a]
- **P** - Peer [for and with]
- **O** - Others (Intrapersonal Self-Construal) [towards a]
- **D** - Divinization Process (Metapersonal Self-Construal)

Ka-UPOD is the Hiligaynon term for companion (philippineculture.ph and kalibo.tukcedo.nl). Hiligaynon is the local dialect of the Capizeños. In several online translators (http://translate.sandayong.com and http://mymemory.translated.net), “ka-upod” is the equivalent of “kasama” in Filipino language or Tagalog. One of its synonyms is “ka-agapay.” The nearest equivalent of “kaagapay” in www.depinisyon.com is “kaakbay.” In other online sources like translate.google.com.ph and tagalogtranslate.com, “kaagapay” means “standing side by side.” Similarly, in tagaloglang.com, “kaagapay” means “hand in hand” and “support or reinforce.” “Inaagapayan” is translated as “supporting [someone].” Clearly, “ka-upod” aptly describes the value and purpose of the program.

In a related note, “upod” as the root word of “ka-upod” takes several meanings. According to kalibo.tukcedo.nl, as a noun, “upod” means a companion. As a verb, it means “to accompany, go with or get along with.” But as an adjective, “upod” connotes being worn out (tagalogtranslate.com). More appropriately, it could be interpreted through a candle with its wick burning and the solid wax slowly melting, getting worn out and becoming liquid as a metaphor.
The candle has given light while getting worn out. There is change. There is transformation. In giving light and getting worn out, the candle has fulfilled its nature and achieved its purpose or end. Though melted, the candle can still take many forms and remain useful in other ways. This latest syntax provides the meaning that Ka-UPOD carries in this study.

“Ka-upod” or a peer could be construed conversely as a companion, a friend or a buddy. Taken from the perspective of seminary formation, a peer serves as someone who undergoes training so that he can help in facilitating the adjustment, growth and development of his fellow seminarians. In the process, he contributes to the entire dynamics and holistic aspects of formation. Yet in the long run, he is the one who gains more – the one who learns and benefits twice.

With the foregoing statements, the program is now related to self-giving and self-emptying that leads to an individual’s transformation as a person. Ka-UPOD then is but an expression of love among brothers who journey together in serving the vineyard of the Lord. Ka-UPOD takes a fuller meaning when interpreted based from its Filipino synonym “kaagapay.” “Agapay” or support is very much near the Greek word “agape.” As understood, “agape” is the deeper expression of love usually associated with the love of Christ to humanity. In the Bible, “agape” refers to the highest love among the other types of love.

Benedict XVI (2005) in his encyclical Deus Caritas Est (God is Love), describes “agape” as love that involves a real concern, care and discovery of the other person. This love seeks the good of the beloved; it is ready and willing for sacrifice. And yet this love must grow towards higher levels. Looking to the eternal is its definitive goal. Ka-UPOD as a peer facilitation program enhances specific variables but more than this, it creates a holistic impact to the integral dimensions of an individual, namely: intrapersonal, interpersonal and metapersonal self-construal.

Further, Ka-UPOD or “kaagapay” taken in a broader sense connotes a Christian understanding of LOVE (“agape”). An authentic follower of Christ takes this love as a journey (Benedict XVI, 2005), that is, an ongoing “going-out” of selfishness or closed inward-looking of self towards its freedom through self-giving (interpersonal), and therefore towards genuine self-discovery (intrapersonal) and indeed the discovery of God (metapersonal).

Ka-UPOD can even take a more theological interpretation. As “agape” can be used as a term for the Eucharist (Benedict XVI, 2005), Ka-UPOD is also a program that creates venues for participants to give themselves in service just as God has given himself to us bodily and in this manner God continues his work in the peer-seminarians and through the peer-seminarians.

Ka-UPOD is not simply an activity or a program. Like St. Paul in his First Epistle to the Corinthians (Chapter 13), Ka-UPOD is convinced that “If I give away all I have, and if I deliver my body to be burned, but do not have love, I gain nothing.” The very foundation of Ka-UPOD is love.
Why Clover?

The clover has three leaves all connected to each other. They refer to the integral dimensions and effects of Ka-UPOD Peer Facilitation Program. Ka-UPOD serves as the stem from which the three dimensions are connected. The present formation year in St. Pius X Seminary where the study was conducted imbibed the theme “Seed to move mountains.” The clover model explains the study that is in line with the formation theme as well. First, the clover figure looks like a seed sprouting. It is capable of growing and of many other possibilities. Second, it is the first time that a peer facilitation program was administered in St. Pius X Seminary. In a way, Ka-UPOD serves as the seed from which other programs and structures may develop. The horizon is great. The seed that refers to seminary formation refers to many connotations.

The “seed” refers to the gift of vocation to the priesthood. The seminary, coming from the word “semen”, serves as the seedbed where the seed is plotted and grown. “Seed to move mountains” captures the significance of seminary formation. There is the seed of faith, the seed of vocation to the priesthood that could bring a person to endless horizons. Mountains could also connote several meanings. They could signify obstacles and impossibilities. But mountains are also places where God would usually communicate. Mountains can become opportunities where a person can encounter the Divine. Ka-UPOD goes hand in hand with the clover and with the theme of the present formation year.

The theme of the formation year 2012 – 2013 in St. Pius X Seminary is ‘The seed to move mountains.’ This has biblical foundation from Luke 17:20 that says, “If you have faith like the size of a mustard seed, you can tell a mountain to get up and throw itself into the sea.” It is a mustard seed because from the start it is very tiny. But as time goes by, it grows vast and huge. Ka-UPOD is like a fertilizer mixed into the soil that adds nourishment to the entire seminary formation so that the seed may flourish well. Coupled with faith and moral values, Ka-UPOD nurtures the participants just like water and sunlight do to the plants. Ka-UPOD contributes significantly to the “multiplication of seeds and nourishment.” Every aspect in the existence of the seed and the seed box is entrusted to the owner who is God. He directs what happens to his vineyard. This is the reason why Ka-UPOD always has the metapersonal dimension that relates itself to the entire whole.

Integrating the focus of the seminary during the time of the study, the interpretation of the answers on how the selections view the Ka-UPOD Program, three (3) themes surfaced, namely: 1) Intrapersonal; 2) Interpersonal and 3) Metapersonal. These three themes form the integral dimensions of an individual, which would have implications on how the selections connect it with their current status as seminarians.

Intrapersonal

This integral dimension of an individual pertains to one’s realizations on the different aspects of his life. Moreover, this may also include their self-management in order to improve as a person and as a seminarian at the same time. The following statements show the verbalizations on this dimension:
“It helps me how to become a responsible person in time of cleaning, studying and praying.”
“In brief, the PFP improved my character in the way of speaking, listening and acting.”
“This program really help me in many things but the most I tried in this program is to make my attitude good and how to facilitate in a good way.”

The verbalizations show how the KA-UPOD program helped them improve their efficiency on tasks as seminarians.

**Interpersonal**

This dimension refers to the dealings of the selections with other people formally and informally. The selections being seminarians are exposed in many community activities. The verbalizations of the selections are given below:

“The program taught me to boost-up the self-confidence of others, to help them of their psychological needs.”
“The program strengthens my bond of friendship to my classmates, friends and siblings.”
“It helps me to understand other people of their problem because of the module about conflict resolution and understanding problems.”
“I will share this to others my skills in facilitating so that they do not be shy on other people.”
“Also I will encourage them to be a good influence to other people and the last but not the least I will share to them the good and the very willingful discussion of the speaker or the facilitator.”

It is evident from the verbalizations that the selections view the KA-UPOD program as a means in improving their interpersonal skills.

**Metapersonal**

This third integral dimension of an individual involves the interconnectedness of all aspects in life. It also involves reaching a deeper level in one’s relationship with the Divine Being. The following are the verbalizations of this dimension:

“By doing all the things I learned from this program… be a good model and sharing the true ingredients to become a responsible person.”
“My learning on this program is very difficult but at the end it so very easy and I will try to teach the other people in other things so that they can be good Peer Facilitators.”
“Applying what I learned and in that way I can start teaching others by being a good example.”
“It’s like this, the more you give yourself to others the more you will know yourself also and it will lead you to God where you can attain the true happiness.”
“I know now that everything that will happen to me has a purpose which will lead me to my own happiness. Thanks to the Peer Facilitator Program!”
The verbalizations show that the selections are willing to participate in the plan of God in their lives by living what has been taught to them as seminarians.

Discussion

Sometimes it is ironic that when one gives, one seems to receive more. This means that According to Micari, Streitwieser and Light (2006), peer leaders may reap the greatest rewards.

‘To give is to receive’ is the phrase that explains in its simplest way the Ka-UPOD. The program initially required the participants to attend each session, as one has verbalized, ‘My learning on this program is very difficult but at the end it so very easy.’ It shows that in the end, the time that they have invested, they have seen the bountiful gains which are evidenced on their perspectives on what Ka-UPOD is all about. As claimed by Micari, Streitwieser and Light (2006), peer leaders may reap the greatest rewards.

The interrelationship between the dimensions of the Intrapersonal Self- Construal, Interpersonal Self-Construal and Metapersonal Self-Construal is multifaceted. There are wide-ranging possibilities in terms of their operation and definition as linked to the impact Ka-UPOD Peer Facilitation Program. Mirella Stroink and Teresa DeCicco (2011) investigated the dimensions of interpersonal, intrapersonal and metapersonal which they termed as cognitive representations of the self that appear across and within cultures. These three dimensions are inter-connected.

The Independent self-construal involves a view of the self as a unique being that is separate and distinct from others. This type of self is thus defined by features and characteristics that set the self apart from others. This self-construal can be linked to the intrapersonal dimension of the seminarians which pertains to the uniqueness of oneself. Bernard Daley Zaleha (2013) termed this as Independents who seek to enhance the qualities that make them ‘stand out from others.’ As seminarians, the trail that they follow may be long and difficult, but their unique individuality allows them to be more tolerant of the challenges.

The Interdependent self-construal is characterized by a view of the self as situated within a specific social context. This type of self is defined by its relationships with specific others (relational interdependence) or its position within certain social groups (collective interdependence). This is similar to the interpersonal dimension of the study which refers to the ideal self that they need in their dealing with other people. When one enters the seminary, not everyone has the gift of charisma to people. This is one of the essential qualities that others struggle in order to succeed in their chosen vocation. Bernard Daley Zaleha (2013) referred this as Interdependents, who see themselves and other people as ‘interconnected’ and mutually dependent

The Metapersonal self-construal involves a view of the self as fundamentally interconnected with all of life. Therefore, this type of self is defined by its connection with all things, at a level of inclusiveness that extends well beyond the individual and his or her ingroups or relationships to include all of humanity and nature. Evidence for the metapersonal self-construal can be seen throughout psychology.
Piedmont 1999) argued that even world’s religions share a consistent description of existence in which the self is seen as part of a fundamental unity underlying all things, including the self. The metapersonal self-construal have implications that are different but complementary to those of the independent and interdependent self-construals. Mirella Stroink and Teresa DeCicco (2011) and Bernard Daley Zaleha (2013), authors of the two studies, agreed to call the individuals as metapersonal, who see themselves as having ‘a deep interconnection with all forms of life.’ In the study, seminarians also sees the Ka-UPOD program as a means to help them not just to know and understand the will of the Divine Being but also to live His teachings as it reverberates in the different dimensions of one’s individuality.

**Conclusion**

The Ka- UPOD program exemplifies many dimensions that a seminarian may need to develop in his chosen vocation; thus it also supports the programs integrated in the seminary formation. The formation program aims to develop the different aspects of an individual.

Moreover, the Ka-UPOD program highlighted the call for the seminarians, which is to give themselves selflessly to others, by developing oneself to its maximum potential through highlighting of one’s uniqueness. Hence, the program paved the way for the participants not just to see the need to develop the two dimensions but also to see the deeper meaning of their existence and life in general.

**Recommendations**

For future researches, ask more open-ended questions so that participants may reflect about the experience in a more dynamic way. The themes that may emerge would further support the holistic impact that Ka-UPOD contributed to the participants. Furthermore, digest from the journal reflections how can the program be more integrated in seminary formation so that more applications may be made. In the process of making Ka-UPOD part of the seminary structure, proponents may be able to maximize or conceptualize topics that would address specific personality variables
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Life in Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go

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Abstract
With the announcement of the sheep clone Dolly as the breakthrough in the biotechnology in news media around the turn of the twenty-first century, the rising issue of human clones in its development and the controversially bioethical issues ensued, Kazuo Ishiguro in Never Let Me Go (2005) focuses his attention, in the area of cell therapy, on how human clones, since produced, lead their model lives and face their deaths, in order that his readers may better understand the meanings of life and death, and that they may stay in a far closer relationship with their family and friends than ever. In this essay, I examine, in two worlds, the normals’ and the clones’, paralleling each other, the true meanings of being human and their lives through the perspective of Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction; and I argue that Ishiguro misspeaks to his readers the true meanings of life and death especially through the clones’ lens and brings them to his readers’ hearts further realistically. In Derrida’s nature-culture structurality of the clones, it is Kathy H., who comes as center into which the other clones come as freplay, in the structurality of the real world, where it is normals who come as center into which clones come as freplay, under the structurality of power in the institutions where the clones’ culture comes as center into which Miss Emily’s ruling comes as freplay, by the structurality of authorship where the author comes as center into which the novel comes as freplay.

Keywords: Kazuo Ishiguro, Never Let Me Go, Jacques Derrida, deconstruction, clone, normal, life, and death
Introduction

Had you been deprived of the right to live with the very beloved in this life ever as I had, you would understand how difficult I have to recover from the grief over my father’s death and for so long years, although in *Hamlet* William Shakespeare writes, “The undiscovered country from whose bourn/ No traveler returns, puzzles the will,/ And makes us rather bear those ills we have/ Than fly to others that we know not of?” (3.1.81-84); and although “your father lost a father;/ That father lost, lost his; and the survivor bound/ In filial obligation for some term/ To do obsequious sorrow. …/ For what we know must be, and is as common/ As any the most vulgar thing to sense ./ Why should we in our peevish opposition/ Take it to heart (1.2.89-92, 98-101)?

Should science and medicine have offered me another alternative and another chance to save his life, would you have suggested that I should have given it a try? Then, I find my answer in Kazuo Ishiguro’s *Never Let Me Go*. Justine Burley introduces the novel “is set in the [background of] the 1990s, when the birth of Dolly the cloned sheep was announced and the human genome project was well under way” (427) and when “Dolly provoked extensive scientific, political and ethical debate and renewed public unease about the implications of the new genetics and the now foreseeable prospect of human cloning” (Carroll 61) and in the early 2000s, when the debates on cloning and biotechnological development were heated (Griffin 646). The novel functions as “comment[s] critically on the history of the present” (Griffin 653).

James Butcher highlights that there are sixty thousand people on the waiting list for kidney transplantation around 2004 and that there is possibility for xeno-transplantation if with proper pigs’ organs or new organs from stem cells growing; however, he refuses the idea that human clones are created for organ farming and harvesting (1299). Titus Levy is a good critic to emphasize the issues of contemporary human rights in the clones’ world in the novel and describe the storytelling of the novel, through the voice of Kathy H., “as a constructive response to atrocity and as a potentially dubious method of overcoming traumatic experience” for the normals in the contemporary world, and he praises Kazuo Ishiguro as sensitive to how the general public read aestheticized forms of traumatic experience “with a mixture of empathy, indifference, and perversion,” the experience, which is the voice of exploitation and injustice for the human clones, the marginalized social groups in a dystopian society, in their struggle for “the fringes of supposedly democratic societies” (1). I argue that in Jacques Derrida’s nature-culture structurality of the clones, it is Kathy H. who comes as center into which the other clones come as freeplay, in the
The structurality of the real world, where it is normals who come as center into which clones come as freeplay, under the structurality of power in the institutions where the clones’ culture comes as center into which Miss Emily’s ruling comes as freeplay, by the structurality of authorship where the author comes as center into which the novel comes as freeplay, as the following illustration shows:

The essay consists of six sections: Postmodernism and Humanism; Kathy H. as Center and the Other Clones as Freeplay; Normals as Center and Clones as Freeplay; The Clones’ Culture as Center and Miss Emily’s Ruling as Freeplay; The Author as Center and the Novel as Freeplay; and Conclusion.

I. Postmodernism and Humanism

The Enlightenment, the Age of Reason, in the eighteenth century, also called modernity, begins in 1492 and permeates in the twentieth century and further onwards in the twenty-first century, when reason and science are two main guidelines in human life and when many enlightened minds such as Francis Bacon, Sir Isaac Newton and Benjamin Franklin believe that the physical universe, truth and reality can be scientifically investigated and objectively explored. Franklin considers that science replaces religion and even God’s existence counts on humanity.

Humanity becomes the sole focus among all, and each individual, the master of his own fate, seeks his salvation in himself (Bressler 96-98). Unlike Franklin and other modern philosophers, who argue that discourse is a representation of reality, Derrida challenges modernity in his declaration that objective reality or truth does not exist but is itself “relative, depending on the nature and variety of cultural and social influences in one’s life” of a reader; hence, there are many truths (Bressler 99). Agreeing with Martin Heidegger, Derrida posits the idea of rupture and discusses
about consciousness or existence. He declares that mind encounters “the unfolding of
the thing’s Being” and that “truth is the projection of a thing’s Being to an observer’s
mind. …truth is but the mind’s determination about the present state of an outside
reality. Truth is [merely] one’s interpretation or consciousness of a thing or reality”
(Sagut 1). The representation of discourse for the sole objective reality in modernity’s
concept is replaced by a collage with meaning always changing in postmodernist’s
view or poststructuralist’s (Bressler 99).

Evidently, Derrida, like Charles E. Bressler, emphasizes the role of readers: Readers
juxtapose the images of the collage from the aesthetic texts and interact with texts.
Each reader, with his own unique divergent background and in his dominant social
and cultural group, has his own subjective and perspectival interpretation of reality,
creating many realities and no absolute center, opposed to the basic philosophy in
modernity, logocentrism, the undiscoverable—objective truth or ultimate reality like
God, reason, science, humanity (Bressler 99-102). Derrida also argues the idea of
erasure and supplementation, or to decenter the center and reverse all binary
oppositions, respectively; and he considers that each character can be self and other
under erasure, the center and the decenter, in their interweave relations.

For Derrida, there is no ultimate truth or absolute meaning, but the meaning is being
defered on the journey of self-construction in relation to other not in their sameness
but in their difference, one temporal meaning after another in the interpretation
oscillation, one signifying after another, where what if occurs and where the author
misspeaks (Bressler 122-28, 132). Briefly, for postmodern thinkers, no one can have
complete knowledge; thus, what one embraces is not individualism and conquest but
tolerance, understanding, collaboration and holism, and what he emphasizes is not
rationality solely but rationality with emotions, feelings and intuition for valid
interpretations and guidelines in this pluralistic society (Bressler 100).

Derrida, inspired by Levi-Strauss, suggests that “all interpretation is really a form of
play, with each participant handling slippery texts [a kind of center] whose meanings
are often illusive” (Bressler 132; Sagut 1). Derrida discusses a centered structure: the
structurality of structure as a structure itself has its center, “a point of presence, a
fixed origin,” which constructs the structurality of structure and meanwhile “grounds
the play of substitutions” (278, 289). The center and the totality seem to be individual
objects: the center is located at the center of totality but does not indeed belong to this
totality; also, “the totality has its center elsewhere” (Derrida 279). It is like that the
center escapes from its own structurality of structure and “the concept of a centered
structure is in fact the concept of a play” (Derrida 279). Then the history of the idea of a structure merely becomes “a linked chain of determinations of the center,” a center for another, creating an ongoing quest for a final center or end (Derrida 279). In Derrida’s perspective of observing culture, he discusses the nature-culture opposition in Levi-Strauss’s example of incest prohibition.

Derrida asserts that the concept of something cooked brings that of something raw into existence despite raw’s precedence over cooked in nature just as how the concept of culture brings that of nature into existence despite nature’s precedence over culture in life. Derrida defines, in Levi-Strauss’s words, nature as something “universal and spontaneous” and something independent of any particular culture or norm, but culture as something dependent on a system of norms, varying from one social structure to another (283 emphasis in original). Their relationship is depicted as “a declaration of absolute interdependency” and one as “causative of the other” (Fry). Levi-Strauss’s nature-culture opposition turns into Derrida’s concept of center-play in a centered structure: nature is center into which culture comes as play (278-83); by analogy, the normal is center into which the clones come as play.

In Derrida’s criticism on logocentrism, center does indeed exist inside a structure where center assures this structure of being as presence. In his term *différance* for the divided nature of the sign, he declares that spatially “differ” is a sign spaced out in a system and that temporally “defer” is a signifier postponing presence. Unlike speech with immediate and full presence, writing physically in its system as secondary, leaving a trace, can be repeated and requests (re)interpretation, which arouses philosophers’ fear to ruin the authority of philosophic truth (Selden 164-65).

However, Bacon illustrates Derrida’s violent hierarchy in pairing writing as secondary and speech as full presence, a hierarchy which can be reversed since writing and speech are both signifying processes lacking presence; “speech is a species of writing” (Selden 166). Thus, writing overrides speech and absence overrides presence. By analogy, philosophy under erasure is a form of literature, and literal language under erasure is a form of figurative language because under erasure, words are many signifiers without fixed meanings in them and language has its own freeplay character in the author’s misspeaking (Sagut 2; Bressler 123, 124, 128; Selden 166). For Derrida, the author does not have his authorial intent; however, he misspeaks or slips his language and reveals what he fears to say (Bressler 126, 128, 132).

In his idea of supplementation, meaning addition-substitution, which features in all human activity, writing not only supplements speech but replaces it. In nature-culture,
nature as a full presence precedes culture whereas the violent hierarchy is that nature is never pure but already polluted by culture (Selden 166). For Derrida, supplementation in every binary opposition plays a role as play to the center; e.g. deception plays a supplementary role to truth, or in Bakhtin’s dialogism, other does to self (Bressler 124-25). Also, Derrida’s concept of différence meaning differ and defer, in his illustration of the word in speech and writing, is a tool for readers to ask What if question and as in the case of narrative detective stories, for a narrative author to suspend the truth of discourse for the climax (Bressler 125; Culler 89).

Derrida proceeds deconstruction by reader’s “locat[ing] the moment when a text transgresses the laws it appears to set up for itself” and when a text breaks into pieces (Selden 167 emphases in original). Derrida declares some features in writing: “a written sign is a mark” repeated in the absence of the subject in a specific context and that of a specific addressee; it breaks its real context and in different contexts, it is interpreted, despite authorial intent (Selden 167). Derrida argues that “the task of deconstruction” is “to discover…the ‘other’ of philosophy,” and the result of it is questioning and subverting (qtd. in Selden 169). Then, there is again no fixed meaning in words, creating one signifying after another, one freeplay after another, which seeks a final center in vain.

Many theorists debate their ideas over humanism as a human essence either beyond history or in its historical context; actually, they are equally significant and the role of history as a process is hence repositioned in humanism. Michèle Barrett proposes that the term humanism changes its fortunes to derogatory particularly in the field of culture in the last two or three decades (Hawthorn 156). Louis Althusser highlights at the heart of humanism with attainment of human freedom as its goal, lies a human essence beyond history and society, not in social structures nor cultural formations but in an individual human being, which is not realist but idealist, ahistorical, and individualistic, “often involving the projection of the characteristics of one form of society [onto] human beings at large” (Hawthorn 156). Althusser emphasizes that human individual’s essential being is “what man makes from his life activity” or from his life as a process; and that human beings as a whole are the existence of a species and “man is a being that treats its species as its own essential being—that treats itself as a species being” (Marx 113 qtd. in Hawthorn 156) and for Pauline Johnson, a human essence “refers specifically to the process of transformation and development which characterizes the history of the species (36 qtd. in Hawthorn 157).

In Barrett’s exposition, humanism as an ideology has its immensely progressive role either as a secularizing force or as a vital role in contemporary politics; indeed, human
essence is not situated outside its historical context (Hawthorn 157, 158-59).

In the twentieth century, a humanist tradition bases itself on Marx’s historicist and non-essentialist emphases and it extends further on. Alan Sinfield supports the same view as Arnold Kettle’s that humanity “is not an essential condition towards which [people] may aspire, but what people have as a consequence of being socialized into human communities” (291 qtd. in Hawthorn 158). Kwame Anthony Appiah even exemplifies that contingency and moral worth are not contradictory and that the essence of “humanism can be provisional, historically contingent, anti-essentialist (in other words, postmodern) and still be demanding. [People] can surely maintain a powerful engagement with the concern to avoid cruelty and pain while…[recognizing] the contingency of that concern” (Ashcroft et al. 123 qtd. in Hawthorn 158). Over the debates, a main direction for humanism emerges: “if a non-essentialist humanism can be established…the free play of the signifier may be, if not arrested, at least slowed down. Even if the human is not a fixed or a unitary reference point, it may denote certain relatively stable (if contested) reference points, whose history, movements and conflicts can be plotted” (Hawthorn 158).

II. Kathy H. as Center and the Other Clones as Freeplay

I would like to ask the question what if the clones and the clones’ world are not created and to reveal that Ishiguro leaves a trace in the name Kathy H. since alphabetically there should be from Kathy A. to Kathy G. and then H. (3), which is unique (Vorhaus 99) and which has no surname in it (Butcher 1299). The meaning of her existence and the novel are being deferred. It is Kathy H. who comes as center into which the other clones come as freeplay in the structurality of the clones; and other clones play a supplementary role to Kathy. There are three life phases in the novel “set in England in the late 1990s” (Butcher 1299):

Hailsham for childhood, Cottage for maturity and recovery center for adulthood. For education in their childhood, the clones live in Hailsham, which provides the human clones with “the opportunity for free and full development of individual personalities, the chance to grow up enjoying the freedoms[,] envisioned by human rights law and literature” the same as normals (Levy 6). Next, they learn to be independent in Cottage. If they cannot endure the boring life in Cottage, they will be active to move onto the next phase, to be a carer in the recovery center. The same is true when they cannot endure the tiring life as a carer, they will become a donor without a deferral. Kathy as a center plays the role model in these three phases
and does her duty well. She is thoughtful and has a perspective and she feels proud of being a carer and a donor-to-be after realizing the whole cruel donating system (Jones 33); however, her friend calculating Ruth (Deb 55) as freeplay follows the trend and succumbs to the fate, and short-tempered Tommy (Deb 55) as freeplay is indecisive between the fate and his freewill, between Ruth and Kathy.

Surprisingly, not mutual love gains the right of deferral of the organ donation but Kathy’s contribution and responsibility do. She is a carer for eleven years (Ishiguro 3) and till the end of the novel since she has not yet gotten tired with her present phase, a carer, and thus never has to move onto the final step, the perverse responsibilities, claimed by a cruel real world (Levy 6). Kathy displays “courageous act of protest” as heroic (Levy 4) and her role as “a cog in the bioconsumerist culture” (McDonald 81) since she offers humanistic expression to the people of her kind, human clones, a marginalized minority in a monolithic majority to seek their right to be included in them (Slaughter 157 qtd. in Levy 4); her voice “stand[s] in for the clone community as a whole” (Levy 3).

III. Normals as Center and Clones as Freeplay

It is normals that come as center into which clones come as freeplay in the structurality of the real world; clones play a supplementary role to normals. Kathy desires to be like normals, and the world of Kathy, Tommy and Ruth, declare I, is no different from that of any normals; and neither are the clones different from any normals (Vorhaus 99), in their personal growth since early childhood to maturity, and to adulthood. As the clones are getting old, they start to donate significant organs until death completes them and parts them from their family and friends, merely like normals in certain diseases and in ill health by losing their sick organs in a surgery room. Then, a real life seems to be a life waiting for death if without love.

Truthfully, there is an absence that if normals need a human organ, they pay the fee, sign the contract with Miss Emily and then serve as role models for manufacturing the clones in trading human organs. Therefore, normals and clones are connected to each other. Just when a normal gets ill and needs an organ, a clone donates one and gets ill, since all lost things return in Norfolk, the lost corner of England, implying Hailsham, all for normals’ benefits (McDonald 81, Ishiguro 169).

Kathy and Tommy’s belief in the theory of love and deferral signifies hope in both worlds. Although there is true love involved between lovers, neither the clones nor the
normals can change their life course to death; namely, they cannot delay donating organs nor getting diseases. However, if with true love, either of them can experience his life with support and company until death separates them from their beloved, which is the spirit of life, despite pain or agony. If with belief in God and metaphysical pattern and leaning, and love, one leads a meaningful life in the kingdom that God numbers and finishes; again, life is meaningful not in the length but in the depth (Wood 39).

IV. The Clones’ Culture as Center and Miss Emily’s Ruling as Freeplay

It is the clones’ culture that comes as center into which Miss Emily’s ruling comes as freplay under the structurality of power in the institutions; Miss Emily’s ruling plays a supplementary role to the clones’ culture; and the center is there and not there: “[t]he rebellious free-spirited individual is at once a produce of the freedoms offered by society, and a threat to the order and stability of that community” (Levy 4). The three main characters, Kathy, Tommy and Ruth, seek their human essence and struggle for humanism in the world of human clones with Kathy as the main voice, created by Miss Emily as the medium in the real world of the normals.

Miss Emily implants the ideology of the twisted social responsibilities into the clones; she educates them in her ruling practices such as Exchanges, Sales or Madame’s gallery, where the clones construct their identities (Carroll 62, 66). Although later on Kathy becomes a universal individual in her struggle for a place in the hierarchical society and her voice represents the clone community (Levy 3), the clones form their culture and practices in Miss Emily’s ruling and they react to it differently.

Kathy recognizes Miss Emily’s conspiracy about ideology imposition, an idea offered by Tommy that the clones in Hailsham are taught with information always an early step beyond their age and they seem to accept the information that they do not really comprehend. Kathy and the other students are forbidden from comprehending the truth, evident in Miss Lucy’s exploding the donating system and the deceit of life in Hailsham (Marks 350; Levy 10-11, 5): “you’ve been told and not told. You’ve been told, but none of you really understand ... You’ll become adults ... you’ll start to donate your vital organs ... You were brought into this world for a purpose, and your futures, all of them, have been decided” (Ishiguro 81) and in Tommy’s discovery to Kathy, “the guardians had, throughout all our years at Hailsham, timed very carefully and deliberately everything they told us, so that we were always just too young to understand properly the latest piece of information. But of course we’d take it in at
some level, so that before long all this stuff was there in our heads without us ever having examined it properly” (Ishiguro 82). Most of the clones remain passive and accept their fate as their responsibility to the real-world society in their doomed position and do not revolt against it (Marks 348; Butcher 1299) because their logic to this responsibility is twisted (Levy 3) and they are “creatures of habit” (Wood 37). For example, after Ruth does a job as a carer for five years, she expresses her willingness to donate organs: “I was pretty much ready when I became a donor. It felt right. After all, it’s what we’re supposed to be doing, isn’t it” (Ishiguro 227 emphasis in original; Levy 3)? Kathy and Tommy intend to save their lives by their mutual love but in vain. Facing the monolithic social forces, it is possible that eventually Kathy will abandon her personal freedom and donate organs simply like Tommy and Ruth, which is indeed “an unjust capitulation to the demands of an oppressive social order” in a realistic version of the Bildungsroman (Levy 4); or, Kathy will age and fade like normals.

In her manipulation, Miss Emily intends to keep the theory of love and deferral as the human clones’ hope of delaying their organ donation and thus keeps those clones living the same regular life as normals (Ishiguro 261), implying whether life is meaningful counts on whether it is in a meaningful process. Although the clones are predestined to donate their organs and complete one day in the recovery center, Miss Emily creates a perfect environment and the best interests for the clones to live their life (Wood 38), creating the theme of a life with predestination or freewill. In the case of the clones’ infertility, it seems related to a test of their freewill.

It is probably not true that the clones are incapable of carrying babies and giving them birth but that they do not believe in their fertility, dare not break the guardian’s rules and do nothing to solve problems. This is indeed what culture as an expression of the clones comes as center into which what culture imposes on them comes as freplay. Then, three phases for the world of the human clones, Halsham, Cottages, and caring centers (Wood 36) are in Miss Emily’s arrangement of imposed ideology, the clones’ responsibility for the society; i.e. predestination for organ donation. The organ harvesting is even “internally normalized by the donors themselves” (McDonald 78). Hailsham, for example, educates students in the world of clones as well as those in the world of normals and it also “constricts individual autonomy, stunting rebellious impulses by strategically acclimating students to their predetermined role in society” (Levy 5). Hailsham as “the educational [humane] environment provides protagonists with a microcosm of the wider world they are later to experience” (McDonald 76-77; Marks 348) since childhood is “a social construction which is both culturally and
historically determined” (Scratton 2 qtd. in McDonald 77) “in a nexus of [given] ideological forces” (McDonald 77). Confessing to Kathy and Tommy, Miss Emily stands for the real world of normals and their desire and demand for healthy organs and for clones as means (Marks 350) of therapeutic ends (Carroll 61) and as the exploited (Levy 8):

There was no going back. However uncomfortable people were about your existence, their overwhelming concern was that their own children, their spouses, their parents, their friends, did not die from cancer, motor neurone disease, heart disease. So for a long time you were kept in the shadows, and people did their best not to think about you. And if they did, they tried to convince themselves you weren’t really like us. That you were less than human, so it didn’t matter (Ishiguro 263).

She feels proud in her deceit that she offers clones an excellent and supportive life in Hailsham, a good shelter, better than any other institutes and that she protects them from sad predestination, the regular procedures for organ donation (Ishiguro 268; Levy 6). Though from the clones’ perspective, if they prove their souls in their creative artistic works to the world, they can defer or stop organ donation (Marks 349); unfortunately, in Emily’s eyes, for Shameem Black, those creative artistic works prove that clones are good products for a wrong purpose (Levy 11-12):

we demonstrated to the world that if students were reared in humane, cultivated environments, it was possible for them to grow to be as sensitive and intelligent as any ordinary human being. Before that, all clones…existed only to supply medical science. (Ishiguro 261)

Under Emily’s careful manipulation, the clones gradually step onto their predestination.

The definition of human beings appears a question: like Butcher, who questions what makes people human (1300) and like Ishiguro, who questions what a soul is (qtd. in Griffin 658), I wonder whether clones are true human beings, have human characters and deserve the same human rights. A human being can be viewed as a human being if he can present his humanity or human essence by creating things and socializing in his human community or historical context, by which it means that he can present his soul and character; so does a human clone. Thus, human clones are not merely commodities but human beings simply if they are creative enough to create artistic
works for Madame’s gallery even from the guardians’ perspective (Griffin 655; Carroll 68), whose importance is emphasized (Jones 32) pitifully for product promotion (Jones 32); if clones’ bodies are “more than the sums of their parts” (Griffin 655); and if they are the oppressed intelligible (Butler qtd. in Carroll 63), which thus proves that they have the same souls in them as normals, since from the medical perspective, an embryo with conception already is counted as human (Marks 340): “She told Roy that things like pictures, poetry, all that kind of stuff, she said they revealed what you were like inside. She said they revealed your soul” (Ishiguro 175 emphasis in original).

Indeed, the clones are more human than the normals in the novel since they show more bonds, intimacy and commitment in the case of the existence of Hailsham and since the system of the successive organ donations is an act of inhuman (Griffin 655-56). Hailsham is meaningful for Kathy not because it is Edenic paradise, an environment for good health care and education but because it is a place that helps the human clones bind one another over space and time (Levy 5); namely, in Kathy’s eyes, without Hailsham, the clones may lose chance to stay linked with one another and lose their sense of belongingness and root.

V. The Author as Center and the Novel as Freeplay

It is the author who comes as center into which the novel comes as freeplay in the structurality of authorship; and the novel plays a supplementary role to the author. The novel uses the technique of postmodern narrative and meta-referencing and “distance[s] Ishiguro from the writing process” (McDonald 79) in Kathy’s address:

I don’t know how it was where you were, but at Hailsham we had to have some form of medical almost every week—usually up in Room 18 at the very to top of the house—with stern Nurse Trisha, or Crow Face, as we called her. (Ishiguro 13)

The reader senses the reader-writer exchange and Kathy functions as the voice of “an autobiographical account of events” and she “stamp[s] her authentic authorial voice upon the work” (McDonald 79) to an imagined reader as a peer by using the second-person address (Levy 9; Caroll 68). The reader and the narrator both look for traces of lives lost in the novel (McDonald 82).

The novel also “provides us with a window into a culture of genetic engineering and cloning technology in which people are exploited and killed by a state[,] seeking the
wider benefits of organ farming, a window that nevertheless reflects in part the
decisions facing contemporary culture” (McDonald 76). Furthermore, the novel is
“the dissensual Bildungsroman, a genre that promotes the benefits of free and full
personality development[,] while calling attention to the oppressive structural
institutions that constrain individual autonomy” (Levy 5); and it “suggests ways in
which ethics might be reconfigured and expanded for a posthumanist age” (Marks
351). The clones’ world is “another reality, an imagined past that could represent a
real future” (McDonald 82).

VI. Conclusion

It is a world and non-world, where clones lead their lives and non-lives as human and
non-human. Ishiguro presents the clones’ world or the three institutes, presented to the
reader, with Kathy as the main voice in parallel with the real world, hidden from the
reader, with Miss Emily as the medium. When facing the death of family and friends,
the normals in the real world have two choices: one choice is to let go of their beloved
and the other is never to let go. It is this choice of never letting go of normals’
beloved that makes Miss Emily create the world of the human clones.

It is absence over presence that the title “Never Let Me Go” actually embeds in the
novel its opposite meaning “just let go” (Deb 55), which echo in Linda Pastan’s poem
Go Gentle, where the speaker requires his ill father in great pain, to let go of life for
death to hold up; conversely, for love, the speaker also has to try best, let go of his
father and accept the loss of him. Namely, if we never let go, we will never let go of
clon farming and harvesting, an aporia, referring to an “unpassable path” (Norris 49),
and a pass against God’s will.

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The Myth of the Impossibility of Peace: A Mytho-Historical Hybridized Discourse

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Abstract
This paper presents the hypothesis that a second order discourse establishes itself and imposes a constructed reality in which Peace is regarded as impossible. This hypothesis is presented through an analysis of the genetic constitution of the discourses of Myth and History, from which the hybrid discourse emerges. It will be argued that:
1. The Discourse of Myth is characterized by:
   A. Thematic Necessity constituting its formal structure: mythological themes follow necessary fixed patterns.
   B. Interpretative Possibility constituting its material content: allowing variability in retellings, within fixed thematic structures.
2. The Discourse of History is characterized by:
   A. Evidence-Based Facts constituting its formal structure: distinguishing history from fiction.
   B. Contingent Events constituting its material content: events regarded as historically significant.

The emergence of the myth of the impossibility of Peace is the result of a subtle hybridization of the two first order discourses whereby a new Mytho-Historical discourse emerges. The hybrid discourse is characterized by the Thematic Necessity of Myth as its formal structure, and Contingent Events of History as its material content. In Mytho-Historical discourse, contingent events are attributed with the force of necessity. Furthermore, in the hybridization process the requirement of Evidence-Based Facts (Historical Discourse) and Interpretative Possibility (Mythology) are discarded.

The paper will conclude with examples of historically contingent facts, which have been appropriated by Mytho-Historical discourse and established as the foundations of the myth of the impossibility of peace.

Key Words: Myth, History, Discourse, Peace
Introduction

In his article entitled “Why do horrific pictures from conflict zones not stop wars?”, journalist and broadcaster, Paul Mason (2014), suggests a number of reasons why “despite the horrific content of the visual imagery of war, which bombards us daily, people still see war as an option and will sanction it even when it is put up to the test of democracy”¹.

When war journalism started nearly a century ago, it was thought that by publishing pictures of the horrors of the frontlines, the public would start seeing through the popular narratives of glory, patriotism, duty and courage which support war initiatives. Ending war by showing its true face, was regarded as the motive and the justification for sending vulnerable unarmed journalist photographers onto the frontline.

Mason suggests three reasons why the hoped for outcome of war journalism has failed to materialize. Firstly, he argues, we have become desensitized by these images which have now lost their power to shock or move us. Secondly, even when they do shock, such images can be used to provoke people to seek revenge rather than peace. Finally, the same bombardment of images coming from a proliferation of sources with different and often conflicting agendas, has resulted in the spread of skepticism among a public which “has come to see all graphic imagery of war as potentially fake, manipulated or propagandist.” By becoming more media savvy, the public now acts as willing or even expectant consumers, with the ability to select or disregard news and images according to how their contents fit with their beliefs, preferences or expectations.

The main objective of this paper is to add a further level of explanation to Mason’s compelling questioning regarding the affectivity and justification of war journalism. Basing on a structural analysis of the two interrelated discourses of Mythology and History, it will be argued that a subtle hybridization of these two discourses gives rise to a hybrid Mytho–Historical discourse whose structure and content combine in ways that support the emergence of myths such as that of the inevitability of war.

It is hoped that by investigating and highlighting how such myths are constituted and how they operate, we may be better equipped with the tools required to understand and expose them. Thus while remaining informed of unfolding significant historic often tragic events, we will also be aware that the reporting of these events can achieve a mythic force which holds us in its grip, and through which the hope of peace has come to be regarded as not only futile, but also dangerous. Awareness of how such myths emerge and operate may place us in a better position to be able to loosen their grip, and to be able to project and strive for those possible peaceful futures which seem to have been pushed beyond the horizon of our imagination.

Discourses and the complexity of Language

In his seminal work, *Philosophical Investigations*, Ludwig Wittgenstein (2001) argues against the simplistic view that language consists mainly of factual statements and that its use is predominantly to point out and name objects or facts. Wittgenstein focuses on the various functions of language to show that language is better conceived of as a complex multitude of diverse, overlapping and related discourses. Language users continuously employ and engage in different types of discourses in their social relations and their attempts to negotiate the different communicative demands, with varying degrees of success.

In order to highlight this complexity of language and the multi-layered discourses it enables and employs, Wittgenstein uses a number of analogies, possibly the best known of which, being those of language games and of the instrument panel in a locomotive cabin.

By drawing an analogy between language and games Wittgenstein argues that the application of different sets of rules and modes of engagement, allows us to use language to engage in different types of discourses, in the same way that modifications in sets of rules give us the possibility to play different board games while still using the same board and pieces. In the same way that the same ball can be used to play a variety of ball games, the same language system is used to engage in discourses whose objectives can vary from merely pointing out objects, to discussing abstract concepts and ideas, or even to express or elicit emotions to change peoples’ moods or motivate them to action. Shifts in the rules of engagement allow for the possibility of the same language systems to be employed in different “language-games”. Wittgenstein emphasizes that there are countless different kinds of use of what we call “symbols”, “words”, “sentences”. This multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (2001, p. 10e).

Wittgenstein mentions numerous examples of possible “language-games” such as “reporting an event”, “making up a story”, “making a joke”, “giving orders, and obeying them”, amongst others.

Each of these language-games or types of discourses, such as historical discourse, religious discourse and scientific discourse, functions in accordance to specific rule variants which may not always be explicitly stated or obvious. When engaging in historical discourse, for example, it is expected that statements are factual and possibly backed by some recorded or witnessed evidence. In the case of religious discourse, the requirement for evidence takes on a modified meaning from that of historical discourse. By contrast, in religious discourse modes of verification such as an appeal to divine revelation or reference to scripture may be accepted as adequate.

Through the language-game analogy Wittgenstein thus draws our attention both to the multi-dimensionality of language as well as to its dynamic state of change and development.
However, while the game analogy works well in drawing our attention to the fluidity, open-endedness and complexity of language, it may also give the impression that like conventional games, language-games serve merely for entertainment or playful purposes.

To counter this impression Wittgenstein emphasizes that the game analogy holds for all discourses equally, and it is not intended to draw distinctions between serious or authentic discourses and less serious or playful discourses. At the level of language, the distinction between “the real world” and the “play world” does not apply. Each of these discourses have their specialized function and should be regarded as multiple layers or different facets, each contributing to the complexity and wealth of the entire or whole language-game, which Wittgenstein equates to a “form of life.”

This complexity and complementarity of the different discourses is further highlighted in Wittgenstein’s analogy of the locomotive’s cabin.

It is like looking into the cabin of a locomotive. We see handles all looking more or less alike. (Naturally, since they are all supposed to be handled.) But one is the handle of a crank which can be moved continuously (it regulates the opening of valve); another is the handle of a switch, which has only two effective positions, it is either off or on; a third is the handle of a brake-lever, the harder one pulls on it, the harder it brakes; a fourth, the handle of a pump: it has an effect only so long as it is moved to and fro. (2001, p. 6e)

Just as the effectiveness of the locomotive depends on all the specialized functions of each lever mechanism, (cranks, switches, pumps, etc.), language also depends on the different functions of all the different sub-games, or discourses which make it up. Each specific discourse adds to the overall efficiency, range and possibility of the language, which it both constitutes and enables. However, one must note that the similarity of the surface features of these handles hides very different underlying mechanisms. Similarly, different discourses, though “looking more or less alike” may also hide different constitutive features and functions. A lack of awareness of such differences by language users may be as problematic and possibly dangerous as a lack of familiarity with a locomotive’s levers, by its driver. Thus Wittgenstein’s locomotive metaphor highlights the importance of awareness of the internal mechanisms and functions of the discourses, which language users may be engaged in. It also hints at the dangers of a lack of such awareness.

Wittgenstein’s insights into the complexity and functions of discourses will now be employed to carry out a structural analysis of the two discourses of History and Myth. Following this analysis, I will turn to Roland Barthes’ (1973) semiological analysis of the structure of first order and second order signs to investigate the process and consequences of the hybridization of these two discourses.

Structure and Content analysis of the discourses of Myth and the of History

The relation between the two discourses of myth and history are a prime example of what Wittgenstein would call ‘family resemblances’ (Familienähnlichkeit) to explain how discourses both resemble and also differ from one another.
The discourses of myth and history are not, never were, and will probably never be completely distinct. Like two intertwining spirals, they continually merge, overlap and separate, drawing nourishment both from their common traits as well as from the differences in their structures and content.

Thus the hybridization of myth and history proposed in this paper is not suggested as a one-off event which took place at a particular point in time. Rather, what is suggested here is that their cross-fertilisation is an ongoing perpetual dynamic.

**The Structure of Myth - Thematic Necessity**

Mythological discourse, whether classical or contemporary, is characterized by the retelling of narratives drawn from an interconnected collection of tales, which are mostly familiar to the audience. Because the narrative content of mythology does not claim strict factual correspondence to evidenced historical events, each re-telling of these tales allows space for changes and modifications to be introduced to the narrative. These changes allow for different interpretations so that the same themes, or re-worked familiar narratives, will ‘reveal’ truths, meanings, or explanations, which are in tune with the particular contextual requirements of the particular occasions of their re-telling (Calasso, 1994; Stiegler, 1994; Vernant, 1988). While the narrative content of a myth may vary, the theme around which it is woven remains unchanged, thus giving the retelling a familiarity which allows both recognition and acceptance of the tale, as well as the possibility of new interpretations and meaning.

The theme of the abduction of prize women would be an example of one such thematic structure which functions as a narrative scaffold which can be assembled and dismantled repeatedly to be re-used in different occasions and locations and to serve different purposes. Using the familiarity of the theme as a supporting scaffold, the mythologist or story teller can work around the tale, reshaping its contours and skillfully reconstructing its details, even giving it new reach and new meanings without weakening or compromising its foundational structure.

Numerous common themes such as that of the survival and return of the abandoned child, emerge repeatedly in classical mythology and also remain clearly operative in our own popular narratives.

The iteration of these identifiable themes allows the audience to engage while also giving them the confidence to accept the newly introduced twists and adaptations. The familiarity of themes provides the footholds or rhythm which entices the audience to be drawn into the narrative space with enough confidence to engage with, and embrace novel developments. The continued relevance and development of mythological re-tellings, therefore depends on the both the thematic necessity and also the re-interpretation of narrative content, which the rigidity of this structure enables.

**The Content of Myth – Interpretative Possibility**

While the structure of mythological discourse is characterized by thematic necessity, its narrative content allows for interpretative possibility. Thus the structure and content of mythological discourse work together to produce that minimal difference required for the continued emergence of meaning.
But Zeus chose the copy; he wanted that minimal difference which is enough to overturn order and generate the new, generate meaning … All Zeus’ other adventures, all Hera’s other vendettas, would be nothing more than further heaves on the same wheel of necessity which Hera set rolling to punish the woman most like herself.” (Calasso, R. 1994, p. 24)

One example of interpretative possibility is provided by the well-known classical myth of Pandora’s box. Pandora releases the curses from her jar, but Hope (Elpis) remains trapped inside. This is part of the rigid thematic necessity of the myth, which draws on the familiar thematic structure of gift exchange running through this myth (Hesiod, 1988; Vernant, 1988). In contrast to the strict thematic necessity, the narrative content related to hope, allows for the myth’s wealth of interpretative possibility (Verdenius, 1971). Why does hope remain in the jar? Is it locked away from the reach of humans, or is it kept in store for them? Is it left in the jar to make human life possible despite its futility?

In fact, the story of Pandora is best known for its presentation of Hope (Elpis), the precise meaning of which has puzzled commentators from antiquity. (Bartlett, R. C. 2006, p. 185)

Examples of the interpretative possibility of mythological discourse abound. Was Helen seduced or abducted? Was Prometheus the savior of mankind, or was he its curse?

The structure and content of mythological discourse is thus characterized by thematic necessity and interpretative possibility respectively.

The Discourse of History – The Parting of the Ways

For the Western tradition, History and Mythology part ways around the 5th century BC with the writings of Herodotus of Halicarnassus. Less than two centuries before Herodotus, Hesiod (c.700BC) would start his myths by invoking the muses, the daughters of memory (Hesiod, 1988). In direct contrast, Herodotus launches a new genre of discourse by proclaiming his authority on his accounts and insists on the factual nature of their contents.

This is the Showing forth of the Inquiry of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, to the end that neither the deeds of men may be forgotten by lapse of time, nor the works great and marvelous, which have been produced some by Hellenes and some by Barbarians, may lose their renown; and especially that the causes may be remembered for which these waged war with one another. (Herodotus. 1954, p. 1)

Hesiod and Herodotus inhabit different regions of an era in which the world-view shifted from the mythological to the philosophical (Vernant, 1988). Hesiod seeks inspiration from a source which is beyond his own time and memory. He is the singer of myths whose source lies beyond the knowledge and memory of mortals.
In stark contrast, Herodotus’ opening declaration stamps his authority. The sources of his narrative are his own searches and efforts, and his stated objective is the conquest of memory over forgetfulness. The sources of these narratives will no longer be lost in myth. History starts by identifying and proclaiming its sources and explicitly dissociating itself from the hidden sources of myth.

Modeled on Herodotus’ proclamation, historical discourse consists in the recording of historically significant events, with the aim that these events become part of cultural memory. This discourse adds another tool to the linguistic toolbox, its function being to supplement living memory by producing evidence-based records of historically significant events. This requirement for recorded evidence gives the discourse of history its distinctive structure.

While evidence-based facts form the underlying structure of historical discourse, the content which fills this structure and completes the narrative is made up of contingent events of historical significance. The contingence of these events, the possibility that things could also have happened otherwise, is essential for their historical significance. What may be of historical significance is not the fact that this or that particular monarch or leader died. That humans, no matter how important they may be must die, is a necessary fact. But what may give this necessity its historical significance may be the contingent circumstances surrounding that particular death. The fact that a king dies, has no historical significance in itself, all humans die, kings included. A king’s death in itself, teaches us nothing, but how he died, (was he poisoned, did he die peacefully in old age), may give it historical significance. History is about important events that happened, which may not have happened, or may have happened otherwise.

The condition or requirement of evidence-based facts distinguishes history from mythological discourse. This rule constitutes the formal structure of historical discourse. The narrative content which fills this structure and completes historical discourse is made up of contingent historical events.

The structures and content of myth and history can be presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mythology</th>
<th>Formal Structure</th>
<th>Material Narrative Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>Evidence-Based Facts</td>
<td>Contingent Historical Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thematic Necessity</td>
<td>Interpretative Possibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Transformation of Discourse

Having analyzed the distinct formal structures and narrative contents of myth and history, it is now possible to show how elements of the two discourses can merge to form a hybridized discourse. The following presentation of this process of hybridization draws heavily on Barthes’ analysis of the semiological process by which linguistic signs, are transformed into persuasive ‘myths’. By focusing on

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2Discussions regarding the possibility of objectivity in recording history (historical epistemology) and the nature of the factuality of events themselves (historical ontology), though interesting and relevant, are beyond the scope of this paper. The relevant points being highlighted here are how history is generally understood and the accepted rules with which we engage in this discourse.
Barthes’ seminal essay “Myth Today” (1973), I will argue that the proposed hybridization of myth and history runs parallel to the semiological transformation described by Barthes.

In “Myth Today”, Barthes describes myth a special type of speech which emerges through a parasitic hijacking of first order linguistic signs. A first order sign may be anything that can be endowed with meaning, “the language itself, photography, painting, posters, rituals, objects, etc.” (1973, p. 123). At the first order level, signs form the association of a signifier with a signified concept. This association is also dependent on the context and the contingent factualities within which it is made.

In the process of myth formation, first order signs are emptied of all contingent reference and then used to build new associations between them and ahistorical (timeless) concepts. In this way myths both construct and present a new reality in which these contingent facts are endowed with unquestionable necessity. Since there is no outward change in the sign itself, the transformation in its level of signification from one of contingent associations to one of necessary impositions, is subtle and unobserved:

“In passing from history to nature myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences, it does away with all the dialectics, with any going back beyond what is immediately visible…” (Barthes, R. 1973, p. 156)

To follow an example used by Barthes, an object such as a red rose can act as a signifier, which when associated with the concept ‘passion’, can take on the function of a linguistic sign, one which in this case Barthes calls ‘passionified roses’. At the start of this process of first order signification, the signifier, the rose, is empty of meaning. The rose itself is arbitrary in its significance – it could mean anything or nothing – but by its association with a signified concept (passion or love), the sign emerges as filled with meaning. Meaning (the content of a sign), therefore emerges from the association of an arbitrary (empty) signifier and a concept. But this emergence of meaning, as well as the success of its use is also dependent on the particular context in which it is embedded:

“The meaning (of the first order language sign: the word or picture) is already complete, it postulates a kind of knowledge, a past, a memory, a comparative order of facts, idea, decisions.” (Barthes, R. 1973, p. 127)

The success of the ‘passionification’ of the roses depends on contingent facts such as, to take just one example, the way they are presented or offered. It is not difficult to envisage how different shades or nuances of the same event of an offer of roses, could easily change the sign from one of passion into one of ridicule or insult. Even when the context is right, there is always room for multiple levels of interpretation of the same linguistic sign.
By contrast, in the second order of signification, through the process of shifting the sign to the force of myth, this openness or possibility is drained out and the sign is associated with an ahistorical concept. This robs the myth of any space for interpretation or nuance:

“When it becomes form, the meaning leaves its contingency behind; it empties itself, it becomes impoverished, history evaporates…” (1973, p. 127)

At this level the roses, irrespective of context or history, must necessarily signify passion. Passion is no longer signified by the roses, an association requiring history and context, but rather, at this second order level, passion becomes the very nature of roses. The association between the signifier and the signified thus loses its arbitrariness and becomes a naturalized connection. “We reach here the very principle of myth: it transforms history into nature.” (1973, p. 140). In contrast to the arbitrariness of first order signification, myth “makes us understand something and it imposes it on us.” (1973, p. 126). It does not only point out a fact, but makes that fact a necessary fact. All gifted red roses are naturally, and must necessarily be, ‘passionified’.

The hybridization of Myth and History

The insights on the effects and consequences of semiological processes can now be used as a model to analyse the parallel process at the discourse level, whereby the first order discourses of history and myth merge into the suggested second order mytho-historic discourse.

In his famous analysis of the picture of “the negro saluting the French flag”, Barthes (1973) holds that the shift to the second level of signification drains the picture of its historical content and transforms or refills the emptied sign with a natural and universal connection between the signifier, (the image content of the picture), and the signified concept (loyalty to the French Flag).

If we shift the same analysis from the semiological to the discourse level, we find that the picture would pertain to historical discourse since it portrays an evidence-based fact of a (potentially) historical significant event, namely that black French military members saluted the French flag. It therefore fulfills both the structural requirement (factual evidence) and the content requirement (historically significant event) that together make up historical discourse.

It is clear from Barthes’ analysis that it is precisely the historic contingency of the event, (the content of historic discourse), that is being drained out of this picture. In sharp contrast, the structure of historical discourse, the requirement for evidenced facts remains untouched.

As a result of this draining of its historical contingency, the ‘historical’ picture acquires its mythical power by taking on aspects of mythological discourse – an appeal to thematic universality – while holding on to the force attributed to it by its evidence base. To be precise, the contingent nature of historical content is attributed with the thematic necessity which characterizes the structure myth.
As a result of this exchange, the evidenced fact of this the historic picture, is no longer evidence merely that at least one black military member was pictured saluting the French flag, but becomes evidence to a newly established necessary fact, backed by solid historical evidence, that all French subjects, irrespective or their ethnicity or background, universally salute the French flag.

This process can be presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st order discourse</th>
<th>Formal Structure</th>
<th>Material Narrative Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mythology</td>
<td>Thematic Necessity</td>
<td>Interpretative Possibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>Evidence-Based Facts</td>
<td>Contingent Historical Events</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The resultant hybrid discourse emerges from a selective cross-fertilization of formal structures and material narrative contents:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2nd order hybrid</th>
<th>Formal Structure</th>
<th>Material Narrative Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mytho-Historic Hybrid Discourse</td>
<td>Thematic Necessity (From Mythology)</td>
<td>Contingent Historic Events (From History)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The shift from history to myth is therefore, only partial. The resulting discourse is not full blooded myth, but a hybrid discourse which maintains genetic elements of both parent discourses. While the structural constitution of the hybrid discourse remains that of myth (thematic necessity), the nature of its content is taken from history (contingent historic events).

It is also essential that through this process of hybridization some essential elements of the first order discourses are not carried forward but discarded. The formal structural constitution of historical discourse – the requirement for evidence-based fact – does not pass on into the genetic structure of the hybrid, as there is in fact no evidence that all black military personnel do salute the French flag. The narrative content of myth, that is, the interpretative possibility is also discarded.

As a result of the discarding of the requirement of evidence-based facts and the possibility of interpretation, the picture thus takes on the mythic power of establishing thematic necessity. Drawing on its new power, it now states categorically that all black French soldiers salute the French flag, and that this is a natural fact not a historic one.

The thematic necessity drawn from the structural form of myth replaces the contingent nature of the event, and gives the resulting myth its universal and unquestionable quality.

**Conclusion**

How does this discourse function in the case of the emergence of the myth of impossibility of peace?

The myth has now been shown to arise from a two-step process whereby, first it establishes a factual sign: “look this is the French empire”; and secondly, it imposes
this fact as a self-evident, necessary fact: “here is undeniable evidence that all it
subjects respect and are loyal to the empire.”

At the discourse level the myth of the inevitability of war is established through the
following parallel steps:

Step 1. It takes hold of a first order sign, for example, a picture of the shelling of the
city of Kobani, or a convoy of armed vehicles advancing through the desert. At this
level, the sign says, “look this is an explosion which took place during the shelling of
Kobani on the 18th of October 2014.” This sign is then emptied of these contingent
contents of the event, thus preparing it to be used as raw material for a new
association.

Step 2. The emptied sign is filled with a new signified concept, in this case not a
particular explosion but the fact of war itself. Through this new association the sign
says and shows more than just a contingent event of an explosion during a shelling
campaign. By taking on the thematic necessity of myth, the sign now says, “look this
is war, here is factual evidence of war, it is a necessary fact which cannot be denied.”

Step 3. The emergence of the myth, through sustained production of signs of war
takes on the force of a self-evident necessary fact. It now does not only point out the
fact that this is war, but it also imposes this fact on nature (Barthes, 1973). “Can’t you
see it? How can you deny that war is a permanent necessary condition? Here is
undeniable evidence of this fact”.

The hybrid constitution of the mytho-historic discourse gives it the constituent
qualities required for it to be able to force us to acknowledge the logical necessity of
this newly established reality.

“Look peace is shattered. It is impossible to establish, and to believe in peace is to
invite the terrors which may result from naive complacency. Do you still want to
maintain that there is a hope for peace? Is this what you want to invite upon us?”

It thus turns out that the language and pictures of war journalism in fact act as the
signifiers in the construction of the myth of the inevitability of war and the
impossibility of peace.

My argument is not a blanket indictment of war photography or war journalism. It is
clear that one type of signifier does not act alone in this process, but must operate
within a complex realm of signifiers which act together to form a cultural mindset
which projects and nourishes the myth.

But awareness of how these myths are constituted and how they operate may allow us
to be better equipped to understand and expose them. Finally, therefore, the argument
presented in this paper is a call for awareness that, while we do well to remain
informed of unfolding historically significant events, we should also be ever vigilant
of the mythic force that narratives and images of war may exert upon us.
References


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Vision of Sri Aurobindo and Teilhard de Chardin: Empowered by Creative Evolution and Mysticism

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Abstract
This paper is an effort to understand vision of Sri Aurobindo and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin pertaining to the future of man. Both were fervid believers in evolution as well as mystics. Evolution occupies a special place in their vision of cosmic consciousness. Evolution theory empowered Teilhard to introduce the idea of re- visioning of Christianity. His spiritual and mystical experiences empowered him to discuss ‘cosmicisation’ of Christ, culminating into, Omega Point. His position was in stark contrast to Biblical fundamentalism, due to which he suffered at the hands of the church authorities till his death, but his faith in Christ and science, compelled the Papal authorities to declare that Christianity is not opposed to evolution. Sri Aurobindo’s philosophy of involution-evolution enabled him to reinterpret vedas and Upanishads. Indian philosopher’s interpretations were idealistic and world-negating. Sri Aurobindo in his reinterpretation did bring out their essential concern in this world, which was a necessary corrective to the dominant inwardness of later Upanishads. The culmination of his integral evolution is the birth of a Gnostic being and Gnostic society. Both the thinkers accept emergent evolution, although there are differences within. Convergence and integration, is common to them, however, for Teilhard it is a closure at the Omega Point. Both the thinkers are influenced by Marxist thought as far as the social aspect of our life is concerned. While Sri Aurobindo’s ‘Life Divine’ can be called post-modern Upanishad, Teilhard is a visionary of new Christianity.

Keywords: Involution, Evolution, Gnostic Beings, Omega, Integration, Cosmicisation.
Introduction

This paper begins with chief characteristics of Sri Aurobindo’s theory of evolution, which is followed by main features of Teilhard’s evolutionary theory. A comparison of Aurobindo’s philosophy of evolution with Teilhard’s ‘hyperphysical’ account of evolution features next, followed by conclusion, which highlights their contribution to the humanity in general.

Sri Aurobindo and Teilhard de Chardin had two things in common, the profound belief in evolution and the repeated experience of cosmic consciousness. Both saw that the ultimate goal of this was to be the divinization of man.

Sri Aurobindo’s educational upbringing in England played a vital role in his reinterpretation of the vedic and upanishadic texts. The western concept of evolution influenced Sri Aurobindo’s philosophy and understanding. Through reinterpretation of the ancient scriptures he gave a new meaning to the concept of salvation, which aimed at universalization of man. S. K. Maitra, in his book, ‘The Meeting of the East and West in Sri Aurobindo’s Philosophy’, observes that, Sri Aurobindo treated creation and dissolution of the Universe as a Maypole dance, which has no place for individual creativity.

As well as, there was no cosmic, collective forward-moving of progressive human race. He also accepted nature/matter as real as Brahman or Sat-cit-ananda, the fact which ancient Indian philosophers, including Shankara had denied. Therefore, it is very clear that, he too was influenced and empowered by modern western science, integrating it in his theory of spiritual evolution. Also, it is very important to mention here that his mystical experiences, have played a crucial role in providing a rock solid foundation and evidence to his evolution theory.

He was well acquainted with the western culture and philosophy and also very greatly influenced by Indian scriptures. Like Teilhard, he too was enchanted with the idea of evolution. According to him, theory of evolution has been the key-note of the nineteenth century thought. He found the Heraclitian dictum, “one out of all and all out of one” very simulative, which was very insightful to his conception of ‘evolution’ and ‘involution’. He believed that this Heraclitian principle was in conformity with science.

The western idea of evolution is the statement of a process of formation, not an explanation of our being. In his philosophical interpretation, Sri Aurobindo seeks to account for the fact which satisfies science, that is, the fact that the higher emerges from the lower. The term evolution carries with it in its intrinsic sense, in the idea of its root the necessity of a previous involution. In other words, we are bound to suppose that all that evolves already existed involved, passive or otherwise active, whatever is the case, hidden or concealed from us in material nature. Hence it is important to note that the spirit involved in material energy is there with all its powers — life, mind and a greater supramental power are involved in matter. The future evolution of man, which involves transcending oneself and moving towards, ‘the superman, the God’ is justified by the human aspiration towards God, Light, Bliss, Freedom, Immortality.
This aspiration is a ‘constant’ in human nature which no scientific theories have quenched, and Sri Aurobindo offers an experiential basis for the expectation of the further step in human development.

There are two factors involved in this intuitive spark or flash of involution-evolution dialectics. One is speculative and the other is existential. First, the speculative factor, to explain the fact of evolution, Sri Aurobindo lays down the principle of involution: nothing evolves which was not previously involved with the scientific evidence that, the higher is shown to develop from the lower. This principle of involution, also is a logical explanation of the process of evolution. Hence, speculating further, he locates the mind and the spirit as well at the deepest level of matter, thus accepting the satkaryavada theory of causation, that effect is in the cause in the latent form. Thus, he concludes that, “If it be true that spirit is involved in Matter and apparent Nature is secret God, then the manifestation of the divine in himself and the realization of God within and without are the highest and most legitimate aim possible to man upon earth.”¹

The existential factor has reference to the undeniable fact of man’s undying aspiration. That is, what is involved, also necessarily must evolve, this reasoning is inspired by the existential factor. If evolution does have a further term, then our aspiration towards something higher is perfectly natural and justifiable. For Sri Aurobindo ‘man’ cannot be the last product of evolution, as he puts man only as a middle term, which is characterized by the consciousness of mind, therefore occupies a transitional status. Although it is so, he (man) fulfills an indispensable function, for it is through him that the divine realizes itself in the universe. Sri Aurobindo’s philosophy of evolution is essentially concerned with the future of man, fundamental inspiration being the existential factor of profound “aspiration” the divinization of man on earth.

His philosophy of evolution has other characteristic features. It is anthropocentric, that is, all evolution tends to manifest the divine, and the locus of that manifestation is no other than man, it is revealing God’s face in ‘man’; and has a spiritualist outlook, that is, it is finalistic in nature, since there is priority of spirit over matter which gives an orientation to matter. Sri Aurobindo’s evolution accounts for the journey of consciousness from ‘physical’ to ‘vital’ and from there to ‘mental’ and beyond this to ‘supramental’. According to him, primarily consciousness is evolving and ‘mind’ cannot be the last manifestation of this evolving consciousness, as ‘mind’ is fundamentally an ‘ignorance’ seeking knowledge. Evolution for Sri Aurobindo is a process by which the face of God behind and within this creation is gradually unveiled and so there is no reason to dispense with God. Sri Aurobindo writes in his Magnum Opus, The LIFE DIVINE, “The animal is a living laboratory in which nature has, it is said, worked out man. Man himself may well be a thinking and living laboratory in whom and with whose conscious co-operation she wills to work out the superman, the God.”²

Integration of the lower into the higher, and triple transformation are two important characteristics of future evolution. If our terrestrial existence (material, vital and mental) should rise to a higher principal, then we should bring about a radical and integral transformation in our present nature. The rational mind has not yet risen to the supermind, and so there is a big gap between the two.
To achieve this goal, Sri Aurobindo uses ‘integral yoga’ and the process of ‘triple transformation’ (psychic, spiritual and supramental). The two stages in triple transformation result in the transition from intellectual to spiritual mind. The third stage is the passage from the spiritual to supramental mind. During this transformation there is gradual ascending of mental powers starting from the Higher Mind, to Illumined Mind, to Intuitive mind and to Overmind. This ascending movement has to be complemented by one of descent, that is the overmind and supermind, as supernatural realities should set in our present nature. In order to achieve this, the individual intuitive consciousness must act only in subordination to the Universal Being. In this ascension, one experiences universal consciousness, thus making a human being as ‘universal individual’. The newly formed nature is not mere substitution for a previous one, but integrates it while transforming it. Thus, Sri Aurobindo is very sure about establishment of a race of gnostic spiritual beings on earth.

**Sri AUROBINDO as a Mystic**

The architecture of Sri Aurobindo’s theory of evolution lies in his mystical experiences. There are four landmark, higher yogic or mystical experiences as recorded in his biographical account of Sri Aurobindo’s yogic development. A first and second experience occurred in quick succession at Baroda in January in 1908 and in Alipore jail, from May of the same year to May 1909. These two were the contrary experiences of acosmic selfhood and cosmic consciousness. The third and the fourth experiences were those of a protracted development. The third experience was the achievement of a synthesis of the previous two. In the fourth experience he rose still further to achieve a supreme form of consciousness. This spiritual experience, led Aurobindo to the threshold of the supramental.

Sri Aurobindo’s system is called purna- adwaita, integral yoga, which is very innovative and constituted a clear break with traditional system of Samkhya-yoga. He was honest to say that, “Heaven we have possessed, but not the earth; but the fullness of the yoga is to make... Heaven and earth equal and one.” He showcased his own spiritual experiences, whatever he experienced through the process of integral yoga. His epic poem “Savitri” is a record of his progressive achievement of higher states of consciousness those he experienced in self-realization.

**Teilhard’s Philosophy of Evolution**

He interpreted the existence and origin of species within earth’s history and this cosmos. He was silenced by his religious superiors for taking an evolutionary stance, at the time when this theory is perceived as a serious threat to already established orthodox theology. Teilhard’s position was in stark contrast to Biblical fundamentalism, which holds the view that creation of this entire universe to be a completed event that happened ten thousand years ago. This was unacceptable to Teilhard as he was convinced of the fact of evolution and that it continues still more magnificently and at the highest levels of the world. His work, ‘The Phenomenon of Man’ was perceived as a threat to traditional theology and the Vatican denied its publication.
Like Aurobindo, Teilhard evolved a system, with mystical experience as its base, and developed it along evolutionary lines. In his book, Science and Christ, Teilhard writes, “It is not I that have laboriously discovered the whole; it is the whole that has presented itself to me, imposed itself on me, through a sort of ‘cosmic consciousness’. It is the attraction of the whole that has set everything in motion in me, has animated and given organic form to everything.” It is said that, during the first world war, where he acted as a stretcher-bearer, he seems to have lived in an almost permanent state of ‘cosmic consciousness’.

To begin with Teilhard’s philosophy of evolution, a quotation to clarify his ideas:

“... In the world, nothing could ever burst forth as final across the different thresholds successively traversed by evolution (however critical they be) which has not already existed in an obscure and primordial way...” According to Teilhard then, life comes from nowhere than earth itself. He puts forth the only scientific explanation that the original earth-mass already contained the elements of future life, when it first separated itself from the larger volume of stellar matter. This matter contained pre-life within it, which emerged as the ‘elementary consciousness’, which brought about the ‘wonderful phenomenon of life, with its noble corollary, the phenomenon of man’. Although consciousness is “only completely recognizable in man” but it does not mean that consciousness is restricted to man alone. That is, since man is himself a cosmic phenomenon, then consciousness too ‘has a cosmic extension’. According to Teilhard, life is the flowering of matter. “Far from being an exception in the material realm, organic matter is a prolongation at a higher level of the potentialities of inanimate matter.”

He views consciousness as transposition at a higher level, of the phenomenon of life. He is reluctant to label his evolutionary theory as metaphysics, but instead calls it ‘hyperphysics’, or ‘ultraphysics’. He was perfectly aware of the fact that his phenomenological view does not exhaust the depths of reality. Yet, he allowed philosophy to influence his theory by formulating two basic assumptions, which guide him throughout his evolution theory, “The first is the primacy accorded to the psychic and to thought in the stuff of the universe, and the second is the ‘biological’ value attributed to the social fact around us.” The other philosophical assumptions which he tacitly accepts include, the principle according to which ‘union differentiates’; that the universe is intelligible and reducible to unity without which he could not attempt to discover a ‘coherent order’ in the universe and finally the deduction of ‘Omega’ as necessary condition of human activity. It is to be noted here that the ‘total’ explanation of evolution requires both the scientific and the metaphysical approach, which are complementary viewpoints.

Teilhard admits the distinct nature of thought as opposed to mere life, because of its universality and its world-wide significance. “The biological change of state terminating in the awakening of thought does not represent merely a critical point that the individual or even the species must pass through. Vaster than that, it affects life itself in its organic totality, and consequently it marks a transformation affecting the state of the entire planet”. For e.g. When life constitutes in a sphere, and emergence of thought affects the very nature of life, then the appearance of thought must result in the formation of yet another sphere.
In this theory the notion of spheres is essentially linked up with evolution itself. In other words, a distinct phase in evolution is automatically translated into a corresponding sphere. Further, the successive superposition of spheres keeps pace with the successive leaps in evolution: so we have the parallel series of geogenesis, bio- and psychogenesis on the one hand, and on the other the geological spheres, the biosphere, and finally the noosphere.

Teilhard introduced the notion of “threshold” and connected it with spheres. The various layers correspond to so many phases in evolution, the passage between the two different phases in evolution represents a ‘threshold’ separating two levels of earth-existence. Also a discontinuity in the movement is marked by a break in the stratification. He distinguishes two such thresholds— the threshold between matter and life and that between life and thought. A threshold, according to Teilhard is, a crisis of the first magnitude, the beginning of a new order. A threshold despite all discontinuity, does preserve a real unity between the two realms it separates. Teilhard brings in the fundamental laws of his evolution theory at this juncture: first, all forms of earth-existence have a within, by which he understands some form of consciousness in the widest sense of the word, and the second, the degree of interiority corresponds to the degree of structural complexity.

He recognizes some form of interiority in matter and therefore a real continuity between matter itself and life, he also stands for an equally real discontinuity between both. At the next threshold Teilhard distinguishes between thought and mere animal consciousness. The within of man is specifically ‘reflection’ i.e., “no longer merely to know, but to know oneself; no longer merely to know, but to know that one knows”. He views consciousness as ‘in the second degree’ and maintains that reflection is that form of interiority, which constitutes man into a center, where man consciousness no longer diffuses itself over a multiplicity of exterior things, but it returns to the unity of its own interiority. This re-turn of man upon himself is called by Teilhard ‘reflection’, which distinguishes between the human and non-human consciousness. Further, he conceives of evolution as progressive deepening of the within of things, an increasing interiorization, with thought an entirely new type of interiority appears.

Teilhard’s evolution theory is anthropocentric, that is, he begins with, ‘pre-eminent significance of man in nature’. The whole argument of ‘The Phenomenon of Man’, is to justify Teilhard’s anthropocentrism which emphasizes the threefold qualification: first, that man is not so much the center as rather the direction of evolution; second, that evolution leads up to mankind rather than to man; third, mankind in its turn has its center beyond itself. Social dimension or socialization is common mark of both, Aurobindo’s as well as Teilhard’s evolution theory. Both show a dynamic evolutionary tendency towards mankind, and through it beyond.

Teilhard’s theory is finalistic and has spiritual character. He introduces ‘a divine focus of mind’ which according to him is the center of humankind. Since it is divine, in his evolution theory it is radically transcendent with regard to man. Teilhard places a supreme center of attraction—an ultimate, ‘Omega Point’, which he places beyond man and makes it the summit of phenomenal evolution. He also makes it preexisting to evolution as the prime condition of its entire development.
Further, it is not a product of evolution, but the source of evolutionary push, which it sustains throughout by attracting it towards itself. Thus, Omega is God, in whom man finds his fulfillment. It is God who realizes the fullness of ‘man’ by drawing him (man) to himself (God). Further, Teilhard brings out the concept of ‘planetisation’, a process by which mankind achieves its unity as a collective reality. A quote from Teilhard’s ‘The Future of Man’ to clarify more on ‘planetisation’— ‘projected forwards, this law of recurrence makes it possible for us to envisage a future state of the Earth in which human consciousness reaching the climax of its evolution, will have attained a maximum of complexity, and as a result, of concentration by total ‘reflexion’ (planetization) of itself upon itself.\(^{11}\)

**Comparison of Sri Aurobindo’s theory of evolution with that of Teilhard de Chardin**

While Teilhard’s philosophy of evolution is founded on his profound acquaintance with the scientific data, Sri Aurobindo’s theory is based on spiritual transformation, however, for him the scientific and philosophical ideas were very simulative.

Upanishadic interpretation looks at the individual liberation as a release of the spirit from its material conditions but, Sri Aurobindo going a step further, sets up his ideal of spiritualization of matter, that is, he does not want an escape but a transformation. Both the thinkers use the term social dimension, as an essential feature of future humanity. Teilhard’s picture of a future is where humanity as a whole would converge upon itself. He conceives of ‘collectivity’ as a reality in its own right. He gives priority to the collective, saying that there is ‘more in society than in the individual.’ Aurobindo thinks of the ‘collective’ in terms of the common nature. For Sri Aurobindo, ‘the Self as individual is no less real than the Self as cosmic Being or Spirit.’ According to his theory of future evolution, that is, his ideal of a universal liberation of mankind requires the realization of super-nature in the individual as a pre-condition. It is clear that the gnostic community can be born only from the association of gnostic individuals.

Both were sympathetic to Marxian socialism. Aurobindo specially felt that, there must be some connection between collective socialist ideal of unity in diversity and his own inner experience, as much the same thing. However, later he rejected it, because the type of society which forcibly subjects the individual to the community, and whose only ideal was economic development, cannot bring about overall development and thus should be a failure.

With reference to the convergence of individuals into the Omega point, Teilhard makes it clear that this Omega is the meeting point of consciousnesses in their individuality. He mentions that Omega is personal in nature and should remain distinct from these elements. Otherwise, if and when individual consciousnesses merge in Omega, then they would destroy themselves at the very moment they hope to fulfill themselves. Aurobindo’s Purna Adwaita, monism stems from his experience of his ‘own individual consciousness’. According to him the individual is ‘universal’ in his conscious comprehensiveness. Thus this individual consciousness will become universal in extension. It will reach its universality when it will not feel itself to be opposed to its individuality.
With reference to the collective dimension, although their terminology differs, they affirm the same thing: the individual has to transcend his limitation and to universalize himself.

Conscious union, thus is equated by Aurobindo with Ontological identity. On the contrary Teilhard presupposes distinction in union, both conscious and ontological. As the ontological reality of the individual is constituted by his capacity of conscious reflection, according to Teilhard man finds himself transcended by Omega; and for Aurobindo man transcends himself in reaching supramental consciousness.

For Aurobindo experiencing the depths of consciousness became the foundation of his spiritualistic evolution theory, while Teilhard discovers the other’s consciousness, that of his fellow-men. According to him, the interpersonal relationship justifies the paradox of ‘differentiating union’. In other words, the individual gifts himself by communicating his very self to others and in this process, far from dispossessing himself of his self, his personality grows through this reciprocity to the extent that, the closer he unites himself with the others, the more he becomes himself.

The concept of involution too, is treated differently by both of them. What Sri Aurobindo means by ‘involuition’, is that the Absolute, before evolving out of matter, first involved itself into it. For Teilhard, involution is the very process or the product of it. For the former, involution precedes evolution, whereas for the later, it is evolution coincide with involution.

CONCLUSION

Despite the intricate differences, there is something which is fundamental in their outlook, their sense for universal unity, which is identified as cosmic consciousness. Both, Sri Aurobindo and Teilhard single out consciousness as the golden thread running through evolution.

Both, Sri Aurobindo and Teilhard were mystics, and mystics are of their very nature concerned with eternity rather than time. However, both were staunch believers in evolution and we know that evolution takes place within time. So, both of them treated the great orthodoxies of the world as the best approximations of the truth or reality; and also simply a stage in the evolutionary process which must be transcended or even discarded in the light of new scientific age.

It is the scientific theory of evolution which empowered Teilhard to introduce the idea of re-visioning of Christianity. It was his spiritual, experiential and mystical aspect of life which empowered him to discuss cosmicisation of Christ, culminating into one point, i.e., Omega Point. Although Teilhard suffered a lot at the hands of the church authorities till his death, his striving faith compelled the Papal authorities today, to declare that Christianity is not opposed to evolution. This is surely Teilhardian unshakable faith in scientific facts which empowered him and gave him courage to rethink about the ‘Historic Christ’. This in turn empowered the church towards the amalgamation of ‘evolution’ in the changing face of Christianity. The following statements from the Papal authorities demonstrate the gradual change in their attitude towards evolution theory and science in general, showing that it is not in conflict with science:
Pope John Paul II in 1996 stated that: “…new knowledge has led to the recognition of the theory of evolution as more than a hypothesis. It is indeed remarkable that this theory has been progressively accepted by researchers following a series of discoveries in various fields of knowledge…”

However before this statement, Pope Pious xII (1939-1958) opened the door to the idea of evolution and actively welcomed the Big Bang theory.

The present Pope Francis backed the theory of evolution and the Big Bang. According to him, “The Big Bang, which today we hold to be the origin of the world, does not contradict the intervention of the Divine Creator but, rather, requires it. Evolution in nature is not inconsistent with the notion of creation because, the evolution requires the creation of beings that evolve”.

The accommodation of the evolutionary theory, to explain the creation and genesis of the universe is a great step forward towards, Teilhard’s remodeling or reshaping the new theology. This phase is also, very prominently pushed by the power and faith in science and the faith that Teilhard had in his mystical experiences.

Ancient Indian Scriptures also required a refreshing review, a dynamic reinterpretation, to highlight their relevance and applicability in the post-modern world. Sri Aurobindo not only excelled in this task, but also came to be known as the supreme yogi or sage of the post-modern world, through his new ‘integral yoga’. He found that, all Indian Philosophy as such was interpreted as Idealistic and World negating. However in his re-interpretation of the Vedas, he brought out their essential concern with this world, which was a necessary corrective to the dominant inwardness of later Upanishads.

He found the justification of this dynamic interpretation of the Vedanta in the ancient Hindu Scriptures, i.e. Vedas, Upanishads and Bhagwad Gita. He had mystical experiences of Oneness of Cosmic Consciousness as he practiced Yoga and his Philosophy of “Life Divine”, is an account of his real practical experiences of the Divine. Through his lifelong yogic ‘sadhana’, and his mystical and occult experiences, he introduced the concept of involution and evolution__ connecting Science, Spirituality and Religion – further making his Integral Yoga, religiously neutral. Teilhard’s as well as Sri Aurobindo’s invaluable contribution to humanity thus was possible through their integration of science and religion. While Sri Aurobindo’s ‘Life Divine’ can be called post-modern Upanishad, Teilhard is a visionary of new Christianity.
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**Abstract:**
The basis of this paper was to create a new ethics statement using mixed culture of East and West philosophy about compassion. The materials I have used include some parts of the following works: books of Arthur Schopenhauer, Vedas, Confucian literature, Buddhist and also some books about Islam philosophy. The method which I have improved to explain the main idea about compassion is describe this idea not only in separate order, but also showing the long term connection this idea between different cultures. My overall approach was to remove the illusory barrier between different philosophical schools and showing the new concept of compassion. Upon completion of the assignment I found that the new concept of compassion is - a daily phenomenon which is working absolutely directly, independent of any other considerations participate primarily in the suffering of others, and through it in the prevention or termination of this misery, what, in the latter end and is all the satisfaction and well being and happiness of all. Exclusively compassion is the real basis of all true justice and humanity.

**Keywords:** compassion, humanity, Arthur Schopenhauer, philosophy, East and West
Introduction

Compassion is the most subtle understanding. Only a man is capable for this feeling. Compassionate person should not worry about the nonsense, which is occurring daily life. Only upon this condition, indirectly, you can help your energy of compassion to accumulate, to crystallize, to become stronger and go up together with meditation. Then on the day of happiness you will be filled with the light and you will have at least one friend - compassion. Your life will change immediately, because now you have such of wealth, which can bring happiness to the whole world (Compassion: The Ultimate Flowering of Love, 9).

For the East and West history of philosophy compassion has been a major factor in an individual’s moral life and in the process of self-fulfillment. Arthur Schopenhauer was a great thinker who had wide understanding of compassion. He was one of the first Western philosophers who seriously study Indian philosophy. Schopenhauer was interested in the Upanishads, late Vedic writings. He also was familiar with Buddhism and Confucianism.

Idea of Compassion in Schopenhauer's Ethics

Arthur Schopenhauer was a philosopher who rejected many principles of classical philosophical traditions, especially the idea that morality should be formed on the basis of reasonableness. The basic idea of a thinker was expressed in the title of his main works "The World as Will and Representation". It is associated with the difference between two worlds. The first the space-time domain of phenomena, or representations, and the second a special sphere of will which does not correlated with space and time, which is unchangeable, which is identical to itself and free from the forms. Schopenhauer considers reality only one of these worlds mysterious, incomprehensible world of human thought of will, which one he understands as "a blind will to live," irrational "desire" that pervades everything, including man. Changing in "human level" will lead to life motives of individual behavior, such as selfishness, anger, but also compassion.

“There are only three fundamental springs of human conduct, and all possible motives arise from one or other of these. They are:

(a) Egoism; which desires the weal of the self, and is limitless.
(b) Malice; which desires the woe of others, and may develop to the utmost cruelty.
(c) Compassion; which desires the weal of others, and may rise to nobleness and magnanimity.

Every human act is referable to one of these springs; although two of them may work together”. (The basis of Morality,171-172)

Last point compassion forms the source of morality. Arthur Schopenhauer argues that compassion contains certain mystical elements.
“.....compassion is stirred within me, by another's pain, then his weal and woe go straight to my heart, exactly in the same way, if not always to the same degree, as otherwise I feel only my own..... It is in fact, the great mystery of Ethics, its original phenomenon, and the boundary stone, past which only transcendental speculation may dare to take a step” (The basis of Morality, 170).

The task of personality to win selfish settings that encourage his will.

Schopenhauer considers human being as an inescapable tragedy rooted in the general character of the being of the world and society. Eternal unconscious desire, constitutes the essence of the will, finds its maximum expression of man. Obsessed with the desires and aspirations, man is doomed to suffering, daily life is experienced as devoid of comforting prospects pointless vanity, joy is reduced only to the temporary absence of suffering, to be followed by a new pain or boredom. True happiness is unattainable for the individual life, as well as for the history, which ruled by a fatal case, selfishness, stupidity and malice. Our ethical goal is to give up desires and abolish the will to live and so get rid of the source of suffering. Schopenhauer thinks that a sense of compassion is formed the basis of the main virtues of mankind: justice and loving kindness.

“....I put two virtues; the one, justice, and the other, loving-kindness; and I name them cardinal virtues, since from them all others not only in fact proceed, but also may be theoretically derived. Both have their root in natural Compassion. And this Compassion is an undeniable fact of human consciousness, is an essential part of it, and does not depend on assumptions, conceptions, religions, dogmas, myths, training, and education” (The basis of Morality, 177).

The moral meaning of life is revealed through compassion, which liberates man from the burden of caring for their own lives and highlights the care for others. Moral basis of human behavior consist two pillars: ascetical attitude towards the self and the altruistic attitude toward others. As a result of this compliance should be an exemption from affiliation meaningless "will to live", elimination of selfishness and achieving a kind of irreligious "holiness".

Indian philosophy and Compassion

Indian Philosophy is not limited to a simple accentuation on the spirit of true religion. This philosophy also gives us the codex of morality. We have to notice that, without this the ideal of morality would be unreliable leader. All form into behavior, where passions are controlled and dominated by the mind, where there is self-transcendence, understood as liberation from the limitations of egoistic personality, where we are creating; because we are all involved in the implementation of the Divine Plan all of these forms are virtues, but their opposites to vice. Kindness and compassion for whole Earth is the main feature of Indian ethics.

There are sources of Hindu thought which inspired men and women to follow the ideals of compassion and nonviolence. The rishis who revealed the principles of dharma or divine law in Hindu scripture knew full well the potential for human suffering and the path which could avert it.
To them a one spiritual power flowed in and through all things in this universe, animate and inanimate, conferring existence of its presence. To them life was a coherent process leading all souls without an exception to enlightenment, and no violence could be carried to the higher reaches of that ascent (https://www.himalayanacademy.com).

If you ask to describe the idea of compassion through the Indian Philosophy only with one idea, it definitely will the next one: “May all beings regard me with the eye of a friend. May I regard all beings with the eye of a friend” (The Texts of the White Yajurveda, 39).

But this idea is not able to show us the whole picture. Based on this we will analyze the idea of compassion through the several schools of Indian philosophy, such as Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism.

Hinduism has its roots in the Vedic civilization that is why it is called the oldest world religion. The word Hindu is derived from the Indo-Aryan word Sindhu, the Indo-Aryan name for the Indus River in the northwestern part of the Indian subcontinent. According to Gavin Flood, "The actual term 'Hindu' first occurs to a Persian geographical term with the people who lived beyond the river Indus". (https://en.wikipedia.org)

The followers of Hinduism believe that we have positive human qualities which lead soul closer to God and away from Evil. There qualities are: Daya (compassion), Sat (truth), Santokh (contentment), Nimrata (humility) and Pyaar (love).

Daya is a Sanskrit term with the meaning "mercy", "compassion" and "desire to help all those who suffer". In Indian religion Daya is one of the "divine qualities" and one of the main virtues. Daya means to feel and understand the pain and suffering of other living beings as your own. Anyone who has the quality of daya, can not stand to see the suffering of others and immediately starts to act compassionately. Daya is opposed to the violence. Who developed a quality of daya prefers to die rather than to be a cause of the death of others.

That is why Sikh verse says: “Keep your heart content and cherish compassion for others; this way alone can your holy vow be fulfilled” ( Unleash Your Life! Your Pathway to Inner Happiness, 136).

The next philosophical school that we are going to analyze is Jainism. This school was one of the ancient dharmic religion, which is appeared in India about IV-VI centuries BC. Jainism preaches no harm to all living beings in this world. The philosophy and practice of Jainism based, primarily, on the cultivation of the soul to attain omniscience, omnipotence and eternal bliss. Jains accept different levels of compliance for the strict followers. There are: Ahimsa (non-violence), Satya (truth), Asteya (non-stealing), Brahmacharya (chastity) and Aparigraha (non-possesion).

Ahimsa is behavior and practice, where the first requirement is no harm and non-violence. Ahimsa is defined as behavior that leads to reduction harm in the world, directed against the most evil, not against the people who create it (no hate). But as a vow ahimsa is distributed among many Eastern spiritual schools such as Buddhism,
Hinduism, Yoga and Jainism. In this part of the article we will discuss ahimsa only through the Jainist philosophy. In Jainism, Ahimsa is not mere human sympathy; it is empathy, the urge to identify oneself completely with other person, other living beings, with the whole universe. Bhagwan Mahavir said,

"If you kill someone, it is yourself you kill. If you overpower someone, it is yourself you overpower. If you torment someone, it is yourself you torment. If you harm someone, it is yourself you harm". (http://www.bodhicitta.net).

Jain concept of Ahimsa is different from the idea of non-violence, which we can find in other schools. For these schools violence associated with causing harm to others. But for Jainism violence, first of all, is injuring own self. Furthermore, this means violence to other. Besides, the followers of Jainism expanded the idea of non-violence not only for humans, but also for all animals, plants, micro-organisms and all living beings. All lives are sacred and everyone has a right to live without fear.

From its origins in India over two thousand years ago, Buddhism has spread throughout Asia and is now exerting an increasing influence on Western culture. The central teachings and practices interesting for the followers are karma and rebirth, meditation and ethics. In clear and straightforward language this part explains a basic Buddhist understanding about ethics, especially about the idea of compassion.

The experiential and emotional dimensions of Buddhism – Buddhism as a lived experience – are extremely important. The Buddha's personal experience of enlightenment is the bedrock of the entire Buddhist tradition. Time and again he invoked his own experience as authority for his doctrines, and suggested that teaching not validated by personal experience was of little value. The Buddha's enlightenment also included an emotional aspect in the form of a profound compassion which motivated him to propagate his teachings, or Dharma. Out of compassion for the suffering of mankind he spent the greater part of his life spreading a teaching which he realized was “hard to see and understand, subtle, to be experienced by the wise”, for the benefit of the few “with little dust in their eyes who are wasting through not hearing it”.(Buddhism A very short introduction, 6-7).

As mentioned above meditation has had deep roots in Buddhism. The importance of meditation in Buddhism can be appreciated by recalling that it was while meditating that Buddha gained enlightenment. Meditation has four measureless states. According to the texts of the Pali canon they are, loving kindness (metta), compassion (karuna), sympathetic joy (mudita) and equanimity (upekkha).

Karuna one of Buddhist philosophical category, which means compassion for people and for other living beings. In comments to the ancient collection of didactic poetry and prose of Sutta Nipata karuna interpreted as a desire which leads us to save other people from misery and suffering, maitri as a desire to bring them prosperity and happiness. These two are altruistic aspects of practice. As the best example of compassion is recognized Buddha himself. Combined with the wisdom compassion is one of the two pillars of Buddhism.
The Essence of the Heart Sutra, Dalai Lama wrote: "According to Buddhism, compassion is an aspiration, a state of mind, wanting others to be free from suffering. It's not passive it's not empathy alone but rather an empathetic altruism that actively strives to free others from suffering. Genuine compassion must have both wisdom and loving-kindness. That is to say, one must understand the nature of the suffering from which we wish to free others (this is wisdom), and one must experience deep intimacy and empathy with other sentient beings (this is loving-kindness)."

Understanding Compassion through Chinese philosophy

Compassion (tong qing) is caring and understanding someone is hurt or troubled, even if you don't know them. It is wanting to help, even if all you can do is to listen and say kind words. You forgive mistakes. You are a friend when someone needs a friend. These same two characters contain this meaning of compassion and sympathy in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, which makes this word universal.

In this part of the article we will discuss the idea of compassion only from the Confucian view. Confucianism often is called religion, but in it there is no institution of the church, and for them the matters of theology are not important. Confucian ethics is not religious. Their main idea is to create a harmonious society on the ancient model, where every person has his own function. Harmonious society is built on the idea of loyalty (Zhōng) loyalty in the relationship between an employer and employee, aimed at preserving the harmony of the society. Zigong asked, Is there a single word that can guide a person's conduct throughout life? The Master said, that would be reciprocity, wouldn't it? What you do not want others to do to you, do not do to others (The Analects of Confucius, 7).

Even then, Confucius said that the degeneration in tradition, accompanied by a losing moral values. And as a consequence of it people have lost sense of decency and ceased to behave appropriately. Therefore, Confucius suggested changing the education system so that it will become the basis of the formation of new morality. The new generation raised on the basis of these moral qualities once again begins to perceive values of something natural and normal. Only people with sincere kindness can be the basis of the restoration of the public peace and order. Although Confucius always appealed to the authorities of the past, he still was innovator, he literally did not try to revive the old traditions, because, as he understood it was impossible and useless.

Also we ought to note that this ethical philosophy can be practiced by all members of the society. Confucian ethics is described as the promotion of virtues, encompassed by the five constants. They are: Ren (humaneness), Yi (righteousness or justice), Li (proper rite), Zhi (knowledge) and Xin (integrity).
Here we will focus only on Ren point of Confucius five constants. Confucius defined Ren in the following ways:

- Ren is a wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others.
- Another meaning of Ren is "not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself.
- Ren is not far off; he who seeks it has already found it. Ren is close to man and never leaves him.( wikipedia.org)

Also it has to be noticed that Ren is not a concept that is learned; it is innate, that is to say, everyone is born with the sense of Ren. This idea has some similarity with Schopenhauer's concept. So from the point of view of Schopenhauer also the difference of character is innate: “Can Ethics fashion the hard-hearted man anew, so that he becomes compassionate, and, as a consequence, just and humane? Certainly not. The difference of character is innate and ineradicable” (The basis of morality, 237).

The idea of Compassion in Islam philosophy

The next part of the article will take you to the Islam point of view of the idea of compassion. In the Muslim tradition, foremost among God's attributes are mercy and compassion. Each of the 114 chapters of the Quran, with one exception, begins with the verse; "In the name of Allah the Compassionate, the Merciful" The Arabic word for compassion is rahmah. Islam teaches compassion for fellow Muslims.

For the Islam epoch the idea of rahman had deep essential meaning. Almost every philosopher pay attention to this ethical category. One of this scholar was Imam Al-Ghazali. We can say that, he was the most important thinkers of the "golden" epoch of Islam. He had a significant influence on the formation of Islamic culture. It is impossible to imagine Islam culture without the ideological legacy of Al-Ghazali.

What was the main point in his understanding of compassion? Here we can find some similarity with the Schopenhauer ideas. Three human attributes which Al-Ghazali mentioned in his book, Schopenhauer distinguished as the three human conducts:

“Some of thy attributes are those of animals, some of devils, and some of angels, and thou hast to find out to which of these attributes are accidental and which essential. Till thou knowest this, thou canst not find out where thy real happiness lies. The occupation of animals is eating, sleeping, and fighting; therefore, if thou art an animal, busy thyself in these things. Devils are busy in stirring up mischief, and in guile and deceit; if thou belongest to them, do their work. Angels contemplate the beauty of God, and are entirely free from animal qualities, if thou art of angelic nature, then strive towards thine origin, that thou mayest know and contemplate the Most High, and be delivered from the thraldom of lust and anger. Thou shouldest also discover why thou hast been created with these two animal instincts: whether that they should subdue and lead thee captive, or whether that thou shouldest subdue them, and, in thy upward progress, make of one thy steed and of the other thy weapon”(The Alchemy of Happiness,17).
The hidden force of personality that Al Ghazali seeks to apply is love. Only love frees people from the bondage of thoughtlessness, selfishness and materialism. Only love is expressed in patience, compassion, kindness and self-sacrifice. Love motivates, inspires, encourages and satisfies.

"This is not because it is paradoxical, but because it is true, and is necessary for the completeness of the thought I have to express. It is this: All love (agape, caritas) is compassion or sympathy". (The World as Will and Representation, 374)

Conclusion

Schopenhauer was the first Western philosophy who has developed a consistent world and life denies ethics. The source of his ethics was Eastern, especially Indian philosophy.

As for Schopenhauer and also for Eastern philosophy main point in the ethics - is compassion. Schopenhauer argued that all life is suffering. The will to live, become conscious, turns into a deep compassion for all beings. This will not only understand the suffering of the people, but this will understand the suffering of all living things in general. The fact that ordinary ethic called "love" is substantially only compassion. Through this universal compassion will to live renounces itself. So compassion is a beginning of true purification.

Taking all this into consideration, we can determine the similarity between the understandings the idea of compassion in the following order.

1. It is the starting point of morality;
2. Compassion contains a mystical element;
3. It cannot be explained psychologically;
4. Compassion is the ground or basis of actions of moral worth;
5. The difference of character is innate, and ineradicable.

In conclusion, I would like to briefly touch on a subject that is beyond the scope of this short essay and the topic more extensive. The happiness of one person can deepest and positively affect the well-being of the entire human community as a whole.

Eventually, humanity is a single organism, and this small planet - our only home. If we want to protect your home, each of us has personal experience to feel this universal altruism. Altruism can only eliminate selfish motives that lead people to deceive and oppress others.

I believe that at every level of society - the family, national and international - the key to happiness and success is the development of compassion. No need to take this or that belief, there is no need to share a particular ideology. All that is needed from all of us is to develop human values.
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The Association between Free Will Beliefs and Stereotypes: People's Belief in Fatalism Promotes Gender Stereotypes

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Abstract
The problem of free will has been analyzed by philosophers over the ages. In addition to these analyses, social psychologists have recently begun to explore the problem of free will from a different perspective. In specific, they examine what constitutes laypeople’s belief in free will and how these beliefs function in people’s social life. As an example of such attempts, Zhao and his colleagues proposed and found that if people are induced to disbelieve in free will, they are likely to show stereotypes against out-group (Zhao, Liu, Zhang, Shi, & Huang, 2014). The present study sought to replicate this work but failed to confirm the effects of disbelief in free will on stereotypes. Then we additionally analyzed the relationships between subordinate concepts of free will beliefs (free will, scientific determinism, fatalistic determinism, and unpredictability) and stereotypes. This analysis found the unpredicted association between fatalistic determinism and stereotypes. Specifically, the more people endorsed the belief in fatalism, the more they expressed gender stereotypes. Despite its preliminary character, our findings indicate it is not disbelief in free will but belief in fatalism which causes stereotype in people’s minds. Implications are discussed with regard to laypeople’s concept of free will and its social functions.

Keywords: Free Will, Fatalism, Stereotype
1. Introduction

Lay Conception of Free Will

The problem of free will has been debated by philosophers over the centuries. Does it exist? Is it compatible with determinism? These are essentially problems for philosophers and not problems for psychologists. The authors, as psychological researchers, do not seek to resolve these philosophical questions. Rather, the present investigation aims to explore psychological processes associated with free will beliefs. In specific, we elaborate the relationships between free will beliefs and gender stereotypes. But before we review the experimental evidence on the effects of free will beliefs on various judgments and behaviors, it will be necessary to confirm what lay concept of free will is.

Free will is a term frequently used in the philosophical literature, but to date there is no consensus about what is meant by free will. While a variety of definitions of the free will have been suggested (e.g., Haggard, Mele, O’Connor, & Vohs, 2010; Kane, 2005), the term is generally understood to mean alternative possibility (the ability to choose actions from at least two options) and agency (the ability to cause intended actions). This idea is supported by empirical research of Monroe and Malle (2010, 2015). Specifically, they asked participants to explain the conception of free will. On the basis of participants’ free description data, they claimed that lay people’s concept of free will consists of (a) the ability to make a decision/choice, (b) doing what you want, and (c) acting without internal or external constraints. We could argue that the responses categorized as “the ability to make a decision/choice” are associated with alternative possibility while those categorized as “doing what you want” and “acting without internal or external constraints” reflect agency.

Having confirmed the lay concept of free will, we will now turn to consider whether people hold strong free will beliefs in their everyday lives. In specific, do people think that they have the abilities to choose actions among possible options (alternative possibility) and cause intended actions (agency)? The available evidence suggests that people do believe in such free will (Laurene, Rakos, Tisak, Robichaud, & Horvath, 2011; Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005, 2006; Paulhus & Carey, 2011; Rakos, Laurene, Skala, & Slane, 2008). For instance, Rakos et al. (2008) demonstrated that people are likely to judge that they have free will when asked, and the following studies succeeded in replicating this tendency.

Effects of Disbelief in Free Will

So far this paper discussed that the lay concept of free will consists of alternative possibility and agency, and people believe they have such abilities. But what would happen if people’s belief in free will is challenged? Recently, this question has been addressed by researchers in social psychology and they have shown that inducing disbelief in free will changes people’s social judgment and behavior. In the typical experiment, participants are shown or read several sentences which support or deny the existence of free will. In a subsequent task, participants who are primed with disbelief in free will are likely to judge or act differently compared with those primed with belief in free will.
As an example of such attempts, Vohs and Schooler (2008) examined the effects of disbelief in free will on willingness to cheat on the test. In one of their experiments, participants were presented with sentences which supported (free will condition), denied (determinism condition), or were unrelated (control condition) to the existence of free will. After this manipulation task, they completed a cognitive test in which they were allowed to overpay themselves. Results provided evidence that participants in the determinism condition took more money than those in the free will or control conditions. Thus, telling people that they do not have free will would prompt them to cheat on the test.

Subsequent work using the similar procedure has expanded the work by Vohs and Schooler (2008). For example, Baumeister, Masicampo, and DeWall (2009) investigated the effects of disbelief in free will on helping and aggression. They found that participants in the determinism condition were less willing to help others and restrain aggression than those in the free will and control conditions. Furthermore, Zhao, Liu, Zhang, Shi, and Huang’s (2014) work demonstrated that induced disbelief in free will facilitates individuals to have negative stereotypes against outgroups. In specific, participants whose belief in free will was undermined were more likely to agree with statements which affirm racial stereotypes. Taken together, it seems plausible that to undermine people’s belief in free will would lead to anti-social attitudes and behaviors.

Why does disbelief in free will facilitate anti-social attitudes and behaviors? According to Baumeister et al. (2009), statements which deny free will undermine the motivation of self-control, which is the capacity to override one’s automatic responses. If people are told that they cannot choose their actions and cause intended actions, they would be less motivated to exert effort of self-control. At the same time, motivation of self-control is needed for restraining anti-social attitudes and behaviors and people tend to act impulsively without self-control. Thus, people whose belief in free will is challenged would be less motivated to control their automatic responses, resulting in the increase of anti-social attitudes and behaviors such as showing negative stereotypes.

The Present Hypothesis

As mentioned in the opening paragraph, this paper is intended as an investigation of relationships between free will beliefs and gender stereotypes. Although several studies have established that disbelief in free will motivates people to act anti-socially, replications are needed for the findings. The present work focuses on the research by Zhao et al. (2014) and aims to conceptually replicate their findings that disbelief in free will results in increased stereotypes. In the current experiment, participants are assigned to conditions which prime disbelief in free will (scientific determinism and social determinism conditions) or a condition which prime belief in free will (free will condition). Our analysis predicts participants in the scientific determinism and social determinism conditions would report stronger gender stereotypes than control participants.
2. Method

Participants

Forty-eight undergraduates (34 men, 14 women, \( M_{\text{age}} = 20.67, SD = 1.36 \)) agreed to participate in an experiment by responding to a series of questions. They were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (free will vs. scientific determinism vs. social determinism).

Free Will Belief Manipulation

Participants completed computer-based tasks, consisting of the free will belief manipulation, the positive and negative affect measures, the stereotype measure, and the free will belief measure. At the first phase of the experiment, we used a sentence completion task as the manipulation of free will belief. This task requires participants to produce as many meaningful sentences as possible out of a series of words, and the contents of the words were changed across the conditions. In the free will condition, the sentence completion task included words such as “free will,” “make choices,” and “decide.” Thus, participants in the free will condition were induced to make sentences which support free will. In contrast, in the scientific determinism condition, the task included words like “genes,” “biological computers,” and “neural activity.” In a similar way, in the social determinism condition, “culture,” “external world,” and “home environment” were included in the task words. Accordingly, participants in these conditions were induced to make sentences which deny free will either because their actions are determined by scientific or social factors.

Positive and Negative Affects

After the free will manipulation, participants completed the Japanese version of Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Sato & Yasuda, 2001) to check the possibility that the free will belief manipulation affects participants’ mood. The Japanese version of PANAS consists of a 8-item Positive Affect subscale and a 8-item Negative Affect subscale.

Stereotype

We used the Scale of Egalitarian Sex Role Attitudes (SESRA; Suzuki, 1994) as a measure of stereotype. This scale included 15 items, such as “A woman should have and raise one or more children,” and “It is extremely important to raise a boy to be masculine and a girl to be feminine.” Items were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree), and higher scores represent stronger gender stereotypes.
Free Will Belief Measure

After the stereotype measure, participants completed the Japanese version of the Free Will and Determinism Plus Scale (FAD+; Watanabe, Sakurai, Watamura, & Karasawa, 2014) as a manipulation check. This scale consists of four subscales: free will (7 items), scientific determinism (7 items), fatalistic determinism (5 items), and unpredictability (8 items). Participants were instructed to rate their responses to these items on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree). Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and debriefed.

3. Results

Preliminary Analysis

Before testing the substantive hypotheses, we first examined the internal reliability of dependent variables and found that participants’ responses to each measure were reliable (positive affect, $\alpha = .81$; negative affect, $\alpha = .89$; gender stereotype, $\alpha = .83$; free will, $\alpha = .57$; scientific determinism, $\alpha = .61$; fatalistic determinism, $\alpha = .79$; unpredictability, $\alpha = .83$). Then we conducted an ANOVA to test the possible effect of the free will belief manipulation on participants’ mood. As we found no effects of the manipulation on positive and negative affect ($F$s $\leq 0.73$, n.s.), these variables were excluded from subsequent analyses.

Stereotype

The mean scores of gender stereotype are presented in Figure 1. We conducted an ANOVA on this measure, but the effect does not reach significance ($F = 1.21$, n.s.). Thus, contrary to our prediction, people’s gender stereotypes have not changed as a function of free will belief.

![Figure 1: Mean gender stereotype scores as a function of free will belief](image)
Free Will Belief

As a manipulation check, we included the FAD+ in the end of the experiment. Although we introduced the manipulation of free will belief, the scores on each subscale did not differ among the free will, scientific determinism, and social determinism conditions ($F$s $\leq$ 0.92, n.s.). Therefore, the manipulation of free will belief was not effective in the present experiment, suggesting that the lack of effects on stereotypes might be due to the failure of the free will belief manipulation.

Relationships between Free Will Belief and Stereotype

Although the manipulation of free will belief had no effects on gender stereotypes, we additionally analyzed correlation between the FAD+ subscales (free will, scientific determinism, fatalistic determinism, and unpredictability) and gender stereotypes. A significant correlation was found between fatalistic determinism and stereotypes ($r = .30$, $p < .05$), but not between free will and stereotypes ($r = -.03$, n.s.). Scientific determinism and unpredictability were not also significantly correlated with stereotypes ($r = -.03$, n.s.; $r = .03$, n.s.). Therefore, gender stereotype seems to be associated with the beliefs concerning fatalism but not free will per se.

4. Discussion

Hypothesis Testing

This study investigated the relationship between free will beliefs and stereotypes. Contrary to our expectations, there was no evidence for the effects of the free will belief manipulation on gender stereotypes: people were not likely to show gender stereotypes in the condition where they were induced to disbelieve in free will. However, the manipulation did not have an effect on the FAD+ scores as well as gender stereotypes, so the lack of effect on gender stereotypes could be due to the failure of manipulation. This possibility is partially supported by the correlational analysis between FAD+ scores and gender stereotypes. As we found the significant correlations between fatalistic determinism and stereotypes, it is suggested that beliefs relating free will have some effects on gender stereotype.

Before speculating the reasons for this finding, we have to discuss why the manipulation of free will belief did not work. One explanation is that the contents of scientific and social determinism messages might have caused psychological reactance among participants. Psychological reactance means the motivation to act counter to pressure that is put on people and it is likely to occur when freedom is threatened or lost (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). If psychological reactance occurs, participants resist or act repulsively to the messages of manipulations, leading to a null or opposite effect. In the same manner, the observed no significant effects in the present study could be attributed to participants’ psychological reactance because the contents of the “no free will” messages in the scientific and social determinism conditions are expected to threaten or lose freedom. In fact, Schooler, Nadelhoffer, Nahmias, and Vohs (2015) have pointed out that the manipulation of inducing disbelief in free will sometimes elicits psychological reactance. Therefore, we speculated that participants’ psychological reactance might account for the manipulation failure of free will belief to some extent.
Belief in Fatalism and Stereotypes

Although we failed to replicate the work by Zhao et al. (2014) that disbelief in free will leads to enhanced stereotypes, we found the unpredicted association between fatalistic determinism and gender stereotypes. Fatalism is the view that everything happens in the world is inevitable and there is nothing to do for us to change the fate. This belief in fatalism would make it difficult to override one’s automatic responses because our efforts and intentions come to nothing under the fate. Therefore, it may be belief in fatalism and not disbelief in free will which undermines motivation of self-control such as showing gender stereotypes. In the meantime, however, previous research has indicated disbelief in free will as distinct from belief in fatalism prompts people to cheat on the test (Vohs & Schooler, 2008), which suggests denying free will is crucial for individuals disinclined to exert effort of self-control. Since the current and past research did not include a direct measure of self-control, it remains inconclusive how belief in fatalism or disbelief in free will affect social judgments and behaviors such as stereotypes and cheating. Accordingly, there would be a clear need for additional research to address more extensive processes behind these effects.

Conclusion

In closing, it is important to note that the present investigation only deals with beliefs related with free will concepts, not free will itself. As discussed in the introduction, the questions whether free will exists, or whether free will is compatible with determinism have been debated by philosophers. Whereas the current study has nothing to say about these philosophical questions of free will, it does suggest social function of belief in free will and fatalism. In specific, this study found evidence that belief in fatalism and not belief in free will is associated with gender stereotypes. These social functions of people’s beliefs in metaphysical concepts seem only solvable by empirical data, so future inquiries should be addressed to further uncover how people judge or act on the basis of their beliefs in fatalism or free will.
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Nature of Knowledge and Knowledge of Nature in Islam

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Abstract
In order to understand the reason behind totalitarian approach to nature and human-nature relationship, this paper focuses on linkage between religion and nature. It is aimed here to answer two complementary questions; firstly, how the knowledge about nature has being produced in Abrahamic religious tradition, and secondly, if environmental ethics originated from Islam can work to prevent the crisis of nature. It is argued that because of originating from an Abrahamic tradition built on masculine power relations and with its value hierarchy based on sacralization and absolutization, and so one dimensionality, the attempts of creating Islamic environmental ethics cannot be enough to face the crisis of nature. To test this argument, the paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, the historical developments related to Abrahamic religion-based calls for environmental action are investigated. In the second section, the attempts of creating an Islamic environmental ethics are examined. And finally Islamic nature of knowledge is analyzed from Political Ecology (PE) perspective. As a result of critical content analysis based on PE perspective, it can be said that the crisis of nature is not stemmed from Renaissance thought and so re-sacralization of nature cannot be the solution to it. Instead, it can be linked to totalitarian thinking. This is so because the problem, here, is not science or religion but an epistemological problem which is produced and re-produced through power relations.

Keywords: Abrahamic tradition, environmental ethics, Islam, nature, religion, totalitarian thinking
Introduction

Today, capitalist-militarist growth strategies cause many problems for the nature -the species including humans as part of it. In spite of being so vital, these problems are ignored or not considered as the top item in the agenda. This is mainly because of governmental policies produced through power relations in a globalized world. And there is not a consolidated opposition against these policies. Since people have mostly similar attitudes towards nature and human-nature relationship, the lack of consolidated opposition can be linked to a specific state of mentality.

At first glance, it can be said that ecological problems is about lack of adaptation. This means individuals, throughout the history, have been mostly choosing to subjugate nature instead of having a responsive position with-in it. It is believed that this is a result of mainstream knowledge production shaped historically by power. At this point, ecological crisis might be seen as the last phase of adaptation problem that is built upon power relations. At this last phase, the totalitarian efforts to control nature cause the crisis with-in nature and between individuals.

This research focuses on religion as the strongest dimension of individual’s mentality which is believed to be crisis-prone. Because of being a socio-political phenomenon, religion is still a crucial aspect of socio-political life. Therefore, it also continues to be an important concept in academia. And since there is an urgent need for facing ecological problems, religions are also considered as potential instruments to implement some key concepts for supporting environmental ethics.

In order to understand the reason behind above mentioned totalitarian efforts, this paper focuses on linkage between religion and nature from a Political Ecology (PE) perspective. Here, main assumption is that Abrahamic religions can be seen among important sources of knowledge production which shapes human thinking. It is also assumed that any academic research paying attention to religion must be held from an “out of religion” perspective, especially if it is not a theological one. Therefore, this research cannot be and will not be based on an ontological understanding but epistemological one.

Based on these assumptions, this paper aims to answer two complementary questions; firstly, how the knowledge about nature has being produced in Abrahamic religious tradition, and secondly, if environmental ethics originated from Islam can work to prevent the crisis of nature. It is argued that because of originating from an Abrahamic tradition built on masculine power relations and with its value hierarchy based on sacralization and absolutization, and so one dimensionality, the attempts of creating Islamic environmental ethics cannot be enough to face the crisis of nature. Although there are important Islamic principles, which can be interpreted under an environmental ethics, this is not sufficient to face the crisis of nature and adapt to it

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1 The man-centered approach of Islam -as well as Abrahamic tradition in general- let the researcher use analytical possibilities of Political Ecology. Political Ecology reflects a relatively new vision considering “the political” and “the ecological” interrelated. This perspective is obviously stemmed from a critical understanding of the link between knowledge and power, and in this situation between knowledge about nature and power. Therefore, it has the potential to open a new phase in sustainability debate through a process of analyzing how knowledge about nature has being produced and how this has been affected by power relations.
through an eco-justice perspective. This is mainly about totalitarianism, which is a very prominent characteristic of religious thinking, stemmed from one dimensionality based on sacralization and absolutization. It is thought that this type of thinking does not question the hierarchy of souls principle shaping value hierarchy and so justifies subjugation of nature.

In order to answer above mentioned questions and test the argument, the paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, it will be discussed how the knowledge of nature is produced through Abrahamic tradition. In other words, the historical developments related to Abrahamic religion-based calls for environmental action will be investigated. In the second section, the attempts of creating an Islamic environmental ethics will be examined. And finally Islamic nature of knowledge will be analyzed from PE perspective in order to show its relationship with today’s ecological crisis and so why Islamic environmental ethics cannot save nature.

**Knowledge of Nature in Abrahamic Tradition**

The literature on the relationship between religion and “environment” is quite new. Still, one can find important works focusing on this relationship. Especially, the article written by Cynthia J. Branton (2006, p. 212-214) is a well-organized work for understanding the general framework. According to Branton, religious tendencies and values are essential for encouraging individuals work together in order to create a sustainable future.

To begin with, it can be said that the literature linking religion and nature has become prominent with thought-provoking work of Lynn White Jr. in 1967: *The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis*. In this work, he insisted that the Christian idea of domination over nature caused the long term ecological crisis in human history. Then he suggested a Franciscan interpretation of nature based on equality among creation (White Jr., 1974 [1967], p. 28-30). Richard L. Means (1967) followed him with similar arguments in his work *Why Worry about Nature?* On the other hand, Schaeffer (1992 [1970]) replied them in a counter way in *Pollution and the Death of Man*.

These first attempts focusing on nature-religion linkage later triggered new efforts. Assisi Conference held by Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) in 1986 can be seen as an important institutional effort in the field. At that time, Prince Philip –the then international president- brought prominent religious leaders together to call their followers for environmental action. It is important to note that the conference was symbolically held in Assisi –the hometown of St. Francis.

At this point, it might be helpful to summarize Judeo-Christian understanding of nature through Assisi Declarations. According to these interpretations, Judaism stands for its concern and compassion for all creation. Order created by “God” out of chaos is a crucial dimension and following Adam, “man” takes the responsibility to keep this order in harmony before “God”. It is said that Jewish festivals can be seen as the celebration of the cycle of seasons of nature. “Man” is accepted as the leader and custodian of nature world. In this sense, no harm principle is very crucial. It is also

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2 Since environment is identified with a man-centered understanding of nature which is criticized from various perspectives, it is written in-between quotation marks throughout the paper.

3 At that time, the name of the Foundation was World Wildlife Foundation.
important to note that being on the same rowboat is a metaphor used in Vayikra Rabbah (Leviticus) of Talmudic literature.

On the other hand, when Christian Call is taken into consideration, a similar interpretation of nature can be seen. Praising “God” through his creation is the basis of this interpretation. Similarly, harmony reflects “God”s power. Based on the concept of double citizenship, “man” is responsible not only in this world but also in heavens. In this respect, stewardship is a key concept. Assisi Declarations' Christian Call ends with St. Francis’ “Canticle of Brother Sun” that sees all living and non-living creation from equality perspective.

These works, generally, focused on how different religious teachings might be brought together for enabling ecologically sustainable societies. In this approach, religion gains importance dependent to its influence on individual’s identity formation and lifestyle. Beside this, there are some works aiming to match science and religion in order to protect nature. For example, Norgaard (2002, p. 842-846) tries to show how Christianity triggered scientific developments enabling nature protection in a more efficient way.

After these primary efforts, academic efforts got on the stage in 1990s and 2000s. Harvard, Yale and Oxford were leading institutions at that time. A conference with the theme of “religion and ecology” was held at Harvard University and then book series were published. Also, two institutions were established: The Forum for Religion and Ecology at Yale and Harvard University Center for the Study of World Religions. Later on, the Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature and Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature, and Culture were published consecutively, and also International Society for the Study of Religion and Nature was established in 2007.

One of the most important expressions of above mentioned efforts might be the 2008 dated collective book entitled The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Ecology. The book is divided into three sections. While the link between traditional religions and nature is analyzed in the first section, the second section focuses on ecological problems caused by population growth, genetic engineering, etc. and the pressure created by these problems on religious beliefs. And third section deals with the question of how the link between religions and earth restoration is tested (Bauman, 2008, p. 14). The book is built upon two main questions. The first question is how world religions approach to individual’s relationship with nature. Second one is how belief and action can be shaped in facing “environment.”

However, the attempt of answering these questions unveils a basic concern. The aim of the book is stated as finding an ecological basis for religions and so enabling them theologically vital and politically energetic (Gottlieb, 2006, p. 8). It is obvious that the emphasis of “politically energetic” is just the opposite of what secular actors are willing to do to keep religion out of politics. It is also important to note that keeping religion out of politics is just a utopia in a historical process socio-political situation interacts with religions. However, such a secular vision is still crucial. Moreover, an effort about how religion can be linked to nature is as a methodological effort while this paper aims to analyze the link from an epistemological aspect which seems to be crucial for conducting an investigation based on knowledge-power relationship.
White Jr.’s claim gains more importance if it is interpreted as a critique of domination over the knowledge of nature. Although there can be alternative explanations of Bible or appearance of it, only one explanation can reach to the status of being “universal”, in other words becomes hegemonic. This is a claim in line with Regis Debray’s analysis of today’s global society. According to Debray, the West (or “developed” North) still holds five trumps: Unprecedented cohesion, monopoly on the universal, global business school, programming human sensibilities, and scientific innovation (Debray, 2013, p. 30-37). Among these trumps, “monopoly on the universal” has been produced and maintained with help of other trumps in the long term.

However, it can be argued that “monopoly on the universal” is not a new but historical phenomenon. While masculine Christian church and state were standing as the local “monopoly on the universal” interpretation of socio-political facts and concepts at the past; today, the area of interest and influence has increased a lot. This means the change about “monopoly on the universal” is not about form and content but scale. Therefore, the knowledge produced by masculine Christian church and state about nature had first become locally “universal” and with the spread of capitalist-militarist modernity, it has become universally “universal”. Additionally, there is one more thing about this universality. Beginning from ancient times mainstream philosophical arguments were explicitly or implicitly built upon the idea of hierarchy of souls. Starting from Pythagoras, all knowledge about nature has been produced without questioning the concept of hierarchy of souls. According to this concept, god is located at the top of the hierarchy, and below the god, angel, man, woman, animal, other creatures, and evil are respectively located. Thus, the belief in hierarchy in a spiritual level justifies the hierarchy in the world.

This universality is also true for the knowledge about woman and gender relations. The fate of Maria Magdalena is just one of the many examples produced by masculine historical authorities in order to determine knowledge about woman and gender relations. Indeed, there is not a huge distinction between the knowledge produced about nature in general terms, and woman in specific terms, from the subjugation politics perspective. Both forms of knowledge have always been produced and re-produced through totalitarian thinking, based on masculine forms of power relations.

**Knowledge of Nature in Islam**

After investigating the positive and negative aspects of the knowledge of nature in Judeo-Christian tradition, it is now time to look at the attempts of developing Islam-based environmental ethics. First of all, it must be stated that there is a common tendency among scholars who link nature and Islam to blame the West for the crisis of nature. These views formulate the problem as either Western (political) hegemony or Western understanding of science and technology. For these scholars, “Islam is essentially good.” Qur’an and Sunnah are taken into consideration as correct sources

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⁴ Maria (Mary) Magdalena is the symbol of female leadership in Christianity but this knowledge was lived down by masculine church. It is insisted that 52 Bibles -which are older than 4 Gospels- have been found in Egypt which proves her close relationship with Christ and leadership after him. For more information, Eisler, R. (2015) **Kadeh ve Kılıç** (Original Name: The Chalice and the Blade), Trns.: Orhun Burak Sözen, Istanbul: Maya Kitap.
in order to develop an ethical opposition to West. Based on this idea, the efforts can be divided into two: those in civil society and those in academia.

It is claimed by various scholars that Islam’s attitude towards nature is much friendly when compared to Judeo-Christian tradition (Manzoor, 1984, p. 232-239). Therefore, it is important to test if there is such a remarkable difference between the approaches of Islam and Abrahamic tradition to the “environment”. Since shari‘a is about practice (law and ethics), it is important to distinguish Islam’s theory and practice before showing the inconsistencies between discourse and practice. However, it is also important to note that any religion’s theory and practice cannot be separated from each other and any new interpretation becomes part of Islam, through an interactive process based on power relations. Here, this can be labeled as religious praxis bringing philosophy and practice together. In this respect, Islam generally refers to peace and focuses on absence of conflict and absolute harmony. But if the relationship between individual and nature cannot be balanced; there can be no room for harmony. Therefore, it is aimed here to answer the following question: Can Islamic values alone be considered as guarantors for nature?

Among the studies focusing on the relationship between Islam and nature, Islam and Ecology: A Bestowed Trust (Foltz, Denny, and Baharuddin, 2003) can be seen as a master-piece by the ones who would like to make a detailed investigation in the field. This book is also seen as one of the main reference books for this paper. Additionally, the book titled The Touch of Midas: Science, Values and Environment in Islam and West (Sardar, 1984) gives a good insight about Islamic environmentalism although it was written almost 30 years ago. This book has triggered some questions which helped to develop main research question.

Obviously, two prominent scholars must be stated in the field of Islamic environmental ethics. Fazlun M. Khalid can be considered not only as an important scholar (Khalid, 2002) but also as a leading activist because of being the founder of Birmingham based Islamic Foundation for Ecology and Environmental Sciences. Finally, Seyyed Hossein Nasr is a prominent figure in this field and his views can be followed in his book entitled Religion & the Order of Nature (Nasr, 1996). This work is also helpful to understand general framework for the attempts of knowledge production through Islamic interpretations.

Khalid claims that there are two fundamental reasons behind today’s ecological problems: the change in perceptions and rise of wealth-money phenomena. These two reasons, for him, are stemmed from the interplay between secular-scientific ethics and modernity, and are against Islamic principles (Khalid, 2003, p. 301). The extended version of this claim can be seen in Nasr’s writing which will be discussed below. So if these phenomena are against Islamic principles, what the principles –the guarantors for nature- are.

Four major principles that can be worked for creating an environmental ethics are listed as: tawhid (unity and oneness of god), khilafa and amana (stewardship and trust), shari‘a (the ethics of action), and ‘adl and i’tidal (justice and moderation) (Manzoor, 1984, p. 155-159). Tawhid can be interpreted as a principle of environmental ethics within the interpretation of respect to the creation of god. Khilafa and amana are identified with the human that is the most important creation.
In this respect, any human-being must be protectionist and honest as part of his “ethical being.” Thus, shari’a, if defined as the ethics of action, is to be worked as an enforcement mechanism for environmental ethics through halal-haram distinction. The main ethical idea behind shari’a is not “being good” but “doing good.” Therefore, shari’a has an absolute ethical understanding. Coming from same etymological roots in Arabic Language, ‘adl and i’tidal can be identified with the concepts of balance and also harmony (between god, nature and history). I’tidal can also be interpreted as a crucial dimension of environmental ethics because of being against consumption. Some scholars also pay attention to ahiret (belief in hereafter) as an additional principle.

An investigation about khalq (to calculate) will also show how it gains importance in Islamic environmental ethics. In this sense, god has some attributes such as al-khalid (creator), al-wali (governor), malik-ul mulk (real owner), al-nazzaq (supplier), al-muquit (nourishing) and al-hafiz (protector) which can be considered as fundamentals of environmental ethics. Also, it is important to note that out of approximately 6600 ayats, 900 ayats deal more or less with the protection of water resources, 1400 ayats are about economic issues, and the rest about the environment, nature and ecological problems. Moreover, it is stated that there is a hadith emphasizing equal use of water, pasture and fire (Kumar, 2003, p. 147-150).

Islamic environmental ethics has been advocated and re-produced by various scholars. And all these attempts can be summarized through Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s (1996, p. 3) interpretations of religion and its relation to modern man. According to him, “the destruction of the sacred quality of nature by modern man dominated by a secularist perspective is directly responsible for this [ecological] catastrophe” and he advocates for re-sacralization of nature through religious understanding (ibid., p. 7). However, what is interesting with Nasr’s position is that he also states humans causing “catastrophe” with their actions “still live within a worldview dominated by religion.” This can be interpreted as a sentence weakens Nasr’s argument. According to this, if people living religiously still cause ecological problems, the reason behind these problems could not be de-sacralization of nature but anything else. By indicating totalitarian claims of modern science (ibid., p. 6), Nasr is approaching to show the reason. However, what is missing in his explanation is that totalitarian claims are not unique to modern science but also mainstream pre-modern thinking which also includes religions. The problem is not about lack of religion and so the solution cannot be re-sacralization. People still have religion(s), and religion(s) still dominates their worldviews but the crisis of nature increasingly continues. Therefore, the main reason might not be science, not religion, but totalitarian thinking itself which is seen as the main characteristic of both fields.

**Islam and Nature: Not Exempt from Totalitarian Thinking?**

Although Abrahamic tradition –including Islam- adopts some important concepts for environmental ethics, because of being man-centered and totalitarian, they also have the potential to cause negative outcomes in nature. It is obvious that these negative outcomes increased dramatically after the developments of urbanization and

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5 Here, the usage of “his” is consciously preferred in order to indicate that the human-being responsible for not only nature but also woman is seen as a male by religion throughout the history.
industrialization. However, the mentality behind these developments can also be related to totalitarian thinking which is closely associated with *homo-religious*. What does this mean from Political Ecology perspective?

![Figure 1: Evolution of human thinking (Anonymous, nd)](image)

According to Friesian Doctrine, religion prioritizes other phenomena which produce human thought. Moreover, the basic difference between religion and philosophy is religion’s “authoritative link to a mythic context.” While this mythic context is not necessarily dogmatic, it is always historical. It can be said that in their evolutionary development, religion, myth, philosophy, science, etc. have their own route but also interact with each other. And because of being the oldest, religion has much power to affect the others in this interaction. This is so because it is closely related to human psychology beginning from childhood –may be mother’s womb. Therefore, it is believed to determine main stream human thinking. Indeed, this form of thinking, framed as *religious*, triggers and reproduces totalitarian thinking. It must be stated that *religiosity* in this sense is a more comprehensive concept than *religion* itself. While religion indicates any system of belief, religiosity means a type of thinking in which the organization of ideas is based on *one dimensionality* through *sacralization* and *absolutization*. Then, it can be said that common sense has been produced by religious thinking. And main characteristic of the common sense is one-dimensionality through sacralization and absolutization of belief and knowledge. Here, belief and knowledge become identified and this characteristic determines mainstream human thinking on nature as well.

Under these circumstances, above mentioned type of thinking does not allow the individual to associate, e.g. *ayats* of Qur’an about water with historical-geographical conditions in which Islam was born. It is obvious that water was essential in this equilibrium. Therefore, Islamic environmental ethics, affected by socio-economic conditions, strongly advocated water conservation at the very beginning. This means, 14 centuries ago, Islam was ecologically sound. But it has lost its ecological essence in time. Why? At once, two explanations come to mind. Firstly, socio-political and economic conditions harmed this essence. And secondly the monopoly of Christian West on the universal (knowledge about nature) also dominated Islamic environmental ethics. By taking the risk of being essentialist, it can be said that both explanations are correct. In what sense? In the course of time, early Islamic vision about nature has changed due to the factors such as urbanization, industrialization, population growth, etc. and additionally Christianity was the motor for above mentioned developments although Abrahamic tradition as a whole directed the
modern era. However, there is another factor in this process: Totalitarian thinking. Starting from monotheistic tendencies of Abrahamic tradition, totalitarian type of thinking can be traced.

Toynbee insists that there is a correlation between the rise of monotheism and the maximization of material wealth and thinking in terms of unlimited liberties with nature is about thinking in monotheistic terms. For him, this is the main cause of the crisis of nature and it can be seen in the example of Japan Christianity (Toynbee, 1974, p. 145-147). Japan Christianity because of following Western Christianity has made same mistakes during its modernization. What Toynbee explains through monotheism can also be explained through totalitarianism. This is so because monotheism—a symbol of rationalization in the history of religions—closes the door for multidimensional thinking. The lack of multidimensional thinking historically becomes part of homo-religious. And Abrahamic tradition can be accepted as the consolidated version of monotheism although there had been previous attempts of monotheism in history, e.g. Ancient Egypt.

Conclusion

In this scheme, there are two layers of reasoning: Firstly, “mainstream” masculine-monotheistic interpretation of Judeo-Christian tradition is based on the concept of hierarchy of souls and has the monopoly on the universal (knowledge about nature), and secondly, “mainstream” masculine-monotheistic interpretation of Islamic knowledge production (about nature) is also based on the concept of “hierarchy of souls” but does not have enough power to determine the universal.

Even the thinkers Nasr blame for the crisis of nature were not exempt from religious thinking based on hierarchy of souls. When Nietzsche attempted to insist that “god is dead,” he was aiming to criticize metaphysical foundations of modern science and philosophy which could not have worked anymore. However he died but metaphysics survived in a stronger way and resulted even in fascism in Germany. This might be interpreted as a reflection of metaphysics’ influence on physics.

As a conclusion, it can be said that totalitarian thinking is not unique for religion or science but can be seen as the main definitive element of human history. In this history, homo-religious does not “prefer” to question but believe. And beliefs are shaped by a value hierarchy based explicitly or implicitly on the idea of hierarchy of souls. For example, it is believed that water, as part of nature which is “God”’s creation, is sacred and this is the absolute truth. However, this type of acceptances lead to other acceptances such as thermal power plant, nuclear power plant, etc. is good for humanity. Science or religion—as socio-political phenomena—are value independent but hierarchically valued by powerful actors. In this sense, interpretations of (male) scholars based on power relations consolidate one dimensional understanding of religions. And other attempts for creating religious environmental ethics remain marginal too.

Looking at nature based on an “us-others” distinction and considering nature as “our environment” can be seen as the outcomes of such a thinking. Therefore, struggle for nature is able to overcome struggle against nature only after totalitarian thinking can be overcome. And as Levinas put it before, political totalitarianism is based on
ontological totalitarianism (1990, p. 206), which means totalitarianism inherent to human thought but is reproduced through socio-political and economic conditions.
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Abstract
In issues pertaining to environmental ethics, the environmental pragmatists accept multiple values. They thus take a position of moral pluralism. Moral pluralism is the view that acknowledges the existence of multiple values. In the discussion pertaining to normative ethics, moral pluralism demands the acceptance of more than one value in determining whether an action is ethical or not. Some philosophers like J. Baird Callicott do not support such many value projects and Callicott even terms value pluralism as like ‘metaphysical musical chairs’. Consequently, according to Callicott, the people who subscribe for this moral pluralism rely upon utilitarian for one ethical problem and deontology for another ethical problem and so on. (Callicott, The Case Against Moral Pluralism, 1990). As against moral pluralism Callicott subscribes for single value theory. He insists on the intrinsic value of nature and on the basis of this single value theory, he comes out with a position on environmental ethics in which according to him the whole eco-system should be preserved. In this paper we will argue against this holistic approach of environmental ethics and try to bring some points in support of pragmatic point of view. We will try to show that a context dependent and sensitive pragmatist position is better equipped in addressing the environmental issues than a universal, abstract monistic one.

Keywords: Moral pluralism, monism, environmental pragmatism, context
Introduction

In issues pertaining to environmental ethics, the environmental pragmatists accept multiple values while considering environment related issues. Environmental pragmatists support more of a liberal view to address the environmental issues. They thus take a position of moral pluralism. Environmental pragmatism looks for consensus or compatibility amongst various values in environmental conflict resolution or conflict management. For example Andrew Light talks of compatibility between social ecology and deep ecology, (Light, Compatibilism in Political Ecology, 1996), while Bryan G. Norton calls for a convergence hypothesis for policy goal among different groups. (Norton, Toward Unity Among Environmentalists, 1991). All these environmental philosophers’ activities show that they believe in plurality of values and thus their position leads to moral pluralism. Moral pluralism is the view that acknowledges the existence of multiple values. In the discussion pertaining to normative ethics, moral pluralism demands the acceptance of more than one value in determining whether an action is ethical or not. “Instead of debating the one, right, univocal metaphysic of morals-ecocentrism versus anthropocentrism, biocentrism versus sentientism, deep ecology versus social ecology, etc.-pluralists and pragmatists seek agreement on practical policies that can be derived from a variety of moral principles.” (Edelglass, 2006, p. 10).

The moral pluralistic position of pragmatists makes them to consider the relation between man and nature as a process and in this process, different circumstances may demand different yields. (Rosenthal, 1986) According to them, morality arises on the basis of how one values one’s own things or circumstances. There are different kinds of moral worth or values for different persons and also in different perspectives. And even same person may have different values in various situations. “Different moral theories are possible depending upon which values or principles are included.” (Buchholz & Rosenthal, 1996, p. 265) According to the pragmatists, as there are different set of values it is difficult to resolve environmental ethical problems on one value principles. For them, the problems are too complex to be resolved with the help of taking a value monistic position. Light remarks thus in this regard, “viewing this problematic situation it is the conclusion of environmental pragmatists that it is time for environmental ethics to consider some new positions in the field, and more importantly, to reassess its direction. The small set of acceptable approach to environmental ethics may be inapplicable to the development of an acceptable environmental policy” (Light and Katz 1996, 3).

Critique of Pragmatism

This position of environmental pragmatists is criticized by Callicott. Callicott being a moral monist believes that the pluralist position is essentially flawed. For him, an ethical monist position is simpler and sufficient in solving environment related issues. Keller brings out the difference between the monist and the pluralist position thus, “Ethical monist maintains that meta-ethical coherence can be achieved only through the adoption of a single unified normative theory. On the other hand ethical pluralists maintain that variety of entities worthy of moral considerability requires multiple normative theories.” (Keller, 2010, p. 18) Callicott by maintaining a monist position feels that a single, monistic principle is good enough in dealing with ethical issues related to environment.
Against the moral pluralists J. B. Callicott comes up with a number of arguments defending his monistic standpoint. First, he thinks that with several ideas in mind in a particular course of action, the self-serving or vested interest may get preference among the many alternatives. It would be very difficult to choose the most suitable one which leads to a holistic goal. As he says, “with a variety of theories at our disposal, each indicating different, inconsistent, or contradictory course of action, we may be tempted to espouse the one that seems most convenient or self-serving in the circumstances.” (Callicott, The Case Against Moral Pluralism, 1990). Secondly, due to the multitude of ideologies, pluralism cannot provide a solid or determining principle for a course of action as to which one to be followed. And more importantly Callicott argues that pluralism leads to nowhere except nihilism and skepticism where we lose both moral and intellectual coherence for environmental ethics. (Edelglass, 2006).

Thus, according to Callicott as the pluralists do not have a consistent approach to deal with environmental issues and as there are no solid ground for them to take a course of action on that basis, they lose their ground in environmental ethics. He rather insists on the holistic approach towards environmental entities based on intrinsic value of nature. He even termed the pluralists’ position as ‘metaphysical musical chair’ who takes deontological position in one place and the consequentialist position in another place. (Callicott J. B., The Case Against Moral Pluralism, 1990).

Now before going to argue for pluralism, let us see how Callicott sets the ground for environmental ethics from a monistic standpoint.

Callicott maintains an ecocentric position towards environment. Callicott bases his ecocentric approach from different traditions of philosophy. He brings in the notion of ‘stewardship’ from Judaeo-Christian tradition to point out the goodness of all creatures on the basis that all are His creations. He also supports his argument on the basis of an orderly world as seen in Leibnitz and other thinker’s works. More importantly Callicott gets the clue from Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic who talks about a healthy eco-system that could carry a rich and diverse culture of creatures. According to Leopold “A thing is good if it provides the stability, integrity and beauty of the biotic community and it is wrong otherwise.” (Leopold, 1949) Callicott’s point is that an ecocentric position that has been envisaged over a period of time is sufficient to take care of the environment related concerns. He maintains that with such a strong historical, moral and normative ethical basis there is no need for pluralist position in environmental ethics. He thinks that without such historical continuity, a new theory, can’t give a good platform for the environmental ethics. (Callicott, Non-anthropocentric value theory and Environmental Ethics, 1994)

**In defense of Pragmatism**

Callicott’s arguments against moral pluralism to a great deal have to do with the problem of not having an absolute standpoint related to environmental ethical issues. By being a monist, Callicott feels that it might be better to have a single foundational principle to address the ethical concerns as such a standing shall give us a consistent approach in dealing with the environment related issues. But does consistency alone matter? The ethics should also take care of the sufficiency principle. This is where we wish to address certain issues with respect to Callicott’s position.
Callicott’s position of having a monistic approach towards environmental ethics, and that too, an ecocentric position fails to address many of the persisting problems related to environmental ethics. Though it might sound sacred to have an intrinsic value approach towards the eco-system, but, it is quite difficult to substantiate the intrinsic worthiness of the ecosystem. The worthiness of the ecosystem possessing a value in terms of it being conducive to human welfare, for both the present and future generations, shall make it be valuable, but claiming that ecosystem to have value-in-itself is given for discussions and deliberations. Moreover, Callicott by emphasising on the intrinsic value of the ecosystem as a whole doesn’t seem fit to give the intrinsic value for the components that make up the ecosystem. For example, while the biocentrists might try to give an intrinsic value for the beings that are sentient, Callicott do not recognize this. As a matter of fact, he takes the individual species as a ‘means’ to achieve the ‘end’ of the ecosystem as a whole. This in fact takes a ‘consequentialist’ turn, even though he might not be subscribing to consequentialism. Influenced by the ‘land ethic’ of Aldo Leopold, Callicott disvalues the individual species which may hamper the integrity, beauty and stability of the biotic community. In this context Tom Regan questions the very basis of Leopold’s land ethic which does not bother about individual species and termed such view as ‘environmental fascism’. (Regan, 2004, p. 362).

Environmental pragmatists think that J. B. Callicott’s argument is abstract and monistic in nature and it will fail to address the modern environmental problems. In a conflict between eco-centrists and animal rights, Callicott would immediately go for the eco-centric position without thinking about the concerned animal due to his over emphasis on ecocentric position as against a biocentric ethics. Similarly as between the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric position, Callicott overwhelmingly subscribe to a non-anthropocentric position, whereas in this situation, some pragmatists go for a consensus between the two poles of anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric in order to bring a solution to the ethical problems. (Norton, 1991).

Secondly, Callicott says that moral pluralism is like a ‘metaphysical musical chair’ for their tendency to display different attitude for different situations. With one value philosophy if we can able to resolve the environmental issues, it is well and good. But, the question is whether we can? Environmental philosophy is the relation/interaction between human and nature in different situations and human inevitably need different reactions for different situations. Christopher D. Stone finds that it is difficult to address different environmental perspective with a monistic principle. So pluralism carries this ethos that for different situation there may be different reaction and one monistic tendency can’t solve all these different issues. (Stone, Moral Pluralism and the cause of Environmental ethics, 1988). Pluralists value different objects in different temporal and spatial perspectives. So these values with different perspectives inevitably lead to the incommensurable situation. In such situation trying to commensurate among different values through single matrix or monistic tendency would be a very difficult job. “The best we can do in these situations is to honestly seek a fair balance point at which we have done our best to minimize harms for which we are responsible.” (Norton, Searching for Sustainability: Interdisciplinary Essays in the Philosophy of Conservation Biology, 2003, p. 377).

Callicott’s argument to maintain a moral monistic position is susceptible to certain shortcomings. Due to overemphasis on the holistic environment, he even avoids the
rights and interest of the individual species. For the sake of whole eco-system Callicott takes the individual species as mere means which is nothing but a typical consequentialist’s position. The acknowledgement of the moral worthiness of the whole as against the individual components many a time goes against our ordinary moral intuitions. One does not make a distinction when one tries to save the life of an animal, if it is in her capacity, to see whether it is rare or extinct or just a commonly available animal species. If one finds some being suffers, she helps it. Perhaps, Callicott’s position may go against this intuitive sense of morality.

One of the arguments against moral pluralism which Callicott maintains is that it may lead to vested interests and there can be chances that decisions are based on vested interests. This can however be true and it demands a more serious study in terms of environmental decisions taken by the people but this maybe beyond the scope of this paper. However, to immediately jump to the conclusion that, therefore, moral pluralism may not be a better alternative is too farfetched. As the environmental issues are quite problematic and complicated, it needs to be addressed based on the situation and the context and other contingent factors. Hence, to think of a solution solely on the basis of monistic principle might rather be a tame solution without addressing some of the important concerns. Pragmatists on the other hand carry this pluralistic attitude to address the practical environmental crisis. Andrew Light accuses J. Baird Callicott of claiming ideological logjam between monism and pluralism, which actually hinders for compatibility among different values for solving environmental problems. Andrew Light finds that despite his deep sense towards intrinsic value of ecology, Arne Naess’s philosophy is quite liberal to merge with the pluralistic world views to address the environmental issues than Callicott’s position (Light, 1996). Keller mentions that Callicott forcefully argue that environmental ethics should be rest on one unified normative standard. (Keller, 2010)

Regarding the advantage of the value pluralism, it can be said that it can take the important elements of different theories from different situations. Marietta remarks, “A pluralistic theory has the advantage of using the elements of different theories which are attractive in different kinds of situations.” (Marietta, 1993, p. 70) As William Edelglass finds that in a conflict between animal liberation and eco-centric ethics, moral pluralism gives us an opportunity to think about the proper course of action i.e. which would be better. So there is an ample scope of moral pluralism to find out a solution in a given conflicting situation than stick to a monistic view. “Instead of rejecting one theory wholesale in the pursuit of monism, pluralists and environmental pragmatists argue, we should prudently determine which moral principle to apply to a particular situation.” (Edelglass, 2006, p. 10).

**Conclusion**

Environmental problems are complex in the sense that it is embedded socially and culturally with human beings. In these complex problems human beings have to think critically in policy formulation for the environment. Apart from that environmental pragmatism insists on context bound principles rather than mere abstract ideas or principles. In this process, it seems that moral pluralism is more flexible than moral monist. “All environmental problems are ecologically, socially, and culturally complex; the complex problems must be seen from multiple perspectives. In real policy context, good response to actual, complex problems are acceptable to as many
perspectives as possible, not judge up or down according to universal, philosophical principles. The goal of environmental ethics should be to use philosophical and ethical theory to tell normative stories appropriate to particular problems, to help community to develop a narrative that fits their perspectives and environmental challenges, not to support universal principles.” (Norton, Why study environmental ethics?, 2009, p. 51) While environmental pragmatism does take into consideration the involved complexities and try to address it as a case by case basis. It may not come up with one universal approach to tackle the environment related issues, but, that is what precisely its advantage also. By being localized and by bringing out context dependent solutions, it places itself as a sensitive and sensible approach towards the multitude of environment related problems than the universal, monistic principle approach.
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Abstract

What properties differentiate artworks from mundane objects, events or states of affairs? The question, which is central to aesthetics and the philosophy of art, preoccupied the late philosopher Arthur Danto for almost a half century. In 'Art and Meaning', among his later attempts at addressing the question, he suggests that for something to be an artwork it must have two properties, viz. intentional content and embodiment. That is to say, it must be about something (unlike mundane objects) and it must be manifested physically (unlike Platonic forms or disembodied ideas). While this explanation is well motivated in some respects, it is problematic. The two conditions, I contend, are by themselves insufficient to distinguish artworks from all non-artworks. My intention is to bolster Danto's explanation by introducing a third condition. I argue that artwork's are distinct from mere objects in part because they possess a unique kind of force, “aesthetic force.” Just as utterances have illocutionary force and mental states have mental force, artworks I contend have aesthetic force. However, in the case of artworks, I maintain that aesthetic force is fundamentally "functionless." In some respects this notion is related to Kant's claim that an artwork "is a way of presenting that is purposive on its own and that furthers, even though without a purpose". By appealing to this third condition, I explain, the difficulties facing Danto's more economical account can be dealt with.

Keywords: aesthetic, art, artwork, content, Danto, embodiment, force
Introduction

'What is art?' What properties differentiate artworks for mundane objects, events or states of affairs? The question, central to the philosophy of art, preoccupied Arthur Danto for almost a half century. Among his final attempts at addressing the question can be found in 'Art and Meaning,' his introductory essay to The Madonna of the Future (2000). There Danto suggests that for something to be an artwork it must have two properties, viz. content and embodiment. While this economical explanation is well motivated in some respects, I argue that it is ultimately insufficient. The problem is that the two conditions alone fail to distinguish artworks from all non-artworks. My intention is to bolster Danto's explanation by outlining a third condition. I argue that artworks are distinct in part because they possess aesthetic force. I begin my discussion by motivating Danto's two conditions for art. Next, I present several counterexamples that reveal the insufficiency of his explanation. Finally, I present the idea of aesthetic force and suggest how it can solve the problem facing Danto's approach.

1. Two Conditions: Content and Embodiment

Among the cornerstones of Danto's philosophy of art is his claim that artworks have intentional content. Unlike chairs, mountains or shooting stars, artworks are about things (objects, events, states of affairs, and so on). For example, Manet's Olympia depicts a female prostitute reclining on a bed to whom a servant is bringing a bouquet of flowers. Of course, the painting is about more than just that: it is surely also about the hypocrisy of a 19th Century art-going bourgeoisie, the role of spectatorship in art, and, by likening a Parisian prostitute to Titian's Venus of Urbino, the gradual empowerment of women.

It's noteworthy that, according Danto, non-representational as well as representational artworks have content. Despite the fact that the major works of Pollack and Rauschenberg, among countless other abstract artists, don't depict material objects, this doesn't imply that they're not about anything. For example, Pollack's splash and drip canvases are about, among other things, movement and color and Rauschenberg's three-paneled White Painting (1951) is about shadows and the changes of light that register on its surface. In fact, even an artwork about nothing has content. As Danto is apt to observe, a distinction must be recognized between "not being about anything and being about nothing" (2000, p. xx). A painting about nothing still has content.

The type of intentional content Danto believes that all artworks have seems to be Fregean in character. This is suggested in several ways. First, artworks that lack reference (e.g. those about nothing) have content.1 Second, an artwork's content is something that can (at least in part) be expressed descriptively. One of the central goals of art criticism, according to Danto, is to make explicit an artwork's content (meaning) (ibid., p. xxviii), and this of course the critic does through descriptions. In fact, the critic's role in

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1 I recognize that this is put rather quickly and requires a more substantial defense. But, it nevertheless strikes me, as I know it did Danto, that reference-less terms and concepts (or sentences and mental states) continue to be a basic problem for Referential Theories of Meaning and Content.
expressing the artwork's content is especially required in the case of contemporary art, which is commonly not only non-representative but about the concept of art itself (ibid., p. ix). A critic's knowledge of the various social, political, historical, etc., conditions of the artwork's creation, possession and consumption thereby helps her to express the work's content because, in general, a work doesn't wear its meaning (content) on its sleeve. In effect, this suggests Danto's utilization of a Fregean notion of content as well. Content, after all, is considered by him to be a non-perceptual (abstract) property: "what makes something art is not something that meets the eye" (xxvii-xxviii).

It's noteworthy that while all artworks, according to Danto, have content, this doesn't imply that an artwork's content must remain invariable over time or that it must have one content (whatever that could mean). (This could be regarded as a departure from a strictly Fregean model of content (thought), one that identifies meanings with Platonic entities.) While there are better and worse interpretations (art criticisms) of an artwork's content (dependent on such things as its coherence and how well it accounts for biographical details of the artist and the social, economic and political conditions of its creation, possession, and consumption, among other things), the postmodernist's claim that meaning (content) is highly sensitive to context and ever-changing is consistent with Danto's claim that all artworks have content. In short, by insisting that artworks have content one need not be insisting that they have the same or a single content in different contexts or at different times.

Danto's second condition for art is material embodiment, or just 'embodiment.' As he observes, this brings his notion of an artwork in conflict with Hegel's notion of symbolic art, the content of which is external to rather than embodied by the object (xx). Similarly, the embodiment condition also distinguishes Danto's notion of art from Croce's. For Croce, art is ultimately a mental state or event, one that can be expressed or embodied materially but need not be (1995). By contrast, for Danto embodiment is an essential condition of an artwork, something without which an object (event, state of affairs) could not be a work of art.

The embodiment condition serves to do several things. For example, in addition to distinguishing Danto's notion of art from both Hegel's (1994) and Croce's (1995), it enables one to distinguish different kinds of artworks with the same contents. For example, it's conceivable that a painting and a piece of music could have the same content, e.g. that both could be about nothing. Without the embodiment condition, there would be no way of distinguishing them as different artworks. For if contents are indeed non-perceptual (abstract) properties, then there wouldn't be a way of distinguishing artworks based on their distinct material embodiment (in this case an object of canvas and paint vs. an event of tones and tempo), let alone based on their unique spatiotemporal presence (embodiment).

Moreover, the embodiment condition enables one to distinguish a piece of art criticism from the artwork it is a criticism of. If indeed the goal of an art critic is to make explicit the content of an artwork, a good piece of art criticism, one that succeeds in this task, might be taken to have the same content as the artwork it is a criticism of. Without the embodiment condition, there would be no way of distinguishing the piece of art criticism
from the artwork itself. Of course, this may already suggest a problem for Danto's characterization of art.

If indeed a piece of art criticism and an artwork are embodied and have content, then isn't a piece of art criticism also an artwork? I'll return to this question momentarily. 2

The two conditions certainly differentiate artworks from many non-artworks. Without the content condition, Danto would be unable to distinguish certain kinds of artworks from mere objects, e.g. Duchamp's *Fountain* from an identical-looking mundane urinal. And without the embodiment condition, Danto would be unable to distinguish artworks from mental states and, for that matter, from one another. Any two objects, events or state of affairs with the same content (whether it's generally considered an artwork, non-artwork, or intentional state) could not be distinguished.

2. The Inadequacy of the Two Conditions

While Danto's two conditions are relatively well-motivated, the question is, Are they sufficient? The answer, I believe, is 'No.' The problem is that many things besides artworks meet these conditions, things we wouldn't generally consider art. For example, a billboard, a street sign and a soup recipe each have content and are embodied. A billboard may be about the luxury and gas mileage of an automobile, a content (message) that it materially embodies on a poster glued to an enormous wooden frame. A stop sign is about stopping and is materially embodied on an octagon shaped piece of aluminum (or steel) painted red and white. And a recipe is about the ingredients and the making of a kind of soup, a content which is materially embodied on the pages of a cookbook.

Or consider a rather different example, viz. human action. An action such as George's lifting his arm is distinct from mere bodily movement in that it involves (essentially) his wanting to lift his arm, an intentional state with content. (Note the parallel between an action and artwork on the one hand and a mere bodily movement and mere object on the other.) Moreover, without being embodied, without a body or at least an arm, George could not perform such an action. In this way, actions have both content and embodiment. However, while some actions may be parts of or may themselves be artworks, most are not.

2 The embodiment condition, it should be noted, is or at least should be more flexible than I've intimated. For example, works of film, music and photography (especially in digital formats) suggest that embodiment can't require that a work be instantiated in a particular material substratum. This leads to the question, How must it be instantiated? It seems clear that in the case of film, music and photography that the token identity of the work isn't dependent on a token material embodiment, though perhaps it is dependent upon a type of material embodiment. But even this might be questioned. If Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* were never performed again, many would nevertheless admit that it still exists. I'll refrain from exploring these problems here, though some light is shed on them by Goodman (1976).
The same might be said about a piece of art criticism. Like actions, art criticisms have content (they are, among other things, about artworks and presumably attempt to make explicit their meanings) and are embodied on the pages of a magazine like *The Nation*. But isn't it far-fetched to presume that all pieces of art criticism are themselves artworks?!

It's noteworthy that appealing to the possibility that, in this day and age, anything could be an artwork, that any billboard, street sign, soup recipe, human action or piece of art criticism could be a work of art, is beside the point. The fact is that most billboards, street signs, soup recipes, human actions and pieces of art criticism are not artworks despite the fact that they meet Danto's two conditions for art. This is the problem.

Danto is not unaware of the problem, which he observes was raised to him as a friendly criticism by Noel Carroll (2000, p. xxi). But his discussion of the matter seems beside the point. He recognizes that the original Brillo boxes, designed by the commercial artist James Harvey, have content and embodiment just as both Andy Warhol's *Brillo Boxes* and the appropriationist artist Mike Bidlo's *Not Warhol* do. However, he also recognizes that Harvey's Brillo boxes are artworks themselves -- works of commercial art, to be sure, but artworks all the same! The problem he addresses in the latter half of his essay, 'Art and Meaning,' is the problem of how to distinguish the contents of these three works, something he believes art criticism is well suited for. Despite being almost indistinguishable to the eye, the contents of the works of Harvey, Warhol and Bidlo are distinct, which he illustrates characteristically with wonderful adeptness by showing that the art criticism appropriate to one is not appropriate to the other.

While much of his discussion is convincing, it doesn't speak to the problem concerning the inadequacy of his two conditions of art. Short of accepting the rather implausible view that all billboards, street signs, recipes, actions, and so on, are (rather than simply could be) works of art, what appears to be needed is a third condition. And this is something I now want to propose.

### 3. The Third Condition: Aesthetic Force

Where there is content, there is force. In fact, the three notions -- *content, embodiment* and *force* -- are recognized and distinguished by linguists as well as philosophers, especially of language and mind (Austin 1975, Searle 1979). For example, consider an utterance such as 'John is at home.' The utterance's meaning or content (its semantics) concerns its aboutness, the fact that it is about John being at home. The way this meaning is embodied in the utterance is unique, given the distinctive syntax (lexicon and grammar) of English. But semantics (content) and syntax (linguistic embodiment) aren't the only properties that the utterance possesses. In addition to these, it is characterized by its force or use (pragmatics). For example, the sentence 'John is at home' can be used as an assertion, a question or even a wish. In other words, while its content and linguistic embodiment remain the same, it can have different uses (forces).³

³ Obviously, more can be said about the relation between these 3 notions. For example, an utterance 's translation from one language to another illustrates a change of linguistic embodiment but a preservation of content and force. An ambiguous
What is true of utterances (sentences) is, I believe, likewise true of works of art. In much the way contents can be linguistically embodied in different languages, they can be artistically embodied in different media, e.g. film, painting, music, and sculpture. But if artworks have both content and embodiment, then surely they also have force: aesthetic force. Elsewhere I've argued that aesthetic force is not the same as linguistic force, as the force of mundane utterances (speech acts) and sentences (Gunther 2015). This isn't something I intend to defend at length here. So, I'll merely assume the point for now and attempt to explain what I take aesthetic force to be.

Like linguistic forces, aesthetic force has a function (point). Yet, where an assertion commits the speaker to the truth of a content and a question requires that the speaker intends for the hearer to answer, artworks have a function without a function. In other words, the way artworks present their contents essentially is as functionless or purposeless. In some respects, this idea is related to Kant's suggestion that an artwork "is a way of presenting that is purposive on its own and that furthers, even though without a purpose" (1987, p. 173), though my suggestion is fundamentally semantic rather than practical in spirit. In claiming this, I'm not suggesting that artworks lack a function -- this would be equivalent to saying that they lack force. Rather, my suggestion is that there is a distinctive way in which the content of artworks is presented, viz. functionlessly.

Aesthetic force, I suggest, is an essential property of all artworks, whether verbal or nonverbal. Their function without function helps to distinguish them from other content-bearing media, whether linguistic, mental or artificial. This is not to say that an artwork's force is transparent. One might not recognize the fact that the object or event before one has a function without function. But this just illustrates that aesthetic force isn't a perceptual property -- an artwork doesn't wear its force on its sleeve either. This, of course, is true of utterances as well, e.g. to recognize that 'Do you have a dollar?' is a request, we need to appeal to something external to it, viz. a speaker's intention. Of course, the difference in the case of an artwork is that this non-perceptual, external component need not be fixed by the artist or performer's (conscious) intentions or mental states. Just what, then, might fix an object's aesthetic force? This all depends on the theory of art one endorses. For example, aesthetic force might be fixed external to the artwork by appealing to the artist's unconscious mental states, the social conditions of the work's origin, the audience's experience of the work, the art community's reception of it, and so on. For my purposes here, it isn't necessary to decide between these theoretical options.

If indeed artworks do have a unique kind of force, a unique way of presenting their contents, then this third condition, aesthetic force, enables us to handle the counterexamples we considered above. A billboard, a street sign and a soup recipe each have force as well as content and embodiment. A billboard serves to solicit or entreat, a street sign functions as an order or command, and a soup recipe presents its content as a directive or suggestion. An action such as George's lifting his arm is accompanied by George's intention to lift his arm (the mental force type analogous to or a precondition for a request or command). And a piece of art criticism has the role of describing, questioning and/or criticizing an artwork.

utterance illustrates a possible change of content and perhaps even of force but a preservation of linguistic embodiment. A conversation in which one interlocutor remarks 'John is going to the store.' and another responds with 'John is going to the store?!' reflects a change of force but a preservation of meaning and linguistic embodiment.
This isn't to say that artworks themselves cannot entreat, command, suggest, request and criticize. We see, e.g., paintings, films and sculptures can be used for the sake of propaganda. But, this is not their primary function -- this is not what makes them works of art. Once an object, event or state of affairs becomes an artwork, it's previous linguistic and non-linguistic functions are superceded (though not necessarily abandoned) by their aesthetic force. In other words, like Duchamp's *Fountain* which, as an artwork, no longer functions (primarily, at least) as a receptacle for urine, any linguistic or non-linguistic function an object once had is superceded by its role as an artwork, as an embodied content with aesthetic force.

Obviously, much more needs to be said. A more careful explanation is needed for what aesthetic force is. An argument is required for why non-artworks that have content and are embodied never have it. And an account of the relation between aesthetic force as a primary force type and secondary, linguistic force types (e.g. assertions, questions, commands) must also be given. However, while the notion of aesthetic force deserves to be developed further, I hope to have suggested how it, as a condition for art, could help to develop our understanding of what art is.
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Metaphysical Foundation of Mencius’s Political Theory

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Over its long history, humanity has always had a tendency to let religion be in service of politics, turning it into such power to dominate all aspects of life. China was not an exception of this rule. Despite the attempt of Confucius in the sixth century BC to exclude any presence of religion in his philosophy in a unique attempt to re-build human on cognitive and moral grounds so as to stay away from the then prevailing thought that the emperor is the son of Heaven or the commissioner by a Decree of Heaven, Mencius was the first, in classical Confucianism, to pursue developing a theoretical basis for the former use of the Confucius religion (particularly in its metaphysical sense) to be politically employed.

It is as if Mencius combined the classic uses of religion, exploited by the dynasties in cementing their power, with turning it into a subject to influence the public, both cognitively and morally. Consequently, the Confucian thought had some metaphysical dimensions which led to the change of the goal to which Confucius devoted his message.

Mencius however is the second teacher of classic Confucianism for his contribution in establishing the theoretical basis which Confucius had ignored as the latter had concentrated on practical issues. Mencius’s importance is clear in the modern and contemporary eras as the person who - according to the contemporary Chinese researchers – introduced a political vision that can limit to western type of democracy\(^{(1)}\). These researchers believe that there is a democratic spirit contained in Mencius’ ideas which seem more appropriate for the Chinese reality than the Western type of democracy.

As for the role played by Mencius as a guard of the Chinese tradition, the Confucian thinkers in the middle ages summoned his ideas to confront the impact of Buddhism coming from India. In their quest for defending the Chinese identity, the Confucian thinkers started, in the first century, to take advantage of Mencius’ text in order to provide a metaphysical vision preventing the dominance of the Indian culture, especially after Confucianism had become, since the second century BC, the official ideology of the Chinese state\(^{(2)}\). Perhaps that explains the description of the western studies of the Confucian thought as a religion because Confucianism penetrates the Chinese spirit and forms the Chinese mentality.

Despite the fact that Mencius did not find - during his long journey throughout the Chinese provinces – a governor adopting his ideas and putting them into effect, most Chinese emperors and governors looked to him with respect and appreciation for his political vision that Heaven is the origin of the governor’s power. Mencius lived in an era of wars and unrest, so he kept looking in the classical metaphysical texts for salvation. This is what he quoted from the "History Book": "Heaven, to protect the inferior people, made for them rulers and made for them instructors, that they might be able to be aiding to god, and secure the tranquility of the four quarters of the Empire \(^{(3)}\).

A state of chaos prevailed in that period of the ancient history of China known as the Era of Conflicting States. The aim of the governors was only to achieve their personal interests of increasing their wealth and left people suffering. The call for self-refinement and moral values looked helpless in the face of the increasing violence.
This led to the collapse of the supremacy of the ruling dynasty, especially when semi-
scholars - according to Mencius – stayed close to politicians as advisers and mentors
while they lacked awareness and wisdom (4).

Mencius saw that there was no way to make any political reform and to confront the
reality of chaos but through building the Chinese mentality upon the Confucian
teachings as introduced by him. Such teachings were reflecting the wisdom of the
Chinese sages in the past, which were the most practical things in the face of the
fierce chaos in China back then. That is why Mencius saw that there was a need for
defending the foundations of the Chinese culture in order to face the opposing
doctrines, whether those who called for the return to the state of nature, which means
the return to the pre-state period, or those who called for the dominance of the state of
law where the relationship between the governor and the governed is controlled by the
law, or even those who called for showing the feelings of love and compassion for all
humanity.

Mencius considered all these opinions as hearsays that needed to be refuted. So he
said : " If the way of Yang and Mo does not subside and the Way of Confucius is not
proclaimed, the people will be deceived by heresies and the path of morality will be
blocked .I wish to safeguard the way of the former sages against the onslaughts of
Yang and Mo and to banish excessive views”(5).And all that was for the sake of the
concept of quasi-totalitarian state, which is a concept that is close to that of the Moral
State. The Totalitarian State is where individuals melt in it, so that it would become a
reality going beyond the presence of these individuals. It is as though he believed that
the essence of the crisis lied in the differences, diversity, and the rejection of any
activity or viewpoint that is different from that adopted by the state. It is as if diversity
was the crisis itself. His aim was to emphasize the need for adopting both one fixed
perception of the Central State adopted by him and the moral relationship between the
governor and the governed so that China may restore the unity of its land.

The rejection of the difference resulted in shutting out any attempt to create moderate
and intermediate viewpoints between the prevailing violence of the Authoritarian
State and the full powers granted to the governor by the will of Heaven which he
called for. That was clear in his book which revealed his inability to provide any
rational explanation for some issues at hand, and, therefore, it ended with attributing
the case either to Heaven – the Sacred - or to the stable classical culture surrounded
by holiness as well. His extreme aim was to maintain the concept of the traditional
model of the state, without providing any logical justification for his vision but he
emphasized that he gave the perfect solution to the crisis and to restore the golden age
of the wise kings of the past. This means that the solution to the problems of the
present lies in the past. He was unable to realize that his views, in and of themselves,
had constituted a part of the Chinese problem because they would be void of the most
important principles of the state which are justice, equality and law.

This caused Confucianism to get into a long conflict with all the trends and doctrines
that appeared on the intellectual scene in China at that time. It is a conflict that
harmed Confucianism itself when the then political regime in China had adopted a
different doctrine, where the regime burnt most of the classics of Confucianism and
the followers of Confucianism themselves(6). Even after Confucianism had regained
its position, it did not stop to have that exclusionary tendency toward the offending
trends. This led to the disappearance of the fruitful rational debate between the Chinese philosophies, and, therefore, there was always that attempt to contain the clash without introducing views that would provide clarity and depth. Therefore, the Chinese are often described as lacking cognitive curiosity. Within this context, Confucianism is often accused of being the main factor in the rigidity of the Chinese mind, especially when some politicians adopted its ideas related to the metaphysical establishment of the political power, and so its thoughts became the official ideology of the state, or the official religion of the state, according to the Western concept.

It is wrong to believe that the era of Mencius was an era of faith in the common sense of the word, but the use of Heaven as the governing power of the universe was an attempt to face these brutal wars that posed a threat to the state. Mencius was not a cleric nor was his time considered an era of religious reform, but the widespread political turmoil all over the empire was the engine of this metaphysical foundation through which he hoped to achieve the desired stability.

Therefore, it was natural for Mencius to move from the metaphysical foundation of human nature in an attempt to prove its innate validity to the field of politics in order to maintain the supremacy of the State and help it overcome that crisis by accepting the same meta-power or Heaven as the authority supporting the universe, human, and the state.

That is why we can say that the greatest achievement made by Mencius in the fourth century BC is emphasizing the goodness of the innate human nature, which is the idea upon which he built his entire philosophical vision\(^7\). Heaven did not just give people their outward forms or their ability to live, but it also gave them a variety of capacities and tied them up with their special rules that form the link between the three known poles in the Chinese thought: Heaven (the Sacred), human, and the earth (the world). These rules, which form an integral part of the human component, are the fundamental truth of humans which distinguish them from other creatures\(^8\). It is the gift of Heaven to humanity and thus it is in every human being.

Since we all have the same benevolent nature with its high and diverse capabilities, each human becomes able to achieve the condition of moral perfection and wisdom as embodied in the men from the golden past\(^9\). It is natural; therefore, that each of us becomes qualified for the same qualities and supremacy reached by the noblemen. All that we have to do is to turn inside, to our essence, to be aware of our innate truth and to seek to discover its nature and activate it so that the fundamental values and virtues ruling all the human and social relations could be released. Nobility does not lie in the outside world, and virtue can neither be acquired from the phenomenal world nor be imposed by law\(^10\). However, virtue is a flow of these primary foundations represented by the good nature granted by Heaven and is existent in every mind or heart. Therefore, Mencius saw that: "All things are already complete in oneself"\(^11\).

A wise man is the one who pays all his attention to the Heavenly mind which is, in its innate condition, similar to children innocence, where a set of emotions spontaneously flow from that mind revealing the goodness of human nature and its four innate tendencies of compassion, shame, modesty, and the good distinction between right and wrong\(^12\). It is the sprouts that will grow through the development processes to be released in the form of the basic virtues or the moral Constitution which adjusts the
human behavior on one hand, and be more like the spring from which all other ethical principles will flow to help man to attain the completeness of his consciousness and the perfection of his virtue on the other hand\(^{13}\). In truth, this is inevitable for humans. Because without this understanding of our true nature, we will not realize neither ourselves nor the purpose of our existence; so we would be away from the laws of our world, namely harmony and symmetry. Thus whoever is aware of his nature, he is aware of Heaven, and whoever knows Heaven, he knows how to serve it and live in harmony with its Decree which has already designed his life, social status, and his place in the universe\(^{14}\).

Based on what has been mentioned above, the cases of corruption and deviation prevailing in reality are not a reflection of the original human nature as much as the result of one’s ignoring the goodness of his nature and his inability to realize his Heavenly nature. Thus, the evil coming from man is an act against his good nature and an evidence of his inability and laziness that cause him to be preoccupied with the smallest things and whatever illusions coming from his senses which always make him busy with the negative effects of the outside world\(^{15}\). Evil has spread because of the disappearance of the original nature and innate tendency to good due to excessive lusts and desires reflecting the control of the individual ego at the expense of the collective soul. This sounds like the view of Lao tzu that is "the realization of simplicity lies in man’s realization of his true nature, by eliminating his selfishness and taming his desires"\(^{16}\).

Really, our actions may be bad, but now and then we encounter things we feel ashamed to do and this reveals the existence of this inherent goodness in our minds/hearts. That goodness disappears when we become slaves to our selfish desires and appears when our private interests disappear and then flows smoothly as water flows in its normal course\(^{17}\). Perhaps what has been mentioned is an explanation that reflects the excessiveness of selfish desires beside irresponsibility toward duties that must be performed by everyone within the set of social relations that he constitutes part of\(^{18}\). Each one of us is a part of a social entity that reflects the commitment to the duties and the morality system. Unlike Confucius, Mencius provided such traditional religious dualism dividing the human into parts that are different and unequal. Although he did not use terms like the spirit or the body, he pointed out in more than one place that man is a composite of parts; some of them are noble and great, and some are small and mean. Therefore, the virtuous person is the one who devotes all his attention to the ultimate part of his nature so that he would become like a leader or governor of the less important parts which can be the cause of his corruption when set free.

It is natural for nobility, supremacy, and greatness to become the attributes of the mind, not only because the mind is essentially composed of pure component and that is why it is called the "Heavenly Mind", but it is also because it is a bowl for those good innate tendencies. However, weakness and meanness are attributed to the sensory knowledge instruments which are influenced by the phenomenal world and so they become confused. Since the body or senses are so weak, it is inevitable then to subject them to the power of the mind\(^{19}\).

Thus, our deviation is an evidence of our interest in that mean part of our being and our disinterest in the greater part of it. The mind will not be able to achieve its major
tasks in terms of realizing the gift inside or the ability to put it into effect unless it has power over the whole body. This is the role of the development and self-cultivation processes\(^{(20)}\). Here is where the differences between the members of the human race are formed. And at this point, there comes the difference between the nobles and the common people, the governor and the governed, and even between humans and animals. That is why he stressed that the cultivation process is only about "restoring or pursuing this lost/strayed mind."

The truth is that Mencius does not give us a specific pattern or hierarchical steps to refine and develop the mind and know what it is all about. Also, he does not refer to the five classics known as the branches of knowledge that contribute in restoring the initial state of purity. What we can understand from his views is that he always warned against the imposition of techniques from outside humanity to conquer the body or to free the mind of the desires\(^{(21)}\). The basic virtues come from inside and cannot be acquired from the outside world. So, what we have inside is the source of perfection.

In addition, real knowledge lies deep inside and perfection is also achieved inside; we only have to give them space and bring down all barriers preventing them from flowing. We have to listen to that voice coming from deep inside because the more we listen to it, the wider the road becomes before that Heavenly gift to control the lustful side and to flow gradually from the inside to the outside, and from the temporary achievement to the permanent incarnation. Again, we are standing before Lao tzu’s approach, related to how to realize that Tao which permeates all things, in his saying: "Educating people without words and achieving actions without action are things only a few people can understand\(^{(22)}\). Thus, man is called out for communicating directly with that Heavenly Tao inside. If this happens, man can get into a larger relationship with the Sacred itself, namely Heaven and its law in the universe. For this, Mencius did not care about contemplating neither the physical nature nor the various sciences, as everything stems from inside and is also completed inside.

It is to be noted that Mencius's call for the necessary achievement of self-refinement and developing his self to reach wisdom and perfect virtue was not a call for individual happiness. Personal goals are not in his interest despite all his words which emphasize that the goodness of the state depends on the goodness of individuals. But attention is often focused on, society or the state and their purpose. Man is not only born with values and virtues that bring him inner peace but is also born with a set of relationships that make him an integral part of society.

In this context, anyone who is able to discipline his self and to restore the Heavenly mind that almost disappears through the selfish desires and lusts, he is truly the one who deserves to rule the state because he is the one who will be able to achieve the safety of the nation. Kings of the past were able to achieve the golden age of the entire empire, because they had that compassionate mind granted by Heaven and which was clear in their rule of the country\(^{(23)}\).

Ruling the state requires a perception of wise policies that mainly work toward the public interest in accordance with the fundamental elements pointed out by Confucius, namely achieving security and peace on earth, the stability of economy, and the people's trust in their leadership\(^{(24)}\).
However, those elements are impossible to be achieved unless every human being is aware - whatever his social or political status is – of the importance of living in harmony with everything surrounding him. A benevolent state is that one built on the coherence of its institutions, to be preceded by that unity of the members of societies in social ties similar to these family relationships\(^{(25)}\).

In the framework of the metaphysical foundation of human nature, we could say that the importance of the state as Mencius sees is not only the result of the human's need as it is common in the human's thought, but it also arises from the original nature of human. His talk about the human nature revealed the existence of differentiation between the parts that form the human structure. There is the mind, which is the greatest part that must control other parts.

Because it is the Heavenly mind in its purity, shining and goodness, other parts should submit to it, and obey it. And the same thing goes for the state. If man is a social being born with a set of relationships, called the five relationships, he is necessarily in need of a power that can adjust the various relationships, just as the mind ruling the body. As there are differences between the organs of the body in terms of power and efficiency, there are also differences between the members of the human race; there are those who give priority to the mind over the body, and those are the leaders who are able to manage the state's affairs. Also, there are those who cling to their senses and instincts and get caught with the development of their bodies\(^{(26)}\), and those are the common people who must be aware of the importance of submitting their selves to the authority of the mind, namely the governor.

On that account, we can say that if the mind is the reason behind the discipline of the body, and if Heaven is the center of the universe and the reason behind that harmony in it, the governor then is the reason behind the stability of the state and its territorial integrity. Heaven has endowed every human being with this gift that formed his original nature, and it has also granted him the state as the only way through which he can achieve the aim of his existence and complete his virtue under the leadership governing by a Decree of Heaven as a representative of the will of Heaven on earth. It seems that Mencius tried to establish a strong relationship between the state and the authority of Heaven in an attempt to restore the supremacy of the state over its land\(^{(27)}\). So obedience must be the basis for the stability of the state and the whole world as well. The state is not only to provide security and economic welfare but also to secure a suitable condition for the moral life that allow each human being to develop his innate nature\(^{(28)}\). The state has to work hard to achieve those aims and humans have to respond to its techniques so that the state could achieve such goals that are more important than the individual rights and personal freedom which the Chinese people did not care much about.

Like other thinkers of the old policy, he mixes politics with morality. Therefore, the ethical principles got confused with the political principles governing the state and forming the relationship between the governor and the governed. And this is due to the fact that the aim of the state is originally an ethical aim. Then all that is unethical is necessarily against the safety of the state, and, therefore, it has to be confronted. And all that is consistent with the system of the values is within the scope of the work of the state and humans have to comply with it. Thus, he did not see a need for issuing a number of laws to adjust relations within the state. It is as if the moral sense of the
governor, according to which the Decree of Heaven was granted to him, is enough for establishing the "Good State" or what is called the "Humanity State". In this context, it is difficult to separate what is moral from what is political, and what is theoretical from what is practical. The issue is that humans should be aware of how to give up their selfishness and individuality in order to take part in the universe dominated by harmony, which is being submitted to the Heavenly destiny.

If it is Heaven that gave the common people this grace that characterizes their natures, it assigned the task of its development and the quest for activating it to the governor, and this reveals the strong relationship between politics and ethics, which determined the governor's relationship with the governed, like that the relationship between the father and his children. That is why Mencius's words about the state is focused on the characteristics of the governor rather than the state institutions, to the extent of making him an observer of everything, and this led to what we might call the personalization of power, if we can say so, and why not while he is the representative of Heaven on earth.

Mencius compares between Heaven and the governor although his philosophy lacked a full perception of the structure of the universe, but there is harmony between his political vision and the metaphysical construction on top of which Heaven was put. Therefore, his political construction went from the highest to the lowest, from the governor to the governed, from Heaven to the beings.

Mencius saw that the presence of a virtuous governor was enough for having a good state, but there may be that virtuous governor, whose regime may remain unstable and would not allow him to make reforms, or there could be virtuous individuals with a bad governor. But Mencius did not suggest all of these assumptions; he only introduced the case of the good model that could affect everything around it. It seems that he believed that assuming the existence of such ruler as Heaven’s representative on Earth was good enough to achieve the desired regime. And this shows that he was influenced by Confucius’s theory about the relationship between the governor and the public that looks like the relationship between the wind and the grass; if the governor is good, his goodness will force the common people to bow down in front of it in obedience.

Thus, among the conditions of granting the governor this Decree of Heaven is to work for the benefit of the people, but that Decree could be withdrawn if the governor violates the following conditions:

1- To make the benefit of the people his priority, as people are the most important element in the state.
2- To work toward creating good living conditions.
3- To provide people with all the appropriate conditions for moral refinement so that each one of them would become the embodiment of the moral Heavenly law.
4- To be aware, as a ruler, of the four destructive evils, which are: cruelty, poverty, oppression, and injustice.
5- To always put in his mind the perfect relationship between the governor and the governed, like that relationship between the father and his children. And then they will hold the feelings of loyalty and obedience without limits to him.
We do not have to refer to how serious it is to put the governor in the same situation as the father for his children. Perhaps this is why he refuses to let the common people participate in the discussion of political issues, or to object to the behavior of the governor and his ruling, or even just to think about dethroning him (33).

One of the main reasons that led to the spread of corruption in the state is the bad behavior of children towards their parents, and disloyalty and disobedience to them. And because children always need to be taken good care of, they are incapable of making crucial decisions, so how would they be able to stand in the face of injustice of the governor?

Thus, Confucianism with Mencius became more focused on duties more than on rights, righteousness more than on justice, and commitment more than on change, despite the fact that the first foundations of the Chinese civilization - as contained in the Book of Changes - is built on the idea of ultimate change.

This also reveals the authoritarian aspect of the metaphysical foundation of politics in choosing a governor according to the Decree of Heaven, and that could also be clear in the allegation of the possibility of withdrawing that Decree, which also submits to the will of Heaven.

This is also manifest in his words about the political freedom and the right of people to choose a governor, which seemed to him as the destructive tool of the state.

Accordingly, he clearly warned against informing the common people of the political issues of the state. Even when he tries to add some paragraphs to decrease the tyranny and to improve the image of the issue of withdrawing the Decree, when the governor fails to perform his condition, the impact of these paragraphs is lost quickly before his decision to not allow the common people to object to the governor or even to think about dethroning him. He concluded that dethroning the governor is a right granted by Heaven to the chief ministers of the governor who belong to the governing dynasty (34). In addition, the dethroning thing is the last solution can be proposed; how to the father be dethroned and how can the representative of Heaven be deposed?

In order for him to make sure that no one could use the consent and non-consent of the public to the governor and his policies, he established that hierarchical perception of the state, which leaves power in the hands of the governor and his family which was deemed superior to the rest of the classes in the state. This embodies the dictatorial construction in its optimal condition no matter how he tries to talk about the ideal qualities of the governor and how much he cares about his people, as father cares about his children.

It is not a secret that the hierarchical perception of power is opposite to that of democracy; it is a model that fits the authoritarian regime ruling from top to bottom. Thus, Mencius's perception of the state, which is predominantly static, is one of the sources of tyranny imposed by the regime in China over the centuries. Therefore, it is Mencius, not Confucius, who is responsible for that static image of China, that is built on the centrality of both the state and the governor.
According to the aforementioned, we can say that the perfect man is the one who attains the degree of full awareness and realizes his position within the cosmic drama. Perfect awareness is for man to move out of his own subjectivity melting in the universal entity where there is no room for any sort of distinctiveness. This means that humans should behave in accordance with a sort of predestination against which they cannot rebel, and this is the essence of wisdom.
Reference:


(2) Han Yu is one of the famous neo-Confucianists thinkers said: "If we wish to study the doctrines of the sages, we must begin with Mencius." James Legge: The life and works of Mencius, London, 1875, Ch. 2, p. 40.


(5) Here certainly Mencius refer to Yang and Mo thinkers as representatives of Taoism and Mohism; Mencius :3B: 9,10 -7A:26.


(7) So he declared that: "The human nature is good just as water seeks low ground. There is no man who is not good; there is no water that does not flow downward…As for his becoming bad, that is not the fault of his native endowment .The heart of compassion is possessed by all men alike, likewise the heart of shame, the heart of respect, and the heart of right and wrong. The heart of compassion pertains to benevolence, the heart of shame to righteousness, the heart of respect to propriety, and the heart of right and wrong to wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not welded on to me from the outside, they are in me originally." Mencius: 6A: 2, 6.


(9) "The sage and I are of the same kind". Mencius: 6A:7 – 6 B:2.

(10) "Seek and you will get it; Let go and you will lose it. If this is the case, then seeking is of use to getting and what is sought is within yourself". Mencius: 7A: 3.

(11) So:" There is no greater joy than to examine oneself and be sincere. When in one's conduct one vigorously exercises altruism, humanity is not far to seek, but right by him". Mencius From: A source Book in Chinese philosophy, trans.by: Wing-Tsit Chan, Princeton University,1963. 7A:4.

(12) Mencius: 6A:6: It seems that the Chinese term "XIN" could be translated as either "mind" or "heart" because there is no specific term for it in English. Therefore, some translators used "mind" and some others used "heart", but the majority used "mind" some others used "heart", but the majority used the form heart/mind, and also this form was used by later Confucianists, specially Neo-Confucianists in sung dynasty [960-1279 A.D]. This study prefers to use the term "mind" especially when it refers to the greater part in the human being compared to the authority of ruler.
Mencius said: "No man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering of others... From that whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of shame, heart of courtesy and modesty, and heart of right and wrong is not human; If a man can give full development to his feelings... he will act according to righteousness wherever he may be." 2 A:6, and Mencius: from: A source Book, in Chinese philosophy: 7B:31.


Ibid: 6 A: 8, 12, 13 - 6B:2.


"Benevolence is the high honor bestowed by Heaven and the peaceful abode of man. Not to be benevolent when nothing stands in the way is to show a lack of wisdom." Mencius: 2A:7 – 4A:9.


So he said: "Slight is the difference between man and the brutes. The common man loses this distinguishing feature, while the gentleman retains it. 'Benevolence' means 'man'. When these two are conjoined, the result is the 'Way'." Mencius: 4B:19, 28 - 7B:16.


Lao Tzu: No. 43, p.161.

Mencius: 7A:15, 21 - 6B:16.


Mencius: 4A: 3, 5, 6, 9, 13.


"Those who are obedient to Heaven are preserved; those who go against Heaven are annihilated... Heaven sees with the eyes of its people. Heaven hears with the ears of its people." Mencius: 5A:5, 6 - 4A:7.


Ibid: 1B:7 - 3A:3.
(31) Ibid: 3A:2, 3 - 1A:3, 6 - 1B:4 - 2A:1, 5 - 3B:5 - 4A:913 - 4B:5.

(32) Ibid: 1A:2, 4, 5 - 1B:7 - 2A:5 - 3A:3 - 4A:3, 7, 9, 13, 14, 20.

(33) Ibid: 4A:20 - 5B:5.

(34) Ibid: 1B:8, 12 - 2B:5,12 - 5B:9.

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The Declining Power of the Nation State in a World of Interconnectivity, Transnational Orders and Cyberspace

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Abstract
Developments of faster means of communication and transport, as well as the growth of international trade had a huge impact on the predefined conception of nation states. One observable factor of globalization is a power shift, away from national governments towards NGOs, communities or companies. Rules applied to international trade have always been to a great extend made outside of state legislation and have been a vast area of research under the headline of the 'new lex mercatoria' or international commercial law. Creation of the internet as a platform for private actors has furthered a development which is similar to that of international commercial law: the growth of privately regulated spheres beyond the control of national governments. Examples include online dispute resolution mechanisms, the internet domain name system or digital rights management. Cyberspace follows its own rules, governance principles and conflict resolution mechanisms, which disregard national borders and are for the most part created by private actors (communities or corporations), rather than governmental agencies. These so called transnational legal, political and economic systems pose a serious challenge to the traditional notion of nation states. At the same time they raise questions about legitimacy, accountability and justice. This paper will address the question whether this development is desirable and what role the nation state can and should play in it.

Keywords: transnational law, transnational orders, transnational legal orders, cyberspace, justice, nation state, online dispute resolution, internet governance, new lex mercatoria
I. Introduction

The idea of a loss of power of nation states is not a new one. In the preface to her book 'The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy', Susan Strange writes almost twenty years ago:

"There is no great originality in the underlying assumption of this book – which is that the territorial boundaries of states no longer coincide with the extent or the limits of political authority over economy and society."¹

However, these tendencies have grown to a much larger extent due to recent technological advancements. What I am trying to accomplish here is to give an overview of how these new technologies, in particular the internet as a medium for everybody (that is the part of the internet called the World Wide Web – WWW), play a most important role in this development and have accelerated it to an extent not foreseeable roughly 20-25 years ago. This still ongoing development poses serious challenges for our current understanding of the political and legal order of the world, divided into single nation states.

II. Historical Background

In this section I will not be able to lay out a complete account of the history of either the nation state or the World Wide Web. My aim is solely to point out that one of them (the nation state) already has a longstanding tradition, whereas the other one (the WWW) is a very new phenomenon.

1. A Long History: The Nation State

The concept of nation states is in itself a highly disputed topic.² I do not want to go into this discussion and I do not want to offer a solution for it here either. For the purpose of this article it is enough to understand the nation state as a sovereign political and geographical entity with predefined borders and a more or less centralized government, which has a monopoly of administering law and order and the legitimate use of (physical) force within its boundaries. Relations among nation states are governed by independence and the principle of non-interference.³ In this sense the United States of America, Japan or Germany are nation states, whereas for example the European Union or the United Nations are not.

The history of nation states is not perfectly clear among scholars. Some put the beginning of the concept of nation states far back into middle ages Europe⁴.

¹ Strange 1996, p. ix
² See for example the discussion about the problem of defining the terms nation or state and how the terminology is often mixed up in: Croucher 2004, p. 85ff.; according to which in my approach here as well the terminology has to be considered as mixed up.
³ see for example Kissinger 2014, p. 7f., who also points out that it is a uniquely European system of its time, which spread around the world
⁴ Strayer 1970
Many associate it with the signing of the Westphalian Peace Treaty in 1648 and therefore call the system of world order today also the Westphalian system. Some trace its beginnings to the 19th century and/or put its definitive height to the time after World War 2. Again I don’t want to solve the dispute. For the purposes of this article it is enough to realize that in any case its history supersedes everybody who is living today and therefore its beginnings have not been witnessed by anybody who is alive anymore. My aim is solely to illustrate, that we can assume a rather longstanding history. This leads to a state of mind in which we take the world’s division into single nation states for granted in our modern day world order. We are used to it and it takes a lot of imagination to imagine it otherwise, albeit the fact that in world history there were all kinds of different orderings, from city states to empires.

2. A Short History: The Internet as a Medium for Everybody

Quite the opposite is true for the internet. Middle aged people living today, grew up without it and some (especially older people in their retirement age) still refuse to go online even now, despite all the advantages it might have. In contrast to the nation state, the history of the internet is a very short one and we as a society, still remember the days without it. The history of the internet as a means of mass communication, as a medium available to everybody, spans just a little more than 20 years. The internet as we all know and use it nowadays is connected to the development of a part of the internet called the World Wide Web (WWW). The WWW was envisioned by CERN employee Tim Berners-Lee in 1989, the first ever website went online August 6th, 1991 and in 1993 CERN released the architecture of the WWW into the Public Domain, making it freely available to everybody and thereby establishing the roots of its rise to fame around the world.

Although very brief, the WWW's history is a history of ever faster growing importance. At first it completely changed the way in which people communicate with each other. From e-mail, over online chats, all the way up to video conferences and social networks.

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5 Kissinger 2014, p. 1ff. (2, 7)  
6 Branch 2011, p. 5ff.  
7 Bowring 2014  
8 On a personal note: Being myself just turned 31 at the time of presenting this paper at the ACERP 2015 conference in Osaka, I already grew up surrounded by computers, though I can still remember having a computer at home which was not hooked up to the internet. For somebody born roughly 5 to 10 years later this already is unthinkable and for anybody in his/her teenage years right now, living means living online, having computers in your pocket, which are much more powerful than the big stationary PC's ten years ago and which are constantly connected to the internet. ‘Always On’ is the slogan of the time, at least in developed countries.  
9 Blum 2011; this first website is unfortunately lost, but a backup version can still be accessed from the CERN website today at: http://info.cern.ch/hypertext/WWW/TheProject.html  
10 CERN
Then it also changed the way in which business is done. Today commercial transactions over the internet have succeeded beyond imagination. Shopping in retail stores is in the decline, whereas online sales are growing more and more. And on top of that customers nowadays combine both experiences, researching about products online, even while in a store. For example in order to compare prices or get better information about a certain product than they would get from a store employee.\textsuperscript{11}

International trade, made possible by the internet is easier than ever. Anybody can use a websites which compares prices for goods and services and order from the cheapest source. Ordering goods from retailers around the world is just a mouse click away. One of the biggest players (if not the biggest) in online shopping is amazon\textsuperscript{12} and with its marketplace makes it possible for anybody to participate in (international) online trade without even running his or her own website or online shop. Items will be sent to your home, nationally mostly and internationally sometimes even without shipping costs. Even easier is the purchase of digital goods like music, movies or software, which, after the payment process is over, can just be downloaded. All this includes items or content, which may be restricted or illegal in your own country. If it is a physical item, it may still have to go through customs inspections, but if it is a digital product, this is not the case. In the latter case, there might be some self-imposed restrictions by the supplier or national restrictions like filters, but this is not the case everywhere and usually these measures are easily bypassed, even by not so skilled computer users.

All this shows, that the internet’s influence on everyday life is profound. It changed the way we communicate and generally interact with each other and also the way in which the buying and selling of goods is carried out. And these are just two examples of a very complex and ever evolving interaction between cyberspace and real space.\textsuperscript{13}

### III. Transnational Legal Orders and Transnational Orders – A Clarification

In the headline for this article I use the term ‘transnational orders’. What do I mean by that expression? And why do I not use the more common phrase ‘transnational legal orders’?

When it comes to transnational legal orders outside of cyberspace, the best example would be what is commonly called the ‘new lex mercatoria’ or international commercial law, which has been called a ‘Prime Example’\textsuperscript{14} of transnational law. Today’s international commercial law uses written law like the CISG (Convention for the International Sales of Goods), which is an UN convention. But we also have a great body of customary law, which is still referred to as lex mercatoria\textsuperscript{15}, a term derived from the medieval customary international commercial law.

\textsuperscript{11} Bogaisky 2014
\textsuperscript{12} E.g. amazon.com; amazon.co.uk; amazon.co.jp; amazon.de
\textsuperscript{13} For the distinction between cyberspace and real space see e.g Lessig 1996; Lessig 2006, ch. 1
\textsuperscript{14} Schultz 2007, p. 154
\textsuperscript{15} For an overview of these rules see for example the Trans-Lex Principles, collected at the Center for Transnational Law (CENTRAL) at the University of Cologne: http://www.trans-lex.org/principles/
These rules are used in arbitration courts around the world. Rulings of these arbitration courts have then to be enforced by national courts, if the parties don’t abide by them.16

When talking about transnational orders, a huge focus of the discussion has been the question whether these orderings can be described as 'legal orders' or 'law'. Some authors have argued for this notion17, some against it18.

My aim here is not to try to answer this question (although if I had to, I would be in line with Schultz), but rather to follow the approach that it doesn't matter for our purposes at hand, which is to demonstrate a decline in power of classic rule making bodies, i.e. nation states. I want to suggest that no matter how one is to label these developments, the phenomenon stays the same and deserves the same level of attention. If one is to give it the label of law or if one wants to reserve the term 'law' for rules/regulations made by nation states, in the end doesn't really matter. It doesn't change the facts about there being transnational regulatory orders, which are not made by nation states, but by private actors and which regulate vast areas of human life. These have been and continue growing in scope and importance and they are outside the effective reach of national legal orders. It does not mean, that national legal orders do not apply in these contexts, it only means that in practice recourse to national legal systems usually just does not happen.

I deliberately choose the title of this presentation 'transnational orders and cyberspace' and not 'transnational legal orders' as you would often find, because I want to point out that the qualification of something as law or not, is not necessarily relevant when looking at the implications these development have in the real world.19

IV. Transnational Orders in Cyberspace and their Effect on Nation States

Schultz demonstrates two important examples, which illustrate how recourse to national courts usually is out of question. First, rulings that settle disputes about domain names made by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The outcomes will be enforced immediately by ICANN itself.

16 Schultz 2007, p. 154
17 Schultz 2007, who convincingly argues that in cyberspace more so than in real space, there exist private legal systems, due to the fact that unlike their real world counterparts, they have their own enforcement methods
18 Roberts 2005; Shapiro 1998, who argues that cyberspace is not a separate place but rather an extension of real space and therefore bound by the same laws (contract, criminal and other), which are in power equally in both worlds
19 This of course does not imply that it is not an interesting and important question in itself and especially in the broader context of legal theory. If you think about the nature of law, the discussion about international law, transnational law and cyberspace law can illuminate a lot about legal theory (see Schultz 2007, Lessig 1999 and of course fundamentally important Hart 1961)
These rulings can be challenged in national courts, but are in fact only challenged in less than one percent of all cases.  

Second, eBay’s dispute resolution mechanism, which works quite similar to arbitration procedures, just over the internet. First a standard procedure is initiated, which is computer mediated. If that does not solve the issue, a real mediator intervenes. Immediate enforcement lies in negative ratings of one or the other party, which in an online marketplace where reputation is most important, forces parties to comply.

Lessig points out other interesting examples. He describes trusted systems, which in order to protect intellectual property, work much better and go much further than national intellectual property law. Technological advances cancel out fair use regulations and protect digital content like music, movies, articles, books and so on better than they would be protected in the real world. Today this is called Digital Rights Management (DRM) and is part of every computer user’s world.

He further describes contracts between users and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). If a user does not abide by the contract terms (no matter how hideous they might be) the ISPs can enforce them immediately by just cutting the user off from the internet. A real world equivalent would be a house owner, who cuts a tenant off from water, gas and electricity if he does not pay his rent, without getting a court order that allows the owner to do so.

Lastly Lessig talks about Spam Filters as a kind of internet ‘vigilantism’. Spam, seen as a crime in the internet world, is tackled by private people through Spam Filters, which effectively cancel out unwanted mail, in a way that would not be possible in real space and in that sense infringe on free speech. Building on the Spam Filter idea one could also easily imagine ISPs to filter content, which can be reached through their networks (a problem recently more and more discussed under the label ‘net neutrality’).

In all these examples the road into national courts is not blocked, people just usually don’t go that way. The reasons for the reluctance to bother national courts with these cases are speculative, numerous and diverse. Maybe it is too costly for the parties to engage in actual litigation, maybe they are from remote corners of the earth, where courts are not readily available, maybe their knowledge about the possibility to reach out to traditional law enforcement is too limited or they fear that the private rules, rulings or contracts are binding on them. Or, maybe the private rules, as well as dispute resolutions mechanism are not only effective, but also recognized by the participants as the proper governing regulations and therefore rulings based on them are simply accepted by the affected parties.

20 Schultz 2007, p. 157ff. (159)
21 Schultz 2007, p. 159ff. (162)
22 Lessig 1999, p. 522ff. (528)
23 Lessig 1999, p. 528ff.
25 Schultz 2007, p. 185
No matter what the causes, these regulation schemes exist around the world. They are able to enforce themselves and since the advent of the internet, they start to affect everybody. Concerning the lex mercatoria, one could argue that it affects only a small number of specialists, i.e. merchants in international trade. These actors might be so specialized, that they embrace these private rulings and do not necessarily want to take recourse to national courts. On top of that, arbitration rulings are still relying on national courts for their enforcement.26

Nowadays, everybody who uses the internet is subject to these new private orderings and has to deal with them one way or another. As we leave the realm of specialists, who best know for themselves what steps to take, now we face a situation in which the nation state has come to compete with transnational orders. Situations arise where normal people, who may be looking for protection from their governments, are facing these private orders and are lost as to their actual rights and possibilities under national laws.

V. How the Nation States (could) fight back

Some claim that cyberspace cannot be regulated.27 Lessig argues this claim is false and only the current underlying architecture of cyberspace is opposed to control. But this architecture is just one out of numerous possible architectures and governments could legislate cyberspace indirectly by forcing its players to change the architecture in specific ways.28

This assumption is definitely correct to a certain extent and if one takes a look at the development since his article has been published in 1999, there have been numerous interferences by government in this architecture29 and in some ways or, better said, some parts of the world, national governments have a very strong power over the internet30.

But in general, I support the claim of Johnson and Post, already put forward in 1997, that "the rise of an electronic medium that disregards geographical boundaries throws the law into disarray by creating entirely new phenomena [...] that cannot be governed, satisfactorily, by any current territorially based sovereign."31 This still holds true today and supports my claim that although it might be possible, as Lessig states, to alter the architecture of the Internet and ISP's could in theory be forced to change it, it would be impossible for any one nation state alone to undertake this task.

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26 As Schultz 2007, p. 154 points out: „The lex mercatoria can therefore only have the contents that national courts allow it to have.“, (highlighting in the original)
27 Lessig 1999, p. 505, who states the argument, but himself argues to the contrary
29 For a detailed description see Goldsmith/Wu 2006, Part 2 ‘Government Strikes Back’, p. 47ff.; one of the more recent examples would be legislation tackling net neutrality, see for example https://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality
30 Just think about the ‚Great Firewall‘ of China or filtering of content in other areas of the world
31 Johnson/Post 1997, p. 1375, highlighting by me
Only if national governments would work together under a united body, effective regulation of cyberspace might be possible. This of course assumes they are able to find a common ground, which is rather unlikely. Or, each state alone could go the way of Iran and try to establish a 'national' internet. This might technologically be possible and for strong despotic governments a viable option. But it would not be an option in a free society and even in these countries it would lead to severe economic difficulties if, due to these restrictions, companies could not participate in cross-border trade anymore.

So, assuming that it is technologically possible to do so, fighting these developments would be a challenging task for national governments. The options are very limited and on top of that, the question has to be raised, whether we want national governments to fight the privatization of cyberspace rule at all.

VI. Should Nation States fight back?

When we look at examples like the Great Firewall of China or internet restrictions in other countries, which basically are just attempts by governments to restrict free speech and we also see what political power the internet holds for dissidents in restricted societies, we might think that it is overall a positive development to have an online world which is beyond governments reach.

But, as described above, these examples also have to face a number of counter examples, in which the private sector is the one that undermines values of free speech or traditional values of justice, like fair use. Lessig rightfully points out, that blacklisting certain systems in order to tackle spam on the internet “...is a kind of internet vigilantism – it is an example of private people taking the law into their own hands.” The conclusion is not confined to this specific example. In other cases as well, private entities are taking the law into their own hands, yes even change the content of the law to their advantage (e.g. when it comes to DRM, see above). Government interference in these cases might lead to a strengthening of publicly shared values, which otherwise get lost in a for profit private form of regulation.

The situation therefore is two sided. In restrictive societies, an unregulated internet might lead to more freedom and justice, in a free society it might alter traditional notions of freedom and justice to the worse.

32 take for example just different viewpoints of (religiously) conservative countries and progressive countries on tackling pornography and what constitutes as such
33 Tajdin 2013
34 Take for example Turkey which regularly blocks sites like youtube or social networks like twitter, Tuysuz/Watson 2014; Akkoc 2015
35 Take the Arab Spring as an example, where the protests which helped to overthrow governments in Egypt and Tunisia were to a great extend inspired and/or organized by social media debates, O'Donnell 2011
36 Lessig 1999, p. 544
37 Shapiro 1998, p. 19
In some cases, the internet’s self-government might alter traditional public values only in its own sphere. This means that maybe online other values prevail than in the physical world. Can we allow this? In other words, can we allow not only a plurality of laws or rule systems, but also a plurality of values? On top of transnational orders, should we allow transnational value systems? And if we agree on the necessity for national governments to interfere in the process, how far do we want it to go? Do we want a completely state regulated internet? Do we want a multinationally regulated internet?

To answer these question one also has to take into account the background of this development of private regulation. In terms of ICANN, ebay and other online dispute resolution mechanism (ODR), one can easily make the point that they arose out of the necessity of the internet community to have a fast and functional way of dealing with disputes. But what if these ODRs, like other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) lead to a compromise of justice?38

In my assumption, nation states have certain responsibilities towards their citizens. Among these are the provision of ways to settle disputes, the installment of a body of rules which govern disputes among people and the provision of a way of enforcement of rulings on these disputes. Also they are responsible to secure peoples freedoms and administer justice. This, together with the monopoly of force, makes states directly responsible. Also, the nation states are liable to their citizens. That means they have to attend to people’s needs for dispute resolution. Lastly they are legitimized, ideally by democratic processes.

But even non-democratic states (ideally) have the aforementioned responsibilities. Shifting the drafting and enforcement of regulations to private entities lifts these responsibilities from the state and turns it over into private hands. But private entities do not share the same amount of responsibility nor liability towards the governed people. They are responsible only to their shareholders.39 This shift, if not tackled by the states, results in a reduction of power for nation states and an increase in power for the private sector. Therefore we face a serious challenge, namely if nation states, especially democratically organized ones, are allowed to stand by and watch or if they have to intervene at one point? In the latter case, at what point?

VII. Conclusion

This short article deals with a great many different and highly disputed issues. In terms of the nation state and transnational legal orders I have not offered a solution to these issues and have not even tried to do so. Accordingly I expect some readers to already dismiss the premises of my paper. But, assuming that the premises are established (and in order to do so I strongly point to the given references), the points made are worth considering.

38 Roberts 2005, p. 23 downer part, footnote 119, 120

39 This leaves aside the question of non-profit online communities, which make rules for themselves. Here the question has to be formulated the other way round. If communities represent a large amount of people, can we consider them to be democratic entities and do we have to consider changing real space regulation according to the rules which arose in these communities?
Do we want this development to go further? Do we want private actors, which are responsible to nobody or only to their shareholders, rather than governments, which are responsible to their people, to be the ones regulating our (digital) lives?

As I have shown, the answer cannot be simply one or the other. In some cases private regulation functions very well and is accepted by users (e.g. ICANN’s and ebay’s dispute resolution mechanisms). In other cases the implications are more frightening and undermine user’s traditional freedoms and generally traditional notions of justice and fairness (e.g. DRM and fair use). Is it possible to keep the good parts of private orderings on the web and get rid of the bad ones? Or are both too interconnected to be dealt with separately? All these questions are unresolved and have to be investigated further. But in any case, the task at hand cannot be dealt with by individual national governments, but only in an international context.
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Abstract
The concept of moral responsibility is increasingly being deployed in world politics. The international community invokes doctrines such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s legal decisions to hold political actors accountable for universal obligations. While the subject has become of prominent interest among political philosophers, insufficient attention has been directed towards understanding the changing nature of the agent carrying this responsibility. The autonomy and rationality of agents are largely considered detrimental to a profound analysis of the value of agency as a social practice that can enable or disable moral responsibility. One remarkable exception is Hoover’s work emphasising not only that a responsible agent is a social construction, as in Frost and Linklater, but also that the act of holding responsible is a coercive and creative political act. Though I agree with Hoover in principle that the allocation of responsibility largely reflects the way in which privileged agents portray marginalised others, I claim that the particularities of globalization are reshaping traditionally perceived relations of power. Particularities related to the multiplicity of poles of authority and their dynamic interactions are rendering the portrait of moral agents less evident in terms of clear-cut dichotomies. As a result, the allocation of responsibilities among them has become more diffuse. To support my claim, I analyse the United Nations’ (UN) mandate and reports produced during the 10 years of the UN Humanitarian Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI). I specify the development and changing character of collective moral agents’ identities in this precise global practice of responsibility.

Keywords: moral responsibility, global practice, UNAMI
1) Moral responsibility as an object of concern in world politics and academic circles

The moral concept of responsibility has been increasingly deployed in world politics today. The international community invokes doctrines such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to support intervention in fragile states. Simultaneously, corporate responsibility has become a subject to be seriously considered in international business, as shown by the establishment of the United Nations’ (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2011. Following the trend, political theorists are showing a steadily increasing interest in analysing the concept. However, much attention has been given to possible objects of responsibility ascription (actions, omissions, consequences, characters, etc.) that is detrimental to a more profound understanding of the changing nature of the agent who carries the moral responsibility. This paper is motivated by the perception that no credible assignment of moral responsibility can exist without a critical comprehension of the limits of the agents who are supposed to bear such a responsibility.

The core literature on moral responsibility presupposes a modern notion of agent as someone capable of evaluating reasons for acting based on his or her free will. Liberal cosmopolitans understand that ethical reasoning is fundamentally defined by individuals’ ability to exercise their universal rationality (Barry 1996, Beitz 1999). Pointing to the utopianism of this perspective, liberal internationalists admit that this capacity depends on the existence of a well-ordered political structure inside which associative obligations are born (Walzer 1994; Rawls 2000).

In view of expanding the potentiality of this perspective, constitutive theory affirms that moral agents are constituted through social practices (Frost 2003). Such practices have ethical codes responsible for framing agents’ responsibilities embedded in them. Frost, for example, admits that moral responsibilities will change and develop in response to the broader social transformations occurring in an increasingly globalised world. However, he offers few clues about how these responsibilities change. Hoover’s (2012) critical approach represents a move forward from this mainstream thought. This author explores the idea that the responsible agent a socially constructed agent and that the act of holding someone responsible is a coercive, creative political act.

Hoover’s critical understanding of moral agency’s constitutiveness is particularly helpful in a global environment with no final political authority apart from that of sovereign states. In this scenario, the allocation of responsibility largely reflects the way in which privileged agents, powerful states and the multilateral institutions formed by them portray marginalised others. While it is helpful, Hoover’s approach seems limited. It offers few clues about how globalization helps reshape traditionally perceived relations of power between political agents, therefore affecting the notion of a morally responsible agent.

In an increasingly globalised world, a growing number of multi-connected actors can pursue common interests in an organised, effective way. They directly or indirectly participate in global governance. I claim that in this context, the sovereign state is led to reassess not only its political role but also the way in which it reinforces its legitimacy as a prominently collective moral agency. The sovereign state faces pressure from its citizens and transnational actors to become more assertive in regulating the socio-political environment, which increasingly transcends national borders; it also faces pressure to become more responsive to these actors’ demands by offering them a relevant role in the formulation and implementation of multilateral initiatives.
The reassignment of the state’s role leads to the emergence of a new power dynamic among international political actors involved in global practices of responsibility. Arguably, it contributes to a diffusion of power among political actors and therefore to a redefinition of the traditional ways of perceiving morally responsible agency.

The analysis of the UN Humanitarian Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the most enduring multilateral effort to reconstruct a fragile state, illustrates the way in which liberally dominant states are obliged to reevaluate their roles within a global practice of responsibility. It also illustrates the extent to which such reevaluation pave the way to a diffusion of power among political units and consequently to the redefinition of morally responsible agency in a less clear-cut dichotomy than the one implied by the characterization of states into fragile and non-fragile states.

The paper is divided into four sections. The first section analyses the conception of moral agency and its responsibilities in view of social practices. The following section discusses the types of pressures globalization brings to such analysis. The third section assesses UNAMI within the context of a global practice of responsibility. It shows how global moral responsibilities have been assigned and to whom they have been assigned. Consequently, it sheds light on the type of moral agency that has been privileged in these interactions and the ways in which this kind of notion is enforced and eventually challenged today. The fourth section presents some concluding remarks.

2) Assessing the concept of morally responsible agency vis-à-vis social practices

The individual is the moral agent *par excellence*. He is potentially capable of ethical reasoning and acting based on such reasoning, bearing responsibility for his acts. More precisely, the individual is a rational being capable of defining his objectives and pursuing them in the most efficient way. He can also exercise his rational capacities *vis-à-vis* others. His freedom to choose and act based on these choices is limited by a recognition of the same ability in others. Moreover, he sees others with a certain integrity, not as a means to achieve specified objectives but as ends in themselves. Only in that way can he and those around him be considered fully valid interlocutors capable of understanding and respecting commitments, which means bearing responsibilities.

The autonomous individual described here needs to be part of a well-regulated social environment to develop his ethical capacities. He needs to be a citizen of a state in which members are expected to relate to each other fairly and recognise each other as equally valid interlocutors while directly or indirectly participating in practices of public decision. As Frost remarks, these public practices, which are backed by the state’s monopolistic use of force, embed ethical codes. Such codes are responsible for establishing the value of a citizen’s action, which refers to what is to be praised or blamed in society.

However, it is worth noting that historically situated practices are necessarily marked by inequalities of power among practitioners regardless of the state’s ability to ensure a minimum level of fairness among them. Ethical codes suffer from the influence of power politics. The actors who most efficiently use their material resources, such as economic advantage, or immaterial resources, such as influence and persuasion, can determine what is blameworthy and who is to be blamed. In this sense, the identity of morally responsible agents will be largely framed by the way in which powerful identities successfully portray themselves in the face of less-privileged others.
The overwhelming public blame of financiers for the 2008 global economic crisis illustrates this point. Public protests, such as the 2011 Occupy Wall Street protests against socioeconomic inequality, singled out undue corporate influence on democracy. In contrast, central banks and other regulators were targeted less after the crisis, even though they significantly contributed to it by tolerating unfair financial practices.

This reference to the 2008 global economic crisis leads us to pose some relevant questions. Can states be considered units bearing moral responsibility in international relations? Is it possible to extend ethical reasoning from the individual to this specific collective? The answers must be in the affirmative, though with some reservations. As Erskine (2003, 21) remarks, many points of comparison between the individual moral agent and the state can be established. The state is structurally organised. It has a singular identity, considering that a distinct politico-cultural identity among citizens is born from their involvement in the process of public reasoning. It enjoys a certain autonomy due to its ability to define and pursue common actions based on its citizens’ broader interests. As O’Neill (1986) remarks, states even have greater power of action and independence from external intervention than individuals or other collectives. They have at their disposal more sophisticated means of gathering information and processing it to organise action, as their ability to declare war shows (O’Neill 1986, 51). The state can also understand the consequences of its actions and recognise that other collectives have similar capacities of action and understanding.

However, the state lacks external conditions that impinge on individuals’ exercise of ethical reasoning. In the international environment, no sovereign political authority can both secure a minimum level of fairness among the involved parts and enforce their commitments through the monopolistic use of force. Multilateral agreements to establish international cooperation are ultimately subjected to the discretionary power of governments, and they can easily be aborted without the governments suffering an overwhelming punishment. The United States’ use of international law to validate their grand strategic aims, such as the war against terrorism, is often used as an illustration of this. It was in view of these aims that the United States attempted to rely on international law and the UN apparatus in 2003 to justify the invasion of Iraq by the Coalition of the Willing.

In such an environment, the most powerful states tend to have a greater advantage than other states that lack the enabling conditions to fully act autonomously. The latter states lack internal means or depend on foreign aid and expertise to exercise basic state capacities. For example, they are characterised by corrupted governments, weak education systems and underdeveloped infrastructure. In political theory, these states have been popularly labelled as quasi-states or deficient states, terms coined by Jackson (1990) and Rawls (2000), respectively. In the language of multilateral organizations, such as the UN and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), they are commonly referred to as fragile, weak or failed states, depending on the level of their disorganization as sovereign political units.

In these different descriptions, incapable states are defined as temporarily less fit moral agents compared to fully democratic and economically developed states. However, definitions of the unfitness of moral agency and what such a state should accomplish to elevate itself to the category of full autonomy are made within global practices of responsibility. It greatly depends on the way in which powerful liberal states portray themselves in ideal terms through the process of devaluing and reconstructing other, less-privileged states as valid interlocutors.
The complex features of globalization introduce a new dynamic to the above reasoning. The multiplicity of poles of authority and their intensive interactions challenge the way in which states are supposed to exercise power. In doing so, they influence the current ability of powerful states to portray themselves in ideal terms in relation to other less-privileged ones, which paves the way for a reassessment of traditional forms of defining morally responsible agency.

3) Globalization, social practices and the changing perception of a state’s moral responsibilities

Globalization is marked by complex diversity. A growing number of actors are dynamically interacting with one another in an intricate kind of dynamism (Sarquis 2014). Using quick means of communications, states and members of civil society are multiplying their representations in supranational structures (e.g. the European Union), international organizations, international nongovernment organizations (INGs) and multinational corporations. They not only are exposed to an overwhelming amount of information but also have more opportunities to exchange viewpoints based on this information flow. According to Held (1996), globalization brings ‘a widening, deepening and speeding up of social interactions in all aspects of contemporary life, creating new flows of activities, relations and the exercise of power’ (16).

Because of their exposition to information and the opportunity to act socially, representatives of the state and civil society can more easily question not only who they are but also how they should act to affirm themselves and their goals at the national and international levels. They are prone to more actively influencing decision-making processes, including those that sustain international norms. Rosenau memorably discusses the newly generated activity of such actors and the political consequences. For him, the world today has become denser with multiple spheres of authority (SOAs) directing global governance to assume a multi-level dimension, which leads to top-down governance, network governance, bottom-up governance, side-by-side governance, market governance and Möbius-web governance. In this scenario, both the authority of the state and the normativity generated by it cannot easily be taken for granted (Rosenau 2004, 35).

In this complex scenario, the state is obliged to reconsider the way in which it exercises its political role and reinforces its legitimacy as a collective moral agency. On one hand, the state faces pressure to be more assertive than in the past in the definition of global responsibilities for itself and other political actors in international relations. Complex social interactions among different political actors require regulation in domains as diverse as financial transactions, migration, environmental pollution and humanitarian disasters. The state remains the most powerful and identifiable unit that can organise multilateral regulative actions in these domains. The adoption of the responsibility to protect the R2P doctrine during the 1990s after the UN’s failure to respond to humanitarian disasters in Rwanda illustrates the point. This doctrine assigns to the international political community the responsibility to intervene with technical support, followed by military action as a last resort when states fail to protect their citizens from mass human-rights violations.

On the other hand, the state is obliged to become more responsive than before to the particular demands of a growing number of public and private international actors. The state is compelled to not only recognise their significance as interlocutors, even if they do not enjoy the same political status as the state, but also incorporate them and their demands into the
international public decision-making process. For example, the Security Council arguably adopted the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) only after receiving extensive criticism from NGOs and other human rights observers for not intervening earlier to stop the genocide in the country.

This impetus for states to be more assertive in their actions concerning international regulation and responsive to the demands of a new string of political actors becomes evident when analysing UNAMI as a global practice of responsibility. During the 11 years of the mission’s existence, UN staff and member-states were led to expand interventionist initiatives to reconstruct Iraq’s state capabilities while leaning on the participation of Iraqi representatives and international civic groups in the decision-making processes to legitimize these initiatives. Consequently, a new power dynamic among the international political actors involved in this global practice of responsibility has gradually emerged. A diffusion of power among political actors can be observed, which will eventually lead to a redefinition of moral agency in a less clear-cut dichotomy, such as the one implied in the characterization of fragile and non-fragile states. I will analyse these points in more detail in the following section.

4) UNAMI as a Global Practice of Responsibility

UNAMI was established in August 2003 through SC Resolution 1500 to help reconstruct Iraq’s state capabilities after the war in view of international security concerns after the 9/11 attacks and the international campaign against terrorism. It has largely been considered one of the biggest challenges the organization has faced. It has continued for over 11 years, and it employs vast organizational resources, with almost all relevant agencies of the UN system actively involved in projects aiming at national reconstruction. On July 2014, the Security Council (SC) adopted Resolution 2169, extending UNAMI’s mission for another year.

The mission’s mandate revolves around activities concentrated in three main areas. The first area involves a political set of activities providing advice, support and assistance to the Iraqi government in advancing national dialogue and reconciliation; strengthening election and referendum processes; reviewing the constitution and implementing constitutional provisions; and resolving disputed internal borders. The second area covers an economic set of activities involving promotion, support and facilitation in implementing the International Compact for Iraq’s reconstruction and implementing programs to improve Iraq’s capacities to provide essential services and attain sustainable development. The third area involves a set of humanitarian and institutional activities including the promotion of human rights and judicial and legal reform.

Such an array of activities provides first-hand testimony regarding the increasingly interventionist functions conferred by the SC to the UN staff on the ground. However, the interventionist character of the mission is balanced by the need to recognise Iraq’s integrity. In pursuing its functions, UNAMI must not only respect Iraq’s cultural and socio-political unity but also pursue its own activities as long as the recipients show a clear willingness to receive international assistance. The mission is mandated ‘as circumstances permit’ and ‘at the request of the Government of Iraq’ (SC Resolution 2110, July 2013).
This dual logic attached to UNAMI’s mandate is reflected in the UN Secretary General’s reports on the mission. Produced each trimester, these reports provide a regular description of the socioeconomic environment in Iraq and the activities carried out by the UN and its interlocutors. They also offer a consistent, detailed narrative of UNAMI in the context of a global practice of responsibility, which is the focal point of my analysis.

In the context of a global practice of responsibility, UNAMI can be represented by an axis. One side of the axis includes the member states responsible for issuing mandates and UN agencies and staff carrying out the responsibilities specified in the mandate. The other side of the axis includes Iraq’s fragile state institutions: governmental, legislative and judiciary bodies. They not only receive the international community’s aid but also share the responsibility to pursue the objectives specified in UN mandates. Other political actors rotate around this axis. Among them are political leaders representing Arab Sunni, Kurdish and Shi’a communities; local organizations defending women’s, political prisoners’ and children’s rights; the World Bank; representatives of the international intellectual community; regional governments (especially Kuwait, Jordan, Iran and Egypt); and transnational business corporations.

Because the socio-political situation in Iraq is proving more complex than initially envisaged, the UN staff on the ground, backed by SC mandates, has developed an increasingly assertive approach to their activities. One striking example relates to the overstretched character of the constitutional activities pursued by the mission’s staff in 2009. These activities included promoting dialogue between the Government of Iraq and regional leaderships (S/2009/393, July 2009); engaging with the leaders of major parliamentary blocs regarding the status of the constitutional review process; providing technical and legal advice to specific Committees of the Council of Representatives on constitutional and legislative matters (S/2009/102, February 2009); holding round-table discussions with Iraqi policymakers to consider hydrocarbon management (S/2009/102, February 2009); and presenting options through the Constitutional Review Committee to resolve the hydrocarbon issue at the constitutional level (S/2009/393, July 2009).

Another example is UNAMI’s engagement in the formulation of the ‘Iraq Briefing Book’ by UNAMI. In March 2011, the UN Secretary General reported that UNAMI and the UN country teams stepped up their engagement with their official counterparts after the establishment of the new government. On behalf of the Iraq Partners Forum, the UN special representative submitted the ‘Iraq Briefing Book’ to Prime Minister al-Maliki. This book ‘outlines policy recommendations in areas such as private sector development, provision of essential services, human rights and governance reform and provides a basis for future discussions between Iraqi authorities and international partners’ (S/2011/213, March 2011).

The UN’s assertive approach to activities on the ground is often accompanied by two kinds of justifications. The first relates to the fact that UNAMI fulfils demands from the Iraqi people. In these terms, the UN Secretary General reported in March 2005 that there was a general expectation both inside and outside Iraq that the UN should play an active role in supporting the constitution-making process (S/2005/141, March 2005). The second kind of justification, as stated in the October 2007 report, relates to what is perceived as ‘the UN’s distinct comparative advantage’ of enjoying both good relations with a wide range of actors from across the political spectrum and a wide range of best practices gained from operating in conflicts across the globe (S/2007/608, October 2007).
Moreover, the UN’s mission relies heavily on a strategy of communication to pursue its activities. The UN’s Iraq website was established in both Arabic and English in February 2004, providing databases, a map centre, Iraq media monitoring, document archiving and discussion forums on the mission (S/2004/625, February 2004). Over the years, it has regularly been updated and expanded to include other services, such as the directorate concerning NGOs working on the ground. Though justified based on transparency and accountability concerns, the installation and expansion of the UN’s Iraq website also educates Iraqis on the purposes of the mission and legitimizes these purposes.

A ‘guided’ type of inclusiveness balances the assertive character of the mission. UNAMI’s staff is clearly attempting to incorporate other international political actors in the decision-making process while maintaining a firm grip on the leadership and coordination of procedures leading to common decisions. The UN Secretary General’s reports presented in 2004 and 2005 illustrate the point. In December 2004, UNHCHR and the UNAMI Human Rights Office organised a mapping meeting in Geneva to share information on UN activities. During the meeting, a list of projected activities in Iraq for 2005 and 2006 was established by UN agencies (UNAMI, UNHCHR, UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNCHR and the UN Development Fund for Women [UNIFEM]), 40 interested governments and about 30 representatives from international civil society organizations (S/2004/959, December 2004). Following the same principle, the UN Secretary General reported in June 2005 on the mission’s informal staff meeting with INGOs and embassies to exchange information and ensure effective coordination in the field of constitution creation (S/2005/141).

The above points implicitly illustrate an ideal portrait of the relation between morally fit versus unfit collective agency and the type of responsibility each agency is supposed to bear in the global practice known as UNAMI. The fit moral agent, here represented by the UN and its member states, is characterised by a certain autonomy representing the broader international community’s interests instead of the SC’s specific interests. This agent’s actions are based on the best interests of such a community and are marked by impartiality. This argument of impartiality is pursued throughout reports in different areas. For example, the Secretary General stated in June 2005 that UNAMI’s role is to provide impartial and objective reporting on returnees, displacement and compensation issues (S/2007/373, June 2007). Any stronger interventionist action by the mission’s staff is justified based on the need to reinstall Iraq’s autonomous state capacities; the Iraqi people constantly recognise this need.

According to the Secretary General’s reports, the Iraqi people demand such an action. In contrast to this fit moral agent, Iraq is a temporarily unfit member of the international community. In the reports, Iraq’s state is portrayed as not having the necessary means to enjoy full membership in such a community. For example, the Secretary General’s 2005 report remarks on the unpreparedness of national staff, ‘with less direction than preferred’, to deal with security concerns affecting the implementation of the mission’s activities (S/2005/373, June 2005) The Iraqi people are nonetheless perceived as willing to work in partnership to advance a liberal agenda, ranging from the establishment of democratic institutions to the defence of extensive human rights, to obtain autonomy and full membership in the international community.

The ideal portrait of the dichotomy between a morally fit and an unfit moral agent is directly influenced by the power relations between the main practitioners of the particular global practice of responsibility known as UNAMI. On one hand, the UN and its member states have at their disposal the economic power to build and allocate funds for Iraq reconstruction; the
accumulated experience and technical expertise to help formulate, coordinate and implement the projects; and the ability to interpret international legal instruments to legitimise the mission’s activities. On the other hand, Iraq cannot perform its basic state functions because its socioeconomic infrastructure was destroyed and its political forces were fragmented. Regardless of its reluctance, Iraq must accept the terms from the UN/international community to work in partnership to re-establish full statehood. Iraqi’s reluctance to fully accept the terms of this partnership is illustrated by the reports of constant security problems facing UN staff working on the ground, culminating with the murder of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary in 2003. It is also illustrated by the continued absence of a status-of-mission agreement for UNAMI, despite the UN’s innumerable demands to Iraq’s government for this agreement.

It is relevant to note that the power relation between these two poles of global practice suffer from the influence of the new international political actors’ activity. The activity of such actors, who are allied with Iraq’s fragile ability to influence the definition of UNAMI activities, allows a diffusion of power among political units, even though this diffusion is restrained. International activists, local associations, regional political representatives and intellectual communities are increasingly engaged in the activities carried out by the mission and share moral responsibilities with the mission. The international actors’ activity is illustrated in the Secretary General’s reports on UNAMI during the 11 years of its existence, particularly in sections related to regional development and humanitarian assistance. This activity is sometimes accompanied by criticism. For example, the UN Secretary reported that after a tour of the region at the beginning of 2007, some senior government officials from the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey criticised the way in which the violent situation was handled and the actions of some external actors inside Iraq (S/2007/126, March 2007).

However, one fundamental question remains to be answered: is the diffusion of power observed among the political units here sufficient to challenge the clear-cut dichotomy implied in the above portrait of moral agency? The answer is partially affirmative. To reinforce its legitimacy, the UN’s mission has increasingly tended to frame moral responsibilities in view of 1) the historically situated particularities of the less-privileged agent and 2) the input offered by a broader audience of international political actors who can not only voice their concerns but also make these concerns heard by engaging in the mission’s decision-making process and extensively using social media. In these terms, the diffusion of power observed here necessarily brings a certain amount of flexibility to the interpretation of what moral agency is and what it bears in terms of responsibility.

However, this flexibility is limited. UNAMI’s reports show that a dominant agent can still creatively make use of the available power resources to restrain the emergence of a critical other who substantively contests the ideal portrait of moral agency. It is important to remember that the UN staff and member-states played a substantial role in not only drafting Iraq’s sustainable development goals (S/2010/240, May 2010) but also Iraq’s adoption of the UN Conventions (S/2008/688, November 2008) and Millennium Goals (S/2010/359, July 2010). The mission’s promotion of these different initiatives prove that the privileged collective self still wants less-privileged others to reflect its image, therefore minimally challenging its dominance.
5) Concluding Remarks

The arguments pursued here are not intended to question UNAMI’s purposes or the reconstruction of Iraq’s state capabilities in the face of a humanitarian disaster and security concerns; instead, they are intended to examine the way in which these purposes have been legitimised by the UN member-states and staff on the ground. These two collective actors must be more critical of how they exercise power and conduct multilateral actions in a global environment.

The analysis of the UN mission in Iraq showed that the UN member-states and staff became more affirmative in their initiatives, expanded their capabilities and demanded a stronger commitment to international rules from their counterparts. At the same time, it showed that these collective actors increasingly incorporate the demands of international civic societies’ active members in the decision-making process, making it relatively inclusive and open to ‘checks’. However praiseworthy, the changes in the way in which these dominantly collective agents exercise power illustrate a dangerous tendency. A fit collective agent is prone to demanding too much from a less-fit moral agent in too little time. In so doing, the agent risks assigning the less-fit agent responsibilities it cannot fulfil.
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Aristotle on the Nature of Friendship

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Abstract
One part of the investigations into human nature in the Nicomachean Ethics is the subject of friendship. Two whole books, Book Eight and Book Nine, are dedicated to analyses on this subject. Aristotle uses the Greek word philia for what we would call friendship. In Book Eight Aristotle proposes that there are three different types of friendship, each with corresponding circumstances that in a way determine each type. There are friendships based on utility, pleasure, and the good. If Aristotle’s goal in his investigations in the Nicomachean Ethics is to determine the best way to lead a good life, and to achieve eudaimonia, or human flourishing, then understanding what friendship is and in fact having good friends is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a life which may be called truly good.

This paper will analyze Aristotle’s arguments on the nature of friendship and will examine in what ways that friendship indeed is a component required for living a good life. Although it may appear from a reading of the Nicomachean Ethics that it may seem that only perfect or virtue friendships are the types of friendship that are worth pursuing, this paper will argue that all three types of friendships are worthy of pursuit. This argument is supported by Aristotle’s definition of friendship in the Rhetoric that states that friendship is a type of reciprocal well-wishing. This study will analyze Aristotle’s arguments for the three types of friendships and show how his distinctions are relevant to the modern world. This study will also propose that by understanding Aristotle’s distinctions one may achieve a clarity concerning human relations and that by practicing caution and moderation in the early stages of friendship will protect a virtuous person from the non-virtuous.
I. Introduction

Aristotle identifies at a very early stage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that the objective of the search in the investigations into ethics is in fact correctly identifying the ways of being that contribute to living well. In order to live well, one must strive for and attempt to achieve, by living virtuously, happiness. *Eudaimonia* is the Greek term Aristotle uses to describe happiness, or human flourishing, and he argues that it is the goal of all human activity. *Eudaimonia* is not a state, nor is it an emotion; it is a function or activity for Aristotle. *Eudaimonia* is a function in the sense that it is the final goal of achievement and the sake of carrying out all other activities and in the sense that humans can possess it through cultivation. Happiness, then, is a function that is the goal of all the processes and pursuits that we as humans carry out on a daily basis. Friendship, or *philia*, is a virtue or contains virtue and also is developed through cultivation. In order to live well, we must have good friends, and because of this Aristotle dedicates two books in the *Nicomachean Ethics* to friendship. Although friendship is necessary, there are different types of friendship, each arising by from different circumstances and therefore possessing varying degrees of depth in relation to well-being for Aristotle. Prior to discussing that, however, it is necessary to show that friendship is indeed a requirement for achieving well-being and *eudaimonia*.

In the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle identifies three basic and easily identifiable types of lives, and contrasts their inherent worth in relation to the pursuit of the well-lived life. The first and the least worthy is the life of pleasure, which is followed by the honor seeking life of politics, and finally the most worthy, which is the life of philosophical contemplation. A life dedicated to philosophical contemplation does not seem at first to be the type of life in which socializing or merry-making with friends holds a very prominent place. Philosophizing generally requires solitude and undisturbed quiet for such deep thinking. A philosopher, in fact, seems to appear to shun social and friendly engagements and is more at ease alone with his or her books somewhere far away from the bustling market. Aristotle in fact addresses the autonomy and independence of the philosopher in the following statement.

> And the self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong most to the contemplative activity. For while a wise man, as well as a just man and the rest, needs the necessaries of life, when they are sufficiently equipped with things of that sort the just man needs people towards whom and with whom he shall act justly, and the temperate man, the brave man, and each of the others is in the same case, but the wise man, even when by himself, can contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is; he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow-workers, but still he is the most self-sufficient. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book X, 1177a27-1177b1.)

It seems to be the case, then, that the philosopher, who is leading the best type of life that leads to human flourishing, needs friends the least. This, however, is not true, and becomes apparent by understanding what Aristotle actually means by self-sufficiency. The term contains a more encompassing definition for Aristotle that also represents in a way the necessity of friendship.
From the point of view of self-sufficiency the same result seems to follow; for the complete good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is sociable by nature. (Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 1097b7-11.)

By thinking about self-sufficiency, then, in this special and qualified sense, it becomes clear that by living the philosophical life one will necessarily by nature also seek out and cultivate friendships. It is perhaps the activity itself of philosophical thinking that is most self-sufficient when compared with the actions of other types of lives, however the philosopher, like all people, does indeed require family, friends and colleagues in the pursuit for well-being and a life truly worth living. The activities of masons and merchants do indeed appear to require more socializing and friendly relations than the daily activities of the philosopher. However, it must be kept in mind that Aristotle is writing in the fourth century B.C. in ancient Greece and his personal interactions in that culture would have naturally influenced the direction he seeks to take in relation to friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics. Once this is taken into consideration it becomes clear that the life of the philosopher consists of many good friendships and friendly relationships.

Aristotle was born in Stagira on the peninsula of Chalkidike in 384 B.C., the son of renowned physician. He went to Athens to study in Plato’s Academy at the age of seventeen. From teaching in the Lyceum his own school of thought arose. His followers were called the Peripatetics, or the peripatetikos, which means walking about while teaching and is named so in honor of Aristotle for his way of teaching philosophy. Far from advocating a life as a recluse in a solitary existence, it seems as if Aristotle’s way of teaching reflects in a way the opposite type of life to pursue. For Aristotle and his followers philosophized in public, and were known to do so while walking, and this took place in busy ancient Athens near and at the Lyceum and it would follow naturally then, that they were philosophizing and wandering about and socializing and making all kinds of friendships. The life of contemplation is the best life worth living, and it is self-sufficient, then, in the sense that only its activity requires the least amount of social interaction, not in the sense that it requires a life of solitude that lacks human relationships. The Nicomachean Ethics, then, can be read as a sort of guidebook to the best way to pursue well-being, that takes into account not only what is best for the individual, but also what is the best route to pursue in the variety of permutations Aristotle called philia. Since it is widely accepted that the Nicomachean Ethics was written as a set of lecture notes to be delivered at the Lyceum, it makes sense to think of these writings partially as the reflections of a philosopher partaking in various friendships throughout the city of Athens.

II. Types of Friendship

In our quest for the well-lived life we must seek out virtuous friends. One step towards being able to make correct rational choices that will assist us in the acquisition of good friends is being cognizant of the various types of friendship that exist and the corresponding impacts they have on one’s search for well-being. In order to figure out what kind of friendship one has with another Aristotle states that it
is important to be aware of the fact that all humans are seeking the good. This may be
the good itself, i.e. the good without qualification or something that is good in general
for oneself. This is quite a meaningful distinction for Aristotle, for identifying what
definition of good we are seeking will assist us in understanding the type of friendship
that will be developed. Aristotle identifies three objects of love and three
corresponding types of friendship. The three objects of love are the useful, the
pleasant, and the good. From this Aristotle states that there are friendships based on
utility, friendships based on pleasure, and friendships based on the good. Friendships
based on utility arise from relations in business. One may be seeking something
useful and another may be able to provide that good or service. Such a friendship is
potentially fleeting in the sense that when the desired object or service is no longer
sought after or desirable and then the said friendship dissolves quickly. This happens
because the friendship was based on utility, i.e. for the sake of something else rather
than friendship itself, and there was no deep concern for the other person involved.
Friendships based on pleasure are also potentially equally fleeting. This is because
the object of pleasure changes frequently and once this happens such a friendship
quickly dissolves. Friendships based on utility and pleasure are usually impermanent,
and are not the best types of friendships to be sought after due to the fact that in these
relationships it is possible for a virtuous person to become friends with someone
wicked. Aristotle warns us of this possibility in the following statement.

Because of pleasure or utility, then, even bad men may be friends of each
other, or good men of bad, or one who is neither good nor bad may be a friend
to any sort of person, but clearly only good men can be friends because of
themselves; for bad men do not delight in each other unless some advantage
come of the relation. (Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, 1157a16-20.)

Since this is so, there must exist some inherent dangers in seeking or developing
friendships based on pleasure or utility. Since the object of love in these cases is
based on acquiring some advantage or pleasure, it is possible to form a relationship
with a wicked or non-virtuous person. This type of relationship would potentially
lead the virtuous person into questionable circumstances. A wicked person could then
attempt to corrupt or take advantage of a virtuous soul. Through experience, however,
the virtuous person should come to know that a friendship has been formed with
someone that is non-virtuous, and appropriate steps may be taken that ensures that no
corruption takes place. The worst type of friendship seems to be that in which two
wicked people become friends. For the two wicked people necessarily are incontinent,
i.e. they both possess a weakness of the will, and will therefore necessarily pursue
deeds and actions that are counter to that which is good, and to that which leads to a
well-lived life.

Friendship based on the good is the perfect type of friendship and it is the type of
friendship we should seek. For this is a friendship between two virtuous people, and
it is a friendship that exists for the sake of itself and no other external object.
Concerning this best type of friendship Aristotle states the following.

Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue;
for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in
themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most
truly friends; for they do this by reason of their own nature and not
incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good—and
goodness is an enduring thing. And each is good without qualification and to
his friend, for the good are both good without qualification and to each other,
since to each his own activities and other like them are pleasurable, and the
actions of the good are the same or like. And such a friendship is, as might be
expected, permanent, since there meet in it all the qualities that friends should
have. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1156b6-19.)

Here in the above statement we see some specific differences between perfect
friendship and those based on utility and pleasure. One difference is whether the
friendship persists for an extended length of time. If the friendship does withstand
the test of time then we can rightly state that it is a perfect friendship. Likewise, if it is a
short-lived friendship, we may correctly assume that there was some non-virtuous
aspect to the friendship, which is to be found in friendships based on utility and
pleasure. Another difference is that in a perfect friendship one will not find the
wicked or the non-virtuous. Such perfect friendships, however, are not very common
because truly virtuous people are scarce or uncommon. On perfect friendship
Aristotle also states:

But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent; for such men are
rare. Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity; as the proverb
says, men cannot know each other till they have ‘eaten salt together’; nor can
they admit each other to friendship or be friends till each has been found
lovable and been trusted by each. Those who quickly show the marks of
friendship to each other wish to be friends, but are not friends unless they both
are lovable and know the fact; for a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but
friendship does not. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1156b25-32.)

These apparent results seem somewhat troubling. Is the proper course of action then
to seek out only a perfect friendship which Aristotle admits is quite unique, seek out
friendships based on utility or pleasure that put us at risk of forming a relationship
with the non-virtuous, or to avoid seeking out friendships altogether? A narrow and
somewhat superficial reading of Books VIII & IX tends to support the idea that we
should in fact avoid friendships based on pleasure and utility. Yet, how is that
possible? Are not most of us if not all of us imperfect in some way and have various
virtues from one another? It seems to follow from lived experience that many good
friendships do indeed spring from utility and pleasure based relationships.
Following Cooper’s line of argument, we should first analyze Aristotle’s definition of
friendship itself and then apply it to the three basic types of friendship and see how
that affects how they can be conceptualized as a whole.iii A deeper reading of
Aristotle reveals indeed that we should necessarily seek out friendships based on
utility and pleasure. The first clue to solving this puzzle is found in Aristotle’s
treatment of friendship found in his treatise entitled the Rhetoric. Aristotle states:

We may describe friendly feeling towards anyone as wishing for him what
you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being
inclined, so far as you can, to bring these about. A friend is one who feels
thus and excites these feelings in return. Those who think they feel thus
towards each other think themselves friends. This being assumed, it follows
that your friend is the sort of man who shares your pleasure in what is good
and your pain in what is unpleasant, for your sake and for no other reason. This pleasure and pain of his will be the token of his good wishes for you, since we all feel glad at getting what we wish for, and pained at getting what we do not. Those, then, are friends to whom the same things are good and evil; and those who are, moreover, friendly and unfriendly to the same people for in that case they must have the same wishes, and thus by wishing for each other what they wish for themselves, they show themselves each other’s friends. (Rhetoric, Book II, 1380b36-1381a12.)

Philia, or friendship, then, as Aristotle describes it in the Rhetoric, is a sort of well-wishing and actually doing what is good for the sake of that person. Furthermore, there is a constant reciprocity of well-wishing that exists between two friends. When the above definition is considered in relation to Aristotle’s treatment of the three basic types of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics, it becomes clear that reciprocal well-wishing exists in all types of friendships. A friendship may have formed initially in a business situation that was centered on possibly self-centered interests, however friendships like other virtues are cultivated over time and two relatively virtuous people may develop a good friendship. A relationship may be initially based on utility or pleasure, however once reciprocal well-wishing or reciprocal good deeds are done for each other’s sake, and they are virtuous people, then a friendship may be formed.

During his investigations into the nature of friendship, Aristotle explains how philia exists in countless situations, including relationships between lovers. Some friendships between lovers are initially based on utility, others on pleasure. Such relationships are imperfect for Aristotle because of the fleeting nature of mutual feelings over time. Friendships that share an equality in the sense that each person receives the same amount of pleasure or utility arising from the same origin have a good chance of enduring through time. Friendships between a lover and the beloved, in which the lover unequally lavishes attention upon the beloved will be less permanent due to the fact that this inherent inequality reflects also an inherent imperfection. A permanence, however, may result over time if the lovers come to know each other well enough, love each other for each other’s sake, and love one another’s character. The friendship of two lovers whose relationship is based on pleasure is in a sense less imperfect and potentially more enduring than those based on utility. This is because utility based friendships even between lovers dissolve once the profit or gain from any agreement or business scheme ceases. Therefore, if one decides to enter into a business agreement with a lover, perhaps it would be best to see first through time if there exists equalities of various kinds between the two.

The fate of two lovers in a way lies in the mixture of luck and chance that leads to and occurs during a spontaneous encounter. Our choices and actions in life present limitless possibilities which done correctly may possibly lead to eudaimonia. All of our reasoned choices and actions, however, do not comprise the Whole of our lived experience, as Aristotle posits in the Physics, Book II, chapter 6:

Chance and what results from chance are appropriate to agents that are capable of good fortune and of action generally. Therefore necessarily chance is in the sphere of actions. This is indicated by the fact that good fortune is thought to be the same, or nearly the same, as happiness, and happiness to be a
kind of action, since it is well-doing. Hence what is not capable of action cannot do anything by chance. (*Physics*, Book II, 197b1-7.)

The outcome of a successful relationship hinges on a variety of factors however it must be proposed that the cultivation of one's own virtues in some ways determines one's partner in the sense that since true friends are literally, for Aristotle, second selves, then our truest friends will possess similar if not inter-compatible and/or complimentary virtues. Successful permanent lovers seem to possess similar virtues because they are driven by their individual activities that in turn benefits their best friend whom they share the same goal which is the achievement of *eudaimonia*. Lovers that also happen to be philosophers or artists, or physicians, or other virtuous individuals love themselves, and the reflection of themselves that is shown in their second selves. Virtues, then, for Aristotle, are best practiced amongst one's closest friends because in this way we may most readily achieve the function of human flourishing, or *eudaimonia*.

Virtuous activities, then, and well-being itself depend upon the delicate and subtle ways in which humans convey their desired activities and goals to other potential lovers and friends. There also exists the flawed human trait that initially projects a similarity of virtues onto a lover or friend. Once those projections are proven false through experience, though, it becomes clear that either the friend or lover was wicked or that chance and luck combined in some way so that the final consequence of the partnership between two friends turns into a fleeting relationship. One result of such a failed friendship is sometimes disappointment. Disappointment occurs when one that possesses a virtuous character is troubled in the deepest sense by another virtuous friend's *akratic*, or weak-willed, actions or decisions. When we are disappointed, it is usually with someone whom we respect, who in a way may also resemble ourselves, and that lover or friend would therefore never do such an action and one would expect virtuous reciprocity in respect to basically all actions. Disappointment rarely or never occurs in human behavior when mutual respect or any sense of friendship is initially lacking. We become mainly disappointed with our virtuous friends, not with non-virtuous strangers. This is because of the expectation of a constant comportment of virtuous actions that we hold to our dearest friends, i.e. our second selves.

**III. Conclusion**

Perhaps then, to pursue the life of philosophical contemplation in conjunction with the search for perfect friendship is indeed the best path to choose for the attainment of *eudaimonia*. Friendship is a necessary component to *eudaimonia* in the sense that reciprocal well-wishing amongst friends, family, business relationships, and even amongst states verifies our potential goodness and cultivates all of our virtues and cultivates human flourishing amongst humanity in general by regarding a person for their own sake and no other reason what so ever. Our modern society has a much narrower sense of friendship than what Aristotle describes as *philia*, nonetheless various friendships do arise in countless situations in our lived experience, and if by chance two people are virtuous, a true friendship may be cultivated. Such a thing is rare, as Aristotle says, and therefore it is very much reasonable to think that a virtuous person counts only a few as his or her truest friends.
As Aristotle recommends striving for that which is moderate in all things, perhaps then it would not be incorrect to say that part of a definition of well-being would contain the notion of several, or a few good friends that are engaged in virtuous activities. Friendships of course will develop through activities based on utility or pleasure that may or may not be lasting. These types of friendships are also necessary for the practicality of a so-called normally functioning state which also in some ways expects that a sort of mutual cordiality exist amongst its inhabitants. We seek out friends, then, because it is a part of our nature and in doing so we may actually have true friends which Aristotle calls our second selves, people that we truly love because their virtues and activities reflect our own virtues and thus resemble ourselves. Friendships arise spontaneously and by chance therefore perhaps by seeking moderation in general one may practice moderation in developing friendships by approaching new relationships with a particular degree of caution.

Virtue may be perceived, however it is only through the hindsight that temporality provides through which one may come to know if truly another is virtuous or wicked. To think or say that someone is virtuous without actually knowing whether such a thing is true or not is in many ways just a projection of hope. While hope is in general a good thing when pursuing a life well-lived the acquiring of true friends is of such great importance that true knowledge gained through experience is the only verification of the formation of a perfect friendship for Aristotle. In other words, hope is just wishful thinking that acts as a temporary replacement for sensible verification when considered in relation to the cultivation of true friendships. Caution, then, in the spirit of Aristotelian moderation then, should be used as a form of protection against a forfeiture of *eudaimonia* at the beginning and early stages of all friendships.

It is only when two people truly become acquainted with one another and are able to see each other's virtues and love each other for the sake of that person when caution fades away and true friendship forms. By approaching friendship with caution, then, relationships with the non-virtuous are minimized, thus proving again that exercising moderation is a virtuous activity because it assists us in achieving the well-lived life by acting as a gateway or checkpoint at two passageways that lead to either encounters with the virtuous or with the non-virtuous. Caution and moderation, if practiced by the virtuous, will assist in the formation of friendships with the virtuous. Likewise, fewer encounters with wicked people allows one a better chance of the possibility of achieving *eudaimonia*.

It is also wise for states to proceed with caution when partaking in relations with other states. If a state is virtuous, and wants to protect and in fact truly advocates the well-being of its citizens, then it will approach with great caution, and hesitation, any type of relationship with another state that may consist of questionable virtues. The wicked are to be avoided at all costs, therefore in order to truly trust each other states must in some ways respectively reflect another's virtues. Diplomacy, is, in fact, the way in which states cultivate mutual well-wishing through respectful, (and at times cautious) virtuous activity. When states recognize that this well-wishing is for the sake of its state and its citizens and nothing else, then true friendships amongst states form, and this is something permanent and it is something worth striving for.
As it stands, then, friendship for Aristotle is a virtue or contains virtue and is a necessary component of having a life that may be considered well-lived. The extempore blossoming of a friendship is initially approached with caution by the virtuous person for the sake of one's happiness and for the sake of moderation.

So, how are we to choose our friends? (Or is that even a fair question with respect to luck and chance?) The *Nicomachean Ethics* does not contain any strict rules through which conduct must be observed. It does however, show that through the development of one's virtues similar good people will become friends and maybe even more. All three types of friendships should be pursued while living the best type of life, one of philosophical contemplation. If a virtuous person pursues this life then he or she may perhaps be able to differentiate easily the good from the wicked, and in doing so will assist in the cultivation and possibly eventually the permanent acquisition and possession of *eudaimonia*.

Friendship, then, holds a place in our lived experience as a relationship based on reciprocal well-wishing with people that we love who hold similar virtues. Such friendships exist amongst individuals such as best friends and spouses, family members, and even amongst states. All individuals and states should attempt to cultivate good friendships because by doing so the best activities that lead to human flourishing are made apparent and are recognized for their inherent meaning and value. Luck and chance will determine whom we meet, however, virtuous people will seek out friends that are considered to be second selves, and the acquisition of such friends will contribute to the achievement of the permanent possession of human flourishing and the possession of a life well-lived.
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2 Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon, pg. 629.
3 See *Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship* by John M. Cooper.
The Power of Nonviolence in Procuring Lasting Sociopolitical and Economic Change: A Christian Ethical Perspective

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Abstract
Violence has become a dominating worldwide phenomenon of profound concern today. Violence has always found a breeding ground where there is social injustice, inequality, oppression and exploitation. The place of violent actions in situations of inevitable structural change has been an issue for long and protracted debate among scholars. Opinions on the critical question concerning the morality of violent actions to bring about the needed change in unjust sociopolitical and economic systems and the potency of violence in actualizing such change have been varied and conflicting. Philosophers like Karl Marx, Lenin, Frantz Fanon and some liberation theologians have seen violence as a necessary tool in bringing about the needed change in the society. However, others like Martin Luther King Jnr, Mahatma Gandhi and many other advocates of peace have advocated for the effective transformation and liberation of the society without violence. Although the subject of violence and nonviolence can be approached from different viewpoints, this paper discusses it from an ethical perspective and seeks to answer the question specifically from the viewpoint of Christian ethics. The paper argues in favour of non violence, insisting that meaningful changes can take place even within the most callous structures of today by applying the Christian ethics of nonviolence. It concludes, among other things, that the Nonviolent approach to social revolution rather than violent methods stands as the more moral and effective means of reaching more moral and lasting ends due to its compatibility with the spirit and teachings of Jesus Christ.

Keywords: Nonviolence, violence; ethics; Christian ethics.
Introduction

Owing to the ubiquity and dominance of violence in global sociopolitical, economic and religious affairs, it has been noted that one of the legacies the twentieth century left for us is that of great cruelty and violence (Nagler 2014: 1). Every community today experiences, in one form or the other, the reality of some or all of such conditions that often generate violence like social injustice, oppression, exploitation, social inequality and lack of freedom.. Consequently, there seems to be a world-wide realization of the inevitability and utility (or profitability) of constructive change in the society. As a result of these social conditions and the attendant realization, the dominated and oppressed people today, whether nations or classes within a nation, are forced to agitate for a revolutionary change in their subjugated or dominated position, which they see as being contrary to basic human rights.

This revolutionary trend appears to characterize all levels of relationship in contemporary times. This can be seen in family life; industrial relations; class conflicts; gender, racial and ethnic conflicts; the world-wide struggle between the rich and poor; and so forth. The demand for change is so much tied-up with the idea of violence today that whenever we hear of ‘revolution’ and ‘revolutionary movements’ (such as liberation theology, students’ union, labour union, women liberation movement, Islamic State, Boko Haram, and so forth), we quickly understand them as referring more or less to violent actions. The tendency to solve the social problems of oppression and other forms of social injustice by violent means has therefore become more and more wide-spread in our generation. As such, our present world and its institutions seem to be built on a worldview that takes violence as an essential norm (Nagler 2014: 3).

That the sociopolitical and economic systems of most, if not all, societies today are unjust and, therefore, need some level of change, is incontrovertible. The critical questions that demand critical consideration, however, concern: (1) whether or not we should embark upon violent actions in order to bring about the needed change in unjust sociopolitical and economic systems; and (2) which of the two options of violence and nonviolence possesses the potency of actualizing the needed sociopolitical and economic changes in our society.

The issue of the place of violent actions in situations of inevitable structural change has been an issue for long and protracted debate. Responses have been varied and conflicting as a wide range of opinions exists concerning the potency of violence in actualizing the needed political, social and economic change in our society without harming, damaging or destroying our humanity. Secular opinions like Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, and others advocate the doctrine of revolutionary violence with the conviction that “violence generates liberation” (Windas, 1971: 41). Fanon, for example, is quoted by Windas (1971:41) to have argued in support of this position that “It is through violence that man comes to stand on his own fact, to realize his own dignity, and it is through a shared act of violence with his fellow men that he realizes a new kind of human community”. Also in his famous book, The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon (1979: 28-29) maintains that “You do not turn any society, however primitive it may be, upside-down… if you are not decided from the very beginning … to overcome all the obstacles that you will come across in so doing. This, according to him, will entail being “ready for violence at all time”.
It is significant to consider that, apart from these secular opinions, many of the revolutionary movements within Christianity itself uphold violence as the authentic, indispensable and inevitable means of bringing justice to a situation of structural injustice. A good example of this is Liberation Theology. Some versions of it uphold the use of violence, as the last resort, to counter organized and government approved violence against the masses.

Although the subject of violence can be approached from different viewpoints, this paper discusses it as an ethical problem and approaches it from the perspective of Christian ethics. Ethics, simply conceived, deals with what is right or wrong in human behavior or with how one should behave in a given situation. Christian ethics, particularly, is concerned with the rightness or wrongness of human actions or behaviour on the basis of the moral teachings of Christ (or Bible). Our concern in this paper, therefore, is with what ought to be the Christian position on the issue of violence versus nonviolence in situations of inevitable structural change. In other words, should a Christian embark on violent actions in a situation where change is needed?

**Violence and its implications**

A discussion of a complex and ambiguous subject of this nature would require some clarifications of the term ‘violence’ and the variety of issues connected with it. This will enable us to fully realize its dangers. Many advocates of violence will never dare to be involved in violence when the word is properly understood. Moreover, many others that condemn violence will discover that they are perpetrators of the very violence they deny and denounce. West (1969: 8) has rightly observed, along this line, that: “We live in a world where the greatest violence may be done by those who most condemn the word, and contrariwise, where the rhetoric of violence may cover the softest hearts and the most ineffectual actions”.

**What is Violence?**

For our use in this paper, the different definitions of violence use the term in a derogatory sense as something evil and they make emphasis on the difference between force and violence. Alistair Kee, for example, defines violence as “excessive, unrestrained or unjustifiable force” (Kee, 1974: 134). He maintains that although there could be no violence without power or force, the difference lies in the fact that while power and force are neutral things that can be used for good or evil, violence can never be neutral, but is by definition an evil thing. Adam Curle goes further to define violence as “action which damages or jeopardizes the possibility of human growth, development or fulfillment, whether physical, psychic, moral or cultural” (Curle 1975: 229). According to him, the word etymologically implies violation, rape, the unlawful use of force.

In agreement with Curle’s definition is the definition of violence in the editorial to the same issues of *The Month* as “The violation of the human person” which, apart from physical torture, includes economic oppression (Editorial 1975: 227). This meaning is also re-echoed in Nagler’s definition of violence as “harm to another’s person or basic dignity” which includes “structural violence” (Nagler 2014: 3).
While Hellwig sees violence in line with Kee as “the force that operates outside the accepted patterns of normalcy” (qtd in West, 1969: 65), West (1969: 14) defines it as “harm done to another outside the rules of conflict which such a society sets up”. In the view of the revolutionary, however, “whatever delays the liberation… whether or not it has been institutionalized by society” is also violence (West 1969: 65).

**Dimensions of Violence**

From these complementary definitions, we can identify, along with Curle (1975: 229) three dimensions of violence:

(i) Pathological Violence: This refers to all kinds of senseless killings and unlawful private brutalities like armed robbers do in order to rob people. That every one condemns such act of violence is self-evident.

(ii) Institutionalized Violence: This is also known as structural violence. This form of violence refers to violence perpetuated by or with the assent or backing of the state. This type of violence occurs when the State uses its force and power in oppressing, exploiting and repressing the weak masses rather than using them for self-defence, punishment of wrong doers and protection of the law-abiding. This type of violence is obviously condemned by all lovers of humanity. Examples of institutionalized violence include the brutal and repressive measures of former apartheid South Africa against the South African blacks and the communist governments’ hostilities against religion in former Soviet Union and other places.

(iii) Ideological Violence: This may also be referred to as revolutionary violence. Defenders of this type of violence refer to it as counter violence which is necessary to counter the institutionalized violence of the status quo in order to bring a change. This form of violence will include violent actions like bloody protests or rampages, coup d’état, guerilla warfare and others. The Russian, French and Cuban Revolutions are example of this form of violence.

**3. Implications of Violence**

The social and moral problems posed by the increasing phenomenon of violence in our world today can be more easily realized when we consider some more recent and strange aspects of it as reported often in the news media. For instance, such unpleasant phenomena as hijacking of airplanes, kidnapping, rapes, terrorism, armed robbery, assassinations, exploitation and repression are unimaginable aspects of violence prevalent in contemporary times, which we all would generally condemn, regardless of our differing positions or schools of thought.

Considering, as West (1969: 8) points out, the fact that the innocent and uninvolved are usually victims of such ugly experiences, and that any of us may be the next victim of these happenings, we usually develop an understandable feeling of indignation, revulsion and a desire for effective counter-measures. However, because many people often allow human feelings to control and impair their human reasoning, their understanding and sense of judgment are often dulled as to the real issue at stake in adopting violent options as effective counter-measures.
While it is quite easy for such people to see and accept that pathological and institutionalized violence are unethical and condemnable, very many of them seem to see nothing wrong with the revolutionary violence of the oppressed because of their claim to its functional necessity for social transformation. By pointing out the impossibility of change in the world by a natural course, defenders of revolutionary violence maintain that the inescapable imperative for revolutionary change necessitates violence. Fanon (1967: 48) argues in this regards, that “Colonialism only loosens its hold when the knife is at its throat… colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence”. Along with Fanon, defenders and exponents of this position argue that: “…armed revolt is the only means which appears appropriate in areas of such unredeemed servitude. The oppressors’ control is too absolute for other solutions to succeed... (Editorial 1975: 227).

As a result of this line of thought, the option of violence in social transformation seems to gain wider support today than the practice of nonviolence. The reason is usually the failure to realize that the adoption of revolutionary violence as a counter transformative measure often tend to actually increase the quantity of violence in society rather than reduce or effectively eliminate it. Ethically, however, actions are judged to be morally right or wrong on the basis of how much they enhance man’s ultimate happiness, self-fulfillment and general wellbeing. The corollary of this is that actions which are debilitating to man’s progress, happiness, self-fulfillment and general wellbeing are judged to be morally wrong (Omoregbe1993: ix). In keeping with this, we need to examine the ethics of violence from the Christian point of view on the basis of how it affects human life.

**Christian Refutation of Violence**

In spite of the plausibility of Fanon’s arguments, counter arguments from practical, moral and Christian considerations tend to invalidate them. Whatever the cause may be, violence viewed from a moral perspective, especially from a Christian moral point of view, is never justifiable. While the theological and moral claims to the need for Christian participation in social transformation cannot be refuted, the use of violent methods is to be vehemently rejected because of its discrepancy with Christian moral teachings and its destructive and debilitating social implications. From a Christian perspective, we can establish the moral wrongness of violence from a good number of premises.

Theologically, violence is incompatible with Christian values, principles and practices. Firstly, it is incompatible with the Christian values of love, faith, patience, forgiveness, gentleness, long suffering, and temperance, which form part of the fruit of the Spirit. Violence contradicts the basic Christian concept of love for the enemy and non-retaliation of the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:38-46). To advocate violence inevitably is to advocate hatred. Moreover, violence promotes fear and eliminates faith in God. It exhibits the fear and anxiety either in the oppressed of being crushed by evil structures of injustice or in the oppressors of being overthrown by the agitated masses of the oppressed.
Reubem Alves, quoting Kee (1974: 138), clearly points out that “the fear of the future gives birth to violence”, for while the violence of the oppressed arises out of fear of being crushed by the oppressors, “those who so possess the present as to fear change use their power to make sure that no tomorrow comes to threaten today”. The use of violence also shows that we lack confidence in God to direct the social order towards bringing the cohesion, conservation, restoration, reconciliation or transformation needed in society at any given time.

Secondly, violence is practically opposed, not only to the teaching of Jesus Christ, but also to the life of Jesus Christ. Since Jesus Christ is our perfect example and standard of morality as Christians, then any lifestyle or doctrine which is in contradiction to His is non-Christian. This is not to say, however, that Jesus Christ was a pacifist, but to emphasize that Christ’s attitude to the social and political conditions of His time was different from the attitude and approach of the contemporary activist – the Zealots. Christ’s repudiation of the violent model both challenges and condemns any Christian who wishes to take up arms in the name of the Gospel, no matter what provocation.

It is pertinent at this point to clarify that the claim that Jesus was a “revolutionary” can be accepted only in the true sense of the term since He stood for standards and values antithetic to those conventionally accepted in the society of His day. Jesus was, however, not a ‘revolutionist’ in that while He criticized the unjust power structure of His contemporary times, He did not take arms or join with the ‘guerilla groups’ of the Zealots. His caution of Peter against his violent action of cutting off the ear of the high priest’s servant at Gethsemane is a very illustrative and validating proof. “Put up again thy sword into its place; for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword” (Matthew 26:52). Therefore, while it is the duty of every Christian to work to eliminate unjust and oppressive conditions, it must be acknowledged, as Ernesto Cardinal is quoted in Editorial (1975: 228) to have said, that “in doing so holiness [should] flourish in them”.

Sociologically, violence is dysfunctional and disruptive. Violence brings a situation of social chaos which impedes progress, peace and the common good and happiness of members of the society. Although advocates of violence justify their action by pointing to the common good of the masses as their cause, it is incontrovertible that those masses are always the looser in and victims of violence. Moreover, we discover in recent times that delinquency and hooliganism often result from violent demonstrations, and in most cases, the target of such demonstrations – the ruling class - never share in such misfortunes that result. Also the change desired often never comes as the protests are often easily suppressed by superior repressive war implements. Thus we discover that the interest of the poor and oppressed masses which violent revolutionists claim to protect always turns out to be jeopardized during any such violent action. Verkuyl and Nordholt (1974: 34) insist that: “Chaos is the worst enemy the poor and oppressed could wish for [and] violent revolutions have seldom brought about a genuinely better condition for the poor people, and in fact are for the most part a demonic impulse”. It is not surprising, therefore, that the ideology of violence rather offends than appeals to people after an unpleasant experience of a bloody revolution and its attendant problems of impoverishment and desolation.
Logically, the social implications of violence reveal the self-contradictory and self-defeating content of the arguments of the defenders of violent revolution. Both the violence of the leftists and that of the rightists are usually justified on the basis of each being a means of eliminating the violence of the other. But in the actual sense they only increase the quantity of violence. Helder Camara, as quoted by Windas (1971: 42), has drawn our attention to what he describes as the ‘Spiral of Violence’. The first violence, according to him, is the deprivation suffered by the masses who are robbed of their property and rights by a privileged elite. This produces the second violence, which is the violence of rebellion; and this in turn generates the third violence – the violence of repression. The point is that violence breeds and begets violence. Therefore, if violence is bad and needs to be eliminated, then it is wrong to use violence to eliminate violence because such a solution will only increase the quantity of violence in the society. In justification of this argument, it is commonly said that ‘two wrongs cannot make a right’. Hannah Arendt (1974) carries this position further in her observation that:

Most violent revolutions have been morally indefensible. Bloody revolutions are usually mad adventures that lead to anarchy and sadistic aggressiveness. They exchange one group of scoundrels for another group of scoundrels. Instead of introducing a new era of justice, they give birth to anarchy … men can be so intoxicated by the passion of revolution that they destroy what chances there are of real social achievements” (34).

Psychologically, violence is inconsistent with and violates our human nature and authentic personality. Nagler (2014: 2) cites Dr. Vanana Shiva, a renowned leader of rural resistance in India, to have said in a recent lecture that we run the risk of compromising our humanity by adopting the option of violence. He further demonstrates this with reference to the astonishing high rate of depression and suicide among American service men and women today. One of them is quoted to have told a documentary filmmaker: “I no longer like who I am. I lost my soul in Iraq”. Another told a member of a Christian Peacemaker Team on a peacemaking trip to the Middle East: “I am still haunted by the things we did… I would give anything to be able to go back and undo some of the things we did. But I can’t. But at least I can thank you with all my heart for doing what you do” (Nagler 2014: 2). Such confessions testify to the original quality of our humanity and the great cost of violating or compromising it through violence.

From these and other possible considerations we can establish that violence is morally bad and should be shunned and condemned by every well-meaning Christian. It is important, however, to emphasize that, contrary to the common impression our position may seem to give, the condemnation of violence does not necessarily tantamount to supporting non-commitment to the cause of justice. Non-commitment itself would amount to encouraging institutional violence of oppression, exploitation and domination which is the primary violence that ignites the other forms. Our concern in this section is to establish, first of all, that violence is not morally right as a means of social transformation. But having addressed the issue of whether violent revolution is a morally acceptable model for social transformation or not, we now shift our focus to that of examining how unjust and oppressive structures can be transformed without bloody revolutions.
Nonviolence: The Christian Option

In consonance with the Christian moral perspective and the realization of the necessity for change in most societies today, there are four primary bases for recommending the option of nonviolence. These are: (i) its compatibility with Christian moral teachings; (ii) its effectuality in achieving concrete social transformations; (iii) its practicability in the most difficult situations of our time; and (iv) its proximity to and consistency with our humanity.

The first basis for our recommendation of nonviolence is its compatibility with Christian moral teachings. Nonviolence is compatible with Christian morality. Nonviolent commitment to the cause of justice is the only prospect for change from a Christian ethical perspective. Nonviolent revolution can follow the patterns of education and conscientization of both the oppressor and the oppressed; the revitalization of democracy; negotiations and dialogues; opposition by word and action, for example, through press releases and other forms of artistic demonstrations to critique or to caricature an evil system or regime; and so forth. The prophetic indictments of and remonstrations of Jeremiah and Amos against their contemporary political, economic and religious policies of the Kings of Judah and Samaria, respectively, and the apostolic warnings against existing social orders, like that of James (James 5:1-6) are biblical examples of Nonviolent means of transforming society. In the course of church history also many have demonstrated the authentic spirit of Christ by upholding this course of nonviolence. An example is Francis of Assisi, who followed the path of nonviolence rather than the violent methods of Innocent III during the Crusades. Those who follow the path of nonviolence reflect the Christian spirit more than other Christian groups that embark on violence.

The second basis for recommending the path of nonviolence is its effectuality in achieving concrete social reforms or transformations. The major criticism against the nonviolence alternative by defenders of violence and their major reason for rejecting it is the claim or fear that injustice is so institutionalized and structuralized that no soft approach can break it down. Both history and present day experience around us tend to disprove this claim or fear. In modern times, there are Christian and non-Christian personages who have effectively and successfully championed and still champion the course of nonviolence.

Among such figures are Mahatma Gandhi of India, Martin Luther King Jr. of the United States of America, Dom Helder Camara of Brazil, Albert Luthuli and Nelson Mandela of South Africa. These men have effected some changes in their respective societies through Nonviolent methods. The change in the attitude of whites to blacks in the United States, for example, owe considerably to the Nonviolent campaigns of Luther. Helder Camara, the Catholic Archbishop of Recife, also, was able to effect small scale reformations in Brazil which prepared the people for larger and more significant changes. He achieved this change while choosing the method of Nonviolent resistance on the basis of his consideration that it is both the morally justified option and the most effective strategy of change.

The practicability of the nonviolence option in the most difficult situations of the world is the third basis for our recommendation of it. The above examples do not only show how effective the Nonviolent approach can be, but also that it has been
practiced by men in social situations and contexts that may even be more difficult than the ones most advocates of violence may be addressing. Thus, the third basis for recommending the path of nonviolence is that it is practicable in the most callous and difficult contexts of today. The dismantling of the iron curtain of communism in former Soviet Union and Eastern Germany and the structures of apartheid in South Africa, mainly through diplomacy, dialogue and negotiation rather than violence, are very convincing demonstrations of both the practicability and effectuality of the Nonviolent approach to structural change. All these examples prove that meaningful changes can take place even within the most callous structures of today by applying this Christian principle of nonviolence.

Finally, nonviolence is being recommended on the basis of its proximity to and consistency with our humanity. Nonviolence is closer to human nature than violence, which is rather alien to it. Gandhi is quoted by Nagler (2014: 2) to have noted that “Nonviolence is the law of our species”. This implies that nonviolence deals with something fundamental about human nature. Its advocacy presents a “higher vision of humanity”, a nostalgic reminder of who we were, while its practice demonstrates a realization of who we wish to be either as individuals or as a people. Therefore, to refuse to adopt nonviolence is to risk violating or compromising our humanity. For this reason, although nonviolence may be a harder and long term option that may require greater sacrifice, patience and courage than violence, it remains, at least, the only process of positive transformation and liberation in society that does not involve or result in losing our humanity.
Conclusion

From the above discussion, we can summarize that Nonviolent approach to social revolution rather than violent methods stands as “a moral means of reaching moral ends” which have ‘the best long-term chance of success in most of our societies” (Verkuyl & Nordholt 1974: 59). Nonviolence is compatible with the spirit and teachings of Jesus Christ. Besides, violence, more often than not, only leads to new forms of despotism and tyranny. Violence as a means of transforming society is, therefore, morally wrong and alien to Christian teaching. It should hence be condemned and rejected both by Christians and all lovers of humanity, peace and progress. Helder Camara’s position on violence and nonviolence as cited by Kee (1974: 139), fully illustrates the Christian stand:

My personal vocation is that of a pilgrim of peace ... Personally, I would prefer a thousand times to be killed than to kill. This personal position is based on the gospel. A whole life spent trying to understand and live the gospel has produced in me the profound conviction that if the gospel can, and should be called revolutionary it is in the sense that it demands the conversion of each of us... We Christians are on the side of nonviolence, which is by no means a choice of weakness or passivity. Nonviolence believing means more passionately to the force of wars, murder and hatred.

From all these, we conclude, from the ethical incompatibility of violence with Christian values, its gross lack of social utility in a moral community; the logical invalidity and inconsistency of its authenticating or legitimizing arguments, and Its inconsistency with and violation of our humanity, that violence is morally wrong.

Conversely, from its compatibility with Christian moral teachings; its effectuality in achieving its noble goal of liberation and transformation; its practicability in the most difficult situations of our contemporary times (as seen from few examples above), and its proximity to and consistency with our humanity, we affirm that nonviolence is both ethically and pragmatically a better and more effective option.
References


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