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Political Moralism as an Illness in the Church?

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The European Conference on Ethics, Religion and Philosophy 2014
Official Conference Proceedings

Abstract

In his homily on October 17, 2013, Pope Francis set a new tone for opposition to the ideological position generally referred to as the “religious right” in US politics in particular, referring to moralizing ideologies as indicating that someone is “no longer a disciple of Jesus” and part of a “serious illness” in the Church. His statements signaled a major shift in Vatican posturing on political matters; arguably the greatest since the Second Vatican Council. Without signaling any major changes to the Catholic Church’s traditional teachings on sexuality, Pope Francis made it clear that “pelvic politics” will no longer be accepted as a higher political priority than “social justice issues” within the church. This in turn represents a serious threat to the political careers of those who have spent the last few decades championing Pope John Paul II’s opposition to abortion, homosexuality, extra-marital sexuality and any economic policies bearing a resemblance to Marxism. Yet it brings to the fore an aspect of John Paul II’s earlier legacy which is sometimes forgotten, and which is difficult to harmonize with his post-Cold War conservatism. This is giving rise to an interesting new conflict dynamic within the politics of the Catholic Church.

Keywords: Pope Francis, Pope John Paul II, Pope Benedict XVI, Second Vatican Council, Religious Right, Robert George, abortion, social justice, politics, moralism

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Introduction

It's hard to find anyone outside of the United States' Religious Right who has anything bad to say about Pope Francis I. At a time when the Catholic Church was mired in its most serious image problems since the Medicis and Borgias, in comes a guy who is selected as being a bit of an outsider — non-European by birth, from a monastic order that's never had a pope before — but a “safe” outsider — ethnically Italian and on record as being something of a conservative moralist — who shakes things up in a way that no one saw coming!

Eschewing pomp and privilege, stomping down on financial and sexual corruption within the clergy, yet at the same time reaching out to gays, Muslims, Jews, divorcees, disabled people, the poor and children of all ages; Francis comes across as the first pope since the beginning of the modern era to take Matthew chapter 25 — “...in as much as you have done it unto the least of these my brothers...” — seriously as a theological premise. A bit over a year into his papacy now, the world's intelligentsia, pop culture and press are even more enthralled with this man than they were with John Paul II when he arrived on the scene back in the 1970s.

But... and this is a fairly big but... in shaking things up on purpose the new pope has made some powerful enemies as well, and not only among former money launderers and allies of child molesters. For some his being labelled as a Marxist by Rush Limbaugh and company is nothing but a further merit, but for others, particularly those within the United States' religious right, his moves away from the legacy of the latter half of John Paul II's heritage, pretty much across the board, is a bit too much to swallow. Most challenged by this radical shift are those who have based their Catholic political principles on the program laid out in the 2009 “Manhattan Declaration,”¹ including more than a few of the United States' leading Catholic bishops.

Historical background

To put this in historical perspective we need to go back from looking at the legacy of the second-longest serving pope in Catholic history, John Paul II, to that of the longest serving pope in Catholic history, Pius IX. Pius reigned over the church at the height of what has been called “the age of revolution”² in the 19th century. His reign saw the rise of Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, Alexander Dumas and Victor Hugo. Only a decade prior to his reign the Catholic Church had finally given up on maintaining the dogma of a geocentric universe, and posthumously forgave Galileo for preaching the “Copernican heresy”. During Pius's reign the Austrian monk Gregor Mendel made his major discoveries in genetics — proving incidentally that Thomas Aquinas's reliance on an Aristotelian understanding of sexual reproduction as a basis for many of the doctrines in *Summa Theologica* was factually wrong — but they managed to keep Mendel relatively quiet about this matter at the time. Most importantly, however, it

¹ Published online and promoted in numerous periodicals on November 20, 2009. Primary authors: Robert George, Timothy George and Charles Colson. The full text of this declaration is available at: http://manhattandecoration.org/man_dec_resources/Manhattan_Declaration_full_text.pdf (Downloaded August 25, 2014).

² Cf. the title of Alec R. Vidler's (1961) classic: *The Church in the Age of Revolution (Pelican history of the Church; vol.5)*. London: Pelican Books

was on Pius's watch that, without the military support of the kings of France, the Vatican States collapsed.

We could say that in psychological terms Pius did not deal with this well. Watching his empire collapse around him in so many different ways, he took to "pontificating" on a vast range of subjects to try to prove to everyone how important he still was. The most famous of his decrees was that of "the perpetual virginity of Mary." He could get away with making such decrees because under his direction the First Vatican Council made "papal infallibility" (when making ex cathedra statements of doctrine) an official doctrine of the church. In other words, when making official doctrinal statements, it became a matter of faith to believe that the pope could do no wrong. This is still a bit of a hot potato among Catholic theologians to this day. Preferably forgotten by the contemporary Catholic theologians would be Pius's most infamous non-ex-cathedra doctrinal statement: his 1864 *Syllabus of Errors*, where he declared such ideas as freedom of religion, separation of church and state, ecumenism, public education and civil marriage to be damnable heresies.³

It wasn't easy for the church to come to grips with all of the problems Pius's dogmatism entailed. They couldn't really come out and reject his reactionary statements right away, in spite of how greatly they damaged the church's relevance to the intellectual life of the 19th century. The best his successor, Leo XIII, could do was to publish an encyclical entitled *Rerum Novarum*, "Of New Things", in which he set out to prove that Marxism was misguided and that the Catholic Church was still on the side of the poor. This document, with its major shift to the left politically, actually succeeded in restoring much of the church's political credibility. Among other things it called for a sense of solidarity between Catholic industrialists and their Catholic laborers, insisting on a principle that any full-time job must pay a sufficient wage to meet the basic needs of a single-income family with a possibility of having money left for savings afterwards. Employers are also morally responsible to ensure that their workers have enough time off for rest, family enrichment and all basic religious observances. Furthermore governments have a moral responsibility to protect the basic rights of the poor against those who would exploit them, and to pass laws regulating labor and protecting basic welfare. All in all, the Gospel prioritizes justice for the poor as the basis of its social teachings, and the church needs to do the same.

Rerum Novarum set the standard for Catholic social teaching for the next century basically. In all of its problematic involvement in wars and politics, from the skirmishes that gave rise to World War I all the way through the Viet Nam era, the Catholic Church maintained a principle of justifying all of its limited participation in political processes in terms of standing up for the basic needs and rights of working class Catholics.

Painting with broad brush strokes here, the next major shift in Catholic social teaching really came with the Vatican II council. Until the 1950s it seems that Catholic bishops had effectively forgotten that officially they still had a church council going on. In 1870, when the Papal States collapsed, Pius IX had suspended discussions at the First Vatican Council, but he had never got around to either reconvening or closing it; nor

³ An English translation of the full text of this document is available at: <http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Pius09/p9syll.htm> (downloaded August 25, 2014).

had his next five successors. It was John XXIII who finally decided that something needed to be done about this, and it needed to be done in such a way as to draw a line under the previous discussions, and then to start a new discussion on how to make the church important again in the lives of its 20th century worshippers. Thus in 1960 he officially closed Vatican I and in 1962 he officially opened Vatican II.

Vatican II is a complex subject of study unto itself, but for purposes of setting the stage for the dynamics of Catholic politics in the first decades of the twenty-first century there are four things about it in particular about this conference that should be pointed out: First of all, the next four popes to be elected after 1962 were all among the delegates who met at this conference and it was here that Karol Wojtyła and Joseph Ratzinger developed their complex working relationship. Secondly, the council took great strides towards ceremonial liberalization, opening up to new ways of worshipping and emphasizing the critical role of lay people in the life of the church. Thirdly, however, it failed to make any significant new progress in terms of defining the Catholic Church's "preference for the poor" in practical terms, though this had been one of John XXIII's priorities in calling the conference. Fourthly, and perhaps most significantly, in the process of relinquishing so much in terms of exclusivity, the priests' aloof status and ceremonial control, it had to give something back to the clergy in terms of the church's sense of self-importance, and it did this by way of *teachings on sexuality*. It was at Vatican II that the Catholic Church fully developed the doctrine that the Monty Python team so aptly summarized in their classic song, "Every Sperm is Sacred".⁴

John Paul II's legacy

From here we come to the election of Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II. Again painting with rather broad brush strokes here, his papacy can be divided into two rather distinct eras: the late Cold War era and the post-Cold War era. In these two eras the Polish Pope pursued two very different sorts of social policy.

In the late Cold War era his emphasis was primarily on bringing about the liberation of workers from the various forms of oppression they found themselves under, particular in terms of totalitarian Marxist regimes. Less emphasized, but equally important to him at this phase of his career, was the protection of workers from the excesses of capitalist abuse. To quote from his first encyclical letter: "*The person who, on the one hand, is trying to draw the maximum profit and, on the other hand, is paying the price in damage and injury is always man. The drama is made still worse by the presence close at hand of privileged social classes and rich countries, which accumulate goods to an excessive degree.*"⁵ The solution he proposed was social solidarity and cohesion built on a principle of brotherly love, protected wherever necessary by social legislation needed to protect the weak from abuse at the hands of the powerful. Anything which turns a human being into nothing more than a tool in the production process is evil. Everything which promotes full appreciation of each other's humanity is Godly.

⁴ From the 1983 film, *The Meaning of Life* (released by Universal Pictures).

⁵ *Redemptor Hominis* (1979): 16

Gradually, over the course of the Reagan administration, John Paul's critique of capitalist abuses ceased. In his last major statement of Catholic socio-economic policy, the encyclical letter *Centesimus Annus*, John Paul goes as far as saying, "*Exploitation, at least in the forms analyzed and described by Karl Marx, has been overcome in Western society.*"⁶ (That may well have been the most politically short-sighted statement ever officially made by a pope!)

With the demons of Communism now defeated, the pope turned his attention to the issues that would come to define the second half of his papacy: reinforcing the church's teachings on human sexuality. This turning point is most clearly marked by his (1993) encyclical *Veritatis Splendor*, where he lays out a case for the seeing the difference between absolute and relative aspects of Christian ethics. Essentially, the "thou shalt's" are relative to situations: honoring your father and mother and caring for the poor are things that need to be done differently in different cultural and economic contexts. As essential as these commands are to the life of faith, we cannot set any absolute eternal benchmarks as to how they must be carried out in practice. When it comes to the "thou shalt not's" however, there we can set standards that will remain absolute and unchanged for all time. These absolute standards, on which the church cannot compromise because they are part of God's eternal law, include prohibitions against lying, stealing, murder... and any form of "artificial birth control". It was in his next encyclical, however, *Evangelium Vitae* (1995), where he really threw down the gauntlet in terms of Catholic political priorities, with an emphasis on "protecting life from conception until natural death". Abortion was to be the political issue to trump all other political issues.

Robert George's intellectual leadership of the Religious Right

This became particularly conspicuous in the politics of Catholic bishops and intellectuals in the United States, being de facto led by Princeton law professor Robert George. A very sympathetic profile of George in the *New York Times Magazine* in 2009 describes his interaction with the more left leaning bishops:

He told them with typical bluntness that they should stop talking so much about the many policy issues they have taken up in the name of social justice. They should concentrate their authority on "the moral social" issues like abortion, embryonic stem-cell research and same-sex marriage, where, he argued, the natural law and Gospel principles were clear. To be sure, he said, he had no objections to bishops "making utter nuisances of themselves" about poverty and injustice, like the Old Testament prophets, as long as they did not advocate specific remedies. They should stop lobbying for detailed economic policies like progressive tax rates, higher minimum wage and, presumably, the expansion of health care — "matters of public policy upon which Gospel principles by themselves do not resolve differences of opinion among reasonable and well-informed people of good will," as George put it.⁷

⁶ *Centesimus Annus* (1991): 41

⁷ Kirkpatrick, David: "The Conservative-Christian Big Thinker". *New York Times Magazine*, December 16, 2009 (<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/magazine/20george-t.html>)

Professor George was the primary driving force behind *the Manhattan Declaration* which was released that same year. Its other authors are credited as being Baptist seminary professor Timothy George (no relation, in spite of the coincidental family name), and former Nixon henchman turned evangelist in prison, the late Charles Colson. But it is generally acknowledged that these co-authors were on board for primarily to bring a broader spectrum of political endorsements; intellectually it was Robert George's baby. He essentially formulated their three areas of political focus: 1. "Sanctity of life": meaning that abortion and euthanasia are to be curbed in every way possible, and between the lines implying that birth control of other sorts as well is to be seriously discouraged. 2. "Dignity of marriage": meaning that all forms of "alternative" and extra-marital sexuality are to be restricted and discouraged, especially pornography and gay rights of any sort. Marriage as an institution is also not to be made still vaguer within our culture by allowing it to apply to homosexual unions as well. 3. "Freedom of religion": taken here less to mean freedom to worship as one chooses and more freedom to publicly hold to the standards of one's religion, meaning most specifically that Catholic employers should not have to provide health care benefits for their employees which would cover any sort of contraceptives. These are the issues which have replaced social justice concerns as the political face of Catholicism within the United States since the second half of the John Paul II papacy.

Pope Benedict XVI's efforts to preserve his predecessor's legacy

Joseph Ratzinger, a.k.a. Pope Benedict XVI, carried forward the line of his colleague and predecessor by expediting the process of the latter's canonization and by writing encyclicals in which he actually attempted to harmonize the teachings of the two phases of John Paul's reign. In *Caritas in Veritate* (2009) in particular he lays out a case for taking anti-birth control teachings as part of an emphasis on social justice and solidarity. The only reason that it is problematic to have too many children being born into the world, according to the current pope emeritus, is if they are not being properly cared for and educated in particular countries, and thus these children are not able to contribute to the overall well-being of others in turn for the investments being made in them. As long as all children are able to play a constructive role in society, the more children we have the more wealth will be generated for everyone. Thus the key to building a healthy global society is through "openness to life" (the emphasis of the second era of John Paul's reign) being combined with "solidarity" (the emphasis of the first era of John Paul's reign).

The means by which Benedict speculated that this should be done are every economic conservative's worst nightmare: reform of the United Nations "so that the concept of the family of nations can acquire real teeth."⁸ This stronger version of the UN would then have the power to redistribute wealth on a global scale in order to prevent humanitarian crises from arising due to a shortage of resources in areas with particularly fast growing populations. Unstated but subtly implied in this argument is that such an organization would also need the moral guidance provided by close collaboration with the Catholic Church to keep it from becoming corrupted by power and to keep it on the straight and narrow path.

⁸ *Caritas in Veritate* (2009): 67

This is not an immediate action plan in any sense; it is long-term speculation regarding how Catholic social teaching of different eras could be brought together into harmony with each other without contradiction or obvious dysfunctionality. As such it fulfills the requirements of Professor George's instructions to the American bishops given above. It also managed to fly just under the radar of international press coverage of the papacy at the time, which was more occupied with Benedict's recommendations against Africans using condoms and the like. Thus its most important implication went broadly unnoticed: *In order for a Catholic family teaching (including the prohibition on birth control) to be functionally possible without creating unsustainable humanitarian crises, a systematic and powerfully enforced global redistribution of economic resources will be necessary.* Or to state it more directly for those who have been in economic moral panic since his retirement, *the "redistribution thing" was actually Pope Benedict's idea to begin with.*

The radical shift signaled by Francis' papacy

That brings us to the one thing that Benedict XVI did as pope which drew more attention than all the rest of his travels and public statements put together: his announcement of his intentions to retire. This cleared the way for the selection of one of the most surprising, and for many one of the most refreshing characters in a very long time to come onto the religious political scene: the former bar room bouncer and long-term man-of-the-people, Argentinian Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio, who as pope assumed the name **Francis I.**

Francis's message to his church is revolutionary in its profound simplicity: we must not love with words or speech but with actions and in truth (1 John 3:18). Religious theories about what constitutes love and how we should require others to act so that these ideals can be realized are too often standing in the way of the church being an authentic expression of God's love in the world. We need to get past all that. In this context his statement from October 17, 2013 rings quite true: When faith gets distilled down to its pure logical principles it *ceases to be faith* — in the sense of being a loving relationship between God and mankind, which from there provides a basis for human caring for each other and solidarity between "people of good will". *"In ideologies there is not Jesus: in his tenderness, his love, his meekness."*⁹ Such ideologies are not steps towards discovering fellowship with God and each other; they are roadblocks to such discovery, for ourselves and those around us.

The problem is that the man whose writings established such ideologies as the political priority of the Catholic Church, John Paul II, has just been canonized as a saint, with great pomp and circumstance; and in the United States in particular the most powerful and influential of Catholics are strongly committed to the ideologies laid out in the Manhattan Declaration, and to prioritizing those absolute principles over relative matters like how to care for those who are hungry, thirsty, exposed, alienated or imprisoned (Matthew 25:36-37).

These ideologies have been carefully nurtured over the past 20-some years by the conservative intellectual journal *First Things*, founded in 1990 by the politically

⁹http://en.radiovaticana.va/news/2013/10/17/pope_francis_at_mass_calls_for_greater_openness_/in2-738150 (Downloaded 25.08.2014)

active conservative Catholic priest (converted from being a politically active liberal Lutheran priest) Richard John Neuhaus. It would be fair to point out that the current highest ranking members of the U.S. Republican Party are just these sorts of ideological Catholics: John Boehner, speaker of the House of Representatives; Paul Ryan, vice-presidential candidate from the last election cycle; Chris Christie, governor of the state of New Jersey; Jeb Bush, former governor of Florida and direct relative of two former presidents; and Marco Rubio, Senator for the state of Florida and very likely presidential hopeful.

These men might be prone to agree with their ideological allies but religious opponents, Rush Limbaugh and Glen Beck, in considering *Francis himself*, with his rather Marxist leanings, to be the current illness within the Catholic Church. These gentlemen have too much invested in their ideological positions to change them just because the leader of their church happens to stand against them. Thus some sort of political and ideological showdown within the Catholic Church in the United States seems somewhat inevitable at this point.

Meanwhile Pope Francis has done nothing to de-escalate the conflict. In June of 2014 he responded to fresh charges of him being a Marxist with the heavily reported quote: *"I can only say that the communists have stolen our flag. The flag of the poor is Christian. Poverty is at the center of the Gospel... Communists say that all this is communism. Sure, twenty centuries later. So when they speak, one can say to them: 'but then you are a Christian.'"*¹⁰

Conclusion

Ultimately with this quote though he is trying to say that labels don't really matter; what matters is how much we are able to do to live up to Jesus's teachings of caring for those in need. The implication remains that anything which prevents the church from doing so is an illness. But rather than getting into a battle of, "You're sick!" "No, You're sick!" "No YOU'RE sick!" Francis is trying to say, "You stay in here and argue about labels if you want; I'll be out caring for the poor, the way Jesus taught us to."

In the coming US election cycles the Republican parties hopes rest largely on being able to mobilize their social conservative base to vote against those who approve of abortion and gay marriage. For this strategy to work they need to convince voters that their party's platform is the truest expression of Christian values in the political arena. Having a pope which labels these sorts of policies as an "illness in the Church" doesn't do much to help their cause, to say at the least. Further conflict over these issues is rather inevitable. It will be fascinating to watch how this plays out in the years to come.

¹⁰ This statement was originally given in an interview in Italian published in the newspaper *Il Messaggero* on Sunday, June 29, 2014. This was translated and widely picked up on by the international press in the following week, e.g.: <http://theweek.com/article/index/264174/pope-francis-just-expertly-trolled-his-critics>

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The Globalization War: Can Ethics Bring Peace?

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Abstract

In a recent talk on Capitalism, Bruno Latour argues that economic globalization is at war with the Globe and that the Globe is losing. Humans can expect to suffer great losses as our life support systems erode and crumble from the relentless attacks of economic aggression. How paradoxical, that it is easier to see the end of the Planet than the end of Capitalism (Jameson). We feel helpless and paralyzed in the face of a transcendent economic system that has assumed the powers of natural law and is waging war against the very Planet that supports it. Only Ethics can resolve the conflict and show the way to a peaceful settlement. Ethics means “putting the other first” (Levinas), and not doing violence. How can Ethics restrain Economics and prevent it from effacing the Other, in other words from murdering Gaia? How can Ethics transform the networks of economic power to become the support of ecological healing? This can only occur through the alchemical transformation of fear to love, from being frozen to being in the flow. An unbalanced brain/mind /person, (banker or ecologist) living in fear, will soon become one of the new wounded, a casualty of the Globalization war. Through advances in technology we can re-calibrate the brain and through ethical relatedness re-tune the mind to cosmic love? With age reversal around the corner this joke is no joke: From a recent future report to the board, “The bad news, the planet won't survive, the good news, there are plenty of profits before it happens.”

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Introduction

Section one, the Problem states that the problem of global war is our war on the Globe. This section is based on a definitive work on climate change, Michael Mann's, the Hockey Stick and the Climate Wars. It is also informed by the illuminating work of Peter Sloterdijk on globalization, The World Interior of Capitalism.

Section two, the Solution sketches a vision of how ethics might bring about peace. The solution follows from Bruno Latour's work on actor network theory (ANT) and his inquiry into modes of existence (AIME). It is inspired by the Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas. The section also discusses the need for an alignment of humanity with cosmic intelligence, as well as the need for a restructuring of economics into networks of cooperative relatedness.

The Problem

We are living in the global age. What does this mean? Globalization, the one-way traffic from west to east, better known as colonialism, started during the age of exploration, and discovery in the 15th century and finished with the photograph from space of the planet Earth in the 20th. No one today doubts that the earth is round and that it can be circumnavigated. Now traffic flows two ways across multiple transportation and communication channels and this traffic has transformed the planet into a global shopping mall. Everything on the planet, virtually, is up for sale and most people seek more spending power, more comfort, and more opportunity to travel, shop, do global business and share in global culture.

The phenomenon of globalization originated in an economic imperative to seek new opportunities for profit in order to pay back interest on loans. However, the enormous success of the global entrepreneurial explosion over the last 500 years has come at a high price. Not only has globalization unleashed centuries of unrestrained violence of man to fellow man, it has put the life support system on the planet in jeopardy. In order to fuel explosive growth the global economy became dependent on the burning of fossil fuels. This was necessary to power the machinery that produced the food, clothing and shelter of those engaged in the productive process as well as producing the luxuries coveted by successful entrepreneurs. The end result of the excessive burning of fossil fuel is the present climate crisis. This is created by a saturation of CO₂'s in the atmosphere which creates the greenhouse effect and results in global warming. Despite the billions of dollars spent by climate change deniers to cast doubt on the reality of climate change and its human cause, it is now generally agreed by all informed that there is a climate crisis, that this crisis has been generated by man, that global warming is irreversible, (although it may be slowed down) and that the only question remaining is how bad the consequences will be for us in the present and future.

There is no known technology or is one likely to emerge that will be able to reverse the effects of global warming given the complexity of the task of intervening in global climate. It is however possible that we will be able to arrest the acceleration of global warming and limit its effects to avoid the most serious imaginable catastrophes. Catastrophes have already been produced by rising sea levels, melting ice caps, and shifting currents and have already triggered cascading systems failures of

metropolitan infrastructures. As the frequency of these occurrences increase the collapse of the global shopping mall and the comfortable lifestyles this mall affords to those inside becomes increasingly under threat. A total global melt down could return those who survived it to the most primitive conditions imaginable. These prognostications of doom are by no means far-fetched. Just think about the effects of hurricane Sandy on New York City and amplify this type of cascading infra structure collapse as something that starts occurring on a regular basis in multiple major cities around the world. This will give you some idea of what will happen when climate change reaches a tipping point and sets off multiple daily climate cataclysms including floods, tsunamis and hurricanes.

And yet, as Jamison has quipped, it is easier to see the end of the planet than the end of capitalism, although simply ending capitalism would not at this point re= stabilize the environment. If the environment were a bank, it would have already had to have been bailed out. Yet, as a recent joke making the rounds suggests, we can expect little positive response to the climate crisis from industry. The joke is as follows: It is about a report given to the board of directors of a major global company by their chief futurologist. He says, "Gentlemen, the bad news is the planet will not survive, at least its life support systems will not survive. The good news is there are still plenty of profits to be made before this happens."

The Solution

We can state the problem of our global age as a war against mother Earth. On the one hand we are reaching a stage of the development of humanity where it's foreseeable, given the rate of accelerating technological evolution to envision abundance for all. On the other hand, in order to reach this stage we need to arrest global warming. The dilemma is that the current imperatives of economic progress are to burn what remains of the fossil fuels left in the earth. How can we resolve this dilemma and end the war against earth, which is war against ourselves.

Let's envision a solution. The solution would require the adoption of an ethics of restraint. The unrestrained violence of competition fueled by greed and the desire for the acquisition of might, and power expressed as the unlimited accumulation of spending money has been achieved at the cost of horrendous consequences to the planet. The unlimited acquisition of personal spending power must be regulated, reined in and redirected in an ethical manner. The prime Law of ethics is putting the other first and this law can be extended to putting the planet or the personification of the planet, Gaia, first. What would it mean to put planet Earth first? If we put one another and planet first we would move from our present system of hierarchy, the dominant system of command and control driving most businesses and governments to a network model of ethical and diplomatic relationship towards all modes of existence. This would mean developing a cosmopolitan collective. In such a collective we would support everything that was a contribution to wholesome and healthy sustainable networks on the planet. We would admit to the collective all things that contributed to abundance for all without deleterious ecological effects.

Instituting the prime Law of ethical restraint and putting the other first would require an alchemical transformation of humanity. We humans would have to move from our prevailing mindset of fear and poverty consciousness to love and the realization of the

availability of abundance for all. We would need to transform our mind set from a state of a fight, flight, and freeze, characteristic of a mind at war, to a state of mind in flow or in the zone. This would bring us in alignment and harmony with the quantum source or cosmic intelligence.

Is it possible to conceive of a technology that would bring about this radical alchemical transformation of all of our fellow human beings, such that we would act in concert for the common good of all and of the planet rather than continue on of our present path of almost certain self-destruction? I believe that not only is such a technology possible but that already exists and that can be made available to all who want it. This technology if widely disseminated would bring about a transformation of our unbalanced and impoverished brain/minds into a network of harmoniously balanced brain/ minds attuned to cosmic intelligence. Such a transformation would realign our individual brain mind quantum brainwave patterns with cosmic quantum patterns of intelligence. Such an alignment would transform each individual's brain/mind to higher consciousness. We would all become self optimizing beings, not unlike Buddhist masters.

Balancing the brain mind is a necessary but not yet sufficient condition for the transition to the ethical relatedness of all to all and all to the planet.

The sufficient condition would require the developments of networks in which we measure our success by the degree to which we help others realize their success. We will save the planet only when and if we establish an ethics of restraint in the global economic and political arena. The paradigm for such global ethical networks are already in place, exemplified as best practice in the best companies within the network and relationship marketing space. Network and relationship marketing will become the basis of a new ethical economy. The networked organization of the present and the future produces servant leaders who work at bring out the best or the greatness in the members of teams they lead. I believe that these global networked enterprises will develop the sustainable energy sources necessary to meet the needs of all without dependence on fossil fuel and will move us forward to unprecedented peace and prosperity.

Two examples of such networked organizations are Bitcoin and Power Cloud. Bitcoin is a disruptive global currency and Power Cloud provides clean solar electricity financed by crowd funding and network marketing distribution.

Conclusion

I've argued that the problem of global war is climate change brought about by our war on global. I have proposed a solution of ethical restraint which could lead to the reassembling of global actor networks. These networks would put the other and the planet first. For this transition or transformation to occur nothing less than the rebalancing of humanity's collective brain-mind, the restructuring of economic relatedness and our realignment to cosmic intelligence would be required.

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The Social Protest Ethical Challenges of the Political Leadership

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Abstract

Inspired by the Arab Spring, a series of transnational social movements, such as the Indignants and Occupy Wall Street, began gathering speed in 2011 in Europe, Turkey, the U.S., and South America, Ukraine. The protest, as a form of mass opportunism against political practices and behavior, questions the status-quo and evokes the need for revision of the moral and ethical values of the political leadership models. Moral values are not merely standards by which we measure our character, activities and social behavior. They also contain emotional and provocative ideas, for which men and women fight and die. An examination of the transforming forces, which translate ideas into activity, serves as a springboard both for explaining the leaders and followers understandings of the political moral standards, and the justification of this morality. The relationship leader-followers should be examined from the perspective of the influence and monitoring that followers have over the political decision-making process and practices. Independently that the political morality relies on different from the common understanding for right and wrong, it should not be viewed as self-sufficient closed system. The social movements came to illustrate that the Utilitarian principles of justifying the political behavior are only one side of the coin. The appeal for revision of the ethical standards in politics is an appeal for recognition of the moral values as a fundamental prerequisite for justifying the political morality.

Keywords: political morality, social movements, protest, leadership, moral values

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Introduction

The registered protests during the last couple years are more than five hundreds with different intensity, number of the participants, and the variety of grievances driving them. What makes the social movements so difficult for exploration is the uniqueness of every protest activity, caused by cultural, political, institutional, financial differences and the inability to be covered by a single criterion of examination. The protest, as a form of mass opportunism against political practices and behavior, questions the status-quo and evokes the need for revision of the moral and ethical values of the political leadership models. In a more general sense, the protest is a form of collective action and of social movement participation at the same time, demanding for political or social change.

In their study “The world protests 2006-2013” Sara Burke, Isabel Ortiz and collective (Burke, Ortiz, Berredá and Cortés, 2013), examined 843 protests in 87 countries, covering 90% of the world population. What the researchers found out was that the protest became one of the most preferable social movement, increasing its multiplicity from local (regional) to global, thanks to the simplified interindividual communication and organization in the social networks (Facebook, Twiter etc.), the transfer of legislative and political sovereignty from the Nation states to the International political and transnational nongovernmental organizations, and the lack of trust in the political representation system and morality. To cite the example of their empirical study, the number of registered protests during 2010 double in comparison to 2006, and the number of conducted protests during the first half of 2013 double the protest activities from 2006. The participation in only 15 of the largest protests during 2013 is more than 200 million. Record is placed from the protest in India (100 million protesters), which became the most massive social movement in the world history.

Many examples could be given to illustrate that the social protest became the “silent revolution” of 21st century. The revolution, as the most extreme form of social movement, always aims at recreating a community, establishing a new social order. On the other hand, social scientists have agreed that the social protest, in its contemporary dimensions, lead new ways of approaching social and political transformation. The term “silent revolution” became increasingly popularized in the study “The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics” by Ronald Inglehart (Inglehart, 1977), in which the author use a political-culturological approach to major the intergenerational shift in the values of the population in advanced industrial societies. The new technological and social changes has impacted and transformed the young generations, developing a new cultural, financial and moral standard. The transformation affects both private and public life, forming a new social and political identity. Viewed in this perspective, the increasing of the social protest activity and its intensity has been expected and predictable, and should not be examined as a phenomenon, but as a challenge in front of the political agenda. Following the same direction of thought, Alain Touraine, a French sociologist and social movements’ expert, indicates that the social protest movements today are completely different from in the past. Instead of labor and industrial conflicts, the contemporary dimensions of the social movements are engaged in social, cultural and political confrontation, forming a notion of social movement that “[...] does not describe part of “reality” but is an element of a specific mode of constructing social reality.” (Touraine, 1985). The social and political secularization created a new form

of social order, where the previous metasocial principles lost their functionality of transmitter between private and public life, social and political order, and individual and communitarian rights. An exploration of this question will provide us with a greater understanding of the factors that facilitate the social protest movements.

Why people protest?

A most profound analysis of the factors that serve to facilitate the social protest movements, would provide with a sound basis for understanding the nature of contemporary social conflicts and would clarify the direction, which the political leaders has to follow, in order to deal with the problem. Important for the purpose of this article is to find an answer of the questions as what makes people go out of their comfortable homes to protest for the common good and socially beneficial causes? What they protest for/or against? Why they choose the protest as a form for reaching their political goals?

Numerous factors have led to the protests in particular which I'd like to group in four categories: economic and financial factors, political factors and globalization, cultural identity and social rights of people, and emotional. With the proviso, that the classification presented and followed in this study does not claim to be complete or exhaustive, neither the criteria, used to group the factors pretends to comprise every particular case of social protest interaction. Furthermore, a variety of the social protests include grievances from more than one group, so the division of the factors is in greater sense conditionally.

Economic and financial factors include grievances such economic injustice (also named distributive social injustice, which refers to the fairness of outcomes), unemployment, labor conditions, inequality, increasing prices of commodities, increasing taxes, social and health welfare, low living standards, reform of public services, high fuel and energy prices, the increasing gap between rich and poor people and other. The greatest part of protest actions are driven by economic and financial causes. In Sara Burke and collective research they took 488 from all 843 examined. (Burke et al., 2013). Economic inequality and poverty alone does not lead to social unrest and protest activity. In many of the poorest countries, which are less affected by technological and commercial progress, social stratification and polarization of society remain unknown process, and they stay untouched for any social movement activity. What became a driving force for any social beneficial activity, according to James Chowning Davies (Davies, 1962) is the feeling of economic deprivation. In the fast developing and growing societies, the level of population dissatisfaction increases when periods of stagnation and recession occur and the social status of the individuals does not undergo the same pace of development as in the past. For example, the financial crisis of 2008 marked the industrial and capitalist societies with the scar of the mass uncertainty, distrust in the effectiveness of the financial and political institutions and doubt in moral principles, which had served primary as manipulation mechanism for control over the majority, rather than an ethical code for social common good and welfare. We know from previous studies, which examine the feeling of dissatisfaction and its relation to the common good and welfare that the driving force for individual and group unrest measures in qualitative comparative dimensions. To clarify I'll cite the example of the lower standard national states in the European Union, where the expected potentialities of social unrest at times exceed

those in the economically stable or developing countries. The unfavorable social when compared to other, better examples of individuals and groups, is the trigger that transform motivation into activity. Last but not least, the technological progress and the conversion of the society into consuming society, introduces a new set of metrics for evaluation of public welfare and common good. The new criteria of happiness are measured with the possession of commodities and the ability to sustain the consumerist appetite, rather in the relationship with the other.

Political factors and globalization group includes: political factors – nonfunctional institutional and bureaucratic system, lack of real democracy, corruption, lack of morality and responsibility in policy, failure to receive justice from the legal system, transparency and accountability in policy, war and military actions, immigration policies, global pollution and environmental problems, protectionism of imperialistic and transnational trade companies, double standards in policies, authoritarian and non-democratic governments. Most of the protests start from economical and financial grievances to turn into political. In globalized societies the border between politics and economics is very thin and in variety of dimensions both areas frequently overlap. Globalization processes have changed the role of the sovereign state from monopolist administrator of power, remisng its place on account of the transnational organizations. The Polish sociologist and social philosopher Zygmunt Bauman, in his book “Liquid modernity” (Bauman, 2000), examines the process of deconstruction of the national state, and the separation of the power from the state. Globalization processes has turned the new modernity into “liquid modernity”. The symbols and ideals of identification do not exist anymore, not in the way we know them. “[...] Modernity creates a new and unpredicted setting for individual life, confronting individuals with a series of challenges never before encountered. Social forms and institutions no longer have enough time to solidify and cannot serve as frames of reference for human action and long term plans. The individuals have to find other and different ways to organize their life.” (Dimitrov, n.d.). No longer are we to solve our problems collectively through Politics (with a capital P), but it is put upon the individual to look to themselves to solve their life-problems. In the period of liquid modernity people have lost their sense of home (in material and spiritual sense) and the sense of belonging to the political agenda. The state has lost its function as accumulator of identity and a circulator of power. The state in its contemporary dimensions became impotent to face the demands of its citizens – for protection, identification and welfare. Despite the fact that the nation states worldwide are experiencing a relative decline in their capacities to control the whereabouts of global corporations, to provide social welfare for their citizens, and to contain the post-Cold War world threats, from the other side, it’s too early to proclaim the death of nation states.

The gap between the individual and the state increases, giving rise to sceptical and pessimistic estimates of the futility of political institutions. The individual became an isolated nomad, looking for new forms of socialization. More and more people are organized in social networks, which explain why the largest social protest gathered speed and popularity through social networks, such as Facebook and Twiter. All these processes lead to crisis of authority and a growing lack of trust in the democratic institutions. From this perspective, the protest is a way to rebuild communities, forging connections between people in an attempt to create a new social reality.

Cultural identity and social rights, such as ethnic and racial rights, women's rights, rights to freedom of assembly, speech and media freedom; religious affiliation; all ethical issues as abortion, technological and genetic progress, rights of homosexual, bisexual and transgendered people and other, are related to the right of particular minority groups in the society for self-determination and cultural identification. The formation of identity is not anymore a priority of the authorities or institutions. Their role, as a regulator and guardians of the public order and welfare, is the recognition of the right for self-determination and the establishment of effective policies for its preservation.

Emotional factors as solidarity, distrust; feeling of anger, insecurity and uncertainty, desire of the individual for social significance, and other, are documented from the social and psychological researchers as the trigger that moves the individuals into activity. Not to be misunderstood, it's necessary to clarify that the emotional factors are not of paramount importance to drive the social unrest, but some social scientists seemed to ignore the force that the last has to turn motivation into activity. In a 2010 research on the social psychology of protests, Dutch psychologists Jacquelin van Stekelenburg and Bert Klandermans (Klandermans and van Stekelenburg, 2010) proposed a model for protest motivation that includes not just the grievances of the participants and their expectations about the political efficacy of the movement they're participating in, but also factors like emotional intensity and "social embeddedness." Klandermans and van Stekelenburg began to explore the role of collective identity in protest behavior. They argued that the generation of a collective identity is crucial for a movement to emerge. The identity in Klandermans' study has been seen in three layers: 1. *personal identity* (the identity as the understanding of who we're) and 2. *the identity as a place in the society* (who we're in a relation with the others), 3. *the collective identity or group identity* (cognitions shared by a group of individuals). In their study, Klandermans and van Stekelenburg focus over the question why group identification is such a powerful motivational push to protest. Human beings live socially, think socially, and grow up and develop in a society. The identification with others is accompanied by an awareness of similarity and shared fate with those who belong to the same category. It provides a security and certainty. When the level of collective identity increases at the expense of the individual identity, the individual get more dependent on the group approval and acceptance. Any threat from outside the group becomes a threat against the individual, who is identifying with the group. The relationship becomes emotional, because the individual feels that has to testify his loyalty and group solidarity. It is now generally agreed that the collective identity is not an invention of the late 20th and beginning of 21st century, while in the meantime, we're witnessing remarkable increasing of the social movements during the same period. In fact, what appears to be more convincing is the phenomenon of the invented "paralleled socialization". Using the contemporary channels for communication with the others, the individual engages in social activity. "Space opens up for the ethical imagination, for creating a difference in relation to ourselves which gives us the potential to imagine new possibilities for self-other relation, for sharing a world with others, for alternative forms of the political." (Moore, 2013) The political reality is not self-sufficient and independent system. The relations in the political reality are relations between institutions in a juridical sense, but also relations between individuals in social dimension. The utilitarian principle for differentiation of the political morality should not serve to justify the double standards in ethical behavior. In the same order of thought, differentiation should be placed between

justification (as an act of approval) and the moral judgment (as an act of ethical evaluation). Moral sense and not reason is what distinguishes man from all other entities in the universe. Moral sense, not reason, is also what drives people to interaction between each other and to active behavior. When protestors are claiming for “more morality in politics”, the demands are for moral equality, where moral relation is between individuals, but social relation is between leaders and followers. To sum up this discussion so far, at a very fundamental level the political morality and general morality overlap, in terms of a moral relation between individuals.

Criticism of the protests includes accusations of a political agenda rather than a social one with revelations of funding from specific organizations and parties in opposition. The media sources claimed that the spontaneous protests in Israel had actually been planned three months and orchestrated by left-wing organizations and The National Left. Many researches examine the organization, ways of funding and the organization of the social movements, and the interaction between social movement organizations. What is in particular important for the purpose of this article is the criticism that accused the 'protestors' of not publicizing specific goals, the lack of visibility of their goals, and the damaging impact of media focus being on a few activists. Similar was the situation with the student protest in Bulgaria, which started the spring of 2013 against corruption, the political protectionism of the oligarchy and the lack of morality of the political representatives. The protestors have been charged that their demands are too abstract and unclear. But this served primary as an excuse for the political leaders not to participate in a political debate with the protestors.

The challenges in front of the political leadership

According to Laza Kekic from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) “of particular importance in sparking unrest in recent times appears to have been an erosion of trust in governments and institutions: a crisis of democracy.” (Kekic, 2013). The crisis in the political system is a crisis of legitimacy. The protestors feel the alienation of the political institutions and leaders from the rest of the society. Because the decisions, made by the political leaders, are delivered to them, recipients should not identify with them. The political morality is a subservient to the same standards as the rest of the society. The utilitarian theory has been used a long time to justify unethical practices in the political processing, a tradition set firstly by Machiavelli.

The new ethical political challenges of the political leadership need an effective means to restore trust in the political system functionality. Based on this logic, Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative rationality seems most appropriate for this purpose. (Habermas, 1992). Habermas' discourse ethics is his attempt to explain the implications of communicative rationality in the sphere of moral insight and normative validity. It is a complex theoretical effort to reformulate the fundamental insights of Kantian deontological ethics in terms of the analysis of communicative structures. This means that it is an attempt to explain the universal and obligatory nature of morality by evoking the universal obligations of communicative rationality. For Habermas, an action/decision can be morally approved and validated, only if all the subjects to whom the decision refers participate in the dialogue voluntary and with equal rights. At the same time, Habermas' model establishes the legitimacy and morality of pluralism. That is, a diversity of communities and participants, while following the same set of rules regarding discourse, may establish diverse sets of

norms as legitimate for given, but not all, communities. (This pluralism offsets especially postmodern critiques of modern rationality and technology as "totalizing" and thus totalitarian.)

The only issue I'm concerned with applying Habermas' discourse model in a political context is that the political institutional system could not be placed in relations of equality with the other social actors. The political institutions operate and act as contributors of power, from which position they serve the function as administrators of public powers. Therefore, the moral dialogue would be possible only between the leaders and followers as only capable of moral sense and evaluation.

Conclusion

Countries with long democratic experience are adapting easier with the increasing protest movements. India's anti-corruption protests did not lead to immediate change, but they raised graft up the national agenda, with the promise of gradual reform. Even the protest do not achieve the desirable goals, it's doing a pressure and monitoring over the decisions in the public sector, which needs a respond. Brazil's president, Dilma Rousseff, wanted a national debate on renewing politics, which would be neither easy nor quick. But protest could yet improve democracy in emerging countries, getting a control function not only in the political institutional system, but also in forming new social identity and moral standards, which are not politically delivered but politically shaping.

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Autonomy and the Demands of Love

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Official Conference Proceedings**Abstract**

J. David Velleman has argued that what it makes sense to care about out of love for someone is the unimpeded realization of her autonomy. Although Velleman refers to both Kantian and perfectionist notions of autonomy, a close look at his argument shows that the form of autonomy that he employs actually amounts instead to personal autonomy. I argue that there are in fact no value constraints on the objects of autonomous choice on this account of autonomy. The upshot of this claim is that a person may exercise personal autonomy without satisfying many other important normative demands. This suggests that Velleman's endorsement of the unimpeded realization of one's beloved's autonomy is wrong, insofar as a beloved's autonomous choice may, in securing her personal interests, thwart her achievement of important goods, especially moral goods. In such cases, we have reason to hinder the unimpeded realization of our beloved's autonomy, precisely out of love for her.

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INTRODUCTION

What is it to love someone, and what should my love lead me to want for those that I love? In “Beyond Price”, J. David Velleman (2008) has answered both of these questions by referencing the central place of rational autonomy in love. Love, according to Velleman, is an appreciative response to the value of a person’s rational autonomy. Velleman gives autonomy pride of place because, in his view, being autonomous is “essential to – perhaps definitive of – being a person” (Velleman 2006, 16-44, 43). In loving someone, we are phenomenologically seized by a “vivid awareness of [another’s] personhood, consisting in [his] rational autonomy” (Velleman 2008, 204); we view that person as “a self-aware autonomous other – a person who is a self to himself, like us” (Velleman 2008, 199). Unlike respect, however, which “arrests our self-interested designs on a person”, love “arrests our emotional defences against him, leaving us emotionally vulnerable to him” (Velleman 2008, 201). Furthermore, by “disarming our emotional defences”, love makes us susceptible to caring about “the unimpeded realization of [the beloved’s] personhood” (Velleman 2008, 205). Specifically, loving someone means wanting him to realize his autonomy fully, because that is what his good consists in:

Things are worth caring about [in a sustained way] because desires so sustained give structure and unity to [one’s] life, thereby providing scope for the fullest realization of [one’s] autonomy. And the fullest realization of [the beloved’s] autonomy is what it would make sense to care about out of love for the person (Velleman 2008, 210).

In response to Velleman, Jeanette Kennett (2008) has argued that although Velleman is “exactly right” to hold that out of love for others we should want the full flourishing of their autonomy, he is wrong to hold that the arresting awareness of the beloved’s value only involves recognition of the beloved’s rational autonomy: “Other capacities and qualities, which may precede or outlast and sometimes even undermine our rational will, may be part of the true and proper self of a person” (Kennett 2008, 214). According to Kennett, then, although “it does make sense for us to want the realization of the beloved’s autonomy for his own sake...autonomy may more often be that which we want for the beloved, rather than the value to which we already respond in the beloved” (Kennett 2008, 214). For Kennett, the value of persons primarily resides not in their possession of rational autonomy, but rather in their capacity to value; and she denies that all cases of valuing can be reduced to acts of autonomous willing.

I think that Kennett is quite right to challenge the primacy of rational autonomy in Velleman’s account of what we respond to when we love someone, but I think that her critique should be extended further. In the present paper I argue that Velleman is wrong to hold that love demands promoting the unimpeded realization of the autonomy of the person one loves. A clearer understanding of what autonomy as understood by Velleman actually amounts to shows that although the full realization of one’s autonomy may be good for one in a prudential sense (in terms of making her life more satisfying for her)¹, the flourishing of autonomy may lead to other important

¹ In the present paper I understand prudential value (roughly) as the value that is present when a person’s life is going well for her in the sense of being satisfying for her to experience. It should be

types of goodness not being so served; and when this is the case, we have reason to disregard or even hinder the full flowering of our beloved's autonomy, precisely out of love.²

VELLEMAN ON AUTONOMY

The core meaning of autonomy is 'self-government' or 'self-determination', but this general concept has given rise to several different conceptions of autonomy which are at odds with each other in various ways. Hence, when one speaks about 'autonomy', it is pivotal to clarify the kind of autonomy that one has in mind. In the present section I reconstruct Velleman's discussion in an attempt to provide just this kind of clarification. I then go on to argue that the conception of autonomy that Velleman seems to be using creates problems for his claims regarding the demands of love in relation to autonomy support.

Curiously, Velleman goes into little detail when it comes to explicating what he understands by 'rational autonomy,' and when he does explicate his understanding of the concept, he seems to give mixed and even inconsistent accounts. I believe that Velleman eventually endorses a notion of autonomy that functionally amounts of personal autonomy, but showing this requires some unpacking.

Velleman first mentions rational autonomy in association with Kant's understanding of the relation between rational autonomy and respect. Paraphrasing Kant, Velleman writes that to act autonomously "we must act under the guidance of reasons", which involves regarding someone "as having the moral law within him" (Velleman 2008, 202). At this point Velleman's understanding of autonomy seems to parallel Kant's: to be autonomous is to act under the guidance of reasons in conformity with the moral law.

Velleman's next reference to autonomy, however, moves in the direction of a perfectionistic account of autonomy as a key component in one's flourishing. After first adopting and adapting Stephen Darwall's (2004) theory of welfare as rational care by arguing that love, rather than sympathetic concern, is the more fitting form of concern in relation to which a person's interests should be defined, and then endorsing Connie Rosati's (2006) suggestion "that what it makes sense to care about out of love for a person is the preservation of the value or the valuable condition to which love is an appreciative response" (Velleman 2008, 197). Velleman writes:

My conception of love, when combined with the views of Darwall and Rosati, favors an Aristotelian conception of a person's interests. What it makes sense to care about out of love for a person is the unimpeded realization of his personhood, which might be described as

noted, however, that other (less subjective) conceptions of prudential value have been defended. I will not enter into that debate here. For an excellent discussion of the variety of conceptions of prudential value, see Daniel Haybron (2008).

² Although I draw upon intuitions that I would consider relatively unproblematic regarding love and its demands in what follows, providing a fully developed theory of the same is outside the bounds of the present paper. My purposes in this essay are primarily critical.

his flourishing, in that sense of the term which is used to translate Aristotle's *eudaimonia* (Velleman 2008, 205).

Velleman goes on to draw a strong relation between the exercise of one's autonomy and "the unimpeded realization of his personhood". This characterization of autonomy sits uneasily with the earlier Kantian conception, however. Here developing one's autonomy is being described as a crucial part of a person's interests, as a core part of a person's flourishing. Although it may be possible to wed this view with the Kantian view of autonomy, it is not obvious that this is appropriate. Talk of 'interests' and 'flourishing' suggests a connection between autonomy and self-interest that Kant wished to deny, at least in the sense that Kant saw us as under a rational obligation to subsume the desire for happiness – our own, or that of others – to the demands of morality when these come into conflict. True, Aristotle's notion of the *eudaimon* is a normative notion that incorporates certain ethical constraints on character, but what is served by the exercise of autonomy within a eudaimonistic framework is not fealty to morality, but the well-being or happiness of the agent.

Velleman goes on to flesh out his understanding of supporting the autonomy – that is, the "unimpeded realization of personhood" – of those one loves by discussing his coming to care for his adolescent sons' interests: lacrosse, Morris dancing, poetry slams and photography. Velleman notes that he came to find himself caring about his sons' progress in these pursuits, "no matter how little intrinsic value I might have been inclined to see there in advance", because they were signs of his sons' coming into "full realization of their autonomy" (Velleman, 2008, 205). Doubtless Velleman's interest in his sons' burgeoning autonomy is praiseworthy, yet here it can be seen that the connection with Kantian autonomy seems to have been rendered even more tenuous. Not only are his sons' autonomous choices disassociated from explicit connection to the moral law – they seem to have been motivated rather by inclination and a desire for private happiness – but they are also admitted by Velleman to have potentially little intrinsic value in his eyes, which would be impossible if Velleman accepted the Kantian understanding of the nature of autonomous choice.

It may be objected that Kant established imperfect duties to self and duties to others within his moral philosophy, and that incorporating these notions provides Velleman with the resources to retain an association between his understanding of autonomy and Kant's. Imperfect duties to self include an imperfect duty to cultivate one's natural powers.³ Duties to others include the duty to make others' ends one's own, at least to some extent.⁴ In one sense these reminders are very helpful: we can certainly make sense of how Kant could hold that an autonomous (moral) agent could be virtuous when seeking her own perfection, or could be virtuous when concerned with helping others' attain their ends. In a more important sense, however, these reminders are beside the point. I am not arguing that Kantian autonomy is *incompatible* with self-cultivation or benevolence. My point, rather, is that Kant's understanding of what it means *to exercise autonomy as such* has nothing to do with satisfying one's inclinations. Velleman has claimed that love for his sons demands that he seek the full realization of their autonomy, *the exercise of which consists in* developing and exploring various (and shifting) interests. Yet this is not what the exercise of

³ See Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, MS 6.444 (translated by Mary Gregor)

⁴ See Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, MS 4.423 (translated by Mary Gregor)

autonomy consists in for Kant. For Kant, the exercise of autonomy is essentially linked to freedom from inclination and the possibility of adherence to the moral law that that freedom permits. In short, saying that self-actualization or concern for others' interests are compatible with Kantian autonomy is a far cry from saying that the exercise of Kantian autonomy consists in these things. My claim is that Velleman's account of autonomy moves away from Kant to the extent that he claims that autonomy is a matter of exploring interests such as Lacrosse or Morris dancing. Even if the maxims associated with the latter pursuits pass the Categorical Imperative test, this does not mean that engaging in the content of those maxims is the exercise of autonomy. Based on these considerations, it seems that Velleman's actual interest is not in a Kantian but rather in a perfectionist understanding of autonomy as a core component in human well-being.

Velleman's later appropriation of Harry Frankfurt's (1998) account of caring, however, brings the suspicion that Velleman is actually concerned with the relation between love and support for the flourishing of a still different kind of autonomy, namely *personal* autonomy. Velleman quotes Frankfurt with approval when the latter writes:

Caring is important to us for its own sake, insofar as it is the indispensably foundational activity through which we provide continuity and coherence to our volitional lives. Regardless of whether its objects are appropriate, our caring about things possesses for us an inherent value by virtue of its essential role in making us the distinctive kind of creatures we are (Frankfurt 1998, 162-3).

The point that Velleman makes here is that choosing things to care about is a central aspect of realizing one's autonomy, and is valuable for persons because it gives their lives continuity, unity, and coherence. This is certainly plausible, yet here once again it seems clear that the connection with Kant's notion of autonomy has gone by the wayside, for Kant certainly could not have accepted that autonomous choosing can take place "regardless of whether its objects are appropriate." More strikingly, the connection with the perfectionist understanding of autonomy seems to have been rendered tenuous at best, for it seems doubtful that perfectionistic accounts of autonomy can sit comfortably beside the idea that what one chooses to care about is only constrained by the condition of giving one's life unity and coherence. This condition seems too thin to constitute the condition of a plausible perfectionism, for choices that satisfy this condition well might be opposed to other perfections constitutive of flourishing – including, say, perfections of rationality or sociality. Aristotle, at the least, would have accepted the view that the unimpeded expression of one's autonomy is constitutive of flourishing only if some further conditions regarding rationality or nobility were put on the objects of caring. A contemporary perfectionist like Thomas Hurka – who explicitly defends autonomy as a valid component of Aristotelian perfectionism – would agree:

A...serious impediment [to the absolute value of autonomy] comes from the recognition of perfections other than autonomy. No plausible value theory can treat free choice as the only intrinsic good. It must acknowledge some other goods, so that, for example, freely chosen creativity is better than freely chosen idleness, and autonomous

knowledge is better than autonomous ignorance...A plausible broad perfectionism, then, can treat autonomy only as one good among others, which may sometimes be outweighed (Hurka 1996, 148-9).

As it stands, then, the condition espoused by Velleman for the objects of autonomous choice – that they give unity and coherence to the lives of the choosers – seems far too thin to support either a robust Kantian or perfectionist reading of autonomy. A Kantian understanding of autonomy must constrain the objects of choice within moral parameters, and must have no determining reference to inclination or happiness. And flourishing, on any plausible perfectionist model, demands far more than developing one's capacity to autonomously choose objects of care that give one's life unity and coherence.

It is clear that Velleman wants to consider autonomy as a perfectionist value in the Aristotelian sense. The point that I would like to press, however, is that, *as it stands*, Velleman's understanding of rational autonomy seems to amount to no more than personal autonomy. It doesn't matter overmuch if the nomenclature is resisted, so long as the practical implications of the conception of autonomy defended by Velleman are what I believe them to be. And it is these implications, I believe, that yield difficulties for Velleman's endorsement of seeking to bring about the full flowering of autonomy for those we love. To see why this is the case, though, it is necessary to say a bit more about personal autonomy.

PERSONAL AUTONOMY

Put most generally, personal autonomy is the property possession of which allows a person to effectively express his or her authentic identity (Frankfurt 1988, Dworkin 1988). One's identity is authentic when a preponderance of the parts that make up one's identity – one's values, preferences, wants, beliefs, aims, goals, desires, and so forth – are reflectively endorsed in a procedurally independent manner. Reflective endorsement thus constitutes a person's identification with the aspects of her identity. One is then autonomous when one possesses the internal capacities and enjoys the external enabling conditions necessary for the effective expression of one's authentic identity in action. Importantly for the present discussion, possessing autonomy both requires and reinforces a certain unity and coherence in one's identity; for without such coherence, one's identity would be too fractured to allow for effective self-determination. To be personally autonomous, then, is to be self-determining: to be effective in the expression of one's unified, authentic self.⁵

The only constraints on this kind of self-determination are formal (in a sense to be explained below). One has already been mentioned: one's authentic self must be relatively unified. A second constraint is this: one must have a positively valenced attitude towards the self that one reflectively endorses as authentic. Although it is possible to defend the idea – as Marina Oshana (2005) has – that a wider notion of authenticity should incorporate aspects of character that one merely acknowledges but does not value, the kind of authenticity that is *relevant for personal autonomy* must be

⁵ Supporting this conception of autonomy clearly requires some important assumptions about the nature of the self, self-knowledge, and self-control, among other things. For the purposes of the present discussion I will assume that this kind of autonomy is possible.

positively valued. The reason for this constraint is provided by the nature of personal autonomy. Personal autonomy, as self-determination, only makes sense as the determination of oneself in accordance with aspects of oneself that one *values*. It would be highly counterintuitive to hold that one would, with the robust awareness and control constitutive of autonomy, choose to determine oneself in accordance with aspects of oneself that one does not value, at least in some way or to some extent. To choose to so determine oneself would indicate either that one in fact does value those aspects, or that autonomy is not present. The third constraint on the determination of the authentic self follows from the second: succeeding in fulfilling aspects of one's authentic identity in autonomous choice brings satisfaction. One's autonomous choices, as expressions of one's authentic identity, concern those aspects of oneself that matter most to one in terms of who one is or wants to be, and when such choices are satisfied, a sense of personal fulfilment results.

Crucially, it should be noted that nowhere in the above elaboration of the constraints on authentic identity were substantive value constraints – that is, particular values or ways of life that must be endorsed – introduced. This is an admission of prudential pluralism: different people have different authentic identities, and take satisfaction in a wide variety of different practices, activities, and ways of life. Some people – Velleman's sons, for instance – may take deep satisfaction from caring about photography and lacrosse; others may find these activities boring or distasteful. Autonomous choices, as expressions of one's authentic identity, share this normative content-neutrality. There are no substantive value constraints on the objects of autonomous choice.⁶ This important claim about the nature of autonomous choice will, I shall argue, form the shoals against which grates Velleman's endorsement of helping the full flowering of our beloved's autonomy.

AUTONOMY AND THE DEMANDS OF LOVE

If we love someone, according to Velleman, we will wish to bring about her good for her sake, and the good of a person is seen as the flowering of her rational autonomy. But if the kind of autonomy that Velleman explicates amounts, at the end of the day, to no more than personal autonomy – as it seems to – then it becomes hard to see how the imperative to support the unimpeded development of one's beloved's autonomy necessarily follows. The problem, as I have already hinted, is that the expression of personal autonomy is not constrained by any substantive values whatsoever. All that is required is the satisfaction of the formal conditions of (i) unity and coherence of identity, (ii) a positively valenced attitude toward the aspect of self that one seeks to express in autonomous choice or caring, and (iii) the presence of deep satisfaction when that choice is fulfilled. The problem is that fulfilling these conditions is consistent with autonomously choosing in a manner that is antithetical to a wide variety of important moral and perfectionist goods.

⁶ The only possible exception to this claim comes from the idea that we cannot reflectively endorse ways of life that involve a focus upon certain (putative) intrinsic prudential 'evils' such as death, pain, and suffering as such (that is, without inclusion within a wider valuational system that renders such prudential evils meaningful). In claiming that autonomy is content-neutral – this one possible exception notwithstanding – I am taking issue with theorists who defend substantive accounts of personal autonomy. As I will not provide here a robust defence of this view, I refer the reader to what I believe to be an excellent defence of the content-neutrality of autonomous choice: see Friedman (2003), 19-25.

Take the case of someone I loved, whom I will call Arthur. Arthur was in many ways a very good person, and more often than not I had no problems supporting what he cared about, insofar as his choices were both satisfying to him and moral – even noble. But Arthur was also an inveterate racist. His racism brought a certain unity and coherence to his worldview and action, and he received satisfaction from being aware of, or even causing, the entrenchment of racial prejudice. Now, there is a sense in which satisfying Arthur's racism was good for Arthur: it was prudentially good for him in that it made his life go better from his perspective, and unquestionably brought him personal satisfaction. But I believe that most of us would say that it is not good for him in all senses – certainly not morally. I loved Arthur, but I would consider myself a poor beloved if I did not try to *challenge* the flowering of his autonomous will in such cases *for his own sake*, and *out of love for him*, even if it made him unhappy. Of course there are different ways to do this, and perhaps the most loving would be to seek to effect that goal with a concomitant expression of compassion, and a sustained attempt to speak in terms of reasons rather than to resort to forms of manipulation or deception.⁷

Loving someone brings with it a concern for that person's good, but the totality of what is good for a person – what one should support and promote – is not confined to what is prudentially good for him (that is, what satisfies his personal interests). Moral goods such as the development of capacities for compassion and justice, and perfectionist goods such as the development of capacities for rationality and sociality, should also play a part. Aesthetic goods should as well. These different kinds of goods, it must be noted, are conceptually distinct. Although they certainly can exist together – one can derive prudential value from being moral, for example – there is no logical or conceptual guarantee of an inherent connection between them. One may derive prudential value from objects, events, states of affairs, and activities that entirely lack moral, perfectionist, or aesthetic value (see Sumner 1996, 20-25). And it is precisely this conceptual separation that drives the necessity to challenge a beloved's (admittedly prudentially valuable) personal autonomy when it threatens important goods of other kinds.

Velleman writes, "Not all of [one's] ends are of significant importance to his good – only those which he cares about in the way that sustains his desire for them. Things are worth caring about in that way because desires so sustained give structure and unity to his life, thereby providing scope for the fullest realization of his autonomy" (Velleman 2008, 210). Yet if one's beloved can gain unity and structure in his life through the realization of autonomous choices that are morally questionable or even depraved, then it becomes hard to see how one's loving that person would require supporting the full realization of his autonomy. The root problem in Velleman's account is that the notion of autonomy that he defends seems to allow for such unacceptable expressions of autonomy; and as a result, his explication of the demands of love is rendered untenable.

⁷ It might be interjected that more needs to be said at this point as to why the lover's set of moral norms should become reasons to which the beloved's autonomous self should be responsive, given that the lover's norms could very well be arbitrary or mistaken. This concern is very well taken, but this, it seems to me, is a separate discussion that is unnecessary to resolve in order to make progress in the present work. I might also note that I have chosen the case of Arthur partially because the racist norms that he accepted are, to most minds, quite clearly immoral.

MODIFYING VELLEMAN'S ACCOUNT

At this point, it might seem that modifying Velleman's account to avoid the unwanted conclusions just mentioned would be an easy matter of introducing or clarifying further constraints on the objects of autonomous choice. Velleman could do this, for instance, by retreating to a Kantian conception of autonomy, in accordance with which all of the objects of autonomous choice will be morally permissible. Or Velleman might develop further the latent perfectionist resources in an Aristotelian account of flourishing. Velleman did not avail himself of these options in "Beyond Price", and the only condition that he introduces on the object of autonomous willing – that it conduce to the unity and coherence of the chooser's life – is, as we have seen, satisfied by personal autonomy. But such a modification, it might seem, would be relatively straightforward. I do not believe that it would be, however, for at least two reasons.

First, by adding further conditions on the objects of autonomous willing, Velleman would be forced to disavow his endorsement of Frankfurt's account of caring, which explicitly involves the accession that the importance of caring for something – bringing unity and coherence to one's life – is *independent* of the value of the object of choice. On a revised account that includes further conditions on supportable or acceptable objects of autonomous choice, the fact that a beloved cares about something – however deeply – would, by itself, provide little reason to seek to secure or promote it out of love for the beloved, no matter how beneficial it might be in terms of conducing to the unity and coherence of the beloved's life. A sustained desire for something that brings unity and coherence to one's life – however strong – would not, of itself, be enough to generate weighty demands for its support.

Second, and relatedly, Velleman would have to introduce an asymmetry in his view between what we appreciatively respond to when we love someone and what we should want for the beloved's own sake. Velleman holds the view that when we love someone, we focus "appreciative attention solely on him...Each person is special in the sense that he deserves to be valued singularly in this manner, as he is in himself" (Velleman 2008, 200). On this view, what we love about someone is unique to him: the particular expression of their autonomy. On the view of autonomy defended by Velleman, there is a symmetry between what we respond to when we love someone (the unique expression of their autonomy), and what we should want for the beloved's sake (the flourishing of the unique expression of their autonomy). Yet if Velleman introduces perfectionist or moral constraints on the expressions of autonomy that deserve support, an asymmetry results: on the one hand, one loves someone in all of their uniqueness, but on the other, what one wants for the beloved is not necessarily indexed to the unique expressions of their autonomy. This would be the case, for example, when those whom we love autonomously choose ends that are unacceptable from a moral or perfectionist point of view. The result of this asymmetry is a weakening of the view that what love demands in relation to the beloved is indexed precisely to the beloved. On this new view – and in accordance with the consequences of giving up endorsement of Frankfurt's account of caring – what love demands may often have nothing to do with what the beloved actually cares about. Indeed, it may concern promoting something the beloved actually hates, something that would make the beloved's life prudentially worse (although in as loving a manner as possible, of course). Some – myself included – would consider such a modification

an improvement, but it would require a not inconsiderable modification of Velleman's views on what love demands in relation to the beloved.

FINAL COMMENTS

In this paper I have not sought to provide an alternative to Velleman's theory of love, or to proffer a complete alternative to his view of the demands of love. And certainly much more needs to be said about how to balance the demands to support different kinds of goodness. My goal has been to uncover the form of autonomy operative in Velleman's account, and to show that a clearer understanding of its nature suggests the desirability of a revision of Velleman's views consisting of an explicit introduction of constraints on support for the autonomy of one's beloved. Perhaps a wider aim has been to temper an apparently widespread confidence in the categorical correctness of respecting the autonomy of others (where 'respect' is understood as allowance and enablement). I have not meant to imply that developing the capacity for personal autonomy in one's beloved is unimportant. Without question it is – especially in relation to the prudential value gained by the autonomous person from expressing her authentic self through fulfilled autonomous choice. But it is not an absolute value; and in cases where the full expression of a beloved's autonomy would hinder the development of other important goods, one's love for another requires that one thwart their autonomy, precisely out of love.

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Moving Toward a Better Business Model for the Millennial Generation

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Abstract

Recent literature, which focuses on the millennial generation, finds that their attitudes towards the banking industry make it number one on a list of industries likely to experience severe disruption in its business model in the future. The Brookings' papers on 21st Century Capitalism, carefully examines the culture and values of a generation that, because of its size and its unique experience, is likely to dominate American culture for years to come. This present analysis builds on these findings from Brookings, to explore the importance of ideology in the policy-making circles, and how the recent financial meltdown attests to the serious consequences, dislocations and expensive disruptions that occur when ideologies dominate economic policy making. The papers also explores how one may rescue ethical discourse from ideological imprisonment and thus move society toward a solution- focused policy environment based on ethical discourse, and thus help in the building of the business models, which the millennial generation can trust.

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Introduction

The paper is divided into several sections. The paper begins with an exploration of how students of economics and business are introduced to the economic models, which determine policy making, and how the millennial generation is emphasizing a focus on ethics and corporate social responsibility. The second segment of the paper details how we measure well-being and what changes may be necessary to address the expectations of Millennials. The third segment of the paper analyzes a typical Wall Street business model, and explains why the Millennials may not find it to be aligned with their interests. The fourth and last section of the paper explores questions, concerns and solutions that are designed to help the discourse about the relationship between ethics, Millennial Goals and discourses, and actions that will align better with these goals. Each segment of the paper is subdivided into self-explanatory sub-sections.

Positive and Normative Economics and the Ethical Journey Not Taken

Today, a typical introductory economics textbook introduces students to a definition of economics in the following fashion: ‘...the things we use to produce goods and services are limited, while human wants are unlimited..’ The definition is helpful in that students are thus engaged with the notion of scarcity and tradeoffs. And yet, it remains disturbingly lacking since the idea of scarcity and tradeoffs in production, consumption and exchange jettisons the entire ‘value system’ and the ethical dimension of this critical introduction. If one looks closely, however, it is easy to note that the definition does indeed tacitly incorporate an ethics-based system, a system that has been in the making for a couple of centuries - capitalism. The typical introductory economics textbook chapter also finds a way to defend such a definition by introducing within a few pages after the definition ideas about ‘Positive and Normative economics.’ A typical textbook author urges the student to distinguish between “What is?” (Positive economics) and “What ought to be?” (Normative economics), and then encourages the student to leave the normative economics aside and encourages students to focus on positive economics.

The Context: The Great Recession, the Millennials and Ethics

A lot has changed in the new century, especially since the Great Recession of 2007, the consequences of two important changes since the mid-1990’s. A new wave of globalization that was ushered in since the early 1990’s, the opening of a new technology frontier in the area of information, and its increasing adoption over the past two decades, allowed for an extraordinary level of financialization, in which megabanks of Wall Street have played a crucial and muscular role.

Researchers have begun to pay attention to how a new generation is reacting to these changes, and whether the ethical and value system that is embedded in a typical definition of economics in a standard textbook, with a nod to the twin gods of consumerism (utility maximization) and profit (profit maximization) is truly the way these Millennials accept the world we live in today. Millennials increasingly dominate the nation’s workplaces, and will be increasingly influential in determining the corporate culture. If they are renegotiating their understanding of the business world, and are not willing to accept the ‘values and beliefs’ that dominate the present Wall

Street culture, illustrated by a series of recent crashes from the Internet bubble to the housing bubble, in which Wall Street played the most critical role aided by the policy apparatus of the state, then both the value system that undergirds the definitions and goals of economics and business, and the pilgrimages the students of business schools are finally directed toward, to the sites and rituals of 'profit maximization' and 'utility maximization,' need to be revisited.

In a recent study published by the Brookings institution, Morley Winograd and Michael Hais outline the cultural force of the millennial generation on the economy. The authors argue that the current culture on Wall Street is becoming increasingly isolated from the beliefs and values of America's largest adult generation. The authors offer data on Millennials' ideal employers, and their levels of institutional trust and observe that one of the key Millennial values shaping the future of the American economy include:

"Emphasis on corporate social responsibility, ethical causes, and stronger brand loyalty for companies offering solutions to specific social problems." (*How Millennials Could Upend Wall Street and Corporate America* 2014)

The question remains as to why the typical introductory textbook definition of economics and the consequent journey students are invited to may be grossly inadequate in this century, and so removed from what the authors survey reveals. In order to analyze that issue it is worth exploring a series of narratives and questions:

Measurement Matters

How Should We Measure Well-Being-GDP or Health?

In his recent book *Price of Inequality* (2012) Joseph Stiglitz notes " ..GDP per capita mis-measures the value of goods and services produced in several sectors, including health and the public sector - two sectors whose importance today is much greater than when GDP, first started to be measured a half century ago. America, for instance, gets worse health outcomes, in terms of longevity or virtually any other measure of health performance, but spends more money..."

" How we measure performance is an aspect of the battle over perceptions and makes a difference, especially in our performance-oriented society. Our systems of measurement affect our perception of how well we are doing - and of relative performance of different economic systems. If we measure the wrong thing, we will be tempted to do the wrong thing, and to make the wrong inferences about what is a good economic system. If we measure our success by GDP, that's all we'll push for, and we'll pay insufficient attention to, what's happening to most Americans."

Any reading of the history of modernism, and industrial society, which has now given us the 'information age' and 'globalization,' unequivocally informs us that what we measure matters. Within this context, a misguided measurement agenda, given our two-century-old obsession with measurements, beginning with Quetelet's study of Belgian lilacs (*History of Statistics* 1986), and Galton's study of heredity (*Hereditary Genius: an Inquiry Into Its Laws and Consequences* 1869) will lend itself to bureaucratic utopias, and lead to an inexorable mad march, reminiscent of Mao's Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward, or Stalin's measurement of national

well-being based on Soviet steel production. Mao and Stalin's utopianism was the socialist heir to the dreams of Western progress. This experience aimed at achieving socialist goals by state collectivist means is now being mirrored in a coordinated international effort during this new wave of globalization, where extreme financialization, marketization, and privatization serve as the scaffolding, and where penetration of extremely mobile and flighty capital, in all geographies, and in every 'growth' sector has led to what Pantich and Gindin call, an "internationalization of the state." (*The Making of Global Capitalism 2013*).

Yet, such financialization of economic activity, and its domination by American finance is not a surprise. Paul Warburg, who was key in drafting of the legislation, called the Federal Reserve Act (1913), observed that the "foundation on which our own financial edifice is erected" would "make our paper part and parcel of just about a century ago, the world's financial exchange" (*The House Of Morgan: am American Banking Dynasty and the Rise of Modern Finance 1990*). It is very possible that this full blown experience, for which American society was fully poised, just about a century ago, and which was made eminently possible, with a rejection of the Bretton Woods agreement in the early 1970's, allowing for the preeminence of the U.S. dollar as the international currency, will ultimately prove to be a grand folly, but not before we have lost much as did China as well as Russia. Hence, it is not quite surprising that a reconsideration of the 'fusion of financial and government power,' illustrated by a questioning of Wall Street ethics, and hence the entire political-economy that drives the Wall Street behemoth is underway.

Such a re-assessment of institutions, and discussion of discomforts and hopes for change necessitates an assessment of values, of ethics, of priorities, and it is not quite a surprise that in the wake of two expensive and unresolved wars, a financial crisis that has left an indelible, and persistent mark of uncertainty, and two decades of relentless globalization, which despite all the technological and productivity achievements has left large segments of the population behind, a re-calibration of values is possibly under way. Depending on how this engagement evolves, priorities may change. With such changes, measurements will change, and so will institutions.

Measures Matters- GDP Volatility, Recessions and Health- A Consideration for the Millenials?

Since the 19th century, business cycles, unemployment rates and risk of suicide have been seen to be highly correlated. As data collection and analysis improved, public health researchers found that those looking for work (and are hence counted as part of the unemployment statistics) are about twice as likely to end their lives than those who have jobs. (*Suicide, Deprivation, and Unemployment; Record Linkage Study 1998*)

In a recent book, *The Body Economic – Why Austerity Kills* (2013) Sanjay Basu and David Stuckler report that soon after the Great Recession began in 2007, Peter Byrne, director of public education at the Royal College of Psychiatrists in the UK, observed, "In 2009 all of us - whether we work in general practice, general hospitals or specialist services- are seeing an increase in referrals from the recession. The stresses of the downturn are the last straw for many people." (*Antidepressant Use Rises as Recession Feeds Wave of Worry 2010*)

The modernist dream may now be flying full circle, on the wings of market capitalism and financialization, but there is a huge cost, which just cannot be so easily brushed off as a tradeoff a society must endure to have economic growth, when such growth is built on institutional structures that creates perverse incentives and extreme inequality (*Capital in the Twenty First Century* 2014). Just as the claims, and statistics fed into the hyper- enthusiasms of the Great Leap Forward and propelled it forward, so it seems that the new claims and statistics of globalization, productivity growth, the grand solutions of information technology, and financialization of the last two decades of the 20th century, created the exuberance that feed bubbles in capitalism, which has most recently led to the worst financial disaster since the Great Depression.

It is possible that the economic system that has been spawned, especially since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, (the consequences of which the Millennials are waking up to) will become a self- reinforcing system for some time to come, which crashes with regular frequency registering varying degrees of dislocation and disaster, as did the housing bubble in 2007, or tulip bubble in the 17th century, and all the other bubbles in between. Hence a desire to get off the ship, and reassess the destination, as well as the journey by questioning ethics and values, the purpose of economic activity, and the institutions we have built to protect it and stabilize it *internationally*, is to be expected of the Millennials. It's a natural consequence of having a more integrated world, and an examination of some critical sectors and industries that ties this world together, and how they function, and what the incentives and conflicts of interest exist therein are worth examining to understand the desire to reset priorities.

Examining the culture, and the values of Wall Street, the banking and shadow banking sector and the industries they trail are a critical component of this inquiry. The following narratives detail the working of a typical business model, which fuses finance, industry and government, and helps us understand as to why a cultural shift which the Brookings study suggests may be underway.

Narratives and Queries to Explore Issues of Ethics, Corporate Responsibility, Financialization and Information Technology

The Business Model on Wall Street

A new business model emerged in the 1990's, even though it had been in the making for at least a quarter century prior to that (since the early 1970's) that allowed for extreme financialization of commercial activity since 1999, and the creation of megabanks such as Citigroup and the breaking of Glass-Steagall (the law that separated commercial banking from investment banking and thus put brakes on the speculation that created the Great Depression, the worst downturn experienced since managerial capitalism emerged as the economic system for much of the globe, especially the industrial West, in the 19th century).

Narrative 1: The Information Age -Technology Companies, Mega-Banks and Crashes

The 1996 Telecommunications Act, and the decision by the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) to create more competition in the data market did not lead to better outcomes in regards to growth and distribution of income and wealth

(*Blue Skies* 2008). It did help create an industry, where data traffic grew for a while and it also helped create new commercial products related to data. Wall Street financing, a new banking architecture which made such financing possible, and the breaking of an important piece of post-Depression legislation, as well as the U.S. Congress and successive U.S. administrations played an integral role in this (*The Wall Street Fix*).

Sam Weill of Travelers insurance was a key player in engineering the creation of the new megabanks as the Wall Street business model for the new century, when in 1999, Travelers, an insurance company, was combined with Citibank, a commercial bank, and Salomon Smith Barney, an investment bank, to create the 'super bank,' the new model for the financial sector. These megabanks and in particular Citigroup were important players in the crafting and the crashing of the Internet bubble in 2000.

This creation of the super-bank model (which required the breaking of the regulation called Glass-Steagall) was allowed by Alan Greenspan, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, the Central Bank of the United States, the U.S. Congress and the Treasury Department headed by Robert Rubin, Secretary of Treasury in the Clinton administration.

It is no coincidence, that these same players also allowed the operation of the financial derivatives market (complex financial securities) as a dark market by both encouraging Congress to maintain an extreme deregulatory stance toward financial derivatives, and by forcing, Brooksley Born, who led CFTC (Commodities and Futures Trading Commission), and opposed them, to retreat from her demands for more transparency in the derivatives trading market, leading to far more devastating consequences that followed in 2007 with the housing crash (*The Warning*).

The Citigroup super-bank model enabled the origination of loans that were provided by Citibank to Bernie Ebbers, the former CEO of WorldCom, which Ebbers used to acquire firms. Such as MCI. These mergers were the way a small data company, taking advantage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, began to 'grow.' Investment bank analysts such as Salomon Smith Barney's Jack Grubman (the investment bank that was part of the architecture of the super-bank model, created by Sam Weill and allowed to operate as such an entity by the U.S. Congress's smashing of Glass-Steagall), touted such growth as growth of 'data traffic, even when it had stopped being so, and in his capacity as investment analyst continued to provide 'buy' ratings to WorldCom-MCI stock, despite the fact that it was not warranted by growth of 'data traffic,' thus helping spawn a dual investor class- those who had information on the true nature of growth and the hapless other that did not and lost heavily, when WorldCom-MCI crashed.

Narrative 2: Bubbles Galore- WorldCom-MCI, LTCM, Enron and Lehman

The unfortunate and dangerous fact is even while so many investors lost so much with the WorldCom-MCI crash, Salomon Smith Barney, the investment bank arm of the megabank made a great deal of money in M&A (mergers and acquisitions) fees. It is also interesting to note that legendary investor, John Meriwether, formerly of Salomon Brothers was at the helm of the derivatives trading firm LTCM (Long Term Capital Management), when it spiraled into a meltdown in 1998, just two years before

the bursting of the internet bubble, and the crash of WorldCom-MCI. The LTCM disaster, a firm that operated in the stratosphere of high-finance, and was heavily connected to other Wall Street firms, helped the public to become aware of the existence of too-big-to-fail financial companies, and set off the first alarms. Its rescue by the Federal Reserve Bank to avoid a systemic crash that would have been would have wreaked havoc across the U.S. economy, also indicated the depth of the problem, and the fault lines in the area of international capital markets, that had been wrought through the engineering of complex financial products, and too-big-to-fail firms, (*NOVA: The Trillion Dollar Bet*).

Accounting gimmicks were yet another problem in the crises that followed, from the crash of the Internet bubble to the housing bubble in the years following the LTCM crash. However, accounting tricks can be traced back to the energy trading firm of Enron, which involved the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen and was responsible for rolling blackouts in California (*Frontline: Bigger Than Enron*). According to the investigative reporting by (*PBS: Enron: The Smartest Guys in the Room*), the government regulatory agency FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) refused to investigate Enron, despite repeated requests by the State of California, thus again attesting to the worry that we are today living very much in the bosom of crony capitalism (*Crony Capitalism, A Fact of Modern Economies* 2014).

Accounting gimmicks, such as the use of repos (a product that is bought and sold in the bond repurchase market), which was used to present 'debt' as 'profit' to many investors, using off-balance sheet accounting, was also used by Lehman Brothers, the firm, whose collapse ushered in the Great Recession. Lehman was also heavily engaged in the trading of mortgage derivatives, in the unregulated dark derivatives markets. As is well known, the U.S. Treasury's decision to let Lehman fall in September 2008, let to a meltdown in financial markets worldwide, and ushered in the worst economic downturn in the United States, since the Great Depression, with more catastrophic consequences in many countries in Europe, since financial 'liberalization' which came in the wake of the new wave of globalization, and development of information technology, allowed for supreme exposure of countries to these unregulated and risky financial products. (*Frontline: Inside The Meltdown*)

The engineering of bubbles, tied to accounting gimmicks, extreme financialization (trading of financial derivatives in 'dark' unregulated markets), and the creation of too-big-to-fail firms, and consequent perversion of incentives, and extreme conflicts of interest in the financial sector , is an ever present danger that we live with today.

Ethics, Values, Ideology and Culture

Not that this should be a surprise given the design and hopes for the financial system spawned about a century ago (Federal Reserve Act 1913). Despite the Federal Reserve Banks involvement as a firefighting team in the resolving of the LTCM (Long Term Capital Management) crisis, and its mission to protect the economy from extreme volatility, the experience seems to have had absolutely no impact on the ideology, values, and the culture that informed the policy climate, presided over by the same Federal Reserve Bank under the same Chairman, and a new Congress and a new administration and Treasury, as the derivatives market remained unregulated, accounting gimmicks continued, super-banks remained in operation, and the likes of

Lehman Brothers and too-big-to-fail-banks remained and became a more integral part of an increasingly globalized economy ever so more connected by *financial liberalization and information technology*. A few years after the LTCM crisis, though the super-troika of Alan Greenspan-Robert Rubin-Lawrence Summers, were now replaced by others, such as Ben Bernanke (Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank), Henry Paulson, then Timothy Geithner (both Secretary's of Treasury under the Bush and Obama administrations that followed the LTCM crash) and yes again Lawrence Summers (as advisor to the Obama administration), nothing much changed in regards to dealing with the issues at the core of these disastrous crashes. The warnings by Federal Reserve Governors such as Edward Gramlich (*Subprime Mortgages: America's Latest Boom and Bust* 2007), who warned of the housing bubble, Brooksley Born formerly of CFTC, who warned the U.S. Congress, the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) and the Clinton administration officials such as Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers, of the dangers in the 'dark' unregulated derivatives markets, and Raghuram Rajan formerly of the IMF, who warned policy makers of the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury, of the risks of extreme 'financial liberalization' in the wake of increasing globalization and the penetration of information technology, all went unheeded and helped spawn another financial bubble, fed by the derivatives market on home mortgages, which crashed catastrophically in 2007-2008, ushering in the Great Recession.

Boom and Bust Capitalism for Millenials – Engineering Uncertainty, Volatility and Extreme Unequal Economic Outcomes?

In the context of millennial experience, the recent history of such bubbles can be traced back to the S&L (Savings and Loan) crisis of the 1980's and the junk bond empire that was spawned by Mike Milliken. Though several pieces of legislation have been passed in this new century, such as Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) and the Dodd-Frank act of 2010, the fact is that the lobbying by the financial-banking sector remains fierce, and unprecedented. The recent erosion of campaign finance laws by the U.S. Supreme Court (*How Chief Justice John Roberts orchestrated the Citizens United decision*, 2012) makes it more likely that the financial lobbies will have increasing sway in politics, and thus increasingly capture the regulatory apparatus of the state, possibly creating a roller coaster, boom-bust economy, for time to come.

What promise does this present scenario, built on the business models of megabanks and an uncontrolled financial sector then hold for growth of the U.S. economy and inequality in wealth in the U.S.? If this process continues, how may that affect the political-economy of this country and relations between economy and the state? These questions are indeed the questions one must ask in the wake of the crashes Millenials have lived through. Hence it is not surprising that we may be observing a fundamental shift in the attitudes of the millennial generation, a re-evaluation of goals of economic life, of measures of well-being and of the institutional structures and the ideologies that support them.

In attempting to understand the priorities and the value system that undergird institutions and help direct policy possibly for decades, and thus self-replicating bureaucracies, and incentive structures, it is germane to recall 1973. In April 1973, in a memorandum prepared by Bill Casey, who had just assumed the position of Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs after leaving his position of Chairman

of the SEC, argued " the dollars problem comes from a failure to properly assess the solid assets which lie below the surface...the U.S. is still dominant in computers, photography, pharmaceuticals, medical technology, aerospace, nuclear power, home building, heavy industrial machinery, off shore drilling utility operations and so on. " Casey went on to say.. "trade need no longer be the only source of major gains in our balance of payments." The U.S. could instead export "securities." Casey went on to point out that the U.S. had " such a large stake in the creation of better capital markets around the world. Fortunately know-how is one of our greatest assets and the securities markets of the world are becoming increasingly internationalized...With the announcement that controls on the export of capital are to be phased out, it is vital for our talented community to unleash itself" (*William Simon Papers, I 1973*)

This 'talented community' did indeed unleash itself. This talented community has enabled the bubbles that the Millenials have grown up with. They grew up with the crashes of Enron, WorlCom-MCI, the Internet bubble, and finally the Great Recession of 2007-08. These bubbles and the crashes have been, as the Great Recession in particular reveals, finally catastrophic. While some have gained enormously, others have lost dismally from a particular political-economic arrangement, and a Wall Street business model, which characterizes this time. The legislation that was supposed to help the American society as well as the international economic order move closer to corrections has not happened. Questions must arise and the values and ethics underlying the crafting and the preservation of such an economic-financial-political system must necessarily follow.

Unanswered Questions that Feed into Uncertainty for Millenials

Is it likely that such a system of unregulated financial sectors, such as the shadow banking sector and the derivatives markets, and too-big-to-fail firms, which assists the present globalization of trade without attention to differences in labor and environmental laws, human rights, and the lack of co-ordination of international tax laws, will spawn a series of catastrophic financial bubbles (*The True Cost of Hidden Money 2014*)?

Given the present business model, will such a system prove good for long-term growth? Will this growth be sustainable in regards to the environment? Will such growth engage more human capabilities? Will such growth be helpful for political democracy?

Will continued trade imbalance in the international accounts (some countries running chronic trade surpluses with imports exceeding exports, while others run chronic trade deficits), differences in tax treatment of profits, which allow for the gains from trade to be 'hidden' in treasure islands such as Canary Islands, Liechtenstein enabling flighty capital flows (hot money), seeks out a speculative opportunity, and then leaves an economy at the first signs of trouble without funding the entire project thus destroying the 'income-making, and employment generating potential of such an economy? Will this worsen the stability of the international economic system in the coming decades (*Fault Lines 2010*)?

Reimagining the World of Business for Millenials

Corporate Responsibility – A Perspective on Reform

The Wall Street financial lobby keeps chipping away at the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reform law, which is the only significant piece of legislation that was enacted since the economic meltdown that brought the world to the brink in 2007-2008, and has created the worst recession since the Great Depression.

Wall Street banks are trying as they have done from the time Brooksley Born of CFTC tried to bring it to the attention of the public, to derail regulation of derivatives — the complex and risky financial contracts that led to fall of Lehman Brothers and the global financial meltdown of 2008. One deregulation bill, the “London Whale Loophole Act,” would allow American banks to skip Dodd-Frank’s trading rules on derivatives if they are traded in countries that have similar regulatory structures.

In a recent interview with Bill Moyers, economist Anat Admati, co-author of the book, *The Bankers’ New Clothes*, said this of the Dodd-Frank legislation, “It keeps being weakened and weakened.” She additionally observed this about financial liberalization reform, “We have some tweaks. We have messy, unfocused efforts. But we haven’t really gotten to the heart of the matter and really managed to control this system effectively...the financial system continues to be fragile and the banks continue to live dangerously. And when you speed at 100 miles an hour, you might explode and harm other people.” (<http://billmoyers.com/episode/full-show-too-big-to-fail-and-getting-bigger/>)

Consequences of Reform Failure: New Oligarchy for Millenials?

By the time de Tocqueville wrote *Democracy in America*, he was observing that a tension between the industrial working classes and the factory owners were already visible and that a “new oligarchic” impulse was potent in American society. This is not surprising, since history is littered with such tensions, and one can appeal to the ancient Sparta-Athens conflict and the Peloponnesian War, to read into this impulse. Yet, since the passage of almost two centuries of the Tocqueville’s observation, we have seen this impulse play out in different ways and through different crises, and democracy surviving in the United States, unlike what happened in Athens (*The Mutilation of the Herms: Unpacking an Ancient Mystery* 2012).

The sustainability of certain values and ethics depends on the institutional structures we build, and how during times of crises we are able due to such institutions, to allow for the discourse on ethics to re-emerge, and be sustained, till the conflicts between ethical goals and existing conditions are comprehended, and initiatives are undertaken to change course.

As Daren Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, have observed in their recent tome, *Why Nations Fail*, (2012) "Inclusive economic and political institutions do not emerge by themselves. They are often the outcome of significant conflict between elites resisting economic growth and political change and those wishing to limit the political change and those wishing to limit the economic and political power of existing elites. Inclusive institutions emerge during critical junctures, such as during the Glorious Revolution in England or the foundation of the Jamestown colony in North America,

when a series of factors weaken the hold of elites in power, make the opponents stronger, and create incentives, for the formation of pluralistic society. "

The Millennial's insistence on ethics and corporate responsibility is part of a process of resistance to the type of succumbing that occurred in Athens over two millennia ago, and is very much in keeping with the tension that the United States has lived with for almost two centuries since Tocqueville made his observations. The ethical dilemmas, that we face as individuals and as a society alert us our capabilities and to the possibility of 'choice.' The fact that there is a choice is sometimes hard to see, and hence it is instructive to pay attention to literatures that alert us to that., and explore the nature of the dilemmas the Millenials and the rest face this time.

Ethics, Business, Economics and Millennials - The "Normative" Discourse is an Imperative of our Times

Goethe has pointed out that while the impersonal viewpoint within us produces a desire for goodness, fairness, and equality the personal one leads to the pursuit of ones own gain often at the expense of others (*Equality and Partiality* 1991). This is the basis of course of our moral dilemmas in an uncertain world. The Indian epic Mahabharata, is a narrative where the personal dominates, interrupted frequently by the impersonal, and illustrates this conflict between our divided selves, which underlie moral dilemmas, for both the heroes of the epic and the heroes in all of us, thus bringing to us an 'awareness of the possibilities of life.' (*The Great Tradition* 1962).

A Dilemma of Our Times:

Enamored by technology and the Promethean hope, extended to us by standard growth models of economics, which permeates the discourse in the policy apparatus of states, and international institutions, and beholden as we are still to the mystical hope of Schumpeter's "creative destruction," we remain attached to the business-as-usual model and the grand utopia, always beckoning us to a new horizon, as perfect as the past, after another great war, another great crisis, as if everything will be resolved in time without a reckoning, as if the new technology around the corner will deliver us from our essential dilemmas and the horror of the past crisis, as if the Great Recession, and the boom-bust cycles we have created can be dispelled by the magic wand of Ben Bernanke, and the Federal Reserve and the IMF, and the coast will clear and we will emerge into a new day, and wake up from a bad dream.

Our modernist hopes for deliverance through technology, which is, however as old as civilization itself, or at least as old as the West, also exposes us to exposure to the Wall Street model and its system of incentives, and the inevitable linkages between big business and big government.

The dilemma is tough to resolve, since finance is the life-blood of capitalism, and capitalism is on the march. Yet, to begin the ethical discussion, in an interdisciplinary and intercultural forum is a good start. Technology is a global phenomenon, particularly due to the twin changes that have been wrought over the past two decades, in the areas of globalization and information technology. The state has been internationalized, during this time period in a spectacular way, since states have encouraged capitalists to extend the range of activity beyond the territorial boundaries

of the state. In so doing, the capitalists have encouraged us to follow “knowledge like a sinking star, beyond the utmost bound of human thought.” (Tennyson)

So we cannot escape the lure of Jason Lanier’s dream, no less powerful than Tennyson’s “We don’t know what technology can achieve. Glinting at us from the horizon is a fantastic vista of a heavenly future where anything might be achieved. We can’t tell how much is a mirage. Just considering that some techie scenario is impossible might prevent us from discovering how to do it. We must not acknowledge limits. Limits kill.” (*Who Owns the Future* 2013).

Yet, to surrender to utopias is to seal our fates, for then we would have lived just a little longer than we should have in “willing suspension of disbelief” (Coleridge), but just long enough for the discourse to have ground to a halt. Hence it is indeed important to let the dream co-exist with such observations as by Susan Crawford, “The Comcast- NBCU merger has shed light on concentration and market power in high-speed Internet access, programming, and devices, but after it was over there was scarcely a ripple; Comcast continued in its path, strengthened. ..The investment bankers were already hard at work on the AT&T- T-Mobile merger,” to serve as warnings, and as goads to discussion and debate on ethics and institutions. (*Captive Audience: The Telecom Industry and Monopoly Power in the New Gilded Age* 2013)

A Way Forward for Millenials?

Dilemmas are not an invitation to resignation but to discourse, challenge, purpose, and engagement. As discussions on ethics begin to take on new meaning and purpose in the context of the Millennial perspectives, maybe it is time for the United Nations to discuss how important it is to incorporate the ‘reduction of engineered volatility of GDP’ as has been illustrated by employing the narratives in this paper, as an important Millennial goal. As we have observed earlier, extreme volatility of GDP after all leads to poor health outcomes, and better health outcomes are already an integral part of the United Nations platform for improving the well-being of Millennials, in the United States and the rest of the world (<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/news.shtml>).

The key to reducing such engineered volatility in economic outcomes of course involves a discourse about corporate social responsibility as it relates to the financial sector and the business model of Wall Street. The importance of that needs to be recognized and cannot be overstated in the context of the aspirations of the Millennials. It is only through an engagement in relevant discourse that we can ever begin to question the axioms that serve as the pillars of understanding of what has the possibility of securing our well-being. Without that discourse, which is in its essence, interdisciplinary, and intercultural in nature (both spatially and temporally, since it involves different cultures and different generations) that one can ask the question as to whether the first chapter of introductory textbooks for students of economics and business, which differentiates between “normative” and “positive” economics, and then relegates the “normative” issues to a dark corner of the course, is actually helping the aspirational goals of the Millennials- is this the best we can do in helping them clarify their aspirations?

The textbooks already teach us that once the goals are specified, and if they compete, it becomes possible to discuss the issue of scarcity, which is presented as a fact of life,

an axiom. Yet, a more radical re-statement in this new context of the Great Recession, and a new understanding due to that, is possible. The goals may have to be restated. Then we may finally engage in the appropriate discussion of “scarcity” endowing it with the meanings made available to us using a broader measure of ‘possibility and capability,’ and not confine the discussion to the deadness of efficiencies achieved in the quest for ‘consumer utility maximization’ and ‘supplier profit maximization,’ thus helping the discourse move toward a more meaningful approach to measuring what matters now, for this new generation. Only then can institutional changes be imagined, and can hopefully be wrought around that discourse. What Kuhn had to say of measurement, may also be true of institutions: “The road from scientific law to scientific measurement can rarely be traveled in the reverse direction” (*The Essential Tension*). Its time to listen to the Millennials, their aspirations and their concerns, and ask the more fundamental questions about moral dilemmas, that will help clarify these goals and ethical expectations, bringing us the awareness of the possibilities of life, a discourse which employs the more open and appropriate methodology of Sen’s “capabilities approach” (*The Idea of Justice* 2012).

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