


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***Transnational Crimes of Human Trafficking in Malacca Strait:
National Security Threat Analysis***

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Abstract

This paper is an elaboration of the research results generated from three activities: a meta-analysis, field studies and reflexivity. The fieldwork took place in Melaka and Dumai. The network of human smuggling in the Malacca Strait takes three main forms; fraud models, demand models and necessity model. The first two models are most often used as tools to investigate elements related to human trafficking, including human smuggling. There are important differences to human smuggling especially on the necessity model. In this area the root problem lies on the invisible actors, including the state and other violence actors which sometime the researcher tends to ignore. Human smuggling has affected state security, from territorial security until the state power and sovereignty including human security. Therefore, the most appropriate way to combat human smuggling is a defensive strategy in which elements of ethics and responsibility of governance are integrated in it. By including moral values, the state could still possibly serve as a basis for security policy, and as a force for improvements in global security governance.

Keyword: *human smuggling, state security, Malacca Straits, defensive strategy*

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Introduction

The analysis of the human smuggling generally still overlaps with the issues of human trafficking. It is believed that there are other factors of human smuggling that require deeper strategic and security analysis. The formation of human smuggling networks is not only the result of human exploitation through fraud (fraud models), and due to the high demand in the scope of the market (demand model), but also it happens because of asymmetrical power relations, discrimination, violence, conflict and war. Those situations have threatened human security. Even more, those can raise collectivities and needs of individual to smuggle (necessary model).

Fear and security threats as the excesses of ethics which are not run by a regime have raised the issue of human smuggling in a global scale. In fact, many illegal workers who sneak or are being smuggled want to obtain the status of refugee or asylum from relatively secured countries. Director of the Water Police of Indonesia, Brigadier General Iman Budi Supeno reveals that Indonesian waters territory is vulnerable to be means of human smuggling from Pakistan and Myanmar.¹

In 2010 to 2013, there was a significant increase on human smuggling activities which generally came from conflicted country, particularly from the Middle East and South Asia. In some cases of human smuggling, the eradication action which emphasizes on punishment can be fatal for the smugglers who really need protection from the State. By implementing the approach of international law, the smugglers have been confronted by the security military policy. The smuggling action is similar to the cross-border crimes and other actions, such as the smuggling of forbidden or hazardous goods and terrorism.

Referring to the cases above and the number of other human smuggling cases, in the last few years, it can be presumed that the issue of human smuggling is urgent to be reviewed by applying the security and strategic approach considering the existing problems and long-term impact to the national security of the country. Security threats posed by smuggling human beings have reached a critical area for the survival of the nation, ranging from territorial security to the state sovereignty and the power of the state to the threat of human security.

Furthermore, it is necessary to gather a series of questions in order to get the accurate data and information about the human smuggling. How is the actual content in the human smuggling network? How far is the country involved in causing this problem? What kind of security strategies applied to reduce and combat the smuggling of human beings? Are those strategies appropriate for all countries and for all the problems caused by the smuggling of human beings?

¹ <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/hukum/13/02/15/mi8gw0-perairan-indonesia-rawanpenyelundupan-manusia>, 15 Februari 2013

Security and Strategic Approach

Moh Ayyob,² Kamarulnizam Abdullah and Mahmud Embong³ are among scholars who have given attention to the human smuggling cases related to the national security. They clearly show the strategic values of the nation affected by the smuggling of human beings crimes. There are at least three main principles of national security that could be threatened by cross-border human smuggling crimes;⁴

1. sovereignty
2. territorial Integrity
3. political, social, economic and cultural survival.

The study of human smuggling seen from the victim side is rare. It happens as a result of violence committed by actors outside the smuggling network. Human smuggling can be related to the issues of sovereignty and violations of the nation. However, the roots of this problem also lie in the countries themselves. The analysis of human smuggling in connection with national security is problematic because it does not look at the main source of the problem. The behavior of nation's violence, conflict and war has contributed to human smuggling efforts. The smuggling agents are only associated with elements of violence and exploitation of the smuggled people.

A site of judiciary in the United States has elaborated the distinction between human trafficking and human smuggling as follows;⁵

Table 1. The difference between Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking

HUMAN TRAFFICKING	HUMAN SMUGGLING
It must contain an element of force (actual, perceived or implied), unless under 18 years of age involved in commercial sex acts.	The person being smuggled is generally cooperating.
It forces labor and/or exploitation.	There is no actual or implied coercion
Persons trafficked are victims	Persons smuggled are violating the law. They are not victims.
It is an enslavement and subject to limited movement or isolation, or had documents confiscated.	The smuggled people are free to leave, change jobs, etc.
It does not need to involve the actual movement of the victim.	It facilitates the illegal entry of person(s) from one country into another country.
There is no requirement to cross an international border.	Smuggling always crosses an international border.
Person must be involved in labor/services or commercial sex acts, i.e., must be "working".	Person must only be in country or attempted entry illegally.

² Mohamed Ayoob, Regional Security in the Third World. Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Boulder Colo. Westview Press. 1995, p.72.

³ Kamarulnizam Abdullah dan Mahmud Embong, Kepentingan Strategik, Kepentingan Strategik di Dalam Keselamatan Negara Malaysia. Sejarah, Universiti Malaya. No.6, 1998, pp.132-135.

⁴ Ibid, pp.151-176

⁵ The Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center Fact Sheet: Distinctions between Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking, Unclassified, January 2005, <http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/ops/training/bcpo/smugglingvstraffickingguide.pdf>.

The description on the table is useful as a template for determining the initial contents of human smuggling networks. The smugglers coming into Indonesia are alleged to have taken these three following forms:

- a. Amateur Smugglers, which is run privately by those who have the means of water transportation to make living. It is used in human smuggling when there is a rise in demand, either from a person or a group of people in exchange for money;
- b. International smuggling networks, which is more like an international criminal organization selling and offers services to move people illegally from one country to another, or pass through cross-border;
- c. Small groups of organized smugglers, which is organized or half-organized human smuggling attempt. It sometimes also involves the big company operating for transporting people illegally.⁶

Seeing from the types and forms from the explanation above, it can be said that human smuggling is like a business in international markets, since there is a supply and demand factor. From this perspective, the actors in the market have seen promising benefits from smuggling human (supply model), and the rising of demand for smuggling (demand model). Those two factors become determining factors in human smuggling cases. In addition, the punishment to the offender is not effective as the demand remains high.⁷

It is often said that corruption in law enforcement agencies can be the problem that makes the implementation of sanctions to the trafficker is difficult to be performed.⁸ For the same reason, the issues of human smuggling have been consuming a lot of attention in the area of law enforcement. From the law perspective, the war against human trafficking not only requires the credible officials, but also a government that has a willing to cooperation with the international law.⁹

From the perspective of the United Nations, the fight against human trafficking including human smuggling and global compactness requires commonality of approaches and viewpoints in viewing the issue. This is applied to all elements that have function to prevent, protect and punish the actors in the chain of human trafficking crimes.¹⁰ USAID offers one way out for tackling the problem of the anti-trafficking policy that covers four areas; prevention, protection, prosecution and partnership. It is the same as the view of the United Nations that the punishment is the most appropriate solution to handle the human smuggling case.¹¹

⁶ Cat Barker "The people smugglers" business model Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Section, 28 February 2013, Research Paper no. 2, 2012–13
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1213/13r p02

⁷ Alexis Aronowitz, Gerda Theuermann and Elena Tyurykanova, Analyzing the business Model of trafficking in human beings to better prevent the crime, OSCE, Austria, Ueberreuter, 2010

⁸ US State Department. Trafficking in Persons Report 2008 - Indonesia. 4 June 2008. Accessed from:
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105658.pdf>.

⁹ 13Janie Chuang, "Beyond a Snapshot: Preventing Human Trafficking in the Global Economy" Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: Vol. 13: Iss. 1, Article 5. 2006, p.1

¹⁰ UN Global Compact, ILO and UN.GIFT, 2009, Human Trafficking: Everybody's Business, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.1_news_archives/2009_03_27/Story_Survey_Final.pdf

¹¹ USAID, "Counter Trafficking in Persons, Field Guide". Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance within the United States Agency for International Development. April 2013, pdf article

This proposal emphasizes that the issue of human smuggling requires serious attention from strategic and security study academics. The usual rights applied by countries are the principles of the state sovereignty over its territory. On the contrary, in the scope of international relationship cooperation, there has been a violation over these rights especially to the less powerful countries. Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor of international law from the Faculty of Law, University of Indonesia confirms that the state government should not treat the issue of illegal entrants and asylum with the transactional principles which he says that as “barter”. The example of this action is by accepting foreign funds.¹²

Suhakam’s annual report mentions that human smuggling occurs almost every day.¹³ It is equal to the report of other scholars like J.M Winw¹⁴ and Irene Fernandez,¹⁵ which also provides information about the fact that almost every day the Malacca Strait becomes the entrance and exit of the human smuggling. In contrast to human trafficking that is understood as technique to gain financial profit by performing coercion, fraud and violence, human smuggling is a more fundamental issue in security, ethics and morals in applying domestic and international law.

Thus, security threats arising from the human smuggling reach out to a very wide area as they are not merely about regional security. The triggering factors are asymmetric state power, racial discrimination, religion or ethnic violence, war among countries and global armed conflict. Human smuggling also includes exploitation over a country that has a weak and insecure government. It often involves war and armed violence. In short, the fear of the national security and insecure situation of the country become the main causes of the human smugglings.

The result of the research that we conducted at Malacca Strait shows that there are three major models of human smuggling network in Malacca; fraud model, demand model, as well as the necessity model. Those three models contain elements of crime and economic background which concern about the problem of symmetrical power relations in countries and between countries to cause problems in human security. This at once affirms that the human smuggling issue needs more concern in political area, moral ethics of governance, on the security policy makers and managers, rather than in military.

Human Smuggling Networks in the Strait of Malacca; Study Cases

Fraud’s Model

It is extremely difficult to trace the perpetrators of the human smuggling network that uses the techniques of fraud, as from departure to the destination agents; the smuggling involves many parties or actors. They swap from one location to another, as an organized network, which threaten the human security. This case primarily happens to the crime of human smuggling from Indonesia to Malaysia. The ignorance victims are usually not aware of what the smugglers do. Thus, they do not realize that they will be

¹² Antara, Jakarta, 26 September 2013. Accessed through <http://id.berita.yahoo.com/indonesia-harus-bersikap-tegas-terhadap-australia-015629765.html>

¹³ Annual Report, 2004 about Malaysia in “Trafficking in Person Report”.

¹⁴ J.M Winw, Alein Smuggling: Transnational Crime against National Borders, Presentation to the working Group on Organized Crime, National Strategy Information Centre, Paper, Washington DC, October 8. 1996, winter, p.57.


¹⁵ Irene Fernandes, Stop Trafficking in Person, Welcome address, 2007, Tenaganita, Malaysia, p.17.

smuggled. Aryo is a representative person to illustrate the condition of victims of human smuggling in fraud model.

Aryo was smuggled to Malaysia by *tongkang kayu* or known as wooden ship with other 70 people. They were being sold to a *tauke* in Malaysia. The boat was actually considered overloaded by the passengers so there was a big possibility to be sunk in the sea. Most of the passengers were the victims of fraud and few of them were died of illness or had sea accident. In the Malacca's lane, generally, the victims consist of Javanese origin people with low education background and skill. Commonly, they are employed at a location that does not demand special skills such as in menial works.¹⁶

The following table explains how the smuggling process from Indonesia to Malaysia:

Diagram 1
Fraud Model (Indonesia to Malaysia)



As depicted in the above diagram, to efface smuggling trace, the victims of the smuggling in fraud model are being sent from one agent to another agent. The swap can happen more than two times until the victims arrive at the hand of the main person. In this case, the agents have significant role such as looking for, loading, gathering the victims and connecting the victims to the main actors of the smuggling. The means of smuggling is not only using traditional ships, but also it includes big ships of the high class entrepreneurs at a very expensive rental cost. An agent which just shipped people from Java by using *Roro*¹⁷ to *TBK* states.¹⁸

At Malacca, the smuggling by using the fraud model is considered as a well-organized smuggling network. In some cases, it is difficult to differ whether the smuggling people are the customers or the victims as sometimes they are "voluntarily" to be smuggled. In this case, they are aware that they will be victims but they do request to be smuggled for job reasons.

¹⁶ Deep Interview with Mas Aryo as user of smuggling service on Sunday, May 26 2013

¹⁷ Large ship transporting cars and motorcycles from Riau to the surrounding islands such as TBK, Bengkalis, Selat Panjang and others.


¹⁸ Interview with Rasidin (former tekong), at Tanjung Balai Karimun, Jun 10 2013

Demand Model

The human smuggling has existed in Malacca, Malaysia for quite long time. It is a spot where the agents receive the smuggled people. Ironically, this kind of activity has been performed from generation to generation. The smuggling ventures have less awareness that they perform crime by doing the business. The term of “human smuggling” never exists in their life. The strategic position of their residence, the high profit and demand of human labor’s needs have become the supporting factor for the traditional sea transport agents living in Malacca to run the business.

En Azhar; a person who used to work for a traditional sea transportation agent, is one of a representative examples in the case of human smuggling as he worked in this area because of the increasing demand in his environment. When the study was conducted, he stated that he has already retired from the job. He worked in the business for 22 years and not even once the local security officers pursued him. He earned around RM 600-800 for smuggling a person to Malaysia depending on the ability of the service users.¹⁹

The following chart provides further explanation for the schemes of smuggling between Indonesia and Malaysia seen in demand model.



An Azhar, as one of the actors in this smuggling business, does not see himself as the part of the crime. He stated that the community around him has nurtured the habit of “smuggling” people so that this activity is not considered as a crime. An Azhar and the people around him justify that what they have done is based on the demand of the clients and they have done the business as a side job.

Necessity Model

The human smuggling is a multifunction indication in which it can be a means to save a person or a group of people who do not receive their rights or services properly in their home country. Mr. Kasim, an Indonesian originally from East Java, once has used the service from the smuggling agent to bring him back home to Indonesia. He stated that he is also one of the victims of deception when he was looking for the job to Malaysia. Despite of his unpleasant experience, he still prefers to use the service from the smuggling agent.

¹⁹ Interview with Mr. Azhar, service provider (tekong) from Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, May 24 2013

The “bribe” money or in Indonesian it is known as “uang tunjuk” is a sum of money which has to be shown by the Indonesian workers to the Indonesian immigration staffs at Dumai. It is also common for them to give tips to the immigration staffs at Indonesian or Malaysian immigration office. Actually, both of the parties are reluctant to call the money as a bribe as the amount of it is not that much according to their opinion. However, the tips, despite of the small amount of it, has an important role for the smugglers.²⁰

Recently, Mr. Kasim works as a daily cleaning service at Hulu, Langat. He and his colleagues work in the morning until 5 p.m. There is a pickup-drop service; a truck; for him and his colleagues to go working and home. Mr. Kasim is an example of an Indonesian citizen who actually deserves for protection from the Indonesian government, however, as he does not receive it, he inevitably involves in a human smuggling circle. The uncertainty of Indonesian government’s service to the citizen has been mentioned as one of the factors which trigger a citizen to involve in a human smuggling network.


It means that both of the actors, the customers and the agents earn the benefits. In performing all of the procedures of human smuggling, both of them are aware of their own risk. They also consider the commercial factor when they perform the procedures. Both of them can be called as criminal in term of violating the law in the origin or destination country, conversely, the necessity model clarifies this kind of mutual relationship. The innocence and force exist in this network are often being used by the organized agents to fool the innocence people.

The thing to be considered in Mr. Kasim’s case is that as the costumer who uses the service of human smuggling agent, he has lost his right as a citizen of certain country which is also supposed to be protected by the destination country. By taking that kind of way, Mr. Kasim or other similar people are prone to be the victim of violence that possibly happens in their departure process or even in the destination country. The better salary in the neighborhood countries lead them to have less fear of the risk that they might have encountered in the future.

The origins of the smugglers with the necessity needs model in Malacca Strait still remain indefinite. The fact shows that the number of smuggling and the smuggled-people are raising and varied each year. This following chart can be used as a basis to observe more about the source elements, actors and security staffs which are related in this model.

²⁰ Interviews with smuggling service users (Pak Kasim), an Indonesian citizen aged 65 from East Java, had several times using Tekong services of smugglers to take him to Dumai before traveling to East Java. Baranang, Hulu Langat, May 25 2013.

Diagram 3
Necessity Model



From the chart, the assumption that the smugglers are the victim of violence is not only relevant in connection with the agent, but also it is relevant to its connection with the powers beyond the human smuggling networks. The vulnerable security condition and security threat experienced by a community in a country is seen as the root problem of the smuggling in this model. In Malacca, the smuggling agents smuggle people who look for economic security. However, it is also found that the smuggling people are also in conflicted and violent condition from the origin countries or to the destination countries. This model may also have military security purpose and it still requires further study.

National Security Threat Analysis

As the region borders at sea, Malacca strait is a strategic area to test the ability of the countries to keep the sovereignty and security of their people. However, the human smuggling is still happened in that area and even it is not easy to catch the actors. One of the Malaysian agents states that the equipment used by the smugglers from Malaysia are sophisticated.²¹

The mentioned agent above knows the water territorial borders of Indonesia very well. He knows well which areas belong to Indonesia or Malaysia and which one is categorized as international area. He states that he often plays 'hide and seek' with sea patrols but he is never being caught. There is also a way to negotiate between the smuggling agents and local bureaucracy in handling the people's mobility out of the country matter.

The newest chasing case was the casing that was done by the Malaysian police on 17th and 20th of May 2013. They arrested a fisherman's boat which was about to smuggle humans via *Tanjung Lumbuk*, Selangor. Malaysian Maritime area (DM 5) Kuala Linggi, Malacca arrested the boat and they took it to the seaport DM 5. The next case was on May 20th, the smugglers were trying to smuggle cigarettes worth RM870,000, equivalent to Rp.2,784,000,000. However, they were arrested at *Pulai* and *Benut* River at *Batu Pahat* and *Pontian Johor*.

²¹ An interview with Mr. Burhan, Sunday June 9, 2013, Kukup seaport, Malacca.

The less sophisticated security device in Indonesia is seen as one of the significant factors being neglected by the Indonesian officers. The “grey” area is also a representative area to lead the conflict especially when the Indonesian government increases the security level. In this area, the conflict often happens. The security officers both from Indonesia or Malaysia claim that the grey area is the sovereignty of their country. Increasing the security of the country tends to be seen as a provocative action and treat to the others’ sovereignty. One of the interviewed police officers in water area of *Dumai* claimed that they only do patrol if they receive a command.²²

The smuggling may happen as the decrease of respect to the destination country. A destination country is considered as a country which has weak law enforcement so that the transgression of the law is a possible thing. Meanwhile, in the origin country, the smuggling happens as the poverty and security threat. The Malaysian agents’ representative stated that he was brave enough to enter Indonesian water area as he realized about the inconstant patrol done by the Indonesian water police and the easily deceived marine police.

The damage of regional security occurs due to the rise of smuggling activities. As a result, the smugglers have no fear to perform their action as the local officers have less power to stop the smuggling activity. In addition, there is also damage to cultural and social security as the effect of commercialism in which each individual has an assumption that he/she has power over his/her survival and rights to do individual efforts.

Meanwhile, the political security damage emerges as a result of security officers’ perception when there is a smuggling case. It also happens as the facts that government’s apparatus are easily corrupted and fooled. Government that is responsible for securing rights has ignored the rights of the citizens so the nation’s credibility as the owner of the sovereignty rights is getting lower.

By examining cases, it can be inferred that the root of human smuggling problem is not only found on the network or human smuggling organizations. This problem occurs because the State has failed to provide simple and affordable public services to all its citizens. This problem also arises in regard to the State Government which does not care about the problems of integrity of security and vulnerable security threats

Until 1990s, the guardianship at Malacca Strait was still very weak, barely there was no security control found there. It is believed that the condition was the main triggering factor of human smuggling. Few years later (in 2000), the countries in the region started to give attention to the problems. The slow response is deemed reasonable by the local security apparatus because there are many things to secure and it is not only the sprawling sea area with its many islands that should be safeguarded but also rivers which go through the hinterland with its undeveloped land and inadequate security tools. The security apparatus in lower government level seems having less confidence that they will be able to combat these “diseases” without the support of military and financial power. This understanding is supported by assuming that the effort to combat this “disease” leads to security dilemma.

²² Interview with the Indonesian Navy, Captain Budi Purwanto S.T. and Dumai’s water police, AKP Hanafi, Thursday June 13, 2013.

Conclusion

Human smuggling problem is a complex issue as it involves many actors in diverse range. It cannot be solved by the conservative security techniques relying on the strength of military and technology. It requires a new security technology which engages the government responsibility and ethics converge in it. State partnerships in tackling the problem of human smuggling are not seen as a promising aspect to solve the problem as the power of partnership countries is asymmetrical. If one of the partnership countries is having a weak power, then the security cooperation will be developed into other forms of military intervention and a more powerful country intervention particularly in the domestic affairs.

In the globalization era, there is no single security matter that can be solved by a State on its own. Definitely, a security affair involves many parties and they need to cope with. Under these conditions, the defensive strategy, however, should be a choice, to achieve national security and to confront the security threats which can result trepidation effects. The community's view of a country plays an important role for types of human smuggling crimes. According to the agents, the rise of human smuggling activities happens because of the limitation of the country's ability in maintaining its sovereignty.

The best security policy refers to human security in term of its ability to secure all aspects which are able to reduce the quality of human life in the country. Therefore, enhancing country's military power is not the best solution to solve the human smuggling problems. The concept of holistic security and defense should be considered more regarding to the efforts to combat the transnational crime of human trafficking.

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New Thinking about Strategy, Power and Victory in the Twenty-First Century

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Abstract

It is normal to talk about foreign policy *strategy*, in the sense of achieving the national interest, but the language of strategy is often linked to the language of the military: overpowering enemies and defeating them, for example. While this conceptualization of strategy was perhaps relevant as recently as the Cold War, it is fundamentally inadequate for dealing with the challenges of the twenty-first century, even in the realm of international security. For the United States, dealing with potential threats from such sources as China, Russia, and North Korea is not about achieving victory over them in any traditional sense. Even a threat like ISIS, which is being engaged militarily, cannot be defeated through the exercise of brute military power. Yet much of the thinking about foreign policy, including the way that policies and leaders are judged, still relies on thinking of foreign policy strategy as a path to power and victory. This article problematizes this approach, focusing on the United States case, and suggests a new metaphor through which to understand power and strategy—one that better reflects the ways the world is changing.

Keywords: IR Theory; U.S. foreign policy; grand strategy; international security; Asia-Pacific

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Introduction

In late 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama was criticized for his remarks on dealing with the Islamic State (ISIS), when he said, “We don’t have a strategy yet” (Ackerman, 2014). Critics considered this a failure of leadership, arguing that it was the president’s duty to develop a strategy for defeating ISIS. However, a great deal hinges on how ‘strategy’ is defined. It is true that the Obama administration had no plan for destroying ISIS on the battlefield, but it quickly became clear that they had a plan for creating an *environment* in which the ISIS threat could be dealt with, which is far more likely to yield long-term results. Criticism leveled at the administration for its lack of ‘strategy’ for the Middle East echoed questions about how it deals with its strategic rivalry with China, and with Russia over the invasion of Crimea.

The problem lies not with the strategies of the administration or its critics, but with the way in which the concept of strategy has failed to evolve. The term ‘strategy’ is used metaphorically, meaning that the term was transplanted from its original use in the military realm. According to Harper (2015), strategy originally meant the “art of the general;” in other words, a plan for defeating one’s opponents militarily. While it has become common to adapt the term to mean ‘achieving one’s goals’, its use in political and diplomatic discourse still seems to carry those original militaristic connotations. This can lead to strategy being framed in zero-sum conflictual terms. Similarly, concepts such as ‘victory’ and ‘power’ carry much of the same normative/cognitive baggage. This article will **expose** the inherent weaknesses in this approach and **propose** a new paradigm for understanding strategy, victory, and power in the twenty-first century. Then it will **demonstrate** how this approach leads to more diverse and effective solutions to three of the United States’ most important foreign policy challenges: ISIS, Russia and China.

i. The Limits of a Military-Based Metaphor of Strategy

Looking below the surface of the ISIS phenomenon, it is clear that a traditional militarized strategy for dealing with the problem will be inadequate. Firstly, ISIS has its roots in Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), one of many militant organizations that sprang up in response to America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003; secondly, their *salafi* ideology calls for a renewal of the Islamic faith and a complete rejection of modern, secular values; thirdly, their proclamation of a Caliphate is an audacious claim to be the sole legitimate successors of the Prophet. In short, ISIS embodies a narrative of Muslims resisting the oppression of the decadent Western/Christian powers, which means that a Western invasion would only reinforce their narrative and increase their appeal. As long as they hold territory, they can be bombed, but doing so does not address the roots of their ideology or support. Moreover, Sunni support for ISIS was fueled by the corrupt, sectarian rule of Iraq’s Shi’ite government, a problem that cannot be solved militarily.

In contrast, the confrontation with Russia in and around Crimea (and recently in Syria as well) is far closer to a military invasion, although Russian President Vladimir Putin has consistently obfuscated on this issue. However, Putin’s goals are clearly limited, as Russia has done little since annexing Crimea on March 18, 2014 except maintain a simmering conflict in eastern Ukraine. The United States probably has the military power to force Russia out of Crimea and put down Russian puppets in contested

regions of Ukraine, but the game would not be worth the candle. Even assuming the war—and Putin would consider it a war, as the annexation of Crimea is official in Russia, if nowhere else—could avoid escalating into a nuclear conflict, the resultant destruction in Ukraine would make it a pyrrhic victory at best. In addition, there is a very real chance that U.S. credibility would be tarnished and anti-western forces (in Russia, China, and elsewhere) would be emboldened.

Thirdly and most importantly, the Sino-American relationship defies a military solution. There is no doubt that the Chinese government is conducting wide-scale cyber-espionage against American companies and the government, while pressing its claims to territory and influence in Asia. Yet at the same time, cooperation and communication between these two powers continues across the board, even at the highest levels. It is true that China poses a threat to American interests and broader conceptions of American national security, but it is not true that China is America's enemy. Attempts to confront China militarily, while likely to succeed in the short term, would ultimately only serve to strengthen the position of what Yufan Hao (2007) calls "an anti-America group who are highly suspicious of America's intentions towards China" (p. 136). Those in Washington who see China as a military threat have the power to fulfill that prophecy, but lack the ability to find a peaceful path around this dilemma.

These three cases demonstrate the deep weakness of the military-based metaphor for strategy. Much like a game of chess (which is itself a common element of the extended military metaphor), strategy has traditionally been seen as a way for one side to eliminate the other side. Thus 'victory' occurs only when the enemy is defeated or weakened to the point of surrender, usually through military means, and seldom with any possibility of coexistence. Yet even though great power strategies are multifaceted, involving economic, social, legal and ideational tools, this military element is invariably essential and usually dominant. This can be amply demonstrated by comparing the size of defense and foreign affairs budgets in any great power, for example.

Despite the primacy of this military-based metaphor for strategy, the great conflicts of the twentieth century have not lent themselves to this way of thinking. The defeat of Germany in World War I was a primarily military victory, but the enemy was not destroyed. Rather, the Germans were defeated militarily, but the German state persisted, and the conditions of that defeat ultimately fueled the next global conflict. On the other hand, World War II shows how a military victory can lead to long-term transformation of enemies into friends when combined with a broader range of political and social tools. The Cold War shows once again that defeating an enemy is not sufficient to achieve a positive outcome for the victor. The fall of the Soviet Union was not military in nature, but rather economic, political, and arguably even cultural. Gorbachev's decision not to use military force to keep the empire together was not the result of American military primacy, but rather was out of American hands altogether, and the victory over the Soviet Union only left the U.S. with a new set of problems (the failure to deal with which contributed to the current stand-off over Ukraine). The failure to take advantage of the Cold War victory to craft a more stable international order can be seen as at least partly the result of an inadequate conception of what a Cold War 'victory' would look like, and this again can be attributed to the prevalence of the military-based metaphor for strategy.

ii. Towards a Game-Based Metaphor for Strategy

An alternative model of strategy is clearly needed just on the basis of the twentieth century record, let alone the emerging challenges of the new century. As Patomäki (2002) pointed out, “the language of world politics is thoroughly metaphorical” (p. 129), because a field as complex as international relations cannot be understood without reference to other, more concrete images. Metaphors, in short, are an inescapable tool for understanding IR. If it is not possible to do away with the flawed military-based metaphor for strategy, it is vital to find a metaphor that more closely corresponds to the essential elements of twenty-first century IR, otherwise the metaphor will be more confusing than constructive. A better metaphor must meet at least four criteria:

- Describe multilateral relations, not merely dyadic ones;
- Combine conflict and cooperation, without assuming the predominance of one or the other;
- Incorporate more than just hard power; and
- Allow for the possibility of defeated actors to remain in the system.

With these criteria in mind, it seems that the world of games offers a more suitable metaphor than the world of war. Many games involve multiple players on independent teams, allow for a combination of cooperation, bandwagoning, balancing and open conflict, combine influence as well as coercion, and allow for repeated iterations after one player has ‘won’ the game. In this way, a **game-based metaphor for strategy** is a more apt model for today’s great power politics than our current military-based metaphor.

Consider a card game. Many players with different power resources may sit down at the same table, and while they are all competing for the greatest gains, there is cooperation between the competitors. Perhaps the most important element of a game is the explicit acceptance of a set of rules and standards, understood by and equally binding to each. Each player agrees to these rules because that arrangement suits their interests better than not playing the game. Additionally, players can still enjoy the game even if they lose the particular game, which corresponds to the interest that states (and non-state actors) have in a stable international order.

Applying this game-based metaphor to international relations, a ‘game’ refers to any set of organizing principles that a state would like to apply to some aspect of international affairs. In contrast to game theory, which begins by looking at how players will behave during a particular iteration of a game (e.g. a hand of cards in poker), the game-based metaphor for strategy looks at a particular game for which a state seeks new players (e.g. a player who prefers poker to cribbage). Each actor may have their preferred game, or perhaps different games, meaning different organizing principles for different aspects of international affairs. From the point of view of the United States, their preferred game is a combination of free-market capitalism, liberal democracy internally, and a rules-based international order externally, centered on Westphalian norms and the institutional framework that evolved from the Bretton-Woods institutions after WWII. Many states have already adopted this framework, but most notably great powers Russia and China have not.

This game-based metaphor readily suggests a new approach to victory and strategy: victory (the end point of strategy) is defined as bringing other actors into one's preferred game, getting them to accept the rules, participate actively, and reproduce the game. Strategy must then involve establishing a framework by which other actors will abandon their games in favor of the preferred game, accepting its rules as they do so.

This approach to strategy is far more likely than the military-based metaphor to meet the criteria outlined earlier: it can be multilateral, incorporates cooperation as well as conflict, allows for the use of both hard and soft power, and frames victory/defeat in a way that allows victors to coexist with the defeated.

This metaphor also explains why the victory in WWII was so complete, as the defeated parties came to have a keen interest in the continuation of the game. We could interpret the interwar years as Germany initially joining the Allied game (Versailles Treaty), then reversing course, cheating, and attempting to start a different game (WWII).¹ Germany and Japan were then fully integrated into the (Cold War) game, now with the U.S. dealing instead of Britain or France, and proving to be very skilled players, to the benefit of all. During the Cold War, the United States was more successful than the Soviet Union in attracting new players to its game of liberal capitalism. In the aftermath, Russia never internalized the rules of the American game, and eventually tried to establish its own game.

Before applying this game-based metaphor to devising strategies for specific foreign policy challenges, three points must be clarified. Firstly, adopting the game-based metaphor does preclude the use of force or even open war; it merely acknowledges that war itself is never the desired goal of any actor, nor does mere victory in war ensure that the winner achieves its ultimate goals. Some actors may be willing to resort to force rather than give up their metaphorical game, or accept someone else's preferred game, and some games may be based on force rather than cooperation—it has not been unusual throughout human history for the strongest powers to favor force and conquest as organizing principles.

Secondly, a game-based metaphor doesn't presuppose the desirability or normative superiority of a preferred game. Whether or not one is critical of the liberal capitalism or the institutions at the heart of the liberal international order, the United States is consistently pushing other countries to adopt this set of organizing principles. Similarly, the Cold War can be described as a competition between the capitalist and communist games in which capitalism was ultimately victorious. This analysis doesn't presuppose any normative value for either game.

Thirdly, while the metaphor may seem western-centric, it is not necessarily so. For a Western audience, card games such as poker may be easier to understand, but every culture has its own games. Indian, Chinese or Japanese audiences may prefer to think of the metaphor in terms of chess, *mah jong*, or *shōgi*, but the core of a game-based metaphor as a tool for understanding international strategy remains unchanged.

¹ Metaphors can only be pushed so far, but perhaps we could imagine Hitler sneaking in a few extra aces and stealing chips from other players.

Adopting this game-based metaphor leads to a diverse and potentially innovative range of policy prescriptions. This approach to strategy involves the following steps:

1. Identifying your game
2. Identifying present players
3. Strengthening players against non-players
4. Encouraging present players to commit more to the game
5. Encouraging/forcing non-players to join your game
6. Undermining attractiveness of rival games

Most obviously, a state must be clear about what organizing principles it wants to develop, and then identify those states (or other relevant actors) that are already 'playing by those rules.' This analysis has an important qualitative element that the military-based metaphor for strategy lacks. In war (and therefore in traditional diplomacy), one side can increase its chance of winning by making alliances, thereby increasing the size of its forces, and this could be seen in the way the superpowers conducted the Cold War. Both sides supported governments that didn't share their ideologies or values, in order to increase their influence. As Craig and Logevall (2009) put it, "charges of hypocrisy flew" (295) during the entire period as the U.S. criticized the human rights records of its opponents while turning a blind eye to those of their allies.

In war, all that matters is that another party is willing to fight with you. Under the game-based metaphor, it doesn't mean anything if someone occasionally sits at the table with you; they can't join your game until they agree to *all* the rules of the game. Given that the ultimate goal of the strategy is to persuade other actors that these principles are the best organizing principles for international relations, states cannot simply pay lip service to those ideas; each player must adhere to the rules of the game for the strategy to be effective, which militates against hypocrisy and alliances of convenience.

Once an actor understands its preferred game and has identified current players, then it can strengthen those players relative to non-players; this is similar to building up allies in a traditional military-based strategies. However, at the same time it is important also to encourage those players to commit more to the game. If the current players are willing to 'buy into' the game, devote more resources to it, or adhere more closely to its rules, then this increases the game's attractiveness to non-players.

The previous two steps were inward-looking, in that a state looks to those actors who are already playing its game. However, a state must also look at potential new players: those who are playing by other sets of rules. Those players can be attracted by either push or pull factors, i.e. making the preferred game seem more attractive, or making competing games seem less attractive. During the Cold War, the U.S. was successful both in restricting the economic growth of the Soviet Bloc, through economic sanctions and so on, but also making its own model seem more attractive, through both prosperity and soft power.

iii. Applying a Game-Based Metaphor to U.S. Foreign Policy Challenges

The game-based metaphor of strategy is readily applicable to the three foreign policy challenges discussed earlier: ISIS, Russia, and China. Rather than assuming that the challenge is an enemy that must be defeated, the contemporary strategist must ask

what a truly beneficial victory would look like, and then find a path that leads to that outcome. For example, the U.S. is *not* trying to destroy or defeat China or Russia in any military sense, and any attempt to defeat ISIS through military force would inevitably strengthen the narrative that gives ISIS its power. Rather, American interests are better served by Russia integrating more with Europe, both economically and politically, and relinquishing its claims to a privileged position with regards to the former Soviet empire. Similarly, American interests are better served by a prosperous and politically open China that accepts, rather than challenges, the institutional status quo, even if it eventually achieves superpower status. In the Middle East, the ideal end-game for the United States would be a stable regional order of independent and secure states, with economic and social development that addresses the needs of all citizens. This would likely deprive groups like ISIS and Al Qaida of their ideological appeal. Using the military-based metaphor for strategy is unlikely to lead to any of these outcomes, and therefore does not serve the long-term interests of the United States as well as the game-based metaphor does.

1. Identifying your game

As the preceding suggests, the organizing principles of the American game—democracy, market-based economies and a rules-based international order—offer long-term solutions to all three challenges. In an important sense, the U.S. does not need three separate strategies for dealing with China, Russia, and ISIS. Different techniques may be needed in each area, but the end goal is similar in each case.

2. Identifying present players

In Europe and East Asia, there are many countries playing the American game,² including many Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members in the former, and at least South Korea and Japan, if not ASEAN as a whole in the latter. This gives the U.S. a number of partners who can model the American game for Russia and China. However, the Middle East is a different story; Israel has historically been the only democratic state in the region, but even there the marginalization of the Palestinian population makes it useless as a role model to attract or inspire others in the region. For the American game to attract new players in the Middle East, America's authoritarian allies such as Egypt and the gulf states will have to join Tunisia in embracing democratic reforms as an alternative to repression and propaganda. This will be difficult, especially as the ISIS threat may cause an instinctive turn away from liberalism in those governments, but without it there is little hope for a lasting solution. The U.S. and its European allies may need to pressure states like Egypt, Jordan, and the gulf states to open up their political processes in exchange for western aid. After all, if they aren't playing the American game, then their nominal allegiance doesn't serve America's long-term strategic interests.

3. Strengthening players against non-players

Once states have accepted the rules of the American game, then it makes sense to strengthen them—militarily but also institutionally. In some cases the most pressing need may be for military defense, but in most cases—especially in Europe and East

² It could just as easily be called the western game, or even the European game, in terms of who invented the rules, but in this case we are focusing on America's grand strategy, and therefore it is correct to refer to these liberal organizing principles as 'the American game' in this instance.

Asia—it is more important to strengthen allies' ability to model the benefits of the western game, which can require longer-term commitments.

4. Encouraging present players to commit more to the game

A significant part of the American game is the rules-based international order, embodied in institutions like the United Nations. However, it is notable that America and its allies often prefer to cling to their national sovereignty rather than trust these institutions to resolve their problems. For example, the U.S. has been agnostic in regards to international arbitration of the territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan, and has failed to ratify the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Both are actually opportunities to increase the attractiveness of the American game, by demonstrating trust in that rules-based order. The U.S. should push its allies to solve their disputes through international arbitration, and be more willing to submit to the same rules that it wants other states to play by. Failure to do so dramatically undermines the appeal of the entire package that comprises the American game—not just UNCLOS or the International Court of Justice, but liberal democracy and free trade as well.

5. Encouraging/forcing non-players to join your game

Using the game-based metaphor as a foundation for strategy does not necessitate a reliance on soft power alone. There may be cases where coercion or even invasion is necessary to force a state to abandon its current organizing principle—it is doubtful that Nazi Germany would have abandoned its ethno-nationalist world view through soft power alone, or that the Afghan Taliban would have moved from theocracy to democracy through the power of diplomacy. However, states are more likely to internalize a new set of organizing principles and truly accept the rules of new game if the decision is not forced on them by a conquering army. The kind of rollback experienced in post-WWI Germany and post-Cold War Russia strongly supports the idea that encouraging change should be the focus of strategy wherever feasible, rather than coercion.

6. Undermining attractiveness of rival games

One of the fundamental advantages of the game-based metaphor as a basis for strategy is that it requires an actor to identify its long-term interests—going beyond today's adversary and tomorrow's war to a clear vision of an optimal future. Not every actor on the world stage today has such a consistent vision, and many who do—ISIS is a dramatic example of this—envision a future that is unacceptable to many other actors. An actor that can successfully proselytize its vision of the future will have a huge advantage in shaping the future international order, and at present this is an advantage that the U.S. can leverage over its challengers.

Putin's Russia is simultaneously taking advantage of the post-Cold War liberal international order (through global trade and its position on the U.N. Security Council, for example) and undermining it by attempting to carve out an exception for its 'near abroad' and supporting the Assad regime despite numerous human rights violations and the illegal use of chemical weapons. According to Ioffe (2015), Putin has simultaneously castigated the American invasion of Iraq and claimed that comparable Russian actions were noble. To the extent that Russia even has a strategic vision for the future, it seems limited to special rights for great powers, which even America's

critics would acknowledge is less attractive than the nominal equality of the American order.

Similarly, Chinese ideas of non-intervention in internal affairs and Asia for Asians, are at best an underdeveloped vision of the future. For the China's smaller neighbors, there is little difference between preventing American intervention in Asian affairs and re-establishing Chinese regional hegemony. This is a vision that will obviously appeal to China, but has little resonance with its neighbors. In both the Russian and Chinese cases, the U.S. strategy seems clear: point out the exceptional rights that Russia and China are claiming for themselves on the basis of power or past primacy, and contrast that with the rules-based international order that, at least in theory, constrains America in much the same way that it constrains other states. The looming shadow of the Iraq War complicates this narrative somewhat, but even then it should be clear that the 2003 invasion was not in any sense an American 'land-grab'; the same cannot be said for the annexation of Crimea or Chinese militarization of the South China Sea.

In a sense, ISIS has the most clearly developed future vision of the three challengers, and it has been successful in proselytizing that vision to some extent. However, this apocalyptic vision of Islam waging war against the forces of Rome has only appealed to a tiny minority of Muslims, and is anathema to non-Muslims. The American vision of a democratic Middle Eastern state that protects the rights and interests of Muslim citizens seems likely to be more attractive over the long term. This is complicated by the dearth of concrete examples, especially when it is hard to see a difference between Saudi Arabia's oppression and Iran's, and so it must be concluded that the key to solving the ISIS problem lies in long-term nation building. In the short-term, however, it may be necessary for the U.S. to use hard power to prevent ISIS from coopting more territory into its jihadist game.

Conclusion

The preceding represents a first attempt to use a game-based metaphor as the basis for grand strategy, focusing only on ways that the United States can develop more effective strategies for dealing with foreign policy challenges from Russia, China, and ISIS. Even from this limited overview it is clear that changing the underlying metaphor of strategy, from defeating an enemy in a military context to expanding a political game to more players, yields significantly improved long-term planning. This has direct implications for the practice of strategy and diplomacy in international relations, but the possibilities of re-rooting prevalent metaphors in new contexts can have relevance for all social scientists.

The game-based metaphor is a more suitable foundation for great power strategy than the traditional, military-based metaphor. It accounts for the realities of today's world, which include a decline in great power war and the great difficulty of destroying or absorbing a defeated foe, and it allows much greater scope for *smart* power, combining hard power resources with persuasion and communication. This seems essential in a world where even dictators must pay attention to their increasingly networked citizens, and the world still struggles to make sense of the international order in the twenty-first century. Above all, the game-based metaphor is a tool for those who realize that war must be an *instrumental* exercise of force. War may be

necessary, or even desirable, in some situations but the war itself is not the goal; even victory in a war does not necessarily serve the interests of the victor unless the post-war order includes an acceptable role for the defeated parties.

At this moment in history, the three greatest geopolitical challenges to the United States and its allies are all cases where a militarized approach to strategy will necessarily be ineffective. Only by evolving past the traditional framework of strategy, such as defining victory in terms of assimilating enemies into the preferred game, is it possible to develop more comprehensive and effective policies to meet these new challenges.



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A Five –Year Follow-Up Study of Fellowship Baptist College Graduates Basis for Student Development Program

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Abstract

This study was conducted to determine the extent of the contribution of the student services of the Fellowship Baptist College have in the enhancement of the skills of the graduates in their performance at the present job.

A total of 100 graduates from 1999 to 2004 were the respondents of the study. These graduates were all residing in Kabankalan City. Likewise, employers were also asked to participate in the study to provide feedback with regards to the skills of these graduates.

A modified questionnaire based on Central Philippine University (CPU) Tracer study was adapted.

From the data gathered, three relevant skills such as Technical, Conceptual and Human Relation Skills were perceived by the graduates as having a Great Extent in relation to their performance at their present job. The employers shared the same perception. Furthermore, there is a significant difference, 9.97 at .05 level of confidence in the extent of Technical skills as needed based on the perception of both graduates and employers. Likewise, a value 11.91 at .05 level of confidence indicated a significant difference in the extent of perception between the graduates and employers regarding Concept skills. On the other hand, no significant difference in the extent of perception of Human Relation skills with the value of 3.55 was indicated by both the graduates and employers at .05 level of confidence.

In relation with the extent of the contribution of the Student Services, the following activities were ranked highest to lowest by the graduates: Spiritual enrichment as highest, Guidance Program as second, Student Services as third and Sports Activities as last.

The findings of the study provided the basis for the recommendation of designing a student development program, which will provide activities related to curricular programs particularly in the enrichment of the Technical, Conceptual and Human Relation Skills.

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Rationale

- The success of graduates in their respective fields is a measure of the admirable performance of an academic institution. Capability, efficiency and competence of employers are always referred to as the products of years of training in the school where skills and potentials are harnessed. Nowadays, schools undergo accreditation to improve the various aspects and phases of its existence.
- A school that aspires to be at par with highly regarded institutions of higher learning, Fellowship Baptist College subjected itself for accreditation.
- During its pre-survey the accreditors of the Association of Christian School College and University (ASCU) recommended that a Tracer study is needed for two reasons: 1.) To have an initial data bank of graduates; and 2.)To generate feedback from both the graduates and employers.
- To pursue its lofty goals and further improve its performance as a school, there is a need for FBC to embark on a tracer study in order to have an information bank of its graduates.
- It is envisioned that this tracer study shall meet the recommendation of the Association of Christian School College and University (ASCU) ,Likewise the FBC shall establish a guidance program that will support the curricular offerings in relation to skills. As the first guidance counselor to initiate a tracer study, the researcher hoped that valuable information can be generated and that beneficial results be obtained for the further development of FBC as evidenced by its well-respected alumni positioned in government, civic sector, church, private institutions and other fields of endeavor.

Statement of the Problem

This study was undertaken to determine the five-year follow-up study of graduates from school year 199-2004 of Fellowship Baptist College as basis for a student development program preparing its graduates for the world of work. Specifically, the study aimed to answer the following:

- The socio-demographic profile of the graduates in terms of personal, professional growth.
- The extent of the following skills needed by the graduates as they perceived it & as perceived by the employers? In terms of:
 - a. Technical skills
 - b. Conceptual skills
 - c. Human Relation skills
- The significant difference in the perception of employers & graduates on the extent of skills needed by the graduates.
- The extent of the following Student Services of Fellowship Baptist College contribute to the enhancement of professional growth of graduates in terms of:
 - a. Spiritual Enrichment
 - b. Guidance Program
 - c. Student Services
 - d. Sports Activities

What student development program could be developed based on the findings of the study?

Respondents of the Study

The respondents of the study were the 45 graduates of Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, 15 graduates of Bachelor of Science in Secondary Education, 10 graduates of Bachelor of Arts, and 13 graduates of Midwifery who completed their studies from School Year 1999-2000 to 2003-2004. A total of one hundred graduates were included as respondents of the study.

Research Instrument


The study made use of the modified questionnaire based on Central Philippine University (CPU) Tracer Study to gather data. The questionnaire for the graduate comprises three main themes mainly: Personal Information, Educational background, Employment data and Program Development. The personal data were modified, which were region of origin, province of origin. The Educational background which were educational attainment from elementary to college, training and advance studies after college and gross monthly income.


Statistical tools

The following statistical tools were used in the study and in analyzing the data.

- Frequency count
- Average weighted value
- Chi-square
- Pearson r

Findings & Conclusions





The following were the findings of the study:

1. The profile of the FBC graduates in terms of personal growth showed that majority of them were BSBA graduates with ages ranging from 18-25 and majority were females and singles.
2. The profile of the FBC graduates in terms of professional growth majority were employed in industrial firms and were continuing their professional skills such as teaching, midwifery and encoding.
3. The graduates perceived the Technical, Conceptual and Human Relation Skills as Great Extent. (3.7).
4. The employers perceived the graduates Technical, Conceptual and Human Relation Skills as Great Extent. (3.8).
5. There is a significant difference in the perception of employers and graduates in Technical Skills (9.97) at .05 level of confidence. Likewise, with the Conceptual Skills(11.91) at .05 level of confidence while there is no significant difference in the perception of employers and graduates in Human Relation Skills (3.55) at .05 level of confidence.
6. The Student Services of Fellowship Baptist College that contributed to the enhancement of the professional growth of graduates were the following, which were ranked from highest to lowest. Spiritual Enrichment, Guidance Program, Student Services and Sports Activities which is ranked to a great extent, with the mean weighted average of 3.7.
7. A five-year student development program was designed based on the findings of the study.

Recommendations

Enhance the existing Academic Program for the development of graduates' skills.

1. That the proposed student development program will strengthen the student services in developing graduate's skills be considered by the administration.
2. Create a Job Placement office for the follow up of graduates.
3. Conduct a seminar for the improvement of the communication skills of future graduates.
4. Seminars should be focus on specific skills needed by the graduates as perceived by the employers such as Technical, Conceptual and Human Relation Skills.
5. Create an Alumni office which is separated from other services that will maintain a data bank to facilitate better access to graduates.
6. Conduct a follow-up study which will include graduates outside of Kabankalan City.
7. Set up an office that will handle programs for student support.
8. The administrator will constantly generate feedback from the employers regarding needs related to students' preparation for job placement.

The logo for the International Association of Forum and Organizers (iafor) is centered on the page. It features the word "iafor" in a light blue, lowercase, sans-serif font. The text is surrounded by two large, overlapping circular arcs. The upper arc is a light blue color, and the lower arc is a light red color. The arcs are thin and have a slight gradient, giving them a three-dimensional appearance as if they are floating or curving around the text.

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A Synopsis of Theoretical (I.R) Perspectives on Peace Operations

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Abstract

The post-Cold War era has witnessed significant increase in the size and scope of peace operations. However, the role and purpose of peace operations have not received commensurate attention within the intellectual context of theories of International Relations. Comprehension of theoretical foundations of International Relations is quintessential in understanding motives behind, and implications of third-party intervention in the quest for a viable peace. The research paper presents a synopsis of major theoretical paradigms in world politics with particular emphasis on their understanding of and implications for contemporary peace operations. The paper strives to delineate the main planks of a particular theoretical paradigm with special reference to underpinnings of peace operations. Towards the end, the possibility of training of peacekeepers to serve as a bridge between the theory and practice of peace operations has been explored. The research findings shall serve the purpose of filling a theoretical gap in peace operations studies and shall help decipher the theoretical basis of the acerbic arguments against peace operations espoused by the obstructionists to the peace processes.

Keywords: peace operations, theories, international relations, peacekeeping, training

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Definition of Theory

The term 'theory' has many definitions in the discourse of International Relations. James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff define theory as "systematic reflection on phenomena, designed to explain them and to show how they are related to each other in a meaningful, intelligent pattern, instead of being merely random items in an incoherent universe." (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1997, 15) Like all other definitions of 'theory' within the context of global politics, this definition assumes that there are patterns to international events and theorists of international relations strive to interpret those events as instances of a larger phenomenon or theoretical proposition.

Importance of I.R. Theories for Peace Operations

One way of thinking conceptually about contemporary peace operations is to view them as third party intervention strategies aimed at stabilizing conflict environment (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004, 13). Comprehension of theoretical foundations of International Relations is quintessential in understanding motives behind, and implications of third-party intervention in the quest for a viable peace. I.R. theory has an indelible impact on peace operations because it 'influences what people think of as legitimate or illegitimate, what analysts consider to be core agents and agendas in world politics and how material questions about responding to suffering are constituted' (Pugh 2003, 105). Theories implicitly or explicitly define normative benchmarks and also help identify various stakeholders in the peace process. An intelligent 'Red Team' analysis of the theoretical paradigms can help decipher the theoretical basis of the acerbic arguments against peace operations espoused by the obstructionists to the peace processes. Theories of I.R. also provide 'a set of templates or prepackaged analytical structures' (Sterling-Folker 2006, 5) to decision-makers in which peace operations might be categorized, explained or understood. The usefulness of theory in the high-tech age has been highlighted by Stephen Walt who asserts that 'We need theories to make sense of the blizzard of information that bombards us daily.' (Walt 1998, 29)

Limitations of Research

Since International Relations is a vast inter-disciplinary social science, the 'theories' in the discipline diverge sharply over their understanding of the global politics. The disagreements typically revolve around 'the nature of the being (referred to as ontology), how we know and acquire knowledge about being (referred to as epistemology) and what methods we should adopt in order to study being (referred to as methodology)' (Sterling-Folker 2006, 6). In addition, there exist multiple variants of each theoretical framework discussed in the present paper. An effort has been made only to delineate the main planks of a particular paradigm, with special reference to underpinnings of peace operations. Since 'states may sometimes choose to act alone or to lead others, *on the whole* peacekeeping operations tend to be organized and coordinated by *international organizations*' (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004, 41, emphasis added), core emphasis will be kept restricted to role of international institutions in each theoretical framework being discussed. Overlap among theories is another limitation worth mentioning as the 'boundaries of each paradigm are somewhat permeable, and there is ample opportunity for intellectual arbitrage' (Walt 1998, 43)

Positivist versus Postpositivist I.R. Theorists

The intellectual spectrum of International Relations scholars can be broadly divided into two schools of thought: positivists and postpositivists. Positivists, also referred to as empiricists, are scholars who insist that there exists an objective state of being or 'reality'. This reality can be accurately and scientifically measured. In other words, the ontology is undisputable and 'a fact is a fact'. The goal of the IR theorist from a positivist's perspective is to empirically test competing IR theoretical perspectives against one another. The best known methodological or analytical tools to perform such tests are the 'levels of analysis'; the three primary levels being the individual, the nation-state and the system, also referred to, respectively, as the first image, the second image and the third image. The first image is the most micro, where causality is traced to the individuals making foreign policy and the psychology of human decision-making. The second image is the middle level and involves the examination of government structures, bureaucratic behaviour, interest groups etc., whereas the third image is the most macro level involving inter-state relations and other structural factors such as geography, relative power, governing system or capitalist interdependence that might affect or direct the conduct of all nation-states (Sterling-Folker 2006, 6-7). Realism, liberalism and constructivism are the three most prominent positivist theoretical paradigms.

Postpositivist scholars, also referred to as postempiricists (Dougherty 1997, 35), lie on the opposite end of the theoretical spectrum. They are skeptical that 'a fact is a fact' and that it can be objectively known and measured. In other words, since the ontology is disputable, the analytical methods drawn from pure sciences to explain the programmed behaviour of atoms and molecules cannot be relied upon to explain the fickle and random behaviour of human beings. They oppose the 'rationalism' of the positivists and insist that 'what gets included and what gets excluded' in the theory and practice of I.R. is not due to 'natural' or 'obvious' choices; instead, these are value *judgments* based on the interpreter's own commitments and biases. For most postpositivists, the primary activity of an I.R. theorist is 'to reveal how policymakers and positivist I.R. theorists describe international events, act upon those descriptions as if they were natural, and then justify their actions and arguments in a self-fulfilling circle of codetermination' (Sterling-Folker 2006, 7-8).

Realism

Realism was the dominant I.R. theory throughout the Cold War. Realism developed out of the perceived failure of Wilsonian idealism which dominated the interwar period (Fetherston 1994, 89). It takes states as the primary unit of analysis, with main focus on territorial-based power politics. Great powers are assumed as rational actors who take security as a 'zero-sum' game which gives rise to the 'security dilemma'. The essence of the dilemma is that the measures a state takes to its own security usually decrease the security of other states (Mearsheimer 2001, 36). Relative power is assigned causal omnipotence in the realist framework. All outcomes in the realist analysis (human rights violations, military intervention etc.) are ultimately dependent on relative power, especially military power of the actors involved. The absence of a central authority which can impose limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests is labelled as 'anarchy'. Anarchy coupled with relative power give rise to a behavioural

pattern called 'balance of power' in which the relatively weak seek power to counter the relatively strong (Sterling-Folker 2006, 13-14).

Realists see global politics as a perennial competition for power—the United States may be the most powerful state in the world, but it cannot change the nature of politics among nations. As a result, realists view "world peace" as a chimera and are 'generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war' (Walt 1998, 31).

The perspective of security as a fixed pie effectively closes doors for conflict resolution in the realist paradigm. Realists also downplay the role of institutions by considering them 'empty vessels' and 'little more than ciphers for state power' (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001, 762). A leading neorealist proponent Professor John Mearsheimer asserts that 'institutions have minimal influence on state behavior and thus hold little prospect for promoting stability in a post-Cold War period' (Mearsheimer 1994/95, 7). A question then arises as to why institutions are created in the first place and large amounts spent on their sustenance? Realists answer: 'Although U.S. leaders are adept at cloaking their actions in the lofty rhetoric of "world order", naked self-interest lies behind most of them' (Walt 1998, 43). In blunt and simple words, realists assert that institutions are created by great powers as smokescreens to camouflage their sinister self-interest.

It is pertinent to discuss the conduct of the American foreign policy from a realist perspective, which is currently the sole superpower. John Mearsheimer, asserts that realism's central message—that great powers should selfishly increase relative power—does not have broad appeal, especially for American general public. Realism is therefore, a hard sell to American public. Hence, US 'leaders tend to portray war as a moral crusade or an ideological contest, rather than as a struggle for power'. This dichotomy necessitates 'a discernable gap (which) separates public rhetoric from the actual conduct of American foreign policy' (Mearsheimer 2001, 23-25).

The realist paradigm divorces morality from politics. The Hobbesian/Machiavellian dictates of Realism leave little or no place for morality or human rights in international politics. In light of this amoral interpretation of global politics, realists blast the concept of 'American innocence', as a snare. America's siding with communist Stalin against the Third Reich and its subsequent dangling with Mao Tse-tung against the Soviet Union is termed by realists as not the action of an innocent nation.

Realist Perspective on Peace Operations

The most important repercussion for peace operations in the realist paradigm is its denial of a qualitative progress in International Relations (Sterling-Folker 2006, 16). Realists argue that much of international politics is 'life on the Pareto frontier', implying that states have already been able to cooperate to such an extent that no further moves can make all of them better off (Jervis 1999, 47). The Pareto concept in the realist world can be elaborated with the help of the following diagram:




Figure 1

If we assume only two countries A and B in a hypothetical world, the intersection of the indifference curves of the two countries on point E, represents equilibrium in the realist world. Any deviation from this equilibrium will lead to loss in ‘utility’ of one or both the countries, prompting consideration of war between the two countries. The same analysis can be extrapolated to ‘n’ number of countries in the real world.

After the end of the Cold War, realism suffered a temporary retreat from its dominant position in academic debates. However, realists have since come up with some interesting new perspectives. Of particular importance to peace operations, Barry Posen has offered a realist explanation for ethnic conflict, noting that ‘the breakup of multiethnic states could place rival ethnic groups in an anarchic setting, thereby triggering intense fears and tempting each group to use force to improve its relative position’ (Walt 1998, 35).

International anarchy advocated by realists implies that the demise of the Soviet Union has left the United States free to follow its whims. Articles 1, 3, 5 and 6 of the NATO Charter stipulate that NATO is a purely defensive alliance. Similarly, Article 53 of the UN Charter requires that regional organizations like NATO can be used to enforce peace only with the authorization of the Security Council. However, ‘anarchy’s effects are obvious in the ability of the United States and other NATO countries to flout the NATO Charter, ignore their obligations as United Nations members to obtain a Security Council resolution authorizing war, and disregard international “norms” against intervention in the domestic conflicts of other states’ (Adams 2006, 25).

As the dominant state in the world, the United States has the greatest capability to take on peacekeeping, yet it also has the greatest capability to shirk such responsibilities. In line with the dictates of realism, when KFOR peacekeeping sectors were allocated, the United States could have chosen the “most sensitive” northern sector of Mitrovica, which borders Serbia. Instead, it chose the southeast sector, which “appeared to be the easiest” (Adams 2006, 30). Anarchy’s imprint is also evident in the *de facto* allegiance of contingent commanders in various peace operations to their respective governments, although they are supposedly under the command of an international institution (NATO, UN, AU etc.).

Liberalism

Liberalism is considered to be the primary theoretical competitor of realism in the positivist school of thought. In sharp contrast to the realist denial of qualitative progress in I.R., liberalists profess faith “in at least the possibility of cumulative progress” in human affairs (Sterling-Folker 2006, 55). Liberalists consider that much conflict in world politics is *unnecessary* and *avoidable*. This *unrealized* cooperation is a result of failure to employ institutions which results in a prisoner’s dilemma or a market failure and produces suboptimal outcomes below the Pareto frontier for all concerned (Jervis 1999, 47; emphasis original). This phenomenon has been explained in Figure 2 below:




Figure 2

As depicted above, there exists a possibility of obtaining mutual gains by both countries A and B, by cooperating with each other and moving towards the point E on the Pareto frontier. The same logic applies to ‘n’ number of countries in the real world.

The cooperation literature in the liberal framework is based on the “Folk Theorem,” which shows that decentralized cooperation is possible in repeated games. However, since decentralized cooperation is difficult to achieve and is often brittle (owing to distribution and enforcement problems, large numbers and uncertainty), states devise institutions to promote cooperation and make it more resilient. These institutions have been defined as ‘explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behaviour’ (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001, 764-6). The role of institutions in promoting peace is pivotal in the sense that these ‘can provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points for coordination, and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity’ (Keohane and Martin 1995, 42). Institutionalist liberals highlight the informational role of institutions in promoting transparency and believe that uncertainty or ‘noise’ is reduced through punishment of ‘cheaters’ in the system. Cooperation is cited to occur more easily in ‘low’ politics (economic, cultural, environment etc.) but liberals believe in the gradual evolutionary development of cooperation in ‘high’ politics (securitization) as well.

Liberal theorists however acknowledge that institutions are not always valuable or 'constitute a panacea for violent conflict' (Keohane and Martin 1995, 50). They recognize that considerable barriers exist to realizing collective action. Hence they assert that "institutions make a significant difference *in conjunction with power realities*" (Keohane and Martin 1995, 42; emphasis added). Liberal I.R. theorists consider that the job of I.R. theorists is to explore the impediments to collective action with underlying rationale that, in revealing such barriers, it might also be possible to overcome them in the future (Sterling-Folker 2006, 59).

Liberalist Perspective on Peace Operations

From the outset, theory and practice of peacekeeping has displayed a commitment to ideas about liberal peace by trying to maintain stable peace across the globe by promoting and defending liberal political and economic practices (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004, 26). In the Westphalian conception, the liberal ideology aimed at creating institutions and spaces for peaceful conflict resolution. In the post-Westphalian conception however, emphasis has shifted towards the democratic-peace dividend which is a refinement of the earlier claim that democracies were inherently more peaceful than autocratic states. It rests on the belief that although democracies seem to fight wars as often as other states, they rarely, if ever, fight one another (Walt 1998, 39). Successive American governments, especially since the end of the Cold War, have made spreading democracy around the world a pivotal foreign policy tenet.

Critics have however pointed out that there are several qualifiers to this theory. First, states may be more prone to war when they are in the midst of a democratic transition, which implies that efforts to export democracy might actually make things worse. Recent experiences in Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Venezuela and Egypt are cited as support for the thesis that a US foreign policy that promotes democracy is misguided. Second, clearcut evidence that democracies do not fight each other is confined to the post-1945 era, and, the absence of conflict in this period may be due more to their common interest in containing the Red Threat than to shared democratic principles (Walt 1998, 39).

The public goods variant of liberalism provides important insights into initiation and continuation of peace operations. It theorizes that intervention in deadly conflicts is not possible without the "big guy" playing the major role. This is because the smaller states tend either to 'free-ride' or consider the burdens of peacekeeping and peacebuilding as too large and the potential benefits as too indirect for them to take action themselves (Boyer and Butler 2006, 77). Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is a case in point which could not have been continued till today, let alone established in 2003, without Australia sharing the lion's share of the peace-building enterprise.

The institutional mechanism for peace operations is not a trouble-free phenomenon. As noted above, institutional peace operations create distributional, enforcement and organizational problems. During the Kosovo campaign, US leaders became increasingly frustrated with what they saw in NATO as a "war-by-committee". The 2003 Iraq crisis demonstrated that 'even tiny Belgium is willing to use NATO assets to block the will of the United States'. As a critical course correction, US took NATO

out of warfighting business but welcomed it in postcrisis peace support operations (Kay 2006, 72-3).

Constructivism

Whereas realism and liberalism tend to focus on material factors such as power or trade, constructivist approaches emphasize the impact of ideas (Walt 1998, 40). The true genesis of constructivism lies in the end of the Cold War, which came as a shock to both the realist and the liberal paradigms. The most striking aspect of the theory is its transformational logic and the feasibility of rapid and radical change (Sterling-Folker 2006, 115), symbolized by the title of Alexander Wendt's oft-quoted article: "Anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt 1992, 391). Contrary to realism, constructivists argue that actors are responsible for creating their own security dilemmas and competitions by interacting with each other in ways that these outcomes appear inevitable. 'Security dilemmas are not acts of God: they are effects of practice' (Wendt 1995, 77).

Constructivist IR scholars have borrowed ideas from other disciplines (literature, linguistics, sociology, etc) in order to build the edifice of constructivism. Since identities and interests are socially *constructed*, constructivists are of the view that if actors in international system were to start perceiving each other as friends instead of foes, the resultant outcomes have the potential to be very different. Even structures which are normally taken by I.R. scholars as "given" or "natural" (e.g. the Westphalian system and the sovereign nation-state) are not seen as immutable structures by the constructivists. They also explore the role of ideas, norms, culture, narratives, rhetoric, speech acts and discourse as contributory factors in producing particular identities and interests. Constructivism has thus broadened IR theoretical debates by incorporating philosophical and diverse range of topics within the discipline of international relations (Sterling-Folker 2006, 115-116).

Many constructivist scholars seek to occupy the middle ground between positivism and postpositivism. Constructivism seeks to legitimize 'certain subjects of inquiry that that had either lain dormant in the discipline or had simply been ignored, such as collective identity formation and culture (Sterling-Folker 2006, 118). John Ruggie, a leading proponent of constructivism is of the view that scholars do not even possess an appropriate vocabulary that can help describe the new factors and forces that are transforming global politics in the digital age (Walt 1998, 36).

Constructivist Perspective on Peace Operations

Constructivists argue that international institutions (including peacekeeping institutions) play a vital, independent and exogenous role in spreading global norms. They also contend that normative discourse is an important aspect of institutional life and that norms are contested within, and are sometimes propagated by, international institutions (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001, 762).

A crucial issue overlooked in the realist and liberal analyses of world politics is the issue of legitimation. A relational constructivist interpretation of peace operations would advocate that the debates and discourse involving various aspects of the peace process are (deliberately) framed in ways that mould, justify, reinforce or overturn

opinions. The interventionist and humanitarian discourses were merged by US policymakers in order to justify violation of sovereignty of nation-states in the Balkans in the 1990s. This led to what constructivists argue a clever jugglery of words enabling ‘bombing in the name of civilized humanity’ (Jackson 2006, 146-147). Their argument is further reinforced by the fact that similar, if not severe, humanitarian tragedy was allowed to occur in Rwanda in 1994 and now, Darfur is being ‘talked to death’.

Social constructivists attach huge weight to ideas and are of the view that ‘ideas put boundaries on what actors see as appropriate behavior and even possible behaviors’ (Hoffman 2006, 137). The invention of the ‘surge’ tactic propounded by the Bush administration as an attempt to stabilize Iraq and also employed by Barrack Obama in Afghanistan, would be construed by a constructivist as either a manifestation of discourse or application of the norm (idea) life cycle.

Summary of Positivists for Peace Operations

Implications of the positivist theoretical frameworks for policymakers, including those involved in the peace processes, has been summed up by Stephen Walt: ‘The “complete (sic) diplomat” of the future should remain cognizant of realism’s emphasis on the inescapable role of power, keep liberalism’s awareness of domestic forces in mind, and occasionally reflect on constructivism’s vision of change’ (Walt 1998, 44). A summary of the preceding arguments of the positivist theoretical paradigm in International Relations along with the views of each positivist theoretical strand, is presented in tabular form below (Adapted from Walt 1998, 38):

SUMMARY OF POSITIVIST I.R THEORIES			
COMPETING PARADIGMS	REALISM	LIBERALISM	CONSTRUCTIVISM
Main Theoretical Proposition	Self-interested states compete constantly for power or security	Concern for power overridden by economic/political considerations (desire for prosperity, commitment to liberal values) ;	State behavior shaped by elite beliefs, collective norms and social identities; Transformational logic, Possibility of rapid, radical change
Main Units of Analysis	States	States	Individuals (especially elites)
Main Instruments	Economic and especially military power	Varies (international institutions, economic exchange, promotion of democracy)	Ideas and Discourse
Modern Theorists	Hans Morgenthau,	Michael Doyle, Robert Keohane	Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie

	Kenneth Waltz John Mearsheimer		
Representative Modern Works	Waltz, Theory of International Politics Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics	Keohane, After Hegemony Fukuyama, "The End of History" (National Interest, 1989)	Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It" (Int'l Organization, 1992) ; Koslowski & Kratochwil, "Understanding Changes in Int'l Politics" (Int'l Organization, 1994)
Post-Cold War Prediction	Resurgence of overt great power competition	Increased cooperation as liberal values, free markets, and international institutions spread	Agnostic because it cannot predict the content of ideas
Views regarding Peace Operations	Mainly as a vehicle to advance great power interests 'Life on the pareto frontier' closing doors for conflict resolution	As a symbol of growing cooperation among states can help move conflict states towards pareto optimal outcomes	Varies ; Emphasize independent or exogenous role of institutions; Ideas and discourse play important role in success of peace operations
Main Limitation	Does not account for International change	Tends to ignore the role of power	Better at describing the past than anticipating the future

Postpositivist Perspective on Peace Operations

Postpositivists, especially since the 1990s, have theorized across a broad spectrum of issues pertaining to peace operations. The normative purposes and the ontology of peacebuilding have, in particular, been subjected to scrutiny by postpositivists. Some of the leading postpositivist perspectives on peace operations are as under:

FEMINISM:

The word 'perspective' comes from the Latin word *perspectus*, which means 'look through, look into, see thoroughly, try out, investigate'. A perspective may then be defined as that which helps us see aspects of reality. Using a feminist perspective as an analytical tool means looking at the world through the eyes of women. While liberal feminists want women to get a bigger, preferably equal share of the pie, radical feminists do not want to assimilate to the society as it is, but to change it (Brock-Utne 1990, 148). Feminism is a multifaceted theoretical enterprise. Feminist I.R. literature criticizes gender-based oppositional hierarchies in which agency, control and aggression are associated with masculinity whereas dependence, vulnerability and

passivity are associated with femininity. Feminists insist that I.R. is about people-based hierarchies, not about states and that job of I.R. theorists should be to investigate how gender is ignored in political, economic and social processes (Sterling-Folker 2006, 246).

Feminist Perspective on Peace Operations

In societal terms, negative peace exists when there is absence of personal, physical and direct violence. Positive peace, on the other hand, exists when there is absence of indirect or structural violence. Radical feminists insist that the absence of violence against women is included in the peace concept itself and that attainment of positive peace can help achieve gender balance in society. This conception is especially relevant to post-conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding and stabilization phases of the peace processes (Brock-Utne 1990, 147-148):

Table showing negative and positive peace

	Negative Peace	Positive Peace	
	Absence of personal, physical and direct violence	Absence of indirect violence shortening lifespan	Absence of indirect violence reducing the quality of life
Unorganized	e.g., wife batterings, rapes, child abuse, street killings	Inequalities in micro structures leading to unequal life chances	Repression in micro structures leading to less freedom of choice and fulfillment
Organized	e.g., war	Economic structures built up within a country or between countries so that the life chances of some are reduced or effect of damage on nature by pollution, radiation, etc	Repression in a country of free speech, the right to organize, etc.

Critical Theories of Geopolitics and Media

A critical variant of postpositivist theory in I.R. makes an argument that 'readings of world politics are heavily influenced, perhaps dictated, by visual stimuli.' Thus television pictures of peacekeepers distributing or guarding humanitarian assistance have more dramatic visual appeal than 'conflict trade' responsible for perpetuating some conflicts in the first place. Subsequent dramatic representations are also made with the implicit purpose of mythologizing conflict and intervention. The *Black Hawk Down*, made with Pentagon support had little to do with the Somalia and Somali people. On the contrary, it depicted the heroism of the US military in a 'failed' state and provided the 'civilized' watchers around the world, with a sense of 'moral security in the attempt to respond to distant suffering' (Pugh 2003, 109).

The war stories emanating from ‘embedded’ journalists or war-reporters ostensibly provided ‘security cover’ are also subjected to criticism by critical postpositivists. They raise an interesting question as to whether ‘war stories’ or ‘peacebuilding accounts’ dispatched by persons living with the peacekeepers/combatants on the ground, can be fair and impartial, especially keeping in view prolonged/selective exposure to a particular point of view and probable ‘conditioning’ of these journalists.

Critical theories of geopolitics point out to the ‘idealized’ and ‘denounced’ versions of one of the core dimensions of peace operations—its neutrality. In the ‘idealized’ version, peacekeepers are eulogized for remarkably exhibiting no declared interest in outcomes. In the ‘denounced’ version of the same concept, to be neutral is tantamount to standing by in an amoral vacuum when ‘natural’ justice cries out for protection of the ‘innocent’—thereby justifying ‘choices’ to be made for an ‘ethical world order’. Time to contemplate again: *whose* ethics and *whose* world order? (Pugh 2003, 110).

Implications of Postpositivists for Peace Operations

The postpositivist perspectives on peace operations should be seen as a welcome development in the evolution of theory of peace operations. These should be taken as a challenging riposte to the existing theorization in the field of peacekeeping (Pugh 2003, 111). A critical evaluation and absorption of the various postpositivist strands can ultimately help mature the nascent theory of peacekeeping, for the increasingly demanding peace operations envisaged for conflict zones, in the 21st century.

Training as Bridge between Theory and Practice

Apart from integrating peace operations into major theoretical frameworks of International Relations, it is equally important to link theory of peacekeeping with practice thereof. Training of peacekeepers is the key factor in this process. Unfortunately, the training of peacekeepers continues to suffer from conceptual ambiguity and practical incoherence. In a majority of cases, it is not even considered worthwhile to adjust the peacekeepers from an essentially ‘military/combat’ culture to a ‘third party/peace support’ culture. Training of peacekeepers in a coherent and organized fashion carries the potential of not only fulfilling dissemination of guiding principles for successful third-party intervention; it can also serve as a vital link in the testing, revision and polishing of the conceptual basis of peace operations.




Figure 3

The cyclical development of the theory and practice of peace operations has been visually represented in the above figure (Fetherston 1994, 165). The conceptual analysis leads to refinements in training which leads to changes in practice. These changes then spark revision and re-testing which provide the crucial feedback into the conceptualization process. The need for a flexible theoretical foundation for peace operations with built-in provisions for constant re-evaluation of the on-going peace building enterprise, in light of practical feedback received from peacekeepers on the ground, cannot be over emphasized. It is only through such an exercise that workable and effective exit strategies can be arrived at.

In the absence of a sound link between training and practice of peacekeeping, the effect of the peace operations on the conflict process itself is, as yet, a moot question. We should not rule out the possibility that ‘by intervening as a third party and then lacking in third party skills needed to facilitate settlement and resolution, peacekeeping prolongs conflict, further polarizes warring factions, and adds to economic and social problems by creating dependency’ (Fetherston 1994, 210).

Conclusion

The foregoing research has demonstrated that there exist multiple and equally legitimate perspectives on peace operations, thereby revealing the inherently political nature of peace operations. The research findings can serve the purpose of filling a theoretical gap in peace operations studies. We may conclude by a quote from Roland Paris who observes that ‘building the study of peace missions into a mature academic subfield will require a concerted effort to move beyond the current preoccupation with practical operational issues and, instead, to use these missions as windows into larger phenomena of international politics’ (Pugh 2006, 105).

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***Post World War II: Japanese Success Lessons for Post Conflict Sri Lanka's
Successes***

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Abstract

Sri Lanka got her independence from Britain in 1948 and in the same period Japan moved on to the progressive move after the Second World War. It is an instrumental and influencing factor to study about Japanese strategies that effected to their successes after World War II. It is very clear that Sri Lanka too, has entangled with global hegemonic influences after the Second World War with the rise of Cold War affinities. Hans J Morgenthau clearly visualized in his teachings in political realism that the concept of power and political will of nation can make a great progress. Handling of neighboring countries and world powers for the National Security and Development were vital factors in development of Japan. Sri Lanka as an Island nation too can study Japan as a role model. Due to cold war power struggle, Island of Sri Lanka couldn't spear the influences of World Powers for their own trade benefits, military gains and ideological interests etc. The country has vulnerable for more than three decades from the terrorism and it was badly affected to the growth of the country. With the defeating terrorism, more challenges were emerged from international and Diaspora community. Therefore Researcher will focus on the applicability of Japanese success lessons for the Sri Lanka's post conflict scenario.

Keywords, National Security, World Powers, Japanese Success, Post Conflict Sri Lanka,

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Introduction

Sri Lanka is an island in the Indian Ocean which is located to the South of the Indian subcontinent. Its documented history spans 3,000 years, with evidence of pre-historic human settlements dating back to at least 125,000 years. Its geographic location and deep harbours made it of great strategic importance from the time of the ancient Silk Road through to World War II and so on. Due to that geographical significance, Sri Lanka had many influences from many nations during the past, especially from South India, Arabia, Portugal, Netherlands (Dutch), and Great Britain. As a result of that presently Island is converted as haven to multi ethnic groups such as Tamils, Muslims and burgers....etc. However still majority Singhalese (76%) are the predominant ethnic group in the country and after eradicating thirty years of brutal terrorism, Sri Lanka is now seeking a way to achieve post conflict development as a tool for stabilization in the region.

When considered the Japan, it is an island nation in East Asia extending along the Pacific coast of Asia. Predominantly its inhabitants are Japanese¹ (98.5%) and other minorities are Koreans 0.5%, Chinese 0.4%, other 0.7%. The country is located in southeast of the Russian Far East, separated by the Sea of Okhotsk; slightly east of Korea, separated by the Sea of Japan; and east-northeast of China and Taiwan, separated by the East China Sea. Japan is a nation who actively fought two world wars. Despite to the devastating damages occurred specially during the WW II, as a nation they were able to rise as a one of the promising world economic power.

The Significance of Sri Lanka and Japan in Geo- Strategic Perspective

Sri Lanka and Japan both are Island nations which exist similar Geo – strategic importance in different domain. Sri Lanka is located in the southern tip of India, lies at the crossroads of all maritime routes in the region. It is an economically booming region mainly due to the rapid development of two giants; India and China. Therefore Sri Lanka can consider as economically, militarily and politically important geographical location for world prevailing and emerging powers. Hence as a prevailing super power, USA also looking for strong foothold in the Indian Ocean region. In same manner Japan also an Island nation and geographically it's situated near to the great powers like Russia and China. Therefore geographic prominence for the Japan in Pacific Ocean is very much similar to the Sri Lankan geographic prominence in Indian Ocean.

¹ Sud de France Development, "Japan Introduction", (2015, May 18), <http://www.suddefrance-developpement.com/en/country-profiles/japan/presentation.html>



Figure 1: Japan Geographical location in Pacific Ocean

Source: <http://geography.howstuffworks.com/asia/geography-of-japan1.htm>



Figure 2: Sri Lankan Geographical location in Indian Ocean

Source: <http://www.slpa.lk/location.asp?chk=1>

Japan after Second World War

The Japanese expansion in East Asia began in 1931 with the invasion of Manchuria. It continued in 1937 with an attack on China. The success which gained through different eras was completely changed due to Japan's surprise attack on the United States Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. In response, the United States declared war on Japan. At the final stage of WW II on August 6, 1945, the United States Air Force dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Tens of thousands of people died in the initial explosion, and many more died later from radiation exposure. Three days later, the United States dropped another atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Nagasaki. Approximately 120,000 civilians died as a result of the two blasts. Because of those huge catastrophes Japan completely devastated and faced an urgent need for economic and societal rehabilitation. In order to achieve this, Japan had to align itself with the West through the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty (1951).

At the war time the British had occupied the coastal areas of the Island since 1796. In 1917 as a British colony Ceylonese were encouraged to volunteer for military service. Most were joined to the Ceylon Defence Force. On the other hand the Royal Navy was maintained by naval installations in Trincomalee. Therefore Japan dropped bombs to Colombo in 1942 against to the British Armed Forces. But in 1951 Ceylon was appeared as a non-attending country for above those two treaties. The Ceylonese Finance Minister J.R Jayawardene insisted that the terms of surrender should be rigidly enforced in an attempt to break the spirit of the Japanese nation.

*"We in Ceylon were fortunate that we were not invaded, but the damage caused by air raids, by the stationing of enormous armies under the South-East Asia Command, and by the slaughter- tapping of one of our main commodities, rubber, when we were the only producer of natural rubber for the Allies, entitles us to ask that the damage so caused should be repaired. We do not intend to do so for we believe in the words of the Buddha whose message has ennobled the lives of countless millions in Asia that 'hatred ceases not by hatred but by love.'"*²

It was hugely affected to the change the mindset of world community which regards on Post war Japan.

Post War Japan as a Model for Sri Lanka

According to Francis Fukuyama, the nation-building in Japan has occurred in three phases. In the first phase, the United States solved immediate problems of infrastructure and Economic problems through the infusion of security forces. The second phase begins once a viable level of stability is restored, and focuses on building self-sustaining state institutions. Finally, in the third phase, the United States helped to the 180 state institutions to provide public services including education and protection of property rights. All these three phases were appropriately managed by the General McArthur who was the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed on September 8, 1951, marked the end of the Allied occupation, and when it went into effect on April 28, 1952, Japan's independence was fully restored.³


Economic Growth in Japan

Trade Policy and uses of Human resources were led to the post world war development in Japan. Two factors of this miraculous economy were the acquisition of investment funds by enterprises, the investment behavior of enterprises and the role of the government (Industrial Policy). The economic bodies which actually attained this high economic growth are individual enterprises. The growth of Japanese enterprises in the post war period has been fit the world miraculous economy. As an example a leading manufacturer of domestic electronic appliances such as Sanyo Electrical, Sony and Hayakawa were able to gain profits from 1954 to 1963 due to

² Ancestry Community, "Japanese raided Colombo this day in '42", (2015, April 5), <http://www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~lkawgw/japraid.html>.

³ Francis Fukuyama, "Liberalism versus State- Building", Liberalism versus State-Building", (2007, July 3), http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/journal_of_democracy/v018/18.3fukuyama.html.

rapid investments.⁴ These inceptions of Electrical industries were the basic steps of the economic development in Japan. Implementation of Kaizen made huge impact for the development of economy in the Japan. Kaizen is a daily process, the purpose of which goes beyond simple productivity improvement. There are 5 primary phases of 5S which are sorting, straightening, systematic cleaning, standardizing, and sustaining. Kaizen was first implemented in several Japanese businesses influenced by American business. It has spread throughout the world and is now being implemented in environments outside of businesses and productivity.



Secondly Japan is considered as a hegemonic country in world hegemonic system. Monetary hegemony is an economic and political concept in which a single state has decisive influence over the functions of the international monetary system.⁵ It means the United States emerged from the Second World War as the undisputed hegemony of world capitalism. But within a generation, neither the American will nor the American ability to continue managing the global capitalist order could be taken for granted. As an example Japan achieved sustained economic growth in per capita income between the 1880s and 1970 through industrialization.⁶ Likewise Japan made its name in the international business community thanks to the “post-war entrepreneurialism, which led to the establishment of the well-known business companies such as “Keiretsu” groups. According to Mearsheimer a regional hegemony is a state that dominates distinct geographical areas and possibly controls another region that is nearby and accessible over land.⁷ During the first half of the 20th century, Japan embarked upon an ambitious strategy of aggressive militarization and an expansion of its empire. That was their mechanism which used to stabilize their power among other powerful nations. Further, the cultural hegemony describes the domination of a culturally diverse society by the ruling class⁸. This type of hegemony

⁴Yoshikazu Miyazaki, “Rapid Economic Growth in Post War Japan”, (2007, March 6), <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1746-1049.1967.tb00502.x/pdf>

⁵ Liqui search, “Monetary Hegemony” (2015, January 4), http://www.liquisearch.com/monetary_hegemony/

⁶Carl Mosk, University of Victoria, “Japanese Industrialization and Economic Growth” (2013, June 5), <https://eh.net/encyclopedia/japanese-industrialization-and-economic-growth/>

⁷Shasikumar Shanmugasudaram, “Regional Hegemony and Emerging Powers: Theorizing India’s Neighborhood Policy”, (2012), www.etd.ceu.hu/2012/shanmugasundaram_sasikumar.pdf

⁸A tool box for revolution, “Theory: Cultural Hegemony” (2015, January 30), <http://beautifultrouble.org/theory/cultural-hegemony/>

is not visible as a form of control. Rather, it becomes society's norm through language, art and other aspects of culture. For an instance after Second World War US began to rebuild the entire society including culture. During that time period Japan was highly influenced by American culture such as clothing, music and the English language.




Figure 4

Source: By Author

USA Influences

The United States is currently pursuing a strategy of “rebalancing” its attention to the Asia-Pacific region which is a region seen as central to future American economic growth and also to global security. This strategy consists of interconnected efforts in three broad areas: diplomatic, economic, and military. Although Japan is more widely known for its diplomatic initiatives throughout international institutions and its global contributions as the world's third largest economy, Japan's military capabilities and its longstanding military alliance with the United States make it a central partner to the U.S. rebalance strategy. Japan announced a new national security strategy in December 2013 that dovetails well with the U.S rebalance strategy, placing an emphasis on a more proactive contribution to security in the Asia-Pacific region. The two allies currently are having negotiations to change their defense cooperation. At the same time, much depends on avoiding potential challenges that could prevent closer security cooperation. The diplomatic and economic spheres promise to see an increased U.S. presence in regional groupings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asian Summit and closer regional trading ties via the Trans-Pacific Partnership and other economic initiatives. Cooperation with Japan in both of these spheres will be critical to a successful U.S. implementation of the rebalance strategy; On the other hand in 1952 the United States Congress ratified the peace treaty that formally ended the American occupation of Japan. Simultaneously it ratified the "U.S.-Japan Security Treaty."⁹

⁹ Yuki Tatsumi, “Japanese Foreign Policy, Challenges in East Asia”, (2014), http://www.stimson.org/PDFs/Japans_Challenges_in_EA_FINAL_WEB.pdf,

This treaty has allowed American military to continue to use important bases in Japan for the defence of the Far East and to intervene in Japan to put down internal disturbances should the Japanese government request such assistance. While the Japanese government and a majority of the public supported the ratification of the new treaty, a sizable portion of the public did not. Even many pro-American conservative Japanese felt that the treaty compromised Japan's independence. Also article 4 and 10 of post war Japanese constitution has created a controversy about USA.

- The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.
- This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.¹⁰

Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution not only forbids the use of force as a means to settling international disputes but also forbids Japan from maintaining an army, navy or air force. Therefore, in strictly legal terms, the Self Defence Forces (SDF) is not land, sea or air forces, but are extensions of the national police force. This has had broad implications for foreign, security and defence policy. According to the Japanese government, “war potential” in paragraph two means force exceeding a minimum level necessary for self-Defence Forces. Apparently when the Self Defence Force was created, the capability of the SDF was inadequate to sustain a modern war, it was not war potential. Some Japanese people believe that Japan should be truly pacifist and claim that the SDF is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, however, has ruled that it is within the nation's right to have the capacity to defend itself. These factors show that Japan's military commitment to the USA. The American forces have surrounded Japan because of the importance of East Asia. Japanese government has held that exercising the right of all sovereign states to collective self-defence would violate Article 9 of Japan's postwar constitution.¹¹ Through these legal bases Many Japanese feel that the lesson of World War II is reliance on military power.

Democratic Party System

In the present juncture Japan maintains multi- party parliamentary representative democratic system and it has taken at a democratic level. Democracy is a form of government, where a constitution guarantees basic personal and political rights, faire and free election and independent courts of law. Even though western countries originated the concept of democracy Japan has implemented it according to their society and culture. The first general election in Japan was held in 1890. Japan is a society which having strong sense of group and national identity. Therefore after 1890 they developed their political party system with the consideration of society in Japan. It means it has provided an opportunity to considerable participation of ethnic

¹⁰Asia for Educators, Columbia University, “Bilateral Security Between the United States of America and Japan”, (2015, April 20),

http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/japan/bilateral_treaty.pdf

¹¹Asia for Educators. Columbia University, “Article 9 and the U.S. –Japan Security Treaty”, (2009), http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/japan_1950_usjapan.htm

minorities to their political system. In their parliamentary cabinet system, the relationship between the ruling political parties and the cabinet is very strong as are the roles played by politicians and bureaucrats. As detailed in the figure 5 the emperor is the symbol of the state has no powers related to the government. But the most important point is that the emperor is the person who represent the Japanese identity and culture in a western centric democratic system. Executive power is vested in the cabinet which consist of the prime minister and not more than 17 ministers of state that collectively are responsible to the diet (The legislature). The Prime- Minister is designed by the Diet. In practice the Prime Minister is always a member of the House of Representatives. He has the power to appoint and dismiss the ministers of state.




Figure 5

Political System of Japan

Source: http://www.sf.us.emb-japan.go.jp/en/e_m08_01_08.htm

Other than that there is a close economic relations between these two countries. Being a third- largest economic power in the world, it is essential to keep strengthen relations as a whole. Both countries have identified the applicability of the trans-national relations partnership and negotiations on motor vehicle trade to gain economic developments. Following figure shows that the US is the main country which carried out direct investment from Japan.




Figure 6
The Japan- US Investment Relations
Source:

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2015/html/chapter2/c020201.html>

Territorial disputes: Island Issues

Relations between Russia and Japan in present are a continuation of their foreign relations in 1917-1991. However the two countries have been unable to sign a peace treaty after World War II due to the Kuril Islands dispute. Japan currently has territorial disputes with Russia over the Kurile Islands and it has challenged to Russia considering her military expansion in the Kuril Islands. As an example a 30,000-strong Russian community now lives on the Islands and there is also a Russian military presence on the Islands. In early August 2006, the Russian government backed a 17bn-rouble (\$630m) plan to develop the entire Kuril Island chain, including improving energy and transport infrastructure. Last year Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe holds talks in Russia with President Vladimir Putin about long-standing territorial dispute between the two nations. It's depicted that Japan is still handling the above issues with Russia since the World War II.¹²

¹² Jstor, "A Historical Reevaluation of America's Role in the Kuril Islands Dispute", (1988), http://www.jstor.org/stable/2761081?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents



Figure 7: Kuril Islands

Source: <http://japandailynews.com>

Policy towards other countries: Russia, North Korea, China

The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis and Russia's annexation of Crimea, Japan sided with the USA. However The Ukraine crisis has not only changed the relationship between Russia and the West but also led to more intense cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. After the European Union and the United States imposed sanctions on Russia, President Vladimir Putin made a dramatic turn to China and signed a series of deals, including a \$400 billion deal to export gas to China.¹³ But regardless those situations in world arena Japan has built strengthen relationship with Russia. As an example Last year in the autumn, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Japan to make a progress on a territorial dispute dating back to World War and Japan's sanctions against Russia.¹⁴ On the other hand North Korea now possesses nuclear weapons and, at this time, appears provocatively unpredictable. For instance, North Korea launched two missiles in 2012 and in February 2013 carried out a nuclear test. It is a violation of the UN Security Council resolutions. Henceforth the United Nations Security Council has adopted three major resolutions that sanction North Korea for continuing to develop its nuclear weapons program and call on Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear program "in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner" and refrain from ballistic missile tests. Now Chinese and Russian leaders recognize that the DPRK's disintegration could induce widespread economic disruptions in East Asia, generate large refugee flows across their borders, weaken Chinese and Russian influence in the Koreas by ending their unique status as interlocutors with Pyongyang, potentially remove a buffer separating their borders from the side of USA, and possibly precipitate a military conflict on the peninsula—which could spill over across their borders.¹⁵

¹³ Alexander Gabuev, "A soft alliance? Russia-china relations after the Ukraine crisis", (2015, February), http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR126_-_A_Soft_Alliance_Russia-China_Relations_After_the_Ukraine_Crisis.pdf

¹⁴ Reuters, "Russia's Putin to visit Japan, ties with Tokyo warming", (2014, February 8), <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/08/us-russia-japan-idUSBREA170I620140208>,

¹⁵ Ministry of Foreign Relations of Japan, "Japan-North Korea Relations", (2015, November 20), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/index.html

Lessons for Post Conflict Sri Lanka




Figure 8: Protracted Conflict in Sri Lanka

Source: Author

The conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE lasted nearly three decades and it was one of the longest-running insurgency in Asia. More commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, the LTTE wanted an independent state for their minority. Following a long military offensive, the Sri Lankan government defeated the separatist group and killed their leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran. Due to this internal struggle there were Loss of human lives, Economic Instability, Psychological effects to the citizens and International pressure within the country. According to figure 7 there are lot of challenges which emerged from international community during post conflict era.




Figure 9: Post Conflict Challenges for Sri Lanka

Source: By Author

India

In post conflict era the terrestrial disputes between both countries made a massive impact for their foreign relations. The dispute between South Indian fisherman and the Sri Lankan Navy over the fishing rights increased the tense relation between Sri Lanka and India further more. The narrow area of Palk Strait between Sri Lanka and India, which separate the two countries, is the disputed area for a long time. The Tamil Nadu fishermen often enter the Sri Lanka water for poaching fish around the Strait of Palk and this practice continues for a long time. During the war, this area was controlled by the LTTE, but with the end of civil war, Sri Lanka Navy has gained controlled of this area and it has increased her patrol in the strait much. On the other hand there is an ongoing argument between South Indian politicians and Sri Lankan Government regarding on Katchathivu Island. Katchathivu is an uninhabited island of 235 acres formerly claimed by both India and Sri Lanka. The two countries recognized Sri Lankan sovereignty over the Island in 1974. It has a Catholic shrine and has been declared as a sacred area by the government of Sri Lanka.

Diaspora Community



Figure 10: The Extent of the Tamil Diaspora and LTTE Organizations

Source:

http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Modus_Operandi_Tamil_Diaspora_and_LTT
E_Organisations_20140605_05

According to above figure, India is the most convenient place for the LTTE to regroup and rearm with the support of Tamil Diaspora. Other countries with Tamil population that could provide cover are too distant to be viable alternatives. Since the outbreak of open war between Tamil militant groups and the Sri Lankan state in 1983 the Tamil Diasporas has been a central actor in Sri Lanka's political life. Diaspora

contributions provided money for weapons, and Tamil organizations, generally closely linked to the LTTE, provided the political advocacy in western countries in support of the struggle for an independent state of Tamil Elam. Since the LTTE military defeat in May 2009, the Tamil Diaspora has been in crisis, forced to reorient itself in a much more difficult political context, without any clear leverage within Sri Lanka and with much reduced clout in its various host countries. In the same time the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu is home to roughly 60 million Tamils. While the prominence of the Sri Lanka, Tamil struggle has ebbed and flowed in the state's politics, it has always been a sensitive issue. Among the state's political parties and the public, there has been consistent support for Tamil Elam. For example a survey in August 2008 by the influential Tamil Nadu weekly "Ananda Vikatan" found that over 55% of Indian Tamils in the state supported a separate Tamil state while nearly 35% supported a federal system in Sri Lanka.¹⁶

International Community

The United Nations Human Rights Council and the High Commissioner for Human Rights are considering whether to launch an international investigation into reported war crimes in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan Government, however, has expressed its dissatisfaction with outside interference, pending its own investigation. On 12 September 2011, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon sent the report of his panel of experts who investigated alleged war crimes in the final stages of the civil war in Sri Lanka to the United Nations human rights chief and the Human Rights Council. This year United Nations called for it to set up a special court, including international judges and lawyers, to investigate what it called "horrific" abuses committed by both sides. In 2014, Human Rights Council in its midday meeting adopted a resolution in which it requested the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to undertake a comprehensive investigation into alleged serious violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes by both parties in Sri Lanka.

Conclusion

Sri Lanka is a country enjoying the full benefits of peace and harmony, and it is engaged in a concerted push to accelerate its economic development to its citizens. After the war ended in 2009, there were many challenges to rebuild the country. In this regard the foreign influences have a got prominent place during the post conflict era. As the author mentioned earlier even though Japan and Sri Lanka are island nations, there are some differences between the countries in post war and post conflict situations. The assistance which offered after the WW II by the USA was the main reason for the miracle development in Japan. Japan is not only a keystone of U.S. security policy toward East Asia, but also a critical hub of the U.S. global military network of bases and facilities. Meantime Japan's strategic significant has increased due to its geographic location, because it is situated at the door front of the USA cold war rivalries: Russia and china. Therefore during the post war Japan received immense aids from USA. But in the Sri Lankan scenario there were no any direct assistance from developed countries rather than financial grants from Asian Powers like China, India and Japan. It's well accepted fact that Sri Lankans are the first nation, who was able to

¹⁶International Crisis Group, "The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora After the LTTE", (22 September 2015), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/files/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/186%20the%20sri%20lankan%20tamil%20diaspora%20after%20the%20ltte.pdf>

eradicate terrorism by militarily defeating them. With that we were able to get the attraction of the world powers, especially those who tried to force us to negotiate with the LTTE such as USA. In contrast to that in today context world super powers like United States maintains their friendly relations with Sri Lanka while respecting to the sovereignty of state.

Due to the three decades of conflict Sri Lanka has lost countless opportunities for growth such as foreign and local investments as a result of fears about the uncertainty of insurgency. This is why the development is the biggest responsibility of the government of Sri Lanka. Even in today's post conflict situation, it is important to ensure the continued security of the country. Because without security and stability, there will be no economic or any kind of development in the country. Hence it is compulsory to have sound mechanism to reciprocate these issues. Therefore we need to study regarding good mechanism which already paved the way to success. As the author discussed throughout this paper Japan's post conflict development framework is a one of most efficient frameworks in the world. As the author pointed out Japan was faced difficulties in taking part in development coordination. However through the implementation of sound policies Japan were able to achieve huge success. Within the context Sri Lanka is also seeking the success after the long lasted insurgency. Therefore Sri Lanka needs to establish her own framework while studying success model frameworks in Japan, The current phase of post conflict scenario is the emergence of challenges from International and Diaspora community. The suggestions which are articulated by the author in the paper can apply for overcome those issues and as a recommendation the author suggest that the Sri Lanka should focus on establishing stronger links with other nations while strengthening its economic ties with India and USA.

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Changing Security Dynamics in East Asia and its Impacts on South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy

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Abstract

China's economic and military rise in recent decades has begun to change East Asian regional security order, dominated by the US since the end of World War II, based on hub-and-spoke security architecture. Not only is China increasingly aggressive over its maritime territorial disputes in East China and South China seas, but also aspires a 'new type of great power relationship' with the US, whose ultimate objective is to create China-centered Asia, largely devoid of US influence and accepted by the US. Following the launch of 'Pivot (later Rebalancing) to Asia' by Obama administration in the face of assertive China, the region has experienced the 'return of geopolitics'. The burgeoning US-China rivalries and Japan's new assertiveness at the regional level in recent years started to impair South Korea's middle power diplomacy which had been earnestly pursued globally since the beginning of Lee Myung-bak administration (2008-2013). North Korea's military provocations manifested in the Cheonan naval ship sinking, Yeonpyeong Island shelling and its nuclear tests, and China's diplomatic shielding of these reckless added to South Korea's 'strategic ambiguity'. This article attempts to explore how this changing security dynamics in the region impacts South Korea's middle power diplomacy.

Keywords: East Asian security, US-China rivalry, South Korea's middle power diplomacy

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I. Introduction

The hub-and-spoke architecture based on US bilateral security ties with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan has been the main provider of peace and stability in East Asia¹ since the end of World War II. China's rapid economic and military rise since its economic reforms in 1978 has begun to undermine American primacy in the region and the broader Asian order in the recent past. China's dependent on maritime trade for the first time in its history since 1990s has been driving the expansion of its military power in South China Sea. Japan, South Korea and other East Asian countries too developed military modernisation due to the security threat arising from within and outside of their territories. The 25 years of the post-Cold War period have witnessed the evolution of inter-spokes security relations which has been steadily enhanced through a number of trilateral initiatives.

China's diplomacy has moved towards more confident and assertive in international politics in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. This is evident from its angry reaction over US arms sales to Taiwan in January 2010 and over the Dalai Lama's visit in February 2010; its apparently more expansive claims over the South China Sea in March 2010; its diplomatic defence of violent actions by the North Korea on Cheonan sinking in March and Yeonpyeong Island shelling in November 2010; and its tough response to the Japanese arrest of a Chinese fishing captain in September 2010 (Johnston, 2013). Compared to its verbal critique in the past, China vociferously protested the US-Korea joint naval exercise in the Yellow Sea in July 2010, which compelled them to shift their maneuvers to the Sea of Japan. At the Fourth Conference and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit held in Shanghai on May 21, 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping even proposed a 'New Asian Security Concept' that excludes US in the region.

Stressing the significance of the Asia-Pacific, President Obama launched its 'Pivot to Asia' in 2011 with its main emphasis on strengthening military ties with its Asian alliance, a shift in US foreign policy priority after two decades of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Under this strategy, the US strives to strengthen security ties with its Asian Alliance and make full use of the region's economic potential while preventing China from shaping East Asia according to its own terms and rules. This had been greatly emphasised during Hillary Clinton's first official visit to Asia in 2009 followed by Obama's attending of the Sixth East Asia Summit for the first time in Bali, Indonesia on November 18–19, 2011. On his last stop in Australia before attending the meeting, Obama declared that America was 'here to stay' as a Pacific power. Beijing disapproved of this strategy and accused the US of containing China. As a result, the Obama administration adjusted this strategy and renamed it as 'rebalancing to Asia' in the late 2012 from military initiatives to economic and diplomatic elements and called for deeper engagement with China..

The US launch of its Pivot to Asia in the face of assertive China has impaired South Korea's middle power diplomacy at the regional level, which had been carried out successfully at the global level since the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in 2008. The US-China geopolitical rivalry in the region has put South

¹ East Asia here refers to China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia and Taiwan, although the term has also been used in geopolitical sense to include the 18 members of East Asia Summit together with North Korea.

Korea into a strategic ambiguity offering limited options for its foreign policy strategy. The North Korea military provocations and the divergent response from China and US posed immense diplomatic skills to the South Korean policy makers. China's stern opposition to the US-proposed deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea to counter the possible future attack from North Korean missiles engendered wider debates on the security strategy of the South Koreans. In the light of these considerations, this paper attempts to analyse the changing security dynamics in East Asia posed by the China's assertiveness, US rebalancing acts, North Korean military provocations, Japan's new assertiveness and its impacts on South Korea's middle power diplomacy.

II. The Concept of Middle Power

Middle power by simple definition is what it is not – it is neither a great power nor a small power. The concept of 'middle power' is a controversial term in the study of foreign policy, as it involves defining relational terms, 'middle' and 'power'. In order to define 'middle' it is necessary to define the other two extremes - great and small. Although the use of the term can be traced back to the sixteenth century, the modern idea of middle powers being potentially significant actors in international affairs has been traced back to Jan Christian Smuts' writing on *The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestions* in 1918 (Evans, 2011). The term was institutionalised in the Canadian context in the 1930s with the writing of David Mitrany on world government and was popularised in Canada's persistent claim to middle power status and its firm embraced in its foreign policy. Australia also adopted middle power diplomacy alongside Canada after the end of the World War II in order to promote its role in international affairs. Other countries like Norway, Sweden and New Zealand followed the same policy and are most commonly identified as 'traditional' or 'first generation' of middle powers. South Korea is regarded as a 'new' or 'late comer' which belongs to the emerging group, regionally active in the fourth wave of middle powers.

As there is an ambiguity in its concept, identifying middle powers has become a highly contested among scholars. No two different authors fully agreed upon the parameters of classifying middle powers. As Adam Chapnick rightly notes, 'For all its importance, middle power is rarely defined and limited explanations are never specific'. Three main approaches are useful in defining middle power – positional (material capacity), behavioural (good international citizenship called middlepowerism) and identity (identifying itself and recognised by others). Some countries meet only one of the above criteria while others meet all of them. Roughly twenty to twenty-five countries that possess material capabilities to shape the outcomes in niche areas in the global governance sphere when acting in concert the like-minded states are identified as middle powers (O' Neil, 2015).

III. South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy

South Korea is among the few countries that qualifies the status of a middle power, both in terms of material capacity and foreign policy behaviour. Economically, South Korea had joined the group of middle powers way back in the late 1980s, but its foreign policy did not reflect that of a middle power. The Gross Domestic Product (nominal) of South Korea in 2014 was \$1.4 trillion and ranked the 13th largest economy in the world. Its per capita income (PPP) as per IMF report in 2014 was \$35,379. In 2012, it became the seventh member of the 20K-50M club - countries with per capita income of \$20,000 and a population of 50 million.

Lee Myung-bak who took office as the tenth President of South Korea (or Korea) on February 25, 2008 earnestly pursued middle power diplomacy in commensurate with its material capacity. Under the banner of 'Global Korea', Lee sought to restore the US-ROK alliance as the basis of his foreign policy, while at the same time strengthening its relationships with key regional powers. Terming the two preceding terms as lost decades, Lee advocated for reciprocity in his North Korea policy and focused on promoting Korea's global role by moving away from its obsession with North Korean military threat. He laid out the beginnings of a vision for Korea as a responsible and contributing member of the international community committed to global diplomacy and the global movement for peace and development (Snyder, 2009).

In his pursuit of enhancing Korea's status to the international community, Lee administration adopted low carbon 'Green Growth' as a national vision in 2008 and made its entry into the member of OECD Development Assistance Committee in 2009. As a host country of the G20 Summit in 2010, South Korea pledged to reduce CO2 emissions by 30 percent by 2020. Korea was also able to push its agenda of eliminating poverty and sustainable development by 2015 at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan in 2011. The hosting of Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in 2012 enhanced Korea's leadership role from 'follower to rule maker'.


The thinking of Korea's middle power diplomacy has been provoked by the dramatic shift in the nature of international system (Yul, 2013). The rise of China and India created space for South Korea to play greater role in international arena. It was also prompted by South Koreans' changing perception; from a victimised small power to having attained the status of middle power. Moreover, South Korean leaders felt the need to repay back the contributions of international community for its economic development during the period following the Korean War 1950-53. First mentioned during Roh Tae-woo administration (1988-1993) and touched upon during Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) administration, 'middle power or jung-gyun-guk diplomacy' received prominent airing following the formation of Lee's administration (Lee, 2012). Lee's year of inauguration also witnessed the founding of G20² as a replacement of G8 to combat the financial crisis which started in 2007 which widened Korea's leadership role.

Korea's middle power diplomacy under Lee Myung-bak has enhanced its international image which is greatly different from the previous governments. As Joseph S. Nye (2009) noted, "quietly South Korea has moved away from being defined by its problematic North Korean neighbour, and is becoming an important middle-ranking power in global affairs". President Park Geun-hye, who succeeded Lee on February 25, 2013 continues to pursue middle power diplomacy as one of her foreign policy goals under the banner of Trustpolitik. Despite its success at the global level, the burgeoning great power rivalries coupled with the North Korea's military threat constrain South Korea's middle power diplomacy at the regional level.

² The G20 countries account for 66 per cent of world's population, 80 per cent of the global GDP, and at the same time produce 80 per cent of the world's global greenhouse gas emissions.

IV. The Sinking of Cheonan and Its impacts on South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy

The South Korean navy corvette Cheonan was sank in a mysterious way on the night of March 26, 2010 while conducting a patrol mission in the Yellow Sea (or West Sea) off the Baekryeong Island on the west coast of the Korean peninsula. The 1200-ton warship named after the South Korean city of the same name, meaning 'heavenly peace' split into two parts leading to the death of 46 sailors out of 104. President Lee Myung-bak set up the Joint Civil-Military Investigation Group (JIG) comprising of 22 military experts, 25 experts from top 10 Korean expert agencies, 3 members recommended by the National Assembly along with 24 foreign experts from the US, UK, Australia, Sweden and South Korea. The team released its preliminary report on April 16, suspecting North Korea's involvement behind the attack, as the incident took place at the disputed territory between North and South Korea.



NB: The blue line indicates the oceanic border as understood by South Korea; the red line indicates the border as insisted by North Korea.

Map 1: Map of two different military demarcation line
(Source: <https://mouonekorea.wordpress.com>)

The following day, North Korea denied its involvement in the attack, but this did not change the suspicion from the South Koreans due to any clear alternative explanation. The final report of the JIG released on May 20 concluded that the torpedo was fired by North Korean submarine. A key piece of evidence produced by the investigation team was the discovery of the torpedo on the seabed bearing a blue '1 bon' (No.1 written in Korean) ink mark consistent with the previously obtained North Korean torpedo (You, 2015). Their conclusion, however, has remained the subject of intense controversy. An independent Russian naval expert team also reached a mark contrast conclusion from the findings of the JIG. The team concluded that that it was not a torpedo but a floating mine in the water that was responsible for the ship's sinking



Map 2: Possible North Korean attack. (Source: <http://www.abovetopsecret.com>)

Domestic Impacts of Cheonan Sinking

As days went on, suspicions grew over the findings of the investigation team as to how the ink mark could have survived the enormous heat of the explosion, while the paint on the outer surface of the torpedo did not. In a survey conducted in 2011 by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, 80 percent respondents trust the government's announcement that the Cheonan was attacked by a North Korean submarine. However, in another poll conducted by Media Research in 2012, of the 700 people, 71.3 percent believed that the ship was attacked by North Korea. This indicates that a growing number of people started to question the findings of the investigation team.

In the absence of substantial evidence, various conspiracy theories have been circulating on the internet and social media. Some believe that Cheonan may have hit a mine laid by the South Korean military or collided with a US submarine, while some suspect that the warship may have been torn apart due to metal fatigue fractures as a result of poor maintenance. Some even believe that a team of US Navy Seals who had recently been involved in the joint US-South Korean Foal Eagle anti-submarine exercises, sunk the Cheonan using a magnetic 'rising mine' deployed on the sea bed. Other believe that the US carried out the sinking as a pretext to scare the Japanese into allowing them to keep their controversial military base on Okinawa which America says is essential for deploying marines to secure North Korean nuclear facilities in the event of war.




Figure 1: (a) Cheonan warship; (b) Sketch of the part damaged during the incident (Hwang and Mauro, 2014)

The Lee Myung-bak government stuck to its stand and called for a hawkish policy towards the North. Many of the South Koreans argued that Lee government's accusations of North Korea were aimed at avoiding heavy defeat at the June 2 local elections. Lee adopted the May 24th Measures, which among other things, called for banning of visits by South Koreans to North Korea, halting of all North-South trade, prohibiting business expansion by South Koreans in the north, halting of all aid projects, and prohibiting North Korean ships from sailing in South Korean waters. Following the introduction of these measures, all businesses in Kaesong Industrial Complex were stopped. Since then inter-Korean relations has become weakened and the two Koreas are hostile to each other.

Regional Impacts of Cheonan Sinking

The Cheonan sinking not only widened the divisions between progressives and conservatives but also ensued regional split as US took this opportunity to sustain its military dominance in the region to balance China. China's reluctance to condemn North Korea led to mutual distrust and antagonism between Beijing and Washington. With the increasing perceptions of military threat from North Korea, Japan's decision to relocate US military station from Okinawa was held back in the wake of Cheonan sinking. China's diplomatic shielding of North Korea on the two incidents prompted South Koreans doubt about the 'strategic partnership' between the two countries and China's status as 'a responsible stakeholder' in the region.

The relationship between North Korea and China became much closer than before on the heel of the Cheonan sinking. The North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il made a secret visit to China for the first time in four years, on May 3, 2010 in a special train amidst the military tensions prevailing on the peninsula. Similarly, US-Korea alliance has been strengthened to prevent any future North Korean attack. Prior to the Cheonan incident, all clashes that had occurred were managed in a strictly inter-Korean context.

However, the Cheonan sinking has become an intense issue at the international level due to the geopolitical rivalry between China and US.

VI. The Impact of Yeonpyeong Island Attack on South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy

The North Korea soldiers fired around 200 artillery shells at Yeonpyeong Island, which lies in the Yellow Sea, 50 miles off the South's northwest coast in an area close to a disputed sea border, on November 23, 2010. The shelling killed two South Korean marines, two civilians and hurt another 19, in one of the heaviest attacks on its neighbour since the Korean War ended in 1953. The South Korean soldiers in return shelled North Korean gun positions. The incident is believed to have been sparked by South Korean military exercises in the area, which the North had objected to. It is also widely believed to bolster the North Korean army's support for the succession of the ailing Kim Jong-il's youngest son, Kim Jong-un. The North Korea's supreme military command, however, blamed the South for the incident and accused the South Korean army of firing first artillery shells, which the latter denied.

The islands were the scene of three skirmishes between the navies of North and South Korea in 1999, 2002 and most recently in 2009 when a North Korean patrol ship was set on fire by South Korean gunfire, but the latest comes at a time of rising regional tension. Seoul promised that it would be ready to respond strongly to further attacks. There was condemnation of North Korea from various countries including the US, Japan, Russia, EU and the UK, while China refused to apportion blame. Instead it blamed the US-Korea joint military exercise as triggering the North Korea's attack and appealed all sides to remain calm. China's refusal to criticise North Korea's violent act in the Cheonan sinking, to a certain degree was justifiable, considering the lack of evidence on the part of the investigation team.

However, China's silence on the North Korean shelling of the Yeonpyeong Island this time called into question of its status as 'responsible stakeholder' in the region. China's attempt to restore its reputation as an honest broker in the Korean crisis by calling an emergency meeting of the senior representatives of the Six-Party Talks – US, China, North and South Korea, Japan and Russia did not receive positive response from the US, Japan and South Korea which further cast doubt on the efficacy of the Chinese initiative. South Korea on, its part, has been insisting North Korea's apology on Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong Island attack as a precondition to resume the inter-Korean peace talks.

VII. The Impacts of the US Proposal to Install THAAD

The Terminal (formerly Theatre) High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile system is an easily transportable defensive weapon system to protect against hostile incoming threats such as tactical and theatre ballistic missiles at ranges of 200km and at altitudes up to 150km. It can shoot down short, medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The system consists of launchers, missiles, battle management/command, control, communications and intelligence (BMC3I) units, THAAD radars, and intercepts exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric threats. The US proposal to install THAAD came in the wake of the third North Korean nuclear test on February 12, 2013. The primary purpose is to protect the soldiers and combat assets of US Forces in Korea (USFK) against increasingly direct nuclear and missile threats. In addition, in terms of a strategic military perspective, the implementation of the tailored

deterrence strategy (TDS) by the deployment of THAAD to the Korean theater will reinforce extended deterrence strategy (EDS) to deter North Korean nuclear and missile attacks (Chung 2015).





Figure 2: Missile Defence on the Korean Peninsula (Source: The Korea Herald)


Despite the intense debates on the pros and cons of the missile defence, the majority of South Koreans are in favour of installing THAAD due to the growing fear of missile attacks from North Korea. The Defense White Paper 2014 published by the South Korean Ministry of Nation Defense estimated that North Korea is in a substantial position to obtain ballistic missile capabilities delivering nuclear warheads and develop KN-08 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threatening the continental US. In 2014, North Korea test-fired 111 missile rounds consisting of FROG, SCUD, ER, and Rodong Missiles in order to increase accuracy of their missiles. The February 2015 Joongang Ilbo poll showed that 56% of the respondents favoured the deployment of THAAD. South Korean presidential spokesman Min Kyung-wook described Seoul's position as three 'no's'— "no [US deployment] request, no consultation, and no decision."



Map 3: Showing how THAAD would protect South Korea only from the North
(Source: The Heritage Foundation Research)

China has been raising its concern and strong opposition to the installation of THAAD on the fear that the radar will be able to detect military movements in China. Russia too considers the deployment of THAAD system in South Korea as a security threat to its security and the wider region. It further raises its concern over the possibility of sparking an arms race and hampering negotiations on North Korea's nuclear ambitions. US officials have continually insisted that THAAD would be aimed at guarding against only North Korea's growing ballistic missile capabilities. "The THAAD interceptor has a range of 200 kilometers. Its range means that a THAAD interceptor - if based at Osan Air Base, a likely U.S. option (for the potential deployment) - could not reach as far north as Pyongyang - it would fall about 65 kilometers short," said Bruce Bennett, a senior analyst at the US think tank RAND Corp. However, China does not want to compromise on its stands, which observers suspect its fear of potentially weakening its A2/AD capabilities. There are also speculations that China wants to weaker the US-Korea alliance through its opposition to THAAD. There are some who suspect that China might want to see how South Korea response its pressure to take sides.

THAAD in South Korea Poses No Threat to China's Global Security Interests



Map 4: Map showing how China is not a threat to THAAD
(Source: The Heritage Foundation Research)

South Korea has been in strategic dilemma on whether it should go along with the US and install the THAAD or whether it should listen to China and oppose the plan. It neither wants to disappoint China, its largest trading partner nor the US, its security guarantor. There is a speculation that China may retaliate against South Korea in the form of banning trade and enhancing travel regulations, if it allows the US to set up THAAD. On the other hand, if South Korea listened to China and opposed THAAD installation, it can cause US abandonment when it needs US security protection in the future.

VII. The Impact of Japan's New Assertiveness on South Korea's Middle Power Diplomacy

The issue of comfort women³ and territorial dispute over Dokdo Island⁴ are the two main bones of contention that hinder the two countries' path to peaceful cooperation. An estimate 200,000 Korean women, mostly under the age 18 were forced by the Imperial Japanese Army to have sexual relationship with 30-40 men each day in the military brothels before and after the World War II. Korea has been demanding sincere apology for the atrocity and compensation for the victims which the Japanese parliament did it by issuing an official apology on March 27, 2007. The situation took an ugly turn when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and most members of his Cabinet who are openly supporting revisionist organisation, negated the existence of Japanese war crimes, including sexual slavery for the military. This created public anger among the South Koreans.

³. Estimates vary as to how many women were involved, with numbers ranging from as low as 20,000 to as high as 360,000 to 410,000, in Chinese sources.

⁴ The Liancourt Rocks, called Dokdo in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese, are a group of islets in the Sea of Japan that is occupied by South Korea but its ownership is still disputed between South Korea and Japan.

When the news of Lee Myung-bak government's signing of General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan came out in July 2012, it created public uproar in South Korea. The Lee government widely regarded as pro-Japanese, has long prepared GSOMIA which was aimed at formalising a long standing commitment to share intelligence and security information on North Korea and missile programmes. The signing of the agreement had to be cancelled due to the protest on Japan's unwillingness to apologise for their use of comfort women as sex slaves during the colonial period.

Faced by public anger over the issue of GSOMIA, Lee Myung-bak was left only with the Dokdo Island issue. The Island is a major source of nationalist tensions between the two nations. Lee made a visit to Dokdo in 2012 in order to regain the public support. This angered the Japanese government, which was considering filing a complaint letter against South Korea at the International Court of Justice. It was also considering suspending a currency contract with South Korea that expanded the amount from \$13 billion to \$70 billion in an attempt to stabilize the foreign exchange market (Sohn and Kang, 2013). The two contentious issues between the two countries constrain South Korea's regional strategies for middle power diplomacy. It also hampers US Pivot to Asia, which Korea needs, in order to effectively balance against the influence of China.

VIII. Conclusion

South Korea's rise as a middle power provides a unique case, as the country is surrounded by great powers and a hostile nuclear-armed North Korea. The success of South Korea's middle power under Lee Myung-bak at the global level is a remarkable achievement. Seoul's growing leadership role and its commitment to combat global issues looks a too ambitious aspiration, yet an exemplary step for other small and middle power countries.

However, its diplomatic skill has been tested time and again by North Korean military provocations. This raises the question of Seoul's ability to sustain its long term policy goal of unification with the North under democratic government and open market system. In order to make a headway in dealing with Pyongyang, South Korean leaders should avoid using North Korea issue as a mere vote bank politics, so that there can be common consistent policy which is acceptable to both the conservatives and progressives. South Korea's middle power policy is a strategy to induce the support of international community for this goal. Unfortunately, the reality of its geopolitical challenges loomed large in the face of the US-China rivalries. China's strong opposition to the deployment of THAAD in Korea can be interpreted as China's growing assertiveness on the Korean peninsula.

The peaceful cooperation of US and China best serve South Korea's middle power diplomacy at the regional level. The strong security ties with US and close economic partnership with China acted as the twin pillars of South Korea's middle power diplomacy. South Korea fears that any military conflict between the two great powers will force South Korea to make a choice between the two. It is, therefore, a great challenge for South Korea to maintain a balanced-relationship with both countries.

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Japan-China Game: Navigating Through the Risk Zone

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Abstract

This research aims to analyze the recent developments in the strategic interactions between Japan and China over their territorial disputes in the East China Sea from the perspective of statistical and game-theoretical modeling. Two linear regression models were run in the framework of this study. The first model assesses the effect of political deterioration between the two nations on their economic relationship. The second model deals with the test of the relationship between the dynamics of public opinion of China shared by the Japanese people on the volume of Sino-Japanese trade. The methodology of this study also includes application of deterrence model to Sino-Japanese territorial disputes. By analyzing the case studies of incidents between Japan and China over the disputed islands in the East China Sea, this study tracks the evolution of strategies of different administrations both in Japan and China. The importance of the signaling is assessed. I conclude by showing the implications the model for the understanding of the motivations behind the actions of Japanese and Chinese leaderships.

Keywords: China, Japan, game theory, Senkaku/Diaoyu, statistics

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Introduction

In the wake of the 21st century the relationship between the two Asian giants has been dynamic and puzzling at the same time. The geopolitical structure of Northeast Asian sub-region has undergone tectonic shifts, mainly caused by China's economic and military rise. At the same time, the decades-long stagnation of Japanese economy has only contributed to the rapid shuffle of relative power potentials of Japan and China. Thus in the year of 2000 Japanese GDP was 2.5 times larger than that of China, while in 2015 Chinese economy exceeded its eastern competitor by the same margin. In the mentioned period China has also overtaken Japan as the regional leader in terms of military spending, with Beijing's current military budget being more than a threefold of Tokyo's military expenditures.

Such kind of profound power transitions were echoed by the aggravation of uneasy situation in the East China Sea. The historic conflict between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which was overlooked for decades, has unwound in the recent years greatly spoiling the atmosphere of the relationship and defacing the public perceptions of each other. Currently the grim sentiments on both sides are record high reaching the point where more than 90% of the populations have a negative opinion of the vis-a-vis.

However, one aspect of the Sino-Japanese relations that has been on the rise is the bilateral trade. The East Asian paradox of "cold politics-hot economics" persisted throughout the first decade of the 21st century. Nevertheless, the advent of the new phase of aggravation over Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2010, the application of economic leverage by China in the form of embargo on rare ore following the detainment of a Chinese captain by Japanese officials, and the decline in investment between the two countries has led some authors (Chang, 2014) to announce the end of the "hot economics" era.

In this paper I address the dynamics of the contemporary Sino-Japanese relations using statistical and game theoretical models, attempting to reveal the motivations behind the administrations' decisions and to figure out their interests and valuations in this conflict.

In order to better understand their utility function I first answer the questions:

What is the impact of deterioration of political relations between China and Japan on their bilateral trade?

What is the impact of deterioration of public perceptions of each other on the bilateral trade?

On the next stage of analysis I model the strategic interaction over the disputed islands in the form of a dynamic game, assess the impact of several variables over time and draw conclusions from different response patterns of succeeding administrations.

Literature Review

The extensive literature on the Asia Pacific region and China's role has been categorized (Evans, 2010) into three broad schools of thought: primacists, exceptionalists and pragmatists. The first school (Aaron L. Friedberg, John J. Mearsheimer, Robyn Lim, Hugh White) is advancing the China threat theory and adheres to (neo)-realist conceptual stream. The second school of exceptionalists (David Kang, William H. Overholt, Kenneth D. Johnson and Edward Burman) propagates the exceptionalism of East Asian region and argues that China's rise has been possible so far and will be possible in the future.

John Ikenberry's position (Ikenberry, 2005), underlying the importance of liberal world order as an environment of China's rise, which engages and constrains the latter by economic and other means of cooperation, is also somehow close to the exceptionalists' view.

Finally, the pragmatists (Amitav Acharya, Muthiah Alagappa, Robert S. Ross, Ashlet Tellis and Michael Swaine and Avery Goldstein) combine "hard" alliance systems with soft projects of regional interdependence. Evelyn Goh (Goh, 2007/2008) even proposes the concept of "omnienmeshment policy".

More specifically, the Sino-Japanese relations have undergone a transformation since the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of US-China-USSR triangle (Yunling, 1997). Currently many scholars (Mochizuki, 2007; Terada, 2006; Rozman, 2007; Hughes, 2009; Sohn, 2010) see the logic of balance of power as the backbone of the relationship. Yun Zhang (2013) emphasizes major power interactions as the determining force of Sino-Japanese relations instead of balance of power. Finally, other researchers (Bjorn & Hagstrom, 2012) argue that there is Japan's accommodation policy towards the rising power of PRC.

A specifically important aspect of Sino-Japanese relations is the interplay between economics and politics. While the effects of economic interdependence between Japan and China on the political relations have been widely studied (Koo, 2009), the relationship between the public opinion and trade has often been neglected. On one hand it is argued by Victor Shish that "All kinds of policymaking, not just trade policy, are increasingly reactive to Internet opinion" (Bradsher, 2009). However, on the other hand "hot economics, cold politics" paradox, though questioned by some (Chang, 2014), is still a counterargument to that opinion applied to Sino-Japanese relations.

This literature review does not cover the arguments of all theories of international relations; rather I have systematized some of them in the following table.

Table 1. Balance of Realism/Neorealism and Liberalism/Neoliberalism Arguments

Process/Factor	Theory		
		Realism/Neorealism	Liberalism/Neoliberalism
	Maritime Conflicts	++	-
	Military Expenditure	+	-
	Economic Interdependence	-	++
	International Organizations	-	+
	US Involvement	+	+
		4/2	4/2

Table 1 summarizes the debate between realism/neorealism and liberalism/neoliberalism applied to Sino-Japanese relations in the form of a “draw”. The peculiarity of the Sino-Japanese relationship is the intertwined nature of factors and processes that fall in the logic and worldview of both broad theoretical groups. This pretty much explains why there is no “black and white” in these puzzling interactions.

Much of the literature deals with investigating the effects of economic integration and engagement on political relationship, while the reverse connection of political climate on economic and trade relations has been somewhat overlooked. The current research attempts to test for the relationship between political deterioration and trade turnover between Japan and China.

I also propose explanations for the aggravations in the Sino-Japanese relationship over the course of time and through different administrations in Tokyo from game-theoretical perspective.

Methodology

This paper adopts a game theoretical approach to construct a model of interaction between Japan and China that would be explained in details in The Game section of this paper. One of the main assumptions the analysts make about the Sino-Japanese relations is that the challenge to the status quo is a tradeoff between economic (profit from trade) and political gains (the new or transformed status quo). It is argued that depending on the type of one of the two possible leaderships that differ in their valuation of political and economic gains, a respective decision (challenge-not, escalate-not escalate, etc.) is made. However, in this paper before running a game theoretical model I aim to verify whether such kind of tradeoff really exists or political and economic gains can be obtained by the players independently of each other.

For that purpose this study aims to empirically test for the existence of a relationship between public opinion and trade, as well as deterioration of the situation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and trade in the case of Sino-Japanese relations in 1988-2013.

Two linear regression models were run. In both cases the bilateral trade volume was selected as the dependent variable.

In case of the first model the independent variables of interest were the favorable opinion of China in Japan, the unfavorable opinion of China in Japan. The GDP of China, GDP of Japan and economic crises were selected as the control variables influencing the level of trade between the two countries.

In the second model, the concept of deterioration of political situation over the disputed islands was operationalized as the number of major incidents over the disputed islands, including the incursions by the Chinese vessels into the territorial waters that are currently under Japanese control, political standoffs, detainment of Chinese captain, etc. The GDP of China, GDP of Japan and economic crises were again selected as the control variables.

The data for China's and Japan's GDPs were taken from World Bank's databases (World Bank). The data describing the bilateral trade level throughout the period of 1994-2013 were obtained from China Statistical Yearbooks (National Bureau of Statistics of China). The public opinion data were supplied by the polls conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, whereas the major incidents were recorded from the timeline of Senkakau/Diaoyu dispute provided by the Center for a New American Security (Center for a New American Security).

On the next stage of analysis a game theoretical model was applied which would be described later in this paper.

Data Analysis

The data were analyzed with the SPSS 20 (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) software.

First, I am going to look at the connections between the variables included in the first model. The correlational matrix is presented below.

Table 2. Correlational matrix

	Japan GDP	China GDP	Trade	Economic Crises	Opinion - Favorable	Opinion - Unfavorable
Japan GDP						
China GDP	0.687**					
Trade	0.624**	0.932**				
Economic Crises	-0.042	-0.043	-0.158			
Opinion - Unfavorable	0.727**	0.944**	0.957**	0.42		
Opinion - Favorable	-0.651**	-0.819**	-0.861**	-0.008	-0.927**	

** - Pearson correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Here the Japanese and Chinese GDPs are both positively correlated with the trade level between them which is intuitive. However, the puzzling part is the statistically significant positive correlation between the percentage of the Japanese public that has unfavorable opinion of China and trade. At the same time there is a significant negative correlation between the percentage of Japan's population that has favorable opinion of China and the bilateral trade¹. In other words, the data suggest that years with higher percentages of unfavorable opinion correspond to higher levels of trade.

Naturally, this does not imply that there is a causal relationship between these two variables while this would have been totally counterintuitive. Rather this correlation occurred because of two sustained positive trends in both variables throughout the observed time period. Those trends had their separate causes (other variables). Thus, this positive correlation can be interpreted as the preliminary evidence of independence of these variables. However, it may be possible that controlling for the effects of other independent variables on trade, negative coefficients for the effects of "Opinion Unfavorable" variable could be derived. Therefore the first linear regression model has been proposed. The output matrix for the model is presented in the following table.

Table 3. Effects of Public Opinion on Trade

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	-18744193.992	10941585.891		-1.713	.107
China's Gross Domestic Product	.455	1.008	.120	.452	.658
Japan's Gross Domestic Product	.094	1.799	.005	.052	.959
EconCrisis	-2006793.478	2165908.589	-.071	-.927	.369
JapanOpinionUnfav	571116.566	176010.996	.832	3.245	.005

a. Dependent Variable: Japan-China Trade

It occurred that the only significant variable was the level of unfavorable opinion of China in the Japanese society. Again the coefficient of the variable is positive which is counterintuitive. This means that even controlling for the effect of other economic variables the "Opinion Unfavorable" variable does not have a logically grounded influence on Sino-Japanese trade. On the other hand the inclusion of this variable in the model cancelled out the effect of the economic variables that turned out to be

¹ The data for neutral opinion were not included.

statistically insignificant in this case. This is due to the high correlation between “Opinion Unfavorable” and those variables which causes multicollinearity when the results about any individual predictor may not be valid (as it is in this case).

Next, I am going to examine the relationship between the major incidents in East China Sea that spoil the political atmosphere between the two countries and their level of trade.

The output table for the second model is presented below.

Table 4. Effects of Crises on Trade
Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	T
	B	Std. Error	Beta	
(Constant)	9598908.905	10209394.067		.940
EconCrisis	-160453.038	2640307.110	-.006	-.061
1 China's Gross Domestic Product	3.137	.522	.829	6.006
Japan's Gross Domestic Product	-.893	2.317	-.049	-.385
IncidentsJapChin	1283073.012	940964.898	.186	1.364

a. Dependent Variable: Japan-China Trade

The only variable that has statistically significant effect on the level of trade is China's GDP which sounds logical because the booming Chinese economy led to increased levels of China's foreign trade and namely the trade with Japan.

On the contrary, Japan's GDP did not have any statistically significant impact captured by the model. This fact can be explained by the nation's long lasting stagnation when the figures for GDP did not change dramatically while the trade with China boomed, mainly because of the latter's rapid economic growth.

Finally, our independent variable of interest, major incidents between Japan and China throughout the observed period, also did not have significant impact on the trade. This demonstrates that deterioration of political climate between the two countries does not lead to the decline in their economic relations. Thus, the East Asian paradox of “cold politics-hot economics” is empirically sustained. This phenomenon presents a great interest for the game theoretical modeling.

The Game

This paper applies the classical deterrence (Huth, 1999) model to the study of Sino-Japanese dispute making several adjustments and clarifications on the definitions of players' types and actions broadly defined as “challenge-not challenge, resist-accept, escalate-not escalate”.

First of all, the author assumes that the outcome of full-scale war between Japan and China which happens after the terminal history “challenge, resist, escalate” is extremely unlikely. However, the model of gradual escalation (not necessary to the stage of an all-out war) and backing captures the logic of strategic interaction between China and Japan over challenging/preserving the status quo in East China Sea quite well.

Solution of the Game

The overall game tree is presented below:




Figure 1. Game tree

The condition for China choosing “Not Challenge” as the rational decision is represented by the following formula:

$$pW + (1-p)N_J - c_c < N_C$$

Where p is the probability that China assigns to Japan playing escalate after the non-terminal history “Challenge-Resist-Escalate”, i.e. being of the “aggressive² type”; W is the payoff China obtains in case of final escalation by Japan, N_J is China’s payoff in case of Japan accepting the altered status quo after China’s challenging or after the terminal history “Challenge-Resist-Escalate-Back”; c_c is China’s costs of challenging the status quo.

From the previous formula it is obvious that the probability that China assigns to Japan playing escalate after the non-terminal history “Challenge-Resist-Escalate” should be:

$$p > (N_J - N_C - c_c) / (N_J - W)$$

for the inequality to hold. It can be observed that the costs of challenging for China “ c_c ” decrease over the course of time. China’s remarkable military and economic rise has transformed the country into a much more powerful one and continues to do so. It is intuitive to argue that costs of challenging a status quo are less for a more powerful country than for a weaker one, which can face political isolation and decline in its geopolitical positions as a result of the countermeasures taken by the status quo nation. Thus the lower values of c_c vector in the inequality correspond to higher values of the overall expression on the right side of the inequality. This means that for China **not to challenge** the status quo, the probability that it assigns to Japan acting escalate at the final decision node should grow parallel to the decline of c_c . In other words, the more assured China is that Japan is “aggressive” the less likely it is to challenge the status quo. The irony of the deterrence model applied to Sino-Japanese relations is that Japan needs to become more and more “aggressive” for the preservation of the status quo, because of the ever decreasing value of the costs for China.

At the same time it is noteworthy that the value of W is not negatively influenced by the decline in trade, while the economic relationship between China and Japan is independent of the escalations of disputes in East China Sea. Therefore the operationalization of W , i.e. the payoff China receives in case of the escalation by Japan at the final decision node, requires more precise understanding of the risks that China actually runs in any realistic scenario of limited escalation. Let’s assume that the value of W , i.e. the loss that Japan can infringe on China in a realistic scenario, is proportionate to Japan’s potential and will to do so. While Japan’s potential has remained nearly constant in post-Cold War period, because of the “lost decades” of Japanese economy, current humble GDP growth and invariable amount of military expenditure, it can be argued that W value is solely dependent on Japan’s will to

² Note that the term “aggressive” is used in the meaning of preferring the payoffs from escalating to the payoffs from backing at the final decision node. It is not used in the meaning assigned to the words “aggressor”, “aggression” in the international law.

infringe loss on China. In its turn that will is mainly stipulated by the ruling administration at the time.

Therefore I propose several case studies of the game that reveal some patterns of reaction by different administrations.


Cases

In the incidents occurred during the incumbency of Junichiro Koizumi the Game mainly followed the pattern of Challenge-Resist-Not Escalate. This could have been due to Koizumi's harsh stance on China and unambiguous inclination to taking "aggressive" action for the second time after the non-terminal history "challenge-aggressive-escalate" that was known to policy makers in Beijing.

On the contrary, Yasuo Fukuda's administration followed a different pattern though not in a boat incident with China but with Taiwan in 2008 (Hsiu-Chuan & Wang Flora, 2008). Yasuo Fukuda's administration backed and apologized. Thus the Game resulted in "challenge-aggressive-escalate-back".

Naoto Kan's administration followed the same strategy in the infamous 2010 fisher boat incident. Thus, the Game again took place in the form of "challenge-aggressive-escalate-back" terminal history.

An unusual role change occurred in 2012. This time the Japanese side has played as the challenger of the status quo with the purchase of the three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. China's "Resist" response phase was rather prolonged. An unprecedented wave of a number of incursions by Chinese vessels into the territorial sea surrounding Senkaku/Diaoyu islands began immediately after the purchase and has lasted until now. However, Japan chose the action "escalate" without backing down and returning to the pre-purchase status quo, which in this case was the different legal status of the islands. China, in her turn, chose to back. The last claim may sound somewhat arguable when examined against the background of severed rhetoric in official statements as well as media and even academic narratives. However, the graph (Japan Coast Guard, 2015) presented below shows a gradual trend of backing.



Finally, the last case study of the Game is connected with the establishment of Air-Defense Identification Zone by China over the East China Sea (Gladstone & Wald, 2013). This step, which was accepted in Tokyo as an unfriendly act targeted against Japan (Szechenyi, Cha, Glaser, Green, & Johnson, 2013), can be considered as a “challenge” action aimed at altering the status quo. Japan, in its turn, chose to play “Resist” by ordering its commercial aircraft not to comply with the Chinese request of submitting the planned flights schedule. Furthermore, the US and Japan sent jet fighters to fly over the newly established ADIZ in complete disregard of Beijing’s new rules. We can claim that China reacted to these “violations” with an action “not escalate” while measures were not taken against any of the violating aircraft.

Conclusions

First of all, it was demonstrated that the paradox “cold politics-hot economics” is sustained by empirical test. The level of political crises does not have an impact on the trade between the two countries.

Besides that, another factor that becomes more and more important, the unfavorable-favorable public opinion of China shared by the Japanese people is also independent of the economic relationship.

The dynamics of deterioration of the political atmosphere over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands can be explained by the growing power of China, i.e. decreasing costs for challenging the status quo, and the effectiveness of Japanese deterrence. When speaking about deterrence, it should be noted that signaling a determination to escalate at the final decision node of the game and the perception of that determination by China is crucial in order for the deterrence to occur.

That determination, as well as the deterrence itself, is mainly dependent on the incumbent administration. Different response patterns of several Japanese administrations ruling in the 21st century have been demonstrated.



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Yasukuni, The Soft Power of Clashing Identities

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Abstract

Yasukuni Jinja, or Shrine for a Peaceful Nation, in Tōkyō was established by Emperor Meiji to commemorate those who gave their lives for the nation. In our contemporary times Yasukuni has however become shrouded by an ideological aura of the pre-war system where it became the “citadel of military ideology” which it is perceived to glorify to this day. Consequently, when one visits Yasukuni the question arises “What does one commemorate?” and although one’s answer may be very clear to oneself, the action itself carries such great ambiguity that other’s preconceptions equally so define its interpretation. China in particular strongly protests against any visits by Japanese officials to Yasukuni and even views it as a threat to the long treacherous path of reconciliation in East Asia as each nation holds a distinct interpretation of its wartime past. Visits and offerings by current PM Shinzo Abe, who has often been labelled as a hawkish nationalist conservative, have come under particular scrutiny as his image is perceived to enforce Yasukuni’s militaristic past. This research therefore sets out to clarify the role of Yasukuni within Chinese-Japanese relations under the prime-ministership of Shinzo Abe by introducing the concept of assertive soft power which seeks to avert another nations’ identity by endorsing its opposite.

Keywords: National identities, soft power, sino-japanese relations, Yasukuni Jinja

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Introduction

“You and I are two cherry blossoms. Even if we fall apart.
The capital of flowers is Yasukuni Jinja. We meet each other in the treetops in spring”
– Lyrical extract of Doki no Sakura

Doki no Sakura, meaning Cherry Blossoms of the same class, is a song devoted to the selfless sacrifice of ‘kamikaze’ pilots who, like a cherry blossom, would bloom in their finest hour to die momentarily. Throughout the world the act of offering your own life for another human being has been regarded as one of the most sacred acts. To commemorate such acts Emperor Meiji founded Shōkonjo, which would later be renamed to Yasukuni Jinja meaning ‘Shrine for a Peaceful Nation’, in Tōkyō (Yasukuni Jinja, 2008) in 1869. In our contemporary times Yasukuni has however become shrouded by an ideological aura of the pre-war system where it became the “citadel of military ideology” (Ohnuki-Tierney, 2002, p. 82) which it is perceived to glorify to this day (Lai, 2014, p. 117). Consequently, when one visits Yasukuni the question arises “What does one commemorate?” and although one’s answer may be very clear to oneself, the action itself carries such great ambiguity that other’s preconceptions equally so define its interpretation as the perceived identities of Yasukuni come to clash. Another layer of clashing identities appears if one fulfils this visit while holding a public diplomatic function.

Former Prime Minister (PM) Koizumi for example visited Yasukuni shrine on an annual basis during his term in office between 2001 and 2006 (Breen, 2007, p. 71) claiming his visits were with the purpose of paying respect to those men and women who gave their lives (Breen, 2007, p. 53) and to pray for peace (Breen, 2007, p. 75). These visits were nonetheless followed by strong protests by China and tended to endanger the long treacherous path of reconciliation in East Asia as each nation holds a distinct interpretation of its wartime past. Furthermore, one must not ignore the importance of the image one has been assigned by the other in shaping the other’s perception of the visit. Visits and offerings by current PM Abe, who has often been labelled as a hawkish nationalist conservative who seems to firmly belief Japan was also a victim of World War II (Johnston, 2013), have come under particular scrutiny as his image enforces Yasukuni’s militaristic past. The figure shown below illustrates the clashes of the various identities Yasukuni is perceived to hold.




Figure 1: The Clashes of Identities

With these concepts in mind this paper aims at answering the question: "What is the role of Yasukuni Jinja within Chinese-Japanese relations under the prime-ministership of Shinzo Abe (2006-2007 & 2012-present)?" Based on preliminary research this paper claims that under PM Abe Yasukuni's clashing identities have been given a greater role as a place to show assertive soft power towards China. The scope of this paper is limited to the specific role Yasukuni fulfils in Chinese-Japanese relations under the prime-ministership of Shinzo Abe (2006-2007 & 2012-present) as tensions between the two nations as well as the presence of Yasukuni in political discourse has exceptionally increased during this timeframe. The relevance of this paper is to provide a multi-perspective characterization of Yasukuni's identities and analyse its 'soft' power role in China-Japan relations during Abe's term in office. To achieve this goal this paper is structured as follows: a brief introductory section on the concept of 'soft' power, followed by two interrelated sections on the shrine's identities and finally an analysis of PM Abe in relation to his visits and offerings to Yasukuni.

The Notion of 'Soft' Power

The notion of 'soft' co-optive power was introduced in 1990 as the counterpart of hard command power by Joseph S. Nye Jr., who is an American political scientist and former Dean at Harvard University. Hard power constitutes "the ability to change what others do" (Nye, 2004, p. 7) by "ordering others to do what it wants" (Nye, 1990, p. 166) while soft power "occurs when one country gets other countries to want what it wants" (Nye, 1990, p. 166), or in other words "the ability to shape what others wants" (Nye, 2004, p. 7). As the table below illustrates, each of Nye's forms of power has distinct characteristics regarding behaviour, primary currencies and governmental policies.

Table 1: Characteristics of Nye's Hard versus Soft Power ¹

		<i>Behaviours</i>	<i>Primary currencies</i>	<i>Government policies</i>
Hard power	<i>Military power</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coercion - Deterrence - Protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Threats - Force 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Coercive diplomacy - War - Alliance
	<i>Economic power</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inducement - Coercion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Payments - Sanctions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Aid - Bribes - Sanctions
Soft power		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Attraction - Agenda setting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Values - Culture - Policies - Institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public diplomacy & bilateral & multilateral diplomacy

According to Nye's characteristics, soft power depends upon respect and admiration, which requires a degree of mutual peace and trust among nations and flourishes when fear and threats are minimal (Arase & Akaha, 2011, p. 19). The naming as well as the above mentioned characterizations hold positive and negative connotations while in reality both powers hold a duality of positive and negative within themselves.

¹ Nye, 1990, p. 167; Nye, 2004, p. 31

Japan's foreign relations perfectly exemplify this duality as its hard power is very much constrained due to Japan's constitutional limitations as well as the prohibition to act 'aggressively', yet Japan's armed forces have both domestically and abroad been involved in disaster relief and peacebuilding missions contributing to Japan's positive image on the diplomatic stage. With regards to soft power Tsuneo Akaha, who is director at the Center for East Asian Studies with the Monterey Institute of International Studies, acknowledged the presence of a "deficit of soft power" due to the conflicting historical interpretations and lack of trust between East-Asian nations (Arase & Akaha, 2011, p. 63). These conflicting historical interpretations, or clashes of identity, in fact lie at the core of the lack of trust between East-Asian nations as their representatives at times endorse their nation's interpretation. If one regards soft power to also hold a duality it would be fair to identify these endorsements as a display of assertive soft power. Whereas positive soft power seeks to attract other nations through its positive connotation, assertive soft power seeks to avert other nations' identity by endorsing a nation's own identity or by even conveying the other's as a threat. The main difference with nationalism is the principle that assertive soft power does not merely directly speak to a domestic audience, but in fact speaks to both as it seeks to provoke a reaction by other nations. To enhance its effects shows of assertive soft power are particularly undertaken during conflicting events, such as territorial disputes or tensions in the sphere of security, to heighten its provocative effectivity. Furthermore, depending on the nature of conflicting identities as well as the degree and manner of a nation's endorsement of its own identity, internationally shared norms and values of tolerance are at risk of being ignored. As this paper will exemplify through the Yasukuni controversy, assertive soft power has been a driving force behind the diplomatic stand-off between Japan and China under PM Abe in particular.

Commemoration and the Sacred

When Emperor Meiji founded Yasukuni its goal was 'for the worship of the divine spirits of those who sacrificed themselves for the country' and equally so to be 'a place for the Japanese people to pray for peace' (Yasukuni Jinja, 2008). According to Kevin Doak, who advocates Yasukuni's religious role, to commemorate and show the outmost respect to the selfless actions of those enshrined in the form of prayers that transcend the earthly for the sacred world are essential (Doak, 2007, p. 54). In his view Yasukuni can therefore be foremost regarded as a place of mourning (Breen, 2007, p. 55). One should, however, not ignore the fact that these souls have been enshrined obligatorily as the shrine determined to do so without the need for the family's consent (Saaler, 2005, p. 95). From a domestic political perspective Yasukuni has been assigned distinct roles by two dominant groups, the rightists/nationalists, and pacifists/leftists. Daiki Shibuichi, who specializes in identity politics, states that the former consider Yasukuni as a "heart-warming symbol of self-sacrifice and patriotism" representing the essence of "Japan's historical identity as a modern nation-state" (Shibuichi, 2005, p. 199) while the latter regards it as "a symbol of cruel militarism and scoff at the notion that it honours the 'spirit of the fallen' " (Shibuichi, 2005, p. 203). At the core of the perception in which many scholars and much of the media portray the controversy surrounding Yasukuni emphasizing the presence of the 14 Class A War Criminals who were secretly enshrined there in 1978 (Lai, 2014, p. 117). When this was revealed later that year it cascaded into domestic outrage as well as the diplomatic row with China that continues to this day.

They also weighed heavily on Emperor Hirohito and led to his decision to no longer visit Yasukuni, a decision which Emperor Akihito has continued to uphold. This motive was however not public knowledge until 2007 when two diary fragments written by Ryogo Urabe, who served as the Emperor's chamberlain during this troubling period, were published by the Asahi Shinbun. In response to this unveiling the Japan Society for the War Bereaved, who is the single largest sponsor of Yasukuni, set up a study group to examine the possibilities of removing and relocating those souls (Breen, 2007, p. 5). This option proved religiously impossible as according to the rituals at Yasukuni "You can transfer the flame of one candle to another, but the original candle continues to burn" meaning that even if the paper which has the soul's name inscribed upon it would be removed the person's soul would still remain with the shrine (Breen, 2007, p. 5-6). Furthermore, one could shed doubt on its effectiveness in the relations with China as in the eyes of the Chinese the Tokyo war trials were inadequate (Teo, 2007, p. 118). One could therefore envision that to truly 'purify' Yasukuni, the past of every single enshrined soul would have to be closely scrutinized by standards, which may (partially) be determined by China. Such a notion could only be perceived a grave loss of dignity for Japan as a sovereign nation (Breen, 2007, p. 63) and as such only worsen the relationship even further.

Another issue arises due to the fact that Yasukuni has been a private organisation since 1952 through the separation of religion and government, meaning it acts outside of government control. One may conclude that "the element of political ideology is too strong" making Yasukuni "inappropriate for a religious institution" (Lai, 2014, p. 117) and state the same regarding its role as a place of mourning. In much of the discourse regarding Yasukuni alternative locations such as the Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery, which commemorates the unknown soldiers of WWII, as well as the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Memorials, which commemorate the victims of the atomic bombings, are often mentioned. The former, however, lacks public recognition and has become more known as a place for *hanami*, cherry blossom viewing. In 2001 has it also only received 180,000 visitors versus the over six million who visited Yasukuni (Saaler, 2005, p. 102).

A reason for the lack of recognition is firstly due to the fact that it is officially labelled as a 'park' under the Ministry of Environment (Ministry of Environment, n.d.) and secondly visits by high ranking officials, even members of the Imperial family, gain little attention in the media. PM Abe's visit together with the Prince Akishino and his wife Princess Kiko on May 25th 2015, for example, only received a 100-word article on JapanToday (JapanToday, 2015, May 25th). It would therefore be adequate to state that Chidorigafuchi fulfils a complementary role to Yasukuni for those who do not wish to avoid its clashes of identities as U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel did in 2013 (The Japan Times, 2013, October 3^d). Nonetheless, one must always keep in mind that Yasukuni does not merely commemorate WWII militarist fanatics and some souls resting in the shrine are there by obligatory enshrinement. The clashes of identities within Yasukuni due to its religious constraint and unchangeable past, result in a vicious circle of it being a religious institution with a nationalistic past yet with there being no suitable counterpart for people to turn to.

Vivid War Memories

For the Chinese people the aforementioned vicious circle constitutes Yasukuni as a physical embodiment of the painful memories of WWII bringing forth another dimension to the clash of identities. In his PhD Victor Teo EE-Leong, amongst others, provides an in-depth analysis of the role of memories in Chinese politics. According to Teo, these memories have become so ingrained in Chinese national identity that “its elites tend to utilize it as a deterrent to reconcile nationalistic expectations and protect the nation’s sovereignty, pride and dignity” (Teo, 2007, p. 110). These perceptions can be derived from the fact that the Communist Party portrays itself as the victorious party over the Nationalist Party (Taiwanese Kuomintang) and the Japanese Imperial Army. The former ceased to be a principal enemy when the U.S. and China normalized their relations in 1979, leaving only the victory over Japan the communists’ historic pillar in saving the Chinese nation (Teo, 2007, p. 117).

This victory as well as its cost is very much kept alive in Chinese national consciousness as every year the Nanjing Massacre and the Japanese surrender are commemorated. New generations are taught in national museums such as the one at Tiananmen Square about the country’s “unfortunate” or humiliating history (Teo, 2007, p. 123; Breen, 2007, p. 63). Within these museums Japan is portrayed from two perspectives in particular. The first views Japan as a cultural protégé who “benefited tremendously from China’s cultural advances and technological development for an immeasurably long time” (Teo, 2007, p. 112). The fact that the protégé turned against the teacher has led to the perspective that “Japanese people use hatred to repay debts of kindness” (Teo, 2007, p. 112) and creates a sense of moral “debt”, or rather “debt of blood”, owed to China by the Japanese (Teo, 2007, p. 114). The second view has been developing for decades as a process of “dehumanisation” has set in, whereby the Japanese Imperial forces have become ‘horrors’ in China’s past. This perceived “horror” has become embedded at the core of Chinese identity, which consequently provides a moral judgment on the Japanese (Teo, 2007, 113) and perhaps even a sense of moral superiority. A degree of hypocrisy within this view may be observed as while the Chinese government tends to propagate anti-Japanese sentiment within their national museums they strongly condemn the exhibition of the privately owned Yūshūkan at Yasukuni (Breen, 2007, p. 63).

The Yūshūkan, being a non-governmental institution, is perceived to portray an ‘affirmative’ perspective of the war, whereby Japan fought a just war to liberate Asia from Western imperialism (Kingston, 2011, p. 187; Rose, 2015, p. 27-28). When interviewing several of the visitors to the Yūshūkan in early June with regards to whether they recognized this ‘affirmative’ perspective many of them answered negatively, yet did note that sensitive issues such as comfort women and Nanjing receive far too little attention (Koolen, observation, June 5-6, 2015). It is this very perspective of the war which clashes with China as it induces Chinese memories of past humiliations and suffering, which consequently triggers a clash of identities (Lai, 2014, p. 118). Surprisingly, a key figure in post-1949 Chinese identity, Mao Zedong, himself had once made remarks to visiting Japanese delegates that “China should not seek reparations because it was due to Japanese aggression that the CCP was able to defeat the Nationalists” (Friedman, 2001, p. 106).

Some scholars would however claim that the Chinese government has utilized this clash of identities to exert moral pressure as a diplomatic strategy to obtain economic or diplomatic concessions

(Teo, 2007, 114). Whether one agrees with this statement or not, it cannot be denied that memory politics has become one of the most critical foreign policy questions in East-Asia (Fukuoka, 2013, p. 28).

Yasukuni As a Source of ‘Soft’ Power

Having established the various identities of Yasukuni as a religious institution, place of commemoration and embodiment of war memories, one starts to wonder how these clashes have become the major obstacle for Chinese-Japanese relations. The missing piece of this puzzle lies in the perception of the person visiting Yasukuni. According to Jeff Kingston, commemorating at Yasukuni means one embraces an affirmative war memory of Japan’s actions during WWII (Kingston, 2011, p. 187). Such a narrow perception could be seen a direct insult to both those non-militarists enshrined at Yasukuni as well as those who pay their respects there. The visitors to Yasukuni are in fact of a diverse nature and encompass all layers of Japanese, and international, society and hold widespread political beliefs. They visit the shrine for a variety of personal motives including praying for their fallen family members as well as genuinely praying for peace. Nonetheless, because of the presence of these perceptions such as these the profile of the person who visits Yasukuni is of far greater importance in terms of enforcing the Chinese-Japanese diplomatic ‘stand-off’ as well as the potential of visits serving as a show of assertive soft power. To present a thorough analysis in determining whether or not certain visits and offerings to Yasukuni by Abe constitute as assertive soft power this section of the paper is divided in several subsections. The first subsection presents the timeframe before Abe took office as PM for his second term. The second subsection determines a pattern during this second term in office while the subsequent subsections elaborate on those events which qualify as a show assertive soft power considering the characteristics mentioned in the first section of this paper. It is, however, paramount to state that visits by officials tend to be shrouded in the ambiguity of whether they are performed in an official or private capacity. Although one might argue the capacity determines the transcendence of one’s visit from a domestic to a diplomatic issue, for the Chinese, as shall be discussed in greater depth momentarily, capacity does not change the act.

From restraint to the clash

Before taking office for the first time as PM Abe held the position of Chief Cabinet Secretary under PM Koizumi and joined him in his final annual visit to Yasukuni in 2006 in the midst of heightened tensions with South Korea on territorial disputes. Koizumi’s visits were highly controversial amongst Japan’s neighbours while domestically the following sentiment took root “Japan has apologized for the war on many occasion ... but the neighbours will never be satisfied” (Tamagi, 2009, p. 40). When Abe himself took office as PM of Japan for his first term in 2006 he seemed to break away from the controversy when he stated “I have no intention whatsoever to make a declaration that I will go to the shrine” and in his view “it is important that we can genuinely communicate in a future-oriented manner”(Tamagi, 2009, p. 43).

Although Abe did not visit Yasukuni in his first term he did not avoid the controversy entirely due to his continuous association with the following political groups in particular:

Table 2: Shinzō Abe's affiliations ²

Groups	Advocating
Jimintou rekishi kentou iinkai (Abe was a key founding member in 1993)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Affirmative representation of history. – Retraction of the Kono Statement on comfort women as well as PM Morihiro's general apology to victims of Japanese aggression.
Nippon no zento to rekishi kyokasho wo kangaeru giin no kai	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Textbook revisions regarding issues such as Nanking and comfort women. – Cultivation of patriotic values.
Shintou seiiji renmei kokkai giin kondankai	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – To "restore Japanese-ness" by promoting Shinto values. – Official visits by prime ministers to Yasukuni Shrine. – Opposed the construction of a non-religious site of war commemoration. – Opposed to the 'removal' of the spirits of war criminals from Yasukuni. – Patriotic and moral education.
Minna de Yasukuni Jinja ni sanpai suru giin no kai	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Annual joint visits to Yasukuni to commemorate the war dead in August.

The first two groups are generally labelled as 'revisionist' groups as they wish to reinterpret wartime memories as well as several inheritances of the Occupation, such as the Constitution. Abe's revisionist beliefs manifested itself when he published his book "*Utsukushii kuni e*", which translates to "*Toward a Beautiful Country*" in English. In his book, Abe presents a revisionist claim regarding the unfairness of the Tokyo War Tribunals (Arase & Akaha, 2011, p. 64-65). These 'revisionist' interpretations of Japan's wartime past lay at the core of the use of assertive soft power when they are challenged by China as many of the conservative politicians believe that China uses wartime memories as a diplomatic strategy.

Nonetheless, during his first term Abe did set out to mend relations with China and South Korea which was a reasonably popular policy amongst the Japanese public (Arase & Akaha, p. 78-79). However, when looking back on his first term during his campaigning for the LDP presidency in 2012 Abe stated that he regretted not having visited Yasukuni at the time (Nakamoto, 2012). The tensions between Japan and China flared up during these times as Japan bought out the private owner of the three Senkaku Islands it did not yet control. This action led to anti-Japanese riots throughout mainland China. Abe at the time strongly advocated taking a tough stand against China over this territorial dispute (McCurry, 2013). When he was elected by the LDP as party president he kept both these promises by visiting Yasukuni for the first time since his visit under Koizumi in 2006. Having avoided a clash with China

² Japan Focus, 安倍内閣 所属団体を通してのイデオロギー的分析, 2013

during his first term it is undeniable that Abe knew all too well how this action would be perceived by China. His visit did therefore not merely serve to harness the endorsement of the revisionist LDP supporters, but also to show assertive soft power to China as a symbolic break from his former restraints as well as his willingness to take a tough stand on conflicting issues.

The formation of an annual pattern

A few weeks later the LDP regained its dominance in the Diet and Abe became the next Prime Minister of Japan. In his victory speech he again emphasized that regarding Chinese-Japanese relations "We must strengthen our alliance with the US and also improve relations with China, with a strong determination that there is no change in the fact that the Senkaku Islands are our territory" (McCurry, 2013). Abe from this point onward would regularly send offerings to Yasukuni. These offerings are sent during key annual Yasukuni events, being the Spring Festival and the Memorial Service of the War Dead. Although some of these offerings are presented at times of heightened tensions between China and Japan over wartime inheritance issues, these dates do hold important religious and commemorative meanings. The former, for example, has a strong religious nature as it is a type of festival common in Shintō while the latter mostly carries a commemorative function. Furthermore, Abe presents these offerings annually and one could state that they are at the base of his annual pattern of reaching out to Yasukuni. The offerings presented in April and August therefore do not hold a sense of irregularity to constitute them as a means of assertive soft power. Nonetheless, reactions from both sides regarding these offerings have set a 'status quo' in their discourse on the issue. In April 2013 for example, after several members of Abe's cabinet visited the shrine China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' spokeswoman Hua Chunying stated that it "doesn't matter how or in what role Japanese leaders visit the Yasukuni shrine ... We feel it is in essence a denial of Japan's history of militarist invasion". A few days later during a parliamentary debate in the Japanese Diet Abe stated that "It's only natural to honor the spirits of those who gave their lives for the country. Our ministers will not cave in to any threats" (Sekiguchi, 2013). This last remark in particular reveals that Abe perceives the visits as well as the offerings to Yasukuni as being a matter of showing the resolve of his cabinet.

The first clash

The offering presented a few months later, during Yasukuni's autumn festival in October 2013, is a first irregularity in Abe's pattern as it has been the only reported offering from Abe for this festival. From a political perspective one must consider it as an occasion for Abe to show assertive soft power at times tensions with China are heightened or in expectation of them becoming so. It is the latter which would fit to describe this offering as Abe in an interview with The Wall Street Journal only a few days later would make the bold statement that Japan is ready to stand up against China. In this interview he for example stated that "Japan is expected to exert leadership not just on the economic front, but also in the field of security in the Asia-Pacific" and that "there are concerns that China is attempting to change the status quo by force, rather than by rule of law. But if China opts to take that path, then it won't be able to emerge peacefully." (Baker & Nishiyama, 2013).

By following up the irregular offering with such a bold statements it reveals Abe's intended assertive soft power towards China. Its specific message being that Abe's government will stand vast on their determination for Japan to play an increasing role and even take up a leadership role in the security sphere in the Asia-Pacific.

The backlash

On December 26th 2013 to celebrate his Cabinet's first year in office Abe visited Yasukuni for the first time as PM and also making it the first visit by a Japanese PM since Koizumi's last annual visit seven years before. As a surprise to Abe his visit did not only stir up Japan's relationship with China but also caused a minor row with Japan's longstanding ally the U.S. In response to the visit the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo stated that "Japan is a valued ally and friend. Nevertheless, the United States is disappointed that Japan's leadership has taken an action that will exacerbate tensions with Japan's neighbors". A senior fellow at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations added that the visit "will hurt Japan, especially since it came at a time when there were signs of improvement in Japan's future prospects". Furthermore, according to an article in The Asahi Shimbun on the matter some specialists in the U.S. view the visit as "an intentional snub against the Obama administration" (Oshima, 2013).

Abe's visit also resulted in numerous Chinese officials fiercely condemning his visit. China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the visit had pushed Japan in an "extremely dangerous" direction and that "Japan must bear full responsibility for the serious political consequences". The situation even led the Japanese embassy in Beijing to warn Japanese nationals "to stay away from any demonstrations and to not congregate in big groups" as well as issuing a surprisingly assertive message to Abe himself stating that: "In dealing with Chinese people, pay attention to your behavior and your language." (Slodkowski & Sieg, 2013). This broad international critique truly came as a surprise as Abe's special adviser Isao Iijima admitted in his book "Pressure Points in Politics" (Seiji no Kyusho) stating that at the time they were convinced that "... Xi Jinping, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, is a leader who is beyond complaining about this and that over issues like these" and a visit could engage China in a bilateral dialogue (Hayashi, 2014). Using the visit to serve this purpose exemplifies the misconceived concept of soft power on these men's part as, after more than a decade of highly emotional bilateral dialogues, China's resolve on the issue should have been clear. Spokesperson Qin formulates this sentiment very clearly in his press conference stating that due to "Abe's hypocrisy" it is "[i]n fact it is Abe himself who shuts the door on dialogue with Chinese leaders.

The Chinese people do not welcome him" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs – PRC, 2013). The Chinese state news agency Xinhua even went further claiming that "Instead of a pledge against war, as Abe has claimed, the visit is a calculated provocation to stoke further tension." (Slodkowski & Sieg, 2013), or in other words a show of assertive soft power. Perhaps in preparation to this international critique or through early warning Abe sought to defend his action by releasing a statement named "*Pledge for everlasting peace*" the same day. In his statement Abe emphasized that his visit was to express his condolences and renew his "determination ... to firmly uphold the pledge never to wage war again" (Kantei, 2013). Interestingly he also mentions that he visited Chinreisha, a small shrine to the south of Yasukuni's main hall which commemorates all war dead regardless of their nationality.

The existence of Chinreisha within the Yasukuni precinct is not well known due to its somewhat 'hidden' location outside the main complex (Koolen, observation, June 5-6, 2015). In his closing remarks Abe expressed that it is "regrettable" that visiting Yasukuni has become a diplomatic issue but "[it] is not my intension at all the hurt the feelings of the Chinese and Korean people". This statement, however, even worsened the situation further as China reacted even more fiercely a few days later. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang in his regular press conference claimed that "Abe has been playing a double game in China-Japan relations ever since he took office" and that Abe's actions in fact "jeopardize the overall interests of China-Japan relations and hurt the feeling of the Chinese people" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs – PRC, 2013). Such a fierce reaction from China as well as the U.S.' 'disappointment' seem to have convinced Abe to be more careful in his visits as he has not visited Yasukuni or made any irregular offerings up till this paper's time of writing.



Conclusion

In conclusion, the conflicting historical interpretations, or clashes of identity, which lie at the core of the troubled relationship between China and Japan physically manifest themselves in Yasukuni Jinja. Once ‘a place for the Japanese people to pray for peace’, this identity clashes with its unchangeable wartime identity as ‘a citadel of militarism’. Today this clash has become so fierce that Yasukuni to some has become inappropriate to fulfil a role as a religious institution or place of mourning. For those supporting an ‘affirmative’ interpretation of Japan’s wartime history Yasukuni remains a “heart-warming symbol of self-sacrifice and patriotism” while for the Chinese people the shrine induces painful memories of past humiliations and suffering. These memories have become ingrained in their own national identity and are very much kept alive, which brings forth another clash of identities whereby both China and Japan claim to be a victim of World War II. In Japan some have even come to argue that the Chinese government has utilized this clash to exert moral pressure as a diplomatic strategy. As this paper has, however, shown the Japanese government under PM Abe has, through Yasukuni, used this very same clash to show of assertive soft power towards China.

When Abe took office as PM of Japan for his first term in 2006 he avoided visiting Yasukuni, yet his continuous association with ‘revisionist’ groups supporting the affirmative interpretation remained very much present and continued to enforce his hawkish, nationalistic image. When looking back on his first term in 2012 Abe stated that he regretted not having visited Yasukuni at the time and it would in fact be from this moment onward that Yasukuni became ever more incorporated in both his domestic and diplomatic strategy of showing assertive soft power. Whenever the tensions between Japan and China heightened over for example territorial disputes or security issues visits or offerings to Yasukuni symbolized Abe’s willingness to take a tough stand on conflicting issues. These assertive manoeuvres tend to be followed by China’s strong condemnation of any form of association with the above mentioned affirmative identity manifested in the shrine. The backlash of the December 26th 2013 visit, however, came as a surprise to Abe. Although he sought to defend his action with his “Pledge for everlasting peace”-statement it only worsened the situation further as for the Chinese it confirmed their perception of it being a show of assertive soft power against them. As the clashes between the identities of Yasukuni, China and Japan through assertive soft power take an ever-growing role on the diplomatic stage, the question remains whether China and Japan in their struggle choose to brush aside the internationally accepted value of tolerance amongst people.

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Security for Development: Tun Abdul Razak's National Security Strategy

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Abstract

In the case of Malaysia, even though, *First Emergency* (1948-1960) was declared over in 1960, the communist illegal activities led by Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) were still continuously active. Their illegal activities were the major threats towards the fragile structure of multi-ethnic society in Malaysia. The objective of this paper is to identify the national security strategy crafted during Tun Abdul Razak's premiership in 1970s that contribute to the success of countering communist insurgents. This period of low-intensity conflict between the Government of Malaysia and CPM also known as the *Second Emergency* (1969-1989) was a tough and challenging phase of Malaysia to ensure its survival as the sovereign state. For the purpose of this research, focus on case study of Northern State Peninsula of Malaysia to analyze the implementation and consequences of strategy. The paper discovers Tun Abdul Razak's national security strategy to counter communist insurgents does not solely rely on the usage of hard power but together with non-kinetic approaches through the internal development strategy led to victory on the side of government to end the illegal guerrilla activities of Communist insurgents and unite the population in Malaysia. The collapse of CPM in Malaysia, with the signed treaty of surrender for peace or known as Hatyai Peace Accord in year 1989 indicated the efficacious of national security strategy crafted by the Malaysian government.

Keywords: National security, socio-political, socio-economic, second emergency

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Introduction

The *Second Emergency* (1968-1989) was the most critical period for the survival of Malaysia. It is because even though the state of Malaysia had obtained its independence in 1957, the Communist insurgents' illegal guerrilla warfare activities led by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) were still active. Their activities contributed as a major threat to the authorities. The undeclared *Second Emergency* or low-intensity conflict (LIC) between the Government of Malaysia and CPM was then further continued and lasted until the CPM surrendered through the Hatyai Peace Accord in December 1989.

The objective of this paper is to highlight the strategic approaches crafted by the Malaysian Government through Security and Development (KESBAN) strategy deployed throughout the period of Tun Abdul Razak's era. KESBAN was taken from the combination of Malay words Security or '*Keselamatan*' and Development or '*Pembangunan*'. KESBAN's strategic approaches were originally crafted by the Second Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak Bin Hussien Al-Haj in the early 1970s during his tenure as *Premiership* and his strategy was carried forward by his successors. His belief that both defence and development be two sides of the same coin then indoctrinated in KESBAN strategy.

It is noted that being a multi-ethnic society, it is a very tough and challenging task for Malaysia's authorities to control the infiltration of CPM's propaganda to subvert the population using ethnic propaganda. CPM's technique of propaganda gained support from the majority ethnic Chinese as most of their leadership and membership were from the Chinese ethnic group (Ruhanas, 2009).

The case of CPM's continuous aggression in Malaysia was mostly in the literatures of Counterinsurgency (COIN) portrayed more during the *First Malayan Emergency* (1948-1960). The COIN operation by the British from experiences in the *First Emergency* was somehow being the classic military references of COIN as a rare model of an insurgency defeated by the state and a successive COIN operation (Kaplan, 2013). This left a huge gap in the literatures, COIN between *First* and *Second Emergency* in the case of Malaysia that consist of a multi-ethnic society. For the purpose of this paper, the COIN strategic approaches by the Malaysian government will be discussed using the KESBAN strategy as one of the successful COIN paradigms in countering the communist insurgents.

Second Malaysian Emergency: Communist Insurgents & Racial Riot

The undeclared *Second Emergency* period started after the incident of racial riot in May 1969 (Yadi, 2004). The study of KESBAN strategy in the structure of a multi-ethnic society in Malaysia, is a unique case on how the state deployed strategy to ensure their survival. Taking example of Samuel Huntington (1997) on his clash of civilizations in the case of Malaysia, somehow, back in 1969, the clash between two major ethnic groups in Malaysia, the Malay and Chinese seem that his hypothesis is almost correct but then looking back, Malaysia as a sovereign state still survives until this day.

CPM's guerrilla warfare strategy as highlighted on the report prepared by National Operations Council (NOC) after the incident of racial riot 1969 was sleek cunning as they able to manipulated racial issues via politics and economic to mobilize support of population and weaken the nation by instill hatred through their propaganda of the *hearts and minds* towards the population. CPM is the organized Communist party and was formed in April 1930 after the dissolution of Nanyang Communist Party of Singapore and their struggle is to transform Malaysia into the Communist Republic (Comber, 2009). But then after *First Malayan Emergency* ended, the Malaysian government did not acknowledge their guerrilla activities and this led them to continue their subversion strategy toward population. Taking the definition of Insurgency from Dictionary of International Relations (1998) Insurgency is an armed rebellion against an establishment system of government and this definition suits with CPM continuous guerrilla struggle to topple the government of the day (Evans & Newnham, 1998).

It is a challenging period for Malaysia government especially during Tun Abdul Razak's premiership to find the right strategy that 'fit' into the conceptualization of Malaysia's national security. Looking back the security posture in International politics was not stable because of the Cold War and the financial support of People's Republic of China (PRC) to CPM's guerrilla activities in Malaysia motivated their second wave of Communist armed struggle (Ward & Mirafior, 2003).

Racial riot incident in 1969 gave hint to the political leaders of Malaysia, to take a necessary action and abandon 'divide and rule' strategy, which does not work well anymore in the multi-ethnic society in Malaysia. Thus, Malaysian government crafted KESBAN strategy to protect national security and provide national unity within the society.

KESBAN : The Malaysian COIN Paradigm

Security and Development or KESBAN was the strategy used by the Malaysian government during the premiership of Tun Abdul Razak to counter Communist insurgents and unite the population after the racial riot. It is clear that Tun Abdul Razak through his vast experience as the Minister of Rural Development and Minister of Defence before he became the Prime Minister of Malaysia, realized that internal development is important to ensure better security posture of Malaysia.

“...the primary task of armed forces is to fight the communists, but at the same time they must also help implement the government development plan. This is part of the fight against communists. Defence and development go hand in hand” (Yadi, 2004).

The strategy emphasizes two most important facets, internal security and internal development. The divisions of strategy involve of security forces, both military (MAF) and police in safeguarding internal security and civil governmental agencies taking role for the development aspect.

KESBAN strategy deployed by Malaysian government as early in 1970 but it was formally legislated later as Directive No 11 in February 1980.

KESBAN constitutes the sum total of all measures undertaken by the Malaysian Armed Forces and other government agencies to strengthen and protect society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency (Jawhar, 2011).

There are three objectives of KESBAN as the COIN paradigm includes closing the linkage between the communist insurgents and population, gaining the trust of the people not only the Malays but also the minority ethnic groups and enhancing the twining program of security and development.

Implementation of KESBAN Strategy: A Case Study

At this juncture it is appropriate to provide a general and historical background of the area of our case study. The Upper Perak district bordering Kelantan state on the east, Thailand in the north and Kedah in north-west. In the past, Upper Perak was among the least developed areas of Peninsular Malaysia as well as a sparsely populated region. At the same time, it was also known as a region of 'safe haven' for the communist insurgents – cum – guerrilla fighters.

CPM with communist guerrillas as its military wing had its beginning during the Japanese occupation of the then colonial Malaya between January 1942 and September 1945. Its predecessor was The Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army or MPAJA, formed by the British to help the latter fight against Japanese invasion during World War II. After Japanese surrender, the MPAJA as an organization continued to exist in the form of CPM, but with a different aim, that was to fight the British colonialist in order to free Malaya from foreign domination. Its covert aim was to convert Malaya into a socialist-communist republic, aligned with China and the Soviet Union.

As mentioned above, Upper Perak region or district had been regarded as a 'safe haven' by the communist insurgents, whereby a corridor was formed in the deep tropical jungle as an escape route into Thailand. Way back in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, ambush towards military vehicles or the burning of busses and derailed of trains were quite a common occurrence. The discussion for this paper shall be narrowed down to only three government development programmes namely the **Felda land scheme**, the **East West Highway** and the **Temenggor dam** projects which falls under the KESBAN special projects. All these have a long-term effects of curtailing the activities of communist guerrillas, and at the same time having a long term benefits to the population at large.

The Federal Land Development Authority Scheme (FELDA)

The Felda land scheme formulated in early 1960s was with the aim of providing land to the landless rural population where the government had a direct involvement in the selection of settlers, providing the necessary infrastructure and financial aid as a form of loan to be repaid on a long term basis. The basic aim was to ensure a successful amelioration of the conditions of the rural poor from poverty. The programme had been implemented nationwide in all the nine Malay states in the Malay Peninsula. The indirect or latent aim was to win the *heart and mind* of the people so as not to be attracted to communist ideology.

At the end of Tun Razak's stewardship as a Prime Minister in 1976, there were already 108 Felda settlement schemes located all over Peninsular Malaysia with a total 41,288 households settled in these state farms. Approximately 50% of the schemes were planted with rubber trees while the other 50% with oil palm (Baharin & Parera, 1977). By 1980, the area cultivated had reached 1,301,382 acres.

In the sub-district of upper Perak, there was a Felda settlement located some 10km from the town of Gerik on the Gerik-Jeli or East-West Highway which was constructed in the 1970s. This scheme had 320 households was one of the earliest Felda schemes in the country, opened in early 1960s (Wan Hashim, 1976). In a fieldwork conducted in 1975, out of a total of 160 household interviewed, 64% were formerly engaged in agriculture as landless peasants, 15% consisted of ex-servicemen (police and armed forces), and 6% were engaged in miscellaneous economic activities (Wan Hashim, 1976).

Without doubt, Felda settlement scheme has been one of the success stories of Malaysian style 'land reform' with the main aim of improving the living standard of landless peasants and workers by transforming them into middle peasants-smallholders, each owning some 10 acres of rubber land or palm oil. Surely, these rural 'middle peasants' would never be attracted to any propaganda or attempts to convert them as followers of communism. In fact, they became as bastion or protector of democratic form of government and liberal-capitalist socio-economic system.

East -West Highway between Gerik and Jeli

Before the completion of a federal highway in middle of 1970s that linked Gerik in Upper Perak with Jeli in Kelantan, people from the east-coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu who wished to travel to the west coast states of Peninsular Malaysia like Perak, Kedah, Pahang and Perlis had to travel via southern Thailand or through Kuala Lumpur in the south and proceed north making a travelling distance of more than 600km. After the completion of the East West highway, the distance had been reduced to only one-third or approximately 200km.

Facilitating the movement of population between the east coast and west coast states was only a part of its wider programme. More important was to transfer people into this undeveloped jungle area to become a developed region with settled population. This would end the remoteness and isolation of this thickly covered jungle area. In other words, it was a direct encroachment of the government and the civilian population into the so -called 'safe haven' of the communist guerrilla fighters.

The construction of this highway did not undergo smoothly without incident and harassment by the militant communist guerrillas. Workers travelling daily into and out of the area under construction had to be escorted by military personnel and vehicles. There were several military outposts being formed at a certain distance along the highway. Clearly, the CPM had realised that the presence of the East-West highway would affect their freedom of movement in the area and the Upper Perak equatorial forest was no more 'a safe haven' to them.

The Temenggor Dam Project

The third KESBAN program that saw a direct encroachment of government development project into the so-called 'safe haven' of CPM communist insurgents was the Temenggor hydro-electric dam project which started construction in 1970s. It was also a two pranged approaches, that was to provide electric power supply nation-wide and at the same time to flood the river valleys in the surrounding areas of Perak river with a huge man-made lake such that a relatively large land-mass in the area between the states of Perak and Pahang would be covered with water. While the dam under construction, there was a process of resettlement of Malay and the aboriginal or Orang Asli (original people) villages into areas uphill not effected by the formation of man-made lake in the area. Two Malay villages, Kampung Belum and Kampung Kuala Temenggor were re-located in the more development part of the district acquiring a new name of Kampung Belum Baru and Kampung Ganda Temenggor. All families were provided with agricultural land for cultivation.

The creation of Temenggor Lake had achieved its intended consequences of encroaching and destroying the so-called 'safe haven' of the communist guerrillas and cutting its entire jungle path that connected southern Thailand with north and central Perak. After the completion of the Temenggor dam in late 1970s, communist guerrilla activities was greatly reduce. But from the view point of development, the construction of Temenggor dam had a long-term consequences that the area had since became a tourist attraction not because of the natural beauty of the surrounding environment, but also because the area which has been gazetted as 'The Royal Belum' appear to be one of the oldest and well preserved rain-forest in the country.

Conclusion

For a new nation-state like Malaya and later Malaysia, the struggle to maintain the nation's integrity in facing threats from the CPM to overthrow the democratically elected government was a hard and bitter one.

At its early phase after the declaration of emergency rule in 1948 when Malaya was still under the British, General Sir Gerald Templar, the British High Commissioner had introduced the concept or principle of "*winning the heart and mind of the people*". By cutting off contact between Chinese rural population and the communist guerrillas confining them into 'new villages' which were surrounded by barbed-wires, the guerrillas were denied of food supplies and including man-power. This had helped to confine their activities in the jungle.

But then, during the *Second Emergency* period, government of Malaysia had to find a new and more effective strategy to counter communist insurgents through a guard design strategy of security and development. Overall, the security and development strategy deployed especially during Tun Abdul Razak premiership helped to ensure the survival of Malaysia.

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