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***Perceiving What Comes After War is ‘Natural’: Women Ex-soldiers in Post Conflict Aceh, Indonesia***

Sait Abdulah, National Institute of Public Administration, Indonesia

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**Abstract**

This paper focuses on the Free Aceh Movement or *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM) women ex-soldiers in the post-Helsinki agreement period. This article argues that the patriarchal dividend in the form of material reward and higher social standing gained by the GAM ex-commanders from the peace process are sustained through militarised masculinist ideology in domesticating women ex-soldiers into families and subsuming them into the mainstream GAM ex-military organization (the Aceh Transition Commission or the KPA, *Komite Peralihan Aceh*). The research findings confirmed that women ex-soldiers’ subordination has been ‘taken for granted’ by their ex-commanders. The taken-for-granted-ness of the ex-commander’s view on women ex-soldiers in the post conflict Aceh was as an effect of the gendered power relations. As a result the ex-commanders presumed women ex-soldiers’ return as going back into ‘normal’. Women ex-soldiers’ return was presumed by their ex-commanders as going back into their families, back into society as ordinary girls or women in villages. Although to some extent their ex-commanders still ‘recognized’ them as part of the GAM insurgency movement, in fact their post conflict retained military status was different from their male counterpart. The women were called by their ex-commanders as ‘passive soldiers’ or ‘supporting soldiers’.

Keywords: Gender, GAM, Women Ex-Soldiers, Militarised Masculinist Ideology

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## Introduction

In this paper I argue that the patriarchal dividend in the form of material reward and higher social standing gained by the ex-commanders from the peace process are sustained through militarised masculinist ideology in domesticating women ex-soldiers into families and subsuming women ex-soldiers into the mainstream GAM ex-military organization (KPA).

However, unlike the male civilian elite and rank and file ex-soldiers who were strategically marginalised, women ex-soldiers' subordination has been 'taken for granted' by their ex-commanders. The taken-for-granted-ness of the ex-commanders' view on women ex-combatant return in post conflict Aceh is arguably as an effect of the gendered power relations structuring the logic of masculinity of the ex-commanders. As a result the ex-commanders presumed women ex-soldiers' return as going back into 'habitat' (normal). Women ex-soldiers 'return' was presumed by their ex-commanders as going back into their families, back into society as ordinary girls or women in *gampoeng* (villages). Although to some extent their ex-commanders still 'recognized' them as part of the GAM insurgency movement, in fact their post conflict retained military status was different from their male counterpart. They were called by their ex-commanders and male comrade as reserve 'soldiers', 'passive soldiers' and 'supporting soldiers' who are not like 'a real soldier who carried a gun and fought in the battle'. Hence, female ex-soldiers are having lower status than male ex-fighters and gain less material reward from the post conflict reintegration.

Having been recognised as female ex-soldiers under the GAM insurgency movement, women ex-soldiers were perceived by the ex-commanders as part of the spirit of the corps as the GAM movement. In the eyes of their ex-commanders, the female ex-soldiers are 'our *inong balee* corps' although they did not directly fought in war. They are seen as their 'daughters' and 'sisters' who supported the GAM insurgency movement. Yet, in the current civilian context, to legitimate their interests in the form of high status standing and power as ex-commanders, the ex-commanders require women group who accept and maintain the militaristic masculine ideology of great warrior men who fought and suffer most from war compared to the other male GAM civilian elites. In this sense, the female ex-soldiers' positions are important in extolling the glorification of their ex-commanders as the great contributor of the bloody armed conflict as well as the protector of *bangsa* Aceh (Acehnese). This is also done through the inclusion of the female ex-soldiers group in the KPA patronage network organizations such as '*Putro Aceh*' that subsume them into the ex-commanders' interests in local political power contestation.

This paper is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the concept of logic masculinity. The second section elaborates on what has post conflict reintegration done to female ex-soldiers. The third discusses perceiving what comes after war is natural. Finally, the last part of the paper describes the conclusion.

## The concept of the logic of masculinity

I use the term 'the logic masculinity' to explain how and why the ex-commanders treated female ex-soldiers in their return into the post conflict society in Aceh. I do this for two reasons. Firstly, the term logic of masculinity inherently entails the

explanation of how formal properties of masculinity effect the way the ex-commanders, which is all belong to men in high status and power (ex-commanders) see the post conflict situation regardless of the quality and content of their masculinities. Secondly, the logic of masculinity echoed by Hutching (in Parpart et al, 2008a and 2008b) covers the logic of contrast and contradiction embedded in the concept of masculinity itself which is understood as power relations link to the gendered division of labour and hierarchy of power.

The terms logic of masculinity developed by Hutching, refers to an understanding that masculinity is ‘a resource of thought for our framework to see the world’ (Hutching in Parpart et al, 2008a). It is a fundamental way of seeing how masculinity has functioned as ‘a cognitive short cut’ in our mind regardless the attribute and quality attached to men and masculinity or in ways that masculinity operates to negate the trait and quality inherently embedded in women and femininity (Hutching in Parpart et al, 2008a). Masculinity has always been regarded as ‘a stable and coherent meaning’ and it strongly influences and structures our thinking (Hutching in Parpart et al, 2008a). According to Hutching (in Parpart et al, 2008a), the reason why masculinity operates as a logical thinking and framework to assume a wide a range of social scientific phenomena particularly in international politics is because masculinity entails a logic of contrast and contradiction. The logic of contrast provides masculinity ‘flexibility and malleability and enable change’ in way that masculinity is able to legitimate a given contrast (higher versus lower, active versus passive). The logic of contradiction gives masculinity ‘as a fixed-value hierarchy’ and distinctions which make things are different and eventually value masculinity over femininity (Hutching in Parpart et al, 2008a).

Hutching approach in understanding masculinity as a reference or resource of thought in gender relations (masculinity and femininity) is useful to analyse the taken for granted of gender assumption. The logic of contrast and contradiction in her analysis covers the dualism principle in gender ideology of separate sphere, negation and valorisation of the one over the other. The strength of her framework is in way that gender power structure is sharply crystallised into the logic of masculinity concept in which she explained why and how masculinity operates as a frame of thinking and its implication on dualistic opposition principle and valoration of the one over the other. It has covered more or less the notion of gender structure explained by the feminists like Connell (1987, 1995) and Young (2002, 2003) - in which they distil and breakdown the concept of gender structure into three interconnected aspects: gender division of labour, normative heterosexuality and hierarchy of power.

### **What has post-conflict reintegration done to female ex-soldiers?**

It has been almost a decade since Helsinki peace agreement concluded 30 years of bloody armed conflict with the Indonesian military forces. Yet little has been known about the fate of female ex-soldiers group under the *Pasukan Inong Balee* (the PIB), a division of the GAM military female soldiers. Based on the GAM military structure, the PIB was part of the GAM military wing (Schulze 2003). The PIB’s position in military tasks was pivotal to underpin the GAM armed movement. As the GAM battalion they underwent military training and had significant military skills as intelligence unit and logistic surveyor (Schulze 2003, Uning undated).

In post conflict situation, Uning (undated) has indicated that the reintegration program for women did little to improve their economic life since they received fewer resources from the program than the male ex-soldiers. Some women ex-soldiers revealed their disappointment with the current peace process as their contributions during the conflict have been considered unimportant by the current reintegration program (Uning, undated). Although Uning's research on female ex-soldiers provides important point for the women ex-soldiers' social and economic condition after DDR process, her study is very limited and lacking analytical framework of gender power relations underpinning the distribution of reintegration resources to the women ex-soldiers.

Reintegration of the GAM combatants was mainly channelled to the GAM military hierarchy and highly controlled by the GAM leaders particularly the ex-commanders. Although the formal process of reintegration was institutionally monitored by the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in conjunction with the Indonesian government as well as the local authority such the Aceh Reintegration Board (the BRA) but in practice it was the ex-commanders who dictate how should combatants be reintegrated into Aceh community. Women ex-soldiers were not included on the reintegration list as the ex-commanders were afraid of the sexual abused committed by the TNI once the peace agreement broken. Female ex-soldiers were formally unregistered by their commanders as they claimed that they had to protect female bodies from sexual abuse committed by the TNI (Braithwaite, et al, 2010). Though the GAM leaders did not elaborate more in this sense but it was assumed that if the female were included as targeted group of reintegration beneficiaries while the peace collapsed then women would be targeted as victim of sexual harassment (Braithwaite, et al, 2010). In the process of fund disbursement, not single women ex-fighter' name was on the list provided by the GAM commanders. The 3000 demobilised ex-combatant mentioned on the list was totally men. In this particular issue, nothing that the AMM, the BRA and the local government could do instead of agreeing whatever the GAM wanted to do with the list of men they given to the BRA.

### **Discussion: perceiving of what comes after war is 'natural'**

The return of the *Pasukan Inong Balee* (women ex-soldiers) into Acehnese community has been operating in a broader context of power relations linked to the larger interests of their ex-commanders group. Nothing that women ex-soldiers can do instead they reintegrate themselves of what their ex-commanders have called 'natural reintegration'. Female ex-soldiers' resilience with their community, comeback and rejoice the peace with members of family. To gain an understanding of why and how women ex-soldiers subordination into domestic or private live by their ex-commanders is to chart a larger pattern of power relations in how the ex-commander interest over high status and power is geared toward an ideological masculinist logic to rationalise a dominant position of men over women in society.

Some of the ex-commanders justify the return of the women ex-soldiers into domestic lives by using the word 'women are back into their habitat'. For the ex-commanders, the term 'habitat' refers the family as a site of gender construction leading to the legitimation of their masculinity. This trajectory is not just simply justifying the power of the elite ex-commanders through the patriarchal gender order already established in Aceh but it is broadly linked to the larger ex-commanders' interests of

sustaining their patriarchal dividend in both material and non-material rewards of peace building process and outcomes. In this particular context I analyse the family in relation to both explanation of the power of male dominant position in a gender patriarchal order and the gendered division of labour in family that legitimate the subordination of women ex-soldiers either to their men (their male counterpart or the husbands for the female ex-soldiers who are already got married and to the high status and the power of the elite ex-commanders).

In the gender patriarchal order like Aceh, family as a social institution is matter. It is important for women and men as heterosexual couples bounded with marriage and comply with a gender social arrangement that organize a husband is a head of household and decision maker in family (Meghdadi 2009). Or if women ex-soldiers are still single they might stay close to their extended family including mother, father, siblings and some include grant mother live in together in the same house. However, it is the father or husband who has larger authority to decide matters related with the family.

In post-conflict Aceh, family is a place where female ex-soldiers currently and mostly live with. Women ex-soldiers, in the eyes of ex-commanders, are perceived as ordinary family members, as daughters, widows, and little sisters. They are *urinueng* (Acehnese's term for women). The GAM ex-commanders portray that female ex-soldiers' reintegration is resembling to the return to family members in *gampong*, village sort of family gathering with mother, father and siblings or raise a new family, husband and wife. Although they could not mention in detail how many female ex-soldiers had come back to their family yet they claimed that in majority, women ex-soldiers involved in GAM had reunited early before the Helsinki agreement particularly before the last state military operation in 2003 through their family.

If we look at the way the ex-commanders think about women ex-soldiers in the process of post conflict reintegration, the logic of masculinity is underway. It was framed through the gender assumption that perceives women as something relates to the nature or essence of women as linked to the tranquillity, domesticity and family regardless of the masculine quality of their ex-commanders. Once they think about women ex-soldiers, then their thinking automatically switches on to the assumption of women as belong to family. It is perceived as normal for them to stay closed with their families. In the gender patriarchal order like Aceh, family as a social institution is matter. In patriarchal gender relations, women and men as heterosexual couples, bounded their sexual relationships with marriage and comply with a gender social arrangement that organize a husband is a head of household and decision maker in family (Meghdadi 2009). If women ex-soldiers are still single they might stay close to their extended family including mother, father, siblings and some include grant mother live in together in the same house. In fact when come into decision making it is the father or husband or uncle who has larger authority to decide matters related with the family.

The logic of contrast inherently embedded in how ex-commanders thinking about women ex-soldiers is basically shaped by their understanding of given gendered social system already attached to the local culture which could be functions as norms, sanctions and code of conduct that condition gender relations between men and women. In patriarchal social culture like Aceh, *adat* and Islam are the two interrelated

gendered social system influence and shape day to day practice of people's social interactions. *Adat* that constitutes value, norm and practice had been influential factor in shaping what 'traditional' Aceh society looked like. It strongly ruled Aceh society in terms of household, property, land ownership, labour division and inheritance matters (Srimulyani 2010). *Adat* influences gender relations between men and women, between masculinity and femininity. In terms of household aspect, women's responsibilities were in internal household such as taking care of the morality and education of their children, whereas men social responsibilities associated with the outside house (typically in *muenasah*, a public place for praying and gathering) (Robinson, 2009: 25). In relation to labour division, women jobs associated with rice cultivation (*mita breuh*) while men with money (*mita peng*) (Sri Mulyani, 2010: 331, Robinson, 2009: 25). Men had responsibility to earn money from outside economic activities to support the economy of their families. While women stay close to the home. *Adat* has been in the frame of thinking of the ex-commanders and rendered the dichotomous thinking between men and women. And value men and masculinity.

The other social factor that contributes to the opposite duality in shaping the logic of masculinity of the ex-commanders is Islam as a dominant religion in Aceh. Islamic value and norms as well as practice may vary across society, but Islamic sharia law in Aceh generally structure the relationship between men and women. For instance, Islam value patriarchal norms where men have more control over decision making, property and inheritance. This value has structured gender roles between men and women. Men's primary responsibility is to maintain financial support while women are responsible for taking care of the domestic sphere (Vianen 2006 in Nowak and Caulfield 2008).

Gender structure has infused and reflected not only on the broader social system explained above, but gender also attaches in the nature of the GAM military institution, the TNA (Tentara Negara Aceh) or the Aceh state soldiers. It has manifested in the strong division of labour between male and female GAM combatants ranging from recruitment to military training and post military training period during war. All of these arrangements have impacted in how their ex-commanders and their male comrade see women ex-soldiers in post conflict agreement. To analyse the logic of contrast and contradictions relates to the binary opposition or dichotomous thinking of the ex-commanders in current post conflict situation, we need to understand why women ex-soldiers was labelled by their ex-commanders and their male comrade as 'reserve soldiers' or 'passive soldiers' and 'supporting soldiers' through the militaristic ideology embeded in the logic of masculinity of the ex-commanders GAM.

Assuming that the reintegration of the female ex-soldiers is 'natural', family as gender institution (Connell, 1987) along with the combination with broader intersecting social factors, *adat*, Islam and the militaristic institution, value, and practice of the GAM become crystallised as a given context for ideological construction of ex-commanders GAM that later indorse their logic of masculinity as well as their identity as men with high social status standing as ex-commanders GAM in the KPA. This has larger implications on how the ex-commanders treated the women ex-soldiers in post conflict situation. What the ex-commanders think about women ex-soldiers in fact has ideological and material implications to the process of domestication of women ex-soldiers into already existing social structure that confines the women into household

matters. Considering that it is male not female who are head of household, then the resulting welfare outcome is female ex-soldiers gained less even nothing from reintegration fund allocation compared to their male counterparts. In this context, some ex-commanders argue that men ex-soldiers are priority rather than women as they bear the burden of family economy and stressing that most women ex-soldiers are married and have relied heavily on their husband for economy.

Some group of female ex-soldiers confess that they are now doing household things. They just make a living through going to work in paddy rice field as labour. They do not own the land but working as *buruh tani upahan* (daily labour) and gained less than Rp. 100. 000 per day (approximately accounted for 10 Australian dollars). They do it in the morning and the rest of the day they do family matters such as helping husband in raising kids. While the others who still single just stays with families in *gampong* (villages) while helping the family through making and selling cakes. The other female ex-soldiers spend half day doing household things in the morning and the rest of the day they use their time to earn living through working as labour in small home industry in *gampong* (villages). However, the situation is a little bit difference with those who are still maintaining clientelistic networks with their former commanders or those who are educated and married with middle class men. They have done better working and earning more income. Ironically, most female ex-soldiers did not know what exactly the reintegration funds and how they had been delivered. The amount of money they received was varied from village to village. Some others did not receive any reintegration fund.

While the male ex-soldiers in particular those who close to the inner circle GAM ex-commanders are able to do business, having easy access to politics and bureaucracy, even for those who are excluded by their ex-commanders and do protest to their ex-commanders, they still enjoy patriarchal dividend in the form of higher status and material rewards, such as charity incomes or petty money. Most women ex-soldiers' economic life is different from that of men. They mostly depend on domestic economic production such petty street sellers, farming or even just simply do household things.

Besides women ex-soldiers are having less material rewards as has been elaborated above, women ex-soldiers also pay hard price for their lower military retained status as 'reserved soldiers or 'passive soldiers'. Until now there is no explicit acknowledgement either in local or national public recognitions of their status as women GAM ex-soldiers. There are never recognized formally. There is no specific organization acting as formal organization to shade the female ex-soldiers.

In comparison with the context of post conflict Timorese women for instance, Sara Niner (2011) explains that the meaning of 'traditional 'in fact reflects masculine interests specifically in subordinating women's roles leading to women lower status than men (Niner 2011, 415). In the post conflict Timorese context, this trajectory has continued and reinvented in the form of masculine military ideology created by former resistant movement that further marginalised the status of women, including women who previously served in arm forces (Niner 2011, 428-429). Looking at Aceh context indeed assumption has been made by the ex-commanders on the basis of gender differences that make post conflict reintegration of men ex-soldiers and women ex-soldiers are completely distinct. It reflects in a huge contrast with the

female ex-soldiers's situation, the ex-commanders are having easy access to power and resources in local parliaments and bureaucracy. Although the local regulation allows women to participate in local election to fulfil the 30 % quota for female representative in local parliament, but until present there is no single women ex-soldiers sit in local parliament. Some women ex-soldiers might show compliance of their lower status in respect to their male rank and file and their ex-commanders and still maintain relationship with their ex-commander.

## **Conclusion**

The paper demonstrates that the women ex-soldiers' subordination is 'taken for granted' by the ex-commanders GAM. The logic of masculinity that entails the logic of contrast and contradictions has framed the ex-commanders' perceptions on the women ex-soldiers' return into post conflict society. This has created gender assumptions that lead to the domestication women ex-soldiers into what the ex-commanders said as 'women are going back into habitat' (family) and stereotyping women ex-soldiers' lower status as 'reserve soldiers' or 'passive soldier' and supporting' soldiers. As a result, women ex-soldiers gained less distribution of resources and lower retained military status in respect to their male comrades. The patriarchal dividend in the form of material reward and higher social standing gained by the ex-commanders from the peace process is also sustained through the logic of masculinity operates as 'frame of reference' in further seeing the women ex-soldiers.

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**Contact email:** abdu0074@yahoo.com



***De-Radicalization Style in Indonesian Pilot Prisons:  
Classification Scheme to Support Risk Reduction Theory***

Maya Trisdamayanti, University of Indonesia, Indonesia  
Muhamad Syauqillah, University of Indonesia, Indonesia  
Jerry Marcellinus Logahan, University of Indonesia, Indonesia  
Puspitasari, University of Indonesia, Indonesia

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**Abstract**

In order to tackle radicalism and terrorism phenomenon in the 21<sup>st</sup> century that become a more serious threat for national security, countries in the world have been implementing various soft approach methods and techniques that adjusted to domestic wisdom of the respective countries. In Indonesia, the so-called de-radicalization program has been designated for its terrorist prisoners who serve their sentence in prisons. Numerous studies analyze its advantages and weaknesses, and some have identified its failure. Purpose of this study is to analyze the failure of the Indonesian de-radicalization program and identify its causes. This study uses qualitative method, which supported by data that collected through literature review, observations, and interview sessions. Among some of the causes, previous studies show that lack of post release (after-care) program, in addition to minimum monitoring and evaluation system, have an impact on recidivism. That said, former terrorist inmates have been identified returning violence and involve in terrorism. Further in this study, it develops risk reduction theory that requires behavioral change of terrorist inmate, in order to reduce the risk of recidivism. An inmate classification scheme is used to measure risk level of each inmate, and intended to identify prison assignment, the required level of supervision and control, as well as identifying appropriate de-radicalization program for each terrorist inmate. Prisons in Nusa Kambangan Island are designated as pilot prisons of this project. The Indonesian prison authorities keep developing the risk reduction and the inmate classification scheme, working closely with relevant parties in order to achieve success.

**Keywords:** Terrorism, prison, risk reduction, inmate classification scheme

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## Introduction

A more critical issue comes in the 21<sup>st</sup> century in the forms of radicalism and terrorism, the more serious threat for national security. France intelligence agency discovers that 1,300 France citizens involved in ISIS jihadist network, while 2,000 others were radicalized (Hecker, 2018; in Nguyen, 2018, 3-4). Terrorist attacks in 2018 send the worst impact for the Philippines and Thailand, and that terrorism was getting worst in 2018 for Indonesia (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019, 41). A study even identified an increase number of Indonesian citizens who become ISIS members. In 2014, the number reached 56 people, and it increased 966 percent in 2015, becoming 541 people (Sugara, et.al, 2018, 56).

World countries have been implementing various soft approach methods and techniques to tackle radicalism and terrorism. While Germany adopted family counseling program (Koehler, 2013, 201), France is identified applying laws and regulations that targeting terrorists and jihadists, and the radicalized adults and children (Nguyen, 2018, 34).

Asian de-radicalization program are mostly targeting inmates and granting sentence cut for their participation, so terrorists will be early released. However, the terrorist inmates are identified targeting the early release instead of being de-radicalized (Dechesne, 2011, 3). On the other side, former terrorist inmates are still involved in terror attacks against US and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq (Horgan & Artier, 2012, 84). Similar in Indonesia, former terrorists were involved in JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton Hotel terrorist attacks in 2009, and Jakarta Thamrin Bombing in 2016 (G4S Risk Resulting, 2016, 2). In addition, the riot and escape incidents that occurred in Tanjung Gusta Indonesian prison in 2013 was masterminded by Fadli Sadama, a terrorist inmate who managed to escape from the specified prison (Kompas.com, 2013b; in Suarda, 2018, 104).

The Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) has been applying various de-radicalization methods, targeting terrorist inmates in Indonesian prisons. Numerous studies identified its advantages and weaknesses, as well as its failures. Among some of the causes, previous studies identified that lack of post-release program for former terrorists, as well as the lack of formal, thorough evaluation and assessment system, have increased the recidivism rate (Eckard, 2014, 161-164; Samuel, 2016, 56; IPAC, 2014, 7-14; Taufiqurrohman and Arianti, 2014, 15-16).

De-radicalization is identified as a form of change that requires cognitive and physical changes, which are ideological and behavioral changes (Horgan, 2009; in Horgan & Braddock, 2010, 280). While de-radicalization is not only reversing radicalization process (Moghaddam, 2009, 281-282), de-radicalization is also identified as a strategic approach, not soft approach (Dechesne, 2011, 288). As such, this study analyzes the failure of de-radicalization program in Indonesia and identified its causes.

### Theoretical Framework

As targeting ideological changes is considered ambitious and an outdated idea (Sumpter, 2017, 114; Wiwoho, Pujiyono & Triyanto, 2017, 2577-8), this study further describes risk reduction theory that requires behavioral changes of terrorist inmate when they are serving their sentence in the prison, and outside the prison when they are released (Horgan & Braddock, 2010, 280). Risk reduction is intended to terrorist prisoners so they will not return to violence, and it must use different approach to each terrorist in order to gain information on motive and backgrounds, to determine his risk factors (Horgan & Altier, 2012, 88-89).

A study shows that risk factors will impact assessment tool, and that the tool will predict recidivism tendency of individual (Berkell, 2017, 296). In US and Western countries, the assessment tool has been used since 1970 in their prisons in order to modernize their prison system. In addition to measure risk level of inmates and preventing recidivism (James, 2018, 3), the assessment tool that is called Inmate Classification Scheme (ICS) is also an important element in prison management and benefited prison authorities, in the areas of security and rehabilitation program for inmates (Austin, et.al. 2001; Dowdy, et.al. 2002; in Narag, Galehan, and Jones, 2018, 341-342).

The ICS will assist prison authorities to determine unit assignment, the required supervision and control, as well as appropriate rehabilitation program for inmates. The appropriate unit assignment will ensure safety of prison officer as it reduces security and order disturbance. In addition, if inmate participates in appropriate rehabilitation program, then risk of recidivism will also reduce (Narag, Galehan, and Jones, 2018, 343).




Figure 1. Risk Reduction and ICS Theoretical Framework for Indonesian Prisons

There are at least two prisons in the US have been using ICS. Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) has been using ICS to determine unit assignment for its inmates based on their level of risk to the officer, public, and to other inmates. ICS will be used to assess new inmates, then every six month for evaluation (ADC, 2010: 1-3). Meanwhile, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) has been using ICS to monitor the safety of its inmates and officer, as well as to prevent escape (Petek, 2019, 5).

### **Methodology**

This study uses qualitative method and supported by data that gained from previous studies, observations, and interview sessions. Indonesian prison authorities are currently developing a de-radicalization style that targeting behavioral change of terrorist inmates, supported by a developing classification tool to determine their risk level. The result will determine their assignment in a super maximum-, maximum-, or medium security prison.

### **Discussion**

The Indonesian prison authorities issue a regulation in December 2018 concerning revitalization of the Indonesian prison system, in order to optimize and strengthen the implementation of correctional services. It regulates specialized prison officer, Case Manager who is called *Wali* or *Pamong*, to perform a series of monitoring and log-in activities relevant to behavioral and attitude changes of terrorist inmates from inside the prisons. Correctional Mentors are then assigned to perform rehabilitation activities in Parole Facilities, outside the prison, when the terrorists are released. Prisons in Nusa Kambangan Island, Central Java, are designated as pilot prisons of this project.

The Indonesian prison authorities impose a one-man, one-prison-cell system for high-risk terrorist inmates in its super-maximum and maximum security prisons in the island. While they keep developing the risk reduction and the inmate classification scheme, the Indonesian prison authorities have also been working closely with relevant parties in order to achieve success.

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**Contact email:** mtrisdamayanti@gmail.com  
syauqi\_oki@yahoo.com  
jerrymarcellinus59@gmail.com  
puspitasari11@ui.ac.id

***What does the Policy Formulation Process of East Lantau Metropolis and Lantau Tomorrow Vision Policy Imply Hong Kong Policy Style***

Poon Tsz Fung, National University of Singapore, Singapore

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**Abstract**

East Lantau Metropolis, a Hong Kong reclamation plan of 1,000 ha in the Central Waters, appeared to have reached consensus in a territory-wide consultation. However, the Government did not move forward to policy execution, but introduced a more aggressive and enhanced 1,7000 reclamation proposal of Lantau Tomorrow Vision. Such move received even more grievances in the divided and highly politicised community. The controversies of this issue can be seen and summarised 1) in terms of ideas that why the Government goes far beyond the perceived consensus reached and introduced a brand-new proposal, and 2) in terms of actors and institutions that what are the driving forces behind Lantau Tomorrow Vision. This paper explains and analyses this unconventional change in the policy process according to the four phases of policy formulation process as well as a key stakeholder analysis. Together with the consideration of the current governance in Hong Kong, the unique policy style in Hong Kong under "One Country Two Systems" is conceptualised – implying a conflicting mixture of Chinese Authoritarian style and British Majoritarian Style. This policy style can also be understood and is applicable when looking into other salient issues and the long-lasting anti-Government protest in the polarized society of today's Hong Kong.

Keywords: Land Development, Hong Kong, One Country Two Systems, Policy Formulation, Policy Style

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## Introduction

Housing problem in Hong Kong is described as an “Unending crisis”, “modern tragedy” and “chronic failure” (Goodstadt, 2014). Carrie Lam pledged in her election platform to find more land and seek consensus by “establishing a dedicated task force to review a macro review of our land supply options” (Lam, 2017). Two months after she sworn into the office, the Task Force on Land Supply (“the Task Force”) was established and spearheaded a five-month consultation exercise called “Land for Hong Kong: Our Home, Our Say!” in April 2018 to achieve public consensus on what land supply options out of the 18 identified ones. Going forward with the efforts made by previous administration, this consultation was successful in placing this problem onto the official agenda as the John Kingdon’s policy window of opportunity opens from a problem stream (Kingdon, 1984).

East Lantau Metropolis (“ELM”), one of the 18 land supply options, is a reclamation plan of 1,000 ha in the Central Waters – the largest reclamation project in Hong Kong’s history if implemented. However, during the consultation process, Carrie Lam introduced a brand-new proposal of “Lantau Tomorrow Vision” (“LTV”) in her policy address. This vision outlines an enhanced 1,700 ha of East Lantau reclamation of artificial islands for land production in the mid to long term (Lam, 2018). Although ELM received support from slightly more than half of the respondents and was later recommended by the Task Force together with other seven well-received options, a poor impression was created as the public did not perceive a sudden policy change during consultation period. The public may only expect that the Government could bring ELM proposal towards the decision making stage after consensus was made. Given it is the first time for LTV to be placed in the official policy process, this reclamation proposal has also sparked off huge disputes in the general public. This plan was perceived to be more radical but was never discussed in society including during the land supply consultation. As proposed by Harold Laswell that actors, institutions and ideas are critical factors for effective policy development (Harold, 1951), the controversies in this issue can be seen and summarized 1) in terms of ideas that why the Government goes far beyond the perceived consensus reached and introduced a brand-new proposal, and 2) in terms of actors and institutions that what are the driving forces behind the new LTV.

With the above setting, this paper analyzes that this policy formulation process which originates from ELM to LTV and proposes from this incident that what is the policy styles in Hong Kong. Policy style refers to “the understanding of the relationship between politics and policy” and is useful to “describe the policy processes that lead to policy changes” and “capture the relatively enduring nature of many policy arrangements” (Howlett & Tosun, Policy styles: a new approach, 2018). Therefore, the manner in which ideas, actors and institutions present and respond would constitute a policy style.

In order to carefully analyze this issue in this highly politicized society, a throughout analysis on policy formulation process and related stakeholders is of vital importance. Therefore, a timeline of events is mapped to illustrate the policy formulation process from 2014 when ELM was first introduced till the announcement of LTV in 2019. Then, it explores the policy subsystems involved in this issue with key stakeholders analysis. With the abovementioned sections, an analysis and contextualization of

Hong Kong policy style is concluded. It is hoped that this style can be understood and is applicable when looking into other salient issues in the polarized society of today's Hong Kong.

### **From East Lantau Metropolis to Lantau Tomorrow Vision – An Overview and A Timeline of Events**

In today's fragmented world, policy process is “often rite with irrationality, inconsistencies, and lack of coordination” (Wu, Howlett, & Fritzen, 2010) – and this could lead to major controversies and disagreements in our society. Context matters and ideas are considered as crucial factor in the policy development, especially in this case when the policy related to reclamation in the East Lantau has been in the discussion for more than five years.

To identify the issue, this section adopts the four phases to policy formulation as identified by Harold Thomas, namely 1) appraisal , 2) dialogue, 3) formulation and 4) consolidation (See Figure 1) (Thomas, 2001). Figure 2 summarizes the key events chronologically when formulating ELM and LTV with reference to this model.




Figure 1: Harold Thomas' four phases of policy formulation process (Thomas, 2001)

Concerned Policies	Date	Events	Phases of Policy Formulation				
			Appraisal	Dialogue	Formulation	Consolidation	
ELM	January 2014	<b>1. Introduction to ELM by former Chief Executive CY Leung</b>					
	March 2014	<b>2. Fiscal Budget Application to Legislative Council (“LegCo”) on ELM strategical studies</b>					
	July 2015	<b>3. Launch of Technical Research on Transport Infrastructure at Kennedy Town for Connecting to ELM</b>					
	October 2016	<b>4. Public Consultation and Conceptualization for ELM in HK2030+ Proposal</b>					
	April 2018	<b>5. Launch of Land Supply Consultation by the Task Force</b>					
	August 2018	<b>6. Introduction to LTV by Chief Executive Carrie Lam</b>					
ELM	LTV	December 2018	<b>7. Publication of Report for the Land Supply Consultation</b>				
		February 2019	<b>8. Government’s Announcement on the Full Acceptance of the Report by the Task Force</b>				

Figure 2: Key Events and Timeline of Events of ELM and LTV

### ***Appraisal I – Introducing East Lantau Metropolis (Events 1 – 3)***

A kindergartener asks me, “Where will I live when I grow up?” “Nowhere” is definitely not an acceptable answer. (Leung, 2014)

This quote by former Chief Executive CY Leung in his 2014 Policy Address caught eyeballs within Hong Kong’s society that kids may pose questions related to housing, but the agenda setting has been successfully accomplished that the land supply was too severe that policies should be formulated to alleviate the issue. The concept of ELM was then introduced, claiming that it would become the third core business district after 10 years (Leung, 2014).

After two months, the Development Bureau submitted its proposal to LegCo’s Public Works Subcommittee to review and seek HK\$226.9 million for strategic studies for artificial islands in the central water, including to explore the feasibility of ELM (Development Bureau, 2014). Before so, the Government had conducted a review on the Hong Kong Boundary Crossing Facilities Island of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge in Q3 2013 and identified the economic benefits associated with new reclamation areas in such area (Legislative Council, 2014). Without any public consultation or debate, different actors especially pro-democratic legislators have expressed discontent for not engaging with the public before putting forward the proposals (Legislative Council, 2017) and environmentalists also stepped in to address their concerns on the impact to fisheries industries (Wong, 2014).

Although such fiscal application for strategical studies was never successful and withdrew later due to diverse views within LegCo, the Government proceeded with “Technical Research on Transport Infrastructure at Kennedy Town for Connecting to ELM”. Such research was conducted to understand the “development parameters, population, employment level and development phasing of the ELM” so as to propose related transport infrastructures and connectivity when ELM was put in place in the future (Civil Engineering and Development Department, 2019).

It is worth noting that no public participations were involved during this process, different actors within the policy subsystems had actively voiced out their concerns or grievances during the process. Preliminary studies or researches were also included to generate output for a more practical ELM plan.

### ***Dialogue and Formulation – Public Consultations on the East Lantau Metropolis (Events 4-5)***

Despite a lengthy appraisal phase, the dialogue and formulation phase was nearly combined when the Government proposed a comprehensive and concrete plan of ELM for public consultation in *Hong Kong 2030+: Towards a Planning Vision and Strategy Transcending 2030* (“HK2030+”). Released for public consultation in October 2016, the ELM proposal was conceptualized with a clearer objective to “meet the long-term social, economic and environmental needs of Hong Kong beyond 2030 (Development Bureau, 2016). As a territorial development strategy, HK2030+ was formulated to update the strategy and directions of future planning and development in Hong Kong as well as the built and natural environment beyond 2030 (Development Bureau, 2016).

As one of the key and strategic areas of 1,000 ha development area in HK2030+, ELM has been branded as the third Central Business District (“CBD”) to strengthen Hong Kong’s position as a global financial and business hub. The ELM can also provide housing for a population size of 400,000 to 700,000 and 200,000 employment opportunities. An area in ecologically less sensitive waters near Kau Yi Chau, Hei Ling Chau and Mui Wo were identified, together with a proposed plan of transport and infrastructure between the urban areas, Lantau, western New Territories and the Airport as in Figure 3. The preliminary concept also put forward constraints of ELM, including ecological, environmental, marine and infrastructure difficulties, and such could be addressed in further studies on planning and engineering feasibility (Development Bureau, 2016).



Figure 3: ELM Concept Plan in 2030+ (Development Bureau, 2016)

Despite a clear plan, the Government’s agenda setting changed with a more emphasis on the problem stream as the then Chief Executive Ms Carrie Lam stressed the importance to tackle land shortage in her election campaign by a huge land debate spearheaded by a Task Force (Lam, 2017). This came into action in her maiden policy address and the Task Force soon kickstarted a five-month public engagement exercise since April 2018 with ELM as one of the land supply options.

Although the details in this consultation were the same with HK2030+, this public engagement exercise put an emphasis that ELM could provide the greatest area among all other options and can be used for holistic land use planning. The Task Force also recognized that “reclamation has long been an important source of land supply” and ELM was a feasible solution for reclamation outside Victoria Harbour (Task Force on Land Supply, 2018).

With a mission to gauge wide public consensus, the Task Force conducted 185 public engagement activities, received 29,065 questionnaires, conducted 3,011 telephone surveys and collected 68,300 views by individual groups submitted through mails, fax,

post, telephone or in person for quantitative and qualitative analysis on the popularity of each land supply option. (Task Force on Land Supply, 2019).

**Appraisal II – Introducing Lantau Tomorrow Vision (Event 6)**

While the Task Force’s public engagement exercise was still undergoing with the ELM as an important land supply option, Carrie Lam introduced a brand new reclamation proposal in East Lantau area which is known as “Lantau Tomorrow Vision” (“LTV”) in her 2018 Policy Address. While LTV also covered areas near Kau Yi Chau and Hei Ling Chau with similar vision to make it CBD3 by 2034 and provide priority to transport infrastructure as in the ELM under consultation, the total area has increased to about 1,700 ha with a more ambitious plan to accommodate a population of 700,000 to 1,100,000 and a much higher cost of HK\$624 billion (See Figure 4) (Lam, 2018). All figures nearly doubled from the ELM as illustrated in next section.




Figure 4: Conceptual Development and Strategic Transport Plan for Lantau Tomorrow Vision (Development Bureau, 2019)

After the announcement of LTV, the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme (“HKUPOP”) conducted a survey on 1-6 November 2018 to understand their views on the proposal and noted that a majority of 49% of respondents opposed to the plan (HKUPOP, 2018). Pro-democratic lawmakers who commissioned this survey argued that the Government should first gauge public views on the current consultation, and urge the Government to consider other feasible land supply options like brownfield sites.

Although LTV seems to be put onto the official agenda without prior notice, a local think tank Our Hong Kong Foundation (“OHKF”) published its report on Enhanced ELM earlier in August 2018. As a powerful think tank led by governors and supporters representing major real estate developers, OHKF’s Enhanced ELM plan was a 2,200 ha reclaimed island between Peng Chau, Kau Yi Chau, Hei Ling Chau and Sunny Island (OHKF, 2018). Since this, many have criticized Carrie Lam for giving a “fast track” approach to the powerful groups in the city even before the end of the current land supply consultation (Yam, 2018). A more in-depth stakeholder analysis on OHKF in this policy process would be explained in next section.

#### ***2.4 Consolidation and Appraisal III – Consensus for East Lantau Metropolis but a Yes Still for Lantau Tomorrow Vision (Event 7-8)***

After the public engagement exercise, the Task Force submitted its final report on 31 December 2018 and ELM was among one of the eight options put forward by the Task Force on its multi-pronged approach. Quantitatively, ELM received support of 62% and 58% respectively in questionnaires and telephone survey. Qualitatively, respondents particularly professional organizations supported ELM due to its “strategic significance” in terms of economic development and infrastructure. Views against ELM concerned on the rise of sea level, environmental degradation and low cost-effectiveness. Overall, the Task Force considered ELM “the key to breaking the stalemate of land supply” while impact studies on marine environment and cost benefit analysis should be conducted (Task Force on Land Supply, 2019).

The Task Force also remarked that the LTV proposal raised by Carrie Lam in her policy address, but it stressed the importance for the Government to “take into account this report before finalizing details” of LTV. This means the Government should first focus on the 1,000 ha of ELM before engaging in any more ambitious plan (Task Force on Land Supply, 2019). Stanley Wong, the Chairman of the Task Force, stated publicly that the Government should never interpret that supporters of ELM would also agree with LTV and public consultation should be conducted before any preliminary studies for LTV (Un, 2019).

In February 2019, the Government announced that it “has fully accepted the recommendations tendered by the Task Force on land supply strategy and eight land supply options” (HKSAR Government, 2019). However, the Government insisted putting forward LTV, stating that this 1,000 ha reclamation as part of LTV was “of enormous strategic importance to Hong Kong’s long term future”. The Government, in the meantime, provided more details on LTV that it would first take forward the studies for the first 1,000 ha reclamation of Kau Yi Chau and related infrastructure (Development Bureau, 2019).

### ***Section Summary***

Despite a perceived consensus on ELM backed by evidence after a territory-wide public consultation, the Government made the decision to scrap policy formulation phase with a more ambitious plan when it regarded that the policy window of opportunity opened during the consultation period. While this paper does not aim at giving judgement on the correctness of Government's actions, it presents facts and evidence to illustrate the policy style of Hong Kong Government, which would be discussed next section.

Although ideas are part of the critical factor for policy making, it is equally important to understand this issue from actors and institutions especially in a politically polarized society like Hong Kong. The next section provides a stakeholder analysis as the complexity of this issue is beyond pure technical analysis.

### **Stakeholders Analysis: Policy Subsystem and Policy Network**

“To understand the bias in the participatory practices, we should not merely focus on the type of arguments that are raised but include the conditions of participants.” (Hajer, 2005) In the context of Hong Kong policy politics, it is essential to understand each stakeholder within the policy subsystem. Not all actors and institutions play the same role in this subsystem - some of them are engaged in the struggle of ideas, while there are also stakeholders which belong to the policy network that engaged actively in the formulation and consideration of policy options and alternatives (Marier, 2008). Figure 5 illustrates this policy subsystem.




Figure 5: Stakeholders in the Policy Subsystem and Policy Network

### ***The Government***

The Government as the institution plays an important role in the policy process. Boosting housing and land supply has been on the top priority and official agenda since CY Leung's administration as he regarded it “the most pressing issues” since he sworn into office in 2012 . He pointed out in his maiden policy address that the

housing shortage and poor living conditions affected tens of thousands of citizens and was the worst problem in the city (Leung, 2013).

Despite proposing a lot of solutions and related strategical studies proposals including the ELM, CY Leung failed to execute and implement them in his tenure as he was deeply unpopular with the public (Ng & Chung, 2017). The Government yet successfully set the agenda through the problem stream on the urgency to tackle land supply.

This passed on to Carrie Lam's administration who also endeavored to "focus on home ownership to enable citizens live happily in Hong Kong and call it their home" (Lam, 2018). Lam is well-known for her "decisive style of governance". She grasped the opportunity and continued the unsolved issues by predecessors with the establishment of the Task Force and subsequently the huge public engagement exercise (Cheng & Tsang, 2018). This style of governance emerges significantly when she was asked if putting forward the LTV in her policy address was being overambitious and had neglected public views when the consultation was undergoing:-

*"I really don't think people could blame me as an enemy of the people. I could go for the populist route and not do this sort of controversial things but that's not good for the people." (Lam, 2018)*

Lam's paternalistic and decisive governance style was also exhibited when the Government insisted to go forward with LTV although consensus was only made on ELM after the lengthy policy formulation process.

### ***The Task Force on Land Supply***

Established in September 2017 for a term till February 2019, the government-appointed Task Force was tasked for a mission to find a solution to tackle the land supply problem by facilitating wide discussions, reaching consensus and finding a solution that benefits the community. Its membership consisted of 22 non-official and eight official members from different disciplines including planning, engineering housing.

To set the context of Hong Kong, the concept of public consultation on land development was introduced back in 1991 with a hope to 1)help the transition from a colonial government to a representative government mode after the handover in 1997, 2)engage public views to meet real needs and demands by citizens, and 3)engage the private sector for public-private partnership (Chiu, 2016). Such means have been effective and mature in Hong Kong, which also explained why detailed strategic studies and proposals for ELM laid out during both HK2030+ and land supply consultations. Despite so, the Task Force acted as an important actor in the policy network to collect and present public's views for consensus. This has been successfully achieved with the publication of the results report as well as the its full acceptance by the Government from a policy formulation perspective.

However, one major problem of the Task Force was that its analysis may have undermined the political considerations and neglect the social and political contexts.

The consultation has intensified the disputes between polarized views and has made the community even more divided (Ip, 2018). This also explains the importance of stakeholder analysis for this paper.

Another problem was that despite being part of the administrative support as a government agency, the Government could introduce its new LTV plan which directly contradicted with the ELM plan as a proposed option in the Task Force's consultation. The influence of the Task Force could be undermined under a paternalistic and decisive governance style.

### ***Citizens In Need of Housing***

Hong Kong has been notorious for its poor livability as 209,700 people were crammed into 92,700 subdivided units (Census and Statistics Department, 2018). Although the Government stressed that both ELM and LTV could help ease the grassroots' housing demand, only singular grassroots citizens support these policies (Hong Kong Economics Journal, 2018). 14 political and social groups concerned about citizens in need of housing formed Land Justice United Front in July 2019 to show strong opposition to the ELM.

As a strong coalition with similar social background and same goal, they opposed to ELM for its skyrocketing cost and urged the Government to consider other available short term options especially developing Fanling Golf Course which occupied large piece of land but only tailor-made for the rich. This issue therefore was escalated from the view of social justice and economic equality (Yam, 2018).

Feeling neglected after the announcement of LTV, this group felt that the Government had inclined to the private developers and "took them as an excuse to rationalize its plan. They held numerous press conferences and protests afterwards to advocate on developing Fanling Golf Course and brownfield sites (HK01, 2018).

### ***Environmentalists***

Environmentalists successfully raised awareness among the community on potential environmental hazards for the ELM and LTV including the rising sea level and potential hazard to dolphins. These groups include not only traditional environmental groups like Greenpeace, the Conservancy Association, Greenpower and WWF (HK01, 2019), but also a new group called "Save Lantau Alliance" which was established in 2014 after the ELM announcement by CY Leung. It consistently advocated for the abolishment of ELM and LTV and generated environmental reports with empirical data to prove that the Government may have underestimated the cost of reclamation and the damage to the ecological systems (Savage Lantau Alliance, 2018). These groups also organized protests with Land Justice Unit as just mentioned.

Despite putting much concerted efforts and raised public awareness, business interests have been considered as more important in the heart of Hong Kong's policy formulation. Unless there are grave concerns from the business perspective, it is less likely that environmentalists could enter the policy network or advocacy coalition.

### ***Businesses***

Businesses have been the steadfast supporter for both the ELM and LTV. As the largest business organization with more than 4,000 members and half of the corporations listed in the Hang Seng Index (HKGCC, 2019), Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (“HKGCC”) first showed its support to ELM in the HK2030+ consultation by appreciating its ambitious plan to build a smart and livable city, and urged the Government to align with other master plans including the Smart City Blueprint (HKGCC, 2017). Same stance persisted during the land supply consultation in 2018 as ELM could create new and large piece of land available and would not affect existing land users including businesses (HKGCC, 2018). These two submissions stressed that the Government should expedite its process for all land supply options to increase its competitiveness in the interest of the private developers. Therefore, after the announcement of LTV in the 2018 Policy Address, HKGCC welcomed its decision as it exhibited “Government’s clear determination to solve our city’s determination to solve our city’s acute land supply problem”.

Hong Kong is well known to be an international financial centre and therefore policymakers “intentionally and unintentionally transformed and financialized the Hong Kong economy” (Yu, To, & Yu, 2018). The governance style inclined to benefiting the business community and creating an investment environment responsive to interests of finance and property. Under pluralism, HKGCC and other related business organizations have built strong relationships with the Government and successfully placed their solutions onto the agenda. As an important and key actor in the policy network that influences the policy style, this will be further discussed next section.

### ***Think Tank***

Influences of think tanks in Hong Kong varied, but the most powerful ones are funded with considerable resources for its researches and advocacy work. Despite stressing the importance to “maintain its image of intellectual autonomy from governments, private corporations or any political party” (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009), as noted in previous section, the management of OHKF was formed by these people who are the most influential characters in town as it was led by the first Chief Executive CH Tung. Ranked the highest amongst all Hong Kong-based think tanks (McGann, 2017), it maintained a robust and vibrant research and advocacy team which pulled all efforts on its Enhanced ELM proposal.

According to its research report, it advocated the importance of creating a new city that accommodate up to 1.1 million people with at least 70% of its 32% residential land for public housing. OHKF also conducted its technical feasibilities from transport infrastructure, marine and reclamation requirements and environmental impacts (OHKF, 2018). Such report resembled high similarities with LTV and was therefore criticized for government’s stance on its strong inclination to influential groups in the community (Yam, 2018), and therefore OHKF strongly backed Lam’s LTV plan. Similar to businesses, think tank which is composed of key and influential actors, regardless its population in the community, showed explicitly its importance in changing and influencing the policy process.

### ***Section Summary***

During the whole process, numerous parties involved including various government departments, political parties and professional organizations. This section however highlights the major groups in this issue only as they clearly show the polarized views and their roles in this complex issue. Analyzing these actors were vital to understand the policy style of the Hong Kong Government from who and how different actors entered into the policy process.

### **Analysis of Policy Style in Hong Kong**

After looking into ideas, actors and institutions, this section identifies and evaluates policy style in Hong Kong and also its dynamics during the policy formulation process of ELM and LTV. While policy styles was known to be “standard operating procedures” for policy making processes (Richardson, 1982), contemporary studies concern the “institutional arrangements and the characteristics of political regimes” (Howlett & Tosun, 2018), and below summarizes two policy styles in this case study.

### ***The Government under “One Country Two Systems” exhibits A Mixture of Chinese Authoritarian Style and British Majoritarian Style***

Although no literature reviews presented the policy style of Hong Kong, such researches had been conducted for different countries and was summarized in the following dimension as in Figure 6.

		<b>Inclusiveness of policy processes</b>	
		<b>High</b>	<b>Low</b>
<b>Key Policy Actors</b>	<b>Bureaucrats &amp; Experts</b>	Type 1 – Representative Democracies E.g. United Kingdom	Type 3 – Closed-centralist E.g. China
	<b>Politician &amp; Public</b>	Type 2 – Participatory or Consultative Democracies E.g. United States of America	Type 4 – Competitive electoral authorities E.g. Singapore

Figure 6: Dimensions of generalized policy styles (Howlett & Tosun, 2018)

Hong Kong used to be ruled under British colonial administration, but in order to prepare Hong Kong for a transition to a representational government after 1997, democracy in elections and public consultation in urban planning were introduced to the community. During this period, bureaucrats exhibited representative democracies policy style in the UK. This “top-down” policy style was described as “a mix of majoritarianism and pragmatism” especially in the post-Thatcher era as the Government mostly delegate policy works to external bodies rather than devising itself, but remain control on the final decisions (Cairney, 2018). In relation to this issue, the Task Force acted as the “external body” and was put in charge to this important mission to engage public consensus during the policy formulation. However, the Government still got the final decision on the new LTV plan from a pragmatic approach.

While the British policy style persists, Hong Kong, as part of China under “One Country Two Systems”, was also influenced by its authoritarian style and institutions are crucial in understanding Chinese policy style. Imposed from “top down”, the Chinese administration established “leading small groups” approach that principal-agent approach could work well within different government departments and key actors with proactive and consensus building and may not be reactive to the public so that citizens got the minimal participation in the policy making process (Qian, 2018). Despite authoritarian in nature, this policy style results in successful economic and social development in China over the last decade. Despite the existence of the Task Force, in case of the introduction to both ELM and LTV respectively, both Leung and Lam’s administration did not engage with the public on any plans and both have either conducted preliminary researches or incorporated opinions from key actors – a sign of the “leading small groups” framework with the goal to push forward their policies.

The Basic Law affirms the executive-led government system in the colonial era, and has given extensive power to the Chief Executive and give popular expectations for the public to establish strong governance to maintain capitalism and resolve long-term structural problems of land and housing supply (Yau, 2018). All these summarize that policy styles in Hong Kong are categorized as a mixture of representative democracies and closed-centralist.

***Key actors in the policy network are more important than other actors in policy subsystem***

The Basic Law affirms that Hong Kong has three branches in which the Legislative Council controls the passing of legislations by the administration. With the characteristic of majoritarian policy style, the Government effectively pleased the majority legislators who were the post-establishment camps at the moment for effective governance, making them the key actors in the policy network. Although legislators were not analyzed in previous section, many of them belong to the business sector or involve in the think tank in the policy process.

As in Figure 6, this indeed goes in line with the policy style as the policy networks are composed with mainly bureaucrats and experts, regardless their inclusiveness during the process. As bureaucrats were not elected with high concerns on engaging all actors, the British style tended to pay disproportionately to particular key actors and fail to gather enough information to warn the Government potential problems ahead (Cairney, 2018). Unlike the Chinese style which concerned effectiveness due to vast control, the policy style exhibited when introducing both ELM and LTV concerned on both engaging the public but fail to include all views from different actors into the policy network, regardless its quantity or quality as a whole in the community.

**Discussions – Reflection on Today’s Hong Kong Anti-Government Protest**

While the Hong Kong Government’s policy style is identified and is also exhibited in other major events in the city. The anti-government protest in Hong Kong is escalating by the time this paper is writing, and the infamous quote by Carrie Lam in late August 2019 that she “has to serve two masters” has vividly imply the accuracy of policy style exhibited. In this policy setting, the Government only provided a 2-

month consultation in an attempt for a representative style. Yet, a closed-centralist style was exhibited as discussions with the Government were not open to public and limited to key actors in the policy networks like businesses and pro-establishment politicians.

“Windows do not stay open long. If a chance is missed, another must be awaited.” (Kingdon, 1984) Although we recognize the success by the Government in seizing the policy window of opportunity, such policy styles may lead to an over-ambition and exaggerated plan during policy formulation and may lead to side effects like the riots at the moment.

The concept of policy style is dynamic and timely, meaning that this helps us understand the relationship between politics and policy and may change due to change in ideas, institutions and actors. The current turmoil may lead to a change in policy style to a heavier focus on either the British or Chinese policy style. With a huge governance and institutional change due to the anti-extradition law protests and distrust to government’s responses to COVID-19, the Hong Kong policy style can be further investigated by analyzing these events as a whole after the situation ends.

## **Conclusion**

This paper concludes that Hong Kong Government’s policy style exhibits a mixture of British majoritarian style and Chinese authoritarian style. This policy style has shown its uniqueness under robust diverse of ideas between different stakeholders and a unique political system under “One Country Two Systems” . While this article does not aim to provide a judgement call on whether the ELM or LTV is a better approach to solve Hong Kong’s land supply problem, it looks at a wider approach to explain why a sudden change in terms of plan occur with policy style.

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**Contact email:** [poon@u.nus.edu](mailto:poon@u.nus.edu)



***Managing Small Institutional Portfolios:  
ETFs as a Viable Alternative to Managers***

Jeffrey Haber, Iona College, United States

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**Abstract**

Institutional portfolios provide necessary income for the efficient and effective management of the non-profit entities they are affiliated with. In the recent past a common way to manage the smaller institutional portfolio was with the oversight of a consultant who performed due diligence, recommended managers, provided macro insights and handled performance reporting and elements of risk management. More recently, there has been a move to the outsourced chief investment officer (OCIO) model, where an investment office has responsibility (and often discretion) over several institutional portfolios. In the consultant model there were issues with the better investment funds having capacity constraints and the smaller portfolios having limited (or no) access to these better funds. Similarly, in the OCIO model small portfolios are often unable to find acceptance with the most desirable OCIOs. With the growth of the ETF market there may exist an opportunity for a smaller portfolio to obtain similar returns to larger foundations in a low-cost framework. This paper will build on previous research by using ETFs to replace managers in the average asset allocation of the large foundation. This would remove the constraints of limited access, a minimum investment that was too high, and no liquidity. Without regard to prior performance, and relying only on low cost and Morningstar ratings, the ETF portfolio would have returned 19.59% during 2019.

Keywords: Investments, Investment Management, Institutional Portfolios, Small Foundations, ETFs

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## **Introduction**

Institutional portfolios provide necessary income for the efficient and effective management of the non-profit entities that they are affiliated with. The larger the portfolio the more resources that are available for managing the portfolio. Large portfolios (large defined as assets under management (AUM) of at least \$2 billion) usually have an internal investment team that can handle most of the tasks involved (asset allocation, initial due diligence, on-going due diligence, performance reporting, risk management, etc.). Smaller portfolios do not have the resources to properly fund an investment office and procure the necessary talent.

In the recent past (about 10 years ago) a common way to manage the smaller institutional portfolio was with the oversight of a consultant who performed due diligence, recommended managers, provided macro insights and handled performance reporting and elements of risk management. More recently, there has been a move to the outsourced chief investment officer (OCIO) model, where an external investment office has responsibility (and often discretion) over several institutional portfolios.

In the consultant model there were issues with the better investment funds having capacity constraints and the smaller portfolios having limited (or no) access to these better funds. Similarly, in the OCIO model small portfolios are often unable to find acceptance with the most desirable OCIOs. The ability of a portfolio with under \$100 million in assets to find an OCIO to take them on as a client is severely limited. Anecdotally it is hard for portfolios of under \$300 million to find an OCIO home. With the growth of the ETF market there may exist an opportunity for a smaller portfolio to obtain similar returns to larger foundations in a low-cost framework.

## **Managing Endowments**

There are many types of institutional investor. Foundations, university endowments and pensions are the most common types. Within these, there are also many sub-types (the broad term “foundations” include private foundations, operating foundations and community foundations, for instance). Despite many variations, across all types smaller portfolios have issues that larger portfolios do not. Many excellent funds have minimum investment levels that smaller portfolios cannot meet (a portfolio of \$50 million that has a rule that no investment can be greater than 5% of the total portfolio value cannot make an investment in a fund that has a \$5 million minimum). The need for liquidity is another factor that limits the investment options of the small portfolio.

With the increase in the breadth and depth of exchange traded funds (ETFs), which offer indices as well as active management in a low-cost security with high liquidity, the ability to use allocations to ETFs in place of manager allocations is a viable possibility. This paper builds on previous research (Haber 2019).

## **Asset Allocation**

The management of any portfolio starts with asset allocation. Asset allocation determines the broad asset classes, and sub-classes, how much can be invested in each class and sub-class, and based on certain risk tolerance, this then determines how many managers will be required to fill-out the mandates. It is common to have a rule

that no manager can exceed 5% of the total portfolio. This paper is concerned with the small portfolio. Using the Council on Foundations – Commonfund Study of Foundations for the years 2014-2017, Schedule 1 details the asset allocation of the average small foundation for each year.

	Foundations - under \$101 million			
	2017	2016	2015	2014
<b>US equities</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>35</b>
Active	20	22	22	22
Indexed (passive and enhanced)	12	12	13	13
<b>Fixed income</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>17</b>
US investment grade (active)	12	12	13	10
US investment grade (passive)	1	1	2	4
US non-investment grade	1	1	1	1
Non-US investment grade	1	1	1	2
Emerging markets	0	0	0	0
<b>Non-US equities</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>18</b>
Active MSCI EAFE	13	12	12	10
Passive/indexed MSCI EAFE	4	3	3	4
Emerging markets	5	4	3	4
<b>Alternatives</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>24</b>
Private equity	3	3	3	2
Marketable alternatives	14	11	12	12
Venture capital	2	1	1	1
Private real estate	3	2	3	4
Energy and natural resources	1	1	1	1
Commodities and managed futures	1	1	1	1
Distressed debt	0	0	0	1
Not specified	0	4	3	2
<b>Short-term and cash</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Schedule 1: Asset Allocation of Small Private Foundations, 2014-2017

Over the four years the asset allocation has remained consistent. US equities has decreased, with the increase going to Non-US equities. As more investment choices became global (holding both US and Non-US equities) the differentiation has become less meaningful. If we combine the two to get the total allocation to equities, we see that it was 53% in 2014, 54% in 2015, 53% in 2016 and 54% in 2017. The other allocations did not vary by more than 1%, except for Cash and short-term securities.

Given the tight range and negligible change over the 4 years, the 2017 asset allocation can be considered representative of the small private foundation. Schedule 2 looks provides the asset allocation of the large private foundation over the same time period.

	Foundations - over \$500 million			
	2017	2016	2015	2014
<b>US equities</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>
Active	18	17	18	18
Indexed (passive and enhanced)	4	5	5	5
<b>Fixed income</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>
US investment grade (active)	5	4	5	5
US investment grade (passive)	2	2	2	2
US non-investment grade	0	0	0	0
Non-US investment grade	0	0	1	1
Emerging markets	0	0	0	0
<b>Non-US equities</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>18</b>
Active MSCI EAFE	14	9	10	8
Passive/indexed MSCI EAFE	2	5	2	3
Emerging markets	6	6	5	6
<b>Alternatives</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>47</b>
Private equity	6	9	8	9
Marketable alternatives	12	18	17	16
Venture capital	6	9	6	5
Private real estate	3	4	4	4
Energy and natural resources	3	4	3	4
Commodities and managed futures	1	0	1	0
Distressed debt	2	4	3	3
Not specified	15	1	6	6
<b>Short-term and cash</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Schedule 2: Asset Allocation of Large Private Foundations, 2014-2017

Similar to the small foundations, the large foundations have a very consistent asset allocation over the four years. There was some differentiation on a granular level in the alternative asset allocation – 2017 showed a significant increase in the “unspecified” area. In Non-US equities there was a move from passive/indexed EAFE to actively managed EAFE in 2017.

At the broad asset class level 2017 can be considered representative of the four years. At the more granular sub-class level there are differences that need to be considered.

A comparison of the small private foundation asset allocation for 2017 versus the large private foundation is shown on Schedule 3.

	2017		<u>Difference</u>
	<u>Over \$500</u>	<u>Under \$101</u>	
	<u>million</u>	<u>million</u>	
<b>US equities</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>-10</b>
Active	18	20	-2
Indexed (passive and enhanced)	4	12	-8
<b>Fixed income</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>-9</b>
US investment grade (active)	5	12	-8
US investment grade (passive)	2	1	1
US non-investment grade	0	1	-1
Non-US investment grade	0	1	-1
Emerging markets	0	0	0
<b>Non-US equities</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>-1</b>
Active MSCI EAFE	14	13	0
Passive/indexed MSCI EAFE	2	4	-2
Emerging markets	6	5	1
<b>Alternatives</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>24</b>
Private equity	6	3	3
Marketable alternatives	12	14	-2
Venture capital	6	2	4
Private real estate	3	3	0
Energy and natural resources	3	1	2
Commodities and managed futures	1	1	0
Distressed debt	2	0	2
Not specified	15	0	15
<b>Short-term and cash</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>-4</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>0</b>

Schedule 3: Asset Allocation of Large Private Foundations Versus Small, 2017

There are three sub-asset class allocations that vary greatly between the large and small private foundations – indexed US equities, US investment grade (active) fixed income and not specified alternatives. Each of the first two mentioned decreased by 8% while the not specified alternatives increased by 15%. As alternative assets are generally less liquid and have higher minimum investments, it is not surprising that the large foundation would have a higher allocation (the allocation for the large private foundation to the alternative broad category is 48%, double the 24% of the small private foundation). These are important strategic reasons why the smaller

foundation has less of an allocation to alternative assets and more of an allocation to indexed domestic equities and domestic investment grade fixed income.

Since ETFs provide a liquid investment vehicle with no minimum investment threshold, this presents an opportunity for a smaller foundation to utilize the asset allocation of a large foundation without the limitations. Schedule 4 compares the returns of the large foundation versus the small foundation for the last four years. The returns are reported for 1, 3, 5, and 10 years.

	<u>Over \$500 million</u>	<u>Under \$101 million</u>
<u>2017</u>		
1-year	14.3	14.8
3-year	7.3	6.5
5-year	8.9	8.3
10-year	5.3	5.1
<u>2016</u>		
1-year	6.7	4.7
3-year	4.6	3.2
5-year	8.2	6.6
10-year	4.9	4.3
<u>2015</u>		
1-year	1.1	0.1
3-year	7.8	6.8
5-year	7.0	6.0
10-year	5.8	5.5
<u>2014</u>		
1-year	7.1	5.9
3-year	11.6	10.6
5-year	9.6	8.5
10-year	6.8	5.8

#### Schedule 4: Comparison of Returns

For each time period, except for the 2017 1-year return, the large foundation has outperformed the small foundation. Because of this outperformance we will utilize the asset allocation of the large foundation. The asset allocation is shown on Schedule 5. In addition, the “Not specified” allocation was distributed equally to each of the

existing allocations. Also included on the schedule are the number of ETFs necessary to fill the allocation (no allocation to a single ETF can be greater than 5%).

	<u>Original</u>	<u>Revised</u>	<u># of ETFs</u>
<b>US equities</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>5</b>
Active	18	18	4
Indexed (passive and enhanced)	4	4	1
<b>Fixed income</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>
US investment grade (active)	5	5	1
US investment grade (passive)	2	2	1
US non-investment grade	0	0	0
Non-US investment grade	0	0	0
Emerging markets	0	0	0
<b>Non-US equities</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>5</b>
Active MSCI EAFE	14	14	3
Passive/indexed MSCI EAFE	2	2	1
Emerging markets	5	5	1
<b>Alternatives</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>11</b>
Private equity	6	9	2
Marketable alternatives	12	14	3
Venture capital	6	8	2
Private real estate	3	5	1
Energy and natural resources	3	5	1
Commodities and managed futures	1	3	1
Distressed debt	2	4	1
Not specified	15	0	0
<b>Short-term and cash</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>24</b>

#### Schedule 5: Asset Allocation With Distribution of "Not Specified"

#### Selecting ETFs

ETFs were selected by using the e\*Trade ETF platform. ETFs were sorted by fund category (strategy), expense ratio, Morningstar rating and all-star status. To fill an allocation the lowest cost/highest rated ETF was selected that fit the strategy.

For most alternative strategies there were no suitable ETFs, so an internet search was done. In no case were the previous or current returns reviewed in the selection process. Schedule 6 shows the selections made.

	<u># of ETFs</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
<b>US equities</b>	<b>5</b>				
Active	4	VV	IWY	VO	VB
Indexed (passive and enhanced)	1	SPY			
<b>Fixed income</b>	<b>2</b>				
US investment grade (active)	1	BIV			
US investment grade (passive)	1	AGG			
US non-investment grade	0				
Non-US investment grade	0				
Emerging markets	0				
<b>Non-US equities</b>	<b>6</b>				
Active MSCI EAFE	3	URTH	ACWF	QWLD	
Passive/indexed MSCI EAFE	1	ACWI			
Emerging markets	1	VWO			
<b>Alternatives</b>	<b>11</b>				
Private equity	2	QAI	PEX		
Marketable alternatives	3	PHDG	QLS	MNA	
Venture capital	2	IWC	IPO		
Private real estate	1	USRT			
Energy and natural resources	1	VAW			
Commodities and managed futures	1	FUT			
Distressed debt	1	ANGL			
Not specified	0				
<b>Short-term and cash</b>	<b>1</b>	VGSH			

Schedule 6: Selected ETFs

Schedule 7 takes the selections and allocates the percentage of the portfolio that will be allocated to the ETF.

	<u>%</u>	<u>% to each</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
<b>US equities</b>	<b>22</b>					
Active	18	4.50	VV	IWY	VO	VB
Indexed (passive and enhanced)	4	4.00	SPY			
<b>Fixed income</b>	<b>7</b>					
US investment grade (active)	5	5.00	BIV			
US investment grade (passive)	2	2.00	AGG			
<b>Non-US equities</b>	<b>21</b>					
Active MSCI EAFE	14	4.67	URTH	ACWF	QWLD	
Passive/indexed MSCI EAFE	2	2.00	ACWI			
Emerging markets	5	5.00	VWO			
<b>Alternatives</b>	<b>48</b>					
Private equity	9	4.50	QAI	PEX		
Marketable alternatives	14	4.67	PHDG	QLS	MNA	
Venture capital	8	4.00	IWC	IPO		
Private real estate	5	5.00	USRT			
Energy and natural resources	5	5.00	VAW			
Commodities and managed futures	3	3.00	FUT			
Distressed debt	4	4.00	ANGL			
<b>Short-term and cash</b>	<b>2</b>	2.00	VGSH			
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>					

#### Schedule 7: Allocation to ETFs

#### Returns

Schedule 8 calculates the ETF portfolio return for 2019, using the opening ETF share price on January 2, 2019 and the closing price on December 31, 2019. The percentage of the portfolio allocated to this ETF is then multiplied by the return to get the contribution to the portfolio return. When summed, the ETF portfolio returned 19.59% in 2019.

	<u>%</u>	<u>Stock Price</u>		<u>% Return</u>	<u>% Return x</u> <u>%</u>
		<u>01/01/19</u>	<u>12/31/19</u>		
<b>US equities</b>					
VV	4.50	113.11	147.84	30.70	1.38
IWY	4.50	70.39	96.58	37.21	1.67
VO	4.50	136.22	178.18	30.80	1.39
VB	4.50	130.31	165.64	27.11	1.22
SPY	4.00	245.98	321.86	30.85	1.23
<b>Fixed income</b>					
BIV	5.00	81.39	87.22	7.16	0.36
AGG	2.00	106.55	112.37	5.46	0.11
<b>Non-US equities</b>					
URTH	4.67	77.88	98.78	26.84	1.25
ACWF	4.67	25.85	31.20	20.70	0.97
QWLD	4.67	68.47	85.53	24.92	1.16
ACWI	2.00	63.28	79.25	25.24	0.50
VWO	5.00	37.77	44.47	17.74	0.89
<b>Alternatives</b>					
QAI	4.50	28.81	30.80	6.91	0.31
PEX	4.50	29.69	34.56	16.40	0.74
PHDG	4.67	25.95	27.98	7.82	0.37
QLS	4.67	19.56	22.79	16.51	0.77
MNA	4.67	31.58	33.20	5.13	0.24
IWC	4.00	81.46	99.49	22.13	0.89
IPO	4.00	23.00	31.11	35.26	1.41
USRT	5.00	44.27	54.59	23.31	1.17
VAW	5.00	109.09	134.14	22.96	1.15
FUT	3.00	40.17	39.25	-2.29	-0.07
ANGL	4.00	26.61	29.85	12.18	0.49
<b>Short-term and cash</b>					
VGSH	2.00	60.10	60.83	1.21	0.02
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>				<b>19.59</b>

Schedule 8: ETF Portfolio Return

## Analysis

A common benchmark for a portfolio is a blended return, usually comprising equities and debt. Frequently the MSCI ACWI (all-country world index, a broad global equity index) and Barclays Global Aggregate (a broad debt security index) are used. The relative percentages each contribute to an index is based on the organization that will

be applying it. It would not be unusual to see a 70/30 mix (70% ACWI, 30% Aggregate).

Using the 70/30 blend for the calendar year 2019, the benchmark return was 20.55%, compared to the ETF portfolio return of 19.32%. A one-year comparison is not determinative, and without question, 2019 was a strong equity market. Any portfolio that held a higher proportion of US equities should have expected to do well.

Trying to develop a granular benchmark return (comprised of returns for the constituent strategies) is difficult, largely because many of the alternative strategies do not have robust (or any) benchmarks. The determinative question is whether an organization can do better by moving away from active managers and filling allocations with ETFs. This paper used static ETFs – once they entered the portfolio they remained for the year. There were also no selection criteria based on prior performance – only low cost, Morningstar rating and whether classified as and “all-star” ETF.

### **Conclusion**

The first test of the efficacy of using ETFs in place of managers will come when the 2019 survey results are disseminated and compared to the return of the ETF portfolio. Using the 2019 study the average return of the small foundation can be compared to the 19.59% of this ETF portfolio. If there is a significant difference, a review of the 2019 average asset allocation should be undertaken to see if a shift in strategies accounts for the difference or whether the difference is due to being able to mimic the allocation of a large foundation.

### **Limitations**

The E\*TRADE platform is by no means exhaustive, and there may be a considerable number of excellent ETFs that were not considered by virtue of not being carried on the E\*TRADE platform. A more robust process for selecting ETFs would include looking at past performance, evaluating current performance and making changes during the year (when warranted).

### **Future Research**

Future research can extend this paper by looking at a longer time horizon, consider a combination of active managers and ETFs as being optimal (use managers where the better ones are available to small portfolios at low cost and ETFs when the better managers are hard to access, provide limited liquidity or have higher minimum investments). A more robust diligence process can also be developed that looks at prior performance, depth of bench, succession planning, risk strategies and governance.

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**Contact email:** [jhaber@iona.edu](mailto:jhaber@iona.edu)

***“Connectivist Leadership”: Emerging Leadership Orientations in a Changing World***

Frederique Corbett, Pepperdine University, United States  
Matthew Sweeney, Pepperdine University, United States

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**Abstract**

This paper presents findings from a quantitative research study conducted among the adult population of the United States and Asia-Pacific. The study quantifies how leadership is transforming so that theoretical and empirical contributions can be made towards a new genre of leadership to support organizations in their search for greater leadership efficacy. The main results of this study demonstrate that leadership orientations are evolving from the traditional views of power, authority, control, and hierarchy to a system of shared relationships grounded in connecting people and information sources to create collective influence. Based on the data set presented in this research, it is possible to classify leadership orientations into three groups: (1) traditional, (2) status-quo, and (3) emerging. Answering the IAFOR 2020 Special Theme of “Embracing Difference,” the manuscript proposes a conceptual reflection on alternative forms of leadership emerging in the United States and Asia. The data underscores the widespread evolution of leadership perceptions toward more collective and connected forms, while at the same time, provides evidence of how Asia is leading this evolution. The paper challenges the perennial perceptions of leadership, presenting emerging forms of leadership for future research and scholarly exploration. As such, the study aims to advance the field of leadership studies by showing how “difference” in conceptualizing leadership can provide new opportunities for researchers and business practitioners. It affords leaders around the world new avenues to navigate collectively, better understand difference, embrace, and work together for better global coexistence.

Keywords: Leadership, Connectivist, Asia

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## Introduction

This research paper is part of a more extensive research study conducted in the Summer of 2019 that investigated whether, and to what extent, there is evidence of the emergence of a new kind of leadership phenomenon, which is more collective and connected. The purpose of the full quantitative correlational research was to re-conceptualize leadership by advancing the understanding of leadership from an individual influence on others to a more connected shared process. The research study was based on a 26-question survey comprised of demographic characteristics and an exploration of personal values (Q23), emotional intelligence (Q24), work behaviors (Q25, 26), technology orientations (Q27), and leadership orientations consisting of leadership views (Q28), leadership principles (Q29), and opinions on the future of leadership (Q30).

In the context of this paper, the researchers focused on analyzing just one independent variable - geographic location - and one dependent variable - leadership views (Q28) - to isolate the areas of significance related to a new collective and connected leadership paradigm. Hence, this specific manuscript explores one component of the full research, investigating the leadership views of respondents based on different models of leadership theory (trait theory, behavioral theory, relational leadership theory, and collective leadership). The variable used a Likert 5-point scale with a combination of 10 items based on question 28, where respondents were asked about their leadership views. The main research question driving this paper was: what are respondents' views toward different forms of leadership? The specific research question includes: is there a difference between respondents' geographic characteristics (between those based in the United States versus those in the Asia-Pacific region) and respondents' leadership views?

The study sample included a total of 317 individuals, 159 men, and 157 women, of which 259 were employed full time, and 58 were either unemployed, students, or retired. The study called for the gathering of information on one key demographic, the geographic region where respondents are currently residing. There was no manipulation of the variables by the researchers. Should there be any determined differences, they were ex post facto in nature and resulted from differences in the measurement efforts. This research study sampled from the adult population of the United States and Asia Pacific. Respondents recruited from the United States totaled 198, while those from Asia were 119. The Asia-Pacific respondents were randomly selected from a cross-section of countries, including India (92), Malaysia (2), Singapore (23), and Australia (2). The sample collected cross-sectional data of the identified population through indirect measurement and ascertaining people's leadership views. The population of interest for this study was adults aged 18 to 72. The administration was conducted through non-probability sampling (a survey of convenience) and probability sampling using MTurk. The research was conducted using an online self-administered survey tool supported by Qualtrics, a subscription software for collecting and analyzing data for various research needs. Through this internet-based software, research participants were able to view and participate in the survey, including the screening questions and acceptance of IRB notification. Data analysis was conducted at Pepperdine University.

This study considers one independent variable, which is the respondents' country of residency. The results were obtained through self-reporting by respondents and then categorized by the researchers. Only data from respondents residing in the United States and Asia-Pacific were analyzed. The dependent variable consisted of leadership views, which were measured with question 28 (see below). Questions captured respondents' leadership views on a battery of 10 items, and answers were sorted based on the frequency of responses on a 5-point Likert scale.

1. When I think of leadership, I think of authority, power, control, and hierarchy
2. Leadership is about the common purposes of leaders and followers
3. Leadership is a process of connecting people and information sources to create collective influence
4. Followers can influence the leadership process as much as leaders
5. Leaders need to empower multiple groups, not just individuals, to allow for an inclusive diversity of voices
6. Leaders and followers share in the leadership process
7. The key to successful leadership is a person with special personality traits
8. The key to successful leadership is having the right skills
9. The key to successful leadership is the relationship between the leader-follower
10. The key to successful leadership is the quality of the networking relationships of all those involved

Utilizing the free source statistical calculator G\*Power 3.1.9.2, the F tests and ANOVA: Special effects and interactions test were selected. The following input parameters were used:

1. Effect Size: 0.25
2. Alpha: 0.05
3. Power: 0.95
4. Number of Groups: 4

A total of 317 responses were obtained for the final survey, which was above the G\*Power required of 210 completes with a minimum of 53 per group. Twenty-two individuals were filtered out due to the study not being completed, or their answers did not get recorded within Qualtrics properly.

A variable-reduction technique that shares many similarities to exploratory factor analysis is the Principal Components Analysis (PCA). The primary purpose is to reduce the more extensive set of variables (the 10-question leadership views questions) into a smaller set of principal components that account for most of the variance. Four assumptions were met to complete the PCA correctly. This included ensuring the data is continuous, linear, with no outliers, and sufficient data size (a minimum of 150 cases or 5 to 10 cases per variable). This research collected a total of 317 respondents, with a minimum of 105 respondents from each global region. Utilizing all data received, the PCA was conducted using factor analysis with Quartimax rotation and Kaiser normalization. The rotation converged in three iterations resulting in two primary components. A 0.7 correlation variance was established as a minimum level for grouping questions into primary components. Upon review of the principal components, the researchers evaluated responses to those characteristics associated with an emerging leadership phenomenon. As a result,

series 3, 4, 5, and 6 contained in question 28 represent an aggregate measure of views towards emerging leadership views.

A determination of internal consistency, the leadership view questions were group evaluated as a set of questions. Cronbach Alpha measures scale reliability through inter-item correlation. The evaluation was performed two ways, by measuring all ten items regardless of primary components and then as the two data group components of Asia Pacific and the United States. Cronbach Alpha measured 0.761 with all ten questions. When data was split between the Asia-Pacific and the United States, Cronbach Alpha measured 0.737 and 0.757, respectively. Measures above 0.70 are considered acceptable for social science determinations.

A between-subjects Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was selected to determine the significance of the study. The assumptions to conduct ANOVA were confirmed regarding the level of measurement, random sampling, independence of observations, and normal distributions. Homogeneity tests were confirmed by performing Levene's technique. With only two geographic and gender datasets being analyzed, ANOVA is capable of identifying which groups were significant by contrasting to group means. As a result, post hoc tests were not necessary.

## Conclusions

The main findings of this study underscore the importance of geographic location, and local culture, as critical determinants of leadership views. A substantial body of research (Dorfman et al., 2012; Hofstede et al., 2010; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997) has demonstrated that leadership does not exist in absolute terms; it is shaped by the values of local culture, which set expectations for leadership beliefs and behaviors. At the same time, the study raises the issue of how leadership orientations are evolving from the traditional views of leadership based on power, authority, control, and hierarchy to a system of shared relationships grounded in connecting people and information sources to create collective influence. Based on the limited data set presented in this research, it is possible to classify the leadership views expressed by respondents into three groups: (1) Traditional, (2) Status Quo, and (3) Emerging.

The PCA grouped within two main components. Traditional Leaderships was a separate component, while Emerging and Status Quo, although grouped within a single component, showed a subcomponent breakout, clearly delineating similar, but differing, leadership genres:

- Traditional Leadership: is characterized by views of leadership based on individual attributes and behavior. Data showed that correlations grouped with a high correlation of  $>0.7$ . These views consist of three components: domination, traits, and skills (see Table 1).
- Status Quo Leadership: is characterized by views of leadership based on what is shared by leaders and followers. Data showed that correlations grouped between 0.5 to 0.6. These views consist of two components: common goals and the quality of the leader-follower relationship (see Table 1).

- Emerging Leadership: is characterized by views of leadership based on connectivity and equality among leaders and followers. Data showed that correlations grouped with a high correlation of >0.7. These views consist of three components: the distribution, connectivity, and inclusivity of leadership (see Table 1).

Data validated that the traditional approaches to leadership received a limited appeal from respondents and lower agreement than other more progressive approaches tested in the research. Correlations between Status Quo and Emerging groupings were more closely correlated than with Traditional leadership, supporting a continuing transition from Traditional leadership approach to Emerging leadership.

In addition, the between-subjects Analysis of variance (ANOVA) between the United States and Asia-Pacific were assessed as it relates to the Emerging Leadership. Specifically, is there a difference, if at all, between respondents from the United States and Asia-Pacific with respect to views of Emerging Leadership? The results indicate that significance ( $\alpha < 0.5$ ) exists between Q3, Q4 and Q6. where Asia-Pacific means were higher than the United States, further supporting the propensity of Connectivist Leadership more in existence in Asia-Pacific or that a lower threshold of establishing this emerging leadership exists versus the United States.

<b>Traditional</b>	<b>Status Quo</b>	<b>Emerging</b>
<p><u>Domination</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● When I think of leadership, I think of authority, power, control, and hierarchy (Q1)</li> </ul> <p><u>Traits</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The key to successful leadership is a person with special personality traits (Q7)</li> </ul> <p><u>Skills</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The key to successful leadership is having the right skills (Q8)</li> </ul>	<p><u>Common Goals</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Leadership is about the common purposes of leaders and followers (Q2)</li> </ul> <p><u>Quality of the Relationship</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● The key to successful leadership is the relationship between the leader-follower (Q9)</li> <li>● The key to successful leadership is the quality of the networking relationships of all those involved (Q10)</li> </ul>	<p><u>Distribution</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Followers can influence the leadership process as much as leaders (Q4)</li> <li>● Leaders and followers share in the leadership process (Q6)</li> </ul> <p><u>Connectivity</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Leadership is a process of connecting people and information sources to create collective influence (Q3)</li> </ul> <p><u>Inclusivity</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Leaders need to empower multiple groups, not just individuals, to allow for an inclusive diversity of voices (Q5)</li> </ul>

Table 1: Summary of Leadership Views

### **Traditional Leadership**

Among all the leadership orientations tested in the study, leadership expressed as a form of authority, power, control, and hierarchy scored the lowest. Only slightly more than half (57.8%) of the total respondents agreed that “leadership is a form of authority, power control, and hierarchy” (top two-boxes). In comparison, a quarter of all respondents (26.5%) had a marked disagreement (strongly disagree and somewhat disagree) with this way of conceptualizing leadership. The relationship between power, status, and leadership has been well established and remains a leading theory in the leadership literature and the foundation of much leadership training and competency development. Carlyle (1841) theorized on the “Great Man” theory, describing how leaders were born, not made (Bernard, 1926; Kohs & Irle, 1920; Zeidner et al., 2004) with an ability to exert power on their followers.

Respondents from the Asia-Pacific region (63.8%) were more likely to agree with leadership expressed as a form of authority, power, control, and hierarchy than those from the United States (54.1%).

### **Status Quo Leadership**

The study results prove that there is substantial agreement from respondents on leadership defined through the relationship between leaders and followers. Data indicates that respondents validate the relational aspect of leadership as a core process and its primary purpose. These beliefs are in line with the Leader-Member exchange leadership theory (LMX), which “conceptualizes leadership as a process that is centered on the interactions between leaders and followers” (Northouse, 2013, p. 161). Early studies of the LMX theory from Dansereau et al. (1975) explored the nature of linkages across leaders and followers based on their dyadic relationship, vertical dyads with subordinates, and in-group and out-group relationships. LMX theory directs attention to the relational aspect of leadership and the quality of the leader and follower exchange (Anand et al., 2011), indicating its predictive outcomes at the individual, group, and organizational level of analysis.

A large number of respondents (76.7%) agreed that “leadership is about the common purposes of leaders and followers” (top two-boxes), with more Asian respondents (83.2%) agreeing with this statement than those from the United States (72.7%). Additionally, respondents recognized the importance of the quality of the relationship between leaders and followers. A vast majority of respondents (83.6%) agreed that “the key to successful leadership is the relationship between the leader-follower” (top two-boxes), and this leadership view was equally strong with Asian respondents (84.6%) as American respondents (83.3%). Similarly, almost one in ten (78.9%) agreed that “the key to successful leadership is the quality of the networking relationships of all those involved” (top two-boxes), with particularly strong results in the Asia-Pacific region (86.5%) compared to the United States (74.2%).

The literature has established that Asian cultures value group harmony with a strong dependence on the relationship between bosses and subordinates (Chen & Kao, 2009; Fu et al., 2008; Ling et al., 1987). Employees are members of in-groups who act in the interest of their teams versus individual needs. According to Hofstede et al. (2010), countries in the Asia region tend to have a low Individualism Index (IDV), which

shows they are collectivist and very focused on the relationship aspect of leadership. Conversely, the United States has the highest IDV score of the Hofstede study, placing it at the top of the survey as the most individualistic culture globally (Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 95–97).

### **Emerging Leadership**

Beyond the expected aspects of leadership, such as sharing common goals across leaders and followers and getting along, respondents recognize more emergent dimensions. Progressive views of leadership stress that leadership should be fully distributed with equal power among leaders and followers. The majority of respondents (84.5%) agreed that “followers can influence the leadership process as much as leaders” (top two-boxes), with robust agreement from Asian respondents (91.6%) compared to those from the United States (80.3%). Similarly, a majority of respondents (80.7%) agreed that “leaders and followers share in the leadership process” (top two-boxes), with more Asian respondents (88.2%) agreeing with this statement than those from the United States (76.2%). In the past, followers were defined as “subordinates who have less power, authority, and influence than do their superiors and who therefore usually, but not invariably, fall into line” (Kellerman, 2008, p. xix). However, in recent years, the meaning of the word follower has changed. Followers have come to be gradually recognized as a force to be reckoned with (Kelley, 1992). The data in this study corroborates the evolving role of followers and the dependency that leaders place upon them for success.


Recently, scholars have highlighted that shared leadership and teamwork have enabled companies to respond faster to today’s complex business challenges. According to Kogler Hill (2013, p. 287), “leadership in organizational work teams has become one of the most popular and rapidly growing areas of leadership theory and research.” Sharing leadership is the recognition that “leadership is more than just a role; it is a social process” (Pearce et al., 2009, p. 234) that requires a reappraisal of the role of followers and leaders, who become more commonly thought of, and leveraged, as peers.

Aside from distributing leadership more equally, respondents also stress the importance of increasing the connectivity and inclusivity of leadership. The majority of respondents (84.8%) agreed that “leadership is a process of connecting people and information sources to create collective influence” (top two-boxes) with the vast majority (91.6%) of Asian and American respondents (80.8%) agreeing. The majority of respondents (82.6%) agreed that “leaders need to empower multiple groups, not just individuals to allow for an inclusive diversity of voices” (top two-boxes). This belief was held equally among Asian respondents (86.5%) and those from the United States (80.3%).

The nascent literature on collective leadership provides new perspectives for understanding emergent collective behaviors that transcend the age-old power and status dynamics. Hagberg (2003) called for a more sophisticated view of power and action to create productive leadership. Will (2016, p. 263) argued that “if effective leadership entails creating conditions conducive to the balance of diversity - and consensus-generating interactive dynamics that in turn yield emergent collective behaviors,” it is central to discover which interactive dynamics should be promoted.

## Implications

The implications of this study are significant. The findings challenge assumptions that leadership remains anchored on legacy leader-centric approaches promoting leadership as a function of individual traits, style, or behavior. Across all respondents, regardless of their place of residence, leadership based on authority, power, control, and hierarchy, received the lowest agreement scores (see Figure 1). The data provides supporting evidence for shifting the practice of leadership in organizations and training approaches. Hollenbeck and McCall (2003) emphasize that global executive development has not been working due to outdated strategies too heavily focused on the leader versus the development of relational competencies across teams.



Results based on top 2 boxes "strongly agree/agree"

Figure 1: Summary of Leadership Views Asia vs. the USA

Conversely, leadership that transcends the heroic leadership paradigm resonates strongly. In the United States, respondents are more concerned with the leader-follower relationship, while in Asia, collective influence is paramount (see Figure 1). Sharing leadership and empowering others to create mutual influence becomes the key to leading. Power is achieved through diversity and inclusion rather than individual force. As a result, it is possible to shift the leadership genre from Traditional (leadership is as a person) to Status Quo (leadership as a relationship) and Emerging (leadership as a connective state). Instead of positional power, leadership becomes a process of connecting people and information sources to create collective influence. In content analysis, Corbett et al. (2018) demonstrated that the leadership literature experienced a significant change in 2015, with a marked decline from its steady increase since the start of the century. Search terms for "collective leadership" grew with network theory characteristics, including transparency, collaboration, teamwork, and distributed decision-making (Corbett et al., 2018). These theories advance more complex views of leadership, challenging the underlying assumptions of the previously reviewed literature. In these newer leadership paradigms, leadership is no longer defined based on the leader's idealized influence (i.e., dominating, directive, charismatic), or as of the result of an exchange between the leader and follower (i.e., situational, relational), but as an outcome in terms of knowledge creation through a dynamic and collective effort, and ultimately a shared collective state of connectivity.

“Connectivist Leadership” (Corbett et al., 2018; Corbett & Spinello, 2020) proposes new ways of conceptualizing leadership inspired by the learning theory of connectivism (Downes, 2007; Siemens, 2005), examining leadership as a responsive and networked influence model through shared connections. “Connectivist Leadership” “redefines the leadership paradigm for the 21st century by recognizing that leadership is a dynamic, connected, and collective influence process, based on the principles of digital knowledge and interpersonal neural networks” (Corbett & Spinello, 2020, p. 8). The findings from this study provide new directions for understanding leadership in a changing world.

### **Limitations**

Although this study benefits our research process and creates confidence in the findings, with new emerging leadership views, there are several limitations. First, a portion of the respondents, in both the United States and Asia-Pacific, were samples of convenience with a business or personal relationship with the researchers. Some prior knowledge of our research may have been known and could have biased survey responses. Second, our sample consisted of varying respondent management levels and work experiences. As such, we could have respondents with little or no business environment exposure being assessed equally with respondents in leadership roles with significant work experience. Third, respondents in Asia-Pacific countries were limited to Singapore, Australia, Malaysia and India. Adding additional Asia-Pacific countries may have provided additional perspectives to the leadership phenomenon being studied.

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**Contact email:** frederique.covingtoncorbett@pepperdine.edu  
matthew.sweeney@pepperdine.edu



*The habitat differentiation for fairness  
-Digital Asylum Model-*

Sachio Horie, Nagoya University, Japan

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**Abstract**

In this paper, we propose realization of an equality society for persons with the disabilities who can be distinguished from non-handicapped persons (social strong peoples and weak peoples). The persons with disabilities are a suppressed group of the society. The suppression is only increasing in conflicting society with multiple unequal distributions of the power, the status, and the wealth, such as the controlled society. In this society, persons with the disabilities have always considered coexistence with non-handicapped persons, however the different groups have the different worlds and the concepts. Therefore, although We consider that the solidarity is possible in the society, the coexistence is impossible. This means a high degree of impartiality about the segregation. We call this region of segregation Asylum. The asylum is a safety net for the social weak peoples. The asylum can be realized in a highly digitized controlled society by the advent of the artificial intelligence and highly functional machines with the control of social norms and power, the automatic production of things, It is a basic component of a society (system) that provides services and redistributes wealth. We propose such a system as this digital asylum model. The Digital Asylum Model advocates the anarchism.

Keywords: Asylum, Disability, Controlled Socialism

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## **Introduction**

In this paper, we propose the realization of an equality society for persons with the disabilities who can be distinguished from non-handicapped persons (social strong peoples and weak peoples). In this society, persons with the disabilities have always considered coexistence with non-handicapped persons.

The concept of disability is that the disability increases the isolation and eliminates participation in the society. Therefore, persons with disabilities are an oppressed group of people in the society. Various socially oppressed groups have been classified. The disability is one of the socially oppressed groups. We call this disability [1]. In this paper, we focus on the disability as an example, but our model provides the fairness in all socially oppressed groups.

In society, people with disabilities have always considered coexistence with healthy people. For example, groups that have grown up in the different cultures are able to have the solidarity in society, however not harmony, because the concepts what they have acquired are different. We can have the fairness via the segregating. Even in an ideal society with sufficient resources, the society cannot provide services according to their social abilities. In the controlled society like now, it becomes more apparent. This is because we propose that we cannot have the harmony that accepts the diversity due to different concepts with addition to the social functions. We call this region of the segregation "Asylum". For example, there are multiple asylums, the weak one and the strong one. The asylum is a safety net for social weak people. This asylum does not go through physical contact because the socially strong and weak are connected by digital technology. Each exists in its own place.

### **1. Asylum called disability**

Persons with disabilities are temporarily positioned as producers, but it is difficult permanently, because this is the world models of the normal and the disabled are different.

Recently, the society has become an organization because the powerful entity can operate the society. If the society is an organization, it is formed for a certain purpose. therefore, it is justified that societies interfere with the members' choice of actions in achieving their goals and restrict their freedom. An organization's emphasis on principles threatens actors' freedom. However, persons with disabilities must achieve freedom as "non-conductors" for their survival. It is not compatible with the society formed by non-handicapped persons.

Don't get us wrong, we admit Asylum, which is called a disability because persons with disabilities have the disability, and we create an area within Asylum that is free from anxiety and misery. Asylums exist in each socially oppressed group. Only after establishing the Asylum that allows people to live without acting is it possible for the vulnerable to gain freedom.

## **2. The controlled society**

Currently, the rapid computerization is creating a deterministic social structure. That means the high digitization of society. According to artificial intelligence, we are the subjects who can predict their behavior based on certain probabilities and laws, not as who make self-determination and judgment. The simulations that predict future actions based on past facts are constantly being conducted. The vast amount of personal information accumulated shows us what to do before we make any decisions. The controlled society is established by such extreme digitization of people.

The purpose of surveillance capitalism and digital Leninism is the extreme digitization of people. In a highly digitalized society, socially persons with disability are also excluded from digitalization as meaningless data.

The difference between the controlled society and the supervisory capitalism is that the supervisory capitalism is totalitarian, but the control society manages the society fairly by leaving control to the machine. For this reason, control is justified. The controlled society is the core of the Digital Asylum model. The Asylum is a place where vulnerable groups sometimes offer the opportunity to abandon their autonomous personal responsibility and consciousness decisions. It must exist permanently rather than in a temporary place like TAZ [2].

In the research on surveillance capitalism typified by Jamie Bartlett [3], the issue is how to correct the use of stupid machines by the powerful actors. However, we propose to construct a new social model in which a subject with small power uses excellent machine intelligence. It is an aggregate containing asylum. In realizing asylum, for example, we propose universal basic income.

## **3. World model**

By categorizing the world, the world is ordered and our position in the world is determined. The concept [4] is what characterizes this category mentally. The concept reflects the real world, but they are formed in the process of an entity interacting with the outside. We learn the abstract representation of the existing world. We called this the concept in this paper.

Google randomly extracted approximately 10 million images from videos posted on YouTube without labeling them and processed them by the algorithm they developed. This algorithm made it possible to classify cats a week later. However, they did not supervise the word cat to artificial intelligence, so to be precise, the algorithm classified the groups corresponding to cats.

We postulate this fact that the computer has reached a primitive emergent system and has acquired the concept. In this assumption, we may not be able to understand the concepts that artificial intelligence has acquired without supervision. In other words, persons can't understand the concepts acquired by higher-level unsupervised deep learning. It is different from our concept. The concepts that are qualitatively different appear between us and machines.

If the concept is the state of the existing world model, the world model that the persons with the disabilities and the non-handicapped persons have are obviously different.

From this point of view, we propose that it is fair to separate the persons with the disabilities from the non-handicapped persons

#### **4. The state of society**

In this paper, we first classify the state of society as isolation, inclusion, exclusion, and solidarity, based on the interaction between a group of subjects and objects. Isolation is a group with no interaction, Inclusion is a group with directed interaction, Exclusion is a group with no interaction (there are entities that do not belong to the group), and Solidarity is a group with undirected interaction. As a parallel idea, the classification of rejection, assimilation, segregation, and symbiosis, in which a time axis is added to the interaction, is also proposed. Rejection is based on the process that it will eventually be excluded, Assimilation will change into inclusion according to the field, Segregation will change into solidarity, and Symbiosis will change the direction of each other.

Society seems to have gradually converged to an equilibrium point after a great historical conflict. In the trend, we have considered the way of a better society, including the research of our predecessors. However, we consider that the society will not converge as long as humans make it up. In Japan, there is a movement to realize a diversity society (a society that is tolerant of diversity). However, this realization is a movement realized within the framework of consumption and production. Persons with disabilities may not want to be involved even if they want to be involved in production, and they have no place in a sustainable society. In the first place, persons with disabilities are persons who has parts missing from the definition of person in a narrow sense and cannot change, don't get us wrong. A part of their multimodal is missing. For that reason, we inevitably segregate as the right choice. The cultural background is a world model, and it is impossible for people who can only recognize (live) different world models to live together.

Asylum is one of the groups that make up society, and we aim for solidarity of each group, including socially strong people.

#### **5. Mechanized social norms**

The life of humans was changed by the expansion of the Internet and the evolution of artificial intelligence interdependently with social structure. For example, For example, our lifestyle has changed significantly by the spread of smartphones. The changes in social structure passively change our ethics. The crime is closely related to social structure. The crime occurs repeatedly unless the social structure is changed. The judging only one criminal does not change the social structure. The changes in the social structure are very costly.

However, the expansion of the Internet and the evolution of artificial intelligence have made it possible to reduce the costs with the changes in social structure through efficiency.

The social efficiency makes the change of social structure without criminal act. For example, the drive recorders make drivers unconsciously comply with traffic regulations. By monitoring each other, the speeding may disappear. For example, drive recorders make drivers unconsciously comply with traffic regulations. By monitoring each other, the speeding doesn't exist. Also, if a customer picks up goods and automatically make a payment in an unattended convenience store, then the act of theft will not exist. In the Internet world, we have lost the act of theft (which can be maliciously copied) except for digital data. A society that separates crime from human ethics and renders it meaningless is more threatening than singularity, the creating a system that prevents crime means we can't choose and evil options. In the same way, the social norms can be left to the machine.

Smart contracts arguably have the most innovative potential. In the smart contract, some or all of the parties to the contract invest their assets, and their assets are automatically redistributed among the parties. This means that machines can execute contracts between individuals without coercion or arbitration from third parties. Nick Szabo describes its function through an example of a car lease recorded in a smart contract. In this case, if the borrower misses out on a car lease, the contract will automatically read the borrower's right to use the car from the digitized record and revoke it. The smart contracts thus lead to automatic contract compliance [5].

The controlled societies have a problem when a powerful entity limits the calculation of gain to an individual. For example, some states in the United States have adopted artificial intelligence to identify their antecedents. It is highly possible that the subsequent life of the person is predicted and affirmed by the calculation of the gain based on the attributes born in the past and the past criminal history, which causes social exclusion.

However, we use the function of the controlled society to realize the social norms on machines. Ultimately, the singleton (world order) manages society, as Nick Bostrom [6] says. The social norm enforced by the state power is called law, but by entrusting the social norm to the machine, the state power becomes unnecessary. This kind of society is the mechanism that can create Asylum permanently, and it is called Digital Asylum Model. The digital agile model is a framework of a society (system) that realizes the control of social norms and power, the automatic production of goods and the provision of services, and the redistribution of wealth.

## **6. Consensus to build the Asylum**

In the Digital Asylum model, we must define the norms by which we must maintain solidarity. We reflect Rawls [7]'s veil of ignorance in the actual social structure.

Rawls' conception of justice differs significantly from utilitarian understanding of justice.

The equality in utilitarianism is equality to profit. If non handicapped persons need less than persons with the disability to obtain the same degree of utility, utilitarianism gives the healthy person a good.

It can create extreme inequalities, and the poorest groups in society cannot secure basic rights and freedoms. Rawls proposed the veil of ignorance and the original position, arguing that a society without inequalities or injustices should be constructed and realized from the beginning. This paper also supports this position.

There are various criticisms in Rawls' theory. Sen criticizes Rawls's theory of justice for redistribution of goods. Sen noted the inequality between persons with disability and non-handicapped persons. That is, given the same basic good, persons with disability may not be able to do what non-handicapped persons can do, rather Sen says that society must realize the basic capability of an individual. Latent the capability is a concept that means a set of functions that result from connecting a person with a state and a behavior in order to live a good life or a good life.

Sen considers that it is fair for all to be able to participate in the social life of a community. Rawls also assumes that all members of society are rational. Nevertheless, we support Rawls because we believe that the equality can lead to a fair society, and that achieving equality is the provision of basic goods. In this paper, we consider Rawls' position as a way of thinking that vulnerable groups should be prioritized. In addition, Sen also criticizes the assumption of a rational subject. We make effective use of quantified human attributes in a controlled society, and argue that machine intelligence can save all socially oppressed groups.

We provide the original framework of the society of the future. Therefore, in this paper, it is assumed that Rawls supports the position of disparity, and machine intervention is the intervention.

In channel theory[8], the object is regarded as a distributed system, its elements are represented by each classification area, and the whole is expressed by a channel consisting of the classification area and information projection. This makes it possible to mathematically handle the flow of information in distributed systems.

In the channel theory, let the classification area of each member of the community be  $C_i$ . Furthermore, let  $\pi$  be the information projection. It is related to  $C_i$  and  $C_j$  through the channel  $C$  defined by the core of the classification  $C$ . The local logic generated from  $C_i$  is obtained  $L_i$ , and the local logic on the core  $C$  is obtained  $L_C$  by this local logic and information projection  $\pi$ . Furthermore, by applying the information projection  $\pi$ , it is possible to obtain local logic  $L_i$  derived from the channel  $C$ . Such translation affects the establishment of communication.

## 7. To the Digital Asylum Model

The technology may dramatically increase, and productivity and economic growth rate may increase anew with the spread of artificial intelligence.

When such the mechanized economy will come, the present capitalist economy will the end and workers will be replaced by machines which will free people from labor. It realizes the de-labored society. However, the income of workers changes in the de-labored society. The possible methods 1) welfare, 2) socialist economy, and 3) universal basic income. 1) and 2) do not function well even considering the feeling of satisfaction in life and willingness to work. In 3), the government directly pays the

minimum living expenses to all citizens. Compared with the livelihood protection that is selectively paid, the lump sum can be paid, so the administrative cost is lower. However, persons with disabilities need a social security system.

We consider the realization of the digital asylum model from the energy trade.

#### Value of Bitcoin

Given that a block is generated on the block chain every ten minutes with an estimated energy consumption of 385.84 MWh, a single block uses the following amount of energy:

$$385.84 \text{ MWh} / (1 \text{ h}/10 \text{ min}) \approx 64.31 \text{ MWh}$$

If 12.5 Bitcoins are rewarded to miners for generating a single block, the energy required for one Bitcoin is:

$$64.31 \text{ MWh} / 12.5 \approx 5.14 \text{ MWh per BTC}$$

#### Value of Product- Example: Electric vehicle

An electric vehicle uses 140.83 MWh in its lifetime from its manufacturing and use to its eventual disposal. If it takes 5.14 MWh to create one Bitcoin, an Electric Vehicles worth in Bitcoin would be:

$$140.83 \text{ MWh} / 5.14 \text{ MWh per BTC} \approx 27.4 \text{ BTC}$$

This practical illustration, linking of Marx's Labour Theory of Value to Bitcoin, builds a strong case for the potential to use Blockchain technology for a practice of the Digital Asylum Model.

We can solve the economic challenges needed to maintain the asylum using blockchain. Furthermore, we can form a system that pays the universal basic income regularly by programming Bitcoin in the conversion between energies and value.

People don't understand how powerful artificial intelligence is as a technology that can disrupt multiple industries in a very short time, but it makes continuous maintenance of capitalism impossible.

## 8. Digital anarchism

Treating people fairly means to respect their desires and interests and to acknowledge that they have equal rights to freedom. The goal of the Digital Asylum Model is to ensure that people have the physical and ethical means to develop their humanity. Until now technology has been used to increase profits and expand the economy, which does not free every individual from wasted effort. The Digital Asylum model advocates anarchism. The model's algorithm is maintained by humans, but the model is not governed by humans.

The anarchism is a government-less socialism. In other words, the abolition of human exploitation and oppression by people, the abolition of private property (i.e. capitalism) and government.

Anarchism is a political ideology that aims to create a society without political, economic, or social hierarchy. It is a social system that maximizes individual freedom and social equality. We must create a system that guarantees people the freedom to work. Freedom of labor is not the freedom to search for a businessman who will contribute one-tenth of the product of labor as the tax. Freedom of labor also includes break out of labor. The ultimate goal of society is anarchy, a society without government. We realize that with machines.

### **Conclusions**

The anarchism can be realized if a high degree of mechanization becomes possible, and solidarity is guaranteed there. The Digital Asylum Model replaces the social system based on the class principle and the national principle with solidarity and artificial intelligence, and replaces it with a free non-nationalist society in which machines manage. Finally, we are convinced that those who are dissatisfied with the current social structure have obtained new ways to obtain freedom..

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**Contact email: sgs01115@gmail.com**



***How the Cost of Participation Influence the Inclusiveness of Stakeholder Participation? Experiences in the Participation Process in Flood Risk Management in Indonesia and the Netherlands***

Mustika Anggraeni, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands &  
Brawijaya University, Indonesia

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**Abstract**

Literature continues to highlight the importance of stakeholder participation, although it also emphasizes that it can be misapplied. Participation generates a considerable cost for the organizer and participant. This research addresses how organic participation organized by the stakeholders and how the cost of participation influences the inclusiveness of the process. This study is conducted to compare two case studies; Indonesia (Semanggi, Surakarta) and the Netherlands (Varik and Heeselt, West Betuwe). Both cases involved flood protection infrastructure planning that includes the possibility of displacement. In the Indonesian case study, the factors that influenced the participation process are strong leadership and solidarity. The cost of participation is shared between participants and the elements of intangible cost, namely; time, information, network, skill, and economic status. Individuals who can afford their participation are well represented and can exercise more influence. However, the participation process challenged by power issues, in which the community has a low bargaining position in terms of illegality. The Netherlands case study, the community, can create community organizations to manage the participation process, which can exercise the capability to express their positions, posing arguments, and engaging external party to support their interest. The cost of participation is perceived high for the group leaders, due to the opportunity cost of time, and anxiety. However, these costs are shared by the participant with a membership fee for the organization. With the ability and willingness to borne participation cost, lengthy process, a consensus was finally made in favor of the community.

Keywords: cost of participation, inclusive, flood risk management

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## Introduction

One of the global impacts of climate change is floods caused by extreme weather due to changes in long term climate patterns. Floods were the most frequent (43.4%) type of disaster (Wallemacq & House, 2018). The total loss and victims of disaster worldwide are the majority because of the flood. Forced migration is one of the impacts. Floods cause temporary or permanent displacement (5.4 million inhabitants displaced from their homes (IDMC, 2019).

The impact of displacement influences the community and people's quality of life profoundly on the economic aspect, environmental aspect, and social aspect. Floods also categorized as complex and dynamic environmental and resource-related problems. Therefore, decision-making processes related to flood protection, flood adaptation, or flood risk management need to be well planned by involving the affected communities. Furthermore, in order to gain sustainably to floods risk governance, the input from stakeholders is highly necessary.

Awareness of the significance of participation in flood risk management or governance is pointed out in several studies in various countries (Thaler & Levin-Keitel, 2016; Edelenbos, Van Buuren, Roth, & Winnubst, 2017). However, because of technical-infrastructure approach heavily driven flood risk management, the participation in the sense of engaging affected stakeholders, especially the citizen, are less considered in the policy processes. Also, the emergency nature of floods, in some cases, uses as an excuse for top-down decisions (Padawangi & Douglass, 2015). The fast response for direct intervention from the state is needed at some point. However, this cannot be the excuses to take less consideration to the aspiration of the inhabitant. If citizen participation in flood risk management, especially in the planning stages are low, the outcome of the management is often not suitable for what the people need. This may lead to a high adjustment that causes a lower quality of life, even, in extreme cases, the people will be back to the flood-prone to inhabit illegally and create another problem (Edwin, Najoran, & Kimbal, 2019). The state approach in governing flood is focusing on the physical system of flood-related to the urgency to increase the preparedness of the flood. The reaction in some cases came from the impacted communities that eager to be heard related to what they need, and use their right to questioning about the decision-making process, also demand their participation to be included in decision making process.

At least there are two kinds of participation of citizens to be included in the decision-making process based on who initiated the participation, which is government-induced participation or organic participation/self-organization participation (Edelenbos, Van Buuren, et al., 2017; G. Mansuri & Rao, 2004). The organic participation defined as "activity driven by social movements aimed at confronting powerful individuals and institutions within government and improving the functioning of these spheres through a process of conflict and accommodation" (Ghazala Mansuri & Rao, 2013). Participants/stakeholders that included in the process manage themselves in the form of a community organization to have a better bargaining position. This initiative usually came from the collective concern about problems that occur because of the changing exercise of power. The capability to conduct this kind of process is vary based on several factors such as the social economic character of the community, in term of financial capability, network,

communication skill etc. What is lacking in literature is discussion of how organic participation being financed. This study is focusing on the cost of participation being problematized in relation to the inclusion as the main goal of participation.

The cost of participation studied in this research includes the cost that needed to be borne to be able to participate in the decision-making process. The cost includes tangible costs (e.g., travel cost, staff expenses, administration, event cost, monitoring and evaluation cost) and intangible cost (e.g., time, skill, stress, anxiety, conflict, and uncertainty).

In this organic participation, the resources needed for the process is self-supported by the people, not the state. Organic participation is mainly triggered by inequality perceived by the communities confronting more powerful actors. This motivation drives participation without ulterior motives to achieve the collective goal. However, this process is not without costs, how cost problematized in the organic participation processes needed to be investigated to understand the relation with the motivation of participation. Furthermore, the importance of participation cost examination aims to search if there is a relationship between how participation costs perceived by the community and the inclusive process of participation.

Before understanding the cost of participation, specifically on organic participation, understanding the character of participation is essential. Different natures of participation also will differ the cost generation borne by the participants. The character of participation includes the process of participation as well as the outcome of the participation (Hassenforder, Smajgl, & Ward, 2015). Therefore, this research addresses two research objectives; first, understanding the character of organic participation organized by the community in the context of flood risk management; and second, exploring participation cost influences the inclusiveness of the process.

### **Theoretical Consideration**

Since the rise of the participatory approach in the late 60s, the literature highlights the importance of stakeholder participation (Arnstein, 1969). Among critics of participation implementations (Arboleda, 2014; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Gregory, 2000; Parfitt, 2004), some of them recognize a considerable cost for the organizer and participant (Cohen & Uphoff, 1977; Knoke, 1988). The research of participation cost is less addressed in the literature (Anggraeni, Gupta, & Verrest, 2019). A few examples founded that since the 1970s, participation cost has been known as a factor that can prohibit participation (Cooper, 1979). This is because there is an assumption that the public will be prepared to participate without limits. Other causes also the estimation of cost is difficult because of a lack of data, transparency, and availability of methods (Ansari & Andersson, 2011). Among the few, the development of participation cost studies has categorized several costs of participation; for instance, Sefton et al. (2002) divide the cost of participation as program cost, non-program cost, participant's cost, and production cost.

The literature does not point out precisely how tangible and intangible costs should be perceived, calculated, and budgeted for policy processes, including flood governance to ensure meaningful participation (Anggraeni et al., 2019). Limited research covers how the participation cost can be a factor of exclusion, that drives the participation

meaningful only for those who can afford the cost. The theory of power and participation is critical to understand the local power structure, that participation can influence the distribution of power (Smith, 1998) as well as influenced by the existing distribution of power. The participation cost as a barrier of participation is usually recognized in government-induced participation. On the contrary, in self-organized or organic participation, the motivation is usually high, could be neglecting the cost of participation, and focusing more on the objective of the collective movement. Organic participation defines as "participation driven by social movements aimed at confronting powerful individuals and institutions within government and improving the functioning of these spheres through a process of conflict and accommodation" (Ghazala Mansuri & Rao, 2013). However, any participation is not without cost, so this research will cover the gap in the literature by addressing how the actors of organic participation perceive the cost of participation and how this influences the power exercise.

## **Methods**

The case-study approach was taken in this research, and the case-study area taken place in Indonesia (Semanggi, Surakarta) and the Netherlands (Varik and Heeselt). Both cases involved flood protection infrastructure planning that includes the possibility of displacement. Surakarta municipality was considered a pilot project for its participatory approach initiatives regarding community-based planning (Bunnell et al., 2013; Taylor, 2015), including flood risk management. The Netherlands is well known for its success story on flood risk management, shifting from structural planning to spatial planning approach with more room for citizen participation (Edelenbos, Van Buuren, et al., 2017). Indonesia, as a developing country, has a lower democracy index than The Netherlands (EIU, 2019). In this sense, the maturity of the participation process in The Netherlands is much higher than in Indonesia. The attempt to study both case study in such different background merely understands the problematization of participation cost both countries and learn from each other.

Interviews were conducted in 2018 and 2019 to gather information from 31 respondents from both cases. This research specifically looks at participation from the perspective of the participants. So, interviewees include participants who are affected by the project and the initiator of the organic participation in both case study, conducted through the snowballing approach. Interpretation of the qualitative data was conducted by designing a coding system with multiple sequences. The coding process of the interview transcription is deductively based on literature and participation framework, and inductive coding (open-coding) based on related findings in the field. The codes for assessing participation are context, participation process, participation output, outcome, and impact (modified from Hassenforder et al., 2015), and codes for identifying the level of participation are attendance, opportunity to give/receive input/ideas, consensus-building within the community, shared knowledge/information between community member. Primary data was stored, analyzed, and managed using Atlas.ti version 8.0.

## **Organic participation in Semanggi, Surakarta, Indonesia**

Surakarta is one of the cities in Central Java, Indonesia (Figure 1), with 519,587 inhabitants and a population density of around 11.000 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> (BPS,

2020). This city is known for its initiative for the participatory planning system in the early 2000s (Bunnell et al., 2013; Phelps, Bunnell, Ann, & Taylor, 2014; Taylor, 2015). High populated area, combined with flood risk and continuous struggle with squatter settlement along the flood-prone area of Bengawan Solo river catchment in making this city challenging to be governed. In the rainy season, the city inundates several times every year, and the most severe flooding happened in 2007 (Pramitha & Miladan, 2020). However, Surakarta had implemented relocation for the people who live in the river banks with a participatory approach. This success story was internationally recognized and be a pilot project at the national level back in 2007-2009. Though the floods are reduced because of flood protection infrastructure (Pramitha & Miladan, 2020), it is interesting to see how participatory planning has been developed after the success story. In 2016, a flood risk management project in Surakarta (East part of the city) was started in order to reduce flood risk and protect the area/infrastructure from floods. The project activity includes the construction of parapet, revetment, parapet elevation, water pump infrastructure, and flood gate. The project site includes a flood plain area owned by the state inhabited by slum dwellers that need to be evicted (HP16 plot or known as Kentheng area). The eviction plan was not well communicated to the people, and this is made the community collectively against the plan<sup>1</sup>. This situation also triggered the community leader to take action and organize a movement, and as also the initial moment for the organic participation. The process of participation is very intense in this initial stage. The level of participation was high in terms of attendance, the opportunity to give/receive input/ideas, consensus-building within the community, shared knowledge/information between community members. There is around 600 household inhabiting the area, and more than 75% of the population was attending the meeting. These meetings took place in a community mosque. Because of the escalating threat of eviction, the people express their demands and ideas, and at some point, they achieve a consensus that they build up strategies to strengthen their position against the municipality government. The information shared directly via the meetings, and semi structured network of information from the leader trough each of the people in the area. Meetings in smaller group of community *Rukun Tetangga*<sup>2</sup> was also held in the later stages to make sure that all of the inhabitants have access to information, held minimum once every month<sup>3</sup>.

The initiator of participation in the informal community leader that can mobilize the community to have a common understanding to bargain with the government about their aspiration regarding the eviction plan. With negotiations and meetings with the government, the consensus was achieved. Instead of eviction, the government agreed to consolidate the settlement to reduce the slum area. The government and local community also agreed on a set of eligibility criteria to inhabit the area. They formed an organization called *POKJA Penataan Permukiman HP 16* (Working group for land consolidation in HP 16) within the community. POKJA collaborates with the Surakarta municipality to identify the inhabitants who are eligible for the consolidation.

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with Head of POKJA HP 16, September 2019.

<sup>2</sup> *Rukun Tetangga* is the lowest administrative division of Indonesia, provide social services for small communities, and the leader was selected by the people.

<sup>3</sup> Interview with Head of *Rukun Tetangga* in HP 16, September 2019.




Figure 1: Indonesia case study

### Cost of organic participation in Semanggi, Surakarta, Indonesia

The cost of participation investigated in this research is tangible and intangible costs perceived by the participants to join in participatory events. The events of participation were very intense in the beginning. Though the community is living in constant fear of being evicted, the situation at that moment was very intense<sup>4</sup>. This agitating situation occurred because of the poor flow of information from the municipality. First, the people heard the eviction plan from newspapers, and this creates prejudice and low trust in the government<sup>5</sup>. The cost of participation in this section discussed from participant's and organizer's perspectives as part of the community.

From the participant's perspective, in this high level of uncertainty, some of the participants were anxious to get involved in the participation process. From the interviews, the stress to be in the event of participation to voice their concern is something that inhibits their participation, even though the attendance was high. The uncertain situation and the events itself cause stress and fatigue to the participants. Additionally, it is related to the cultural nature of the *Javanese*, which tends to avoid conflict. The sign of stress and anxiety was identified as intangible participation cost. Another intangible cost is the opportunity cost of time, the community of HP 16 is mostly working in the informal sector, such as trading, household industry, and small scale services that depend on daily income. The events of participation took intense meetings, and thus reducing their time to make a living for the day.

Tangible cost emerged as the transportation cost for some community representatives that went to the municipality for meetings. For most participants, there was a

<sup>4</sup> Interviewee INA-12, September 2019.

<sup>5</sup> Interview with Head of POKJA HP 16, September 2019.

minimum travel cost because the majority of the meetings were held in the neighborhood (mosque). The consumption of meetings was also a component of cost considering custom appropriateness in the area, though the community arranges this element as simple as possible.

The organizer of the organic participation includes a team of people from the community who play a role in arranging the participation process—this team initiated by an informal community leader. The community leader can influence the people since he already made contributions to the community for an extended period. These organizers perceived cost as certain expenses that need to be available so that the process can go smoothly. The treasury person employs a simple accounting system of the POKJA. The total expenditure from the beginning of the record (2016) was approximately IDR 25 million (2019). An element of cost perceived as a very high cost from the organizers is time/overtime. To manage and organize 500 families in HP 16 with differs character are challenging in terms of time for the POKJA member. Other intangible costs that are perceived high are anxiety/stress, information, network, the uncertainty of benefit, conflict, frustration, experience, and responsibility (See Table 1).

The cost of participation is shared between participants and the elements of intangible cost, namely; time, information, network, skill, and economic status. Individuals who can afford their participation are well represented and can exercise more influence. However, the participation process challenged by power issues, in which the community has a low bargaining position in terms of illegality. The participants perceived the cost of participation as a necessity comparing the cost that will be borne if they absent from participation events<sup>6</sup>. The tangible cost borne in the organic participation are catering, travel, publicity (invitation) are perceived low by the organizer and the participant. However, the organizer their perceived tangible cost is higher than the participant because they are directly arranging the participation process.

### **Organic participation in Varik and Heeselt, The Netherlands**

The flood management project in the Varik and Heeselt is one of the DELTA Program that aims to cope with the rising high water level. A bypass is planned as an intervention to accommodate the water from Rhine and Waal River efficiently (Bours, 2016). The intervention expected to bring a positive impact to a broader area in terms of increasing water safety. This project caused some settlement area need to be displaced. The community claims that they were not well informed about this plan, and the local community was against the government plan. They required to discuss why the plan was made, not only participating in terms of operationalization of the project. The main reason was that there were too many uncertainties regarding the urgency of the bypass construction plan. The inhabitants demand that the government need to clarify the uncertainty regarding the impact of the bypass to the water safety compared to other measures such as enforcing embankment. Community leaders initiated the organic participation process in reaction to the government's plan and formed a community social organization known as *Waalzinnig* (WZ). Due to concern about the bypass plan that will change the valued landscape to be so-called an island

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<sup>6</sup> Interview with Head of RT 7, HP 16, September 2019.

(see Fig 2), the level of participation of the inhabitants is high in terms of attendance, opportunity to give/receive input/ideas, consensus-building within the community, sharing knowledge/information between community members. The methods of participation were mainly internal community meetings, held quite intensively since 2014<sup>7</sup>.

The process of participation to influence decision making was challenging, time-consuming, and also costly. The process was supported by the member of the community, which has high education from various backgrounds, and such networking that enables them to have support from external parties regarding technical support (formulating alternative plans), and legal support.




Figure 2: The Netherlands case study

The initiator of participation was the informal community leaders that can mobilize the community to have a common understanding to bargain with the government about their aspiration regarding the plan. Negotiations and meetings with the government were held, and the challenge was that each side has a different perspective and interest. The inhabitants apply multiple approaches to be included in the decision-making process. Effective networking, bargaining position, and right timing lead to consensus<sup>8</sup>. Instead of implementing bypass, the national government agreed to implement the alternative plan, which is enforcing embankment.

### Cost of organic participation in Varik and Heeselt, The Netherlands

The motivation of inhabitant's active participation in the effort to make sure that their voice heard is the common concern of the impact of the bypass plan to their living environment and landscape. The stake of not being active in this kind of event is too costly for the inhabitants. However, participation in these events is not without costs, even though the cost is not perceived as something that prohibits their participation.

<sup>7</sup> Interview with Waalzinnig May 2018

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

From the interviews, the tangible cost of participation recognized by the organizer is the travel costs, report expenses, publicity (website and social media), low cost on postage, and event costs. To finance tangible cost, the Waalzinnig supported by monthly membership contributions, donors, and sponsorship<sup>9</sup>. The cost of participation is not complete and difficult to calculate since not all of the contributions are in monetary form; some of them are in the form of goods and services. This shows that the social cohesion among the inhabitants are high since they have common challenges to their environment. However, there are some intangible costs of participation perceived by the organizer that was not considered. The intangible cost was mainly in terms of time, stress, conflict, frustration, skill (for communicating and negotiation), network, experience, skill, the uncertainty of benefit, sense of responsibility (see Table 1). The highest cost element perceived by the organizer is time. To organize and discuss to have a strategy that agreed by the inhabitants is time-consuming. From the interviews, the time is disrupting everyday activity, trying to understand the technical reports, finding networks, asks experts for consultations, and organize meetings. The long process of negotiation with the government regarding the bypass plan cost the inhabitants high anxiety and stress due to the uncertainty of the process. From the side of the inhabitants or the participants, participation cost was more on the intangible costs, such as time, anxiety/stress, a frustration that caused by in uncertainty of the process.

Table 1: Character of participation and the cost of participation

<b>Codes</b>	<b>INA</b>	<b>NL</b>
<b>Context</b>	System elements: human settlement flood protection project	System elements: flood protection project
<b>Participatory Process</b>	explore decision-making options, community leader	explore decision-making options, community leader
a. Objective & initial idea		
b. Leader	Local leader	Local leader
c. Size of groups	Over 50	Over 50
d. Level of expectation	High	High
e. Length of process	5years	6 years
f. Number of events	Multiple events	Multiple events
g. Attendance	More than 75%	50-70%
h. Setting of exchange	Participant are involved as a group	Participant are involved as a group
i. Degree of participation	Participatory stages: - Facilitation of participation process - Communication of results	Participatory stages: - Design of the project proposal - Selection of methods - Selection of participants - Facilitation of participatory events - Analysis of result - Communication of result

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

Codes	INA		NL	
<b>Output/come &amp; impact:</b>	Revised development plan (eviction to consolidation)		Revised development plan (dismissed bypass plan and employ dike strengthening)	
a. Main output				
b. Impact to participant	Influence of decision		Influence of decision Capacity building Increase collaboration, networking	
c. Impact on actions	Collective action		Collective action	
d. Social scales	Only within the groups		Within and beyond the group involved in the process	
e. Spatial extent	Only within the groups		Only within the groups	
f. Time scales	Long term		Long term	
Cost of participation				
a. Tangible costs:	Participants	Organizers	Participants	Organizers
- Venues	-	-	-	-
- Travel	Low	High	Low	High
- Publicity	-	Medium	-	Medium
- Event cost	Medium	Medium	Low	Low
- Exhibition	-	High	-	-
- Reports	-	Medium	-	High
- Postage	-	-	-	Low
b. Intangible cost				
- Time, overtime	High	Very High	Medium	Very High
- Anxiety/stress	High	High	Medium	High
- Information	Medium	High	Low	High
- Network	Medium	High	Low	High
- Skill, need for training	Low	Medium	Low	Medium
- Status in society	Low	High	Low	Medium
- Uncertainty of benefit	High	High	High	High
- Conflict	High	High	High	High
- Social media	Low	Low	Low	High
- Broker/facilitator	Medium	Medium	Medium	Low
- Frustration	High	High	High	High
- Experience	Low	High	Low	High
- Responsibility	Low	High	Low	Medium
c. Cost-sharing	Shared between members of POKJA voluntarily.		Shared between the member of WZ by the monthly membership contribution and voluntary contribution	

## Discussion

The degree of participation in self-organized participatory in the Netherlands case has more space for participation than in Indonesia, for example, in terms of designing the participatory (includes a selection of methods and participant), and analyzing the result, while in Indonesia is limited on facilitation of participatory events and

communicating the results. One of the reasons is the limited capacity of the community.

Both case studies show that organic participation can influence the government's policy and decision-making process. The inhabitants were able to offer a solution to the state, and this shifts their defensive approach to a more adaptive one, which is the co-production of the flood management plan. This finding parallels with other research (Edelenbos, Buuren, Roth, & Winnubst, 2017). The differences, however, in the process, there were groups of people excluded, especially in the case of Indonesia. And self-exclusion in the case of The Netherlands. In the Indonesia case, individuals who can afford their participation are well represented and can exercise more influence. However, the participation process challenged by the issue of power, in which inhabitants have a low bargaining position in terms of illegality. POKJA negotiated and agreed with the government about the selection criteria of the beneficiary of the land consolidation project. This means that the exclusion was happening at the later stage of the participation processes when the organic participatory followed or changed by co-productions of states' flood risk management plan.

The definition of intangible participation cost in Indonesia case includes how the selection of participants that excluded the people without legal identification. To be involved in the participation process in the consolidation program to have a legal identification was too costly for these people. The person who does not belong to Surakarta municipality, migrant, and informal residents are excluded from the participation process for the land consolidation process. Another form of exclusion was the women are uninvited to the meeting/ participation events; this is assumed that the head of the family will convey the information to the women, and this is not always the case.

In the Netherlands case study, the exclusion happens at the beginning of the project. Calls of ideas were limited to the operational of the project, not the planning process. This conclusion is matched with the research done by Akerboom (2018). Reacting to how participation arranged mainly in operational stages, the community form an organization to influence decision making. Not all community member chooses to engage in this process because the cost of participation is too high for them, e.g., conflict avoidance. Self-exclusion of these people driven by their indecisive/neutral position about the plan, and choose not to participate in the engagement events actively.

## **Conclusions**

The cost of participation can lead to the inclusion or exclusion of stakeholders, even in organic participation. The definition of cost is developed not only in monetary form but also intangible cost that required to be able to participate—this kind of cost causing the exclusion in the participatory processes. There is an underlying assumption that participation is, by definition, inclusive. In both case study shows that this is not always the case. This research mainly focuses on the citizen in organizing them-self to perform participatory. Not yet on how the government perceives this organic participatory initiative, and this should be addressed in future research

because the government's reaction to organic participation could increase the impact of participatory decision making.

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