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Religion and Alienation: The Case of Catholic Poet Alexander Pope

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Alexander Pope (1688-1744) is known to be the first professional English poet. Pope accrued a fortune of approximately £5,000 from his translation of Homer's *Iliad* (1715-1720), making him equivalent to modern day millionaire status.[1] He was able to garner a similar amount of profit from the subsequent translation of the *Odyssey* which followed in 1725-1726.[2] These were monumental feats for a poet in eighteenth-century England, as many writers still depended on royal or aristocratic patrons for their subsistence and success. Pope refused offers of patronage and instead negotiated business transactions with publishers and was careful to retain the copyrights to his own writings. Thus it is that he came to be recognized as the first professional writer in England, one who supported himself independently from the profit of his works.

However, Pope did not come from the most privileged circumstances. While his father, Alexander Pope senior, was a wealthy linen merchant in London, he retired from his occupation in 1688, the year in which the poet was born. From around the age of twelve, Pope also suffered from a physical condition which resulted in stunted growth and fragile health throughout his life.[3]

This paper will focus on the effects which Pope's Catholic faith had on his life and career.[4] As remarked by Helen Deutsch that Pope seemed "destined for the margins," coupled with his physical deformity, his life was marked by factors of alienation.[5] Regarding Pope's rise to fame and incontestable reputation, Pat Rogers comments that Pope exhibits a tendency for "compensatory over-achievement." I argue in this paper that Pope's legally disadvantaged status played an ironic yet significant role in cultivating his ambitions for success.

Beginning with the history of Catholics in England, I will examine the ways in which Pope was barred from mainstream education and university life on account of his faith. I will then trace how, notwithstanding the religious obstacles, Pope managed to build an immensely successful career and will conclude with his statements on the Poet Laureateship and burial in the Poets' Corner in Westminster Abbey, public honors

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[1] See Foxon 1991, 61-63.

[2] See Sherburn 1934, 259 and Foxon 1991, 101.

[3] For detailed analyses of Pope's deformity, see Nicholson and Rousseau (1968) and Rousseau (2007). See also Turner (2012) which, though making clear that his focus is not on already celebrated figures such as Pope, offers insight into representations of disability, broadly defined and previously unexplored.

[4] See, among others, Colley (1992), Tumbleson (1998), and Shell (1999) on Catholicism and English literature. More recently, Jonathan Pritchard is at work on a book studying the relations between Pope, property ownership, and Roman Catholics; see Pritchard 2012, 560.

[5] Deutsch 2007, 15; Rogers 2006, xiii.

which he knew would never be conferred upon him because of his religious faith.

I. Catholics in England

The major event in the history of the plight of Catholics in England may date back to King Henry VIII's separation from the Pope and the Roman Catholic Church. Collectively known as the English Reformation, a series of laws concerning church reform was implemented in the sixteenth century. By the first Act of Supremacy of 1534, Parliament recognized the King as the Supreme Head of the Church of England. Although the Act was repealed in 1554 by Henry VIII's Catholic daughter Queen Mary I, it was introduced again as the Second Act of Supremacy of 1559 by her Protestant half-sister Queen Elizabeth I. The Acts of Supremacy of 1534 and 1559 included the Oath of Supremacy, which required those intending to hold public office to take an oath of allegiance to the Church of England. The Oath eventually became mandatory for Members of Parliament as well as university students.[6]

The Restoration of 1660, in which Charles II returned as monarch, brought an end to the Civil War. Disturbing events such as the Popish Plot of 1679, in which rumors spread about a plan by Catholics to assassinate the King, continued. However, in the aftermaths of the Civil War England for the most part leaned towards Passive Obedience,[7] as avoidance of religious contention was an important factor in restoring national peace and stability. Then, in 1685 James II, a Catholic, succeeded the throne. The birth of James II's son – a Catholic heir – in 1688 sparked once more a religious and political upheaval. This led to the Glorious Revolution in which James II was dethroned in favor of Mary II and her Protestant husband William III.

Upon his accession to the throne, William III initially attempted to reverse some of the penal laws against Catholics and to prevent new ones from being implemented. However, such efforts at religious tolerance were met with fierce opposition in Parliament. As a result, anti-Catholic legislation tightened and new laws were also passed under Queen Anne, who succeeded William III in 1702.

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[6] Thomas More (1478-1535) and John Donne (1572-1631) were Catholic writers who were affected by the English Reformation. Upon his refusal to take the oath required by the Act of Supremacy of 1534, the author of *Utopia* was imprisoned, tried and convicted for treason, and beheaded in 1535. Donne was able to attend universities at Oxford and Cambridge, but he could not obtain a degree. Anti-Catholic measures continued to be imposed in England until the Papists Act of 1778. Subsequent Catholic Relief Acts in the late eighteenth century and nineteenth century gradually allowed Catholics to own land, inherit property, attend Catholic schools, and hold military and other professions which had been previously illegal.

[7] See Erskine-Hill 1979, 15.

The Glorious Revolution occurred a mere few months after the birth of Alexander Pope. It may be assumed that Pope's father retired from his vocation as a precaution to the precarious state of Catholics in England. Pope was born in London, but Pope's father moved his family to Hammersmith in 1692 and then to Binfield in 1700. In 1708, in direct consequence of a Jacobite scare which occurred early in the year, the Queen issued a royal proclamation which required Catholics over the age of sixteen to remove ten miles outside of London and Westminster. It seems that Pope was forced to relocate for a temporary period, as he wrote in a letter to the Reverend Ralph Bridges dated 11 March 1708: "I am so suddenly Proclaimed out of Town that I have but just Time to pack up and be gone."[8]

Life as a Catholic became increasingly difficult after Queen Anne's death in 1714 and, by the Act of Settlement of 1701, it was George I who arrived from Hanover to ascend the throne. King George I, a Protestant, implemented a new law in which Catholics must take an oath of loyalty. Alexander Pope senior refused to do this.[9] Catholics were also ordered to register their real estate. A fellow Catholic Edward Blount wrote to Alexander Pope on 23 June 1716: "Yesterday the Bill to oblige Papists to Register their names and Estates pass'd the Lords with many amendments, and this day was sent to the Commons for their Concurrence."[10] Unjust taxes would later be levied in accordance to the estate's value. Pope senior had purchased an estate with nineteen acres of land for his family in Binfield, but a short while later in 1700 a new legislation was passed which prohibited Roman Catholics from purchasing or inheriting land unless if they officially renounced their faith.[11] In order to avoid the heavy additional taxation, Pope senior had no choice but to sell his estate and, moreover, to sell it to a Protestant.[12] Pope lamented his departure from Binfield in a letter to his Catholic friend Caryll: "I write this from Windsor Forest, which I am come to take my last look and leave of. We here bid our papist-neighbours adieu."[13]

Pope recalled the fate of his family of his early years in a 1737 poem, *Second Epistle of the Second Book of Horace*:

And certain Laws, by Suff'rers thought unjust,

Deny'd all Posts of Profit or of Trust:

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[8] Erskine-Hill 2000, 17.
[9] See Erskine-Hill 1981, 132.
[10] *Corr.*, 1:344.
[11] See Young 2007, 118.
[12] Fortunately a Protestant nephew of Pope's mother, Samuel Mawhood, arranged to take the family's Binfield estate in trust for them.
[13] *Corr.*, 1:336.

Hopes after Hopes of pious Papists fail'd.[14]

Nevertheless, the Pope family never abjured their faith. In 1716 Pope senior moved his family a final time, from Binfield to the west of London in Chiswick. He passed away a year later. Alexander Pope subsequently relocated with his mother to Twickenham in 1718. As Pope could not purchase property, he lived there on a leased estate of five acres until his death in 1744.

It may be worthwhile to mention that by Pope's era, Catholics constituted a small minority of the population. They comprised ten to fifteen percent of the population in England, and only two to three percent may be said to have been practicing Catholics. Brian Young comments that they were mostly concentrated in Lancashire and Cheshire, as well as in the Thames Valley.[15] This may help explain why the Pope family continued to live in the outskirts of London, despite the numerous changes of residence due to interdictions. They wished to remain close to the small communities of co-religionists.

Finally, there was even a law which forbade Catholics from owning a horse that was worth more than ten pounds.[16] This law too affected Pope, as he had received a horse as a gift from Caryll. Pope wrote to him on 14 August 1714: "The greatest fear I have under the circumstances of a poor papist is the loss of my poor horse; yet… If I had a house and they took it away, I could write for my bread."[17] Fortunately for Pope, his literary career showed a promising start while still a youth in Binfield. In 1706, when Pope was barely eighteen years old, he had received a letter from the leading bookseller Jacob Tonson the Elder: "Sir, - I have lately seen a pastoral of yours… If you design your Poem for the Press no person shall be more Carefull in the printing of it, nor no one can give a greater Incouragement to it."[18] His first publication appeared in 1709 and Pope's career was steadily on the rise.

II. Education and Success

Anti-Catholic legislation in England not only involved double taxation and prohibition of property ownership, but it also extended to education as well and Pope was certainly not immune to its effects. He received very little formal education.

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[14] Lines 60-62; *TE*, 4:169.
[15] Young 2007, 118.
[16] See ibid.
[17] *Corr.*, 1:241-42.
[18] *Ibid.*, 17.

As a young child, Pope attended two Catholic schools, one in Twyford and another near Hyde Park Corner. Both schools were unauthorized. He also learned classical languages from a priest named John Banister.[19] He once made a journey to Oxford University as an adult in 1717, in which he described the visit to his female Catholic friends Teresa and Martha Blount: "I wanted nothing but a black Gown and a Salary, to be as meer a Bookworm as any there."[20] Despite the awe and rapture, Pope was never able, apparently on account of his faith, to become a scholar or a professor at a university.[21] From around the time of the family's move to Binfield when Pope was about twelve years old, he resorted largely to self-education. Later in life, Pope commented about his schooling: "God knows, it extended a very little way."[22]

In addition to his Catholicism, a major obstacle which would inflict Pope from adolescence until the end of his life was his physical deformity. Pope suffered from a tubercular infection of the bone, later called Pott's Disease.[23] Pope most likely contracted it from contaminated cow's milk, as pasteurization was not a current practice in Pope's time.[24] The curvature of his spine and limited growth led to other ailments, and he suffered from poor health throughout his life. However, notwithstanding the physical impediments, he convinced his concerned parents to allow him to leave Binfield for a period in 1703 or 1704 to study French and Italian in London.[25] Pope was an ambitious learner and he was determined to procure the best education for himself.

Catholics were prohibited from sending their children abroad, to be educated in their own faith.[26] However, the interdiction was not strictly enforced until the accession of George I in 1714. Families who could afford the voyage often sent their children, clandestinely, to Continental Europe. Teresa and Martha Blount were sent to receive a Catholic education in France as young girls. Pope could not do so, not because of

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[19] See Gordon 1976, 5.

[20] *Corr.*, 1:430.

[21] Towards the end of his life in the early 1740s Pope was offered an honorary degree from Oxford University, but he declined it on the grounds that his friend William Warburton was denied the same honor; see *ibid.*, 4:362 and 436-38.

[22] Spence 1966, 1:8.

[23] Cf. George Rousseau: "By the time [Pope] entered puberty, he began to shrink rather than grow tall, eventually dwindling to no more than four and a half feet tall as an adult, and the fact that one leg was significantly shorter than the other caused him to develop his humped back. The protrusion was painful as well as noticeable, and in time forced him to walk with a stick (cane) and to wear specially fitted shoes" (2007, 210). See Guerinot (1969) for the malicious criticisms which Pope received throughout his career that mocked his appearance and physical limits.

[24] Cf. Nicolson and Rousseau: "[Pott's Disease] was widespread in Europe and America down to the early years of [the twentieth] century, when pasteurization began to be practiced, though almost unknown in tropical countries where milk was boiled for preservation" (1968, 15).

[25] See Spence 1966, 1:12-3.

[26] See Young 2007, 118 and Aden 1978, 3-33.

financial constraints, but because of his physical condition. Pope was never physically strong enough to travel abroad in his life.

In his native England, however, Pope continued to write and publish. His first commercial success came with the publication of the five-canto version of the *Rape of the Lock* on 4 March 1714. The poet wrote with rapture to Caryll on 12 March 1714: "*The Rape of the Lock…* has in four days time sold to the number [of] three thousand, and is already reprinted."[27]

Profit occupied a significant part of Pope's mind in his career as a poet. In 1739 he told Joseph Spence: "An author who is at all the expenses of publishing ought to clear two thirds of the whole profit into his own pocket."[28] Spence also recorded the example which Pope gave him:

For instance, as [Pope] explained it, in a piece of one thousand copies at 3s each to the common buyer, the whole sale at that rate will bring in £150. The expense therefore to the author for printing, paper, publishing, selling, and advertising, should be about £50, and his clear gains should be £100.[29]

While never on the verge of bankruptcy, Pope knew that he had to support his elderly mother and other members of the family. He was no landowner. Nor did he have an aristocratic title to claim. Financial success, in addition to recognition for his literary talent, became an important symbol of status for the Catholic poet.

Pope was fortunate to be endowed with influential literary friends since youth including William Wycherley (1640-1716), John Caryll (1667-1736), William Walsh (1663-1708), and Sir William Trumbull (1638-1716). Pope similarly received several offers from aristocratic patrons. Towards the end of his career in 1738, he boasted: "SOMMERS once, and HALIFAX were mine."[30] Lord Somers (1651-1716) was a successful Whig politician, and Charles Montagu, the Earl of Halifax (1661-1715) was a poet and politician. Both were supporters of Pope's poetry and had proposed to become his patrons. However, Pope turned down the generous proposals.[31] He desired to maintain his independence. To be a client-poet under a patron would curb freedom for the writer, as he must be heedful not to include content which the patron may disapprove. Depending on the patron, the writer may even be subject to

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[27] *Corr.*, 1:214.

[28] Spence 1966, 1:85.

[29] Ibid.

[30] *Epilogue to the Satires. Dialogue II*, 77; *TE*, 4:317.

[31] For Halifax's proposal of patronage to Pope, see Spence 1966, 1:87-88. For Pope's polite reply of refusal, see *Corr.*, 1:237 and Sherburn 1934, 64 and 126. Another figure who offered patronage was James Craggs (1686-1721), Secretary of State. He proposed numerous times a pension of £300 a year, from money which came from secret service funds; see *TE*, 4:354.

producing political propaganda.[32]

The ingenious solution which Pope came up with was to publish a complete translation of Homer's *Iliad* by subscription. While Pope modeled his publication method from John Dryden's translation of Virgil's *Aeneid* (1700), publication by subscription was traditionally reserved for material for which profitability was difficult to predict. Gathering subscribers who would pay in advance decreased the risk of loss, and, in Pope's case, he devised a plan to divide the twenty-four books of the *Iliad* into six volumes, so that a regular annual installment was delivered to the subscribers between 1715 and 1720. This allowed the income from the first volume to supply the cost of production for the second volume, from the second volume for the third, and so forth.

The support from Pope's large circle of aristocratic friends must not be underestimated.[33] Pope had renowned figures such as Isaac Newton on his list of subscribers for the first volume of his translation of the *Iliad* in 1715. Some subscribers ordered multiple sets to distribute as gifts to friends. The Earl of Halifax subscribed to ten sets.[34] The Earl of Carnarvon was the largest single subscriber, who ordered twelve sets. Taking into account the number of wealthy nobility who became subscribers, David Foxon comments that Pope's publication venture resembled "collective patronage" and Paul Baines similarly calls it "diffused patronage."[35] Pope himself, in the Preface to the first volume of his *Iliad*, wrote: "I have found more Patrons than ever *Homer* wanted."[36]

Nevertheless, regarding the business aspects, Pope was unable to reach his target of finding 750 subscribers for the first volume. The true figure is estimated to have been 654 copies for 575 subscribers.[37] Assuming that 650 subscriptions were faithfully paid, David Foxon calculates the maximum profit to have been about £5,435, after deducting payment for the publisher Bernard Lintot. He calculates the minimum to have been £4,372. Taking the middle figure, Foxon thus concludes that a personal profit of approximately £5,000 was made by Pope.[38] Pope repeated much the same procedure for his translation of the *Odyssey*, though this time hiring Fenton and

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[32] This was especially the case with royal patrons. See Steinberg 1996, 108-9 for examples with authors writing for Queen Elizabeth I and Queen Anne.

[33] Cf. Pat Rogers' comment on the system of subscription: "[an] easy 'commission' is a myth: there was only the struggle to find, and to keep, an audience interested enough to subscribe" (1978, 35).

[34] See Spence 1966, 1:88.

[35] Foxon 1991, 39; Baines 2000, 17.

[36] *Prose Works*, 1:255.

[37] See Griffith 1922-27, 1:41.

[38] See Foxon 1991, 61-63.

Broome to facilitate the translation. Even after payments to his two assistants, he managed to secure a similar profit of approximately £5,000.[39] These were no small feats for a poet when we take into account that the average cost of living in England in the eighteenth century was about £30 a year.[40]

IV. Poet Laureateship and Burial in Westminster Abbey

Pope continued to compose highly acclaimed works of poetry such as the *Dunciad* in three books (1728), the *Dunciad Variorum* (1729), *Epistles to Several Persons* (1731-1735), *Essay on Man* (1733-1734), and the *Dunciad in Four Books* (1743).

The history of Poet Laureateship in England may date back to Geoffrey Chaucer (*c.* 1343-1400). Chaucer received an annual allowance of wine for the title, a tradition which continues to this day. However, the position of Poet Laureate as it exists today requires appointment by the monarch. By this standard, Ben Jonson (*c.* 1572-1637) may be said to be the first Poet Laureate in England, who was appointed to the position by King James I in 1617.

Catholics were excluded from appointment as a Poet Laureate. John Dryden (1631-1700), whom Pope greatly admired, was a poet, literary critic, playwright, and in the final two decades of his life, a translator. Dryden was appointed Poet Laureate in 1668 by Charles II and Historiographer Royal two years later. Sometime in the 1680s he converted to Roman Catholicism. The act was very possibly a result of his loyalty to James II. However, when James II was ousted from his throne in 1688, Dryden was stripped from his titles by Mary II and William III. Dryden remains the only figure in England who was dismissed from the position as Poet Laureate.

Like his predecessor Dryden, Pope's Catholic faith meant that he could not hope for a Poet Laureateship. In the *First Satire of the Second Book of Horace Imitated* (1733), Pope as a poet affirms his will to continue to write. The poem is set in an imaginary dialogue between his lawyer-friend Fortescue and himself. Fortescue suggests:

Or if you needs must write, write CAESAR's Praise:

You'll gain at least a *Knighthood*, or the *Bays*.[41]

Pope makes the character Fortescue give an ironic advice: to compose a panegyric

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[39] See ibid., 101 in which Foxon calculates £5,549. 5*s* from 610 subscribers and 1,057 copies. Pope also received copy-money from his publisher Lintot, and the total would then have been closer to £5,916. 15*s*. Fenton and Broome were paid £200 and £400, respectively. Foxon thus concludes that Pope made approximately £5,000 from the translation of the *Odyssey*; see also Sherburn 1934, 259.
[40] See Steinberg 1996, 110.
[41] Lines 21-22; *TE*, 4:7.

("CAESAR's Praise") for King George II in order to receive a knighthood or appointment to the Poet Laureateship ("*Bays*"). Pope makes the lawyer-character miss the point that a Catholic could expect neither of those rewards, and he, in a subtle yet mocking manner, points out the injustice of living as a Catholic poet in his own nation.

Pope personally knew many of the Poet Laureates of his time, including Nicholas Rowe (1674-1718), who was appointed in 1715 by King George I, and Laurence Eusden (1688-1730), who succeeded after Rowe's death. Pope was openly critical of George II's 1730 appointment of the playwright Colley Cibber (1671-1757):

And idle Cibber, how he breaks the laws,

To make poor Pinky eat with vast applause!

But fill their purse, our Poet's work is done.[42]

Pope questions the aesthetic qualities exhibited in Cibber's works. It may be true that Cibber's plays were highly popular, receiving "vast applause" from the audience. Yet their appeal was due more to the spectacle of an actor wolfing down chicken on the stage ("make poor Pinky eat") than appreciation of the drama as a literary work. Moreover, Pope perceives that, for many dramatists including Cibber, their primary motivation was monetary gain: "fill their purse." He laments the lack of appreciation for gifted poets: "our Poet's work is done." In addition to the fact that Pope himself can never hope to be appointed Poet Laureate, he is unable to hide his disillusionment that the highest literary honor is conferred upon a playwright whose works, in Pope's opinion at least, contain no literary merit.

Another public honor which Pope knew could never be bestowed on him was burial in Westminster Abbey. The reason, once again, was on account of his religious faith. Chaucer became the first poet to receive a grave in what is today called the Poets' Corner in Westminster Abbey. Highly renowned English poets such as Edmund Spenser, Ben Jonson, Sir John Denham, and Abraham Cowley have followed since. They were Pope's predecessors from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and Pope had admired their works since childhood. In the eighteenth century, Pope's contemporaries Nicholas Rowe, Joseph Addison, and John Gay were buried there. Pope wrote epitaphs for both Rowe and Gay.[43]

Pope knows that he will not be able to join them in Westminster Abbey. He wrote his own epitaph, which he titled: "For One who would not be buried in Westminster

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[42] *First Epistle of the Second Book of Horace, Imitated*, 292-94; *ibid*., 221.

[43] See *ibid*., 6:349-50 for Gay's epitaph and *ibid*., 400-1 for Rowe's.

Abbey."[44] The date of composition is unknown, but it was published in 1738, six years before his death. Despite his incontestable fame and the immense fortune which he accrued, Pope remained aware that he was excluded from the possibility of one of the greatest literary honors in the nation.

However, earlier in his life Pope had revealed in the *Ode to Solitude* that he wished for a quiet life and an anonymous resting place after death:

Thus let me live, unseen, unknown;

Thus unlamented let me dye;

Steal from the world, and not a stone

Tell where I lye.[45]

The *Ode on Solitude* was published in 1717, but the first draft may have been composed as early as 1700, when Pope was only a youth of twelve years. It may sound as if Pope, as a poet whose desire for recognition and success was apparent, is being inauthentic when he claims that he wishes to be "unseen [and] unknown" in life. This may be an instance of posturing in which Pope feigns humility. The expression, "not a stone | Tell where I lye," may similarly be a slight exaggeration.

It is nevertheless quite true that Pope imagined serenity as an ideal state after burial. In his epitaph of 1738, he wrote: "In peace let one poor Poet sleep."[46] Pope's life was filled with contention. He made many foes in the literary circle, such as the abovementioned dramatist Cibber, on several occasions only marginally escaped censorship by Sir Robert Walpole's administration, began a legal dispute with the publisher Henry Lintot over a copyright issue, and consulted lawyers for cases of piracy.[47] Taking all this into account, it becomes understandable that Pope sincerely wished for some peace after his death. It may also be that, because he was proud and content of the success which he attained in his lifetime, he had no more to fight or yearn for and only desired peace after his life was over.

One must keep in mind that religious faith accounted for only one factor in Pope's disadvantaged status. Although not mentioned in this article, the effects of his physical deformity must not be overlooked in tracing Pope's life and career. He suffered emotional damage from malicious pamphlet attacks ridiculing his short stature, and in his private life he was never able to muster the courage to get married.

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[44] *Ibid.*, 376.

[45] Lines 17-20; *ibid.*, 3.

[46] *Ibid.*, 376.

[47] See, among others, Clegg (2008) for the history of censorship in England; Mack 1985, 683 and *TE*, 4:xxxvii-xxxviii for Pope regarding political issues in his *First Epistle of the Second Book of Horace, Imitated*; Foxon (1991) for copyright matters; and ibid. and Rose (1992) for Pope's cases of piracy.

Nevertheless, unlike the physical state over which he had no control, with regards to faith he had a choice. And yet he chose, perhaps with due deference to his parents, to remain a Catholic.

In the case of Alexander Pope, one sees a poet whose disadvantaged status fueled his ambitions for success. Posterity has borrowed expressions from Pope's own creations. His legacy still lives in titles of notable works such as E.M. Forster's *Where Angels Fear to Tread* (1905) and the more recent film *Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind* (2004).[48] In an ironic way, Alexander Pope stands as testament that it is possible for a writer, and moreover a person, to attain success even in the face of adverse and unjust circumstances.

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48 From *Essay on Criticism*, 625; *TE*, 1:310 and from *Eloisa to Abelard*, 209; *ibid.*, 2:337.

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The Thinking of Animation: Conflict of 3D and 2D

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Abstract

The computer game and cinematic movie are quite common recreational activities in recent people's life, and the computer technology in the game and the cinema is more and more advanced, especially 3D technology is the main instrument which is used on games and cinemas. How does a 3D animation to be created, the procedure of "Pixar Company" is that the Pixar employees pitch their ideas to other members of the development team, and that is reminiscent of a sales pitch, but the real challenge is to get the audience to believe in the idea and see the possibilities in this challenge. The 3D animation is the main production in the animation market, because it looks vivid than 2D animation, and the 3D animation also need to be added more detail, however, there is a slight difference between Asian countries and Western countries. The animation in the Western countries are using 3D technology, but in the Asian, especially in Japan, it still uses 2D technology in animation, because they prefer hand draw and traditional graphics, so most of animations in Japan are 2D, however, Japan is also good at 3D technology, while, sometimes people would overlook the importance of a good story which is more prominent than the 3D technology employed in the animation movie by producers. As a consequence, no matter the producer applies 3D technology or 2D technology, the technology which is used to perfectly profile the story in an animation movie would be regarded as the best technology.

Keywords: Animation, 3D Technology, 2D Technology

Introduction

The computer game and cinematic movie are quite common recreational activities in recent people's life, and the computer technology in the game and the cinema is more and more advanced, especially 3D technology is the main instrument which is used on games and cinemas. The 3D is three dimensions which include X, Y, Z axles (Fig1.). The 3D technology makes computer games and cinemas as the real world. It can adjust figures, articles, space and actions. This technology makes them which are like the real human being and let people who are watching movies or playing games feel that they are in the real situation, so the 3D technology is the advantageous skill in this century.

Fig1. The structure of 3D & 2D

3D technology produce and process

Disney Pixar is a famous animation producer in the world. Pixar has a lot of experience in 3D animation, for example: Toy story; Monsters.inc; Finding NEMO; CARS; Ratatouille and WALL.E, they are all popular movies in the animation market, and they all made by 3D technology, because the Pixar wants to make the animation not just like animation, the Pixar wish it close to the real world and make movies lifelike, so they keep developing new 3D skills to create new animation and add more audio and more emotion into the movies.

How does a 3D animation to be created, the procedure of "Pixar Company" is that the Pixar employees pitch their ideas to other members of the development team, and that is reminiscent of a sales pitch, but the real challenge is to get the audience to believe in the idea and see the possibilities in this challenge. In the second step is that the text treatment is written. A treatment is short document that summarizes the main idea of the story. However, a lot of treatments of the same idea are going to be created in order to find the good balance between the same ideas. These ideas will be filled later by development and storyboard teams. Thirdly, the storyboard is just like comic book by hand drawn, the artists of storyboard have to draw every different actions and

emotions of the movie, they must make every slice of animation seems like real movement, then use the "blueprint" technology, and there is an important thing is that the scenario has been created at this time. The fourth step is voice talent recording. The Pixar artists of storyboard record voice at the first time, when the story and dialogue are finished, the professional actors will record the character voices which read from the script and improvising. The actors must record voice lines several time and different ways, and the best reading and recording will be used in the animation, although there is a little noise and distortion in the best recording, but if it doesn't influence the quality of the animation, the Pixar won't remove it, just let it be the characteristic in the fished item. In the next step, the Pixar art department is going to create the look and the feel about the story, this department creates inspirational art illustrating the animation world and the characters. The art department includes the sets designing, visual looks and props for the surfaces and the colors, it also designs the "color scripts" for lighting. These all parts are impressionistic pastel illustrations. After These procedures, the 2D graphic images will be transfer to 3D model by hand drawing and scanned in three-dimensionally, or it is created directly in the computer, the art department gives the animation "avars", the avars is the object in animation design. After the sets are built in 3D, all the sets need to be dressed by prop models, this step is that create a believable world, then the Pixar gives the animators emotions, sounds, lights and they need to set the view and the camera, and they use "Pixar's animation software" to set the movements and the facial expressions in each scene, these steps are necessary to be used in animation. The last step in computer is that use the "shader". The shader is the technology which used on creating surface color and the texture, after that, the main point in the frame is the lighting, the Pixar uses the "Digital Light" to control the brightness in the stage and balance the color with the animation, the whole procedure of animation production is mainly dominated by arts department in Pixar. Therefore, in the following texts, the popularity of 3D animation and the fall of 2D animation in current animation market will be explained further with examples.

Comparing with 3D and 2D animation position

The 3D animation is the main production in the animation market, because it looks vivid than 2D animation, and the 3D animation also need to be added more detail, it includes the expression, emotion, action, and color balance, there are a lot of parts to be organized in the animation. In the 21 century, the 3D animation meets the demand of the public in recent society, because it is vivacious than 2D animation, and it also close to the real world, but the animation has more imagination and creation, it can do anything that the human can't do, but it does look like so real.

That is why 2D animation becomes fall, although 2D technology is the basic of animation, but it still has some insufficient parts. There were many famous 2D animations in the early animation market, The Lion King, Aladdin, Beauty and the beast (Fig2.), they are good movies, they all have beautiful stories and pretty graphics, but the main point is that the picture looks just like cartoon, it can't be vivid. Some people say that the cartoon should be like the cartoon, if it uses 3D technology in the animation, it is not the cartoon anymore. On the other hand, the 3D technology has been create, the purpose is proving the visual effects and fluency in animation, it can creates a lot of new imaging view which the 2D technology can't do that, and the brightness, color, contrast, camera, light and the smooth also can be adjusted slightly, because of 3D technology, there is more diversification in the animation world.

Compare with 2D and 3D animation in the market for now, the 3D animation seems like more popular than 2D, and it does attract more and more different age spectators and audiences, because it can create plenty of imagination and originality for consumers, the 3D animation is going to become the main type in the animation market (Fig3.).

Fig2. Sample of 2D animation (All by Disney official website)

Fig3. Sample of 3D movie (All by official website)

Discussion

There is a slight difference between Asian countries and Western countries. The animation in the Western countries are using 3D technology, but in the Asian, especially in Japan, it still uses 2D technology in animation, because they prefer hand draw and traditional graphics, so most of animations in Japan are 2D, however, Japan is also good at 3D technology, there are some famous games on play station and computer which are Japan made, for example: The Final Fantasy; super Mario; Devil May Cry, Japan uses a lot of 3D technology in games, but they more like uses 2D technology in animation,   because "comic" which is a special culture for Japan. "The comic could affect any field of culture in Japan, ex: novel, music, drama and movie" (Miazaki, 1996), beside this, "Japanese can accept the image without color and only shape, this image could be applied in any Japanese culture" (Miazaki, 1996), consequently, most Japanese think that the story, background and the role, if these parts can attract spectators, then using 3D technology or not is not so important for them.

In the western countries, it maybe the culture different, the spectators and the audiences prefer 3D games and animations, because they want to enjoy the game and movie, the vivid role and space are very important for them, and the detail of the games and the animation also effects them, like "World of Warcraft", it's the quite famous on line game with 3D technology, and it is played by many players in different countries. This game has great visual graphics, splendid audio, fluent actions, that is why it has been successfully and it becomes the quite popular game in the world.

The "UP" of Disney Pixar is the newest 3D animation, even though the "UP" (Fig4.) is still the animation, it made some changes and improvement, the skin of the every role is more vivid, and the color of skin is moderate and saturated, it used the natural hues, it makes spectators more comfortable when they are watching, and the background in the animation is really like the true scenes in real world, especially the cloud, blue sky, buildings and balloons which has transparent and true color, this part is the surprised part for spectators. The Disney Pixar is the 3D animation specially company, it has cooperation with the Disney Company. The Disney had doing 3D animation by their self, but it was not success, then the Disney started to cooperate with the Pixar Company, and the 3D animation which were made by those two companies was very successful, for example: Toy Story; The Bug's Life; Monster.INC, later, the 3D animation were all made by Pixar Company, and the 3D technology of the Pixar becomes famous in the animation. However, these two companies were broken, but the Pixar kept making a lot of famous 3D animations. The Pixar researches the comments of the consumers, it compares the 2D and 3D

animation, which why the consumers feel that the 3D is better than 2D technology, and the research reports the consumers more like 3D animation, because the 3D technology create more imaginary world for people. In addition, a variety of parameters in 3D technology is more close to virtual world when compared to those in 2D technology. The Pixar starts to improve the technology which they made every 3D animation, and they try to use different hues of colors, and add diverse elements of new perspectives. Moreover, they would employ a range of character descriptions and profile. Furthermore, they would also take into account the current need for the public by means of conducting market survey or questionnaire. Additionally, Pixar also take care of the demand of their customers in 3D industry. However, it is also noteworthy to mention that "UP" would become the best seller since it is the first 3D animation based on the gap of old generation and young generation which is different from characters in relation with animals or some great men adapted from the historical stories. While in terms of disadvantage of 3D technology, it does not have any breakthrough in 3D technology applied to this film.

Fig4. Disney Pixar, UP movie (Official website)

Conclusion

In summary, the current demand of 3D technology is much higher than 2D technology. In addition, the competition among 3D animation corporations in 3D market is drastic in great degree. While, sometimes people would overlook the importance of a good story which is more prominent than the 3D technology employed in the animation movie by producers. As a consequence, no matter the producer applies 3D technology or 2D technology, the technology which is used to perfectly profile the story in an animation movie would be regarded as the best technology.

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Musicians' Enigma in Kazuo Ishiguro's Nocturnes

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Abstract

The globe citizens in the highly competitive material world in the twenty-first century immerse themselves in an enigma, an enigma where they inevitably struggle in their career for fame and fortune as success but they insensibly alienate from their family in daily life. Kazuo Ishiguro, a newly-rising Anglo-Japanese novelist, explores musicians' enigma of how they can achieve success in the music circle in relation to how they can live a happy marriage in *Nocturnes: Five Stories of Music and Nightfall* (2009). The novel focuses its attention on what challenges a musician encounters in different stages of career and how he faces the music and struggles for marriage and love in different career situations, either rising or falling in the fierce business world.
In this essay, I examine Ishiguro's perspectives on musicians' career, aging from old to youth together with their marital relationships, ranging from separation to reunion, through Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin's lens. In my argument, Ishiguro intends to provide his readers with consciousnesses in various examples of musicians and couples in relation in the novel to arouse open-ended meanings of career and marriage in the musicians' world, which the readers comprehend by themselves through the relation of the hero and the characters in each story. He aims to further provide his readers with an insight into both issues and with motives to reexamine, revalue and rectify theirs, from the constant alienation from marriage to the close connectedness to it, leading to true happiness in life. The novel as an utterance consists of five stories, each as an utterance *per se*, embedding Ishiguro's suggestion as authorial intent, in the ongoing dialogue with other utterances in the aesthetic literary world.

Keywords: Kazuo Ishiguro, *Nocturnes*, Bakhtin, Dialogism, marriage, career

It happens. I had been struggling for my essay for months but felt like I could never achieve anything. I felt haunted and overwhelmed by the fear that the deadline approached me, one day after another, until my temper exploded to my dear family. Suddenly, I realized that I was a common victim to no victor, trapped in Kazuo Ishiguro's description as enigma for every globe citizen of all walks in the twenty-first century; fortunately, I was saved by Angus and Sharon in their OPEN-chan waffles, Gangnam Style and ballet.

Kazuo Ishiguro, a newly-rising and award-winning Anglo-Japanese novelist with his serious purpose, prefers themes on universality and people's daily life experience to over-plottiness; his novels share psychological concerns and follow Western tradition, especially English and Russian writers in the nineteenth century like Dostoevsky, Chekhov, Charlotte Bronté, and Dickens (Krider 153-54; Matthews 116, 118; Shaffer 4, 6, 8-11). He includes in *Nocturnes: Five Stories of Music and Nightfall* (2009) themes like fame, love, marital discord, impossibility of perfection, the inevitability of regret, the marriage of convenience, ambition, and the beauty, joy and meaning of music; he portrays acts, emotions and ideas of characters as realistic and vivid, which through repeated encounters and careful study can light up their significance, clarity and power (Robson 44; Garrett 174; Shaffer 11). In this essay, since Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin discusses Dostoevsky's polyphonic novel, I examine Ishiguro's perspectives in the novel on two main directions, the musicians' career, aging from old to youth, together with marital relationships, ranging from separation to reunion, through Bakhtin's lens. In my argument, Ishiguro, in dialogue with readers, provides many examples of musicians and couples in relation in the novel to arouse open-ended meanings of career and marriage in the musicians' world, which readers comprehend by themselves through the relation of the hero and the characters, inclusive of their psychology and emotions; and the novel as an utterance consists of five utterances, embedding Ishiguro's suggestion as authorial intent, in the ongoing dialogue with other utterances in the aesthetic literary world (Matthews 121). There are four sections in the essay: Bakhtin's Dialogism; *Nocturnes* as Musician's Career in Relation to Marital Relationships; Kazuo Ishiguro's Authorial Intent; and Conclusion.

I.   Bakhtin's Dialogism

Bakhtin bases his idea of self-other relationship, author-hero relationship and utterance on dialogism or Dostoevsky's polyphony, where communication, interaction and dialogue are significant for identity construction and truth generation; and the social, cultural and historical background plays important in a literary text. Bakhtin

emphasizes *transgredience*, or *extralocality*, the idea that the external elements of consciousness in its surroundings are indispensable for the making of its completion. Accordingly, this idea manifests itself clearly in Bakhtin's dialogism, where self and other stand separately in different positions simultaneously with their surplus of seeing/vision respectively to each other; where other is defined as other value, consciousness or perspective which he bears on self; where self constructs his identity through other's consciousness, and vice versa; and where the discourses of self and other penetrate each other as co-consciousness or "co-being of being" in their dialogical relation without directly finalizing or explanatory word and judgment (Todorov 94-98; Slater 3; Clark and Holquist 63-73, 77-79, 245-46; Holquist 1990: 18-22, 32-33, 35-37, 68, 164-169; Dentith 12-13, 41-44).

The dialogic self-other relationship in Bakhtin's inference can be applied to the author-hero relationship; from this dialogic relationship between author as other and hero as self, the aesthetic form is generated with moral values, where authors and characters are co-authors and are not objects but independent subjects in their interaction and contention (Dentith 5; Clark and Holquist 63, 245-46). On one side, like the hero, characters themselves carry values or perspectives and are "a *plurality of consciousnesses, with [equal weights and] equal rights and each with its own world*, combined but [unmerged] in the unity of the event"; each of them is important as a fact directed to the hero (Emerson 6-7; Todorov 103-04). On the other, the author as other, in a privileged position with creative reaction to the hero, serves as a reflector for emotional and volitional position of the hero as self, accompanies his life path, and makes him express himself in his identity construction toward the locus, where truth is generated through his perspective without making author's direct judgment but with author's rearrangement of consciousnesses as transgredient to him in the aesthetic literary discourse (Holquist and Liapunov 90; Clark and Holquist 88-89, 244-46; Todorov 100; Patterson 57-58; Bonetskaia 15; Dentith 44; Bressler 46).

Bakhtin emphasizes "nonauthor/itarian," signifying that a polyphonic or dialogic novel has "no overall outlined structure or prescribed outcome, nor … a working out of the author's worldview or understanding of truth;" and the novel is "a process that never achieves a resolution" but refuses "to unify the various points of view expressed in the various characters," which neither merge with nor subordinate to the author's but "retain an integrity and independence" (Selden 40; Dentith 44; Bressler 46). For Bakhtin, an utterance is suffused with "*dialogic overtones*" and expressive intonation, to convey the authorial intent and attitude toward other utterances in concrete reality,

and a literary work is an utterance and a rejoinder, responsive to other utterances, preceding and following in its manifestation of the specific historical situation and provides an arena where people utter their consciousnesses or values, agreeing or contending in a dialogical relation of the "complexly organized chain of other utterances" (Emerson and Holquist 67-71, 84-87, 90-93; Holquist 1990: 38, 68; Dentith 44, 46; Todorov 52-54; Morris 76-78; Holquist 1981: 279-80). An utterance, a double-voiced discourse, provides readers with unsecured position, since the becoming of dialogization cannot be secured, nor can the angle and knowledge of the utterance (Dentith 48) Accordingly, a polyphonic novel emphasizes a dialogic relationship among a plurality of consciousnesses in their truth generation, "an active creation in the consciousnesses of the author, the readers, and the characters" as equals (Bressler 46; Holquist 1981: 253). The truth in a polyphonic novel is neither single nor certain, but instead there are many truths in many characters' articulating consciousnesses in their manifestation and performance from their perspectives, all directed to the hero as self and to one another in their dialogical influence, all of which in the reader's watching and hearing, the reader is shaped into his value as the truth from his own perspective, comprehension and judgment (Bressler 46; Holquist 1981: 254).

II.   *Nocturnes* as Utterance of Musicians' Career and Marital Relationships

Criticisms on *Nocturnes* are various but partial. Firstly, Barbara Hoffert is right not that the novel conveys scary insights into human misbehavior but that it is about the characters' lives in music (55). Also, John Salinsky stands neutral that the "quintet" in it shares certain common themes with one another, particularly "a tangential relationship" between a musician and a woman in their encounter without her entering his life (419-20). Besides, Stefan Beck plays fair that Ishiguro "forces his creations[, characters,] to tell us more than they know about themselves," and success "will be worse than the alternatives;" but biased that characters lack self-awareness, the theme is in variations of success and failure, or happiness and self-hatred, and "Ishiguro's dialogue, and even his [narrators'] voices, can have an almost spookily stilted quality" (31, 32).

None abovementioned can be sufficient enough to illustrate the novel. Since an utterance, declares Bakhtin, is the manifestation of thought and deed and is sized from a single word to a literary work, I argue that *Nocturnes* is an utterance, composed of five stories, i.e. five utterances, themed on both musicians' career and marital relationships (Emerson and Holquist 81; Clark and Holquist 64). The novel, an utterance, portrays musicians' five different stages of career as a reversed life

direction, aging from old to youth, similar to Benjamin's reversed life in *The Curious Case of Benjamin Button* by Francis Scott Key Fitzgerald; they are five utterances: old age, ambition, perseverance, talent/efforts, and education, respectively and sequentially. The novel, an utterance, also conveys in itself among all the characters as consciousnesses the produced message of significant elements in marriage management: communication, reliance, tolerance, sacrifice, and responsibility.

"Crooner" as Utterance of Old Age and Communication

Each story in *Nocturnes*, in my suggestion, consists of many characters, bearing their consciousnesses in the position of others, joining their dialogical relationship with self for his identity construction toward the truth generation; each is an utterance, forming a meaningful sequence with Ishiguro's authorial intent in the novel.

"Crooner" is the first utterance, a musician's old age in relation to his marital relationships lack of communication. As self, Janeck, a young café guitarist from Eastern European in Venice's Piazza San Marco on his journey to music, encounters many consciousnesses in Ishiguro's plan. He bears his nostalgia for Mother, consciousness of love and admiration, who appreciates Tony Gardner's music and always keeps his worn-out albums in the communist days (5-6; Beck 31). He meets Tony in his sixties, consciousness of fame, "some crooner from a bygone era," who invites him to team up for a croon in a gondola to Lindy in her fifties in his attempt to divorce for a career comeback; it is a send-off "to commemorate the end of their loving marriage (a divorce of convenience)," believed beneficial to both (12, 16, Beck 31-32; Garrett 174; Seaman 9).

Then, Janeck experiences Lindy, consciousnesses of vanity, in her marriage of convenience. Lindy seems ambitious and determined to stand in spotlight to hook a rich and famous husband since youth in a restaurant in California like "her Harvard," where she learns tricks and maneuvering from Meg the "fountain of wisdom" (20, 21). Lindy marries Dino Hartman, whom she divorces in his falling career to remarry Tony in Vegas in his rising, neither accused by Dino nor anyone (21-22). Obviously, Tony and Lindy follow marriage of convenience, the trend that marriage in the music circle is business; they get married for "the trophy the other partner represent[s]," despite true love ensued (Robson 44; Hagen 66).

It is lack of communication in marriage of convenience that leads to divorce of convenience, the turning point where Tony turns from consciousness of fame to loss and Lindy, from vanity to sacrifice. Because of business and love, they both agree on

their divorce and remarriage to others to "stay at the top of their respective career paths" before too late (Hagen 66). Namely, they expect their divorce to create another sensation, fame for Tony and vanity for Lindy in another successful career and rich marriage simply like theirs; otherwise, their career in Tony's falling and Lindy's fading beauty will be disadvantaged in music business.

However, I believe that Janeck disagrees on their divorce. It is pitiful that they follow the business trend and lack communication but sacrifice their true love and happy marriage for an illusional and uncertain career in music business despite Tony's greatness in Janeck's eyes (33). It occurs to me how many times of comebacks a life can achieve and what can be better to live in happiness at an old age. If they reach full communication in their achieved true love, they will realize the worthlessness to risk their true love and marriage for another unguaranteed career comeback in divorce. Regrettably, the couple neither seize the timely moment nor take instant action to cancel their agreed divorce after the song "One for My Baby," but one awaits the other to change each mind, in his hesitation and her sobbing (28-29). Janeck is constructed by consciousnesses to the truth that no musician, even Tony the greatest, can always keep the highest status in the cruel real music circle throughout his life and that despite "schlemiel" in his peers' crooked eyes, he with Mother's love is more successful than those materially successful (Beck 32). "Crooner" is an utterance of a musician's falling at old age combined with a produced significant element of marriage, communication. It is a tragedy that the couple's happy marriage, without communication, end in divorce and that they jump in an endless vicious circle in career and marriage, from falling to rising and rising to falling, leading to an enigma of meaningfulness.

"Come Rain or Come Shine" as Utterance of Ambition and Reliance
"Come Rain or Come Shine" is the second utterance of ambition in career coupled with marital relationships lack of reliance by Ishiguro's broad definition of musicians. As self, Raymond leads a happy and content life in school with his students and colleagues on his journey to happiness. He encounters Emily, consciousness of ambition, and Charlie, consciousnesses of fear in their dissonant marriage, which Charlie claims "superbly well" but counts on him, a reliable mediator to resolve, since he is "the material failure" to sustain their marriage and thus Mr. Perspective for Emily to compare which is the successful (41, 42-52; Seaman 9; Hagen 66).

Emily, consciousness of ambition, marries Charlie in university, because he, a potential success, compared with Raymond, satisfies her requirement and offers her

sense of reliance in the material life. She always expects Charlie talented enough to be a head of some worlds whereas he deems himself ordinary (50). It seeds Charlie's fear that if someday his career cannot meet her high expectation and ambition, he will lose her to those successful possible rivals in his imaginary competition, and it creates their marriage lacking mutual reliance and in long disagreement (59).

Their lack of mutual reliance contributes to their difficult communication in events like phone calls and sawing balls off, even with their mediator Raymond, and reasonably their communication cannot be easier without him. On the phone, the two gentlemen talk about different things. Raymond discusses his trouble about peeping into Emily's intimate diary and crumpling the page whereas Charlie expresses his love for Emily, no love affairs involved, and complains about his possible rivals, those with high status and achievement like David Corey, Michael Addison and Roger Van Den Berg (58-61). Subsequently, the couple interpret the sawing-balls-off event differently to Raymond. In Charlie's version, six years ago, Emily is so annoyed about his opening her diary that she threatens to saw off his balls, this anger triggering his suspicion of her love. However, in Emily's, to make him realize his self-worth, she threatens him last year in his depression and inquiry about her reaction to his committing suicide; the emphasized self-worth exposes her ambition about Charlie's career again (60, 80).

Ironically, the couple, lacking mutual reliance, turn to someone else for reliance. Charlie places reliance on a female dentist by pretending to have tooth problems in their regular appointments because he feels her drawing the real Charlie closer, being trapped inside by Emily, wondering whether he may have a different life with her in marriage (73-74). It explains why Charlie instructs Raymond to conceal the trouble by destroying their living room, the way he frequently releases his pressure as fightback against Emily and the material world where he is long confined, and the way he tricks Raymond into being humiliated before Emily. Likewise, Emily places her reliance on Raymond with love in her keepsake, "her treasured vinyl collection," because music connects them since college and bridges her true self to him, with whose musical taste, she once belittles Charlie; her act of hiding music is in fact hiding love, which Charlie senses and avoids Raymond's discussion about music with her (Garrett 174; 55, 63). However, in his visit, she recalls her old passion for him in her expression of being bothered and disturbed in the handwriting: "Buy wine for arrival of Prince of Whiners," while in fact it is her material world being unwrapped by his spiritual world, which terrifies her (56). When Raymond and Emily share music like their good old days in their dance, he feels remorse in tears and she confesses discontent with her

marriage and desires him in the manifestation of their shared music like Sarah Vaughan (84-86).

Raymond's imitation of Hendrix offers the best solution to this dissonant marriage. Under Charlie's instruction, he imitates a dog's habitual action to destroy their living room and finds himself more skilled than Charlie in merging into a dog and its destroying things (68). He sees things from the perspective of a dog in its posture with its vision, hinting a satire that the couple cannot immerse themselves into each other's spirit and vision as the way he does in a dog's (Hagen; 66; 76-77). Conversely, if the couple are in each other's shoe with mutual reliance, they will reach real communication and true happiness. Raymond is constructed by the couple's different values to the truth that career should be based on moderate ambition and marriage, on mutual reliance.

"Malvern Hills" as Utterance of Perseverance and Tolerance

"Malvern Hills," is the third utterance of perseverance in relation to tolerance in marriage. To my disbelief, the narrator is an uncreative and selfish young singer-songwriter in his sister's inn (Hoffert 55; Seaman 9). However, I argue that the songwriter, self on his journey to success, encounters many consciousnesses in Ishiguro's organization. He encounters Malvern Hills, consciousnesses of love, belongingness, affection, nostalgia, calmness, warmth, music inspirations and imagination, in his pleasant memory with his parents and Maggie (94, 104). He meets consciousnesses of discipline and loneliness, Mrs. Hag Fraser, a twisted teacher in his teenager's years who treats him meanly and isolates him from peers (95-96).

The songwriter encounters Maggie and Geoff, consciousnesses of disapproval of his music, during his stay in their café to "write a brand-new batch of songs" to play in London in autumn (93). They hold different values toward music from his. They think of a musician as an indecent career in a practical life and expect him to work hard in their café, where he is considered lazy and loose, whereas he values the contrary. He desires to share his music with Maggie as they did in childhood and win her support and encouragement but in vain. She values family time to watch movies more than appreciates his music when he in his room endeavors to write songs, noisy to Geoff's ears. In their quarrel over whether his music composition is as decent as Geoff's café work, she favors Geoff's practical side (115-17). The songwriter, despite his family's disapproval, is perseverant in his music dream.

The songwriter encounters Tilo and Sonja, consciousnesses of encouragement, two

professional musicians from Swiss, tour-playing music across the Europe with their parents's support but at cost of their son Peter (Garrett 174; 113). Unlike the manager in the London audition, Tilo and Sonja, the songwriter's audience on the hill, enjoy his guitar performance of his composition in "a look of happy amazement, the way people gaze at a baby. …[and] the woman was tapping her foot to [the] beat" (105). Tilo and Sonja, in their big smiles and applause, compliment him on his music and talent, echoing around the hills, as fantastic, splendid and on the radio someday (107, 114). Tilo even shares with him that their professional music career counts not on material comforts but on their music belief, which they feel content with and the same as his (108-09). Conversely, Sonja discusses about the Janus-faced music world and suggests from Tilo's ideal perspective that he should form a band in London and will succeed and from her practical perspective that life is uncertain and sometimes disappointing. She finally favors Tilo's in her reassurance that he, resembling Tilo, can realize his dream even in disappointments and difficulty (122-23).

Sonja and Tilo match each other perfectly in music and they manifest in the marriage their mutual tolerance of disagreement despite their different perspectives, Tilo, the ideal and bright versus Sonja, the practical and realistic, particularly in their different opinions on the real views in Malvern Hills. Tilo considers views wonderful beyond his imagination in Elgar's music; however, Sonja thinks of the real hills as a common park, unmatched with "majestic and mysterious" Elgar's hills, which offends Tilo to walk away from Sonja, in tears, gazing at his figure walking in the distance (121). Sonja, like Mrs. Fraser, is impetuous and critical but learns to tolerate different perspectives in viewing the world and settling disagreement; hence, not in Fraser's example, she saves her marriage. The songwriter on his journey to music is constructed by love, discipline, disapproval and encouragement toward the truth, perseverance and tolerance.

"Nocturne" as Utterance of Talent/Efforts, and Sacrifice
"Nocturne" is the fourth utterance of talent/efforts in relation to sacrifice in marriage. Steven, "[a] gifted yet unheralded [jazz and] saxophone player[,] is persuaded [by his wife Helen and by his manager Bradley Stevenson] to undergo plastic surgery to enhance his visual appeal in a [business] world that values image over talent" for the improvement of his career (Seaman 9; Robson 44). Despite whim, sympathy and vanity, I believe that Steven, self on the journey to success, encounters Helen, consciousness of sacrifice (Garrett 175). Out of love, Helen divorces Steven for Chris Prendergast's sponsor to a face surgery for his music career to go right to the top with appealing image and his talent (Hoffert 55; 132). Helen is not simply consciousnesses

of courage and support, the same as Tilo and Sonja's to the songwriter in "Malvern Hills" but that of sacrifice as Lindy's for Tony. Meanwhile, she saves Steven's dignity by announcing that he deserves the compensation Chris makes due to their happy marriage. Helen sacrifices her love for Steven's success in the same way as Lindy does for Tony's while Steven's divorce with Helen echoes Tony's with Lindy.

Steven meets Lindy as Janus-faced consciousness of talent/efforts in a luxurious hotel in Los Angeles for their recoveries from surgeries. In their encounter, the stereotypes of talent and efforts collapse. On one hand, Lindy believes that everyone has his own position in the hierarchical society, which explains why Jake Marvell, an untalented and even a phony or bluffer in Steven's eyes, wins the statuette, Jazz Musician of the Year, and becomes popular in the music circle. She fights for those untalented or unblessed musicians who pay efforts for a place in the world but being unnoticed in her example and Jake's, since they are supposed to be understood by those God-gifted and to deserve recognition, award and honor like them. In her lecture to Steven, both the talented and the diligent have a place in their career or chance to succeed (152, 164-166, 175).

On the other, Lindy appreciates talented musicians. To Lindy's surprise, Steven is as talented as her ex-husband Tony when he plays the proud version of his band's "The Nearness of You" to win her approval. In listening, Lindy sways dreamily to slow beat, stands still sometime, bends her head forward sometime, slumps into the sofa like a tense model, and stays stiff and awkward (153-54). Steven's music reminds her of Tony: She is very astonished at his personal performance and the song interpretation and her love for Tony are aroused at the moment of listening to his CD recording. To her admission, she cannot get the song out of her heart and he is a genius, blessed by God. To express her honor for him, Lindy steals a statuette at night and awards Steven Jazz Musician of the Year. Afterwards, she returns the statuette by stuffing it into a turkey, a hint of failure and an irony itself to compensate or comfort Steven despite fake statuette-awarding, which she intends to make a world of unforgettable meaning to him (Hagen 66; 157-59, 172-73).

Despite a good chance that Steven may succeed with Lindy's admiration and support, he knows that Helen is the price he pays. Lindy comforts Steven by persuading him that he will win a place in the world at the sacrifice of Helen, which reveals Lindy's values of vanity and sacrifice: Helen is great but if she does not come back to you, you should get a perspective that "life's so much bigger than just loving someone" (182). He finally agrees with her that leaving Helen for a surgery is a turning point

with a big league awaiting him (185). Steven is constructed by Helen and Lindy toward the truth that with talent and an appealing image, he is well-prepared to embrace a new career and life.

"Cellists" as Utterance of Education and Responsibility

"Cellists" is the final utterance of education and responsibility in relation. Tibor, self in quest of musician's success, encounters two different teachers, Oleg Petrovic and Eloise McCormack, consciousnesses of education, formal and informal. Tibor receives formal education from Oleg, formally-educated yet untalented in the Royal Academy of Music in London and lives under his fame and certificate. Later he meets Eloise, informally-educated yet talented, who informs him of his incorrect path but instructs him by inspiration and intuition in their sessions in Excelsior, where they appreciate music, share sense of belongingness and match their talents perfectly. Eloise disapproves of those untalented professionals like Oleg with their teaching approaches and certificates, and to Tibor's realization, Oleg's certificate may not carry the supposed weight as he has expected (Hoffert 55; 198-99). Too intangible as her instruction, it does show a great effect on his playing skills for further improvement and he feels being led to a brand new beautiful distant garden (201-02).

Tibor encounters Eloise, consciousness of untimely education and proper instruction. She recognizes their talents as inherent, not through instruction and practice, and their music life as diverged. She insists on protecting her talent from being ruined by untalented professionals and refuses formal education until one talented professional's instruction, which she reminds him to do the same. However, she waits thirty years for regret and lost chance for formal education, unlike Tibor, talented and well-formally-educated, which she feels envious of and ambivalent to. She thus loses temper to him when required to demonstrate her skills in playing the cello since she cannot, but she expresses her inspiration in words. Therefore, he learns not by copying her skill demonstration but by practicing his comprehension of her verbal instruction and inspiration, which opens windows to him (195-98, 207-08, 211-14). Ironically and surprisingly, it is Eloise informally-educated who instructs Tibor well-formally-educated, and without her, he quits his passion for music but works to manage hotel business in Amsterdam (219). Tibor is constructed toward the true education that a teacher teaches not by imposing ideas on students but by inducing them and that students learns not by copying a teacher's work but by comprehending the instruction, and toward another that the right and timely education is essential.

Eloise is consciousness of responsibility to Tibor. Surprisingly, Tibor gradually grows

love for Eloise under her instruction in their sessions and he fears that she will leave him sooner or later, which "began to haunt him, disturbing his sleep, and casting a shadow as he walked out into the square after another exhilarating session" (202-03). However, she feels sense of mission to train Tibor and correct his misleading way of playing the cello with his potential (195-97). In their sessions, Eloise also interprets love as essential in music and life. She evaluates Tibor performance of Rachmaninov in great emotion of romantic love and abandonment because he once experiences lost love, the German girl in Vienna, despite no physical intimacy (204-05). She shares with Tibor that Peter Henderson, a golfing businessman in Oregon, feels uneasy to live with her because a musician on the music path has difficulty forming a family with someone not there. In her regret for Tibor, she announces her possible marriage with Peter: "she looked at him earnestly, then looked away" (206-07, 218). Eloise finally chooses Peter her secular love in the material world, expressing her responsibility even in audience's shrug, and in return Peter expresses his with tolerance and persistence in their disagreement, toward which Tibor is constructed (Robson 44; 218).

III. Kazuo Ishiguro's Authorial Intent

As a reader, I endeavor to probe into Ishiguro's authorial intent and the dialogic overtone in the novel: Tony at his old age should focus not on comeback but on happy marriage with Lindy in full communication; Emily and Charlie should pay full mutual reliance in marriage with proper ambition; the songwriter in "Malvern Hills" should balance between ideal and practical in his perseverance and seek mutual tolerance with family; Steven, talented, should praise the efforts of the untalented and estimate whether his career is worth love loss; and Tibor should employ his talent and formal education independently and respect responsibility, except love. In Ishiguro's employment of the characters transgredient to the hero toward the produced truth in each story, he intends to solve an enigma for every globe citizen of all walks in the twenty-first century who pursue fame and fortune, that every career has its rising and falling and it is impossible to always stay at the top; that to pursue a career requires both talent and efforts whereas they are likely to contribute to something as expected, or nothing; and that one may lose life to his ambition and neglect his family.

IV. Conclusion

In *Nocturnes*, Ishiguro's utterance, he employs the examples of musicians' career in the reversed life direction intertwined with marriage to create a zoom-in-and-zoom-out effect—zooming in the old and zooming out the young—for readers to shift their focus from what their ambition may lead to in the future to what

they decide to do with their ambition presently, signifying the importance to live a day rather than a life. This way, he provides readers with open-ended meaning of success and happiness; namely, success and happiness should be measured not from one single perspective but from many, where truth will be produced, ensuing a free choice: how one leads a life to achieve success and happiness in his struggle between reality and dream, in thoughtful employment of education, talent/efforts, perseverance and ambition, and in healthy balance of family. It is true that no one can predict the future but the fortune indeed lies in one's hand, which is my utterance, a reader's, in my dialogue with Ishiguro (Hagen 66; Matthews 121).

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The Catholic Church and Abortion: An Examination of Immediate Animation and Hylomorphism

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INTRODUCTION

The Catholic Church currently maintains that abortion is immoral at any stage of gestation because the foetus is a person from conception. This determination as to foetal personhood is founded upon two assumptions: 1. that any being with a soul is a person; and 2. that the foetus is endowed with a soul at the moment of conception. This paper does not seek to contest supposition '1', but rather proposes concerns with supposition '2'. In particular, the paper explores the basic Church dogma of hylomorphism, and raises questions as to whether this view of the process of ensoulment is consistent with a theory of immediate animation. The paper also traces the documented development of the Church's present position, and expresses doubt as to whether the Church's championing of immediate animation is as unequivocal as its condemnation of abortion would arguably require.

The paper aims to critique the Church's position purely on its own terms, so in providing my analysis I will not seek to question the fundamental beliefs of Catholicism. Accordingly, I accept uncritically the following five basic presuppositions:

1 that the Judeo–Christian God exists (hereafter 'God');

2 that souls exist;

3 that persons are those beings endowed with souls;

4 that souls are infused by God; and

5 that the process of ensoulment functions according to the hylomorphic tradition.

The paper seeks an answer to the following question: *Taken on its own terms*, is the Church's position internally consistent, persuasively argued, and thereby relatively credible?

THE RELIANCE UPON IMMEDIATE ANIMATION

The Church's present position on foetal personhood derives from a belief in immediate animation. However, the Church's promotion of its view as uncomplicated, absolute, and immutable is disingenuous, as the Church's real position is far more complex and uncertain.

The Church's current official view only dates from 1869, when Pope Pius IX implied that the Church believed in immediate ensoulment, when he removed the distinction

in penalties for abortion as between the animated and unanimated foetus, making all abortions punishable by automatic excommunication.[1]

The issue was not the subject of further papal comment until 1930, when Pope Pius XI issued his encyclical *Casti Connubii*,[2] and expressly defined abortion, at any stage of gestation, as the murder of an 'innocent person'.[3] Pius XI's position in this respect was reiterated in official statements by his immediate successors Pope Pius XII[4] and Pope John XXIII,[5] by the Second Vatican Council,[6] and by Pope Paul VI, in his encyclical *Humanae Vitae*.[7]

During Paul VI's papacy the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith also reiterated this view when it issued the *Declaration on Procured Abortion*.[8] This document defines 'person' as a human being endowed with a soul,[9] and indicates that the foetus is a person from conception.[10] However, despite describing the foetus as a person from conception, the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith indicated that the Church was nonetheless *undecided* as to when the foetus became ensouled. This uncertainty is expressed as follows:

> This declaration expressly leaves aside the question of the moment when the spiritual soul is infused. There is not a unanimous tradition on this point and authors are yet in disagreement … it suffices that this presence of the soul [from conception] be probable.[11]

This development is extraordinary given what preceded it. It has always been, and continues to be, Church teaching that the *only* criterion (both necessary and sufficient) for personhood is the possession of a soul, and since 1869 the Church has labelled the foetus a person from conception. To then refuse to accept that the foetus is necessarily ensouled from conception results in an obvious contradiction: an inconsistency that is

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[1] See Pope Pius IX, '*Codex Iuris Canonici*' (1869) 5 *Acta Sanctae Sedis* 298.

[2] See Pope Pius XI, '*Casti Connubii*' (1930) 22 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 539.

[3] Ibid 559–65.

[4] See, eg, Pope Pius XII, '*Humani Generis*' (1950) 42 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 568, 575.

[5] See, eg, Pope John XXIII, '*Pacem in Terris*' (1963) 55 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 257, 259–60.

[6] Second Vatican Council, '*Gaudium et Spes*: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World' (1966) 58 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 1067, para 27 & 51.

[7] Pope Paul VI, 'Humanae Vitae' (1968) 60 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 481, paras 13, 14 & 25.

[8] Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 'Declaration on Procured Abortion' (1974) 66 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 730.

[9] Ibid para 8.

[10] Ibid paras 7–13.

[11] Ibid para 13, n 19.

repeated in nearly all subsequent Church documents dealing with the issue of foetal personhood.[12]

The papacy of John Paul II saw the adoption of the foetal personhood principles of Paul VI's papacy.[13] In his encyclical *Evangelium Vitae*,[14] Pope John Paul II provided his own lengthy interpretation and proclamation of those principles. John Paul II unequivocally states that the foetus is a person 'from the moment of conception',[15] and therefore possesses the same rights as all other persons,[16] including a right to life.[17] On this foundation abortion is defined as an 'act against the person'[18] in direct violation of the divine commandment 'you shall not kill'.[19] For John Paul II abortion is murder at any stage of gestation.[20]

On the basis of such unambiguous statements one might be excused for thinking that the Church's position was now clear. However, this was not the case, as John Paul II, in the same breath that he declared with absolute certainty that the foetus is a person from conception, expressed doubt as to the exact moment of ensoulment. Echoing the words of the 1974 *Declaration on Procured Abortion*, John Paul II states that it is only a 'probability' that the foetus possesses a soul from conception.[21]

The logic of this reasoning is flawed. John Paul II states that the foetus is an *actual* human person from conception throughout his encyclical,[22] and Church teaching is unambiguous: *actual* human persons are only those who *actually* possess a soul. Yet, John Paul II refuses to acknowledge that the foetus is endowed with a soul from conception; the most he can say is that immediate animation is probable. As a probable premise cannot logically lead to a certain conclusion, if a being only *probably* has a soul, then the most one can say is that that being is *probably* a person.

Thus, the Church is making two mutually inconsistent assertions:

1   that the foetus is a person from conception; and

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[12] See, eg, Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, '*Donum Vitae*: Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Reply to Certain Questions of the Day' (1988) 80 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 70, 79.

[13] See, eg, Pope John Paul II, 'Marriage and the Family' (1983) 28 *The Pope Speaks* 360, 365; Pope John Paul II, '*Centesimus Annus*' (1991) 83 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 793, para 47; Pope John Paul II, 'Veritatis Splendor' (1993) 85 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 1133, para 80.

[14] Pope John Paul II, 'The Gospel of Life: *Evangelium Vitae*' (1995) 87 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 401.

[15] Ibid para 45.

[16] Ibid para 18.

[17] Ibid paras 5, 20.

[18] Ibid para 4.

[19] Ibid paras 13, 14, 52–58.

[20] Ibid paras 3, 4, 11, 13, 14, 43–45, 53, 57–60.

[21] Ibid para 60.

[22] Ibid paras 2, 4, 5, 11, 13, 18, 20, 45, 48, 53, 57, 58, 60, 62, 63, 76, 77.

2   that the foetus is probably a person from conception.

This, of course, results in logical absurdity as you are either a person or you are not a person — you cannot be both. Put another way, if 'Xs' are those beings with souls, 'Ys' are persons, and 'Zs' are foetuses at any stage of gestation, then the Church position is as follows:

1   all and only Xs are Ys;

2   all Zs are probably Xs; but

3   all Zs are Ys.

For the Church's position to be internally consistent, proposition '2' would have to read that 'all Zs are Xs', yet the Church refuses to make this commitment. It is interesting to note that although the Church refuses to commit to the only premise that would ensure internal consistency in its argument, it is not circumspective with regard to the conclusions it reaches on abortion. Indeed, the Church maintains its prohibition on abortion even if the life of the mother is threatened by the pregnancy.[23] This hard-line stance further erodes the coherency of the Church's position, as the lack of conviction on the part of the Church with respect to immediate ensoulment makes the Church's refusal to allow for exceptions when the life of the mother is threatened difficult (if not impossible) to justify. According to a literal interpretation of current Church teaching on ensoulment, in such cases there is a choice between a probable person and an actual person, and Church doctrine advocates choosing the probable person. Clearly, the Church's refusal to advocate immediate animation with certainty creates a fundamental internal inconsistency in their argument. This raises the obvious question as to why the modern Church feels inclined to place doubt on the only premise that could possibly adequately justify its position on abortion.

Of interest in this respect is the fact that the Church has not always taught immediate animation (or the probability thereof). Prior to the late 19th Century the Church taught delayed hominization, and appears to have done so since its inception. The doctrine of delayed animation was seen in the writings of the earliest Doctors and Fathers of the Church (for example, St Jerome, St Augustine and St Cyril, as well as Lactantius and Theodoret, all advocated a theory of delayed ensoulment), codified by Gratian in the 12th Century, justified by Aquinas in the 13th Century,[24] and adopted by the Church at the Council of Vienne (largely on the basis of Aquinas' arguments) as official Church teaching in 1312. The Council of Trent reaffirmed this dogma in the 16th Century, by which time delayed animation was entrenched; accepted by scholars and taught by the Church. This remained the case until 1869.

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[23] See, eg, Pope Paul VI, 'Humanae Vitae' (1968) 60 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 481, paras 14, 17, 62.

[24] See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (1981) Pt 1, questions 75, 76, 118, and Pt II–II, question 64.

The weight of history poses the obvious question: After almost two millennia of advocating delayed ensoulment (notably with no reservations), why did the Church change its mind on the issue? Unfortunately, the Church has provided no indication as to what stimulated the transformation in this respect. In any case, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the fact that the Church previously advocated delayed ensoulment may partly account for the Church's current reluctance to proclaim immediate ensoulment with certainty. Such reluctance may also stem from the fact that immediate animation sits uneasily with the basic dogma of the Church that provides an explanation of the process of ensoulment: Hylomorphism.[25]

HYLOMORPHISM

The Church's teaching of this doctrine owes much to Thomas Aquinas' interpretation of Aristotle. Put simply, Thomistic hylomorphism rejects the dualist view,[26] and maintains that the body and soul are one. As Donceel explains:

> Hylomorphism holds that the human soul is to the body somewhat as the shape of a statue is to the actual statue … The shape of the statue cannot exist before the statue exists … in the same way, the human soul can exist only in a real human body.[27]

The soul is thus viewed as the 'substantial form' of the body, essentially shaping the body.[28] It is at the moment that this substantial form unites with the body (thereby causing unity of form and matter) that we see the creation of 'one substance — the individual human person'.[29] Hylomorphism declares that only a body with human shape or form possesses a soul, as it is only the presence of the soul that would produce a human shape or form. As a result, unless a being shows human shape or form, then there exists no soul in that being.

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[25] Hylomorphism was adopted as Church teaching in 1312, re-affirmed at the Council of Trent in 1566, and forms part of current Church orthodoxy — see Daniel Dombrowski and Robert Deltete, *A Brief, Liberal, Catholic Defense of Abortion* (2000), 35 & 49; David Shoemaker, 'Embryos, Souls, and the Fourth Dimension' (2005) 31 *Social Theory and Practice* 51, 66; Carol A Tauer, 'The Tradition of Probabilism and the Moral Status of the Early Embryo' in Patricia Beattie Jung and Thomas Shannon (eds), *Abortion and Catholicism: The American Debate* (1988) 54, 77.

[26] See John Coughlin, 'Canon Law and the Human Person' (2003–04) 19 *Journal of Law and Religion* 1, 12.

[27] Joseph Donceel, 'A Liberal Catholic's View' in Joel Feinberg (ed), *The Problem of Abortion* (2nd ed, 1984) 15, 16.

[28] See, eg, Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (1981) Pt I, question 75, answers 1, 4, 5, questions 76, answers 3, 4, and question 118, answers 2, 3, and Pt Ia question 90, answer 4, ad 1.

[29] J P Moreland and Stan Wallace, 'Aquinas versus Locke and Descartes on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics' (1995) 35 *International Philosophical Quarterly* 319, 320.

Adherence to hylomorphism is virtually unanimous within Catholicism.[30] However, the conclusions reached by various Catholic commentators (on the basis of this principle) concerning the exact moment of ensoulment show no such unanimity.[31] Differences arise because the hylomorphic principle is inherently ambiguous, as it begs the question as to what constitutes a real human form, shape, or outline.

The Church arguably suggests that the acquisition of the human genetic blueprint at conception constitutes the acquisition of hylomorphic human shape or form, as:

> [i]t would never be made human if it were not human already … modern genetic science brings valuable confirmation … that, from the first instant, the programme is fixed as to what this living being will be.[32]

One might reasonably expect the Church to provide more detail on this issue, especially with respect to why the genetic blueprint necessarily constitutes the attainment of hylomorphic human form; however this is yet to occur.[33] The Church has been content to continue to repeat the above simplistic genetic determination.[34]

However, the Church's view sits uncomfortably with the hylomorphic principle as it is difficult to grasp how a microscopic speck of single-celled matter may constitute hylomorphic human form.[35] The Church might answer that it is not so much the single cell that constitutes the human shape, but rather the human DNA residing within that cell. However, such a focus prompts the rebuttal that all human cells have this DNA, yet clearly every human cell cannot constitute a hylomorphic human body. Furthermore, it is now possible to isolate DNA from a cell, and it would seem bizarre to suggest that in such a form it satisfies the hylomorphic conception of a human person.

Perhaps most fatal to the coherency of the Church's position, fertilization is not the point at which all necessary genetic information is received. Without delving into excessive (and unnecessary) biological detail (as this has been more than adequately

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[30] See Robert Pasnau, 'Souls and the Beginning of Life (A Reply to Haldane and Lee)' (2003) 78 *Philosophy* 521, 524–25; John Coughlin, 'Canon Law and the Human Person' (2003–04) 19 *Journal of Law and Religion* 1, 4–12.

[31] See, eg, Daniel Dombrowski and Robert Deltete, *A Brief, Liberal, Catholic Defense of Abortion* (2000); Norman Ford, *When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science* (1988); Joseph Donceel, 'A Liberal Catholic's View' in Patricia Beattie Jung and Thomas Shannon (eds), *Abortion and Catholicism: The American Debate* (1988) 48.

[32] Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 'Declaration on Procured Abortion' (1974) 66 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 730, para 13.

[33] See Leslie Griffin, 'Evangelium Vitae: Abortion' in Kevin Wildes and Alan Mitchell (eds), *Choosing Life: A Dialogue on Evangelium Vitae* (1997) 159, 165.

[34] See, eg, Pope John Paul II, 'The Gospel of Life: *Evangelium Vitae*' (1995) 87 *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 401, para 43.

[35] See Carol A Tauer, 'The Tradition of Probabilism and the Moral Status of the Early Embryo' in Patricia Beattie Jung and Thomas Shannon (eds), *Abortion and Catholicism: The American Debate* (1988) 54, 76–79.

canvassed elsewhere),[36] it is clear that the reception of the essential genetic data (which appears to be the Church's focus) is a relatively lengthy process. The zygote's genetic information obtained during the process of conception (and contained in chromosomes) is complemented with further genetic information (that the zygote requires in order to continue its development) from both maternal mitochondria and messenger RNA, and this usually occurs sometime between three and five days after conception.[37]

Some authors even go so far as to suggest that it is not until approximately two weeks after conception, at implantation, that it is possible to declare that the genetic blueprint has been wholly received, in the sense that it is only after this point that one may say with certainty that the embryo will undergo no further genetic modification.[38] Whether one agrees with this later hypothesis or not, what is clear is that biology does not support immediate hominization in the way the Church asserts that it does.[39] If the Church, in determining the moment of ensoulment, wishes to rely on the reception of the genetic information necessary for the subsequent development of the human individual, then conception/fertilization is an inappropriate (in the sense of being biologically inaccurate) moment to choose. There is therefore no obvious biological support for the proposition that a hylomorphic human body (as defined by the Church) is created at fertilization.

The Church furnishes no additional argument as to why hylomorphic theory necessarily (or even probably) leads to a finding of immediate animation. On this basis one may conclude that the Church's position is inadequately argued and, as a result, unconvincing. This conclusion is reinforced when one recognises that the strength (or weakness) of a theory is dependent not only on the merits of the theory itself, but also on the theory's ability to withstand critical attack. It is of interest to note in this respect that the Church is silent when it comes to rebutting alternative

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[36] See James Diamond, 'Abortion, Animation, and Biological Hominization' (1975) 36 *Theological Studies* 305, 308–16; Thomas Shannon and Allan Wolter, 'Reflections on the Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo' (1990) 51 *Theological Studies* 603, 606–14; Mark Johnson, 'Delayed Hominization: Reflections on Some Recent Catholic Claims for Delayed Hominization' (1995) 56 *Theological Studies* 743, 744–63; Shoemaker, 'Embryos, Souls, and the Fourth Dimension' (2005) 31 *Social Theory and Practice* 51, 53–74; Paul Copland and Grant Gillett, 'The Bioethical Structure of a Human Being' (2003) 20 *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 123, 125–28.

[37] See Carlos Bedate and Robert Cefalo, 'The Zygote: To Be or Not to Be a Person' (1989) 14 *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy* 641, 644–45 (1989); Daniel Dombrowski and Robert Deltete, *A Brief, Liberal, Catholic Defense of Abortion* (2000), 43; James Diamond, 'Abortion, Animation, and Biological Hominization' (1975) 36 *Theological Studies* 305, 310; Thomas Shannon and Allan Wolter, 'Reflections on the Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo' (1990) 51 *Theological Studies* 603, 608; Lisa Sowle Cahill, 'The Embryo and the Fetus: New Moral Contexts' (1993) 54 *Theological Studies* 124, 127–28.

[38] See Norman Ford, *When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science* (1988), 181; James Diamond, 'Abortion, Animation, and Biological Hominization' (1975) 36 *Theological Studies* 305, 312–16.

[39] See James Diamond, 'Abortion, Animation, and Biological Hominization' (1975) 36 *Theological Studies* 305, 307, 316, 319; H Tristram Engelhardt Jr, 'The Ontology of Abortion' (1974) 84 *Ethics* 217, 228; Daniel Dombrowski and Robert Deltete, *A Brief, Liberal, Catholic Defense of Abortion* (2000), 78; Carol A Tauer, 'The Tradition of Probabilism and the Moral Status of the Early Embryo' in Patricia Beattie Jung and Thomas Shannon (eds), *Abortion and Catholicism: The American Debate* (1988) 54, 76–77; Thomas Shannon and Allan Wolter, 'Reflections on the Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo' (1990) 51 *Theological Studies* 603, 625–26.

conclusions reached by Catholic scholars applying the identical metaphysical theory of hylomorphism.[40] Such scholars have canvassed various time periods as to when the foetus acquires a soul, and thereby attains its personhood, with many focusing on a point after implantation (which occurs between 14 and 16 days after conception).[41] Dombrowski and Deltete even go so far as to suggest that a hylomorphic human body is not apparent (and therefore ensoulment has not occurred) until sometime between 24 and 32 weeks gestation.[42]

This divergence of opinion within Catholicism is hardly surprising as the concept of hylomorphic 'human form' is susceptible to myriad interpretations. Nonetheless, one might well have expected the Church to answer such Catholic 'radicals', and support its preferred position of immediate hominization, but this is yet to occur.[43]

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the preceding discussion the Church's position on foetal personhood may be described as both inconsistent and unpersuasive. There is no doubt that the Church's failure to unconditionally adopt the teaching of immediate ensoulment produces internal inconsistency in its stated position on foetal personhood, and the Church provides insufficient reasons in favour of even the probability of immediate animation. In addition, a theory of immediate animation creates tension with the basic dogma of hylomorphism.

The analytic impotence of the Church's argument raises the implication that the official position is not actually believed by the Church, but rather determined by desired objectives. For instance, perhaps conception is chosen by the Church as the point of ensoulment due to a desire for practical certainty.[44] Such a hypothesis is compatible with the Church's refusal to adopt immediate animation as fact, while still defining the foetus as a person from conception. Or perhaps the Church labels the foetus as a person from conception only because it results in a strong moral

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[40] See, eg, Joseph Donceel, 'Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization' (1970) 31 *Theological Studies* 76; Norman Ford, *When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science* (1988); Daniel Dombrowski and Robert Deltete, *A Brief, Liberal, Catholic Defense of Abortion* (2000).

[41] See eg, Norman Ford, *When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science* (1988), 170–81; Joseph Donceel, 'A Liberal Catholic's View' in Joel Feinberg (ed), *The Problem of Abortion* (2nd ed, 1984) 15, 15–20.

[42] Different date ranges are suggested throughout their book but the above range fits within all those mentioned — see Daniel Dombrowski and Robert Deltete, *A Brief, Liberal, Catholic Defense of Abortion* (2000), 53, 56–59, 121–28.

[43] See Leslie Griffin, 'Evangelium Vitae: Abortion' in Kevin Wildes and Alan Mitchell (eds), *Choosing Life: A Dialogue on Evangelium Vitae* (1997) 159, 165.

[44] See Carol A Tauer, 'The Tradition of Probabilism and the Moral Status of the Early Embryo' in Patricia Beattie Jung and Thomas Shannon (eds), *Abortion and Catholicism: The American Debate* (1988) 54, 54–55; Joseph Donceel, 'A Liberal Catholic's View' in Joel Feinberg (ed), *The Problem of Abortion* (2nd ed, 1984) 15, 17. Engelhardt suggests the novel motivation that immediate animation was 'developed under the pressure of the Catholic dogma of the Immaculate Conception' — H Tristram Engelhardt Jr, 'The Ontology of Abortion' (1974) 84 *Ethics* 217, 226.

condemnation of abortion, which the Church opposes for reasons other than foetal personhood; reasons that might not generate the level of support that a 'right to life' position tends to produce. Of course, the Church has never suggested such contrived motivations, and it is beyond the purpose of this paper to investigate such assertions.

Monk's marriage in Japan—

The ideas of Shinran and a comparison with M.Luther—

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1. Introduction

Buddhism is one of unique religions, which prohibit having sex as religious rule. Monks must keep their precepts in which prohibits "any kind of" sex. In laymen' precepts, on the other hand, "wrong" sex is prohibited. It shows that the difference of sexual precept is one of clear distinctions between monks and laymen.

However, in Japan, we can see monk's marriage or their children. It shows Japanese monk's violation of precepts, and it has been perceived as unique phenomenon among Buddhist countries.

Japanese monks have been permitted marry since Meiji period by the government. Since then, among Japanese Buddhist sect, *Jōdo Shinshū* sect was only one Buddhist sect which was permitted monk's marriage by the government. And *Jōdo Shinshū* sect had permitted monk's marriage as their doctrine.

Jōdo Shinshū sect was founded by *Shinran* (1173-1262), and he has been said that he was a first monk who married as a monk. His marriage has been evaluated revolutionary (Matuo 2010:p.17) one, however, there are no historical record or his statement about his marriage. Therefore, we cannot know was there any his religious ideas or not now.

In order to explain logic of his marriage, this paper focuses on his ideas, foundation sutra and his structure of faith. He set the three sutras about the Pure Land as his foundation sutra. And he also strongly emphasized on work or power of *Amida Buddha*.

In the western religious history, on the other hand, *Martin Luther* is known for having gotten in marriage under prohibition on sex. Comparing these two men of religion, there could be any common logic that Luther and *Shinran* shared, or any critical difference in their perception of marriage.

With logic of *Shinran*'s marriage, this paper attempts to provide an explanation of monk's marriage in Japan.

2. Some features of Japanese Buddhism

Japanese Buddhism was brought to Japan via China in about 6th century. And Japanese Buddhist reads scripture, which was translated in Chinese.

There are some unique points of Japanese Buddhism; they use Chinese, but use the Chinese-style reading of a character in Japanese. And Japanese monks do take funerals or some rituals, which related to death. And these rituals are one of the most important their work in Japanese society. Also we can find that they are drinking alcohol or having other job as a businessperson.

These points show unique points of Japanese Buddhism among other Buddhist countries. It'll be said that Japanese Buddhism is quite worldly one. In generally, monk must not do such things because of their precepts.

However, it's usual to see their marriage or kindred family in Japan. They live with their family in house, do not live in temple. It's one of the most clear features of Japanese Buddhism, it shows that how worldly Japanese Buddhism is.

Monks has been thought that they must not have sex or marriage because of their precepts. So monk's marriage in Japan looks like quite unique phenomenon among Buddhist country.

3. Difference between Buddhists

There are two clear differences of precepts between monk and layman.

First is its number; layman keep five precepts and monks on the other hand, they keep two hundred fifty precepts.

Layman keeps these precepts as follows,

Ⅰ.Abstain from destruction of life.

Ⅱ.Abstain from stealing.

Ⅲ.Abstain from doing wrong sex.

Ⅳ.Abstain from lying.

Ⅴ.Abstain from intoxicant.

The four precepts of layman, abstain from destruction of life, abstain from stealing, abstain from doing wrong sex and abstain from lying are similar to those of monk's precepts.

But there is a clear difference on sexual precept between Buddhists.

In Monk's precept, it's described as follows,

"All monks must not have all sex including with animals without rejecting monk's doctrine or precepts, or saying that they cannot keep them. If they did it, they must not live with other monks." (Hirakawa 1993:p.157-8)

In this precept, "All sex" is prohibited. On the other hand, in layman's precept, "Wrong sex is prohibited". It can be thought that the difference of precept means a distinction between monk and layman and it's a clear difference of them.

Since monk practice with other monks, cannot live with other monk means excommunication as monk. In another words, monk can exist as a monk, because he keeps precepts.

Sex is strong connected with marriage and monks have been thought that they must not marry. Actually, other Buddhist For this reason, Monk's marriage in Japan has been said quite unique phenomenon.

4. Japanese Buddhism and marriage

Japanese monks had been prohibited marriage by the government since Nara period. The government enacted a decree for monks and nuns, and there were sexual rules that prohibited having sex of monks and nuns.

In Meiji period, Japanese monks were permitted marriage and at the same, the government permitted monks to eat meat, having hair and having own names (not names as a monk but names in society). It has been said that the government did it for modern family registration system and they laicized monk. Since then, marriage of monks spread to Japan and all over the country. Almost all Buddhist sects permitted monk's marriage as officially and it became usual one.

On the other hand, until then, *Jōdo Shinshū* sect, which developed one of the largest Buddhism sects in cotemporary Japan was only one sect that was permitted monk's marriage by the government. This Buddhist sect permitted monk's marriage as their

doctrine and they had been permitted it by the government before Meiji period.

Not many religions among the major religions of the world that prohibit marriage or having sex as rule. Buddhism is unique religion that prohibits sex. Nevertheless, it 's usual for Japanese Buddhist sect to merry or having children. It seems transgression for Buddhist precept.

Among many Japanese Buddhist sects, *Jōdo Shinshū* sect was the only one sect, which didn't prohibit monk's marriage as Buddhist sect. Is there any special reason or logic for monk's merry or violation of sexual precept as a Buddhist sect.

This sect has been said *Shinran* founded and his marriage has been said it was revolutionary one in Japanese Buddhist society. For an explanation monk's marriage in Japan, this paper focuses on his ideas and attempt to interpret his logic.

5. *Shinran* and his marriage

Shinran was born in 1173 and had practiced as monk at Mount *Hiei* for twenty years. After at he was twenty-nine years old, he became Honen's pupil.

He has been said that he was a first monk, who married as a monk. His marriage has been said, " revolutionary" (Matuo 2010:p.17) or "it was only *Shinran* whose marriage is connected with his doctrine" (Akamatsu 1961:p.2).

There are two famous traditions that tell factor of his marriage. One is revelation of his dream and the other is teaching of Honen who was master of *Shinran*.
First we see a revelation of his dream as follows, he got it by *Kannon Bidhisattva* and he was permitted to have sex with woman.

…. If you did sexual intercourse, I 'll become beautiful women and be violated by you. And I'll protect whole your life. And at after your death, I'll bring you to the Pure land. (Shinraṇ syōnin zensyu hensyū dōjin.(Ed.)1957: p.201)

Second factor of *Shinran*'s marriage has been said it was a teaching of *Hōnen*. In this

tradition, he told *Shinran* to marry with woman; *Hōnen* recommended marriage to teach that there is no difference between monk and lay believers.

Shinran's marriage has these two stories and these stories made his marriage special marriage. However both of them have not been proven yet and these stories don't the reason why *Shinran*'s marriage was revolutionary or reasonable one under religious doctrine. He has been said, "he insisted that monk can marry (Matuo 2010:p.17)" however, it's obviously violation of precept for monks. Monks should not have sex or marriage under their Buddhist precepts. Therefore, his marriage should be by no means reasonable one for monk.

His marriage has been evaluated as revolutionary (Matuo 2010:p.17) not only in these traditions but in much discussions and discourses within *Jōdo Shinshū* sect. Needless to say, these are not *Shinran*'s own statement for his marriage, and also these discourses are not one, which was said by *Shinran*'s religious idea. Some people say he had a religious conviction, however there is no record of his statement about his marriage.

In fact, *Jōdo Shinshū* sect couldn't answer the reason why they can marry as their doctrine (Hirata 2010:p.430). This sect described their doctrine by explaining that their founder *Shinran* married. However it's not reason that explains rightness of their doctrine about marriage. There are not any historical records and we do not know why the government permitted monk's marriage only for *Jōdo Shinshū* sect.

In addition, in recent study, it is said that it was not unusual for monks to marry or have child in *Shinran*'s days. Many historical documents tell that many monks have children or partner (Ishida 1995,Taira 2011) and therefore, we can't say his marriage was first or revolutionary one for monk or Japanese Buddhist society at large.

There is no historical record that tells reason of his marriage or why it was revolutionary. We need to organize *Shinran*'s marriage again and whether was it rightness one for Buddhist or not.

Furthermore, we may not say that he "married". In modern concepts, marriage will be described as having one or steady partner, or there is something contract. However in

his days, there is no clear definition of marriage, and there is not any historical record that tells his marriage or contract with woman.

After his dead, some his biographies were made and they tell about *Shinran*'s marriage or wife although, there is no his statement about his marriage; he didn't call his behavior marriage and also, he didn't say nothing about his marriage as biographies tell.

If we call his behavior "marriage" like modern concept, we have to find some historical evidence such as something ceremony or contract with his partner. There are two women who has been thought *Shinran*'s wife. One woman is *Eshin* nun and the other is *Tamahi hime*, and *Eshin* nun is the most likely theory. She wrote many letters to *Shinran and* had at least two children between *Shinran*. However *Shinran* didn't call her wife and she didn't call him husband, either. Even if she had children between *Shinran*, there is no historical record that proofs her status; whether she was his wife or not. Therefore, marriage that was written in these his biographies is lacks of its objectivity and his marriage needs to be studied more carefully.

In this paper, we distinguish his marriage and sex. Many studies have not distinguished sex and marriage. In Buddhist precept, marriage is not clear prohibition but having sex is obviously violation of precept because it's written in precept.

We can know existence of *Shiran*'s child from historical sources. He called a man as his son and he treated the man his real son[1]. Therefore, we can't say marriage of *Shinran* was marriage, in modern concept however, we can say that *Shinran* did a violation of sexual precept.

6. *Shinran*'s idea -- the Pure Land and faith--

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[1] Of course, there is a possibility that the man was adapted child of *Shinran* and he didn't have sex with any woman. But he treated him as his real son, and it means that he accepted suspicious of having sex or violation of precept. Therefore this paper set his behavior (having son) as a violation of Buddhist precept.

This paper focuses on *Shinran*'s two main ideas to explain his violation of Buddhist precept. He set three sutras as his foundation sutra and had absolute faith to *Amida Buddha*.

He set three sutras that tell about the Pure Land as foundation sutra. The Pure Land is a world that *Amida Buddha* lives and there is no discrimination, pain or hunger. Furthermore, people who are born in there can attain enlightenment in their next life.

There is a validation of precept or class because they are promised enlightenment at their next life. To attain enlightenment is common goal for Buddhists so in this present world, Buddhists need to practice for attain enlightenment. They must obey precepts as training for enlightenment, and there is a clear difference between Buddhists, monk and layman.

Monk or not monk is same to which precept they receive and keep, it also means that whether having sex is permitted or not. In the Pure Land, on the other hand, it is certain for them to attain enlightenment at their next life. In that sense, the monks and lay believers become level equal.

Shinran emphasized the faith such as the way to go to the Pure Land. Like other sects that preach to go to the Pure Land, he chanted Buddhist prayer, which is an expression of gratitude to the *Amida Buddha* by calling his name. But it is not a practice for *Shinran* but nothing more than just saying gratitude. In his idea, it's enough even just once or even just recites in mind, although other Buddhist sect did it as practice and they chanted it many times.

Also, *Shinran* thought that can call *Amida Buddha* is a proof of salvation by *Amida Buddha* and going to the Pure Land. He thought that faith is not what you get on your own, rather he thought that faith is something bestowed by the *Amida Buddha* and people are led to believe or led to call *Amida Buddha*'s name by *Amida Buddha*.

In his idea, belief in *Amida* Buddha or can call his name itself is proof of salvation. His idea doesn't need any practice or keeping precepts because their salvation and enlightenment is already certain promised.

If training is denied, precepts are no longer necessary. He thoroughly denied subjective action of human such as training or keeping precepts. It has nothing to do with going to the Pure Land.

Shinran thought that men who can belief in *Amida Buddha* has already been decided that he can go to the Pure Land. Belief in *Amida Buddha* is definite evidence of that can go to the Pure Land, can attain enlightenment and can become equal to Buddda.
  He said as follows

"People who can get belief in *Amida Buddha* are already Buddha. They are equal to Buddha." (Tada 1964:p.115)

Enlightenment is common ultimate goal for Buddhists and they practice by keeping precepts. However, in his idea, people who can believe in *Amida Buddha* are promised to attain enlightenment and it means that the people are already Buddha. What all they have to do is believe in *Amida Buddha* and its belief is given by *Amida Buddha*.

He called himself "no precept no name monk" or "non-monk-non-layman". By absolute faith for *Amida Buddha*, he denied precepts that distinguish Buddhists. There are not any precepts. If there are not precepts, there are not violations of precepts.

7. A comparison with *Martin Luther*

Luther is famous as the central figure of the reformation. First common point of *Luther* and *Shinran* is that they had strict monastic life. *Shinran* was at temple, and Luther was at monastery. There were strict rules that they must keep and in those rules, there were rules prohibit sex or marriage. Nevertheless, they have been said got married or had sex although, they knew well that they must obey their precept as monk. They had strong belief, *Luther* in God and *Shinran* in *Amida Buddha*. Their action is called a revolution and after their death, teach of them established group or sect.

For *Shinran*, belief in *Amida Buddha* is definite evidence of can go to the Pure Land and attaining enlightenment. Man who can belief *Amida Buddha* or can call name of *Amida Buddha* is already Buddha. He doesn't need to keep precept therefore he can marry. He is able to obtain the ultimate goal of Buddhists nevertheless he violate Buddhist precepts and denied being a monk. These his position is supported by an absolute devotion to *Amida Buddha*.

Luther, on the other hand, had absolutely belief in God. And he tied to rectify by gospel understanding, the tradition of the Christian world so far. Monks of the church have been required in the single and virgin, however, he proved that there is no prohibition of monk's marriage or having sex in the Bible. He insisted on that whether they marry or not should be left freely by each person. And he claimed being single and virgin was to be contrary to the provisions of God. After he admitted the great value to be married than single or religious life and he married *Katharina von Bora*. His marry based on faith in God and the Bile.

Marriages of *Shinran* and *Luther* seem to obviously violation of their religious rules. But we can also say that *Shinran* and *Luther* did it by very basing on faith. Their marriage or having sex was violation of sexual precept, however, *Shinran* did it by denying a monk and *Luther* did it by basing on the Bible or gospel, which come from God.

8. Conclusion.

It has been said that *Shinran* violated sexual precept, and his marriage has been evaluated as revolutionary one, although the marriage has no reliable record and no explanation about the revolutionarily of his marriage.

To evaluate his marriage as revolutionary one, this paper focused on his foundation sutra and his belief stance. There is a special structure of the Pure Land and a structure of faith. In the Pure land, it's possible to invalidate precept because everyone who can be born in the Pure Land are promised attaining enlightenment in their next life. In the present life, Buddhists are different for their precepts and this difference of precept distinguishes their class. In the Pure land, on the other hand, Buddhists are

same in attaining enlightenment in next life and they don't need any precepts or practices keeping precepts because it is sure that they attain enlightenment.

Also, *Shinran* emphasized work or power of *Amida Buddha*. He thought belief in *Amida Buddha* is certain proof of salvation. In his idea, belief is one that given by *Aminda Buddha*. His attitude seems similar to the point that absolute faith in God by *Luther*. This is a quite unique point for Buddhism because his idea seems to be monotheism. *Luther* and *Shinran* have in common in point of absolute faith and this point needs to be compared in more detail the structure of the faith.

Also from a different point of view, it can causes blood relative. In fact, *Jōdo Shinshū* sect has achieved great development by kin, and it is only this sect among other Japanese Buddhist sect. As a Buddhist sect, which denies Buddhist precepts, *Jōdo Shinshū* sect has developed one of the largest sect in Japan. It's an interesting point as sociological theme and this paper will be a first step for such points.

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Theses on Prolegomena to Ethics

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Theses on Prolegomena to Ethics

Building the concrete ethics (or moral) always depends on the solution of the question of the existence. "Due" (better or "Good") is determined according to the understanding of the individual's existence, its aims and sense. Existence can be understood purely metaphysically (as differenced by some transcendental bases), religious (as extension of the God's will), naturalistic (according to postulating some Nature or natural conditions), at last, the existence can be understood in the existential perspective (as the being-to-death). In any case this understanding constitutes the space of the ethics and determines the ethical landmarks. It's important to note, that in this case any ethics can be called "immanent" – any transcendent and transcendental idea is needed only for explanation or justification of individual's existence.

We can explain some typical links between the concepts of existence and ethics. So, the concept of existence as the implementing of "Unity" (order, substance, logos and others) often leads to ethics, in which due or better is defined as following the need and cognition the need. When we define the existence as the realization of some social structure, keeping concrete community, we get ethics, which sees due in the maintaining the unity and integrity of the society and increasing its performance. Naturalistic definition of the existence gives us the utilitarian ethics, which concentrates on the search of the best ways (or best compromises) to satisfice natural needs or defense natural rights in the community or by the community. Describing the existence as the co-being of the different exists, we built the ethics, which implies that better is something that can enlarge concrete individual's possibilities to realize his own ability to existence.

Here we can conclude, that any attempt of building ethics has to begin from resolving the question about existence. This way would be traditional, and also it is relevant to the good sense: it looks like we draw the general map at first, and only then, mark some reference point on it. But can we propose, that it is possible to answer the question about the individual's existence unambiguously? Or, to be more concrete, can we solve the question about the existence basing on the analyses of structure and possibilities of the mind, some limiting assumptions?

The speculation about possibility to answer the question in this way looks very disputable, first of all, because we have a lot of alternative attempts of such clarifying. We can spend a lot of time to describe all differences between approaches and their aspects without any hope for the end of this work. Here we are far from fully criticizing the principle of understanding individual's existence on the base of ontological, epistemological, phenomenological or other such analysis, but, taking into account the actual availability of the very large number of difficulties and questions, we propose to go other way. Our attempt isn't the consequence of obvious crisis of other methodologies, but it is better to identify it as some kind of "reconnaissance in force": the try to prove it's productivity and true by making the analysis.

We propose to approach the question of the construction of ethics from the other point of view: to make conclusions about the existence after analyses of ethics and ethical, but not backwards. The relationship between ethics and existence is two-way. This means that we have the possibility to make conclusions about the structure of existence based on the analysis of that, which we call ethical, based on that how Due shows itself. If earlier we subordinated the proposition of ethical to the question of

existence, now we should make contrary gesture and subordinate the question of existence to ethical. Here we of course must ask ourselves how we can authentically speak about ethical. Or, in other words, on what bases we can claim that practically identifying Better and Worse is made unambiguously, without supposing any general principles. It is clear, that it is a critical question for our method.

To clarify practical possibility to identify "better" or "due" and to describe the moment of this identifying, we propose to use the concept of "ethical situation". It is the situation in which due reveals itself, in which it is shown or appears. Obviously, such a situation should be located before or outside the limits of previously outlined or definite (based on some sources) understanding of due, outside any visions of Good and Evil. It is the situation which on the contrary leads us out of any distinctness. It's the reason why, ethical situations are disclosed as the antinomies where any decision is paradoxical and impossible, making outside any regularity, including logical or rational regularity.

We can mention some of such antinomies. First, it is moral responsibility or due, which are locked in double limits: this responsibility has to be mandatory and, at the same time it must not to have any bases; forgiveness, which forgives the unforgivable; competition, the intensity of which is based on its artificiality and frivolous; love, which does not love what it loves.

The analysis of these antinomies shows us, that the ethical situation is always a moment of creation, but not of incarnation, implementation of Due. And we shouldn't say that "we know due because it is implemented in ethical situation", but we should say "we know due, because we can see how it is produced". Due or Duty isn't relevant to Better and Worse or to Good and Evil, it is only a choice of the way in which individuals realize their own ability to exist. Strictly speaking, Good and Evil, Better and Worse lose their sense, and ethics stops to be the science about Better and Worse or the search of the base to understand Better and Worse.

In this case the moment of the appearance of Due is not the moment of the disclosure of difference in being, but it is the moment of creation, of marking this difference. The difference isn't clarified by Due, but it is produced by Due. Due is the implementation of self-own being through co-existence, through sharing of self-own existence with others. And moral responsibility is not the result of freedom of Other (or the result of the presence of Other), but Other is the result of the statement of moral responsibility. In this sense, the appearance of Due, duty, which occurs outside of any determinacy, outside any Good and Evil, for which you can put the blame, – it is the act of the being, the realization of ability multiple existents to exist.

Here we can deeper proceed this logic: as well as different existings are recognized in the ethical situation of the relying of Due, Being also is relied through the practice of love. Love isn't relevant to existing Other, which is loved for its qualities, but instead it seeks beyong Other, to it's ability to be, the ability to be different and to exist differently. At the same time love isn't only acceptance of any abstract accident, the existence of anyone, but it refers to the existence of this particular Other. Love is to give Other possibilities to be which can't be imagined or subordinated by loving or beloved, where "giving" is active action, intervention and provocation. In this sense, love turns out to be relevance to being, but not to being at all, but being of this existing. While it is actually complicity in being of Other, love is the only possibility to operate being of existing, to rely it. As well as the Due isn't the result of the

presence of Other, but the way to constitute presence of Other by relying of Due, and Being too isn't given in any experience, but it is relying in the practice of love.

Now it is important to claim that ethics that we got couldn't be reduced to the statement of Love and Due as "Good". Moreover, the very statements like "Due should be" or "to love somebody" self-destruct, they contradict themselves, no one could not follow these statements. Ethics that we obtained does not point to Good and Evil, but it only shows us the possibility to talk of due and love, the possibility how we can talk about ethics, if we want to talk about it.

After all of this reasoning it becomes clear that there is not any "Unity", because if this Unity is necessary, such picture couldn't take place. There are any bases to understand self as the Substance or its part. The ethical situations, the opportunity to feel due deconstruct necessity of the Unity, and hence, its reality. And in this case, the ontology is dependent on ethics: implementation of its ability to determine the existence in Due (and overrides the ontology).

The Quest for Spirituality: A Psychoanalytic Approach

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Abstract

The relationship between psychoanalysis and religion is often said to be antagonistic, as Freud famously claims that religious beliefs are but a product of irrationality generated by our infantile phantasies. Recently, however, the philosopher John Cottingham suggests that religious faith is not only compatible with, but in fact supported by psychoanalytic theory, as both of them are motivated by a need for self-discovery, and that a synthesis of the two is possible as long as we take religious practice as indicative of the creative and benign power of human phantasy. Following this psychoanalytic defence of religion, in this paper I shall attempt to further explore the function of phantasy in a person's quest for spirituality. I argue that in order to attain the kind of synthesis between religion and psychoanalysis that Cottingham recommends, we must first examine the conditions under which a religious faith goes astray because of the baneful effects of a person's persecutory anxieties, so much so that his religious belief is formed out of defence and self-misrepresentation. Conversely, a genuine quest for spirituality is more likely to consist in the person's loving and hopeful attitude. Finally, I propose that this way of distinguishing between genuine and defensive religious faiths will have profound implications for a naturalist approach to religion informed by psychoanalytic theory.

As a renowned critic of civilization, a naturalist who presumes no rational character of human nature, Freud is often thought to be promoting a damaging view of religion for believers. Religion, he tells us, owes its origin to primitive peoples' belief in 'the omnipotence of thought', plus mankind's oldest wish for the father's protection against the child's helplessness. But as all these are projected outwards to a God-like being and given various forms of rationalization, Freud warns us that religious beliefs are mere illusions that give no compensation for the hardship of life. Just as the Oedipus phase is to be outgrown by maturity where the reality principle is dominant, it is necessary for the religious phase to be replaced by the scientific one; so argued Freud (1912-13; 1927c; 1930a).

The question remains, of course, whether anyone who is impressed by psychoanalytic theory must end up following Freud in being anti-religious. Granted his view that there is a close connection between religion and human irrationality, or that between our beliefs in God and our infantile phantasies, are we to say religious faith must have no positive role to play in human life? Taking up this line of inquiry, John Cottingham recently made a very interesting suggestion that religion, broadly understood as a set of 'spiritual activities' which 'aim to fill the creative and meditative space left over when science and technology have satisfied our material needs' (2005:3), can be psychoanalytically defended on the ground that it exhibits the beneficial functions of human phantasy (2005: 69-73; 2012: 123-5) The suggestion seems to me valuable, not only because it is an innovative way to defend the value of religion, but also because it demonstrates how such a naturalist worldview as endorsed by psychoanalysis can be reconciled with religious faith. In this paper, I argue that such a project of synthesizing psychoanalysis with the religious quest for spirituality is not only possible but in fact worth pursuing. I shall first evaluate Cottingham's arguments for the proposed synthesis, and then proceed to suggest what more considerations need be taken in order to complete his project.

1. Cottingham's Defense of Religion

Cottingham considers religion as essentially an internal journey of self-transformation, a process aiming at the fullness of the self as a result of what one *does* in religious life, and not of what one *believes*. He compares this conception of religion with the pre-Renaissance notion of 'spiritual exercises', the aim of which 'was not merely intellectual enlightenment, or imparting of abstract theory, but a transformation of the whole person, including our patterns of emotional response' (2005:5). It is beyond the scope of the present paper to give a full assessment of his philosophy of religion. But what is relevant for my purpose is his idea that, if it is practice and not theory that

concerns religion, and if it is self-transformation and psychological well-being that one aims at in being religious, there is indeed not much point for philosophy and psychoanalysis to cast doubt on the *truth* of religion—for this should not be the concern of true believers at all.

Why then should we resist the idea that a religion can be is justified only by its truth? It is worth quoting Cottingham's thesis of 'the primacy of praxis' in this connection:

> This envisaged process of internal transformation, in contrast to the intellectual business of evaluating propositions, seems to me fundamental to understanding not just the nature of spirituality, but also that of religion in general. What holds good for any plausible account of the tradition of spiritual exercises also holds good more generally for any *true understanding* of the place of religion in human life: we have to acknowledge what might be called the *primacy of praxis*, the vital importance that is placed on the individual's embarking on a path of practical self-transformation, rather than (say) simply engaging in intellectual debate or philosophical analysis. (ibid.; emphasis added)

Implicitly, typical seminar room debates over those issues like the existence of God, the problem of evil, or the moral character of God, are missing the point on the present account. These are irrelevant to a meaningful understanding of religion, because truly religious *faith* does not encompass a theory which is to be vindicated or refuted. Religious life involves a progression of knowledge, not because it is an intellectual engagement, but because it is about our knowledge of the *self* in which emotions play a vital part, a kind of knowledge that resists intellectualizing (ibid., 11). A further consequence of this view is that there is no need to take religious expressions literally. This is because, as a means to transforming the person, religious language often is used metaphorically or figuratively to capture the emotive dimension of religious experience. It will be inappropriate to blame people for following the teaching of the Bible, for example, just because those ideas like genesis or resurrection are literally at odds with our scientific knowledge.

It is on such a conception of religion that Cottingham's project of synthesizing it with psychoanalytic theory becomes possible. If we treat Freud's theoretical notions as heuristic tools by which to interpret patterns of human behaviour, and take seriously his claim that the mind is not transparent to itself, it appears that religion is quite in line with psychoanalysis in being a business of human self-discovery. Although it is well acknowledged that Freud's own view of religion is a deflationary one,

Cottingham argues that this need not be what a psychoanalytic thinker is forced to accept.

2. Phantasy, Illusion, and the Theory-Theory of Religion

It is thus understandable why Cottingham thinks the tension between psychoanalysis and religion can be promisingly *defused* even in face of Freud's criticism of religion as a mere illusion. He reminds us that on Freud's usage, an 'illusion' is different from a 'delusion', and is not necessarily false (ibid., 66, *n*20). This gives rise to a distinction between the kind of harmless phantasy in religion and the neurotic's belief in magic, one which is comparable to Wittgenstein's distinction between 'faith' and 'superstition' (ibid., 66). But more than that, Cottingham has a more interesting response to Freud within the frames of psychoanalytic theory. His suggestion is that, if we follow the ideas of two other prominent psychoanalytic thinkers, Donald Winnicott and Carl Jung, religious phantasies may be considered as a kind of symbolic thinking, without which human creativity and the integration of self would not be possible. The lesson to be drawn here is that from a psychoanalytic point of view, 'Freud's dismissal of the religious impulse as infantile fails to recognize the imaginative and symbolic role of religious modes of thought and expression, and their possible role in the healthy development of the human person'. (ibid., 70) After all, even if religious symbols are products of phantasy, they can still be good for maintaining psychological health, integrating, as it were, the conscious and the unconscious in a such way as to attain the fullness of the self.

The disagreement between Freud and Jung asides (cf. Freud, 1912-13: 146*n*, 150-1*n*), this psychoanalytic response to Freud's religious deflationism seems to very interesting in being able to highlight the role of phantasy in a person's good life. But before assessing its strengths, I think it is necessary to point out that the Winncott/Jung thesis is a more a supplement of Freud's theory than a *criticism* of it, as Freud's account of religious illusion is directed not so much to religious symbolism as to the 'system of thought' and institution that it produces. If my argument succeeds, it can be shown that Freud's theory does not in fact contradict Cottingham's view of religion at all.

To start with, let us consider why Freud in the first place would call the religious illusion a bad thing. Perhaps the following paragraphs from *The Future of An Illusion* are helpful:

What is characteristic of illusions is that they are derived from human wishes. In this respect they come near to psychiatric delusions. But they differ from them, too, apart from the more complicated structure of delusions. In the case of delusions, we emphasize as essential their being in contradiction with reality. Illusions need not necessarily be false….Thus we call a belief an illusion when a wish-fulfilment is a prominent factor in its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its relations to reality. (1927c: 31)

We can now repeat that all of them [i.e. religious doctrines] are illusions and insusceptible of proof….Of the reality value of most of them we cannot judge: just as they cannot be proved, so they cannot be refuted. (Ibid.)

'Well then, if even obdurate sceptics admits that the assertion of religion cannot be refuted by reason, why should I not believe in them, since they have so much on their side—tradition, the agreement of mankind, and all the consolations they offer?' Why not, indeed? Just as no one can be forced to believe, so no one can be forced to disbelieve. But do not let us be satisfied with deceiving ourselves that arguments like these take us along the road of correct thinking. If ever there was a correct case of lame excuse we have it here. Ignorance is ignorance; no right to believe anything can be derived from it. *In other matters no sensible person will behave so irresponsibly or rest content with such feeble grounds for his opinions and for the line he takes.* It is only in the highest and most sacred things that he allows himself to do so….Where questions of religion are concerned, people are guilty of every possible sort of dishonesty and intellectual misdemeanour. (Ibid., 32; emphasis added)

It is easy to misread Freud here as promoting an old-fashioned nineteenth century scientism, a sort of 'ethic of belief' once attacked by William James—that you have no right to believe in anything unless you have enough evidence for it. But here I think we need to place more emphasis on the notion of 'dishonesty and intellectual misdemeanour', which is a different issue from that of the evidential basis of belief. What matters, the argument goes, is that you allow yourself to believe in one case and not the other, when the evidential bases of both are equal. The charge here is that the religious believer can enjoy no *internal consistency* in his Weltanschauung. The question that concerns Freud is not whether the religious illusion can turn out to be true, but whether such a believer is a victim of undue rationalization.

So is it that Freud attacks religion merely because it is an illusion? Or it is that he is attacking the person's dubious Weltanschauung produced by the religious illusion? Answers to these questions must be made with reference to his comparatively more favourable attitude towards the illusion produced by art. The following account of artistic illusion is illuminating:

> In the exercising of an art it [i.e. psychoanalysis] sees once again an activity intended to ally ungratified wishes—in the first place in the creative artist himself and subsequently in his audience or spectators. The motive forces of artists are the same conflicts which drive other people into neurosis and have encouraged society to construct its institutions….The artist first aims to set himself free and, by communicating his work to other people suffering from the same arrested desires, he offers them the same liberation. He represents his most personal wishful phantasies as fulfilled; but they only become a work of art when they have undergone a transformation which softens what is offensive in them, conceals their personal origin and, by obeying the laws of beauty, bribes other people with a bonus of pleasure….Art is a conventionally accepted reality in which, thanks to artistic illusion, symbols and substitutes are able to provoke real emotions. Thus art constitutes a region half-way between a reality which frustrates wishes and the wish-fulfilling world of the imagination—a region in which, as it were, primitive man's strivings for omnipotence are still in full force. (1913j: 187-8)

What strikes us here is that Freud takes art as an illusion produced by wishful phantasies, which is symbolic in character and an effective means to self-expression. If anything, this description of artistic illusion implies a non-aggressive and harmless way to handle our instinctual desires—much in the same manner that Cottingham's ideal religious quest for spirituality works. Although Freud regards art as a mere consolation, providing transient pleasure but not totally effective in eliminating our pain (1930: 81), he never suggests that it should be replaced by a scientific Weltanschauung; indeed, he treats it as a real alternative to religion which in a sense is necessary (ibid., 75). The question to be asked is: why these different attitudes towards artistic and religious illusions?

An answer suggests itself, and it is that art does not provide a worldview to be criticized. While being essentially a process of projection along which our wishes are being gratified, art nonetheless produces no belief-system to rule the conduct of our life. Art is an isolated area where the pleasure of imagination is collective felt by

artists and appreciators, and it claims no authority in regulating *other* aspects of our life. But religion's reign is different, because it is both comprehensive and demanding intellectual unity. Its special authority lies, according to Freud, in a process of 'system construction', an instance of 'secondary revision' in virtue of which people—albeit falsely—make sense of their otherwise unconnected and unintelligible ideas (cf. Freud, 1912-13: 95). In other words, Freud has a strong criticism of religion because he thinks it embraces a shaky theory of the world produced by illusion. And yet he need not take illusion as a bad thing in itself—what is bad is the kind of undue rationalization or 'theorizing' of the illusion.

It is thus clear that when Freud launches his attacks on religion, he is targeting *a conception of religion as theory,* something that Cottingham finds quite unattractive according to the 'true understanding of religion'. The two's views do not in any way contradict each other, for Freud is attacking the *folk theory* of religion from the general masses, while Cottingham is defending a more or less *idealized* conception of religion which may not be generally endorsed.

3. Two Models of Illusions

Given these considerations, we may see in a new light how the conception of illusion, via a perception produced by phantasy, should figure in our overall account of the religious quest for spirituality. On my argument above, there are two models of illusion with which Freud provides us: one being *the Worldview Model,* as is illustrated by animism and religious doctrines; the other *the Self-Expression Model,* as can be found in the cases of art and literature. Exactly why some types of phantasies would result in systems of thought or worldviews is a question to be further investigated. But that much can be said of them: their capabilities to produce worldviews require a lot of intellectual works; and once they take the guise of being *objective reasons* for the belief in some supernatural power or the existence of God, they start to claim authority over the regulation of people's moral, social, political, and scientific outlooks. In virtue of such power in shaping our second reality, we can say the Worldview Model of illusion is an elaboration of the Marx's notion of ideological self-misrepresentation.

Since these are not the features of a good religion by Cottingham's standard, I venture to say his idealized case of religious faith relies primarily on the Self-Expression Model. When he borrows from Winnicott the idea that 'playing' is a source of creativity, he probably has in mind a kind of illusion similar to artistic imagination, so much so that he follows William Weissener's idea that '[the] man without

imagination, without the capacity for play or for creative illusion, is condemned to a sterile world of harsh facts without color or variety' (2005: 69-70). Then in the place where Jung's notion of religious archetypes is discussed, Cottingham stresses the essential role of religious symbolism in the person's struggle for 'internal balance and integration' (ibid., 70); and he warns us that the Jungian approach never is concerned with the intellectual question of a transcendent reality as posed by religious realists (ibid., 72). Since what these arguments target is the person's strike for the growth of the self, the idealized quest for spirituality so recommended has nothing to do with a religious doctrine which claims to discover an objective and transcendent reality, and which claims to have moral, social, political, and scientific authorities over the general masses. Such a spiritual quest is, in a sense, *wholly personal*—as a piece of work of art is.

Unexpectedly, then, it turns out that Cottingham's conception of religious faith have some strong anti-fundamentalist and liberal implications, with which quite some religious believers may disagree. The interesting thing is, once the anti-fundamentalist and liberal character of this view is made clear, Freud will appear more on Cottingham's side, and the Freudian arguments against religion can be shown to be directed to the fundamentalist and authoritarian version of religion only. The consequence of this is: if we are to complete Cottingham's project, there need be some criteria by which we distinguish between this allegedly bad version of religion, which both Cottingham and Freud attack, and the good version of it, which they tend to support.

4. Genuine and Defensive Religious Faiths

The criteria required cannot help but be psychoanalytic. For, on the present approach as advocated by Cottingham, people have spent too much intellectual energies on the question of God which, on Kant's view, allures human understanding (ibid., 72). Over-intellectualizing the topic of religion will also have the consequence of undervaluing the roles of human emotions in the religious contribution to the good life. By contrast, the psychoanalytic approach can show us how phantasy leads a person astray in his search for a meaningful life, as well as the favourable emotive conditions under which happiness and faith converge. For this reason, I shall in this final section make a psychoanalytic proposal about how to distinguish between genuine and defensive religious faiths, with a view to fleshing up Cottinhgam's model of good religious practice.

The characterization of good religious faith, however, is a much neglected topic as far as psychoanalytic literature is concerned. So maybe it is helpful to rely on the works on psychoanalytic *moral psychology* with a view to developing a rudimentary account. Here I have in mind the moral psychology presented in Chapter VII of Wollheim's *The Thread of Life* (1984), which I think can give us a guide to distinguishing good morality from bad morality. According to Wollheim, our sense of morality is a sheer product of irrationality that we inherit from the development of the superego. Because a child is helpless against the parent whom he takes to be aggressive and threatening, in phantasy he is motivated to devour and so destroy the parent. But this gives rise to a further phantasy that the parent is residing in his body, watching and controlling him in such a way that he cannot do what is forbidden to him. In this way, morality as a system of rules and obligations is a mere price we pay for our persecutory phantasies. But instead of going down to the conclusion that morality need be totally removed in our search for the good life, Wollheim also suggests that we can take up a broader conception of it as comprising not only obligations, but also the subject matter of *values*, which he takes to be originating in the phantasy of the ego-ideal and perpetuated by our loving attitude.

Wollheim's proposal of a revised and yet broader conception of morality seems to me able to demonstrate an optimistic view about the progress of civilization from the psychoanalytic point of view. To be sure, the narrow conception morality, as followed by the general masses, is too bad a thing for the enhancement of a person's life. And yet there are pretty interesting examples of some *good* persons who, not being totally restrained by a sense of obligation, can continue to maintain good relationships with others, and also see the world as pleasant and lovable. The Wollheim view does not take these persons as more rational, but argues that they embrace a good sense of morality because of the power of love and the effects of some benign phantasies.

Applying this argument to our topic, it can be said that in the bad version of religion, the person who embraces his religious illusion nonetheless cannot free himself from persecutory anxieties, just as a person who submits himself to the rule of the superego can never get rid of the fear and horror he once experienced in the father-child relationship. In excessively intellectualizing his religious phantasies, and abusing religious authority over others, such a believer shows himself to be haunted by the fear of death, by the obsessive longing for the father's love, and by his own aggressive instincts. If anything like this can be said of the bad religion, should we also attribute the softening power of love—the power, that is, to phantasize a good world which is union with oneself—to Cottingham's ideal quest for spirituality? I find

that is not only possible, but in fact required by his psychoanalytic approach to religion.

5. Conclusion

Very briefly, then, this is my conclusion. A defensive quest for spirituality is different from a genuine quest not because one is illusive and the other is not. On my argument above, both are illusive and are products of wishful phantasies. What matters is that the defensive quest is filled up with the forces of the bad images of the self, the father, and the natural world, so much so that its only motivation to flee from such badness. A genuine quest, by contrast, sees the connection between the self and the world as guaranteed by the (phantasized) goodness of the world, and in its motivation we find a loving and hopeful attitude towards life. So if we are to make sense of Freud's criticisms of religion, there may be a need to argue that the intellectualizing, dogmatizing, and politicizing of religious ideas are in fact motivated by the need for defense. They are also self-defeating in giving no peace of mind for the believers. And if we are to make sense of Cottingham's idealized conception of religious quest for meaning, we need also to argue that such a quest shares with artistic illusion the power to produce pleasure, plus a perception of the world as filled with value. More work will be needed if we are to support these arguments by real world examples. But I find such a task forced on anyone interested in the psychoanalytic approach to religion, and no less so for Cottingham either.

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Communication Technology and the World Spirit

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The principal aim here is to indicate how Hegel's notion of 'spirit' can shed light on the current-day phenomenon of the increasing interconnectedness of the world enabled by the development of communication technology. This may initially seem odd to some, not only because of the juxtaposition of the words 'technology' and 'spirit', but also because even Hegel's contemporary advocates, even those to whom certain details in Hegel's writings furnish valid insights into issues that affect modern society, shy away from the notion of 'spirit' and the idea of history as the progressive realization of the 'world spirit', regarding both as antiquated historical curiosities. It is to be argued here that Hegel's conception of the activity of the 'world spirit' in history is by no means as outlandish as it may sound to modern ears and that it can in fact provide a useful means of comprehending some of the effects of the increasing communicational connectedness of global society. In order to do this it is necessary to explore the meaning of the term 'spirit' in Hegel's work, not only with a view to demystifying the concept, but also with the purpose of demonstrating its intrinsic relation to universality, sociality, and the public sphere of intersubjective communication. It is then necessary to show how the notion of 'spirit' may contribute towards an understanding of the collective awareness that communication technologies can help bring about.

Worldly Spirit

A common misapprehension of the Hegelian concept of 'spirit' is that it refers to an otherworldly force that manifests itself in human society and history. The caricature is that the 'world spirit' is some kind of divine pantheistic essence of the universe that realizes itself through human historical development. Charles Taylor is an example of a contemporary Hegel scholar who adheres to this line of interpretation, claiming that for Hegel 'spirit' is a 'cosmic spirit' which expressively manifests itself through the vehicle of human individuals and cultures (Taylor 1979: 11). Taylor finds this aspect of Hegel's philosophy impossible to accept for the modern mind, but he finds much to admire in Hegel's social and political philosophy. While the term 'cosmic spirit' is a term invented by Taylor that is absent from Hegel's writings, there is plenty of textual evidence that appears to suggest that Hegel did indeed mean something divine by his use of the term 'spirit'. Hegel refers to the historical development of the 'world spirit' as the plan of providence and as a theodicy, an ultimate vindication of God's goodness in the face of all the evil in the world (Hegel 2001: 26-29). In the *Philosophy of Right* Hegel writes that nations and individuals 'the unconscious tools and organs of the world-spirit' (Hegel 1996: 343).

However, despite the use of animistic metaphor and theological allusion, such statements do not necessarily mean that the 'world spirit' is a conscious being whose deliberate plan is realized in the development of human cultural formations. There is nothing otherworldly about what the word 'spirit' refers to in Hegel's system. 'Spirit' names the level of consciousness that depends on social interaction and that goes beyond immediate sense-awareness, making possible the conception of things in terms of universal concepts. The German word that Hegel uses, *Geist*, can be rendered into English as either 'spirit' or 'mind'. Hegel's earlier translators preferred the latter and his more recent ones the former. The word 'mind' has the advantage of implying something commonplace rather than mystical, but it has the disadvantage of implying an individual person's consciousness. The word 'spirit' has the disadvantage of

implying something otherworldly and mystical, but it has the advantage of being used to refer to collective forms of consciousness, as in phrases like 'team spirit', 'spirit of the age', or 'spirit of the nation'. For Hegel, 'spirit' is a social or collective awareness that does not exist independently of the individual minds that take part in it. Spirit emerges out of human interaction.

This can be seen most clearly in the section of Hegel's book the *Phenomenology of Spirit* where consciousness in its progressive development accedes to what is called 'the spiritual daylight of the present' after it sees itself through the eyes of the other, a condition of mutual recognition (Hegel 1977: 110-111). The ability to transcends one's immediate individuality, to conceive of oneself from the outside and thus to be genuinely self-conscious, is made possible by encountering the other person. With such mutual recognition individuals come to regard themselves and others as free self-conscious persons with their own independence and intrinsic worth. It is at this point in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that Hegel provides a definition of the term 'spirit' in the following way: 'Spirit is… this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: "I" that is "We" and "We" that is "I"' (Hegel 1977: 110). Spirit is then a community of free beings who mutually recognize each other's freedom and independence.

Spirit as the unity in diversity of a community of free beings is not then merely a set of shared ideas. It is not just a collective something, or 'substance' as Hegel would call it; it is also conscious life-activity, or 'subject' as Hegel would call it, a free self-determining activity that negates the mere givenness of positive substance. Spirit as subject is a self-positing determinability which negates and transcends naturalistic substance, which is able to resist the determinations imposed by natural causality. As the free negative activity of substance that is also subject, spirit has a will. Spirit's will is a 'universal will' which, like Rousseau's 'general will', is not the aggregate of the selfish wills of all the individuals who are included in the collective in question. Nor is it a will that is conjured up above and beyond these individuals; it is rather a will for the common good that resides in each individual.

As spirit is substance transforming itself into subject, the in-itself into the for-itself, it is not just information, but also communication, not just the public availability of information and ideas, but also intersubjective communicative activity. Spirit emerges out of intersubjective communication, which, when genuine, is itself founded on relations of mutual recognition, the mutual recognition of each participant as a free and independent rational being. Such communication is based on the assumption that viewpoints need to be justifiable to other people, to other free rational beings (Hegel 1996: xvii).

Universal Self-consciousness

For Hegel, what arises out of the intersubjective relations of mutual recognition is what he calls a 'universal self-consciousness' (Hegel 1971: 176). The self becomes self-conscious through being acknowledged by the other, an act of becoming self-conscious which itself in turn involves acknowledging the other as an independent self-consciousness. However, Hegel does not stop at a theory of the interdependence

of self-consciousnesses, of the role of intersubjectivity in the formation of self-conscious identities; he seeks to comprehend what this mutual dependence of independent beings actually entails. A new conception then arises in which what is collectively acknowledged is effectively the humanity of each individual person. While Hegel prefers to use the word 'spirit' rather than 'humanity', it is clear that he regards what is here being recognized in the other as the genus [*Gattung*] of all rational self-conscious beings. This universal self-consciousness of a shared humanity is spirit becoming aware of itself as spirit. The awakening of the lived universality of the generic-being of spirit, of spirit *as* spirit, lifts the stranglehold of the immediacy of egoistic need, making it possible to see the intrinsic value of *each* person.

The notion of spirit as concrete universality, as the manifestation of universality in and through the individual, is what lies behind another of Hegel's attempts at defining spirit. In the *Philosophy of Right* he writes: 'The individuals of a multitude are spiritual beings, and have a twofold character. In them is the extreme of the independently conscious and willing individuality, and also the extreme of the universality, which knows and wills what is substantive' (Hegel 1996: 253). When these two aspects of the life of spirit are abstracted and made external to each other a condition of alienation occurs and spirit is divided from itself, leaving universality as a lifeless abstraction opposed to an individual trapped in a state of wretched immediacy.

Two of the so-called Young Hegelians, Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx, apply Hegel's insight here to the philosophy of religion and social theory respectively. Feuerbach directly refers to the 'twofold life' of the human, a finite individual with an essentially unrestricted universal mental existence (Feuerbach 1855: 20). The finite embodied individual is alienated from her own generic-being when this lived universality is misrecognized as belonging to a projected external theological entity. The Christian God is then conceived by Feuerbach as a projected representation of human conscious universality in the form of an otherworldly being separated from actually living human individuals. The unlimited lived universality of 'human nature' is alienated from individual human beings by being attributed to an imaginary theological being who is external to all humans. Feuerbach advocates a 'humanist' overcoming of this religious alienation in the form of a re-internalization of infinite generic-being into the life of individual human beings.

For Marx, it is capitalist social relations and the division of labour that alienate the worker from her universal 'generic-being', her *Gattungswesen* (Marx 1977: 67-69). Under such conditions the limitless creative capacity of a human as a 'generic-being' is not manifested in the free productive activity of the individual person, but is reduced for that person to a narrow repetitive activity that is experienced as a mere means to subsistence. The worker does not see herself in her own activity or in the product of that activity. The ultimate product of the labour of the workers as a class is capital as a whole, which presents itself to individual workers as something hostile and alien rather than as the product of their own labour. Capital in the form of money is described by Marx as 'the alienated *ability of mankind*' (Marx 1977: 123), a limitless creative capacity represented as something external to each human being, but which in reality has its source in the limitless 'generic-being' of so-called 'human nature'. In the *Grundrisse*, Marx differs from Hegel when he argues that the modern emergence of 'universally developed individuals' (Marx 1993: 162), of people not

restricted to one role or function, is not simply an intra-spiritual development, but a product of historical developments in the mode of production at the economic base of society. This universality is made possible by capitalist 'production on the basis of exchange values', production for a market system, a system which enables people to transcend limitations such as feudal bonds, but which at the same time alienates this universality from the life of each person. Universality is realized at the external abstract societal level – in the form of money, exchange value, the sociality of production, and the division of labour – but is alienated from the individual worker. The overcoming of such alienation would involve a transformation of the social relations of production in a way that would internalize the limitless creative activity of generic-being into the lives of each individual.

Marx's notion of the human as a generic-being is a reprise of Hegel's notion of spirit. For Marx as for Hegel, the universality of consciousness, the ability to think conceptually, is a product of the sociality of humans. Marx writes that the rational universality of consciousness is 'the *theoretical* shape of… the *real* community, the social fabric' (Marx 1977: 92).

Public Spirit

Spirit is the universal self-consciousness of the intersubjective life of a community or society. While the Hegelian notion of spirit appears in many ways to be a socially concrete elaboration of Kant's merely formal and abstract conception of rational universality, spirit is implicitly present in Kant's writings in the notion of 'publicness' or 'publicity [*Publicität*]'. The critical use of reason requires a public sphere of debate and argument, free from the coercive demands of mere authority (Kant 1991: 125-130). What Kant calls the 'private' realm is the realm in which individuals obey authority without question, whereas what he calls the 'public' realm, provided that it is genuinely a realm of the exchange of ideas among free-thinking people, is the arena in which reason is employed. Something is rational if it can be justified to other rational people in a non-coercive public space. Someone can freely employ the faculty of critical reason and offer justifications for his arguments if he 'considers himself as a member of a complete commonwealth or even of a cosmopolitan society, and thence as a man of learning who may address a public in the truest sense of the word' (Kant 1991: 56). Kant's notion of a 'public will' for the common good is similar to Rousseau's 'general will', but unlike the latter it can only be realized through the public use of reason (Kant 1991: 77). Of course, Kant's concept of 'publicness' assumes as a precondition a community of well-informed and educated 'rational beings', unconstrained by inequalities of access and opportunity, so it should be seen as an ideal to be worked towards rather than as a given reality.

Interest in the Kantian notion of the public sphere has been reawakened by the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas. He regards the public sphere [*Öffentlicheit*] as a space in which the participants are assumed to be equals, irrespective of their pre-existing social positions. He claims that such a sphere emerged in eighteenth-century Europe, during the age of the Enlightenment, through the mass publication of newspapers, pamphlets, and books, as well as through the setting up of literary salons and debating societies (Habermas 1989: 36). Such a realm encourages the putting forward of evidence-based arguments for the public good rather than for private

interests. Habermas laments the later decline of the public sphere in which the mass media reduces the public to passive consumers rather than participants engaged in deliberative interaction (Habermas 1989: 159-180). As a result of this decline, what presents itself as collective decision making amounts to nothing more than a compromise of conflicting private interests rather than an agreement arrived at by rational beings engaged in discussion about the common good. Out of his interest in the notion of the public sphere Habermas develops a theory of intersubjective communicative rationality, which he claims at one point 'can reconstruct Hegel's concept of the ethical context of life' (Habermas 1987: 316). This is another way of saying that the Habermasian theory of communicative action is an attempt at modernizing the Hegelian concept of 'spirit'.

The public sphere is a Weberian 'ideal-type', a 'category' of bourgeois capitalist society whose actual existence does not live up to its idea. Habermas notes that Marx submits this 'category' to a withering ideology-critique. He writes: 'The public sphere with which Marx saw himself confronted contradicted its own principle of universal accessibility' (Habermas 1989: 124). A pseudo public sphere emerges that serves to mask the anti-universalist particularism of class society.

For Marx, under certain socio-economic conditions the public sphere is the sphere of what he calls 'ideology'. Ideology is here a conception of social consciousness both as being conditioned by the particular system of production at the base of the society in question and as masking that system with a false universality. It is thus an illusory form of consciousness that presents a false image of harmony and unity in society, hiding the reality of class division and conflict. In this way it functions to maintain and reproduce the existing system of social relations by serving the particularist interests of the ruling class, interests which it presents as universal. Marx writes: 'The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it' (Marx 1970: 64). The public sphere under capitalism is a bourgeois public sphere pretending to be a universal one. This public sphere does not live up to its idea, because society is divided from itself at the level of the relations of production.

The Aim of World History

A genuine public sphere could only emerge if there were historical changes that somehow reintegrated the abstract generality of ideas with the lived experience of individuals, a concrete universality that would establish a level playing field for each person in terms of opportunities for social participation and communication. In his article 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose', Kant suggests that a philosophical approach to history, one which aims to make of history something intelligible, should involve an interpretation of events in terms of how they ultimately further the formation of an integrated and harmonious global realm of rational world citizens (Kant 1991: 51). This prefigures Hegel's later formulation of history as the progressive realization of the 'world spirit'. Such a formulation refers to the patterns discernible in philosophically comprehended past history and does not imply that progress is inevitable in the actual events of empirical history. The latter can move forwards or backwards without any guarantee, but the term 'forwards' here implies

that history has an aim, a *telos*, which renders it comprehensible. In discussing this aim, Hegel, in his *Philosophy of World History*, offers yet another definition of spirit. He writes: '*As* the essence of Matter is Gravity, so, on the other hand, we may affirm that the substance, the essence of Spirit is Freedom' (Hegel 2001: 31). It should be noted that this is 'freedom' in the Kantian sense of self-conscious rational universality which constitutes a will free from naturalistic impulses and external authority. Hegel goes on to summarize his philosophy of world history in the following sentence: 'The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom' (Hegel 2001: 33). For Hegel, implicit in the idea of world history is the aim of the realization of the idea of spirit. This is because without the mental transcendence of nature there would be no history. The process of history tends ultimately towards the universal self-consciousness of the world spirit as the world spirit. This is spirit's coming to consciousness of itself, of its own freedom. Hegel sees the modern world as the awakening of reason in history.

Notoriously, Hegel claims that the freedom that is the ultimate aim of history was realized in his own time in the form of Napoleon's conquest of Prussia. Hegel saw Napoleon on the streets of Jena after the decisive battle there, and proclaimed in a letter to his friend that he had seen the 'world soul [*Weltseele*]' on horseback. Hegel saw the world spirit as being manifested in the actions of historically significant individuals, despite those individuals being unaware of this. The substantive freedom that is for Hegel the culmination of the historical process is realized in the combination of the individual inner freedom of the protestant 'priesthood of all believers' with the outward civic freedom in which each citizen is recognized legally as free (Hegel 2001: 473-477). This combination supposedly characterized the Prussia of Hegel's time, because civic freedom was brought to protestant Prussia by Napoleon's reforms which abolished the last vestiges of feudalism and brought equal rights to all. The principles of the French revolution that Napoleon was applying could not bring the substantive freedom of spirit to France itself on the grounds that Catholic France had not had a religious reformation emphasizing inner conviction rather than outward observance.

The Spirit of Social Media

Whatever one may think of Hegel's attempt at giving a particular empirical example of the world spirit becoming conscious of itself, a drive towards universal self-consciousness can certainly be discerned in some of the historical events of today. While, as we have seen, the Habermas of the late twentieth-century describes how the mass media works towards the closure of the public sphere, the question now arises as to whether the spread of communication technologies such as the internet might cut through this closure and reignite the public spirit. Much has been said about how the enhancement of both social awareness and interactive communication enabled by social media may have played a role in certain protest movements and revolutions in recent years. For example, collective outrage at general corruption and specific acts of injustice played a major role in the upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011, a response made possible by the accessibility of the relevant information and by the connectedness of significant swathes of the population.

The internet theorist Clay Shirky plays down the significance of social media in such events and their potential for influencing immediate political change. Instead, he claims that 'the more promising way to think about social media is as long-term tools that can strengthen civil society and the public sphere' (Shirky 2011). In Hegelian terms, social media, as the tools through which spirit can become conscious of itself as spirit, can more effectively serve to enact a gradual change in the inner conviction of people rather than to enact a sudden regime change that is merely external to each person. Shirky describes how social media can further the development of social consciousness. He defines this 'shared awareness' as 'the ability of each member of a group to not only understand the situation at hand, but also understand that everyone else does too' (Shirky 2011). Shirky points out that the public sphere cannot flourish just under conditions of abstract political freedom, but also requires a society that is educated and connected enough to be able to engage in rational discussion of the issues at hand. This insight that the achievement of freedom depends on the emergence of the social conditions of its possibility, that it is not enough to posit abstract principles, is an argument that Hegel at times wields against Kant. However, Shirky is silent on the socio-economic conditions that would be necessary for a viable public sphere.

Despite this, he is not so naïve as to regard social media as having a necessarily positive political effect. He writes: 'Social media produce as much harm to democratization as good, because repressive governments are becoming better at using these tools to suppress dissent' (Shirky 2011). As has been discussed, Marx claims that the class who control the means of 'material production' also control the means of 'mental production'. The question of the role that communication technology can play in the development of a genuine public sphere and in the progress of the self-consciousness of the world spirit is principally the question of the extent to which the use of this technology can exceed such control.

One of Shirky's books about the impact of social media is titled *Here Comes Everybody*, which is named after the main 'character' in James Joyce's 'novel' *Finnegans Wake*. If changed from a Joycean to a Hegelian idiom the book could have been called 'The World Spirit Coming to Consciousness of Itself'.

The Hegelian notion of spirit is not a relic of an outdated and irrelevant philosophical system, but refers to phenomena – such as universal self-consciousness, sociality, mutual recognition, and the public sphere – which are more topical now than ever before. It seems at least more reasonable to attribute the notion of the emergence of the self-consciousness of the world spirit to the social impact of today's proliferation of communication technology than to Napoleon's invasion of Prussia. Far from being something otherworldly, 'spirit' refers to the world of social relations and intersubjective communication which develops through history. The awareness from within of this world as a whole, the self-awareness of spirit as spirit, produces the universal self-consciousness, freed from the bonds of givenness, of a free, self-determining rational being. Alienation occurs under social conditions in which universality is separated from the life of the individual. Spirit is realized in a public sphere of uncoerced communicative interaction between people. In a capitalist society founded on class division an alienated pseudo public sphere emerges through which ideas serving particular interests are presented as universal. The aim of history is the de-alienation of spirit. The spread in the use of communication technology and the

social media can causally contribute to this aim, provided that this spread enables the emergence of a public sphere that transcends the dominance over the means of mental production by the particular interests of the owners of the means of material production.

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Ricoeur's Dialectic of Distanciation and Appropriation in the Asynchronous, Online College Classroom

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Abstract

The digital age has brought about new dimensions of connectedness and alienation in the 21st century. New communication technologies and social media have transformed the everyday realities of human relations in many different ways, some positive and perhaps some negative. It is a legitimate question to ask what this is doing to interpersonal relationships and institutions. One vitally important area of transformation in recent decades is in the area of college education. The traditional brick and mortar classroom is no longer the only option for those seeking a higher education. Online education has been making academic inroads in virtually all demographics, and it is a legitimate question to ask how this is transforming higher education. Having taught thousands of students in the traditional classroom and in the online classroom, I intend to explore a major difference in the relation of the spoken to the written word. The classic critique of the written word is, of course, found spoken by Socrates in Plato's dialogue Phaedrus (274 ff). Ironically, this critique would not be part of the contemporary philosophical discussion if it had not been written by Plato and read by students of philosophy for the last 2500 years. Philosophical hermeneutics is the best field to address this new dynamic, and Paul Ricoeur makes a plea for writing and via his dialectic of distanciation and appropriation. I intend to discuss some advantages and disadvantages of the asynchronous, online classroom and offer some reflections on the future of higher education online. In so doing, the question will be raised as to whether there should be a distinction made between the Socratic Method A, and the Socratic Method B.

There is no doubt that one vitally important area of social transformation in recent decades is in the area of college education. The traditional brick and mortar classroom is no longer the only option for those seeking a higher education. Online education has been making academic inroads in virtually all demographics, and it is a legitimate question to ask how this is transforming higher education. Having taught thousands of students in both the traditional classroom and in the online classroom, I will begin by exploring a major difference in the relation of the spoken to the written word as it relates to the live and asynchronous online college classrooms.

Philosophical hermeneutics, as the science and art of the interpretation of written texts, is vital to this endeavor in comparing the spoken word of the live classroom to the written word of the asynchronous, online classroom experience. Paul Ricoeur's "dialectic of distanciation and appropriation" can be applied to the asynchronous, online college classroom, in the attempt to understand and explain both the alienation and new form of connectedness in this 21st century mode of education. In so doing, the question arises as to whether there should be a distinction (to be explained) made in the famous pedagogical "Socratic method" between method "A" which can occur in the live classroom, and method "B" which can occur in the asynchronous, online classroom. This paper will end with that question, but we shall have to undertake a journey before we can get to the proper understanding of the question.

The classic critique of the written word is, of course, found spoken by Socrates in Plato's dialogue Phaedrus (274 ff). Ironically, this critique would not be part of the contemporary philosophical discussion if it had not been written by Socrates' student Plato and read by students of philosophy for the last 2500 years. For inquiring minds, the question arises as to why great teachers such as Socrates, Siddhartha, and Jesus never wrote down their teachings. Is this an accident of history or is there something about the written word that is fundamentally inferior to the spoken word? Of course, the great teachers are gone and we cannot ask them. Neither can we ask their disciples who wrote down their lives and teachings in the texts that we know and love. More to the point, we cannot ask the texts themselves, or we can ask, but the texts cannot answer.

For Socrates, there are a number of problems with the written word. Writing is an iconic, fixed expression of dialogue. Philosophers who rely on reference to written texts can only "remember" knowledge previously acquired, rather than develop new knowledge in dialogue with others. In this sense, the written word is a flat representation of reality, analogous to the two-dimensional representation of a real nature scene in a "realist" painting. In the viewing of a nature painting, there is no real interaction with nature, just as the writer of a written text has no real interaction with her reader. Also, a text cannot tailor itself to its audience the way that the live teacher with a command of the subject and rhetoric can. The text does not know its audience and what to leave in and what to leave out, when and how to "speak" and when to remain "silent."

However, the greatest weakness of the written word is that it cannot defend against or rescue itself from misunderstanding. In Plato's dialogues we have a plethora of examples of Socrates and his friends and the conversational rescue from misunderstanding on the road to the appropriation of understanding. The "Socratic Method" proceeds by question and answer, dialogical proposal, consideration,

acceptance or rejection, correction and proceeding with a new proposal until the participants in the dialogue have reached a mutual understanding of the truth of the subject under consideration. Here the meaning is one with the event of the dialogue and the spoken word is aided by the rhetorical forms of non-verbal communication that accompany the speech.

All good teachers know and continually aspire to the joy of the discovery of truth that occurs when in live dialogue with students, guiding them through a procession of thought until the students realize a new vista of understanding has revealed itself on their horizon of understanding! More rare but even a greater joy is when the questions and dialogue with students leads both the instructor and students to a legitimately new understanding of a subject! This is the Socratic method as depicted in the dialogues and referred to in the explanations of pedagogy in academic instruction. Here, misunderstanding is avoided and true understanding achieved by the interlocutors in the process of dialogue.

This is not the case with the written word. In truth, the Socratic Method as depicted in Plato's dialogues *cannot* occur in anything *but* live dialogue with active participants in the propinquity of the live classroom (or its technological substitute) in which the meaning of the discourse is inextricably linked with the event of live discourse. Here, what Paul Ricoeur calls "the dialectic of meaning and event" is united in a "event-meaning" (1976: 27).

Ricoeur understands Socrates' criticism of the written word (and the critique as developed by Henri Bergson and others) and allows it a measure of validity in the search for truth. "The written word, as the deposit of this search, has severed its ties with the feeling, effort, and dynamism of thought. The breath, song, and rhythm are over and the figure takes their place. It captures and fascinates. It scatters and isolates. This is why the authentic creators such as Socrates and Jesus have left no writings, and why the genuine mystics renounce statements and articulated thought" (1976: 40).

There is no doubt that writing is "a kind of alienation" (1976: 38), however, Ricoeur makes "a plea for writing" and his hope is for a hermeneutic that can overcome this alienation inherent in the written word in a productive manner in the quest for truth. If possible, this would be a hermeneutic that validates the pedagogy of the asynchronous, online classroom and could address the issue of "the Socratic Method" in this educational environment. The place to begin is with the written word itself, the text.

A text is discourse fixed in writing. There are both negative and positive elements in fixing discourse in writing. Once words are fixed in writing, they become a "text" that has an independent existence. It can be copied and distributed and have its own "career" enduring throughout space and time beyond the life of its author. So, while there is the disadvantage that an author cannot defend her written word against misunderstanding beyond her own existence in space and time, there is the advantage that her words can still be understood beyond her own existence in space and time. The written word can speak to people and situations beyond the capacity of its author to even *imagine* when she originally wrote the text. Ricoeur writes, "To understand an author better than he understood himself is to display the power of disclosure

implied in his discourse beyond the limited horizon of his own existential situation" (1976: 93). The power of disclosure in discourse fixed in writing gives a text the autonomy to continually speak to new audiences and new situations.

This is no doubt the case with Plato's dialogues of his teacher, Socrates. To bring the idea of justice of Plato's *Republic* into "dialogue" with John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* is something that Socrates and Plato could never have foreseen 2500 years ago, but is something that the contemporary philosophy student of social justice in the West should not forego. Traversing the limits of space and time can be a definite advantage of writing.

In *Phaedrus* writing is compared to painting, as mentioned above. It is rather easy to imagine that seeing a painting or photograph of a nature scene that one has not visited, nor is likely to visit in one's lifetime, is preferable to never having seen "the nature scene" at all. But Ricoeur wants to elevate the status of painting and writing and art, in general, to a status above that of reality itself. What do I mean by that? Art produces what Ricoeur calls "iconic augmentation" (1976: 40). In the sense of vision this would be the focusing of attention on a particular aspect of the visual field that normally goes unnoticed in the ordinary reality of day-to-day living. "Iconicity" can present a subject under different aspects of space and time than are ordinarily experienced. Painting can capture aspects such as the play of light or momentary facial expressions that would otherwise escape attention.[1] Technology enables perception outside the "rainbow" light spectrum, through the galactic reaches of space and at the molecular level. Still photography can capture the wings of the humming bird in flight. Time-lapse photography or cinematography can enable us to see clouds forming and flowers blossoming. In a similar but even more pronounced fashion, impressionistic and abstract art can show dimensions of reality unavailable to normal vision.

Ricoeur goes so far as to say that "Iconicity, then, means a revelation of a real more real than ordinary reality" (1976: 42). Literature does this in the projection of modes of being-in-the-world. More than simply being a redescription of reality, literature is a means of revealing being in ways that are inaccessible in everyday living. For instance, through a narrator, the reader can have access to the trains of thought of all the characters in a scene and move back and forth in time and space. Literature can encompass a single moment in time or a century. It can be about the past or the future or any place mundane or fantastical. Most importantly, it can be about a different way of being. "This is very of iconicity - as aesthetic augmentation of reality - gives us the key to a decisive answer to Plato's critique of writing. Iconicity is that re-writing of reality. Writing, in the limited sense of the word, is a particular case of iconicity. The inscription of discourse is the transcription of the world, and transcription is not reduplication, but metamorphosis" (1976: 42).

The communication in the asynchronous, online college classroom proceeds via the written word (versus the live classroom that proceeds via the spoken word). At any given time, 24/7, students and the instructor may log on from anywhere in the world with internet access and read posts and respond to them at will. This takes advantage

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[1] Here I am thinking of Claude Monet's series of paintings of the Rouen Cathedral and Leonardo DaVinci's *Mona Lisa* as prime examples.

of the nature of the written word. "Printed texts reach man in solitude . . . Abstract relations, telecommunications in the proper sense of the word, connect the scattered members of an invisible public" (1976: 43).

In truth, the asynchronous, online classroom creates a "world" where the praxis of the written word transcends the limitations of space and time. In the propinquity of the live classroom, there is extremely limited time for class discussion, and only one person may respond to a classmate or the instructor at a given time. Class sizes being what they are, not every student is even able to speak in any given class or perhaps any given week of a class, and the instructor is not able to hear and respond personally to every student in the class. In the asynchronous online classroom, there is an ideal situation brought about by the nature of the written word posted in the discussion thread or forum of the classroom. Every single student may speak on every posted topic during the week, and every student may read and respond to the post of every classmate, as they will. Every student may "speak" to the instructor and the instructor may "speak" to every student in the class every week. As discussion threads and forums develop, no student or comment is excluded because of distance in space or lack of classroom time. Discussions can develop based upon the sheer willingness and ability to read and comprehend the written word of one's peers.

Of course, there are disadvantages as well. At any given time one is logged on, there may be only a few, or no classmates logged on at the same time. The instructor may or may not be logged on. If there is a chat-room available in the online learning system, it may not be set up properly and is probably never or rarely used. Although one posts, there is no guarantee that anyone will actually read and respond to the post, including the instructor. If you take the time to carefully read someone else's post and substantively respond to them, there is no guarantee that they will read that response and reply back to you. However, there is the ideal possibility that everyone in the class will read your post, and everyone and anyone will respond to you. Your post will remain after the class is over. Even if you can no longer access the course and you did not save a copy of your own post, it will remain on the university servers, accessible by your instructor and administrators for a long time, perhaps indefinitely. At this point in history, there is the possibility that your posted words may live forever in the cyber-sphere, readily accessible to anyone who has the right code to access them. Once you have written and posted the words, they take on a life of their own, far from your capability to "take them back."

When we write words down, we "distance" ourselves from them. The exterior marks are inscribed upon a physical medium which is foreign to and has nothing to do with the spoken language itself. The inscription is separate from our physical selves and has the capacity to traverse our limits of space and time continue on to new spaces and new times. There it will speak without the benefit of our correction . Rather than an empty monument carved in stone, our word will be a living "thing" like any good work of art, that we have given birth to, and goes on beyond us, taking on a life of its own. We don't so much as create the distance, as we allow or enable the distance, once the words have been written.

In certain situations, when you write words, you don't know who, if anyone, is going to read them, and how they are going to interpret them. You hope for the best possible interpretation under the cultural circumstances, but you never know. If someone does misunderstand your words, you will not be there to correct them. The

very act of writing words down is the beginning of "distanciation." The ability of the hermeneutical process to take into account the distanciation of the writer and the necessary appropriation by the reader is the beginning of the understanding of Ricoeur's dialectic.

Ricoeur makes three moves in his essay *The Task of Hermeneutics* in order to follow up on some "decisive suggestions" in Gadamer's hermeneutics by rehabilitating the concept of alienating distanciation.[2] The first is to recognize the "distance" integral to Gadamer's concept of historically-effected consciousness (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*). Historical efficacy occurs over historical distance. There is a "paradox of otherness" here in that what is temporally distant (other) has a current effect here and now. Rather than resisting or trying to overcome "distance" the interpreter assumes it in a positive sense. The second move is to raise Gadamer's fusion of horizons into view. When horizons fuse, understanding happens by bringing into one's purview the *other* from a distance. While the other remains other, there is a participation in the other. It remains an autonomous other with respect to its distance even as the self remains an autonomous self. Distance here is a positive concept for one who desires to expand her horizon. One cannot see things from another's viewpoint without recognition of the distance that separates them from oneself. Ricoeur calls the fusion of horizons "an index of the dialectic of participation and distanciation." The fusion is never total, as in a total mediation or the breakdown of ontological differentiation. Part of the horizon of the other always remains unassimilated, distanced from the self. There is a mutual participation and distanciation in the fusion of horizons. The third move Ricoeur makes is to invoke the text. The text is discourse fixed by writing, and an autonomous text is the beginning point of turning alienating distanciation into a befriending distanciation. The text communicates at a distance *by design*, and so is the paradigm of distanciation in communication. In order to pursue the productive concept of distanciation, Ricoeur will elaborate on the nature of the text.

> To interpret is to render near what is far (temporally, geographically, culturally, spiritually). In this respect, mediation by the text is like the model of a distanciation which would not be simply alienating, like the *Verfremdung* which Gadamer combats throughout his work . . . but which would be genuinely creative. The text is, *par excellence*, the basis for communication in and through distance (2007: 107).

Whether it is called "distance learning" or "online learning" or some other variation, the asynchronous, online college classroom uses the written word (text) as its means of communication. Instead of propinquitous speaking and hearing, the individual student and instructor reads and writes. We have seen the innate distanciation in the process of writing, now we should take a look at the "appropriation" process in reading. Ricoeur writes,

> The problem of writing becomes a hermeneutical problem when it is referred to as complementary pole, which is reading. A new dialectic then merges, that of distanciation and appropriation. By appropriation I mean the counterpart of the semantic autonomy, which detached from the text of its writer. To appropriate is to make "one's own" what was

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[2] Ricoeur, "The Task of Hermeneutics" (HHS 2007, 43-62). What follows here is from pages 61-2.

"alien." Because there is a general need for making our own what is foreign to us, there is a general problem of distanciation. Distance then, is not simply a fact, a given, just the actual spatial and temporal gap between us and the appearance of such and such work of art or discourse" (1976: 43).

Distanciation and appropriation appear in the asynchronous, online college classroom in the form of discussion threads or forums that are usually carried on through the academic week (or further). Here, students must make an initial post which is a response to a question, and read and respond to several of their classmates' posts. The classmates and instructor may not be online at the same time, so there is usually not an opportunity to for immediate feedback.

At the same time, there is the opportunity to read and think and reply, and to develop discussion threads or forums on specific branches of the topic of discussion, limited only by the students' and instructor's availability and willingness to log on and read and write during any given week or weeks! These branches of threads can become quite complex and substantive, and therefore meaningful to those who read the thread. Unlike the live classroom, however, there is no guarantee that every post made by a student in attendance, or the instructor, will be read by every other student in the class.

The software of different online learning systems can be managed in different ways. It appears that what we see here is a fundamental difference in the educational experience of the live, traditional classroom and the asynchronous, online classroom. This difference relates specifically to the difference between the spoken (and heard) and written (and read) word. Different technologies can certainly provide different formulations, and there are hybrid classes that incorporate elements of both. Both the live classroom and asynchronous online classroom have their advantages regarding communication. However, there is a greater level of responsibility for the students who read and write. As Gadamer says it, "Thus written texts present the real hermeneutical task. Writing is self-alienation. Overcoming it, reading the text, is thus the highest task of understanding" (1990: 390).

The fundamental difference between the spoken and written word raises a question concerning our philosophical pedagogy. We have discussed above "the Socratic Method" as it relates to the live classroom. This seems to be analogous to the literary portrayal of Socrates' style of communication in Plato's Dialogues, if we imagine these dialogues actually take place in space and time. This is not what we experience in the asynchronous, online classroom. In truth, what we experience in the asynchronous, online classroom is analogous to (in its ideal state) the actual written forms we have of these dialogues, such as in the text of Plato's *Republic*. The live classroom within the confines of brick and mortar is able to cultivate what is portrayed dramatically in the written text. There is no doubt about that. Let us call this the "Socratic Method A".

However, the written form of discussion threads and forums as they occur in the online classroom are analogous to the actual written text of the dialogues. Of course, the discussion threads represent real discussion, rather than the literary formulation of a single mind, a disciple of Socrates, putting words in the mouths of literary characters. But the discussion threads or forums of the asynchronous, online

classroom share with the writer Plato a certain "distanciation" in their composition. The readers of these discussions share the process of appropriation with the readers of Plato's Dialogues. Given the understanding of Ricoeur's dialectic of distanciation and appropriation as it applies to the asynchronous, online college classroom, it seems appropriate to delineate the educational communication there as the "Socratic Method B" while reserving the term "Socratic Method A" for the discussion that occurs in the live, brick and mortar classroom.

In the latter sense, the "dialogues" as a literary portrayal are analogous to the instructor in the live classroom with students in classroom discussion. In the sense of Socratic Method B, the discussion threads/forums that develop actually resemble the text of Plato's dialogues. If we are talking about "the Socratic Method," the question is, does it make sense to distinguish between the method as carried out in the live classroom as "Socratic Method A" and the method carried out in the asynchronous, online classroom as "Socratic Method B"? There is no judgment here on what is the preferred mode of education, simply the question of whether a distinction should be made. In closing I would like to share a few more words of Gadamer. "The mode of being at text has something unique and incomparable about it. It presents a specific problem of translation to the understanding. Nothing is so strange, and at the same time so demanding, as the written word." (1990: 163).

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Postmodern Identity Politics and the Social Tyranny of the Definable

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In what we are now used to calling postmodern times, discourses about race and gender are characteristically fraught with ambiguity. Various unprecedented gender identities have emerged in these dynamic times and have asserted themselves in concrete ways, claiming political rights, gaining economic power, and acquiring social legitimacy in a wide spectrum of practices ranging from a new female workforce invading previously all-male professions to gay and lesbian marriages and the going-public of alternative hybrid genders displaying their differences in transvestite performances and drag shows. Many new voices have spoken up on behalf of racial or ethnic minorities that have emphasized their cultural distinctness, even in making a bid to be recognized as fully integral components of a now unmistakably multicultural society.

While such conspicuous and colorful new identities have successfully asserted themselves, at the same time the idea of identity has been eroded from within by the very logic or *ill*ogic of postmodern thinking, which does not take any identity as more than an arbitrary invention or convention: identity is considered to be at most a purely heuristic construct. The hard-nosed identity politics of the 1960s have come to seem impossible after the pervasive deconstructions of identity that gained ever greater currency, especially through the 1980s and 1990s. And yet the proliferation of new claims to identity has hardly abated.

Can some strands of postmodern theory give us critical insight into and sensitivity towards what identity and its claims consist in? Such theoretical reflection should serve at least to sharpen our awareness of the ultimate indefinability of identity. Whatever it is that makes human beings what they are is, in the end, *not* reducible to identical terms. So far, perhaps, most of us working in the academy today and in the variously theoretical disciplines would tend to agree. However, widely divergent pedigrees for this kind of insight can be produced, and the stated consensual premise concerning the ultimate indefinabilty of identity turns out to be only the beginning of seemingly irresolvable controversy.

Anti-identitarian thinking seems at first to belong to radical and iconoclastic movements aiming to liberate individuals from static myths inherited from the past and purportedly fixed in stone by tradition. Paradoxically, however, this emancipatory vision can also be cast in apparently traditional theological terms through reference to the image of God: our being made in the image of an *infinite* God is, at the same time, our being infinitely open and *in*definable as any sort of identical or essential nature. This is the consequence of God's infinity, which no language or knowledge can encompass. More precisely, a deeper insight into the non-identity of individuals belongs to *negative* theology, that is, to the admission that God is *un*knowable in any definable concepts or terms. In classical negative theologians such as John Scott Eriugena, the unknowability of God extends to the unknowability and thus also to the non-identity of individuals in general in their deepest core.[1]

The pervasive, almost irresistible privileging of what can be defined and specified and claim rights for itself in a democratic society supposedly based on argument and rational justification, including self-justification, entails certain liabilities and susceptibilities to being abused. The focus on definable identities seems to have been necessary for social progress, yet it has also led to some systemic distortions. For not only those whose identity can be well-defined have needs and a claim to protection and respect. In the overall scheme of things, those who have not yet

come to any developed degree of conscious or even combative awareness of self—as well as certain parts of us that have no individuated, isolable identity—are just as important and often even more in need of benign fostering. But, in the politics of identity, only those identifiable as belonging to some definite group are recognized and accorded rights and even privileges. If you do not have a label—a socially marketable or a politically appreciable distinctive identity that can give you a publicly recognized status, you have no social capital and no political leverage— you are no one. This, too, builds invidious biases into the social system and its communicative practices.

In order to make a case for the non-identical and to defend those persons and aspects of life and existence that fall below the threshold of identity and its claims, we need to critically examine the basis for the widespread vindication of identity in contemporary society. It proves to be complex. There is a confluence of inspirations and derivations in their genealogies that can make the agenda of these identity-based regional, gender, class, or special-interest groups and movements conflictual, or at least confusing.

Are these ideologies of identity informed by the structuralist insight into the relativity of all oppositional terms that lies at the foundation of the critical theory revolution of the last several decades, especially since the 1970s? Ferdinand Saussure famously maintained that in language that there are only differences without positive terms, and this insight was carried over and applied to culture generally by, among others, Claude Levi-Strauss in anthropology and Roland Barthes in semiotics. This structuralist theoretical paradigm entailed the valorization of difference—and consequently the self-assertion of their different identities by non-mainstream groups under the banner of their being different but not less entitled than those belonging to majority identity groups.

Or are the new ideologies of identity beholden rather to the Enlightenment ideal of promoting free-standing individuals? This latter agenda has also been important in fueling a wide spectrum of liberation movements since the 1960's.[2] The assumptions of the Enlightenment have been placed under a heavy pressure of critique within the ambit of theory, especially postmodern theory, which is generally *anti*-Enlightenment in its premises and persuasions, since Enlightenment was perhaps the leading project of modernity. Even the philosophy of the Frankfurt school itself, for all its continuity with Enlightenment thinking, made programmatic especially in Habermas's thought, was based on a deep sense of the ambiguities inherent in the *dialectic* of Enlightenment, whereby the Enlightenment was charged with producing myths of its own and thereby leading to the totalitarianism of consumer society.[3]

Some recent revisions of identity theory take stock of the backlash against identity politics from left, right, and center, both within the academy and within political movements themselves. Such revisionist efforts take note of the reversal of the positive valence of identity in the discourse surrounding the liberation movements on behalf of disenfranchised minorities of a few decades before.[4] These authors attempt to defend identity politics and even a certain realist theory of identity. They admit the anti-essentialist arguments showing that identities are socially constructed and nevertheless insist that "identities can be no less real for being socially and historically situated."[5] In the end, they wish to defend the concept of identity and its relevance, despite the recent critiques provoked by its excesses: "We . . . believe that these critiques of

identity are largely mistaken, too often based on anecdotes about incidents where specific groups used poor political judgment rather than empirical studies of identity-based movements from which a larger analysis of their effects can emerge" (3). Like Habermas, such new proponents of identity turn away from the dominant trends of postmodernism in order to reaffirm something of a classic modern vision of progressive social liberation. But what does such an affirmation entail?

Especially dear to the ideology of the Enlightenment, individuals are discovered as valuable in themselves and not only in their relations within the social order, in which they are good for performing useful functions, delivering differentiated services such as those of butcher, baker, or candlestick maker. The individual's value is not functional, but absolute. Historically, the Bible and Judeo-Christian culture have played a key role in bringing about this affirmation of the unconditional value of the individual person. The individual is no longer essentially qualified as male or female, slave or free, Greek or Jew (Galatians 3: 28). All are equally and infinitely valuable in the sight of God. Such a notion of unconditioned individual identity and worth emerges as a concept from theological discourse. Particularly Saint Paul's role here has been key to recent discussion among philosophers.[6]

The Bible declares that Adam is made in the image of God. When God became something of a dubious hypothesis for Enlightenment thinkers, the human individual, newly discovered in previously unsuspected freedom and potential for self-realization, stepped forward in a bright new light. Without a transcendent foundation for value, the autonomous Enlightenment individual in important ways became an absolute value in himself. (At this stage in modern history, the generic individual was usually designated simply as *he*, though many women, beginning with the revolutionary *tricoteuses* [knitters], were in fact very active and influential in disseminating enthusiasm for the new outlook.) Individual identity and the autonomy it claims is, in crucial ways, itself the invention of the Enlightenment, although the basis of it is borrowed from biblical religion and ethics especially as interpreted by Protestantism since the sixteenth century, with its emphasis upon the single individual directly face to face with God.

Theology offered the description of God as the source and ground of all being. God alone is unconditioned being. All else is derived from him and is therefore *conditioned* being. Eventually, however, absolute value was transferred from God to the human individual. This was an inevitable result of the proclamation of the Incarnation—that God became man. Such was the central thrust of Christianity for Enlightenment thought, as one can see, for example, from Hegel's philosophy of religion.[7] But then the problem arose of a plurality of absolutes or of claims to be valuable in oneself and not only in relation to some greater whole, within which one functioned. The claim to self-grounded, self-sufficient, self-generating value persists, but now in a fractured world, where all is no longer placed under the one supreme, unique source of value affirmed by monotheism. The death of God was the birth of the autonomous individual self with a claim to unconditional value. Theoretically, each individual is an origin of unconditioned value in and for himself or herself, just as theologically God is the unconditioned, ultimate source of value and good. In practice, however, rights and privileges for human individuals can only be granted and guaranteed on a very relative basis. Each person's absolute value is, in fact, qualified and severely restricted by that of everyone else. Each other person has exactly the same claim to being valued absolutely for him- or herself alone.

The gain in intrinsic value for the individual was at the same time, in effect, a loss of value based on the individual's playing a part in a greater whole. This registers in dramatic ways in various cultural expressions of existential *Angst*, such as certain works of Expressionism like Edvard Munch's "The Scream," or in the argument for suicide as made, for example, by Albert Camus in *Le mythe de Sysiphe* (1942). The modern, supposedly liberated and apparently valorized individual is also *de*valued by being made valuable only for him or herself alone: s/he has no foundation for his or her attempt to be and mean. What worked for God is very difficult for a human individual to sustain. To create and emanate value from oneself alone is divine, but the human way can only be to create and transmit value through interacting with others. Humans become valuable by serving purposes more significant than themselves: existing for themselves alone as mere particulars rather than in relation to always larger wholes, they turn out to be vain and empty.

However, Enlightenment ideology has encouraged and keeps encouraging individuals, whether alone or in groups, to claim unconditional value for themselves. The premise of this claim is that every individual is entitled to the full privileges of value-in-him-or-herself. This is what Kant in his moral philosophy called being an "end-in-oneself" (*Zweck an sich*). This assumption leads to movements of various types militating for the rights of individuals of one group or another that for some reason seem to be denied the rights and privileges of being valued for their own sake alone. These movements are typically about self-assertion; they focus on *class* interests as extensions of *self*-interest that is simply made collective. Their common premise is the Enlightenment valorization of the individual as such and without necessary relation to anything greater or more important.

There is in this ideology of the individual an absoluteness and inviolability about each individual *I* that is at least quasi-religious. As unconditional, the value of the individual person is derived or borrowed from the absolute value of the Supreme Being. And yet all rights for any group or individual must be negotiated against the rights of others. This cannot be avoided in the social context, even though it did not apply in the theological context, where God is indeed one and only. Therefore, as we translate this idea of being valuable in and for oneself from the theological to the secular sphere, we need an appreciation not just of the unconditionality but also of the relativity of rights. Every individual does have an infinite dignity and worth, but not in virtue of their identity as defined differentially against others' identities. This unconditional worth has to be based on what in the individual cannot be identified or delimited in any definable way. This has been theorized by philosophers from Jean-Luc Nancy to François Jullien and Giorgio Agamben in various ways as "the common."[8] The "nothing" or no determinate identity that we all share in common is actually worth more in our valuation as human beings than any distinguishing trait or characteristics. It is in this common being alone that we are all equal.

A strong sense of the limitation of our rights by those of others is needed because of the tendency to absolutize the rights of any given class of individuals who come to self-consciousness and assert themselves, acquiring identity and voice, even, for example, through channels of social communication such as literary theory itself. All such organs of self-expression, as means of communicating, are the special concern of theory. They are intrinsic to how any identity comes to be significant and to how it signifies itself. But beyond the contingent relativities determining which individual identities emerge into visibility and self-assertion, there is an ethical question of

relation to others or to the Other (in terms, for example, of Emmanuel Levinas's ethics) that forces us to look beyond the absoluteness of any one individual's or group's claim to value.

The seminal inspiration of the human rights movement is the idea that certain rights are natural and universal and ought to be guaranteed quite independently of history or social context. They are taken as context-transcendent and are advocated as applicable irrespective of local or regional or cultural or any other contingent norms. However, in any explicit and formulated rendition, they are not culturally neutral and do not come from nowhere. Any specific and concrete formulation of what someone declares to be universal and absolute creates a disequilibrium: other contingent norms are threatened by an absolute. All systems of value can aim at the absolute and universal, but only on condition of not appropriating it for any particular finite code and language.[9]

Disability theory can be pondered here as an example. The rights of the handicapped require special attention and provision. There is even an absolute ethical imperative behind this. However, when these rights are absolutized in specific forms, they risk infringing on the rights of others. Loading and unloading wheel chairs on buses in big cities at peak hours, for example, can cause traffic jams that bring circulation to a standstill (especially when the lift mechanism refuses to function properly). This is certainly tolerable, up to a point, but there are nevertheless limits. Those who are not officially designated as handicapped are in many ways weak and vulnerable too. The stresses and strains of public travel can cause illness and injury to anyone, not just to those certified as disadvantaged and wearing an official badge to that effect. This is where there has to be negotiation and balancing—weighing of which rights are to take precedence when and where. Some find themselves often confronted today with situations where no one without a handicapped sticker on their car can find any place to park, while rows of handicapped-reserved places remain empty day and night.

One theoretical tendency of movements like disability rights is to create the fiction of a generality of normal people who do not have special needs. But this fiction of the "normal," too, is an invidious labeling. An ironic reversal has occurred when rather than complaining about being discriminated against through presumably stigmatizing categories, like homosexual or black or female, a particular identity group is able to exploit its status as minority and presumably disfavored in order to gain advantage and claim special privileges and compensations. In many competitive activities, like seeking jobs or applying for admission to universities, being in some special minority category can prove to be a distinct advantage. The claim for enfranchisement on an equal basis mutates into a stealing of privilege in the name of some particular category or group and its preferential treatment. Easily identifiable, publicly recognized categories become the basis for special rights, but there are many kinds of weakness and disadvantage that do not fall into such categories, or are at least not easily identifiable as doing so.[10]

The tyranny of identity, of the recognizable category and label, has become pervasive in our society. People are treated in terms of their definable characteristics and the discriminating traits by which they fall into various categories. The digital logic of 1 or 0, such as reigns in administrative milieus, furthermore, dictates that you either are or are not disadvantaged or

deserving. It ignores the fact that all of us are these things rather in various ways and in infinitely varying degrees and according to variable circumstances.

Those without any special label may be the most apt *not* to be represented. A politics which manipulates power or advantages always on behalf of what is defined and categorized builds a prejudice into the system. In fact, these are the same epistemological tendencies that Cornel West analyzed as having engendered white supremacy and the demotion of blacks as a race in the first place[11]: "observing, comparing, measuring, and ordering of the physical characteristics of bodies" (49) led to a certain type being perceived as ideal and normative. To this extent, the mania for the special categories of identity politics is the perpetuation of an invidious and oppressive system.

This sort of epistemic problem has long been a source of concern in national politics steered, or at least deflected, by special-interest groups. Pretending that all that exists and needs to be cared for humanly is parceled out into definable groups with labels blinds us to a deeper level of reality, human and even non-human. As in much Marxism, the mistake is made of treating all reality, including ourselves, as at our disposal, as exhaustively comprehended by our categories. We need instead to foster greater sensitivity towards the deep vulnerabilities in the human mind and body that remain unidentified in explicit social terms, as well as to what transcends the human and thereby resists the totalizing systems of human beings and yet nevertheless demands to be respected as well (ecology or nature and divinity or life itself are prime examples).

In the postmodern perspective, there is a degree of choice about identities, since they are recognized as constructed. It is not that we have no identities, but we do not simply *have* them. We own them and appropriate them in ways we freely choose. Like the dead God who, once dead, becomes an obsession present everywhere, according to Freud,[12] so the deconstructed identity is not done away with but is made into an obsession with identity, an obsession that threatens to eclipse concern for what is not so easily identifiable. In a more productive reaction to this situation of shattered and reasserted identity, we accept the challenge to take responsibility for our identities.

We should, furthermore, recognize that there is always a degree of non-identity in every identity that we may choose to assume. The non-identical may be our deepest being and "nature."[13] Here, again, nature may come back from beyond the obliterations that modern and postmodern culture have perpetrated against it. It may be, then, that race, for example, should be a criterion in hiring, but it should also be recognized as an artificial construct used for pragmatic purposes: the hiring agency must take responsibility for its use of such a criterion. This bias in policy should not be mystified as natural justice. It is the result of a certain politics. And politics means taking up the cause of a certain party rather than keeping an equal measure for all or "regarding no persons," as an older Scriptural idiom put it concerning God's unbiased regard for all (for example, in James 2: 1-9).

Without careful attention to the non-identifiable, to what is indeed no person and remains virtually invisible because unidentified by discourse, identity politics are at risk of becoming an attempt to make exclusionary tactics work in favor of a group that has been harmed by those very tactics in the past rather than to escape or at least to exit from the system of binary

opposition and oppression. The result can at best be the attempt to achieve retribution for past wrongs rather than to right the system for the future.

I wish, then, to voice a plea on behalf of what or who is no one or nothing identifiable. The non-identity of what is deepest and most precious in human beings is apt to be forgotten for lack of any label or discursive marker. The order of identity is an order of discourse. It is apt to distort or suppress the *other* order or *dis*order that subtends every discursive, artificial system of instituted significances. This other, sacred sphere of existence is what Georges Bataille seeks to gain access to through sacrifice and festival. It is also what Michel de Certeau traces through Christian traditions in his "heterologies."[14] It is what has been held sacrosanct as the divine throughout the history and especially the pre-history of cultures.

I have endeavored to show here how certain recent, let us say, loosely, "postmodern" theorists of identity have brought out ways in which the very notion of identity escapes treatment by an objective logic that would enable it to be deliberately advocated and directly established in any straightforward way. And yet the practical applications of identity politics often still tend to conceive identity in individualistic terms and as something other than just a relation. They conceive it as something substantive rather than relational to the extent that they make unilateral assertions of identity. The dialectic between the claims of identity in the style of the Enlightenment and the deconstruction of identity following the insights of post-structuralist theory can be traced, as we have seen, in some of the most highly influential work on the politics of identity down to Cornel West and Judith Butler.[15]

Identity can come back in postmodern thought as an indefinable sort of *non*-identity. Identity is one of the primary concepts of metaphysical tradition, but it can also return after the post-structuralist critique of metaphysics in an unsettled and unsettling form, a kind of return of the repressed. Non-identity ("das nicht Identische") is a key concept for Theodor Adorno—or rather the key to moving beyond conceptual thinking—in his philosophy of "negative dialectics."[16] Of course, we need to think in terms of identities in order to think beyond them. All this can be considered to lie broadly within the tradition of the Enlightenment and yet to emphasize the self-critical turn whereby the Enlightenment illuminates and exposes its own myths, including that of identity, when it is construed as a sort of pure or natural entity. Enlightenment in this way, along this critical path of thinking, becomes the dialectic of Enlightenment.

Clearly, fundamental issues in philosophy are here engaged that do not admit of definitive answers but turn on questions that must remain inevitably controversial. Still, in any case, it is imperative that we recognize something as not resolvable in verbal terms at the bottom of all our discourses. A crucial and difficult question of philosophical logic is whether that indefinable Namelessness which elusively appears here should be recognized as difference par excellence, as the absolutely and indescribably unique, or as being without any identifying difference at all. Or perhaps as the absolutely universal? Difference is not predicative but appellative: like the proper name as it is theorized by Franz Rosenzweig, it names unique being that cannot be said or be linguistically determined. It can, nevertheless, be invoked or called upon as a difference that *could* be made by one who opts to respond.[17]

Issues of recognizing racial, gender, and class differences have been cast in a new, original light by a number of recent political and cultural theorists thinking along these apophatic, non-identitarian lines.[18] Especially theological approaches by feminists open up a space of the apophatic, which transcends the oppositional logic of much now institutionalized gender discourse.[19] A new generation of American feminist theological thinkers, overcoming traditional tensions that polarize the European and American approaches, have begun to converge with French feminism. French feminists, including eminently Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous, have long pursued a re-inscription of female identity, whereby the identity of woman is not simply asserted against that of man or as equal, since that is typical of the oppositional logic that has proved inadequate in the postmodern view, but as irreducibly different.

The non-identical may seem hardly worth worrying about. It has no face or front, nor any constituency behind it. But if we lose sight of it, the conflicts between different identities can only tragically battle out their differences unto death or, at best, effacement of one another. Most importantly, it is necessary to discern and retain this elusive dimension of the non-identical in order to deal in a more supple manner with the identities that are overtly declared: we must remember that they do not declare everything and that they in fact inevitably dissemble what is most important about any one of us.

NOTES

[1] Thomas Carlson in *The Indiscrete Image: Infinitude and the Creation of the Human* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), explores the anthropological relevance of John Scott Eriugena and other negative theologians in order to argue that humanity is without any definable identity. What defines human nature is paradoxically its lack of any essential, defining characteristics. I have treated negative theologians including Eriugena in *On What Cannot Be Said: Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, Literature, and the Arts* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), vol. 1. Other contemporary philosophers, for example, Slavoj Zizek in *The Fragile Absolute—or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?* (London: Verso, 2000), likewise employ often highly heterodox theology in their questionings of identity politics.

[2] bell hooks, *Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics* (Boston: South End Press, 1990) and Jane Flax, *Disputed Subjects* (London: Routledge, 1993) could count among innumerable possible examples as representatives of this tendency.

[3] Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung: Philosophische Fragmente* (Amsterdam: Querido, 1944).

[4] Witness to widespread questioning of identity politics is borne by Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (New York: Norton, 2006).

[5] Linda Martín Alcoff, Michael Hames-García, Satya P. Mohanty, Paula M.L. Moya, eds., *Identity Politics Reconsidered: Future of Minority Studies* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), p. 6.

[6] See Daniel Boyarin, *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994) beyond the usual references to Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: La fondation de*

l'universalisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1997), trans. Ray Brassier as *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003) and Giorgio Agamben, *Il tempo che resta: Un commento alla lettera ai Romani* (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2000), trans. Patricia Dailey as *The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).

[7] This genealogy is suggestively treated by Mark C. Taylor in *Erring: A Postmodern Atheology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

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On Divine Omniscience and Human Freewill: An Analysis of Nelson Pike's Argument
of Incompatibilism

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Introduction

Nelson Pike's article entitled, "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action," proves that fatalism is unavoidable. Fatalism is the philosophical doctrine emphasizing the necessity of human acts rendering them unvoluntary. Theological fatalism is the thesis that infallible foreknowledge of a human act makes the act necessary and hence unfree, that is, if there is a being who knows infallibly the entire future, then no human act is free (SEP 2008). This is the same thesis maintained by Pike and concluded that the Christian concept of divine omniscience, which includes the power to know everything and hold no false beliefs, removed all possibility of voluntary action.

If God knows everything, then He knows all the facts about the past, present, and future. If God has knowledge of the future, then He has knowledge of the outcome of human actions prior to their performance. If God has the power to hold no false beliefs, then He can never be wrong about humans' future actions. If God has infallible knowledge of the future, then humans can never act in contrary to what God has already known and believed. If humans can never do anything in contrary to what God had already believed them to be doing, then no human action is voluntary. Therefore, according to Pike, based from these set of assumptions that he presented about God's omniscience, either we are not truly responsible for our moral actions since we have no power to do other than what God had already believed we will be doing in the future or God is not omniscient.

Pike (33-34) presented the schematic representation of his argument as follows:
1. "God existed at $t1$" entails "If Jones did X at $t2$, God believed at $t1$ that Jones would do X at $t2$."
2. "God believes X" entails "'X' is true."
3. It is not within one's power at a given time to do something having a description that is logically contradictory.
4. It is not within one's power at a given time to do something that would bring it about that someone who held a certain belief at a time prior to the time in question did not hold that belief at the time prior to the time in question.
5. It is not within one's power at a given time to do something that would bring it about that a person who existed at an earlier time did not exist at that earlier time.
6. If God existed at $t1$ and if God believed at $t1$ that Jones would do X at $t2$, then if it was within Jones's power at $t2$ to refrain from doing X, then (1) it was within Jones's power at $t2$ to do something that would have brought it about that God held a false belief at $t1$, or (2) it was within Jones's power at $t2$ to do something which would have brought it about that God did not hold the belief He held at $t1$, or (3) it was within Jones's power at $t2$ to do something that would have brought it about that any person who believed at $t1$ that Jones would do X at $t2$ (one of whom was, by hypothesis, God) held a false belief and thus was not God--that is, that God (who by hypothesis existed at $t1$) did not exist at $t1$.
7. Alternative 1 in the consequent of item 6 is false. (from 2 and 3)
8. Alternative 2 in the consequent of item 6 is false. (from 4)
9. Alternative 3 in the consequent of item 6 is false. (from 5)
10. Therefore, if God existed at $t1$ and if God believed at $t1$ that Jones would do X at $t2$, then it was not within Jones's power at $t2$ to refrain from doing X. (from 6 through 9).

11. Therefore, if God existed at $t1$, and if Jones did X at $t2$, it was not within Jones's power at $t2$ to refrain from doing X. (from 1 and 10).

In this paper, I shall argue, considering the set of assumptions provided by Pike about divine omniscience and the above premises, that Pike successfully proves the incompatibility of divine omniscience and human freewill. To show this, I shall analyze other attempts of reconciling divine foreknowledge and human freewill, excluding what Pike had already analyzed in his article, and prove that none of these attempts can successfully deny Pike's argument of incompatibilism unless we try to redefine the concept of divine omniscience as Pike suggested.

Future Indeterminacy

In the article "re-reading Nelson Pike's "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action,"" Fischer, et al. re-examined Pike's argument and the different versions of Open Theism that offers alternative interpretation of divine omniscience and human freewill. One version of Open Theism offers the view that "the future is not "settled"; that is, there are no truths specifying how future indeterminacies will unfold (Fischer, et al. 2009: 5)." Hence, human freewill is not harmed. However, this view asserts that God's knowledge about the future is not distinct from humans as there are no truths as to how the future unfolds. Thus, just like humans, God is also clueless about what will happen in the future as the future is uncertain. This view, then, affirms the conclusion made by Pike about the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge with human freedom.

To simply put it, in this version of Open Theism it wasn't even *true* at *t1* that Jones would do X at *t2*, supposing Jones does X at *t2* freely (Fischer, et al. 2009: 5). However, this view is still problematic if omniscience is an essential attribute of God, which Pike assumed in the formulation of his argument. As Pike (28) explains, "if the person we usually mean to be referring to when using the name "God" were suddenly to lose the quality of omniscience, the resulting person would no longer be God. Thus, Open Theism's argument, although it affirms Pike's incompatibilism thesis, cannot be a successful defense of human freewill. If we take into consideration the set of assumptions made by Pike about the essential attributes of God, to risk denying one of the essential attributes of God which is omniscience is to risk denying altogether the existence of God.

Hard Facts vs. Soft Facts

Another approach discussed by Fishcer et al. (2009:5) is the Ockhamist approach advocated by (among others) Marilyn Adams and Alvin Plantinga. This version denies premise (8) in Pike's argument and offered a distinction between hard facts and soft facts. The Ockhamist's claim is that while hard facts are plausibly thought to be subject to the principle of the fixity of the past, soft facts need'nt be fixed (and thus out of control (Fishcer et al. 2009:6). The Ockhamist grants that it is not within Jone's power to do something that would have brought it about that some hard fact about the past would not have been a fact, but argues that it is within Jone's power to do something that some soft fact about the past would not have been a fact. For instance, suppose Jones mows his lawn at *t2*. For the Ockhamistss, it follows that it was true at

t1 that Jones would mow his lawn at *t2*. Did Jones have it within his power at *t2* to refrain from mowing his lawn? For the Ockhamistss, if he did, this power is the power so to act that a fact about the past—the soft fact that it was true at *t1* that he would be mowing his lawn—would not have been a fact (Fishcer et al. 2009:6).

However, to deny premise (8) of Pike's argument is to deny the infallibility of God. The Ockhamist's's distinction between hard and soft fact doesn't remove the fact that God already knows at *t1* what Jones will do at *t2*. And to say that Jones has it in his power to do something in contradictory to what God had already believed at *t1* that he will be doing at *t2* would have brought it about that God held a false belief at *t1*. Thus, it will also fail to resolve the incompatibility of the divine omnscience and human freewill.

Explanatory Dependence

As the Ockhamist approach previously failed to elaborate the significance of the distinguishing between soft and hard facts in the discussion of God's knowledge of the future, they later appeal to a claim concerning explanatory dependence. The Ockhamist says that instead of thinking of the past fact that Jones would mow his lawn as forcing Jones to mow his lawn, or constraining what Jones has it within his power to do, think of of Jone's free decision to mow the lawn as explaining why it was true that Jones mow the lawn. In other words, for the Ockhamists, Jones' free decision to mow the lawn is the explanatory ground of the fact that, at *t1,* it was true that he would mow the lawn (See: Fischer, et. al. 2009: 7).

Then again, explaining Jones' action in terms of the underlying reason why Jones chose to perform that action doesn't remove the fact that even the underlying reason to Jones' performing of the action was already known and believed by God even prior to Jones' arrival at a decision. If God had already known at *t1* that Jones would mow his lawn at *t2*, God had also known at *t1* that Jones' would mow his lawn at *t2* because of the reason, say, that he sees his yard looking more like a prairie than a lawn. Therefore, if God had already known at *t1* that such would be the reason why Jones would mow his lawn at *t2,* and it is not within Jones' power at *t2* to do somenthing that would have brought it about that God did not hold the belief he held at *t1,* then Jones' action at *t2* cannot have any other reason otherwise than what God had already believed him to have at *t1*. Therefore, this approach also fails to resolve the issue that God's knowledge of the future threatens the voluntariness of human action.

To discuss the nature of God's knowledge of the future, the Ockhamist claims that God's belief at *t1* that Jones would mow his lawn at *t2* is explanatorily dependent on Jones' free decision. Therefore, God knows about Jones' future decisions because of Jones' decision themselves (Fischer, et. al. 2009: 8). Thus, this view rejects one of the most important attributes of divine omniscience: infallibility. As Pike had pointed out in his argument, if God has knowledge at *t1* of Jones' action on *t2,* His knowledge at *t1* of Jones' action on *t2* would render it impossible for Jones to act in contrary to what he had already believed in *t1* Jones to be doing in *t2*. But for the Ockhamists, God's knowledge about our future is not hard but soft fact, and thus changeable. Thus, if God has knowledge at *t1* of that Jones' would mow his lawn at *t2* and Jones has it

in his power to act voluntarily, then he can render God's knowledge at *t1* false by doing at *t2* otherwise at than what God had already believed at *t1*.

God's Knowledge of the Indeterminancy of the Future

Fischer, et al. develop another possible Open Theist position—the future changes and God's knowledge of the future changes as well. On this version, "there are truths specifying how indeterminate aspects of the future will unfold, *and* God knows these truths (Fischer, et al. 2009: 14)." They maintain that:

> God can know truths about the future, but the future changes: the set of future tensed truths at one time may contain *it will be the case that p* even though the set of future-tensed truths at another time may contain *it will be the case that ~p* (Fischer, et al. 2009 14-15).

This approach, Fischer, et al. states, etither denies premise (1) or premise (6) of Pike's argument. Premise (1) states that if "God existed at *t*1" entails "If Jones did *X* at *t*2, God believed at *t*1 that Jones would do *X* at *t*2." In this version of Open Theism, however, states that if "God existed at *t*1" *does* not entail "If Jones did *X* at *t*2, God believed at *t*1 that Jones would do *X* at *t*2" or entail "If Jones did *X* at *t*2, God believed at *t*1 that Jones would do *~X* at *t*2 although Jones did *X* at *t*2." To simply put, at *t1* Jones wasn't going to mow his lawn at *t2,* even though as it turnde out, Jones did mow his lawn at *t2*. Fischer, et al. (2009: 17) explains that in those circumstances, "God wouldn't have known at *t1* that Jones would do *X* at *t2* simply because that was false at *t1* and didn't become true until later". At one time God knows that Jones will not mow his lawn; at a later time God know that Jones will mow his lawn.

On the other hand, denying premise (6) accepting that "it was within Jones' power to bring it about that although God still existed, and still held the same belief (which was true) at *t1*, God comes to hold a different belief thanks to the fact that the future has changed (Fischer, et al. 209: 17)." If such is the case, this approach, just like the *Explanatory Dependence* argument, denies the infallibility God's knowledge about the future that would render any future human action as involuntary, which only proves again the incompatibility of divine omniscience and human freewill.

Conclusion

The various approaches of reconciling divine omniscience and human freewill proves Pike's point that unless the set of assumptions about God's essential omniscience are redefined, the implication it has on the (impossibility of the) voluntariness of human action will stand.

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We are place; place is us

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Abstract

The way we see place is the way we see ourselves; the way we see ourselves is the way we see place. Our thoughts, values and identities are shaped by how we perceive place and our relationship to it. Shift in perspective about place can result in a shift in our way of perceiving ourselves - from being isolated to place to being connected. The purpose of this study is to understand the conditions that lead to a sense of place or a sense of connection to our inner self. Research participants were 10 college professors from various disciplines who engage their students in meaningful learning by connecting them to natural ecosystems. The shift in research paradigm - from an observer's point of view to a participant's point of view resulted in a change in perception of place and self. The perspective of place in this study evolved into three stages: first as a concept, second as a process, and third as a relationship. The methods of analysis also evolved into three stages. In the first stage, transcribed interviews were analyzed using the Systematic Grounded Theory of Strauss and Corbin. In the second stage, a reflective method of analysis gradually developed. At the third stage, the reflective analysis was integrated to the systematic analysis. The study shows that there is a relationship between our perception of place and perception of self. Direct meaningful experiences through nature-centered learning can develop an intimate connection between our inner self and place.

Key words: sense of place, grounded theory, chaos theory, quantum theory, shift in perspective

The separation of science and humanities in the curriculum at all levels is a reflection of a kind of thinking that divides nature and culture (Selby 1999). Reason (2008) refers to this thinking which separates humanity from nature as a "crisis of the mind" (33). Reason explains that this crisis comes from educational forms that tend to "divide the world by academic discipline, advocate dominion over nature, promote individualism and rights over citizenship and responsibility, and separate rationality from feeling and valuing" (2008, 27). The separation of humanities and science in the curriculum creates an illusion that humanity and nature are separated from each other. The dismal consequence of this is the disconnection of self with nature.

SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of the study is to explain the relationship of self with place. This study sought to answer this research question, what is the relationship of self with place?

In this study, place refers to Nature and self is viewed as a process of becoming whole. The perspective of self evolved into three stages. In the first stage of the study, self is viewed from the third person perspective or "they" referring to the research participants excluding the researcher herself. In the second stage, self is viewed from the first person perspective or "I" referring to the researcher herself. In the third stage, self is viewed from the second person perspective or "we" referring to the researcher and the other research participants. The perspective of place also evolved into three stages: first as a concept, second as a process and third as a relationship.

The relationship of self and place is referred to as sense of place in the literature. Sense of place consists of "feelings, attitudes, and behavior towards a place which varies from person to person, and from one scale to another (e.g. from home to country). Sense of place [also] consists of knowledge, belonging, attachment, and commitment to a place or part of it " (Shamai 1991, 354). Shamai (1991) describes sense of place in terms of levels and identified commitment to a place as the highest level of sense of place. Shamai (1991) explains that deepest commitment to a place is realized through the sacrifice of important attributes and values such as prosperity, freedom, or, in the most extreme situation, life itself. At this level there is readiness to give up personal and/or collective interests for the sake of the larger interest of the place. In this study, sense of place is viewed in terms of phases or stages rather than levels.

METHODS

RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

We were 10 college professors from various school and various field of discipline (philosophy, social science, marine ecology, mass communications, food chemistry,science education, cultural anthropology and zoology). Our common characteristic is our strong commitment on the use of nature-centered learning in understanding our discipline. Together with our students, we are engaged in meaningful learning through direct interaction with natural ecosystems. Grounded data consisted of transcribed interviews of the other research participants and the

researcher's field observations, memos and personal journals.

METHODS OF ANALYSIS

The method evolved from a positivistic to a constructivist paradigm in the process of understanding the phenomenon. This method referred to as systematic-reflective grounded theory method integrated the systematic grounded theory of Strauss and Corbin (1990) with the reflective method that emerged in the course of the study.

SYSTEMATIC GROUNDED THEORY OF STRAUSS AND CORBIN

Grounded theory is a specific methodology developed by Glaser and Strauss for the purpose of generating a theory culled from actual human experiences rather than simply applying a theory to understand human experiences. It is also known as constant comparative method (Walker and Myrick 2006) since different pieces of data are compared for their similarities and differences (Corbin and Strauss 2008). The theory generated from grounded data is derived from qualitative analysis of data which involves coding of data (Corbin and Strauss 2008). Coding is an analytical process of taking raw data and raising it to a conceptual level (Corbin and Strauss 2008). The coding process of Strauss and Corbin (1990) involves three phases: open, axial, and selective phases. In practice, the phases overlap and occur simultaneously. Although the coding process is iterative, it should not be seen as a linear process.

The first phase is the open coding process. "Open coding is the part of analysis that pertains specifically to the naming and categorizing of phenomena through close examination of data. Without this first basic analytical step, the rest of the analysis and communication that follows could not take place. During open coding the data are broken down into discrete parts, closely examined, compared for similarities and differences, and questions are asked about the phenomena as reflected in the data (Strauss and Corbin 1990, 62). Categorizing is the main analytic process and concepts are used to label discrete happenings, events, and other instances of phenomena. Furthermore, concepts are grouped together under a higher order, or more abstract concept called a category.

The second phase is the axial coding process. Axial coding is "a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making connections between categories. This is done by utilizing a coding paradigm involving conditions, context, action/ interactional strategies, and consequences" (Strauss and Corbin 1990, 9). In the axial coding process, an analyst selects a core category or phenomenon that was identified in the open coding process. The core category is connected to the other categories in the axial paradigm to show interrelationship of causal conditions, phenomenon, context, intervening conditions, strategies and consequences (Creswell 2005).

The third phase is the selective coding process. In the selective coding process, the theory derived from data is refined and developed as relationships among the categories are further validated from data (Strauss and Corbin 1990).

EMERGENCE OF THE REFLECTIVE METHOD

Patterns, relationships and connections among the categories emerged when I abandoned the axial coding paradigm. The preconceived framework for categories (e.g. causal conditions, context, intervening conditions, strategies and consequences) restrained the emergence of the relationship among the categories. Glaser, a co-proponent of Strauss in the discovery of the grounded theory (cited in Creswell, 2005) views the axial paradigm to be limiting the emergence of a theory. Creswell (2005, 401) writes, " Glaser, however, stresses the importance of letting a theory emerge from the data rather than using specific, preset categories (Glaser, 1992), such as we saw in the axial coding paradigm (e.g., causal conditions, content [context], intervening condition, strategies, and consequences).

After abandoning the axial paradigm, a reflective method of analysis emerged in the process of developing the theory. The process involved simultaneous and repetitive pattern analysis (a,b,c) and synthesis of data (d, e and f). The reflective techniques that evolved in the process included
> a) paying attention to words that appear often in the data;
> b) visualizing words through color coding;
> c) selecting words and isolating words from data;
> d) rearranging chosen words in space through a concept map in order to make sense of the words;
> e) connecting chosen words to create a new word, a new sentence, a new logical diagram, or a new paragraph; and
> f) creating new forms of thought such as combined words, a logical diagram, a new sentence, a new paragraph, or a creative composition like a poem.

This reflective technique also involved recognizing word patterns as they seem to appear in space. Unlike the traditional way of reading from left to right, word patterns were recognized by reading the words from right to left, top to bottom and bottom up. It also involved recognizing a pattern in the position of subject and object in a sentence. The reflective method that emerged in this study made me aware of the changes in my process of thinking and the development of spatial thinking.

I was aware of a shift in my thinking as my analysis changed from being conceptual to being visual and spatial. My analytical and linear thinking may have developed from my training as a science educator. Singh H. and Singh A. (2002) relates analytical, linear left brain mode of thinking to traditional philosophy which may have been influenced by the Newtonian scientific paradigm which views the world as a giant clock, or a machine made up of isolated parts (Stapp 2009).

The shift from analytical, linear thinking to spatial thinking was a consequential effect of a shift in the method of analysis from systematic to reflective. Consequential effect of shift in the method is a a shift from linear to non-linear thinking. Non-linear thinking is thinking in terms of processes, patterns, connections and relationships rather than concepts. It is thinking in terms of wholes, systems and integration rather than thinking in terms of fragmented parts and parallel opposites , and thinking in terms of phases and stages rather than thinking in terms of levels.

FINDINGS

This is how the theory of sense of place emerged in this study. The shift in perspective of the researcher - from third person point of view, to first person point of view, and then to second person point of view (from "they", to "I", and then to "we") is the condition that has brought about the theory of place which explains a unique evolution in our understanding of way of thinking, of nature of self and nature of place, and of the relationship of self and place.

THEORY OF SENSE OF PLACE

This study discovered that nature of self is similar to nature of place. The patterns that describe self is similar to patterns that describe place- self and place are dynamic quantum systems that co-evolve with each other.

Zohar (1990 cited in Selby 1999) explains that quantum systems co-evolve. A new quantum system (with its own particle and wave aspects) evolve when two quantum systems meet. The particle aspect of the two systems stays somewhat separate but their wave aspects overlap and merge giving rise to a new system. Likewise, the theory of sense of place views self and place as quantum systems co-evolving together (Selby 1999).

The co-evolution of self and place is similar to the process of the evolution of the universe. As the universe continue to expand, space, time and matter are created. Similarly, the inner self is in the process of becoming whole as self consciously interact with place. The process of becoming is similar to the process of expansion of the universe. The core of the process is pure thought [Immaculate Conception], pure love and pure joy. This process is illustrated in the visual representation of the model generated in this study (Figure 1).

The theory of place proposes two ways of understanding the relationship of self and place. The first relationship views self as a whole within a larger whole rather than just part of a whole. The second relationship views place as an integral part of self.

1) Self is within place; and
2) Place is within ourselves.

Since self is within place, when a slight change happens in one's state of mind, this is felt by place. Likewise, when a slight change in place happens, this is felt by a conscious self since place is within ourselves. This conscious evolution of our own consciousness -deep understanding of the relationship of self with place is referred to as sense of place. In this study, sense of place can be viewed both as a condition and a consequence – the condition is evolving and dynamic and the consequence of the evolutionary and dynamic process is the emergence of a unique identity with a higher order of consciousness and with a new system of thinking.

| A. Direct knowing of sense of place | B. Theoretical model of sense of place |

Fig 1. Theoretical model of sense of place (B) evolving from direct knowing of sense of place (A)

SUPPORTING THEORIES, BELIEFS AND PRINCIPLES

The theory of sense of place integrates post modern perspective with indigenous perspective. Chaos and quantum theory belong to new science that proposes new systems of thinking which resonate with indigenous holistic thinking .

Similar to chaos theory, theory of sense of place proposes conditions that can result to a new system of thinking- a shift in thinking from linear to non-linear thinking. The literature refers to this condition as the edge of chaos, (Singh and Singh 2002). Singh, H, & Singh, A. (2002, 32) defines edge of chaos as "a condition, not a location. It is a permeable, intermediate state through which order and disorder flow, not a finite line of demarcation. Moving to the edge of chaos creates upheaval but not dissolution. The edge is not the abyss; it is the opportunity for productive change [10]. Edge of chaos is "where innovative ideas and advancement reside" and where " linear systems begin to fail and non-linear systems begin to dominate" (Singh, H. and A. Singh, 2002, 32).

Sense of place and edge of chaos are similar to what the Aztec people refers to as Nepantla, a "place where different perspectives come into conflict and where you question the basic tenets, and identities inherited from your family, your education, and your different cultures. It is the zone where you struggle to find equilibrium between the outer expression of change and your inner relationship to it" (Anzaldua and Keating 2002, 549 cited in Chin 2006).

The unique evolution of sense of place is similar to what Reason refers to as " a radical shift in awareness and worldview." (2007, 40) and sense of place is similar to what Bateson refers to as "outcome of third-order learning" (Chalton 2003, 114-15 cited in Reason 2007). Reason writes "this involves a radical shift in awareness and worldview – what Bateson describes as the shift from Learning I, in which learning is acquired from within an existing frame, to Learning II, which takes place through changing the frame (Bateson, 1972; Hawkins, 2004) – or even at times (and I write very cautiously) to Learning III, where there is a transcendence of the ego world and

an experience of deep participation in the processes of the planet." (2007, 40). Bateson refers to "the outcome of 'third-order learning' [as] can be something very like enlightenment. It can reveal 'a world in which personal identity merges into all the processes of relationship in some vast ecology or aesthetic of cosmic interaction " (Chalton 2003, 114-15 cited in Reason 2007).

Quantum perspective recognizes that Nature is integral, consisting of both mental and physical aspects, "two aspects of a rationally coherent whole" (Stapp 2007, 142). It also recognizes the role of human beings as "co-creators in partnership with a global creative power of a universe shaped in part by our conscious thoughts" (Stapp 2009, 10). It overturned classical physics of a mechanical universe and provided a profound conceptual change in the "conception of man from that of an isolated mechanical automaton to that of an integral participant in a non-local holistic process that gives form and meaning to the evolving universe" (Stapp n.d., 140). Similar to quantum theory, the theory of sense of place proposes a shift in understanding of the role of human beings from being passive witnesses to active participants and a shift in understanding meaning of place from having merely physical attributes to having both physical and psychological attributes.

The indigenous perspective resonates with the quantum paradigm. Similar to the indigenous perspective, the theory of sense of place views human beings within Nature rather than above Nature (Slikkerveer 1999). Likewise, it recognizes that human beings and non-human beings dwell together in Nature rather than separated from eachother. Singh, H. & Singh, A, (2002) writes" it is humankind's destiny to evolve through learning new systems [of thinking]. The systems that will survive in the future will be those that will be in harmony with nature " (32).

In this narrative of a philosophy professor who has engaged throughout his life to the grounds of his country vividly describe the conditions that shaped his identity and his system of thinking.

When I was there, I was not even thinking of the dead body on my side. I was feeling something very peaceful. It's all quiet. For me its weird, very beautiful. So I've never forgotten it. I've never forgotten lake Tikub. I'll never forgotten Chaong. I've never forgotten the mountain near it. That's form part of me. When you see beauty in things like this, uniqueness in things like this, you don't forget. If you don't forget, that's part of you. . . Because I've walked the ground, I've known the ground so much. The grounds of this country. Not really the nation, I mean the country, the land. The very land, the very earth, the very rivers, the very grass, blades of grass. When you get to know that, you get to have an attachment to it and so it is part of my identity.

> I don't need to imagine some soul, or some forces, or some priest to tell me what this all about. I'm more of like a Dumagat who does not know the pope or does not read any book or any bible. And I can still say, well I think I love this place and I recognize the peacefulness of this place. That's what makes it universal. It will not matter if I'm talking to a Dumagat or a T'boli that I've met in different places, who have never read a book because they are so illiterate, never seen a television. When we're talking about peacefulness in the uniqueness of birds, we understand each other, as part of my experience. . .

> And if I die, I become part of what I've seen. It's all right. If I die and there is no heaven, it's alright. I'm part of this beautiful world. It's like the message of the Little Prince. You hear laughter all over. That was what I saw in that lake. (PJ).

IMPLICATIONS

Sense of place can be developed by a kind of education that provide direct meaningful sensory experiences of natural ecosystems outside school. This education is referred to as nature-centered education (NCE) . Nature-centered education (NCE) is anchored to a philosophy that is based on the principle of oneness and interconnectedness of human and nature. It recognizes that nature and humanity are not two aspects of reality but integrated into one - humanity is a whole within a larger whole which we call Mother Nature. This is the challenge to the present educational system– to recognize that the separation of humanities and science in the curriculum created an illusion that humanity and Nature are separated from each other. The dismal consequence of this is a fragmented self. Integrating humanities and science through nature- centered education can restore our sense of place and consequently our sense of self, and our sense of identity.

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Is Self-Defeating the Self-Fullfilling Prophecy of Judaism?

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Abstract

The challenge of the *Re-Ligare* and Connectedness ensemble surveys also the interwoven and tangled form between other conceptual pairs, such as Knowledge and Information, or Mythology and Reason.

The estrangement of beings can, though, transport meaningful purposes to their unity (Heidegger):

After the rise of the Enlightenment, and Reason worth an Age of its own, Contemporanity granted tractable *scripti* about Mythology and Religion by men such as Frazer, Freud, Jung, Lévi-Strauss or Eliade, after the Natural Philosophy of Darwin, impossible beforehand.

Accordingly, Ancient World Mythology was capable of having been reinvested under determinant Reasoning *argumenta* with Judaism and, soon after, with Christianity, both impossible in time to be deferred, after Greek Natural Philosophy, from Democritus and Aristotle.

From Ancient to Modern History Judaism was, all through and enigmatically, the combination of total *Re-Ligare* and scarce Connectedness.

Judaism´s unique Humanist endowment is critical at this point, due to the διασπορά (dispersion) of Hebrews and Jews. Since the United Kingdom of Israel and Judah (1030 BCE-930 BCE), with the exception only of the Hasmonean Dinasty (140 BCE-37 BCE), lacked a fatherland, until May 14th 1948. The scattering and one *axis mundi* orphanhood determined also to Judaism a tripartite mould: (1) a Religion without cathedrals but of συναγωγή (assembly, Synagogue), of domestic partaken spirituality; (2) an *Interpretational* Philosophical sort, demonstrable in the Talmud ascension; (3) and secular communal excellence.

We´ll be intellectually guided by the Philosophers Emmanuel Levinas with the idea of "the other" and "the face", and Martin Buber´s "I and thou".

Introduction. It is our goal to abridge in two different sections – first Ancient World, Biblical Times, Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and second Modernity and Contemporaneity – relevant notes about the exposed total *Re-Ligare* and scarce Connectedness that constituted Judaism. We shall not be captured exclusively by these time frames, but instead, through the direction of Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas, Philosophers of the tribe, dissert from the start in retrospective, attending to the special sense of Philosophy of time, contracted and expanded, as if, contrary to natural embryological Law, Phylogeny recapitulated Ontogeny, that such a concept as *Prophecy* in Judaism holds and commands.

In overview, we shall assert Judaism intrinsically as Philosophy of Judaism, capable of, almost in stuttering reverence to a self-inflicted sense of History, reconciling the inexpressible with speech, the Book with dialogue, communication with silence, as all throughout Prophecy with History, in such a way that eloquently emulated, in the realm only of Religion, the two most prominent paradigms of *adequatio*: the Aristotelian-Scholastic and the Darwinian-Natural Empirical versions. This distinctive aspect has strongly augmented the original bond of *Re-Ligare*.

Ancient World, Biblical Times, Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Usually one tends, from the aseptic neutral eye of Secularism (often Atheism or Agnosticism) to consider Buddhism as the most unambiguous case of a complimentary assistance, perhaps a half way through stone, between Religion and Philosophy. Time and again this observation leads to suggesting Philosophy as the natural perfected path to which Religion eventually leads. Nevertheless, from the eyes of an atheist, Judaism should minimally be considered *one* perfected Religion, in the sense that the מָשִׁיחַ (Messiah) will never arrive, and so, tempting a rabbinic sense of humour, it is a Religion valid for the eternity of time. In more conceptual terms, the distinction of Judaism as compared to other Religions approves a fulfilment of the time of History that takes in a much more deep *existential* religious and secular quest, with equal maximal bonds to *orthodoxy* and *orthopraxis*. This is very much opposed to the *physicalist* Aristotelian and, in the outcome, Theist conception of a *semper existens* time, equivalent to attributing (in the same sense of Scholastic and Modern Philosophy *attributus*), plainly, History to Mankind, sensualising time and faith. This went often to the degree of vanishing Religion into old φύσις (Philosophy of Nature) and demising eternity into immobility or, at least, non-miraculous expectedness. This was to set free the foundations for Theodicy (Leibniz) and the Absolute (Hegel), which are, though, the closest of the concepts of Philosophy of Time to Prophetic Judaism in Continental Philosophy, to show only Philosophy of Religion and Rationalism mutual *argumenta*.

If paid attention, it becomes evident that Judaism never suffered significant Scepticism, except when the Philosophy of Judaism was, both before the השכלה (Haskalah) and the Scientificist *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, excommunicated to Natural Philosophy, as Judaism did so to Spinoza, or otherwise dramatically infringed upon biblical and rabbinical orthodoxy, as happened under Louis IX and at the time of the Great Exile in Medieval France, still with Vilna Gaon´s antagonism to Hasidism in the XVIIIth century, or a combination of both, as came to pass with Uriel da Costa in the XVIIth century Amsterdam. Moreover, Judaism, all the way through different Ages, was capable of remaining *in substantia*, i.e., in the core of the Monotheist rock, appealing to all sorts of different naturalistic ontology *modi*, secularly expanded, and in the root, philosophically *attributing*, i.e., intellectually transferring and ascribing.

Attributus here referred is not to be considered a *per accidens* physicalism, but instead, holding the Scholastic and Modern imbrications – from Thomism's quasi-Nominalism, to Cartesian Dualism and Spinoza's *Natura Naturans* – without which caveat it isn't fair to use the analogy, yet perceptibly including the Hebraic מידות (Measurements, *Attributus*) fetching from biblical anthropomorphic reflections and Cosmogonist Mythical Books (*e.g.* the *Zohar*; the *Sefer Yetzirah*) to the Medieval used turned Classical by Moses Maimonides.

In more conceptual-logical terms we can assert that Judaism, though ebbing and flowing in vigour throughout History, was always in religious terms, in spite of the monadic disposal of *properties* typical of Monotheism, essentially polyadic-free. The miscellaneous fine-grained *predicables* always combined swiftly with the coarse-grained Monotheism Rock, at once selfsame and pluriform.

In overview, though, what is important to consider lies clear in the passage: "Thus the religious value of monotheism consists not in numerical unity, but in the cause whence this unity proceeds, in the *content* of the idea of God."[1]

This *notae per se argumenta* has been capable of giving the different contours to the Philosophical and Religious idea of Judaism, and therein characterised the distribution of attributes in such fashion that was and has been together *a caelo usque ad centrum* and *a posse ad esse*.

Buber and Levinas conjoined efforts to exalt the dialogical commandment at once concealed and carved in different slices of the Monotheist rock that constitutes each one's face in front of "the Other" and "Thou". I defend that it was the Prophetic value of Judaism that not only begot and shaped in unison the indomitable certainty of *intuition* in Judaism with constant inward anew breadth, abiding faith and charisma in one Judaism through personalities, to the extent of claiming for eternity a "Kingdom of Priests and a Holy Nation" (Exodus 19:6), but also helped Prophecy to uphold the balance between repent and behest, self-reproachfulness and command, which, in turn guided the shift from "thou shalt" to "I will". It is of common consensus to ascertain the passage from Israelite Prophecy to Jewish Legalism on this basis as, basically, the rainbow almsgiving covenant implied that any wrongdoing against God or biblical sin contemplated also the violation of any Monarchy Israelite tribal law, other than the spiritual bend that Ethics gains which is most important. Prophecy in Judaism was also capable of by-passing Religions, in a not exactly lenient but definitely diffused *modi*, as happened with Jesus and Mahomet, having powerfully *instantiated* Christianity and Islamism in, what's more, nearly half a millennium.

Under this view it is important enough to consider the fact that the last Hebrew Judge, Samuel, also a Prophet, anointed the first Kings of Israel, Saul and David. And the settling of the nation state sealed not only the Patriarchal Society in one Tribal Kingship, imparting greatly the at-the- root warfare covenant between overlord and vassal (Exodus 6:7; 19:5; 24), if not owner and slave, worth comparing to the Acadian deeds of liberation and freedom from Egypt (Leviticus 25:55), having converted, thus, the offence of trespass into a religious transgression. To this purpose it is crucial to

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[1] BAECK, LEO, 1936. *The Essence of Judaism*. (1936) McMillan and Company Limited St. Martin´s Street, London, p.93

understand how God was, nevertheless, non-committed to the territory, although the Holy land was allotted to God, in a sort of tenancy more than an ownership. This subtle difference was decisive then and in the following globalist approach to the διασπορά (dispersion) of Hebrews and Jews. But it is not just that: being correspondent the invisibility of God to the respective metamorphosis into the Holy land, it is, thus, more understandable why out of all Law Biblical Codes of the Israelites, - The Covenant Code (Exodus 20-23), The Decalogue (Exodus 20:1-17; Deuteronomy 5:4-21), The Ritual Decalogue (Exodus 34:11-26) The Holiness Code (Leviticus 17-26), The Deuteronomic Code (Deuteronomy 12-24) and The Priestly Code (majority of Leviticus; some laws in Numbers) and irrespective of the different conceptual treatment given by Hellenistic (Philo of Alexandria), Romano (Flavius Josephus), Patristic (Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Augustine of Hippo), or Modern Hebrews – it is of fair justice to say that it made a descent on Hebrews a sort of otherworldliness indwelling, just as it sublimed a recognisable territorialised logic – land, home, woman or women, slaves and pets - ultimately, under the *Sacred and Profane* and Mythological ingenious syllogisms, a demonstration of the Divine right of the Israelite to the land of Canaan.

Therefore, the land and Covenant blending in the case of Judaism seems to have been a portable altar *a fortiori*, inasmuch as Law making was so by definition. This *axis mundi* scattering and *Sacred and Profane* portability was decisive in making apprehensible the transfer from *the* Land to *the* Israelites and Hebrews. Alternatively and conversely, we can say that the *in centrum* symbolic מידות (measurements) have passed transitively from *the* Land, ultimately the land of Canaan, to the wholesome pre-existent bodily measurements, such as the אצבע (fingerbreadth), טפח (palm), זרת (span), אמה (ell otherwise called cubit), and even the walking distance by an average man, such as Latin *mil* and Persian *parasang*. It is not just that the Talmud has added some units under this sense, it is also symptomatic that the סְפִירוֹת (*sephirot*) (emanations), originally dating from the ספר יצירה Book of Creation *Sefer Yetzirah* (between the IIIth and the VIth centuries) are, in the number of ten, associated with anthropomorphic representations – head, arms, torso, legs and sex -, under the Kabala sort of Apophatic Theological notion of אין סוף (*Ein Sof*) (the Endless One; The Ineffable).

Notwithstanding Jerusalem has been vested in the Literature as the umbilicus of the world, Judaism's Cosmogony concentrically emanates from the body, as Christianity recaptured so eloquently.

"The Face-to-Face" measurement pertaining to the Ethics of Reciprocity by Levinas, and the Dialogical Existentialist commandment found in Buber's work through "I and Thou" are, thus, a furtherance of the just exposed, through "The Face" מידה אמת (Measure) at basis. Still it suggests principally the passage to the אין סוף (*Ein Sof*) or comparable in "The Other" otherwise "Face-to-Face". Fundamentally, the birthright starts with the statement "God made man in his own image" (Genesis 9:6), and from it derives *per se* the anthropomorphic *attributing*, which belongs to the Middle Bronze Age and the Age of Patriarchs, contemporaneous of various Ancient Collections of Laws Outside Israel, ranking form the Laws of Urnammu, Lipit-Ishtar, and Sumerian to the *ius talionis* of Hammurabi and Hittite Laws.

It is noteworthy that just as extant treatises lasted and went on to become renewed covenants –public reading was prepared every seven years, it subsisted the need to pay heed to Prophets word of warning both by Judges and Kings, and Moses in Moab, Joshua at Shechem and King Josiah in Jerusalem all perpetuated the promise, entailing the passage from the clan to the city, pastoral semi nomadic households to a more abstract common allegiance to the overlord God, sedentary and very inclined to *Amphictyony* (association of neighbouring states), more and more in the stranglehold of foreign powers (Persian, Semitic, Hellenistic and Roman) – the Philosophers Levinas and Buber who reflected upon Judaism´s heritage can also be said to appertain to this far-off lineage, now with one exceptional difference: the irresolvable complexities of the post-*Shoah* were of such proportions that they forced to breakup even the most antique Religious and Rationalist *argumentum*. By this we mean the Ontological ceaselessly lasting *argumentum* - replaced by *Éthique comme Philosophie première* and *Autrement qu´être ou au-delà de l´essence* which are signs of testimonials that apart from belonging to the instruction of Prophets, place outside the Being and multitude *étants* the meaning of life – foreseeing not Ethics pertaining to Philosophy, not Ethics pertaining to Ontology, but Ontology pertaining to Ethics. What's more, this contemporaneous wishful blessing to be granted to the devoted, although a yearning for the Future, and transcending already the tribe and the need for an office devolved upon the sanctity of the firstborn, obliges Philosophy of Time within Judaism to consider at the Hermeneutical level, one *terminus ante quem et post quem* Ethics resurged as Fundamental Philosophy. If it was true that Judaism, through Prophecy and its dramatic History, self-defeated in fulfilment its apodictic and casuistic religious formulations, now, with Levinas and Buber, Prophecy abandons "Time and Being" to rejoin the constitution of Ethics, i.e., the participants of all the offspring. Amongst the superabundant intricacies, one thing seems clear: if it was to be a post-*Shoah* Philosophy held to be just, it had to be post-*Ontological*, depleted of its religious-jurisprudential everlastingly historical *argumenta*. The unanticipated turn both in the case of Buber and Levinas, but with a stronger incidence on Levinas, was more accurately the fact that it exposed an *ante-Ontological argumenta*. This was of such kind that overwhelmingly unhindered *Time and Being* in Philosophical terms to Dialogue.

To better grasp the tripartite mould – (1) συναγωγή (assembly), (2) Interpretation, additionally ἐξήγησις (exegesis), and (3) community – originating from the written and oral Law, it is recommendable to attest in retrospective what the decisive moments of Judaism until the dawn of Modernity were which certify for a silent *Religare*.

One undisputed and delicately featured element in Judaism was the pliability of the Monotheism Rock's *orthodoxy*, as if it was earthen, made of soft modelling clay, very much contrary to the prohibition of any idolatry worshiping – the first of the Ten Commandments – made plain in several passages of the Christian Old Testament, as in (Exodus 23:24), (Numbers 33:52), (Deuteronomy 7:5), which permitted essentially one interpretational, of engraving and crafting hypertext, oral, dialogical and exegetical canonisation. The three divisions of the תנ״ך (Tanakh), the תורה Torah, נביאים (Prophets; Nevi´im) and כתובים (Writings; Ketuvim), the ancillary תורה שבעל פה (Oral Law, oral Torah), again in different apodictic (mnemonic) or casuistic (interpretational, dialogical) styles similar to written Law, essentially postulating a mosaic reveal, throughout the own lineage of time, unfold the formative age of

Rabbinic Judaism. This was so as if Prophecy was no longer possible when the achieved interpretation eventually arrived.

In Rabbinic Judaism and Oral Law, thus, we encounter the assembly of the משנה (Mishnah; Repetition), the (transliterated from Aramaic) Gemara, which together form תַּלְמוּד (The Talmud) and also מדרש (The Midrash). Each of their formation tales is a mark of the above mentioned.

The Mishnah echoes the open-wounded conflict between Jews and Romans in commence of the Common Era, after the destruction of the Second Temple on the Temple Mount in the laid siege Jerusalem (AD 70) under the rule of Titus, as if the Great Jewish Revolt in continuum could replace in words what was lost in stones. At a time when dissenting flocks and sectarian fondness for quarrels disputed about dogmas such as after life, resurrection of the death, free will and predestination – Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes, Sicarii and Zealots – resurging clashes dating back from the Babylonian captivity, History itself, with its proper benedictions and curses, seemingly of plea and right to time, had to, necessarily, echo Prophecy.

And this was a time second to none, except for the Golden Age in the Iberian Peninsula, the latter without major political rifts, when peace and sagginess blossomed in Al-Andalus under the Moorish rule. In effect, the period from the Hasmonean-Maccabean revolt (167-160 BCE) to the end of the Formative age of Judaism (300 CE), extending to the beginning of the Middle Ages (500 CE) its epiphenomena, coincides largely with one such *revolutio axis mundi* in Judaism, that impinged the most elemental resonant Foundational amendment of the Religion. Its political, philosophical and linguistic consequences are all in all analogous only with proper Modern Times Revolutions. Hence the following section is entrusted, then again, in the backward-looking study.

Modernity and Contemporanity. The periods in time and the works in written word where lies most unequivocally the foundation of Modernity in Judaism - the Rabbinical Period, of Pharisaic inspiration, which stretches, as proof enough, in strong deference to the *הֲלָכָה* (Halakha) until the end of the Age of Reason, abridging favourably not just the ל"חז ספרות ("Literature of Sages of Blessed Memory") the collective body of texts, but a renowned Rabbinical character in Judaism – are set down, as a spiritual depository, for posterity. Articulately, **אחרונים** ("the last"; Acharonim) generation of rabbis and legal decisors, is the name given to those from the XVIth century to these days. This reinforces the completion of the Judaic character fitting in the justifiably coined Formative Age. Simultaneously, we should retain how much the Diaspora, and even before the Kingdom of Judah, is the counterpart myth of the Babel Tower as told by Noah in the Genesis parshah, since the castigation and scattering of multitudes came as of the Jews' rebellion and idolatry practice.

It shall not be forgotten how prodigious the restoration of Modern Hebrew was, the past witnessing a language death except for religious services, by the great harbinger and lexicographer Eliezer Ben-Yheduda born almost a century before the upshot Zionism. Past its Semitic origins, Hebrew was at risk of being dashed away by Aramaic at the occasion of Babylonian invasion (586 BCE), a sign of danger enough as the Mishnha having been written behind precisely in Aramaic. Before being snuffed out by Hellenistic and later Roman influence, consonantal Biblical Hebrew הקודש לשון (The Sacred Language) was the dominant language of the Tanach,

herewith collecting, as of poetical initiation, above anything else the outspread historical close-circle of Patriarchs, Judges, Kings and Prophets. Hence, it rolled and also carried along onwards, respectively, Commandment, Law, Decree and Prophecy.

The referred Biblical Hebrew comprises the Deuteronomy which, in turn, except for the Patriarchs - the ancestor of the Israelites, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, or else the ancestry to Adam from Abraham – holds at the beginning of different Chapters, correspondingly after the Deuteronomic Code (12-16a), the selection and instruction of the community and foremost Leaders (16b-18), hence Judges, Kings and Prophets, in the same order. The Biblical Hebrew that responds better to one unyielding classical form (VIIIth - VIth BCE), gathers also the Minor Prophets Hoshea, Amos, Micah, Obadiah, Joel, Jonah, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi and Zephaniah, and, amongst the Major Prophets of the *Neviim*, Isaiah and Ezekiel. Still composed alike are under the *Ketuvim* Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, The Chronicles, most part of The Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Ruth and Song of Songs. The Deuteronomy is eloquent in this respect once it enclosures not just the passage to Δευτερονόμιον (Second Law) as to דְּבָרִים (spoken words), being, thus, one canonical response in Biblical Hebrew to posterity in what relates to the relation between Divine Right and Common Law, written and oral juncture, and, even, the superfluity of written and oral forms.

As noticed, Prophecy is the very last angle of the tetrad, so as to echo in time. This proved successful upon Rabbinical Judaism, inasmuch as the Priesthood commandment in Rabbinical Judaism moulded community, language and practice for all of one's idea of descendants. It is very interesting to confront the scattering of the Diaspora with the dispersal of the Biblical Hebrew sounds, yet with the necessary liberation of the latter by the Oral Law, most often from lingo palimpsests and cultural-political crossroads.

In reality, aside from the Deuteronomy resembling in paraphrasing etymology the Mishnah as "Second Law", it's fair to say that the time elapsed until the completion of the Mishnah regimented the various sect quarrelling, allowing, thus, Rabbinical Judaism to uplift from all different *strata* of time and dissimilar faith sediments. It also has to be said that the different factions - Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes, Sicarii and Zealots, as later happened with outward Samaritans, Baptists, Christians, in due course with Karaites and long after with Hasidism from whose lessons Buber harvested seminal insights – helped to characterise best the past and prospect the follow-through of Patriarchs, Judges, Kings and Prophets.

This spectrum in chain reaction also shines through the proper place of the synagogue and freedman fortitude until the time of the Formation of the State of Israel, explicating better Modernity and Contemporaneity in Judaism.

This was so as far as the *Tannaim* and *Amoraim* (Talmudic-Mishnaic Period) synagogue, whether taken as congregation, assembly or building, depending on secular, religious or civil administrative uses, was taken as going back to the time before Moses, some sort of elusive retroverted prophecy. This false hyperbole elapsed so in the same exact proportion as great it was the deprivation from the Holy Land of Judea (since Hadrian a lost transposition to the *nomino* retaliation of "Palestine", and even more so with the bereaving of Jewry thereafter). Even more so, the synagogue seems to be essentially a Second Temple period (520 BCE to CE 70) late

development. Let´s not forget, too, that the Temple itself had been degraded under Herod´s Monarchy before it was destroyed, and later libelled and thought reprehensible to the level of ignominy, under the ensuing view of Rabbinical Judaism, even though the Pharisees allied with Herod against the Sadducees at the beginning.

It cannot be unsighted how striking it is, in Ethical and Religious terms, that Judaism, amidst variegated theological propensities, multifarious doxological machinations, abiding sects, overrule of colossal Empires, has dwelled so mightily in Oneness, from Antiquity to Contemporaneity.

Hebrews and Jews underwent one such worship practice, deeply rooted in acts of Piety, Torah study and Benediction past lent support to sacrificial cult, having sealed, therefore, visible from the Intertestamental and Early-Roman Period to all the *Humanitas*' heirs, one *inter se* perdurable affection, that is only worth designating as Martin Buber´s "I-Thou". This shall not be interpreted as a tentative of obliterating factual altercations, as serves the example of the troubled period of the First Jewish-Roman War, until the Destruction of the Second Temple, when Zealots *sicarii* menaced the order of the procuratorial province, Pharisees and Christians shared charitableness and Essenes vanished even from the site of recess Qumran. The same is true with subsequent Jewish-Roman Wars, but what is to be appreciated here is the fact that it was not just a millenary Israelite ancestry, in obliging a brotherhood, that forced a consensual *inter se* appreciation, the demarcation from *alius* having been imperative in nature, although not at all obfuscating a deep religious "I-Thou" dialogue of which Western Philosophy and Religion is still retentively obedient, in regard with *fides* and *argumenta*.

All the same, taking into account, at discretion, historical facts, as the most probable (Biblical-minimalist) Egyptian slavery of Ancient Israelites, the Babylonian deportation and exile, the turmoil and disturbances under Seleucid, Hasmonean and Roman sovereignty, in the sequel the clash with Christianity's proselytes, as alike, posterior to the Babylonian Talmud and Palestine demise, the Germanic Franks awakening to the "Jewish Question", equally Hispania's mounting resentment, Byzantine Jew's civil rights restrictions, until Papacy *Sicut non* policy, only one conclusion is possible:

Even though portending ongoing persecutions was more of a reality than a stray suggestion, it did not by the slightest degree amend Judaism Oneness' predilection, and nor did any tension rise amongst them. Indeed, the just referred "I-Thou" relationship did not just grow stronger throughout the Diaspora, in spite of the several Rebellions of the exile in Cyrene, Cyprus, Mesopotamia and Egypt – which would have meant an "I-it" relationship with the at-the-time Roman enemy – as, furthermore, prayer (as a definite substitute for sacrifice), one among a number of precepts, as well as copying of scrolls, recitation of contents and oral exegesis of traditions, helped to chisel firm and skilfully on the Monotheist rock the "Face-to-Face" encounter. This was so, essentially discerning on one side Pharisaic and on the other side Sadducaic and Essenic Halakhic interpretations, at first stance. Moreover, the Oral Torah helped to labour indulgence on dogmatism, as is shown evidently in the Talmudic-Midrashic tradition of rendering Private Law *responsa prudentium*, originating from admissible degrees of sanctity in the scribal priesthood.

On the whole, of all the fluctuations herewith imaginable – Jerusalem *vs*. other *loci*; Caesarea and Tiberias *vs*. Babylonia; House of Hillel *vs*. House of Shammai; Tannaim vs. Amoraim; Aristocracy *vs*. Democratising; Subrogates *vs*. Elderly; Levites *vs*. Priests; Pentateuchal nonconformists *vs*. Zadoqites – what remains elucidative and truthful is a sort of mainstay for Modernity and Contemporaneity, with reference to an "I-Thou" dialogical mutuality fortress, distinctive in having a Sanhedrim in each household, and, as Buber quoted, a progeny of Amos' descendants for the days to come. This last affirmation entails, if appreciated from our drafted close, the Prophecy of Prophecy. By the fact that it accruals, as if it were a Babylonian ziggurat, a progeny of elected people until the final days, and Prophecy having been successful in reiterating itself in post-Darwinism, it involves also an inversion, through Philosophy of Religion, of the Biogenetic Law's *dictatum* – in Judaism it is as if phylogeny recapitulates ontogeny – and helps us to amply understand the much-insisted-upon shift to *Humanitas*, mostly in the case of Martin Buber.

Prophecy enacted, thus, the interpretation of any forfeit as a future redemption and dissipated any possible minimal breach of the worship contract. Prayer in lieu of sacrifice seems, sadly, to have taken an about-face in the "Face-to-Face" and "I-Thou" relationship in the *Shoah*.

Without advocating an anachronistic spin, it's permissible to defend the view that several of these traits were, thus, almost in decal style, portrayed into posterity, discovering, in addition, how much of Levinas' conception of Ethics avows Buber's proclamation that the Divine cannot be approached by going beyond the human.

The aftermath of the French Revolution (1789), especially taking into account the fact that the Spanish Inquisition ended only at the beginning of the XIXth century, really marked the retake of a period of communal and religious normality in Europe for the Jews, except for the Golden Age of Jewish Culture in Iberia, the Sephardic flee to Holland, Cromwell's readmission of the Jews since the Reign of King Edward I in England, and, maybe ahead in time, for the Carolingian Renaissance with Charlemagne. They were all of intermittent nature, except for the in-the-root Anglo-Saxony, Protestant, active in commerce, advanced in Civil Rights and Religious tolerance cases of England and Holland. Subsequently, Rationalism seems to have wreaked havoc upon the most puerile folklore Culture and Religion through sophisticated Paganism, along the lines of interpretation of the Frankfurt School, themselves a refinement by-product of Reason, again in a demonstration of *argumenta* amalgamate. Just as it was anti-Semitism as such that drove to Nazify Catholicism and Protestantism, it was also Messianic Judaism petitioning to Cromwell by anathemised *Marranos* lead by the Rabbi Menasseh ben Israel, that granted a sort of shy citizenship.

As for the outward frontiers of Europe, prosperous Jewish communities had flourished confined to the territory of Mesopotamia, endowed by the spectacular and, for centuries, notorious *Yeshivas* at Sura and Pumbedita. After the siege and Fall of Constantinople (1453), with the Hellenised Byzantines having been deposed by the Ottomans, the Jewish Communities in Byzantium, some settled since the days of the Roman Empire or Arabs in origin, saw the arrival of their fellow Sephardic Jews, mainly after the year of the expulsion of Jews from Spain (1492), and, under the *dhimmi* status, they cultivated largely a Golden Age nostalgia. Even after having

endeavoured in former Byzantium, old Adrianople and Byzantine Thessaloniki, publishing Hebrew books, building *Yeshivot* and giving rise to a generation of *Halakhic* mentors, dialoguing with the Ashkenazi who had in the meanwhile arrived from Central Europe, it was not long before, again in Messianic sort, that the Sabbatians had plunged Jewry into decay. It was hand in hand, it seems, therefore, that the unorthodox Messianic incursions in Judaism, as apostasies to Prophecy, were lost as Sacred and Profane *argumenta* after Rationalism, with the exception of mystical Hasidism.

Nevertheless, it does not seem to the slightest degree that Prophecy in Judaism has in any way lost its long-lasting great exaltedness of God in the secular time of History, of fearing and striving Nature, and the post-*Shoah* age even looks as if it is in repentance, as Paul Celan poeticized, lied at unspeakable depth beneath *Time and Being*, borrowing again the Philosophical title by Martin Heidegger. Secular Providential Prophecy having substituted Religious Prophecy, a passageway which, in turn, wasn't possible without the referred liberated philosophically *modi*, otherwise in Hebraic discovered to originally accommodate to the sense of מידות (*Middot*:Measurements, *Attributus*), is still, furthermore, unlike the strongly land-statal and secularly divided Catholicism's schisms, wholly inclusive but still excluding, and unlike Islam's expansion-caliphates non-secular unity, exclusive but still wholly inclusive.

In responsa "I-Thou" and "Face-to-Face" come to represent, therefore, dignifiedly, Time and Prophecy in Judaism.

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Beyond Kolmogorov Philosophy

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Abstract

The Kolmogorov's probability philosophy is based on set of axioms that can be extended to encompass the imaginary set of numbers and this by adding to the original five axioms of Kolmogorov an additional three axioms. Hence, any experiment can thus be executed in what is now the complex set C which is the sum of the real set R with its corresponding real probability, and the imaginary set M with its corresponding imaginary probability. Whatever the probability distribution of the random variable in R is, the corresponding probability in the whole set C is always one, so the outcome of the random experiment in C can be predicted totally. Hence chance and luck in R is replaced by total determinism in C. This is the consequence of the fact that the probability in C is got by subtracting the chaotic factor from the degree of our knowledge of the system.

keywords–Kolmogorov's axioms, random variable, probability, real set, imaginary set, complex set, complex number, probability norm, degree of knowledge of the system, chaotic factor, Bernoulli experiment, Binomial distribution, Gaussian or normal distribution, density function, Young's modulus.

Original Kolmogorov's Set of Axioms:

The simplicity of *Kolmogorov's* system of axioms may be surprising. Let E be a collection of elements {E₁, E₂, …} called elementary events and let F be a set of subsets of E called random events. The five axioms for a finite set E [2] are:

1. F is a field of sets.
2. F contains the set E.
3. A non-negative real number $P_{rob}(A)$, called the probability of A, is assigned to each set A in F.
4. $P_{rob}(E)$ equal 1.
5. If A and B have no elements in common, the number assigned to their union is $P_{rob}(A \cup B) = P_{rob}(A) + P_{rob}(B)$; hence, we say that A and B are disjoint; otherwise, we have $P_{rob}(A \cup B) = P_{rob}(A) + P_{rob}(B) - P_{rob}(A \cap B)$.

And we say also that $P_{rob}(A \cap B) = P_{rob}(A) \times P_{rob}(B|A) = P_{rob}(B) \times P_{rob}(A|B)$ which is the conditional probability. If both A and B are independent, then $P_{rob}(A \cap B) = P_{rob}(A) \times P_{rob}(B)$.

An example of probability would be the game of coin tossing. Let p_1 denote the probability of getting head H and p_2 denote the probability of getting tail T. Then we have:

$E = \{H,T\}$

$F = \{\Phi, \{H\}, \{T\}, \{H,T\}\}$

$P_{rob}(\Phi) = 0, P_{rob}(E) = P_{rob}(\{H,T\}) = 1$

$P_{rob}(\{H\}) = p_1$ and $P_{rob}(\{T\}) = p_2$

$P_{rob}(\{H\} \text{ or } \{T\}) = p_1 + p_2 = 1$

$P_{rob}(\{H\} \text{ and } \{T\}) = 0$

And this according to the original Kolmogorov's set of axioms.

Adding the Imaginary Part M:

Now, if we can add to this system of axioms an imaginary part such that:

6. Let $P_m = i(1-P_r)$ be the probability of an associated event in M (the imaginary part) to the event A in R (the real part). It follows that $P_r + P_m/i = 1$ where $i^2 = -1$ (the imaginary number).
7. We construct the complex number $Z = P_r + P_m = P_r + i(1-P_r)$ having a norm $|Z|^2 = P_r^2 + (P_m/i)^2$
8. Let Pc denote the probability of an event in the universe C where C = R + M
   We say that Pc is the probability of an event A in R with its associated event in M such that: $Pc^2 = (P_r + P_m/i)^2 = |Z|^2 - 2iP_rP_m$ and is always equal to 1.

We can see that the system of axioms defined by Kolmogorov could be hence expanded to take into consideration the set of imaginary probabilities.

Example: Coin Tossing (Bernoulli experiment)

If we return to the game of coin tossing, we define the probabilities as follows:

Output	R	M
Getting Head	$\mathrm{Pr}_1 = p_1$	$Pm_1 = q_1 = i(1-p_1)$
Getting Tail	$\mathrm{Pr}_2 = p_2$	$Pm_2 = q_2 = i(1-p_2)$
Sum	$\sum_i p_i = 1$	$\sum_i q_i = i$

If we calculate $|Z_1|^2$ for the event of getting Head, we get:

$$|Z_1|^2 = \mathrm{Pr}_1{}^2 + (Pm_1/i)^2$$

$$= p_1{}^2 + (q_1/i)^2 = p_1{}^2 + (1-p_1)^2 = 1 + 2p_1(p_1-1) = 1 - 2p_1(1-p_1)$$

This implies that:

$$1 = |Z_1|^2 + 2p_1(1-p_1) = |Z_1|^2 - 2.i.p_1.i(1-p_1) = |Z_1|^2 - 2i\,\mathrm{Pr}_1\,Pm_1$$

$$= \mathrm{Pr}_1{}^2 + (Pm_1/i)^2 - 2i\,\mathrm{Pr}_1\,Pm_1 = (\mathrm{Pr}_1 + Pm_1/i)^2 = Pc_1{}^2$$

where $i^2 = i \times i = -1$ and $\dfrac{1}{i} = -i$

This is coherent with the axioms already defined and especially axiom 8.

Similarly, if we calculate $|Z_2|^2$ for the event of getting Tail, we get:

$$|Z_2|^2 = \mathrm{Pr}_2{}^2 + (Pm_2/i)^2$$

$$= p_2{}^2 + (q_2/i)^2 = p_2{}^2 + (1-p_2)^2 = 1 + 2p_2(p_2-1) = 1 - 2p_2(1-p_2)$$

This implies that:

$$1 = |Z_2|^2 + 2p_2(1-p_2) = |Z_2|^2 - 2.i.p_2.i(1-p_2) = |Z_2|^2 - 2i\,\mathrm{Pr}_2\,Pm_2$$

$$= \mathrm{Pr}_2{}^2 + (Pm_2/i)^2 - 2i\,\mathrm{Pr}_2\,Pm_2 = (\mathrm{Pr}_2 + Pm_2/i)^2 = Pc_2{}^2$$

This is also coherent with the axioms already defined and especially axiom 8.

1. Role of the Imaginary Part:

It is apparent from the set of axioms that the addition of an imaginary part to the real event makes the probability of the event in C always equals to 1. In fact, if we begin to see the universe as divided into two parts, one real and the other imaginary, understanding will follow directly. The event of tossing a coin and of getting a head occurs in R (in our real laboratory), its correspondent probability is P_r. One may ask directly what makes that we ignore the output of the experiment (e.g. tossing the coin). Why should we use the probability concept and would not be able to determine surely the output? After reflection one may answer that: if we can know all the forces acting upon the coin and determine them precisely at each instant, we can calculate their resultant which will act upon the coin, according to the well known laws of dynamics and determine thus the output of the experiment:

$$\sum_i F_i = ma \,, \text{ where } F \text{ is the force, } m \text{ the mass, and } a \text{ the acceleration}$$

Hence, taking into consideration the effect of all hidden (i.e. unknown and

undetermined) forces or variables, the experiment becomes deterministic, that is, it becomes possible to know the output with a probability equals to 1. This is plausible if we consider the simple experiments of dynamics like of a falling apple or a rolling body experiments where the hidden variables are totally known and determined and which are: gravitation, air resistance, friction and resistance of the material. But when the hidden variables become difficult to determine totally like in the example of lottery – where the ball has to be chosen mechanically by the machine in an urn of hundred moving bodies!!!– we are not able in the latter case to determine precisely which ball will be chosen since the number of forces acting on each ball are so numerous that the kinematics study is very difficult indeed. Consequently, the action of hidden variables on the coin or the ball makes the result what it is. Hence the complete knowledge of the set of hidden variables makes the event deterministic; that is, it will occur surely and thus the probability becomes equal to one, [3].

Now, let M be the universe of the hidden variables and let $|Z|^2$ be the degree of our knowledge of this phenomenon. P_r is always, and according to Kolmogorov's axioms, the probability of an event. A total ignorance of the set of variables in **M** makes:
$P_r = P_{rob}$(getting Head) = 1/2 and P_{rob}(getting Tail) = 1/2 (if they are equiprobable).
$|Z_1|^2$ in this case is equal to $1 - 2p_1(1-p_1) = 1 - (2 \times 1/2) \times (1 - 1/2) = 1/2$.
Conversely, a total knowledge of the set in R makes: P_{rob}(getting Head) = 1 and $P_m = P_{rob}$(imaginary part) = 0;
Here we have $|Z_1|^2 = 1 - (2 \times 1) \times (1-1) = 1$ because the phenomenon is totally known, that is, its laws are determined, hence; our degree of our knowledge of the system is 1 or 100%.
Now, if we can tell for sure that an event will never occur i.e. like 'getting nothing' (the empty set), in the game of Head and Tail, P_r is accordingly = 0, that is the event will never occur in R. P_m will be equal to $i(1-P_r) = i(1-0) = i$, and $|Z_1|^2 = 1 - (2 \times 0) \times (1-0) = 1$, because we can tell that the event of getting nothing surely will never occur thus our degree of knowledge of the system is 1 or 100%.
It follows that we have always: $1/2 \le |Z|^2 \le 1$ since $|Z|^2 = P_r^2 + (P_m/i)^2$ and $0 \le P_r, P_m \le 1$. And in all cases we have: $Pc^2 = (P_r + P_m/i)^2 = |Z|^2 - 2iP_rP_m = 1$

2. Meaning of the Last Relation:

According to an experimenter tossing the coin in R, the game is a game of luck: the experimenter doesn't know the output in the sense already explained. He will assign to each outcome a probability P_r and say that the output is not deterministic. But in the universe C = R + M, an observer will be able to predict the outcome of the game since he takes into consideration the contribution of M, so we write:

$$Pc^2 = (P_r + P_m/i)^2$$

So in C, all the hidden variables are known and this leads to a deterministic experiment executed in an eight dimensional universe (four real and four imaginary; where three for space and one for time in R, and three for space and one for time in M) [1]. Hence Pc is always equal to 1. In fact, the addition of new dimensions to our experiment resulted to the abolition of ignorance and non-determination. Consequently, the study of this class of phenomena in C is of great usefulness since we will be able to predict with certainty the outcome of experiments conducted. In

fact, the study in R leads to non-predictability and uncertainty.

So instead of placing ourselves in R, we place ourselves in C then study the phenomena, because in C the contributions of M are taken into consideration and therefore a deterministic study of the phenomena becomes possible. Conversely, by taking into consideration the contribution of the hidden forces we place ourselves in C and by ignoring them we restrict our study to non-deterministic phenomena in R.

Conclusion:

The degree of our knowledge in the real universe R is unfortunately incomplete, hence the extension to the complex universe C that includes the contributions of both the real universe R and the imaginary universe M. Consequently, this will result in a complete and perfect degree of knowledge in C. This hypothesis is verified in this paper by the mean of many examples encompassing both discrete and continuous domains. Moreover, we have proved a linear proportional relation between the degree of knowledge and the chaotic factor. In fact, in order to have a certain prediction of any event it is necessary to work in the complex universe C in which the chaotic factor is quantified and subtracted from the degree of knowledge to lead to a probability in C equal to one. Thus, the study in the complex universe results in replacing the phenomena that used to be random in R by deterministic and totally predictable ones in C.

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Patients' Perception of their Patient Rights as Compared to Compliance with Such Patient Rights as Exhibited by Nurses When They Incorporate the Patient into the bedside Teaching of Nursing Students

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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to study patients' perception of their patient rights while concurrently observing how the actual nursing care provided related to such patients' rights when the patient was involved in a bedside teaching experience to nursing students, and compare patients' perception of patients' rights and the perception of these same patients' rights by the nurses providing the aforementioned bedside teaching. Subjects were selected by the technique of simple random sampling and were comprised of 140 patients in Yala Hospital and who were subsequently assigned to nursing students. The research's instruments were the Perception of Patients' Rights Questionnaire and the Perception of Patient when they were involved in actual Bedside Teaching Questionnaire. The reliability of the instruments was tested by Cronbach's alpha coefficient with a value of .95. Data was analyzed by using frequency distributions including percentages, means, standard deviation and dependent t-test.
The results showed:
1. Patients perceived their overall patients' rights at a moderate level ($\overline{x}$ =2.24, SD =.35). One out of four components, the right to the provision health care dimension, was at a high level ($\overline{x}$=2.36, SD =.41).
2. Patients perceived overall actual nursing care as it related to their patient rights at a moderate level ($\overline{x}$=2.27, SD =.35). One dimension of the right to receive the provision health care was at a high level ($\overline{x}$=2.38, SD =.40).
3. The total mean scores of the perception of patients' rights while nurses provided actual bedside teaching was at a moderate level. The mean scores of the perception of patients' rights while nurses provided actual bedside teaching were significantly higher than the mean scores of the perception of patients' rights at a level of .001.
 This study indicates that nurses should, at all times, provide nursing care based upon a patients' rights.
Keywords: Perception of patients' rights, bedside teaching

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Background

Today, basic human rights are considered to be an inviolable concept, and a minimum requisite in all civilized societies. Every adult person has the right to come to their own decisions. This is particularly true when a person becomes a patient as they have both physical and psychosocial needs. They have the right to receive timely and appropriate information so they may make informed decisions, and such information should be forthcoming without regard to the patient's particular situation or environment. Therefore, it is very crucial for nurses to protect patients' rights. The Law of Thailand, establishes that persons have their own individual rights and freedoms. Additionally, The Act of Consumer Protection B.E.2522 (1997) focuses on patients' rights including their right as to whether or not to choose particular health care services, their right to receive standard care, their right to be informed as to their or their family's rights, their right to receive compensation as a result of suffering any harm or injury, and their right to personal confidentiality.

In nursing education management, learning and teaching processes focus on authentic, or hands-on learning. Nursing students, during their clinical practicum, interact with real patients so they may develop their clinical skills, thereby integrating their theoretical knowledge with actual practical experience. Patient based teaching is an invaluable tool for developing qualified health care professionals, and as such it is necessary for nursing institutions to initiate and continue such teaching programs and methodologies.

Bedside teaching is a key method of teaching within the nursing profession. It enables students to assess patients effectively. Students are able to analyze the individual patient's problems and plan appropriate care. Bedside teaching is not a lecture but rather is comprised of a small group consisting of nursing instructor, students, and the patient and requires that one needs to know the patient's demographic data, treatments they have received, and the progression of their disease or health trauma. Occasionally, patients do not want to reveal such information. Nursing educators and students should be aware of the potential for violation of the patient's rights. In particular, prior to teaching, nursing instructors must ask and obtain from the patient, their permission to use them as a case study for educational purposes. Such requests typically are neglected. Naradol (2006) and colleagues studied how patients' felt about being used in a bedside teaching methodology known as the teaching ward round (TWR) method. Patients in their study expressed that neither a physician nor a nurse asked them for permission. Only 20.7% of them informed patients of the study's goals before they performed TWR teaching. 3.4% of the patients indicated that they felt a sense of isolation. They felt different from other patients, and 6.9% of the patients indicated they would not want to participate in the study if they were re-invited because they felt their rights had been violated.

Yala Hospital provides an educational venue for a number of health care educational institutions within Yala Province, Thailand. It is a significant resource of learning and teaching for nursing students, and bedside teaching is one of the teaching methodologies conducted by the hospital. If nursing educators and nursing students are unaware of patient's rights, it would be perceived by patients as a violation of their rights. Therefore, the researcher conducted this research study to examine the

perception of patients' rights and the perception of patients' rights while nurses providing actual bedside teaching.

The Study's Objectives

The study's objectives were to study:

1. the level of patients' perception of their patient rights;

2. the level of actual bedside teaching provided by nurses, and how the conduct of such related to patient rights; and to

3. compare the patient's perception of patient's rights and the patient's perception of patient's rights while nurses provided bedside teaching

Assumptions

1. Patients admitted to Yala Hospital had perception of patient's rights at a high level.

2. Patients admitted to Yala Hospital obtained nursing care related to patients' rights while nurses performing bedside teaching at a high level.

3. There were no differences between patients' perception of their rights and the perception of their rights when they received bedside nursing.

Scope of the Study

1. The scope of this study involved the examination of patients' perception of their rights as they participated in bedside teaching.

2. Population and sample of the study were the patients admitted to Yala Hospital from January to June 2009.

Conceptual Framework

Patient's perception of patients' rights

1. **Perception of the right to receive health care services**

2. **Perception of the right to receive information**

3. **Perception of the right to make decision regarding treatments**

4. **Perception of the right to protect confidentiality**

Nursing care related to patients' rights while performing bedside teaching

1.Providing care based on the right of patients to receive health care services

2. Providing care based on the right of patients to receive information

3. Providing care based on the right of patients to make decisions regarding treatments and nursing care

4. Providing care based on the right to protect confidentiality of the patients

Definitions of the Variables

1. The perception of patients' rights is the awareness exhibited by patients about the rights they should receive as stated by the Professional Nursing and Midwifery Act B.E. 2540 (1997) and the Declaration of Patients' Rights of Thailand Nursing and Midwifery Council. There are 4 components:

1.1 The perception of their right to receive health care services is the awareness exhibited by patients' as to their right to receive qualified, safe, equal care.

1.2 The perception of their right to be informed is the awareness exhibited by patients' as to their right to be informed concerning their health status, advantage(s) or disadvantage (s) to be obtained from any form of treatment or nursing care, and the provision of such treatment and nursing care.

1.3 The perception of their right to make decisions regarding treatment and nursing care is the extent to which patients are aware of their right in the freedom of choice they have to make decision to obtain or refuse treatment and nursing care based upon their beliefs and/or culture, as well as in their freedom to select health care provider over another.

1.4 The perception of their right to protect their confidentiality is the patients' awareness of their freedom to discuss their beliefs, culture and religion, as well as their choice to decline the divulgence of their personal information to the health care provider.

2. Nursing care related to patients' rights as nurses perform bedside teaching is the patients' opinions toward their own rights while bedside teaching has been performed by nursing instructors. They consisted of 4 components.

2.1 Providing nursing care based on the right of patients to receive health care services is the patient's view of obtaining effective nursing care while nurses are providing bedside teaching.

2.2 Providing nursing care based upon the right of patients to receive information is the patient's opinion of being informed about their health status, advantage(s) or disadvantage(s) to be obtained from any forms of treatment or nursing care, and the provision of such treatment and nursing care.

2.3 Providing nursing care based upon the right of patients to make decisions regarding treatment and nursing care is the patient's opinion about their choice to gain or refuse treatment or nursing care, depending upon their beliefs and culture. It also includes the freedom choice for patients in their selection of health care providers or a request for assistance from nurse instructors.

2.4 Providing care based upon the right to protect and uphold the confidentiality of the patient information, is patient's view of their freedom to discuss their beliefs, culture and religion without fear of prejudice as well as certainty that such information will not be divulged to those without a need to know such information. Additionally, it is the patient's choice to withhold their personal information, and to ask for protection of their confidentiality from the nursing educators.

3. Patients comprised those individuals who were admitted to any ward of Yala Hospital, and where nursing students performed their clinical practicum.

Research Methodology

1. The population of the study from which the sample was derived included 925 patients who, during the period May to June 2009, were admitted to any ward of Yala Hospital, and in which such wards, nursing students of Borommarajonani Nursing College of Yala were participating in the satisfaction of their clinical practicum (Medical Registrar, Yala Hospital, 2009).

2. The study's sample was selected by a simple random technique and using the indication to specify the sample size as mentioned by Sripairoth (1984): If 100 < N < 1,000 specify sample size (n) = 15-30% of N (Population). For this study, the sample size equals 140.

Research Instruments

1. The instrument of this study was a Likert's Rating Scale. It had been modified by the researcher from the research tool of Supasri (2003) as well as the conceptual framework of the Act B.E. 2540 (1997). There were 3 parts, as follows:

    1) 10 items of demographic data

    2) The Patients' Perception of Patients' Rights Questionnaire consisting of 40 items encompassing 4 components: the perception of their rights to receive health care services, the perception of their rights to be informed, the perception of their rights to make decision regarding treatments and nursing care, and the perception of their rights to protect their confidentiality; and

    3) The Patients' opinions of their rights as nurses performed bedside teaching, consisting of 40 items covering 4 components: providing nursing care based on the right of patients to receive health care services, providing nursing care based on the right of patients to receive information, providing nursing care based on the right of patients to make decision regarding treatments and nursing care, and providing care based on the right to protect confidentiality of the patients.

    ### Scoring Interpretation

Mean Scores	Interpretation
2.36 – 3.00	Patients' perception of patients' rights is at a high level
1.68 – 2.35	Patients' perception of patients' rights is at a moderate level
1.00 – 1.67	Patients' perception of patients' rights is at a low level

3. The content validity of the instrument was tested by 3 experts and then revised as recommended by the experts. The researcher later tested the revision of the instrument with 30 patients. Also, the reliability of the instrument was examined with Cronbach's alpha coefficient demonstrating the value of .95.

Data Collection

Subsequent to receiving permission from the Director of Yala Hospital, the researcher met with patients and informed them of the study's goals and inquired as to their willingness to be a part of this study. The researcher distributed the questionnaire to those patients agreeing to participate in the study. Once completed, and prior to the recording of the data, patient questionnaires were reviewed by the researcher to ensure the completeness of each questionnaire.

Data Analysis

1. Frequency and percentage were used to analyze the demographic data.

2. Mean and standard deviation were utilized to analyze the level of the patients' perception of patients' rights while nurses performed bedside teaching.

3. Dependent t-test was used to compare between the level of the patients' perception of patients' rights and the level of the patients' perception of patients' rights while nurses performed bedside teaching.

The Results of the Study

1. Demographically, most of the sample consisted of female patients (67.9%) within the following age ranges: 15-30 years old (41.4%), 31-40 years old (22.9%) and 51-60 years old (7.1%). With respect to the sample population taken as a whole, 66.4% were Muslim, 61.4% were married, while 32.9% were single. A majority of the patients had been admitted to the hospital more than once within the three years prior to the conducting of the study (61.43%), and the predominant length of their stay was 3-6 days (40.7%). As to their educational backgrounds, most had graduated from elementary school (34.8%). Undergraduate degrees represented the highest level of education achieved within the sample group (28.4%). There were a variety of occupations within the sample. 24.1% were independent employees, 23.4% of them were still in school, and 4.9% of them were retired government officers. Their monthly incomes ranged from less than 5,000 baht (45.7%) to more than 15,000 baht (4.3%), 74.3% of the sample population received economic support from the Royal Thai government with regard to the provision of health care services.

2. With respect to patients' perception of their patient rights, the results demonstrated that patients perceived their own rights at a moderate level (x = 2.24, SD = .35). Only one out of 4 components, the perception of their right to receive health care services was at a high level (x = 2.36, SD = .41). The other three components of patient rights, as perceived by the patients were at a moderate levels, including the perception of the right to receive information.

(x = 2.19, SD = .44), the perception of the right to make decision regarding treatment and nursing care (x = 2.18, SD = .37), and the perception of the right to protect their confidentiality (x = 2.25, SD = .41).

3. With respect to the perception by patients as to the adherence of the nursing instructors complying with patients' rights while such nurses were involved in bedside teaching, most of the patients perceived they received nursing care to protect their rights at a moderate level (x = 2.24, SD = .35). The component consisting of a patient's right to be kept adequately informed was perceived at a high level while nursing instructors performed bedside training (x = 2.36, SD = .41). However, the three other components were perceived by patients at only moderate levels as nursing instruction in bedside training was taking place. Specifically, the three components and their scores were; the right to receive information (x = 2.19, SD = .44), the right to make decisions about treatment and nursing care (x = 2.18, SD = .37), and the right to protection of their confidentiality (x = 2.25, SD = .41).

4. When comparing between the patients' perception of their patient rights, and their perception concerning their rights as they participated in bedside teaching conducted by nursing instructors, the findings showed that the mean scores of the level of perception of their rights while they were receiving bedside teaching were significantly higher than their perception of patients' rights without bedside teaching at a level of 0.01. There was no difference in the perception by a patient regarding the right to protection of confidentiality either with or without bedside teaching. The mean scores of the level of their perception of their right to receive information, make decisions about treatment and nursing care, and the right to receive health care services, were higher while they were receiving bedside teaching (D = .07, S_d = .37, D = .06, S_d = .18, D = .05, S_d = .32, and D = .02, S_d = .30 respectively). There was no difference between the mean scores of the right to the protection of patient confidentiality when considering perceptions associated either with or without bedside teaching.

Discussion

1. Patients admitted to Yala Hospital evidenced moderate levels of perception with respect to their patient rights. Study participants exhibited moderate levels of perception concerning the right to receive health care services, the right to be kept informed, and the right to make decisions regarding treatment and nursing care. These levels were consistent with the study of Supasri mentioned earlier. She studied the perception of patients' rights exhibited by mothers giving birth in the hospital under the Ministry of Public Health, Thai Red Cross Hospital, and Chonburi Hospital. The results in her study showed that the mothers perceived their rights at a moderate level (x = 2.25, SD = .65) for the 3 component of patients' rights consisting of the right to confidentiality of patient and patient information, the right to obtain information, and the right to receive health care services. Mothers perceived at a low level, their right to make decisions concerning treatment and nursing care. Also, in Polsen's study (1998), she studied the patients' perception of patients' rights in Navy Hospital. The findings demonstrated that most patients perceived all components of their rights including the right to receive health care services,

patient confidentiality, the right to information, explanation from health care providers, and the right to refuse treatments. Patients had a high perception level when considering each component: the right to obtain information, the right to make decision concerning treatment and nursing care, and the right to protect confidentiality. Concern for privacy has dramatically increased within the past few years as a result of the globalization of today's world. The use of the Internet is ubiquitous and when coupled with the advancement of technology and information systems creates the potential for misuse of a patient's personal information. At the same time this new world order also empowers the individual (i.e., patient) to be more aware of their personal rights when it comes to the health care arena. People are more cognizant of their own rights and freedoms. Specifically within the health care system, the past few years has seen an increasing focus by health care organizations upon patients' rights. These health care organizations are exerting greater efforts to initiate health care services that recognize and comply with patients' rights, such as the right of patients to be provided equal and standardized care without regard to their gender, ethnicity, religious background, socio-economic status, culture or personal beliefs and values.

2. Patients admitted to Yala Hospital had a high level of their perception of their rights while nurses were performing bedside teaching exercises. However, patient perception was at a moderate level with regard to the right to obtain information, the right to personal decision making about treatment and nursing care, and the right to protection of patient confidentiality. In comparison to Supasri's study (2003), mentioned earlier, she found that the mothers had a moderate level of their perception of their rights ($x = 2.02$, SD = .57) while these same mothers expressed a low level of perception with respect to their each of the following rights – the right to obtain information, the right to personal decision making about treatment and nursing care, and the right to protection of patient confidentiality. In another study, conducted by Prachakorn (2002) among patients of Bang-Bor Hospital, Samut-Pragan Province, it was found that patients perceived their overall component rights at a moderate level ($x = 2.96$, SD = .44). Within this same study, the researcher discovered that patients perceived their right to the protection of patient confidentiality to be at a moderate level. Perhaps nurses are more aware of patients' rights given the mandate expressed by Thai Nurse and Midwifery Council's Declaration of Patients' Rights in which they state that "Nurses should provide equal care to Thai people regardless of ethnicity, religion, and socio-economic status" (Thai Nurse and Midwifery Council, 1998). Moreover, nurses have perceived their nursing roles and responsibilities and have integrated and incorporated these into their nursing actions. Today, people are able to recognize what nursing roles are, and as a result expectations of patients and family with respect to health care services or health care providers are now raised to a higher level. When contacting health care institutions, today's patients anticipate receiving effective care, particularly as regards their patient rights.

3. Bedside teaching created no statistical difference in the perception by a patient as to their patient rights. The results showed an increase in the mean scores of patient perception in those instances of bedside teaching of .001 over instances not involving bedside teaching. The mean scores were different when

considering the individual components of patient rights involving their right to receive information, the right in their freedom to select treatment and nursing care and their right to receive health care services. However, contrary to the findings in the studies of Supasri (2003) and Prachakorn (2002), mentioned earlier, there was no difference in the component protection of patient confidentiality. This may result from the fact that in this study data was collected from others by care givers such as nursing students. The higher mean scores of the right to receive information, the right to make decisions about treatment and nursing care, occur as nursing education places more emphasis on patients' rights. Today's nurses are more aware of patients' rights. For instance, when nurse educators plan to perform bedside teaching with students, they will, prior to implementing the bedside training, assign a patient to the student in advance. Typically a student will have anywhere from a half to a full day prior to bedside teaching which provides them with the opportunity to meet the patients and develop the professional relationship. In this situation, students introduce themselve, assess the patient's demographic data, health history, and offer help for them. Most of the patients in this study are Muslim (66.4%). Their ways of life and native language and dialect they use, called "Malayu" are specific to their culture. Most of the nursing students in this study were able to communicate in the patient's native language and this may establish trustworthiness between student and patient and an understanding of the patients' ways of life. This in turn enables patients to feel comfortable in sharing their opinions about their problems. Similarly, in the study of Songwattana and her colleagues (2008) they found that the factor that could help establish the collaboration of the education in the three south-bordered provinces was to minimize the communication barriers as well as to promote cultural sensitivity among health care providers. Consistent with the study of Sansabai, Suttasungsri, and Chaowarit (2005), they found that nurses gave inadequate and ambiguous information to HIV/AIDS patients that may have a negative effect on a patient's perception and result in a patient misunderstanding their illness. Therefore, the researcher concluded that it is necessary for nursing students to be supervised by the nurse preceptors or nurse instructors so they may guide their students in how to best achieve meeting patients' rights. Although, the mean scores of the level of the perception were higher when they received bedside teaching, it was not considered as highly different among each component. This may be attributable to the increased use of technology by the general populace as they can educate themselves via the modern technology such as internet. They have easier access to information systems and learn what people expect to achieve from health care services or health care providers (Sansabai, Suttasungsri, and Chaowarit, 2005). There was no difference between the mean scores of patients' perception of the right to the protection of patient confidentiality. This may be attributable to the fact that confidentiality of patients' rights had been discussed. Patients learn about their rights from a variety of media. If nursing students are aware of patients' rights, they would be able to provide an appropriate care for their patients with the respect of the patients' cultural differences and provide alternative choice to receive care such as a choice to choose a male or a female nurse. Subsequently, the patients would not feel the gap between them and the nurse instructors when obtaining bedside teaching.

Suggestions

The application of the research study are as follows:
1. The application for nursing administration and nursing intervention
1.1 Establishment the health care policy to protect patients' right.
1.2 Announcement of the Thai Nurse and Midwifery Council's Declaration of
 Patients' rights should be posted in the hospital area where people can see easily.
 Also, bilingual, Thai and Malayu, should be documented.
1.3 Review the Thai Nurse and Midwifery Council's Declaration of Patients'
rights and the guideline for practice periodically.
1.4 Review the Thai Nurse and Midwifery Council's Declaration of Patients'
 rights and the guideline for practice for the new nurses.
2. The application for nursing education
2.1 The integration of patients' rights into every nursing course as well as the
 extra-curriculum activities;
2.2 Application of the findings of this study into the curriculum management;
2.3 Orientation of patients' rights to new students and graduates and;
2.4 Enhancement of sharing environment to learn about the patients' right
 between nurse instructors and nursing students.
2.5 Establishment of daily affirmation by nursing students committing themselves
 to recognizing and complying with a patient's rights.
3. The application for research
3.1 Further research study regarding the nursing students' perception of the
 patients' rights should be conducted in order to examine whether there is a gap of
 nursing students' perception.
3.2 Further research study should be conducted in other groups of patients.

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Freedom of Speech on Political Issues vs. Independency of Judiciary Power

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Introduction

In November 2011, a Korean judge posted a message on his Facebook wall criticizing the possible approval of the KOR-US FTA[1]. As judges are expected to be politically neutral, a vibrant public debate followed up.

Arguments basically hinge on the competition between judicial freedom of speech on political issues and independency of the judiciary[2]. In order to establish to what extent judges are legally and ethically supposed to make public comments on political issues, it is firstly necessary to separately study the two values, recalling both their historical evolution and their legal force and, secondly, to compare the findings.

For purposes of convenience, the analysis will be limited to Greece, England and United States.

Evolution of Freedom of Speech

The first people formally acknowledging the freedom of speech was Ancient Greece. Such an achievement was very important because it implied that all the citizens, no matter their social status, could actively participate in the formation of the public policies by showing up at the *Demos*. This right of free speech was known as *isegoria*[3]. The introduction of *isegoria*, most importantly, clearly consecrated the belief for which freedom of speech and self-government were crucially interdependent[4].This desirable Greek footnote of history did not last. Moreover, it did not fully expand to other peoples[5] . In fact, it can be observed that people not acknowledging great freedoms of speech, were ruled by non-democratic regimes[6]. The issues related to the freedom of speech came back to be actual in occasion of the English democratic process, demonstrating once again the strong connection with the latter form of government.

The increased involvement of people in public policies started – in 1215 – with the concession of the Magna Charta in favor of the Barons. The consent of the latter was necessary for approving tax laws. For all the other subjects the Barons exerted a consulting role for the King. Barons were successively joined by Representative of the counties (therefore not noble people) and in 1285 the Model Parliament was established. This body, made up of aristocrats, clergymen and representatives, gained more and more importance, becoming the very body for the law making[7]. They

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[1] On line column at: http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/507277.html

[2] As observed by Van Mills (2012) "we are socially situated and it makes little sense to say that Robinson Crusoe has a right to free speech". This observation hinges on the fact that freedom of speech must be appreciated in relation "to other important ideals such as privacy, security and democratic equality and there is nothing inherent to speech that suggests it must always win out in competition with these values" (Van Mills 2012).

[3] Berti (1978 p. 352) explains that in Athens, philosophers were prosecuted just because a certain freedom of speech was admitted; this is different from what happened in Sparta, where philosophers were not prosecuted because they were not even admitted.

[4] At that time, Greeks also prided themselves of another right related to the speech: *parrhesia*.
This right "referred to the content of what could be said. It included the right to criticize both persons and politicians, and to censure, admonish, berate, share, and insult one's fellow citizens and the leaders of the polis." (Roisman 2004). The right, anyway, also had some limits: "speaking against the gods or to the danger or detriment of the State were both forbidden". (Roisman)

[5] Mills (1859) provided a clear explanation about why governments shifted toward a less favorable treatment of freedoms, reaching   different degrees of political rights and constitutional checks.

[6] For a very brief overview of the history of democracy, see
http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/democrazia_res-c4b3cff1-bd4f-11e1-bb7e-d5ce3506d72e_%28Dizionario-di-Storia%29/

[7] So not any more a body for mere consulting services.

initiated and won their struggle against the King for the acknowledgment of freedom of speech inside the Assembly. Practically, while debating Acts, members could freely express disagreement with the executive on public policy issues, resulting in a better or improved enactment of statutes. Similar path was followed in colonial America[8]. Freedom of speech for Assembly members involved two aspects: substantial – what they actually were allowed to say – and procedural – who exerted the control of what they were allowed to say. The Parliament itself established the limits and exerted the control. This model of governance, by the way, had two drawbacks:

a) the Parliament could prosecute any citizen that expressed a not welcomed opinion and, in fact, it used to do so;

b) it did not ensure the good quality of the Acts as members could freely act in the pursuing of their own interests than in those of people[9].

In the US, problem a) was resolved by the approval of the First Amendment of the Constitution. Accordingly, Horward (2006) remarks "…the First Amendment provides that the Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. In a democratic society we consider this freedom to be essential for participation in decision making by all members of society."

Another confirmation comes from Cooley (cited in Eliel 1924) in whose opinion the purpose of the First Amendment was "to protect parties in the free publication of matters of public concern, to secure their right to a free discussion of public events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at any time to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of public opinion… To guard against repressive measures … by means of which persons in power might secure themselves and their favorites from just scrutiny and condemnation was the general purpose…The evils to be prevented were any actions of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens".

The First Amendment, therefore, gave full meaning to the historical tradition of the freedom of speech: a tool to participate in the political activities.

Yet, it must not be forgotten that the acknowledgment of the freedom of speech was also a result of the establishment of natural right theories[10].

Problem b) was resolved through recognizing the power of judicial review. This power stems from the principle of separation of powers which is going to be discussed in the next paragraph.

Judicial Independency

The judicial independency is a value which basically characterizes all the current democracies. Thousand evidences can support such statement (national statutes, academic literature, magazines, newspaper etc.); it is worth, anyway, to mention the most representative one, which is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: it affirms that everyone must be judged by an "independent and impartial tribunal".

Although independency and impartiality look closely related each other, these two values deserve a separate attention.

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[8] See Corwin (1920).

[9] This is the agency problem abundantly discusses in literature. See Fama and Jensen (1983).

[10] See Hamburger (1991).

A tribunal is believed to be independent if it is free from the interference of other governmental branches[11]. Therefore, laws must provide mechanisms that ensure the separation of powers[12].

If one assumes this notion of judicial independence, it is very hard to argue that a judge speaking out about political issues is actually doing something that she/he should not. Interestingly, the two things seem even unrelated: there cannot be identified any interference into judicial activity[13].

But if one pays attention to the goals judicial independence is expected to pursue, then a different opinion may be brought up.

These goals are[14]:

a) the maintaining of the rule of law;
b) the overturning of unconstitutional laws[15];
c) the full execution of laws.

The goal in letter a) basically represents the impartiality of the judge. Therefore, if judicial speech on public policies affects the impartiality of the judge, it in turns affects the independency itself. Judicial speech on public policies and independency are hence related.

Accordingly, the attention has to be focused on when judicial speech on political issues affects the impartiality – and the independence – of the judge.

In order to accomplish this investigation it is firstly necessary to check what actually impartiality means.

According to case law[16], impartiality can be seen in three different ways:

a) judges do not have bias for any of the parties in the trial;
b) lack of preconception in favor or against a particular political/legal view;
c) openmindedness, meaning that the judge is impartial when he/she is not reluctant to consider legal issues that are contrary to his/her preconceptions.

The most accepted notion of impartiality is the one expressed by letter a)[17].

Clarified the concept of impartiality, the analysis should be continued by answering the question: in which cases the judicial expression of thoughts render the judge biased in favor of one of the parties?

To begin with, it must be specified that two different situations might occur. The first one is that the judge expresses his/political thoughts about issues which are very far from the courtroom. The second one is represented by cases where the judge expresses opinions about issues on a pending or imminent case that he/she her/himself or even different court is dealing with.

The distinction between the two situations is clear.

In the latter, the opinion of the judge might affect the jury[18] or "the outspoken opinion of a respected federal judge might influence the prosecutor's decision about whether or not to proceed"[19]. A biased behavior from the judiciary is therefore likely to

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[11] See Judicial Office for Scotland (n.d.).

[12] Concerning these mechanism see for example Lord Justice Brook (n.d.).

[13] This perspective takes into consideration the historical struggle between people and authority. In particular, people have never been happy with courts serving Government's will. Emblematic is the case of England, where this struggle was resolved only in the 17th century, with the adoption of the Bill of Rights 1688 and the enforcement of Act of Settlement in 1701. See Diescho (2008)

[14] *See Republican Party v. White*

[15] For a more detailed discussion about the judicial review see Gerber (2007).

[16] See footnote n. 14

[17] *Ibid*

[18] See the case of Judge Lance Ito in Chemerinsky (1995).

[19] See Freedman (2001).

happen and for this reason restrains on speech in this kind of speeches might be considered fair.

In the former situation, there is no ground for charging a judge to undermine impartiality, as no trial exists and no parties can be favored by biased conducts. Yet, a judge expressing thoughts on political issues may be seen as undermining the appearance of impartiality: as a consequence of the judicial speech, people will get more familiar with the conviction that judges' decisions are shaped by their preferences rather than by the rule of law.

Appearance of impartiality is by no means "weaker" than impartiality; though, before deciding that it would lose the competition against the freedom of speech, it is indispensable to remark that both appearance of impartiality and impartiality itself are values whose force strictly depends on on which perception of the law is adopted[20].

In the opinion of Legal Formalism thinkers "law is deterministic, meaning that there are "right" legal decisions dictated by a correct application of the relevant legal principles. Judges may make mistakes in deciding cases, but Formalism suggests that judges correctly applying the appropriate rules to a given case should reach the same legal result"[21].

To better understand Legal Formalism, one can refer to a school of thought that is on the other extreme: Legal Realism. In particular, these intellectuals claim that law is "indeterminate and judges' decisions depended as much on context as upon strict application of rules of law"[22].

On one hand, if one assumes the Legal Formalism perception of law, the value of impartiality and, obviously, of appearance of impartiality, turns out to be dramatically reduced. According to this stream of thought, in fact, law admits only one correct solution to cases, being judges nothing more than the *bouche de loi* and their discretion rather limited. Therefore, even though they make public statements on political issues, their application of the law cannot be partial by definition: appearance of impartiality does not represent a danger because the law does not leave room for impartiality itself.

On the other hand, if one assumes the Legal Realism approach, then the both the impartiality and the appearance of impartiality gain importance. While, as seen earlier, the former seems to deserve a greater protection than the freedom of speech, the second would rather lose the competition. In particular, according to one stream of thought within the Legal Realism itself known as Legal Political Realism, most of the time the judge takes a decision, he/she does not purely apply the rule of law, but he/she applies also his/her own political beliefs: all law is political. Since it is very important, for a question of certainty of law, that judges comply with the rule of law as much as they can, then it is likely important people expect them to do so.

To protect the "appearance of impartiality", that is to say to reassure people by saying: "no worries, judges are strongly committed to the rule of law", judges have been asked to observe a duty of political neutrality. If a judge does not speak out, the citizen can still be confident that rule of law shall

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[20] See Marshall (2011).
[21] *Ibid*
[22] *Ibid*

prevail on personal inclinations: expectations for the judge to be as much loyal as possible to the legal principles, strongly increase.

The formalization of such standard of behavior, anyway, does not look like having a very long tradition.
The key date is the 1924, when the first Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted in the United States[23].
This document did not provide any canon concerning judicial participation in political activities. Amazingly enough, such issues were addressed only in 1972 when the 1924 was updated and rendered compulsory[24].
This could be due to two reasons: judges actually did not involve themselves in political debate; judges were involved in political debate in such a way that no other interests, as the impartiality, of the society were undermined.
According to literature, the reason is likely to be the first one[25].

Comparison of Findings

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that freedom of speech has a very long tradition, especially in relation to political issues. It is a value which is strictly connected with the democratic state. Independence of judiciary is also a value which has a long tradition and it is basically implemented through the impartial application of law.
If law is political, as Legal Political Realism maintains, it means that most of the judicial decisions are expected to carry with them some degree of partiality. Even though everybody would agree that the State should restore public confidence in that judges will be as less biased as they can, it would turn out difficult to claim that such State interest might be able to sacrifice an individual and natural right such as the freedom of speech.
Along with that, US legal doctrine has defined the appearance of impartiality as not representing a "compelling interest" for the State (Spottswood 2007, p. 352).
It can be concluded that, from a legal point of view, a judge publicly expressing opinions on political issues is protected, unless such opinions undermine the impartiality itself, as it possibly happens when a judge express opinions on pending case[26].
Even though judicial freedom of speech is supposed to enjoy great protection, still it would be professional for the judges to not openly disclose their views, and leave the public believing they are going to decide the case according to the rule of law.

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[23] Attempted actually were mad in 1907 and 1917, see Strawn (2008 p. 786).
[24] In 1990, further Canons concerning judicial political conduct were added. *Ibid* p. 787.
[25] The past 25 years have seen a growing judicial activism. See Salzberger, E. (2007)
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The Challenge of Assessment for the Community of Inquiry: Negotiating Individuals and Community

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In the Philosophy for Children (P4C) movement inaugurated by Matthew Lipman, Lipman and his followers have always recommended a dialogical model for children to practice philosophy – flowing from the ancient tradition of the Greeks. The increasing desire in education for the development of 21st century skills has breathed new life into this ancient tradition. Lipman's Community of Inquiry (COI) model (1976) promised to help children overcome the alienation of contemporary lifestyles through engaged dialogue and collaborative thinking. However, given the imperatives of a school system and the need for assessment to ascertain students' attainment of knowledge and skills, the challenge is for teachers to meaningfully assess philosophically rich discussions in an equitable (fair, valid, reliable) manner. This contribution seeks to engage the growing P4C movement with the conversation on assessment.

One key concern with assessment of dialogical skills developed through the COI is precisely the need to balance an assessment of the child as individual with the need to see the child as an integral part of a wider conversation. Exclusive focus on the individual was an unrealistic abstraction. Focus only on the group risked ignoring the distinctive contributions of individuals. *Est modus in rebus*. Some middle ground had to be found. This paper traces the development of an assessment approach that seeks this balance.

In *Discussion as a way of teaching: tools and techniques for democratic classrooms* (2005), Stephen Brookfield was interested in promoting classroom discussions as a form of teaching and learning and although he had some helpful things to say about evaluation, his approach did not include a full fledged formal means of assessing discussions and thus there was still much room to explore in the development of an assessment model for P4C's COI discussions.

This paper traces one of the top girls' schools in Singapore in its journey in coming up with an equitable manner to assess the students who are engaged in COI.

Background

Each educational institution will have to tailor its curriculum to its students. Likewise, the school in this study chose Philosophy as a curriculum anchor to underpin the intellectual development of its students who are female adolescent High Ability Learners (HALs). Philosophy is not a common subject for adolescents, in Singapore or elsewhere. And if done, it is usually done as an extra-curricular enrichment subject offered for only the HALs within that particular institution. Due to the school's student profile, Philosophy is offered to all pupils in this school as part of its curriculum.

Philosophy is not taught as a content-rich subject but more as a skills-enabler. The aim is to develop the girls in the art of philosophizing where they have to collaborate

with one another to co-create knowledge. This is also in line with the 21st Century Competencies model where the various skills (not exhaustive) as listed below in Figure 1 are taught not in and of themselves but in order for students to prepare themselves for collaborative problem-solving and knowledge creation in an increasingly interconnected environment:

21st Century Competencies

* Information and Communication Skills
* Collaborative Learning
* Cross-Cultural Competency
* Socio-emotional competencies
* Critical thinking and problem-solving skills

Group-based problem-solving and knowledge creation in an increasingly interconnected environment

Figure 1: Competencies and Skills for the 21st century

We can also see (from the Figure 2 below) [adapted from Gunawardena et al (1997)] that this emergent need to equip students with the skills necessary for collaborative inquiry towards the goal of co-created knowledge is an important one that present-day educators need to address in their curricular, pedagogical, and assessment approaches.

Phase	Processes	Actions
V	Application of newly constructed meaning	As students inquire collaboratively and teach one another reciprocally, their further discussion reflects new knowledge construction.
IV	Testing and modification	The negotiations trigger further experimentation, collecting data, review of literature and consultation with experts.
III	Knowledge co-construction	Considering others' viewpoints, students negotiate their diverse ideas and direct them towards a collective understanding.
II	Exploration of inconsistency among participants	Students contribute ideas and the ideas are different from each other.
I	Sharing and comparing of information	In groups, students discuss identified problems, set goals and determine group processes with guidance from teachers.

High degree of knowledge construction

Low degree of knowledge construction

Figure 2: 5 Phases of Knowledge Construction [adapted from Gunawardena et al (1997)]

In coming up with the schools' own model of assessment, we proceeded through several iterations. Each assessment model exposed certain limitations which prompted a review and the development of a revised assessment model.

The problem (Pre-2010): Focus on the Individual, Overly Analytic

In pre-2010, the assessment was focused on 12 discrete moves[1] taught to and expected from the students. These 12 were observable moves from the categories of "Active Participation", "Respect and Openness", and "Quality of Thinking".

		Moves made
RESPECT AND OPENNESS	1	Actively fosters an **atmosphere of respect** for dialogue partners
	2	Is willing to **modify her views** in the light of evidence presented
	3	Respectfully engages with opposing views by offering meaningful **counter-arguments**
ACTIVE PARTICIPATION	4	Demonstrates her attention to the discussion by accurately **re-stating** or **paraphrasing**
	5	Demonstrates her attention to the discussion by asking relevant **clarificatory questions**
	6	Helps advance the discussion by **taking stock** of the various views put forward
QUALITY OF THINKING	7	Elaborates one's position by supplying **relevant examples**
	8	Uncovers **assumptions**
	9	Traces the **implications** of a position
	10	Identifies **fallacies**
	11	Makes relevant **conceptual distinctions**
	12	Suggests a **working definition** to help focus the discussion

Figure 3: Pre-2010 list of COI moves

However, this checklist was found not to be satisfactory. Firstly, there were too many descriptors. Even though not all 12 moves will be simultaneous, it is difficult for any teacher to observe and note the different moves made by each student in a sitting with 6 to 12 students. Secondly, it is difficult to differentiate a reticent student who has been actively listening and awaiting her chance to contribute, from a confused student who cannot follow the discussion. Thirdly, the rubric was also overly analytic and focused too much on the individual. The assumption seemed to be that students would be able to display the significant moves during the time-bound assessment.

Working through the problem: Shift away from Discrete Items towards Holism

In November 2009, after a 3 full day internal Annual Department Conference held to re-examine existing syllabus and practices, the Philosophy Department then collapsed the category of "Respect & Openness" and "Active Participation" into that of "Participation", and changed the rubric from a highly analytical one to a holistic one based on pre-conceived pen pictures. In any authentic discussion, it is not possible for all students to demonstrate all the 12 moves meaningfully. For instance, when

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[1] Developed in-house by Raffles Girls' School Philosophy Department

there are no fallacies made, then there is no opportunity for students to identify any fallacies. The principles underpinning the new assessment document were Richard Paul's Intellectual Standards and Bloom's Taxonomy. 2 samples of the document (Fig 4a and 4b) are shown below:

RAFFLES GIRLS' SCHOOL (SECONDARY)
RAFFLES PHILOSOPHY COURSE
YEARS 3 & 4 COMMUNITY OF INQUIRY RUBRICS

Participation (Active Participation, Respect and Openness)

Excellent (13-16 marks)	Proficient (9-12 marks)
She *participates actively* in the discussion while taking time to *listen attentively* to the contributions of her peers. She thus displays *intellectual curiosity* in the topic and an *opennesss to learn.*	She *participates readily* in the discussion without the need to be called upon. She thus displays interest in the discussion.
She makes *sustained effort* in advancing the inquiry.	She makes *substantial attempts to advance the inquiry.*
She shows *respect and patience* for the views of others by *actively including* her peers in the discussion.	She shows *respect and patience* for the views of others by *trying to include* her peers in the discussion.

Figure 4a: Sample of 2010 COI rubric

RAFFLES GIRLS' SCHOOL (SECONDARY)
RAFFLES PHILOSOPHY COURSE
YEARS 3 & 4 COMMUNITY OF INQUIRY RUBRICS

Quality of Thinking (How does the pupil deal with philosophical concepts and arguments?)

Excellent (13-16 marks)	Proficient (9-12 marks)	Adequate (5-8 marks)
She has *precise* understanding of the central philosophical concepts in the article. For example, she paraphrases the concepts concisely for further clarification and/or raises questions about them.	She is able to *accurately* grasp central philosophical concepts in the article.	She has *partial* understanding of central philosophical concepts in the article.
She *applies these insightfully* in the discussion such that they probe the heart of the issue.	She applies philosophical concepts *thoughtfully* in the discussion such that they revolve around the issue.	She applies these in a *simplistic* manner such that her contribution does not add value to the discussion at hand.

Figure 4b: Sample of 2010 COI rubric

Present Reality: Acknowledging Collaboration, Emphasizing Holism

There was however still dissatisfaction with the revised document. The holistic approach made identifying precise areas of weakness difficult and did not help teachers in the coaching of the students on specific skill-sets where extra practice was needed. More precise categories were thus still deemed helpful in developing students' skills. And thus the broad "Quality of Thinking" criterion was distilled into 2 key individual competencies of "Questioning" and "Asserting" (See Figure 5a below).

Figure 5a: Sample of present day COI rubric (Individual Component)

At the same time, the review also considered the group context. To omit this was to bias the assessment towards individual performance. It tended to foster individualistic behaviours that could be detrimental to the overall quality of discussion. In response to this recognized need, there was a specific inclusion of a group component that focuses on the Community creating and maintaining a safe and conducive environment (hygiene factors) for discussion (See Figure 5b below).

Figure 5b: Sample of present day COI rubric (Group Component)

This is the current rubric in use at the moment. Some of the shortcomings identified in the previous models have been successfully dealt with – although room for improvement remains.

Conclusion

Our journey towards a fairer and more reliable assessment model continues. What I have shared above is just one school's journey. There should be useful lessons for any educator or institution seeking to give greater prominence to student-led discussions as a pedagogy.

To date, there has been little discussion in the P4C literature on assessing group discussions in a rigorous manner. Most schools which have infused P4C in their curricula have avoided evaluating the COI discussions directly – since P4C is often deployed instrumentally towards the development of critical thinking, collaborative thinking and other like competencies. Assessment is usually left to performance in other subject-based assessments. However, if we are to take seriously the idea that discussions are authentic demonstrations of students' cognitive, affective and interpersonal abilities, then it is time that we give the question of how to evaluate such discussions more thought.

Assessment for Learning applied to student-led discussions can help both teachers and students understand which skills need reinforcement and help develop the student towards being a more effective discussant. As we seek to cultivate engaged and active global citizens for the 21st century, discursive and dialogical skills are areas we cannot afford to neglect.

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Does Muslim and Secular Fundamentalism Suffer from the Same Pharmakon?

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The cataclysm caused by the destruction of the World Trade Center has reflected a division between social scientists over the perception of globalization. While some saw it in terms of the promise for economic advancement of the vulnerable it appeared to hold out, other saw in it the threat of the growing pauperization of the world in developing and developed countries, and the jeopardizing of fragile cultural communities[1]. Eclipsing such concerns for most westerners, however, is the specter of Muslim fundamentalism which has risen with blind violence. For religious fundamentalists it has become clear that the battle lines have been drawn over the primacy of religion over all other concerns. As a consequence, Muslim fundamentalism is now on the top list priorities of the United Nations. The impression of what religious extremism is varies between those who see globalization as a danger and those who don't. That can stem from several reasons: according to them, globalization is not only a political and economical threat but it is also a cultural one. The latter may well crystallize into what they started to call secular fundamentalism encompassing the two dimensions which will be explored in this paper. Secular fundamentalism has also been more recently described as an attitude excluding spirituality from the political realm. Indeed secular fundamentalists are "no different than their religious cousins"[2] in the way they hold an exclusive claim on truth or religion and the hatred they have for one another. Their shared conviction of possessing the whole "truth" means that they both exhibit a high degree of arrogance coupled with a common aversion to dialogue and compromise. This article intends, in the first place, to consider the conditions informing the emergence of both the Muslim and secular "-isms" and how both paradoxically end up sharing the same defects: which is to say, the rejection both of moral norms and of tolerance for others. This article will then attempt to answer the question do Muslim and secular fundamentalisms suffer from the same *pharmakon*? Keeping the double meaning of the Greek word in mind, at once poison and remedy, this question is double edged. On the one hand, it will be examined how the "poison" was transmitted; on the other, whether a common remedy can be found to both –isms.

Let us start by a few remarks in order to frame this study. An interesting case is the resurgence of Wahhabi ideology within Islam in the early twentieth century. In the region of what would become Saudi Arabia, this phenomenon emerges it at the same time as -the rise to prominence of nihilism in Europe. Both contain the seed of future Muslim and secular fundamentalisms. One could say that this was made possible thanks to an unlikely "theft"[3] by the extremists. Both groups situated at the extremes of the religious and philosophical spectrum. There was the attempt, on one hand, to rid Islam of its moral foundations, instead focusing on their exclusive approach of Islam; while the nihilists sought to re-appropriate the public sphere and make it their own with their scientist, materialistic and relativist approach to truth.

Let us closely examine both phenomena one at a time starting with that of the religious fundamentalism. Before defining this, one ought to know that without the double phenomena of modernization and secularization, Muslim fundamentalism

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[1] Michael Emerson &Hartman David, "The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism", *Annual Review in Sociology* 32 (August 2006), 132.

[2] Ramin Jahanbegloo New Face of Barbarism", *Jahanbegloo.com*. October 15. 2012. http://janabegloo.com/content/new-face-barbarism, 2.

[3] Khaled Abou El Faddl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007).

would not exist today[4]. For example, the wind of modernization sweeping across Muslim countries began to make its presence felt in beginning of the twentieth century with Kemal Ataturk in1922 in Turkey, Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia (1947), and Mohammad Rezā Shah Pahlavi (1941) in Iran: each proposing modernization and secularization in their respective countries. Secular Muslim political leaders gradually lost support from their respective religious movements. These campaigns encompassed the economic, political and social sphere and resulted in progressively more freedom for women, achieved, however, via an authoritarian approach which would ultimately have a boomerang effect in the Muslim and Hindu worlds. Muslim fundamentalism thrived in the subsequent backlash. It is therefore noteworthy that this branch of Islam displays a political agenda. That is it considers the restoration of the Muslim historical caliphate today as a viable way to unite most Muslims under a single polity. That type of Islam holds an ideology, like any political ideology. They reject western culture and define Islam as an "antithesis of [what] the West might be[5]", that is its democracy or its western human rights. As we will see later, both Muslim and secular fundamentalisms share more than a few characteristics. In order to understand why, it is necessary to undertake a short historical survey of Islam and look at the emergence of fundamentalism in order to consider whether or not these later values were perennial.

Islam has Muslim religious and judicial schools and form what we would call jurists. By the 10th century, there were six judicial schools four in the Sunni branch and two in the Shii branch. And jurists were educated in one of them. They then spent numerous years acquiring several licenses in order to become an expert in *sharia* (law). *Sharia* encompassed religious and social rules; the Islamic law was then very complex as it demanded the knowledge of subtle code of laws existing in a thousand books demanding knowledge of political, heuristic, and historical knowledge. The *sharia* was complex involving both rational and sentimental considerations. It required discerning debates between jurists as they were providing guidance hence using their ethical and historical learning. They represented an authority given to them by their rich knowledge and capacity to understand and analyze with sagacity; thanks to this they played an important role in civic society as advisors. Hence their status in society was high as they were the conduits of historical knowledge. Their training was paid for by wealthy philanthropists' people, who were politically disinterested, a fact which assured them certain equanimity[6]. Their opposition to extremist creeds which articulated during debates kept the latter at bay for several centuries. Under the Ottoman Empire, the jurists' schools were attached to the state that paid them a salary. Training became less demanding and the level of complexity of the teaching was impoverished. As first a reaction to the Turkish occupation the state modified the Muslim orientation of Jurists' school by emphasizing an Arab centric monolithic Islam. By the beginning of the18[th] century, the state jurists' schools had lost their prestige along with the jurists' status. By 1820, with the arrival of western colonialism modern legal standards transformed the Muslim legal schools. It is within this political context of foreign occupation that Muhammad bin Abd al Wahhab (1703-1792) has epitomized the transformation of the Muslim religion. He opposes within Islam the doctrine of intercession, mysticism, rationalism, and Shiism. He also

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[4] Emerson & Hart, "The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism", 127.

[5] Abdelwahab Meddeb, *Malady of Islam*. (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 65.

[6] Al Faddl, *The Great Theft*, 48.

stands against modernity which, to him, radically alters the human conception of reality with new theories – such as subjectivity and relativity - and stands against innovative scientific discoveries. He instead advocated a return to the so-called pristine, simple Islam by strictly abiding to the literal rituals and practices of the Holy text of the Koran. He rejected any influence outside of the geographic Saudi Arabic context, including the Sufi mystic influences of Persia, the abstract philosophical rational influence of Greece and the Turkish style of venerating Muslim holy places. He believed that the previous historical habit of allowing pluralism in Muslim practices and values had resulted in their backward underdeveloped situation. Hence is violent rejection of the Ottoman Empire lead him to collaborate with the English to repel Turkish domination, insisting on Arab Muslim purity and Arab Muslim nationalism by universalizing the particular Bedouin culture as the only proper Islam. He then sided with the Al Saud family so as to propose a unified front against the Turkish domination during their first alliance lasting from 1745 to 1818 for the creation of the first Saudi state. Ousted in 1818, their alliance reappeared under the leadership of Abd al Aziz bin Saud in 1902-1953. It is during this time that the Wahhabi tried to control Mecca and Medina, seeking thereby to take hold symbolically of the spiritual core of Islam. This was achieved by the "unholy" triple alliance between the Saudi family, the Wahhabi and the British Empire. Everybody gained something out of it and thanks to it they imposed their domination in the region. The Muslim World League was created in 1962 and Al Saud's family spread the Wahhabi doctrine throughout the world, a doctrine which became increasingly more sophisticated during the 1970's. Finally, the discovery of oil and the following wealth from the oil industry after 1973 allowed the explosive propagation of the Wahhabi creed throughout the world. Let us note that in most Muslim countries then the *sharia* was then instrumentalized by the Muslim fundamentalists to fight the left opposition.

Of crucial importance, as Meddeb asserts is the extent to which fundamentalism grows from the failed attempts of the isms; in this case the collapse of pan Arab nationalism that Nasser had fostered[7]. It is in this context that the Egyptian paradox emerged during these years, interweaving the re- Islamization of the country with the growing influence of American interests through an American Egyptian alliance. Last but not least one has to include the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that greatly contributed to the defeat of Pan Arab nationalism of Islam in the region with the 1967 war. The defeat of several Arab countries by Israel came as a blow to Arabs, who subsequently turned to a political Islam to channel this frustration, using it to rally people behind the fundamentalist Muslim cause. Nonetheless, the Egyptian paradox would be shaken by the assassination of President Sadat by Muslim fundamentalists led by the infamous Ayman Al Zawayri. From the 1980's onwards, Egypt and the other Muslim countries (including the rest of the world where Muslims lived) proved susceptive to the Wahhabi's exclusive and strict adherence to Islam. As suggested above, that was made possible thanks to Saudi financial support of Muslim institutions, Wahhabi literature, government's funds for Wahhabi teachings, scholarships and financial support to intellectuals or theologians who divulgated or embraced Islamic creeds. Muslim anti-western propaganda that had started in the Muslim world around the 1920 and 1930's resumed from the 1970's onwards. Western signs were as much as possible obliterated from the cultural life, women's veils reappeared, and conservative

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[7] Meddeb, *The Malady of Islam,* 89.

Muslim laws adopted. As El Faddl explained Wahhabism did not spread its teaching under the Wahhabi banner as it would have been derogatory, since to them it is the only valid branch of Islam. Therefore instead they spread it under the Salafi banner. *Salaf* meaning predecessor in Arabic, a salafi is someone who follows the Islamic, genuine pure creed. At the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the twentieth century, Muslim theologians and philosophers such Al Afghani (1897), Abduh (death 1905), R. Rida (death 1935) followed this tradition. Foreign occupation, western colonialism as explained previously and the absence of progress in the Muslim world transformed the jurists schools by adopting a form of egalitarianism rejecting and dereifying the traditional notion of authority that rested on a historical and moral understanding of morality. By so doing it removed a certain aura of authority to Islam.

As a result of this change, puritan or fundamentalist Islam has formulated a Muslim system of education deprived of its humanistic legacy, one which passed in silence over Muslim philosophical, aesthetic and architectural accomplishments. This generated a Muslim population and its Mullahs quite ignorant[8] about the tolerant attribute that used to exist under certain Muslim periods such the period of al-Andalus i.e. the gold period of Islam. The golden period of Al-Andalus that created the architectural jewels of el Alhambra, the Mesquita of Cordoba and the Palacio de los Reyes in Sevilla produced a Muslim culture that cherished Beauty, Poetry, Universalism, a mystic reunion of the transient and absolute. There used to be a time when Muslims read Dante and Ibn Arabi together. A Muslim open-minded attitude did and does exist as epitomized in those people receptive to the otherness presented by other kinds of cultures. That is why certain Muslim scholars today decry that the predominant forms of Islam today that have inflicted an overly harsh diet, coming out of it anemic[9]. In effect, Islam finds itself today in a dangerous situation: the jurists are unable to use the historical traditional institution of Islam to counter extremist religious factions. As a consequence a growing number of Muslims are unfamiliar with the historical accomplishments of their predecessors and with the tolerance that was more commonly fostered. Without being able to refer to historical traditions, they remain sectarian. Through the process of a conscious deconstruction of the Muslim religion they erected a political Islam via the Muslim educational pillars, and, be it thanks to the more puritanical jurists, the Muslim intellectuals, or via a specific propaganda they marginalized diversity. The buffers to intolerance have vanished and extremism has fully benefited from it.

The time of the philistines has come not just in the Muslim world but is very much in the West too. To explain this let's remember that secular fundamentalism has flourished through an "unholy" triple alliance between scientism, nihilism and a certain kind of a utilitarian liberal capitalism which has gradually, emptied itself of its moral values. This triple" unholy" alliance deprived of morality is equally at the heart of a secular fundamentalism responsible for the worst crises we know of today: the financial, economic, environmental, existential and political crises. Such a criticism may first sound somewhat extreme, yet will demonstrate its validity once we have explored how the latter developments unraveled. But first an answer to one of the questions posed in the introduction: how did secular fundamentalism arise? A historical survey will be of help once more. We will take our inquiry back to the

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[8] Ibid, 76.

[9] Ibid.

process of secularization initiated by Machiavelli, a process implicated in the history of the social sciences.

Such is the insight of Pitirim Sorokin as set out in The Crisis of Our Age. He clearly shows that culture is the backbone of all the different interdependent parts (if one part changes be it fine arts, philosophy, or politics, the others will be permanently affected and culture will then change). That is to say, the secularization of the social sciences is due to the secularization of our own cultural *Weltanschauung*. But how did secularization appear and how did it turned into secular fundamentalism? The secularization process can be dated back to the waning of the Middle Age. The principle of medieval culture was to make practically everything predominantly otherworldly and religious oriented toward the supersensory reality of God whose value permeated this culture up to the decline of the Middle Ages in the 12th century. This culture permeated all integrated components be it architecture, music or literature. With the decline of the Middle Age went its system of truth (faith). Its decline progressively brought along the secularization process.

The radical change from the Middle Age to the Renaissance is effected in the replacement of religion by science; i.e. science becomes the main body of truth inspiring everything. Such an era is typified by the beginning of objective scientific inquiry. The secular process has therefore begun. Consequently, the interests that dominate the time are utilitarian versus absolute. The scientist mindset of the 20th century can already be traced back to Renaissance culture; it was asserted as a doctrine in the 18thor the Enlightenment period and was intentionally put in practice in the 19th with modernization. A few milestones stand out along the way. The epistemological revolution of the natural sciences that started with Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes (1596-1650) and Francis Bacon received further impetus with Newton (1643-1726). In the 16th and 17th century it is Francis Bacon who launched the greatest attack on the medieval Aristotelian –Aquinasian tradition. René Descartes insisted on the practical character of philosophy. Descartes wanted to find in philosophy the same level of certitude enjoyed by mathematics. To that end he would use mathematics as a model in the construction of his philosophical system of thought. He would reject any established truth but would endeavor to search for it himself, epitomizing thereby the skepticism and the individualism of the time. The secularization of economic affairs paralleled the growth in capitalist agriculture and industry as well as the secularization of public and scientific affairs more generally. How could Kant's thought not be influenced by the current ethos that man was the master of his fate and the architect of his destiny? As for Adam Smith, he familiarized the thesis of the "invisible hand" which meant that by following one's own interests, competition leads to the optimal use of scarce resources. With E. Kant, A. Smith write the foundational texts of the economic liberal system. The current political philosophy was further influenced by the industrial revolution between 18th and the19th century. The 19th century or scientific one led by scientists and intellectuals such as Comte, Darwin, Saint Simon. Auguste Comte (1798-1857), the father of positivism, asserts that only positivist truths are considered valid which exclude any metaphysical ones. He even attempts to institutionalize a religion out of it: a positivist religion. At once, the advance of secular culture was pushed by the emergence of the modern economic process i.e. globalization.

Of course, we cannot conflate the secularism of the contemporary era with a secular fundamentalist *weltanschauung*. We need to explore how secular fundamentalists

have arisen within this context. As mentioned above it involves the triple alliance of scientism, nihilism, and utilitarianism; scientism, defined as "the dogmatic attitude emanating from the 19th century "positivism" making of science an absolute system with the ambition to provide all the solutions to all the problems assailing Man."[10] Thanks to the growing progress of human reason, science would end up substituting religion, or philosophy. Continuing with this line of thinking, the label human sciences has been provided as a way of aspiring to independence from philosophical affiliation and to better demonstrate their scientific veracity. At first glance, for most social "scientists" in western universities this may be taken for granted; nevertheless it has had unsuspected and dangerous consequences decried by many thinkers from diverse backgrounds. Schumacher cautioned us about the problems attached to materialistic scientism which follows a routine of "leaving something out if it is in doubt"[11] denigrating any artistic or humanistic aspects. He goes as far as to denounce the Materialistic scientist common attitude of associating spirituality to an intellectually backward attitude. Yet, to him its most harmful element has been its rejection of the hierarchy of levels of beings: human beings, animals. By so doing he or she is doomed to only lazily endure his or her "natural" instincts. Another danger attached to that scientism explains Dr Victor Frankl "does not really lie in the loss of universality on the part of the scientist, but rather in his pretense and claim of totality". (…) the true nihilism of today is its reductionism, contemporary nihilism no longer brandishes the word nothingness; today nihilism is camouflaged as nothing-but-*ness*"[12]. If we are to consider the Middle Ages as existing under the thrall of an imperialism of Theology, he argues, there is now an imperialism of Science which has resulted in widespread disorientation in particular amongst youths which could result in the collapse of our civilization. Such recognition leads us to another thinker, this time the scientist Paul Feyerabend who criticized our contemporary era. In his criticism of modern science he laments its lack of freedom of thought. He advocated a plurality of "mutually inconsistent theories"[13]. He denounces the ideology of science as being "wholeheartedly monistic. (…)The science of today is accorded a special status (…). Intellectuals exempt it from criticism, mainly because they think wrongly that it is a superior method for acquiring knowledge … and society lets it off lightly mainly because it is perceived as superior"[14].

What Feyerabend denounces with the tyranny of science holds for philosophy and politics. He insists on the need to "develop diverging' perspectives, the only ones that are likely to propel progress. It is within a coexistence of plurality that fruitful creative discoveries are made. Let us remind ourselves of the beautiful masterpieces of the wonders of *Al Andalus* (the gold era of Islam) achieved thanks to the abundance of coexisting religious cultures.

In contesting the totalitarian approach of science, some scientists have suggested that practical exchanges between experts and "lay" people are to be recommended.

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[11] Schumacher, Ernst, Friedrich. *In the Age of the Perplexed* (London: Abacus, 1977), 50.

[12] Victor Franckl, *Beyond Reductionism,* ed. by Arthur Koestler &J.R. Smythies (London: Hutchinson, 1969), 39.

[13] Paul Feyerabend, *Knowledge, Science and Relativism; Philosophy Papers*, Papers vol.3 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), 67.

[14] Ibid.

Feyerabend enjoys recalling what the ancient Greeks used to advocate. To them science was not an end in itself but rather a mean to purify the soul. To many scientists this would sound somewhat extravagant; or maybe not most since after all Wolfgang Paoli, winner of the Nobel Prize in Physics, kept to himself his misgivings concerning the separation of religion and science (being himself spiritual) for fear of being derided. Instead nowadays scientific knowledge is valued for a utilitarian purpose leaving no room for art or spirituality. Once at the time of Pythagoras' school, science contributed to geometry, astronomy and even ethics. To Pythagoras such an encompassing doctrine worked as a coherent system connecting *Weltanschauungen*, scientific problems and inner characteristics of the soul. Unfortunately with the "scientist" ethos at work in our western educational system, "find a place in the budget for the eternal is not in the spirit of our time"[15].

If scientism predates nihilism this is for specific reasons; as Schumacher explains the scientist rejection of hierarchy of levels of beings equated to subtracting any difference between animals and human beings. By doing so comes to the nihilist attitude whereby "everything begins to be seen as of equal value"[16]. Like Rob Riemen explains "nihilism always begins with robbing human existence of the possibility of elevating the self above its animal nature"[17]. With this theft a reevaluation of all values is started. Idolization of animal nature runs parallel with the dehumanization of nature. Making a distinction is seen as a form of elitism. It is the world according to the "Mass men" as Ortega y Gasset called it: "The world of the barbarians, the vertical invasion of the mass man, is the most dangerous one as it is one that comes from within"[18]. Relativism, that is, coexists with nihilism: holding a hierarchical system of values is seen as elitist if not fascist, it does not suit the democratic so-called system of values. But the truth is, as Schumacher explained in his book *In the Age of the Perplexed*, discernment which is what epitomizes philosophy and ethics is an extremely demanding task (science of the highest things) much more difficult that some scientific tasks which require a knowledge of "the inanimate things or the lesser things"[19]. It could then be understood why this qualitative knowledge was marginalized by the monistic scientism. As a consequence, we could add that moral relativism is a kind of idleness of the spirit; "a weakening of the will may well take place when faced with the multiple possibilities and makes any commitment unlikely[20]." In any case, Materialism has been the victor of the Nihilist quest, establishing its rule over everything. The nihilism of mass society is what prevails. Nihilism, as Rob Riemen sees it, works as a cancer threatening the connective tissue of society. Nihilists deplore capitalism, and mass consumption in society, "yet support these ways of life by continuing their chatter that nothing is timeless or universal because everything is relative"[21]. Instead of resisting with integrity by posing the right questions, they lead a hedonistic way of life which is again much easier than resisting and being an activist by proposing necessary changes.

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[15] Simone Weil, *Simone Weil Reader*, ed. by George Panichas (New York: Moyer Bell Limited, 1977), 302.

[16] Rob Riemen, *Nobility of Spirit, A Forgotten Ideal (*New York: Yale University Press, 2008), 68.

[17] Ibid

[18] Jose Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses (*New York: W.W. Norton, 1930), 131.

[19] Schumacher, *In the Age of the Perplexed,* 69.

[20] Paul Valadier, « Fragilité et Sagesse du Politique », Lumière et Vie 60, no. 290, (avril-juin 2011): 5-19.

[21] Riemen, *Nobility of Spirit, A Forgotten Ideal,* 70.

Today's nihilists have become the quintessential self- interested utilitarian of the globalization.

Hence the last phenomenon of our last triple alliance of secular fundamentalism: utilitarianism. Let's remember that secular fundamentalism begins to appear obvious with its monistic scientism hand in hand with its own creation, nihilism. Its demand for conformity and its totalitarian system of values appear like the "great beast", one that attempts to unfold its net of supremacy. Such an attempt has been transformed into such a reality thanks to the orientation of its system of education: a definite and thought out scheme through educational orientations has evolved from a qualitative organic approach of knowledge into a compartmentalized quantifying sectarian one over time. This has left out the most essential knowledge and qualities that make a human being happy by removing his /her ability to auto-censor him/herself in order not to hurt or damage other people[22]. If Utilitarianism is contributing to secular fundamentalism, it is due to inherent characteristics that have unmistakably led to nihilism. If we again consult our previous dictionary for utilitarianism, we can find that it is "a doctrine that sets utility as its principle from a moral point of view.[23]" It is also a rational theory coined by Jeremy Bentham which determines the techniques insuring a maximum of individual happiness[24]. Such a theory emphasizes how reason leads the individual to make any decision solely based on maximizing pleasures or minimizing pain following his/her selfish interest. Such a definition by emphasizing utility, reason and pleasure can be philosophically and historically located dates back to the Modern British Experimentalists, French materialists of the 18th century and the Cynics of Ancient Greece. All the characteristics of materialist cynicism are present, ready to be employed to the ends of the utilitarian liberal capitalist current model: Free enterprise has degenerated into greed and rapacious capitalism. Our utilitarian liberal system has become a consumerist world whereby all the "valuable" knowledge has been ousted by the consumption society so that insatiable individual freedom can feed our compulsive capitalism. Such system and its culture is permeated by a materialist, hedonist and cynical ethos fed by scientists via the system of education; secular fundamentalism is then insured to live a comfortable living well insulated against the little criticism allowed under the weight of relativism and democracy. Our triple alliance appears in all its intertwined smart and shrewd paradox: its liberal, free and tolerant system is only a façade hiding a monstrous, selfish, devouring system turning people into barbarians.

Hence our two fundamentalisms look very much alike holding in their respective camp a cultural hegemony. They both display a narcissistic attitude through a self-congratulatory self by marginalizing the other and by deconstructing their historical foundations and constructing another in its place. To achieve this, they ignore history or erase it. Once history is annihilated or made useless because inefficient, they can replace it with different sets of values that will be coherent with their incoherence. Their sectarian attitude towards dissenting voices is betrayed in their treatment of the latter as ignorant, backwards, and their silencing of such voices epitomizes their supremacist tendencies. Both fundamentalisms display characteristics of the politicized spirit which animate them. For instance, they follow their respective

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[22] Ortega Y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 65

[23] Gérard Durozoi, & André Roussel, *Dictionnaire de Philosophie. 135.*

[24] Ibid.

"political" ends by reducing realities to fit their agenda. In other words, they are reductive, dividing humanity up as any Manichean would do. Both fundamentalisms are through and through the products of modernity and of modernist ideology, as we observed above. Last but not least, they both reject the moral values that their respective classical universal tradition used to espouse, those capable of preventing extremisms and disasters. Hanna Arendt stated it clearly: "A crisis becomes a disaster only when we respond to it with a preformed judgment that is with prejudices"[25]. Therefore is not the *pharmakon* to these two fundamentalisms the system of education? When badly used it represents a poison, but when used with discernment and timing a medicine. Muslims should enlarge their culture (*Bildung*) and Muslim legal education should embrace the rich inheritance of its golden age embracing ancient Greek philosophy, Sufi mystics along with Sunni and Shiite jurists. It should be mindful of its "historical practice of debating and accepting a plurality of opinions as equally legitimate and valuable". As for the West, it is up to us to undertake our *metanoia* or the inner development of the human being. This is possible only if we revolutionize our system of education by reintegrating the Spirit into our academia so that personal knowledge is allowed hand in hand with tacit knowledge: we know more than that of which we can speak.

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Changing Thoughts and Changing Beliefs - New Trends in Religious Architecture in Twenty-First Century Taiwan

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Abstract

Taiwan is a country full of religious diversity. Buddhism was introduced into Taiwan from China in the seventeenth century by the Chinese immigrants. At the same time, Western religion also appeared on the island followed by the arrival of the Spanish and the Dutch. Different sects of different religions have constructed thousands of temples and churches since then. Some of them are designed in the style of their original prototypes. Some of them are designed with style mixed with local cultural, social and religious thoughts. This paper will firstly review different trends in religious architecture constructed between seventeenth century and twentieth century and then clarify the new trends in the twenty-first century from the view points of the changing thoughts and changing beliefs in Taiwan.

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1. Introduction

Different sects of different religions have constructed thousands of temples and churches since then. Some of them are designed in the style of their original prototypes. Some of them are designed with style mixed with local cultural, social and religious thoughts. This research will firstly review different trends in religious architecture constructed between seventeenth century and twentieth century and then clarify the new trends in the twenty-first century from the view points of the changing thoughts and changing beliefs in Taiwan. Folk religion is the most popular religion in Taiwan. Strictly speaking, it is a kind of belief rather than a religion. However, many people believe that it's a religion. Basically, temples of various folk religions look similar because they all follow the same building type introduced by the Chinese immigrants. Because the prototype continued to be adopted in modern period, there are thousands of examples which will be excluded from the discussions of this paper. In other words, the focus of this paper will be on the churches of Western religion and Buddhist temples.

2. Churches of Western Religion

Different sects of Western religion arrived at Taiwan in the seventeenth century. However, the number of churches increased significantly after several ports of Taiwan was opened to the Westerners. Three stages of church development can be identified.

The first stage of the development of the churched of Western religion is full of regionalist approach. Regional materials and styles were adopted consciously by the missionaries in order to build confidence of the local residents. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Taiwan gradually opened its harbors and cities to the West. The policy was soon followed by the re-entry of Western religion. In addition to religious preaching, the priests and clerical persons, especially those of Presbyterians and Dominicians, sometimes had to take the responsibility of the church design. In comparison to the designers of the Dutch-Spanish period, the nineteenth century missionaries were more sensitive to the regional culture of Taiwan. Among earlier example of these church, Hsintien Presbyterian Church and Wunulan Presbyterian Church are most illustrative.

Hsintien Presbyterian Church, built by famed Rev. George Leslie MacKay in 1874, is basically a Gothic church with a basilica prototype. But the central tower and spire on top were built in some degree to resemble a five-story pagoda, and the pinnacles on top of the buttress were all pagoda-shaped. Although Rev. Mackay didn't described in

detail how he designed the church, the intention of him to be assimilated in local culture was well accounted in his diary and the memoirs From Far Formosa in which he called the church "one of the finest building in North Formosa, and its situation one of the most picturesque." (George Leslie Mackay, 1896: 155) Similar design idea exists in Wunulan Presbyterian Church which was built in 1870. In this case, the central tower was replaced by an impressive two-story Minnan-style pavilion.

Wunulan Presbyterian Church   Hsintien Presbyterian Church

The second stage of the church development is the Western Historicism and the Gothic and Romanesque styles became popular. Western prototypes were adopted in order to stress the features of the Western churches. After the development of pseudo-Western style in the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, Taiwan 傯 architecture reached its high development period which is the Taisho period of Japan. Almost every new public building was dressed with various Western historical styles. Besides, professionals were involved in these buildings and the skills of Taiwanese craftsmen were already well-developed. The build buildings in Western historical style were treated as the representation of modernization.

In the 1920s, construction of churches followed past development in Taiwan. Many churches still rely on the languages of Gothic architecture such as pointed arch, spire, crenellated parapet and quatrefoil to imply their religious meanings. Chihu Presbyterian Church (1927) and Tainan Catholic Church (1925) are two examples and such development lasted until Kaohsiung Rosary Cathedral completed in early 1931. Holy Rosary Cathedral is the oldest Catholic church in Taiwan, located in the southern city of Kaohsiung. It is the seat of the Archbishop of Taiwan. It was first established in 1860 and reconstruction started in 1928 and completed in 1931. The

architectural style is modeled after both Gothic and Romanesque and. Inside the cathedral, seven pairs of supporting columns separate the hall into a centre nave and two side aisles. There is one mezzanine on top of both aisles. The mezzanine and the ceiling are both sustained by a cross ribbed vault. The altar is in shape of an octagon and displays Gothic and Romanesque styles of architecture. The third stage of the development is Modernism-oriented. Churches were designed in a modernist approach, all historical ornaments were rejected by the architects. Building materials play an important role in the shaping of the atmosphere of a religious building. Light becomes one of the most crucial elements in a church.

St. Joseph Technical Senior High School (1960, Kung Tung Vocational Technical High School)designed by Swiss architect Justurs Dahinden and Dr. Schubiger who was the one to take the responsibility of structural design reflect the design of The exposed concrete of the Marseilles Apartment (1947-52), the Chandigarh (1953-62), and the Chapel Notre Dame du Haut Ronchamp by French architect Le Corbusier. The campus buildings of St. Joseph Technical Senior High School are organized inwardly. The church located on the fourth floor of the East Building is the religious center of the school. Climbing through steps is the only way to the church which is also a process of religious ceremony. The church is also outstanding with the performance of indirect natural light falling down the altar, and the gentle light brings the reflection of grayish blue onto the rough surface of the wall where the statue of the saint is in an abstract form. The performance of natural light seems as if it comes from heaven. The irregular openings on the west wall embedded with colorful stained glass represents strongly of religious meanings of contradiction of hope and pain, brightness and darkness, the world and heaven. The used of light can be reminded that of the Chapel Notre Dame du Haut Ronchamp. Luce Chapel designed by Chen Chi-kwan and I. M. Pei. is basically a modernist design although golden yellow tiles contain the traditional image. The Luce Chapel, with its unique built form and special construction, was a big shock to the architectural circle in Taiwan. Tunghai University had offered the architectural circle a place to learn and opened a new vision for the architects of younger generation.

Church of St. Joseph Technical High School

Luce Chapel at Tunghai University

Although the development of Western religious architecture followed four stages, there was an interlude of Chinese Nationalism between 1960s and 1980s. In fact the phenomenon is strongly linked to the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement. The movement was a consciousness movement and cultural policy of the 1960s and 1970s by the Nationalist Government in Taiwan. It is a counter-movement to the Chinese Cultural Revolution started from 1966 in China. On November 12, 1966 when President Chiang Kai-shek delivered a speech at the National Assembly Hall inauguration on Yangmingshan to initiate the movement. The aim of this cultural renaissance movement was to promote President Chiang along with Confucian orthodoxy and to oppose the Chinese communist political authorities that were destroying cultural heritage. Influenced by the Chinese Nationalism, Churches were designed in traditional Chinese style and Western religious figures became Chinese. In the beginning, the Chinese classical style was adopted by the Catholic churches from the Chinese mainlander to claim their legitimacy. But it was developed into a fashion later and widely applied in new churches. Tainan Chinese Our Lady Diocesan Church and Yenshui Holy Spirit Church are among the most interesting example.

Tainan Chinese Our Lady Diocesan Church was built in 1964 after Tainan diocese was established in 1960. Bishop Stanislaus Lo Kuang strongly insisted the Chinese Catholicism and many Chinese Classical Revival churches were built through his advocacy. The main hall of the church is hexagonal in shape with a square altar situated at the end of the central axis. Above the altar is a tower crowned with Chinese classical green tiles. Besides the tower, Chinese classical decorations were extensively used on the exterior. Inside the church, the similarity between its decoration and that of a folk-religion temple is astonishing. The Holy Mother mosaic on the wall of the altar are dressed in Chinese costume and the central the lintel above

the altar is inscribed with the Chinese character Tien-Sheng-Shen-Mu. The term literally means the Heavenly Holy Mother, is also the name for the most popular folk deity Matsu. The association between St.Mary and Matsu reveal the regionalist intention in the church.. In Yenshui Holy Spirit Church, the regionalist approach was developed further into a complete icongraphic scheme. Scenes from Bible and Biblical figures are painted on the wall as well as the ceiling inside the church. On the wall above the altar, the scene of the Last Supper was painted. The composition of the painting resembles that of Leonardo da Vinci's work.. However, all figures, including Jesus Christ and his disciplines, dressed in traditional Chinese costumes. The utensils and food on the table are also oriental. Furthermore, the statue of Holy Mother in the Holy Mother Pavilion besides the church was dressed as she was the deity Matsu.

Last Supper Wall Painting, Yenshui Holy Spirit Church

4. Buddhist Temples

Buddhism was brought by the immigrants from the Chinese mainland in the seventeenth century. The buildings of Taiwan Buddhist temple developed following several remarkable periods. The first stage of the Buddhist temples in Taiwan is those examples that followed the prototype from China. Buddhist Temples in Southern Fujian style were built in almost every city and village. The tradition continues to practice until now. In fact, by the time Koxinga defeated the Dutch, Buddhist monks were already coming Taiwan with official sanction. Buddhist temples were built with the support of Koxinga and his family. The development continued during the Qing Dynasty. Buddhist Temples in Southern Fujian style were built in almost every city and village. The tradition continues to practice until now.

Kaiyuan Buddhist Temple, listed as a Grade II historical landmark, was original a house named *Pei- Yuan Pieh-Kuan* (North Garden Villa) built in 1680 by Cheng Ching (Koxinga's son) for his mother. The house was donated to become a Buddhist monastery in 1690 and called Hai-Hui Szu in which Sakyamini is worshipped as the

main deity. The monastery has been undertaken various renovations since then. The front hall and the main hall have preserved their original structure. The atmosphere of the monastery is tranguil because of the aged trees in the front yard. The statues of *Mi-Le Fo* (Happiness Buddha) and Sakyamini as well as four enormous celestial guardian deities *Szu Ta Tien-Wang* (Four Great Heavenly Kings) are of religious and artist importance. The well dug by Cheng Ching at the rear hall and seven-string bamboo in the garden are noticeable. Fa-Hua Szu was original the residence *Meng-Deh Yuan* (Garden of Butterfly Dreaming) built by Lee Mao-Chun of the Ming Dynasty. A monastery named Fa-Hua was built aside the house in 1684 to worship Sakyamini. The monastery was completely destroyed during the WWII and rebuilt in reinforced concrete after the war. Four Great Heavenly Kings as well as portraits of door panels and mural paintings by famous folk artist Pan Li-Shui are among the most distinguishing examples in Tainan. The tomb stone of Lee Mao-Chun is a valued historical artifact. Longshan Temple built in the late 18th century at Lukang is also one of the best examples for this stage. The features of the temple include wooden structure, red tiles, detailed ornaments and dragon columns as well as the statue of Bodhisattva Guanyin.

Kaiyuan Buddhist Temple   Longshan Temple

The second stage of Buddhist temple development is the Japanese Influences between 1895 and 1945 when Taiwan was a colony of Japan. During this period, Buddhist group[s in Taiwan separated into different Japanese Buddhist Sects. Buddhist temple designed in Classical Japanese Style started to appear in Taiwan. Jian Chinxiu Buddhist Temple in Hualien is a case in this point. The establishment of this small Buddhist temple was strongly related to the fact the Governor's Office of Japanese Colonial Government started the immigration affairs in 1910. Chichiaochuan in Hualien is one of the places targeted for the Japanese immigrants. Because many immigrants came from area around Yoshinogawa, Tokushima County in Japan, Chichiaochuan was then renamed Yoshino. When the number of the Japanese

immigrants increased, traditional Japanese religions followed. A preaching chamber was built by Kawabata Michiruhuta in 1917 and a living lodge was added in 1922. After the WWII, a woman named Wu Tienmei took over the preaching chamber and renamed it Chinxiu Temple. Later the property was transferred to Hualien County and used for various functions. The temple was designated as a historic monument in 1999 and the restoration began. In 2004, the temple opened its door to the public again. Architecturally speaking, both the built form and spatial organization of Chinxiu Temple follows that of the traditional Japanese Buddhist Temple. In addition to the main structure, there are 88 Buddha statues brought by Kawabata Michiruhuta from Japan. Some of them are new replicas. Some other stone steles are also inseparable part of the temple.

The third stage of Buddhist Temple in Taiwan was also strongly influenced by the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement beginning from 1966. The best example is the founding of Fo Guang Shan in 1967 by Venerable Master Hsing Yun. It is now an international Chinese Mahayana Buddhist monastic order based in Taiwan and one of the largest Buddhist organizations. The headquarters of Fo Guang Shan is the largest Buddhist monastery in Taiwan. Almost all the earlier buildings constructed at Fo Guang Shan are designed in Chinese Classical style. The Mahavira Hall (main hall) is impressive in both spatial organization and the scale. And Fo Guang Shan has become a landmark as well as a symbol to the temple and the sect.


Jian Chinxiu Buddhist Temple   The Mahavira Hall of Fo Guang Shan

Similar situation continued in the fourth stage development of Buddhist temples in Taiwan. Every new Buddhist sect attempts to create a style for their own temples and other facilities. Chung Tai Chan Monastery, located in Puli and designed by C.Y. Lee, is an attempt to establish an identity for the Sect itself. The monastery occupies a

large area and the construction last for a decade from 1992 to 2001. According to the explanation of the designer and the monastery, the building is a symbolism. "Viewed from afar, the main building of Chung Tai resembles a cultivator in sitting meditation, surrounded by mountains, majestic and serene.

The Building Complex of Chung Tai Chan Monastery (Copyright © Chung Tai Chan Monastery)

The entire building complex of the monastery is an embodiment of the Dharma, unifying sudden enlightenment and gradual cultivation. The three central Buddha halls rise vertically to the golden dome on top, symbolizing sudden enlightenment to the ultimate truth—"awaken the mind and see the true nature; seeing the true nature one becomes a Buddha." The pilgrimage stairways on both sides of the monastery represent the gradual bodhisattva path (a bodhisattva is a Buddha-to-be, one with infinite compassion for all beings), each step leading to the attainment of Buddha hood not just for oneself but for all beings. " (Website of Chung Tai World.）

5.Conclusion: Towards 21st Urbanism and Environmentalism
In response to culture, technology and environmental protection issues of the 21st century, the architecture of Taiwan has been developed along various axes. From cultural point of view, the adaptive reuse of old buildings, which has been popular in other countries, becomes a fashion after the support from the Council for Cultural Affairs is secured. The 921 Earthquake at the end of the 20th century destroyed many school in the disaster district. However, it also offered Taiwan to develop a totally

new concept for buildings of the elementary and middle schools. The New School Campus Movement thus emerged. 21st century is also the period when the green architecture in Taiwan started to be realized. Sustainability is now a global issue. So is the urban issue. New technology and aesthetics reach a new climax in the 21st century. Nung Chan Monastery completed in 2012 might conclude the trend. The monastery is made up of a Chan Hall and the Main Hall which were connected by a corridor. The complex is designed in a rather modernist attitude by using exposed concrete which is penetrated by a Diamond Sutra Façade and delicate doors. According to the design concept, the exterior design of the main hall is "simple and solid, radiates a steadfast spirit, while its interior space evokes serenity and the power of stately simplicity. The Heart Sutra, carved into the interior wall, changes with the flow of natural light, reminding us that life's conditions are impermanent, forever arising and perishing. The pool and the Hall itself depict the contrast between emptiness and solidity, constant change and stability, one expressing stillness in motion and the other motion in stillness, thus reflecting the Buddhadharma." (Website of Dharma Drum Mountain) The Water-Moon Pool in front of the complex is both religiously meaningful and environmentally friendly. The symbolism, urbanism and environmentalism are integrated into a masterpiece, a representation of new religious architecture in Taiwan.

Exterior and water pool of Nung Chan
Monastery

Interior of Nung Chan Monastery

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2013/2014 upcoming events

2013

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November 8-10, 2013 - MediAsia2013 - The Fourth Asian Conference on Media & Mass Communication
November 8-10, 2013 - FilmAsia2013 - The Second Asian Conference on Film and Documentary

November 21-24, 2013 - ABMC2013 - The Fourth Asian Business & Management Conference
November 21-24, 2013 - ACPEL2013 - The First Asian Conference on Politics, Economics & Law

2014

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March 27-30, 2014 - ACERP2014 - The Fourth Asian Conference on Ethics, Religion and Philosophy

April 3-6, 2014 - ACAH2014 - The Fifth Asian Conference on Arts and Humanities
April 3-6, 2014 - LibrAsia2013 - The Fourth Asian Conference on Literature and Librarianship

April 17-20, 2014 - ACLL2014 - The Fourth Asian Conference on Language Learning
April 17-20, 2014 - ACTC2014 - The Fourth Asian Conference on Technology in the Classroom

May 29 - June 1, 2014 - ACAS2014 - The Fourth Asian Conference on Asian Studies
May 29 - June 1, 2014 - ACCS2014 - The Fourth Asian Conference on Cultural Studies

June 12-15, 2014 - ACSS2014 - The Fifth Asian Conference on the Social Sciences
June 12-15, 2014 - ACSEE2014 - The Fourth Asian Conference on Sustainability, Energy and the Environment

October 28 - November 2, 2014 - ACE2014 - The Sixth Asian Conference on Education
October 28 - November 2, 2014 - ACSET2014 - The Second Asian Conference on Society, Education and Technology

November 13-16, 2014 -MediAsia2014 - The Fifth Asian Conference on Media & Mass Communication
November 13-16, 2014 -FilmAsia2014 - The Third Asian Conference on Film and Documentary

November 20-23, 2014 - ABMC2014 - The Fifth Asian Business & Management Conference
November 20-23, 2014 - ACPEL2014 - The Second Asian Conference on Politics, Economics & Law

2013

July 4-7, 2013 - ECSS2013 - The Inaugural European Conference on the Social Sciences
July 4-7, 2013 - ECSEE2013 - The Inaugural European Conference on Sustainability, Energy and the Environment

July 11-14, 2013 - ECE - The Inaugural European Conference on Education
July 11-14, 2013 - ECTC2013 - The Inaugural European Conference on Technology in the Classroom

July 18-21, 2013 - ECAH2013 - The Inaugural European Conference on Arts and Humanities
July 18-21, 2013 - ECLL2013 - The Inaugural European Conference on Language Learning

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