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A Practical Framework Towards Open Government
“Moving Beyond Openness and the Forward-looking Walkways to Open Collaborations”

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Abstract

Open Government is nowadays a popular concept for public administrators and policymakers. Nevertheless, the applications on this are still varied depended on one's interpretation. Many understand that Open Government is only about openness and transparency of the government to the people based upon "Freedom of Information" principles and "Right to know" doctrines. However, in the digital era, many public administrators and policymakers also applied Open Government as an Open Data by opening public sector's data and information with private sectors and people sectors for further usages and analytics to leverage on the power of big data. Furthermore, Open Government can be deployed as Open Collaboration to empower citizen as well as encourage participation in public sector's activities and even in certain government roles in order to leverage the collaborations and competencies among public sectors, private sectors, and people sectors. Therefore, in the article, these various concepts and applications will be explored to gain comprehensive understanding of Open Government in several dimension. Besides, the challenges of applying Open Government in reality will be discussed. Indeed, public sector's information often labeled as confidential and sensitive. Moreover, citizen participation in public sectors can also be complicated due to numerous limitation. As a consequence, reluctance and resistance to open are common issues. Therefore, in the end of this section, the comprehensible framework for evaluating priority and considering stepping stones towards Open Government Initiatives will be presented.

Keywords: Open Government, Collaboration, Open Data, Participation, Openness

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Introduction

Open government is one of the most important issue in public management nowadays. Especially, in the world of digitalization and data, this concept becomes more crucial and valuable because it is not only about creating transparency but it is also about how to establish platforms for open data and further collaborations. Therefore, in this conceptual paper, the various concepts of openness will be widely discussed and the tools for the first-step implementation of open government will also be introduced so government agencies could apply the tools and concepts practically for the utmost benefits of the citizen.

This conceptual paper will begin by exploring various concepts of openness in the open government. Then, simplified tools for assessing the degree of openness and prioritizing the initiatives to open government data will be introduced. Finally, the key challenges in implementation will be highlighted.

Reviewing Concepts of Openness

Openness in open government can be viewed through different perspectives. The first perspective is transparency, which is the beginning concept of open government. Government should be transparent according to basic democratic principles that people have freedom of information and right to know what government is doing. Also, the public information handled by government is also belonging to the citizens. This can be considered as public goods that everyone should have an access equally and openly anywhere and anytime. This concept is mainly about basic right of citizens.¹

In fact, transparency is not optional but it is mandatory. Especially, if people needs to know any government information, they will finally get those information eventually because nowadays the information is abundant and flowed freely over the internet and social media. Thus, this free-flow of information cause very high risk of information leakage despite the confidentiality and secrecy of data. The critical issue is that these leaked information may be inaccurate and distorted so it could be harmful and create distrust between people and government. Therefore, in this perspective, the government should take position to promote freedom of information and proclaim information by itself rather than risking the information leakage.²

The second viewpoint of openness is participation. Nowadays, many people believe that only government transparency is not sufficient, however the government should also engage citizen and stakeholders to share idea and even make decisions collectively. However, according to the literature review, there are many level of participation.³

Inform: This is the very basic level that government only notify its policy or procedure after the final decision were made. The engagement level is very low and it is mainly one-way communication.

Consult: this is the participation form that we usually see. Government or public agencies hold the public hearings for citizen and stakeholders to comment and suggest on particular

¹ Sandoval-Almazan, R. (2015). Open Government and Transparency: Building a Conceptual Framework. p. 3.

² Meijer, A. J., Curtin, D., & Hillebrandt, M. (2012). Open government: Connecting vision and voice, *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 78(1), 10-29.

³ UNDP, U. N. (2016). Citizen engagement in public service delivery. *The Critical Role of Public Officials*, 7.

policies before incorporating those feedback to the decision making. This can consider two-ways communication. Of course, it is more participatory than the first one but there is still not much interaction and engagement.

Involve: in this form, government or public agencies invite citizen and stakeholders to join the team to undergo the working activities and decision process so they can discuss and get advice interactively throughout the whole process. The form of this participation can be appointing citizen as an advisor in policy steering committee or the public agency working group.

Collaborate: the process of this is quite similar to INVOLVE, except that the government or public agencies allow citizen and stakeholders to make decisions together. This can consider as a co-creation between citizen and government or public-private partnership in case of private sectors. Therefore, this is very high engagement scheme.

Empower: this can be considered as ultimate level of participation as government or public agencies play a role of facilitator to open the forum for citizen or stakeholders to be the owner of the whole process to generate policy alternatives and then make the final decisions themselves. The government only provides authorities and resources while the citizen is the real conductor.⁴

Therefore, when talking about openness in terms of citizen participation, it is very worthwhile to explore the level of it. The diagram below (Figure 1) shows the degree of participation according to stakeholder feedback taking and influence in the decision making.



Figure 1: Assessing Level of Participation

The third viewpoint is openness for data sharing and collaborations. This is a contemporary concept as big data and data analytics become very crucial and powerful. Indeed, government and public data can be considered as big data that could lead to value creations for every sector. Therefore, in this idea, government should open up their data not only for the sake of

⁴ Vigoda-Gadot, E. (2004). From responsiveness to collaboration. Collaborative Public Administration: Some Lessons from the Israeli Experience, 701-702.

declaring itself for transparency but also for making data available for further utilization and collaboration. This perspective can be named as open data collaborations, which focuses on open data for sharing among beneficiaries.

However, data sharing can be categorized in many forms based on level of openness and level of collaboration (Figure 2) as following.

Data Exchanging: This is a common form that we have always seen. A few organizations exchange the data for certain mutual benefit in specific circumstances. For example, public agency exchange data with a university to research project about policy alternatives. It is good that at least there is a level collaboration here however this is not a sustainable model as requires efforts to collect and select the data to exchange and mostly task-based which is not constant. This is low level of openness as only few information is open and low level of collaboration due to this discontinuous manner.

Data Partnering: In this form, a few organizations have an agreement to share the certain data and allow accessibility within the partners. This is more efficient ways of data sharing as the related personnel can obtain the data themselves for further usage. However, the degree of openness and collaboration is still low as the data only opens limitedly for the specific group with specific objectives for mutual benefit.

Data Collaboration: In this form, a large number of public and private organizations especially in the related industry or similar ecosystem or function share the data for their members to broadly use and utilize. This is more open and collaborative and the benefits belong to wide-ranges of people.

Open Data Collaborations: This is the ultimate form of openness and collaboration that most of the government data and non-confidential private sector data are open for everyone. With this idea, public sector, private sector, education sector, and all citizen shall have access to the data and they can utilize and make use of the data for further value creation without any hurdles. The good example of this model is Estonia, which has fully implemented e-Government ecosystem and created big data sharing platform so called X-road⁵. Therefore, combining the concept of open government together with data sharing and collaboration not only enables and achieves openness and transparency but this also encourages engagement and empowerment, increases government efficiency and effectiveness, and establishes collaborative environment that finally leads to value creation for government, public sectors, private sectors, the citizen, and the society in overall.

⁵ Vassil, K. (2016). Estonian e-Government Ecosystem: Foundation, Applications, Outcomes Estonian e-Government Ecosystem: Foundation, Applications, Outcomes. Retrieved from Public Documents of World Bank.




Figure 2: Openness for Data Sharing and Collaborations

Assessing the Level of Openness

The next key question is how could the government agencies gauge their openness level. The diagram in Figure 3 was developed by asking a simple questions whether the targeted public agencies mostly have one-way or two-ways communication with citizen and whether the services are provided on online platform or offline platform. This is a simple diagram for basic considerations for government agencies to understand their current stages of openness so the could develop further to higher level, which could require more complex tools for assessing in deeper details. Thus, the benefit of this diagram is to help public administrators to assess openness level of the government agencies and the proper action can be taken for higher-level steps.

Assessing The Openness

The communications and services between the agencies and stakeholders or citizen is mostly

	One-Way Communication	Two-Ways Communication
Online	Limited Communication on Open Platform Information are mostly available through Website and e-services. However, most is one-side information for reference with limited channel for communication.	Open Communication and Platform Numerous channels for information flows and communications are in place i.e. Social Media, Chat box and Chat bot, Open Data Collaboration Platform.
Offline	Limited Communication and Platform Need to meet in person to make a request of information and ask questions with rigid instruction and documentation to undergo.	Open Communication on Limited Platform Still require meeting in person to request an information, but the request and service can be customized and the feedbacks are welcomingly discussed.

Figure 3: Assessing the Level of Openness

The first category is limited communication and platform (Bottom-Left in the Figure 3), when an agency still communicates on a one-way basis and is relied on offline platform. For example, people have to go to the on-site service to request the information they need and undergo lots of processes to get that information. If any agencies fall on this category, it is very urgent for the improvement.

The second category is open communication on limited platform (Bottom-Right in the Figure 3), when an agency falls under two-ways communication and offline. These agencies are already good in engaging people therefore the next stepping stone is to primarily get information technology and infrastructure in place and acquire necessary resources to build up good online platforms.

The third category is limited communication on open platform (Top-Left in the Figure 3). In fact, some public agencies might already utilize online platform but the services and communications are still on a one-way basis without major tools to gain feedback or engage in conversation with citizen. Nevertheless, since the online platform is in place, it is a good groundwork towards better collaborations and data sharing. Therefore, the next key step for agencies under this category is to enable more features that allow interaction from citizen and the users as well as to allocate resources and manpower for engaging people in conversation and developing potential initiatives according to the feedback of the citizen.

The fourth category is open communication and platform (Top-Right in the Figure 3). An agency under this category has continuously created two-ways communication with citizen through online platform. The next step is to increase efficiency and effectiveness to serve citizen's need and generate best user's experiences. Indeed, digital technologies i.e. Artificial Intelligence (AI), Chat Bot, or Internet of Things (IoT) could be utilized to identify citizen's insights so as to interact with the citizen according to their needs and preference in a customized manner. Also, aiming at developing open data collaboration platform would also be another aspiring direction.

Prioritizing Open Government Initiatives

Government data is massive and it is certainly not practical to be fully opened in a short period of time as there are still numbers of challenges and concerns. Government data sometimes contains sensitive data that could lead to different interpretations on government intentions, actions, and performance in both positive and negative ways. Besides, data privacy is another key concern as sharing some data could violate individual right and people's privacy. Nevertheless, these concerns should not be a justification to avoid open the data or revoke open government initiatives. Instead, searching a way to overcome these challenges and creating step-by-step actions are essential. Therefore, in Figure 4, this simplified two by two framework is introduced to initially identify the concerns on data sharing as well as suggest the action and prioritization.




Figure 4: Prioritizing Open Government Initiatives

There are two dimensions in the framework whether the hurdle and concern of that data sharing is on data sensitivity or on data privacy with the answer whether it is yes or no.

If both answers are no (Top-Left in the Figure 4), it means the data is ready to open so government agencies need only to ensure its accuracy and reliability before sharing to public. In this case, government can release the data in this category without delay.

If only data privacy is a concern (Top-Right in the Figure 4) the data can still be opened but need to undergo anonymization process to ensure no personal information is leaked out and cut out potential traceability. The next step's priority is on data anonymization in this case.

If only data sensitivity is a concern (Bottom-Left in the Figure 4), for example, the data could be widely debated among people and spread over the news and social media and it could potentially be a negative impact to the government and lead to distrust from citizen, the data could still be opened but it must be shared with clear and concise clarification as well as designated communication channel in case any questions may arise. The next step's priority is data clarification and communication channel setting in this case.

Finally, if both answers are yes (Bottom-Right in the Figure 4), the data is considered both sensitive and private. It is worthwhile to take time to carefully considered the impact in every aspects before laying out step-by-step approach for data sharing. Both data anonymization and clarification as well as two-ways communication platform creation are crucial. Anyhow, the ultimate goal is still to open that data but must do with well-rounded consideration and proper strategy.

Key Challenges

To implement open government concepts as well as share the data, there are certain key challenges to be aware of and overcome. First and the most important challenge is the mindset. It is possible that some government agencies may fear of opening the data since they do not want to take risk on how people would think about it and do not need to handle the comment and feedback. This is the nature of self-protection. Therefore, it is important to shift

this mindset in a way that feedback and comment are opportunities to improve and respond accurately to citizen's needs. Thus, openness is a big opportunity to gain those constructive feedbacks. The second challenge is the unaligned expectation. Sometimes, government agencies have concrete reasons not to share certain information or limitations on collecting some information regularly. Thus, it is important to set the clear direction and communicate to citizen and stakeholders to align expectations as well as listen to their comments so government can shape the open data direction and allocate resources and efforts on opening key data that serve people's need at first. The third challenge is digital literacy. As most opened data is the data that offered via online platform, government agencies should focus on creating digital people and enhancing digital competency to the organizations.

Conclusion

In the era of digital technology and data, open government concepts should be examined beyond the transparency viewpoints. Instead of only declaring information, governments and public agencies should focus on how could they could engage citizen as well as public and private sectors in an open platform that every people could access and utilize the data for value creation as well as collaborate with each other. Hence, the first stepping stone is the most challenging. It is important that government agencies must be able to assess their current level of openness in order to take proper strategic actions and then prioritize the further open government initiatives by classifying the data to be opened in different categories which require different implementational directions. Therefore, this conceptual paper provides these simplified tools for public agencies to embark on the initial steps towards open government and open collaborations.

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The Impact of an Increase in Minimum Wage in Vietnam

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Abstract

There are few studies on the implementation and effects of a minimum wage increase on low-wage workers in Vietnam. A few studies have investigated whether or not the minimum wage has had a negative effect on low-wage employment status, but, to date, no work has explicitly considered the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on working hours and allowances. The main contribution of this study is to provide empirical evidence of the effects of the minimum wage increases on wages, working hours, and allowances of low-wage workers in the formal sector of Vietnam by using the different-in-different method to analyze Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys from 2014 to 2016. The estimator results show that most low-wage workers had received higher wages through a minimum wage, while the monthly wages of low-wage workers in the rural region remain unchanged. In addition, there is a significantly positive effect on working hours across all regions. Furthermore, the author also finds no evidence of the allowance effect on low-wage workers after the intervention. The main policy implications from these findings are that monitoring should be promoted in rural areas to ensure that the benefits from the implementation of the minimum wage reach low-wage workers. Next, the government should reduce the number of maximum working hours per week. At the same time, it is necessary to adopt hourly minimum wages for both full-time and part-time workers. Finally, the law remains ambiguous about the payment of allowances to workers and needs to be clarified.

Keywords: Impact, Minimum Wage, Increase in Minimum Wage, Vietnam

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Introduction

The International Labor Organization defines minimum wages as "the minimum amount of remuneration that an employer is required to pay wage earners for the work performed during a given period, which cannot be reduced by collective agreement or an individual contract." (Minimum Wage Systems, 2014).

The minimum wage is considered as a popular tool used by politicians to intervene in the economy as well as with regard to social welfare, especially for low-wage workers. About 171 countries around the world have minimum wage regulations, which comprise about 92% of the total member countries of the International Labor Organization (ILO, 2015). A trend that emerged in recent years is that more and more countries have enacted minimum wage laws, and governments have decided on this issue to protect workers. However, different countries implement different minimum wage policies. In general, the main purpose of the minimum wage in most of those countries is to increase the living standard of workers, especially low-educated workers (Carpio & Pabon, 2014).

Vietnam is a member of the ILO and is also among the majority of members that regulate minimum wages. Recently, the objectives, criteria, and mechanisms for determining minimum wages in Vietnam follow the provisions, conventions, and recommendations of ILO. In addition, Vietnam is also known for its abundant labor supply at low wages. Therefore, an increase in the minimum wage is a sensitive issue for firms and workers. In 2015, the government adjusted monthly minimum wages for four different levels throughout Vietnam.

In the case of Vietnam, there are few studies that estimate the effect of minimum wage increases; those studies just investigated its effects on employment and wages (Carpio et al., 2013). In addition, the evidence was from a time when the minimum wage regulation was different from today. Moreover, there seems to have been no research about the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on working hours and allowances in Vietnam. Therefore, more research on the effect of minimum wage increases in Vietnam is needed.

Methodology

From the literature review, there are several models used to measure the impact of minimum wage; however, the most common approach to estimating minimum wage effects is the estimates of panel data models (Dale Belman & Paul Wolfson, 2015). This study will measure the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on wages, working hours, and allowances of low-wage workers by applying the Difference in Differences (DiD) estimator and Fixed effect estimator methods. Those methods will analyse subjects into two groups; and the first group is called the treatment group which includes workers treated by the minimum wage policy, and the second group is the control group including workers who are not affected by the minimum wage policy. Workers in both groups work in the formal sector. An important assumption of the method is that those two groups have similar characteristics at the time before the policy implementation. Thus, the distinction of outcome variables between the control group and the treatment group is caused by the impact of the minimum wage increases.

In addition, in order to keep the assumption of the DiD method, the research uses a fixed effected estimator model to add more control variables which allow the research to measure

other factors that might affect workers' outcomes. Commonly, the set of control variables is limited, so this study includes most of the factors affecting the outcome variables such as gender, age, education, and marital status. After controlling the difference between the two groups, the model gets the estimation results of the effects of the minimum wage increases on low-wage workers in formal sector.

The research uses panel data from two surveys of Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) in 2014 and 2016. Based on the minimum wage increase in 2015, the author selected certain individuals in the treatment group and the control group. This included basic demographics, wages, working hours, working days, and allowances.

These estimation results, such as changes in wages, working hours, and allowances of low-wage workers in the treatment group, the research suggests how the minimum wage can be adjusted to make it more effective.

Results and Discussion

By using two different models to estimate the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on workers' outcomes in the formal sector of Vietnam, the estimator results from the two models are quite similar. The analysis discovered that raising the minimum wage increased monthly workers' wages in most regions, with the exception of workers in level 4, where small and micro small firms perform poorly to comply with the minimum wage policy. In addition, while there is no evidence of an increase in working hours per day in the treatment group, one issue to consider is that employers increased total worker working hours per year by increasing the number of working days in response to higher minimum wages. Furthermore, employers did not reduce allowances of low-wage workers after the government adjusted new minimum wage levels in 2015.

▪ The Impact of the Minimum Wage Increases on Wages

The intervention to raise the minimum wage levels was implemented to improve the living standard of workers, through which the government expected low-wage workers to receive higher wages. Using the different-in-different technique, the estimator result suggests that, in general, an increase in the minimum wage has a positive effect on the wages of workers who are covered by the minimum wage policy. Since the minimum wage level is fundamental in calculating the total wages of workers, so an increase in the minimum wage leads to an increase in the total wages. The result of this study is in line with a recent study in Vietnam (Carpio et al., 2013) and Gindling and Terrell (2004) in Costa Rica.

In contrast, in this study, there is no significant difference in monthly wages between workers in the treatment group who were covered by the policy and workers in the control group who were uncovered by the policy in the rural region of Vietnam by increasing the minimum wage. One possible reason to explain this result is that firms in region 4 are almost all medium, small and micro firms, of which medium firms account for only 1.6% of the total number of firms located in the region (Chu, 2020). In addition, according to the latest ILO Wage Report, the case study in Thailand shows that micro and small firms are the most non-compliant with the minimum wage law. Similarly, Nguyen (2013), using the kernel destiny method, also found that employers in Vietnam have low compliance with the minimum wage regulation. As a result, this issue of firm size is likely to explain why workers' wages in the rural region did not affect after the minimum wage increase in Vietnam.

▪ **The Impact of the Minimum Wage Increases on Working Hours**

Working hours of low-wage workers in treatment group across all regions of Vietnam increased significantly after the government implemented the new minimum wage levels in 2015. Although the number of working hours per day of workers was unchanged, total working hours per week increased due to an increase in total working days. Through raising minimum wage intervention, the government expects employers to pay a higher wage to low-wage workers in the formal sector, but places pressure on the employer to deal with increasing labor costs. As a result, they might find some way to avoid an increase in production costs caused by higher minimum wages. In such cases, employers increase working hours to offset the amount of raising wages causing by higher minimum wage levels. That result is similar to a case study in China where the government applied a monthly minimum wage like Vietnam (Jia, 2014). In contrast, a negative impact on working hours was found in countries where the government set hourly minimum wages (Zavodny, 2000; Burauel et al., 2018).

There are possible explanations for these effects of the minimum wage. First, it comes from the wage law of Vietnam. Although the government has not applied an hourly minimum wage for workers, they introduced a regulation for paying for working extra hours. Particularly, working one extra hour is calculated by multiplying the employee's actual wage for one hour of work by the lowest factor of 150 percent. The actual wage for one hour of labor is calculated by dividing the total monthly wage by the number of working days in a month and then by the number of working hours in one day (usually 8 hours). Therefore, the cost of one hour of overtime is higher than the cost of one hour of work at the minimum wage. As a result, employers will not increase workers' working hours beyond the specified number of hours (usually 8 hours per day) in response to a minimum wage increase.

In response, employers will instead increase the number of workers' working days to offset the costs incurred by the minimum wage increase. Thus, the average total number of working hours in a day does not change, but the total number of working hours in a year increases as working days increase. With this response, the employer will not increase the labor costs as a result of the increased number of working days. The reason is that according to labor law, an employee's standard working time cannot exceed 8 hours per day and 48 hours per week. In fact, according to the 2014 analysis results of workers in the treatment group, the average number of working hours per day is about 7.9 hours, and the average number of working days in a week is only 4.5 days. Therefore, the employer can increase the employee's working days without breaking the law with the current wage.

Another possible explanation comes from a practical issue. Carpio et al. (2013) claim that raising the minimum wage reduced Vietnam's formal sector employment. Thus, employers tend to demand more work from employees who remain on the job. As a result, they increase total workers' working hours to respond to changes in minimum wage levels.

▪ **The Impact of the Minimum Wage Increases on Allowances**

An increase in minimum wage levels in 2015 did not have a significant effect on the monthly allowances of low-wage workers who were covered by the minimum wage policy. However, some workers have claimed that as a result of raising minimum wage levels, there are employers who somehow find ways to cut down labor costs by reducing workers' allowances.

In fact, monthly allowances of workers were unchanged after the government implemented the new minimum wage levels.

The possible explanation for that result comes from a practical issue. One could argue that minimum wage levels in Vietnam remain relatively low, meeting only around 80% of workers' basic living needs (Labor Newspaper, 2018). As a result, if employers reduce allowances, they may face potential risks regarding future labor supply. Furthermore, because minimum wage levels are deemed insufficient to meet a basic living standard, the low-wage workers may be enticed to seek out a new job market with higher wages. According to the Ministry of Labor-Invalids and Social Affairs statistics, from 2010 to 2016, the total number of workers exported to Northeast Asian markets such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan were 9,8776 per year, a 69 percent increase from 2000 to 2009, of which unskilled labor accounts for half of total employment. Therefore, it may be a risk of a labor supply shortage in the domestic market in the future.

Recommendation

(i) The main policy implication deriving from these findings is that in order to protect the benefit for low-wage workers in terms of wages across all regions of Vietnam, policymakers should determine labor market profiles and consider employer subsidies if it is necessary. This is because firms in rural areas tend to have low productivity and would not be able to afford higher minimum wage. Additionally, in order to adjust minimum wage levels, it is important to have a clear formula that takes into account many factors.

(ii) To ensure employers' compliance with the minimum wage policy, policymakers should increase the allocation of resources for labor inspectors. At the same time, penalties of non-compliance should be strong enough and described clearly in the minimum wage regulations and be reviewed and be adjusted more often. In addition, both employers and employees should have wage and employment records which labor inspectors are able to monitor and determine compliance more easily.

(iii) The result found that an increase in minimum wage levels leads to dramatically increasing the number of working hours across all regions of Vietnam. However, the increase in working hours may be associated with the risk of workers' health. According to the World Health Organization, working long hours per week is associated with risks from diseases that kill hundreds of thousands of workers each year. Especially, Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific were the most affected regions. Furthermore, the Vietnamese government only adopted a monthly minimum wage; at the same time, maximum working hours per week is much higher compared to other countries. Therefore, the author supposes that policymakers should reduce the maximum working hours and also adopting an hourly minimum wage for low-wage workers in order to avoid the negative impact of the minimum wage increase on low-wage workers. At the same time, it is necessary to increase the monitoring of employers about enforcement and compliance with the minimum wage policy.

(iv) Looking at the characteristics of workers who were covered by the minimum wage policy, it is clear that they are less-educated, and most of them are married. Therefore, to alleviate the negative effects of minimum wage increases, the Vietnamese government should support them by other policies such as investing in education, training, and medical services that will contribute to improving their productivity to avoid the negative effect.

Conclusion

The main purpose of raising the minimum wages of Vietnam is to improve the living standard of low-wage workers so that they can meet their basic needs (Minimum wage regulation, 2013). However, this positive effect can be negated if the higher minimum wage levels lead employers to exploit labor. Based on the minimum wage literature, although many studies suggested that raising minimum wages brought benefits to low-wage workers, others showed a negative effect on labor outcomes after implementing the minimum wage increases due to employers' response to reduce production costs. In Vietnam, the debate about the impact of an increase in minimum wage levels still continues even with the lack of empirical evidence.

The purpose of this quantitative study was to estimate the impact of raising minimum wage levels on different aspects, both financial benefits and labor exploitation. Based on the empirical evidence of the analysis, the study was able to make some recommendations to adjust the minimum wage regulation for more effectiveness. Three conclusions can be made from this study.

The first conclusion is that raising the minimum wage levels have increased the monthly wages of most low-wage workers in the formal sector in general but did not affect workers' wages in the rural region. Although this result is in line with previous empirical evidence, this study also indicates that minimum wage did not have a significant impact on low-wage workers in the rural region. This means those workers have not benefitted from higher minimum wage. However, in this study, by measuring the wage effect in different regions, the impact of the new minimum wage regulation can be seen.

The second conclusion is that the effect of the minimum wage increases on working hours was significant across all regions of Vietnam. Although there have been some studies on the impact of minimum wage increases in Vietnam, there is no empirical evidence on the working hour effect of raising minimum wages. Therefore, this study contributes to the research on the impact of an increase in minimum wage levels on the working hours of low-wage workers in the formal sector. The result shows that there was a dramatic increase in the number of hours worked in the formal sector following a minimum wage increase. The author argues that based on the minimum wage regulations, employers might have different responses to a higher minimum wage. For example, because the government of Vietnam set only a monthly minimum wage, in order to reduce production costs caused by raising the minimum wage, an employer might increase hours of work. This contrasts with some countries where governments adopted an hourly minimum wage, and the evidence mentioned in the discussion part of this study shows that there was a decrease in working hours after implementing a new minimum wage.

The third conclusion is that there is no evidence to justify the often-made argument that employers reduced allowances of low-wage workers after implementing higher minimum wage levels. However, it is necessary to have a clear list of allowances to protect the benefit for low-wage workers.

The main implication from these findings indicates that, first and foremost, the government should promote monitoring in rural areas to protect low-wage workers. Second, the government should reduce the maximum number of working hours per week. At the same time, hourly minimum wages for both full-time and part-time workers are required. Finally,

allowances should be addressed clearly to mitigate the negative impact of minimum wage increases. Thus, the findings of this research may also have implications for contexts similar to Vietnam.

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***Revisiting External Stakeholders' Role in Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)
Disclosure: A Systematic Literature Review and Research Agenda***

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Abstract

An increasing number of countries have implemented mandatory environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure to encourage listed companies in apprising their stakeholders on the 'non-financial' aspects of relevant operational risks, resilience, and outcomes. Recent studies however revealed that mandatory disclosure in most cases does not increase the quality of filed reports, thus may hamper ESG investment decisions and the global corporate community's ongoing effort in addressing sustainability challenges. To date, researchers have largely focused on investigating the effect of company characteristics (firm level) on ESG disclosures. This literature review contributes to the scarce evidence concerning the growing influence of external stakeholders including international buyers, rating agencies, foreign investors, media, non-governmental organisations, and regulatory bodies in demanding ESG credentials of companies. The initial findings offer insights to policy makers and industry practitioners on leveraging the stakeholders by channelling their distinctive sources of contextual pressure to influence ESG disclosure decisions by companies.

Keywords: ESG, Sustainability Reporting, Scopus, Google Scholar, Literature Review

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Introduction

Over the past few years, an increasing number of countries have introduced sustainability reporting instruments that require or encourage organizations to provide disclosure about their current efforts and future commitments on social, environmental and governance (ESG) performance (Bartels et al., 2016). ESG is an acronym developed in a 2004 report jointly prepared by 20 financial institutions that were invited by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to provide guidelines/recommendations on the integration of environmental, social, and corporate governance issues in asset management and securities brokerage services (Compact, 2004). Professor Virginia Harper Ho (2021) proposed that the term “ESG” should serve as interpretive guidance and to be defined broadly to include “all nonfinancial information that is or may become material to the reporting company or its investors.”

Investment mandates have propelled the ESG reporting trend as more global assets managers and investment firms are incorporating ESG considerations in their ethical/impact investment processes and proxy voting decision-making (Eccles & Klimenko, 2019; Boffo & Patalano, 2020; Gerber et al., 2021). However, the ESG disclosure among businesses remains weak, despite the Government’s ongoing effort to encourage industries in providing relevant disclosure about their ESG commitments and indicators (Bakar et al., 2019; Kasbun et al., 2017; Mohammad & Wasiuzzaman, 2021). As countries are debating for a stronger legislation such as mandating ESG reporting standards (Krueger et al., 2021), policy makers should explore novel approach beyond policy intervention to improve ESG disclosures quality. To date, researchers have largely focused on investigating the effect of company characteristics (firm level) on ESG disclosures. The perceived growing influence of stakeholders can play a proactive role in investigating and exposing controversial corporate practices, either in response to complaints or on their own initiative. Dansky and Gamm (2004) have defined external stakeholders as “those special-interest groups that are concerned with the organization’s operations relative to their own interests.” Notwithstanding the growing interest in ESG, there remains limited systematic review of the literature concerning the influence of external stakeholders in ESG disclosure. The objective of this review study is to systematize the empirical literature related to the role of stakeholders in ESG disclosure.

Conclusions

Systematic literature review (SLR) refers to a form of review method that involves critical appraisal of empirical evidence from all relevant studies with the aim to answer a clearly defined question or hypothesis (Liberati et al., 2009; Synder, 2019). This study adopts the SLR approach as propagated by Tranfield (2003) that involves three stages namely selecting database systems (Google Scholar and Scopus) and search term, screening, and retrieving of article texts for careful and iterative reading. The protocol allows the researchers to identify and retrieve an initial 72 sample of articles.

Whilst by no means exhaustive, the initial findings of this literature review reveal the growing list of external stakeholders including international buyers, rating agencies, foreign investors, media, non-governmental organisations, and regulatory bodies in demanding ESG credentials of companies. The prospect of this review study is promising and warrants further investigation to better understand the influence of various stakeholder groups in driving corporate motivations to disclose ESG information across different countries with unique regulatory mandate settings. In summary, the initial findings highlighted the pivotal

involvement of external stakeholders to channel their distinctive sources of contextual pressure to influence ESG disclosure decisions by companies.

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***International Business and Economic Growth:
The Dimensions and Challenges of Internationalization***

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Abstract

This paper will examine the context of globalization and the development of companies. It is now established that internationalization is one of the essential strategic components from the outset. Smaller companies have an advantage due to the flexibility provided by their small size and dimension of a structure such as a representative office abroad. Whatever the scale, internationalization takes place in stages, although the crossing of these different stages can be rapid, depending on the incentives, provisions, means and motivations for export. As soon as they have the opportunity, small companies try the cross-border adventure, and they no longer hesitate at all to tackle sectors on other continents. The consensus is that small companies are also subject to several risks: product inadequacy, organizational complexities due to the increase in the size of the company, currency risk, the competence of local employees, social risks of labour protection, the financial risk of unprofitable investments, difficulties in obtaining credit and, above all, intercultural risk. In this paper we will discuss how small companies need to ask the right questions, and how can four steps of critical path analysis assist businesses? The four steps are: identify tasks, determine proper sequence of tasks, estimate the time required to perform each task, and prepare time-scaled chart of tasks and events to determine the critical path. The outcome of this study and our findings suggest that the support of theoretical models will help companies, through practice, the effective management of risks complexity in the context of internationalization.

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Introduction

The Internationalization Concepts: Three Levels of Competencies

In the context of globalization, it is now established that internationalization is one of the essential strategic components from the outset. Smaller companies have an advantage due to the flexibility provided by the small size and dimension of a structure such as a representative office abroad. Whatever the scale, internationalization takes place in stages, the crossing of these different stages can be rapid, depending on the incentives, provisions, means and motivations for export. From now on, management boards invest if they can in neighboring and distant markets. As soon as they have the opportunity, small companies try the cross-border adventure, and they no longer hesitate at all to tackle sectors on other continents. These three reasons have led to the globalization of the distribution of products and services, as well as other business services production, HR, R&D, finance, and capital contribution. We can consider three main phases of international development:

- Initial internationalization: first orientation of national or regional organizations towards the outside.
- Local development: This corresponds to the strengthening or consolidation of the various structures. This type of foundation corresponds to the complex processes of internationalization.
- Multinationalization: Establishment of homogeneous and integrated entities in the various building areas.

The Initial internationalization is a first phase of a cautious and exploratory approach. During this phase, the parties and project managers get to know the targeted geographical location. The establishment in the country is done in an exploratory and flexible form. The main objective is to assess the potential of local markets. After a good reading of the market, the company commits itself in ways that do not involve much: at any time, it can go back without having to resort to excessive costs. In this approach phase, the structure relies on intermediaries and local partners. These two categories limit the impact of any lack of trading knowledge. After a year or more time, this preparatory phase leads either to a total withdrawal from the market or to a more significant commitment such as establishing a subsidiary. In this way, the head office is moving towards the second stage, which is local development.

The local development is a second phase that concretizes the promising nature of the project or initial idea. The company can choose to build their business alone or to create a partnership. In the case of a partnership this is done for financial, marketing, cultural, legal, and cultural reasons. In some cases, companies rely on large groups or holding companies to set up in the country, who act as guarantors that negotiations are going well. This second step enables companies to optimize the different facets of their marketing mix. This implies the development of a certain local adaptation of the product and its strategy, the objective is to remove the foreign aspect of the product. This second phase consolidates the tactics and product in the host country. To validate this second transition and qualify for multinationalization, the company has to develop over several years and strengthen its presence in the territory. The volume of sales must be transcendent, the margins high and the management method efficient to maintain the structure financially viable. It is very common for companies, especially small companies, to stop trading at stage two of the international development phases.

The multinationalization is a final period of commercial development that requires a significant number of local establishments and should no longer be considered as an isolated group, but as a homogeneous group. This third level includes harmonizing procedures and centralizing certain functions, particularly the finance function. If properly conducted, this third stage can lead to globalization. In this stage, the most important element is the company international image, in terms of marketing, sales and finance. The most important financial element is the company's ability to raise funds, both to strengthen its position and to seize opportunities. This affects both the company self-financing and investments.

The Global/Local Grid and the Identification of the Potential for Internationalization of Activities

The Global/Local (G/L) grid makes it possible to highlight the intensity with which local adaptation forces are exerted that drive the geo-centralization of an activity. And the intensity with which global adaptation forces are exerted are the ones that push for the internationalization of an activity. When an activity such as the forces of globalization have a strong role and the forces of localization have a weak role, we are in the presence of an activity with global dominance. For this type of activity, competition is global, and involves companies that combine both volume strategies and strategies of cost competitiveness domination. For these companies, the offer is standardized, and the geographical distribution coverage of the product is at its maximum. As the demand for a product expands, a certain degree of standardization usually takes place. (Vernon (1966).

But when the forces of globalization play a limited role, and local adaptation forces have a strong role, then we are involved with an activity that is predominantly local. Between these two extremes, there are mixed activities, i.e. global-local activities. The main characteristics of global activities are based on two things: the nature of the products, i.e. standardized products with wide distribution, and the extent of the resources used, including financial, industrial and marketing resources. For most of the 20th century and the present century, the deployment of resources and capabilities in market-oriented economies has been shaped by a micro-organizational system (Dunning 1995). The company and the strategic options/organizational methods for globally dominant activities can be characterized by five dimensions, and all these dimensions converge towards the implementation of a global cost advantage. By one strategy, a single company began to expand and integrate through creating its own marketing organization. (Chandler 2003)

The five dimensions are the development or implementation of strong, even dominant commercial positions: in the main global markets, and to maximize sales volumes. The standardization of service is always done on a global scale: to take advantage of the experience effect, and to extend the sizes of the series products produced. The concentration of each of the elements on the value chain: R&Di, production, assembly, and distribution to benefit from a comparative advantage. The choice of a positioning and marketing strategy that is almost uniform throughout the world. The possibility of developing a major integrated global approach to all strategic movements to generate interdependencies between different locations, marketing, management, and product-specific R & D can be used to service production plants in countries other than the country in which these inputs are employed (Helpman 1984: 451). This corresponds to the search for partners, internal or external growth, the sale of assets and R&Di. It is important for a company to analyze the consequences of the progression of a certain number of its activities towards globalization. This should include the weight to be given to the international dimension. As companies lose their geocentricity in

favour of an opening towards the outside world, three characteristics emerge: Increasing and progressive local involvement of most administrative, financial, and commercial functions in the internationalization process. The activities have an increasingly international aspect that takes the structure out of its original space. This corresponds to the shift from an ethnocentric management model to a polycentric system. The international aspect is considered in upstream decision-making processes. This internationalization of the business is more sensitive and is felt more at the level of functional strategies than at the level of overall strategy. When the opening is in its infancy, it is first and foremost the supply department that is more involved, or more often the purchasing department. Globalization occurs at the level of the responsibilities, rather than the firm, and highlights important differences in the timing, sequence, and objectives of the process across functions (Malnight 1995).

These different categories are grouped around a decision-making circle, which highlights the interactions between functions in the context of internationalization.

The three main orders are: the basic strategies; marketing, including business development, and procurement. From the outset, they are the most solicited. The strategies include human resources, accounting and financial management, industrial policy, and patent management. They are there to implement the basic ideas. The structural strategies: legal functions and controls. They make it possible to adapt to their new surroundings. It is also expressed in terms of sales and then downstream logistics. Human resources and R&D will only be involved afterwards, in a third phase and at the last moment during recruitment.

Incentives for Internationalization: Reasons for the Key Role of Specific or Competitive Advantage in the Initial Phase

In the first phase of internationalization, triggers are essentially related to specific advantages and competitive advantages that differ from localization or internationalization advantages. In the case of a domestic company, it will be encouraged to expand its reference space for several reasons. Two main categories of motivation can be highlighted. Either it is a question of asserting its distinctive skills and competitive advantages across borders, or it is a question of compensating for a saturated domestic market, or one that is on the way to being so. Firms that benefit from a location advantage in the country of origin are more likely to start multinationalizing. (Cuervo-Cazurra 2007)

The first set of incentives or triggers related to the specific benefit is directly related to the desire to preserve and enhance the benefits acquired during its domestic expansion. For sectors where marketing-mixing techniques are evolving rapidly, there is a need to develop a monitoring capacity, particularly to maintain a marketing lead. In this case, innovation can be considered as a trigger mainly for service activities. Conversely, for sectors where obsolescence is less rapid, the requirement to develop a monitoring system and the obligation to create one is less important, but this does not mean that it does not exist. The need to respond to the foreign threat in the short, medium or long term is a concern to reduce the risks of saturation of the domestic market or a decline in domestic demand. The following sectors can be mentioned here that do not always follow the conventional internationalization stage: mobile telephony, electrical devices, construction, automotive, agri-foods and clothing. Common to all these sectors are several factors that are likely to generate threats: demographic changes, large volumes of investment in the short term, pressure from substitute products, and improvements in living conditions and consumption habits. (Bell 1985)

Thus, technological renewals are frequent to ensure market share even when sectors are in difficulty. At the time of the local development phase, incentives are mainly based on the opportunities contained in the foreign geographical areas in which companies are likely to grow. There are three main triggers in this phase: The growth of the potential of a target location, which are the most important objectives to be addressed first. To which type of industry and firms have we directed our research? If the geographical area selected by the company is limited and its market is saturated, it is advisable not to embark on the process of internationalization. The transition for companies was in part accomplished through the rapid deployment of new organizational form and new technologies in production. (Harvey 2000: 82) If the company is certain of getting involved in the market, it does not hesitate to invest in resources and human capital.

Country Risk

Every country presents its own investment opportunities. Before expanding a company overseas, however, one should be aware of the additional risks of the foreign trade market. In general, the risks of conducting international business can be segmented into four main categories: country, political, regulatory, and currency risk. Assess risk at an early stage rather than later if a risk become too high. Document and communicate risk through a risk register (ERP) Enterprise Resource Planning. A risk is an event or situation for which there is no corrective action that can be taken, and which can endanger part or even the whole project.

To prevent a failure of the project we need to use a contingency plan, an activity or a budget that will have to be activated should a specific situation arise, or a risk for which one has an action plan should it occur. The risk management is the art and science of identifying, analyzing, and responding to risk factors throughout the life of a project and in the best interest of its objectives. Risk can be defined as any possible event that can negatively affect the viability of a project. To complete an internationalization project, companies have to work with an external partner, thus relying on a third party outside the direct control of the project to supply components or services necessary to complete the project. The Strategic decision contributing to this pattern is one that is effective over long periods of time (Andrews 2011).

Global risk includes the political risk. The political risk defines the political climate of another country where the company wishes to work. Before starting any processes, the company must make sure and be aware of the political situation and the business perspective of the foreign government. The company should target the political issues in a market and work on the possibility of developing an investment inside the country. The statistics based on the FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) which can be provide by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) or the World Bank can be very useful to determine if one country is likely to receive foreign investments. Some countries involve crime and corruption. FDI does not have any significant impact on international transparency. In all different types of estimations and despite different control variables. (De Groot 2014: 196)

It is important for a company to analyze the currency exchange risk. The currency is one of the most important risks within international trade. The volatility of currency must be studied for all countries the company wishes to work in. Stable governments are more likely to have a stable currency while less developed countries can have very volatile and unstable currencies. The changes or any political changes can drastically reduce the profits of a project. Currency rates and trends must be checked every week and the political or

economic events must be studied by the executive board.

At the same time, this leads these companies to analyze the credit risk. Credit risk is linked to the banking system, how a foreign company will be able to be supported by banks and how the company will be able to get credit lines, mortgages, and other financial products indispensable to an international development. From where will the investment come from? The original country or the receiving country. The management of logistics activities must be coordinated with the transport risk. Costs, deadlines, damages, and security are the most important risks in all international transport.

By setting up abroad, head offices are increasing benchmarking by competing with local competitors: product quality, after-sales service quality, improved marketing mix, and an acceleration in the pace of R&Di investment. Benchmarking has in recent years become an increasingly common practice not only among companies but also among groups that carry out these studies to compare companies with each other. The greater the geographical scope of internationalization, the more efficient and effective the information system must be today, and the more favoured it will be for the EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) The preceding paragraphs included the basic and essential elements to understand the simple and complex processes of internationalization. We have seen in what contexts they apply or not, otherwise companies can find themselves in clear financial difficulties.

This gives the company specificity and identity. Porter's concept, the value chain, shows that it is inevitable to evaluate the interdependent activities of a company along a chain to determine the ability of the organization to create value; this will be perceived by customers. Porter's analysis leads to the value chain principle diagram. This diagram structures the company in a horizontal axis (main activities) and a vertical axis (support activities). The common goal of the core and support activities is to create a profit margin. However, even within an industry, the choice of strategy depends of the segment of the value chain that a firm competes in. (Perlmutter 1985) There will only be a profit margin if the value that customers receive is higher than the cost price of the product. Distinctive skills, within a business or organization, a company are present when the company can master a technique, a management dimension or know-how better than its competitors. In this case, the company has a distinctive competence. In general, trade requires several distinctive skills. Considering the three previous elements, we will present the following diagram to better understand these three core areas of strategic positioning.

Diagram mixing the three concepts:




Figure 1. Key Success Factors

These Key Success Factors (KSFs) must be reduced to the sector level, segmentation, and analysis identifying the different strategic segments. A strategic segment is a subset of the market in which the combination of KSF is specific. This analysis can be done from different perspectives: types of customers, technical (in relation to know-how), segmentation of the product, and geographical location. This strategic segmentation determines the Strategic Business Areas (SBAs). The SBA determine whether the company has the right segment and competitive advantages. With the steps of the strategic approach, and considering the key concepts of the analysis, we can detail this approach in four successive steps:

- 1) Knowledge of the environment and society: a precise diagnosis should enable the company to develop its strategy by reducing uncertainty and complexity, it is both an internal and external evaluation. This diagnosis corresponds to the synthesis of information that is relevant for the company at a given time. The diagnosis concerns the environment near and far from the company and integrates the criteria of the competitive system.
- 2) System highlights the strategic segments analyses the position of the structure of the company segments. It positions the company specific skills and assets forward on which it can base a strategy.
- 3) Characterization of strategic alternatives: the internal and external diagnosis make it possible to delimit the company distinctive skills (i.e., strengths and weaknesses). At the external level, the diagnosis presents the attractions of the environment and its constraints, in economic, sociological, political, fiscal, and international contexts. Based on the diagnosis, the manager determines strategic alternatives that present themselves to the company. The decision resulting from the strategic alternative will then create the positioning.

Once the strategic orientation has been chosen, the manager evaluates each of the components of the strategic alternative among several possibilities. The components of the analysis are compared in a cost-benefit assessment, to decide objectively and comprehensively what to do. However, the selection criteria used to determine the final strategic direction are rational, and contingent. The selection indices can also be the result of compromises, and power games between decision-makers. The company, however, remains in a context of limited rationality. This rationality is limited by the level of information of the decision-maker and the capacity for competence. The manager sets up indicators to monitor actions and measure results. The control system, which will be visualized by a project plan dashboard, will make it possible, if necessary, to refocus the strategic orientations over time.

Business Strategies

A company's strategy is determined by the market breakdown, which is achieved by segmentation. Once this market breakdown is done, the strategy is driven by the positioning of product/market pairs. The company is looking to focus its activities to develop the product/market combinations that will enable it to succeed. To do this, the company must determine its Strategic Business Areas. This field of activity can be analyzed either by its nature or by its dimension. The nature of the DAS will define the distinct strategies, a single activity, specialization or several activities, diversification, and differentiation. Which strategy is better is not a matter of opinion but of necessity. (Levitt 1983: 92)

The reasons that lead the company to this choice are multiple: a better control and for a longer time, a technique, a product, and a market. The company may also suffer from a lack of resources to deploy in several directions. It will, therefore, focus its efforts on a specific sector. Niche strategies are not only the responsibility of a small company. A large company can develop this type of strategy in certain segments. There are several forms of

specialization, they are generally dependent on the choice of companies, the focus can be geographical, the product range or on market specialization. It should be noted that the niche strategy is not without risk; here are the risks faced by the company that wants to work in a local context: Risk of market saturation, the trade can mature or decline, the high-growth sector could quickly attract other firms, the environment that may evolve unfavorably for this activity.

Management of International Subsidiaries: The EPRG

The EPRG model was proposed by Perlmutter in 1969 to highlight the different conceptions of company management in international markets. He considers four important strategic predispositions in a multinational company: the Ethnocentric model, is a predisposition where all strategic decisions are guided by the values and interests of the parent company. Such a firm is concerned with global viability and legitimacy in its domestic country.

The ethnocentric model is characterized by the unification of systems and strategies: the model applied to subsidiaries is that of the parent company. The polycentric model is a predisposition where strategic decisions are tailored to suit the cultures of the different countries in which the multinational company competes. A polycentric multinational is mainly concerned with its legitimacy in each country in which it operates, even if this means some loss of profit. The polycentric model is characterized by a fragmentation of systems and strategies between subsidiaries and the parent company, the management of entities is as local as possible.

The predominant orientation of a multinational is called an EPRG profile. An ethnocentric or polycentric EPRG profile is very common (Perlmutter 1969), while a regiocentric or geocentric EPRG profile is relatively new between multinational companies. This model has contributed to a better understanding of the strategic and organizational orientations followed by companies at the international level.» The theory is a comparative synthesis of headquarters-subsidiary relationships based on the approach developed by Perlmutter. The comparison is based on three main criteria that represent differences in:

- organizational approaches: degree of complexity, authority and decision-making, evaluation, and control.
- intra-firm relationships: cultural orientation, degree of interdependence and autonomy, origin of flows. Theoretical and methodological strengths and weaknesses of the different conceptual frameworks are next discussed. (Andersen 1997)

Internationalization Implicates Intercultural Changes

Intercultural ignorance is a real factor, and many are affected in their daily functions. No expatriate or executive can ignore these barriers, they are real, present, and part of everyday life. Learning, knowledge, and mastery of theoretical elements are an asset to anyone who wants to apply them in their work and this learning has a profound impact on how the firm is seen to approach foreign markets (Forsgren 2002). It is our objective to study the phenomena related to culture in the future. Internationalization should be progressive and incremental and explores the issue of de-internationalization and its role in the long-term internationalization of the firm (Richard 2001: 25).

Conclusion

Companies need to ask the right questions, how with four steps can critical path analysis assist the business? Identify tasks, determine proper sequence of tasks, estimate the time required to perform each task, prepare time-scaled chart of tasks and events to determine the critical path.

There are three factors that explain the dynamism of international trade. First, transport costs have fallen significantly as a result of a series of innovations and increased efficiency of transport modes and infrastructure. The second decisive criterion is that integration processes such as the emergence of economic blocs and the abolition of tariffs on a global scale have been successful in promoting international trade. Finally, the third factor is that production systems are increasingly flexible and interlinked, stimulating the exchange of goods and services of all kinds. Globalization covers many facets, including tariff liberalization, increased capital movements and international labour mobility are some of these well-known features. We can prepare ourselves with the following information:

At first glance, globalization appears to be a phenomenon of the last two decades of the twentieth century in relation to the economy. We were already talking about the global village and the impact of multinationals. Then, in 1986, the long working sessions of the Uruguay Round began, which led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Meanwhile, capital was becoming more mobile across borders, giving rise to geo-finance or financial globalization.

Globalization is a process that tends to make the same goods, services and factor services accessible at the same price and quality conditions in all countries at the same time. The search for a better organization, optimizing the internal structure, rationalization with the right recruitment of human resources who will manage the establishment and represent the parent company abroad. It is thanks to innovations that the company becomes competitive, R&D creates more modern products and business perspectives.

Companies are also subject to several risks, product inadequacy, organizational complexities due to the increase in the size of the company, currency risk, the competence of local employees, social risks of labour protection, the financial risk of unprofitable investments, difficulties in obtaining credit and, above all, intercultural risk. The above elements will gradually lead us to the importance of considering interculturality in remote and relocated entities. It is essential to design detailed learning with the support of theoretical models that will help and lead expatriates through practice to effective management of intercultural complexity in the context of internationalization. Entrepreneurs must have the will to define and develop an excellent international strategy, based on global competitiveness where firms in a competitive, globally integrated environment face a liability of foreignness. (Zaheer 1995)

Management frameworks that are not familiar with the vast aspects of cultures are first invited to study the theoretical and literary outlines of the subject. These models and theories are based first of all on large-scale studies conducted by recognized researchers in world-class companies.

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Resilience as a Policy Goal and a Policy Measure: South Korea's New Deal Policy in the Post-COVID-19 Era

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Abstract

Resilience draws attention as a way to combat the unprecedented uncertainty today. Especially in this post-COVID-19 era, a sense of insecurity penetrates nearly every aspect of our lives, from political to economic, social, and cultural dimensions. At times, those dimensions meet and overlap each other, affecting and being affected. Resilience thus can be both a policy goal and a policy measure to the goal. South Korea, in July 2020, announced a new policy package, the Korean New Deal, while grappling with the COVID-19 crisis. The three main components are the digital economy, green technology, and the social safety net. This is a shift to a new path for resilience building in industrial, environmental, and social sectors. Of these, the most vulnerable one is the social sector, thus weaving the social safety net tighter has become one of the top policy priorities. The government has taken aggressive measures in tackling this, distributing four cash and card subsidies in 2020, followed by two more subsidies in the first half-year of 2021. South Korea's policy response to the pandemic crisis was mainly a two-track approach: offering unconditional cash transfers and openly examining universal basic income (UBI). Such a policy measure and public policy discourse indicate the interconnected resilience mechanism in which increasing economic resilience may lead to social resilience. This paper will further explore the link between economic and social resilience through the case of South Korea's post-COVID-19 policymaking, along with the impact of subsidies on the social safety net.

Keywords: Resilience, Social Resilience, Social Safety Net, Subsidies, UBI

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Introduction

Resilience draws attention as a way to combat the unprecedented uncertainty today. In this post-COVID-19 era, a sense of insecurity penetrates nearly every aspect of our lives, across different dimensions of our society. Some dimensions meet and overlap each other, affecting and being affected and causing a problem in another dimension of resilience. For example, a weakened economic resilience may result in structural problems weakening social resilience, especially if eroded over a long period. Economically and socially embedded low resilience requires a rather interdisciplinary and holistic approach to re-building resilience across the entire society. From this point of view, resilience can be both a policy goal and a policy measure to the goal. South Korea, in July 2020, announced a new policy package, the Korean New Deal, while grappling with the COVID-19 crisis. The three main components are the digital economy, green technology, and the social safety net. This aims to shift to a new path for resilience building in industrial, environmental, and social sectors. Of these, the most vulnerable one is the social sector, thus weaving the social safety net tighter has become one of the top policy priorities. The government has taken aggressive measures in tackling this, distributing four cash and card subsidies in 2020, followed by two more subsidies in the first half-year of 2021. South Korea's policy response to the pandemic crisis was mainly a two-track approach: offering unconditional cash transfers and openly examining universal basic income (UBI). Such a policy measure and public policy discourse indicate the interconnected resilience mechanism in which increasing economic resilience may lead to social resilience. This paper will further explore the link between economic and social resilience through the case of South Korea's post-COVID-19 policymaking, along with the impact of subsidies on the social safety net.

Resilience as a Policy Concept

The concept of resilience has too many versions of definitions, even quite different at times. The definition gaps and various resilience narratives made resilience a 'dynamic and malleable' concept that has 'evolved and still been evolving' (Bene et al., 2017, p.3). One of the major reasons for the complexity of resilience is its interdisciplinary use across various disciplines, especially popular in Engineering, Ecology, and Social Science. During the 1960s and 1970s, resilience gained some limelight from engineering scholars, defined as a system to disturbances and the speed of return to its pre-shock state. The resilience from the engineering perspective was normalization after an external shock and how fast it can come back to normal. It was ecologists who picked up the academic interests in the emerging concept and joined the resilience discourse. Ecological understanding of resilience is more close to the durability of a system. Resilience, for ecologists, is a scale of disturbance that a system can absorb before getting destabilized.

In the 1990s, social scientists started to apply the concept of resilience to societal contexts by combining the two and expanding the definition of resilience. Resilience is deemed a complex set of economic, social, and institutional traits that characterize regions' ability to respond to a shock. What made the social science thinking of resilience different from others were two dimensions of resilience that were not included in the concept before - adaptive and transformative dimensions of resilience. The adaptive dimension means that 'the capacity to learn, combine experience and knowledge adjust responses to changing external drivers and internal processes, and continue operating' (Bene et al., 2017, p.3; Berkes, Colding, and Folke, 2003). The transformative capacity, on the other hand, is the capacity to create a fundamentally new system when ecological, economic, or social structures make the existing

system untenable (Bene et al., 2017, p.3; Walker, Holling, Carpenter, and Kinzif, 2004, p.5). By having the adaptive dimension, social science's usage of resilience 'no longer refers to the capacity of a system to return to an old and unchanged state after shock' (Brinkmann et al., 2017, p.9). Rather, adaptive resilience extended the understanding and definition of resilience to the post-shock transition necessary to move on to a new state.

The critical point in social science's definition of resilience is that it refers to a system and institution as the subject of resilience, unlike psychology's interpretation of resilience based on individuals. Resilience is, in social science, interpreted as the buffer capacity or the system's ability to absorb disturbances before the system changes its structure by altering its variables or the processes that control system behavior (Serban & Talanga, 2015; Adger, 2002). Such group or system-based viewpoint of resilience makes resilience building a collective goal for the betterment of a system. Those in the same system are pulled and converged to the common aim to make the entire system work better in the face of economic and social shocks. Just like the complexity of a system, resilience also has similar innate complexity adding more layers and dimensions to the concept, which can be employed in many aspects of society. Many names or subunits of resilience are used in each related dimension; 'economic resilience' for economic security and recovery from recession, 'social resilience' for social development and equality, and 'community resilience' for local governance and authority, for example. Composed of economic, spatial, and social dimensions, the concept of resilience is sensitive to the institutional context and requires 'interdisciplinary analysis at various scales' (Adger, 2002, p.349).

Many scholars highlighted the importance of bridging resilience and policymaking for resilience building. Resilience has been more frequently used in policy and practice, sometimes interchangeably at the micro, meso, and macro levels of policy action and analysis (Donoghue, 2020). The concept of resilience is popular among policymakers and governments, even though resilience-building may come at a huge cost. Scholars found the reasons why resilience is widely well-accepted from two inherent features of resilience. One is the instinctively positive narratives of resilience, and the other is the variable applications for different aspects of society, such as economic resilience and social resilience. Resilience discourses bring the focus on vulnerability, stability, and sustainability as essential keywords for resilience building. These keywords are attractive from "a political and rhetorical perspective as they can associate a whole policy program with connotations of strength, support and enhanced well-being in the face of significant challenge" (Donoghue, 2020, p.2).

To make a society maintain its systemic stability and vulnerability, the concept of resilience turns policymakers' attention to structural transforms and reforms by engaging with the dynamics of social, cultural, and political changes. By doing so, a system can be resilient and move to new development paths through necessary transformations. Thus, the application of resilience to the policymaking process renders policymakers identify the current system's stability and vulnerability, then go through institutional changes and find ways to sustainable development. In short, resilient policymaking in the face of a shock or a disturbance brings the attention of policymakers to the management of social equilibrium for better stability and social equity by tightening the social safety net for vulnerable groups. If necessary, policy reforms or changes can take a proactive approach for the desired policy outcome.

Resilience-based policymaking understands instability or vulnerability as a systemic wrong due to a less resilient society, not each one's fault or misfortune. It relates disturbances and shocks to the improper management of social resources and embedded inequality. As many

policy areas are interconnected and intertwined with one another, it is vital to consider the links between different domains of resilience. Thus, using the concept of resilience itself requires a rather complicated, sophisticated, and interdisciplinary analysis and measures of public policy. With this theoretical background of resilience, let's move on to South Korea's recent policy change and reform for its resilience building.

The Korean New Deal for Better Economic and Social Resilience

In the latest OECD employment outlook publication in 2021, South Korea ranked 30th out of the 42 countries and regions, with only 66.9 % of its working-age population employed. It was lower than the OECD total average (67.4%), and its ranking has been lowered than the previous years. The gap between the rich and the poor is becoming wider in South Korea than in almost any other OECD member country. According to the IMF's working paper on the inequality in Asia (2016), the income inequality in South Korea is the most severe in Asia. The top 10 percent of the population earn about 45% of the entire national income. This is the highest concentration of income among any comparable Asian country. And to decrease income concentration, the IMF called for an aggressive fiscal policy. Overall, economic inequality permeates every corner of society, from getting a job and getting a fair salary to wealth distribution. The impact of such institutionally embedded economic inequality now reaches another dimension of social justice and social equity. A lack of economic resilience negatively affects social resilience. South Korea's suicide rate remained highest among members of the OECD, and the elderly suicide rate is alarmingly high (The Economist, 2013). Plus, South Korean young people feel the least happy of any members of the OECD, according to the Happiness Index in 2016. One out of every five have had suicidal thoughts, and the older they are, the more likely they identify money as the condition for a happy family. Such a socio-economic situation got only worse during the pandemic, harshly hitting the most vulnerable groups.

Two policy papers were published in the middle of pandemic shock. On July 14, 2020, the Korean New Deal was announced as a new policy package. The other was the OECD report, a regular recommendation paper, was released a month after the Korean New Deal announcement. According to figure 1, the high-income inequality and poverty rate were higher than other OECD member countries, whereas the public and private spending on health care and pensions are lower. Many index figures and research outcomes about Korea's economic and social resilience call for strengthening social protection, and the economic inequality issue must be tackled more aggressively. And the policy recommendations from the OECD report pinpointed these economic-social resilience issues. In short, the policy recommendations were on two tracks - enhancing economic support for vulnerable groups and companies while tightening the social safety net and welfare system.

BASIC STATISTICS OF KOREA, 2018
(Numbers in parentheses refer to the OECD average)

SOCIETY					
Income inequality (Gini coefficient, 2017, OECD: 2016)	0.355	(0.310)	Education outcomes (PISA score)		
Relative poverty rate (% , 2017, OECD: 2016)	17.4	(11.6)	Reading	514	(489)
Median disposable household income (000 USD PPP, 2017, OECD: 2016)	27.5	(23.6)	Mathematics	526	(492)
Public and private spending (% of GDP)			Science	519	(491)
Health care	8.1	(8.8)	Share of women in parliament (%)	17.0	(29.7)
Pensions (2017, OECD: 2015)	3.1	(8.5)	Net official development assistance (% of GNI, 2017)	0.1	(0.4)
Education (public, 2017)	4.6	(4.5)			

Figure 1. Basic Statistics of South Korea for the Social Sector (Source: the OECD)

The Korean New Deal interprets the pandemic shock and its recovery path through the lens of resilience theory. A pandemic shock was followed with three expected pathways to recovering from the shock. Interestingly, the Korean New Deal's interpretation is a hybrid version of ecological resilience and engineering resilience in understanding the post-COVID 19 pathways. First, the ecological understanding of resilience mainly focuses on 'normalization' after the shock, which is Pathway A in figure 2. Pathways 2 and 3 are based on engineering resilience focusing on the disturbances a system can absorb, the systemic durability, and the outcome of returning to the pre-shock state or going to a new post-shock state. From the South Korean government's point of view, society absorbed some shock, then would diverge into varying recovery and development paths. This was more proper in the case of the Korean experience since the social dimension was struggling like pathway C while the economic dimension, compared to other countries, was somewhere close to pathway B. So making links between industrial, environmental, and social dimensions of resilience and using the link and interconnection, the New Deal aims to strengthen overall resilience, especially social resilience. Along with the two major areas of development - digital industry and the low-carbon economy - the reconstruction of the social safety net comes to the center of the post-pandemic policy efforts. The aim for bridging economic and social dimensions of resilience is clear, and resilience is a policy goal on the one hand and a policy measure on the other hand.




Figure 2. The Post-pandemic Recovery Pathways (Source: The Government of Republic of Korea)



Figure 3. The Korean New Deal and its Policy Design (Source: The Government of Republic of Korea, 2020)

Subsidies and UBI - Policy Measures for Reconstruction of Resilience

Along with the macro-level policy reform through the New Deal, the government has continued to provide subsidies. It was quite an aggressive policy effort to provide subsidies five times throughout the pandemic in 2020 and 2021. One interesting change between the early and later subsidies was the eligibility. With the OECD recommendation being out in July, the difference between the first and the second subsidies was the change in policy target. More selective, specifically targeted subsidies were delivered except the very first one for everyone. They were given to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), self-employed people, and vulnerable groups while the eligibility was getting expanded later. The latest subsidies were offered to about 80% of the entire nation. There were some immediate positive impacts of grants among the least income groups. The consumption increased among the 1st and the 2nd quantiles while the money could be spent on the essential, necessary items (Nam & Lee,

2021). As more people were eligible for subsidies later, there were some learning effects since some people experienced the social benefit and its positive impact for the first time. After several subsidy distributions, the public support for taxation and welfare policies became wider. A recent study on the impact of subsidies found that people's satisfaction with the subsidies creates a more welcoming atmosphere for other welfare policy agendas (Nam, 2021).

South Korea's Emergency Relief Subsidies throughout Five Distributions 2020-2021

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
Sum	14.3 (Trillion, KRW)	7.8 (Trillion, KRW)	9.3 (Trillion, KRW)	20.7 (Trillion, KRW)	15.7 (Trillion, KRW)
Date	May 2020	September 2020	January 2021	March 2021	August 2021
Target	Universal	Selective SMEs, Self-employed, Freelancers, Vulnerable groups	Selective SMEs, Self-employed, Freelancers, Social/Public service workers	Selective SMEs, Self-employed, Freelancers, Social/Public service workers, Vulnerable groups	Selective People in the bottom 80% income bracket, Extra subsidies for those in the least income groups
Benefits	Maximum 1,000,000 (KRW)	1,000,000 ~ 2,000,000 (KRW)	1,000,000 ~ 3,000,000 (KRW)	1,000,000 ~ 5,000,000 (KRW)	Maximum 20,000,000 (KRW)

Figure 4. A Summary of Korea's Five Subsidies from 2020 to 2021 (Source: IMF)

Aggressive subsidy offering has now turned the policy discourse to the possibility of universal basic income (UBI) as a policy means to increase the socio-economic resilience of South Korea. According to Philippe Van Parijs, who organized the Basic Income Earth Network (NIEN) and invented the concept of UBI, UBI is based on the norm of “real freedom for all” (Lee, 2021, p.147). Four core attributes of the concept of UBI are (i) cash payment, (ii) individual beneficiary, (iii) unconditionally, and (iv) regularity (periodical). Due to such features, UBI is fundamentally different from general social welfare policies that are targeted specific socio-economic cohorts. Finland is the only country to have implemented a nationwide trial of UBI, while there are many other countries considering or used to consider the introduction of UBI as part of their welfare policy reform. It is not a new idea, and in Korea, it has been gradually growing its significance in policy venues. According to a national survey in March and April 2021 (Gyeonggi research institute, 2021), more than half of the respondents agreed with both 200 and 500 USD UBI. And about 70-80% answered that they want it to be implemented in 3 or 5 years. As a policy response to reduce income inequality, UBI can contribute to more fair redistribution and give people better lives than low market wages can support. It would also strengthen the social safety net by reaching all of the needy since UBI targets everyone regardless of income levels or any preconditions (Hoynes and Rothstein, 2019). UBI-related policy talk could come to the front due to the broad acknowledgment of inadequacies of the current safety net and system. Furthermore, a policy window seems ready to open for UBI as well. One presidential election candidate openly discusses the introduction of UBI as part of this pledge. If he won, there could be political traction of implementing UBI soon, making South Korea the first Asian country to adopt a national UBI. Moreover, UBI is not a strange policy idea to Korean people. Youth

dividends of many sorts are available for some age groups of youth since they had been fallen into the blind spot of the national welfare system. Such partially UBI-like policies have been continuously implemented to close the inequality gap, which has gradually laid the ground for further policy talks and discourses on the possibility of introducing UBI.

Discussion

As the concept of resilience is too broad and vague, it does not give specific guidelines to policymakers. It leaves enough room for policy experts to reinterpret resilience as a policy concept and recreate (or reform) resilience-building policies in a context-specific, localized manner. Thus, using resilience in policymaking is not without limitation or contention. Korea's case of resilience-building also has some limitations, among which the somewhat unsophisticated use of resilience and the lack of public involvement in the policy process.

First, the Korean New Deal policies and other resilience-building policies do not distinguish the resilience to different kinds of shocks or stress. However, according to Giacometti and Teras (2019), the resilience to slow burns and shocks cannot be the same. The high unemployment rate, the high concentration of wealth, and the resulting social inequality are all chronic problems. However, it is quite unclear whether the policy measures aimed to solve those issues are effective enough to change the systemic wrongs by bringing any positive long-term impact. Even using some keywords is advised to have them for separate applications; Especially, the usage of 'stability and 'vulnerability' in resilience discourses has been warned to have more sophisticated definition and understanding since those two are related but different in nature (). Moreover, some media criticize policymakers in that the root cause of low youth unemployment is a lack of jobs. The cash-pouring policy of giving subsidies and introducing UBI is no more than vote-buying, albeit radical, because it cannot fix the underlying causes of the structural problems that are economically and socially embedded in society (Lee, 2021; Baek, 2019). More theoretical and conceptual effort for studying resilience itself and its application in policymaking should follow for better policy implementation of the Korean New Deal.

Last but not least is that public participation in the so-far policy processes and people's policy perception are missing in the recent discourses. However, policy perception is essential in effective resilience building. According to Marshall (2007), there are two dimensions of resilience: the risk assessment and the ability to cope with the risk. If people have good policy perception, they are more likely to understand the risk and control it because they would "understand and respect the need for change and will be more likely to incorporate its requirements into their working lives" (Marshall, 2007, p.224). Moreover, involvement and participation in the policy process for meaningful resilience building is significant since an inclusive policymaking process involving wider participation of people is the source of policy satisfaction, trust-building, and preparedness to change (Ibid). Such subjective factors that can enhance resilience are missing in the Korean New Deal and the current policy efforts for resilience reconstruction. The hopelessness and anger from long economic and social inequality should also be included in the resilience discourses as the policy goal of the Korean New Deal is to strengthen the basis for a people-centered and inclusive country.

Conclusion

As the pandemic has eroded and worsened society's economic and social dimension, resilience has emerged and been popular among policymakers and governments as a policy

concept and framework encompassing the different but connected dimensions of national resilience. The Korean government also came up with a new policy package, the Korean New Deal. With the new policy agenda, Korea has continued distributing subsidies targeting vulnerable groups to increase stability. The possibility of introducing UBI has also been seriously discussed to secure economic and social resilience in general while gaining more public agreement and support after the pandemic experience. Economic and social resilience are determined to have a sort of a cause and effect relationship, so the policymakers are trying to tackle the economic resilience for improving the social resilience as the policy outcome. Tightening the social safety net was put at the core of economic resilience-building via digital innovation and a low-carbon economy. However, cautions are needed to encourage participation in the policy process and deeper policy perception among people and to understand resilience as a policy term clearly: resilience to slow burns and shocks.

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Benefits for Bystanders? Effects of the Japan-South Korea and the US-China Trade Dispute for Japan (2018-2020)

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Abstract

The China-US and the Japan-South Korea trade dispute since 2018 and 2019 involve Japan's three top trading partners. This paper provides a comparative analysis of economic spillovers for Japan from both disputes between 2018 and 2020. The author argues that the China-US dispute entailed positive and negative spillovers for Japan as a bystander. As a participant, Japan faced negative spillovers from the Japan-South Korea dispute. Companies with China or US exposure experienced direct effects from the China-US trade dispute, e.g., declining sales and stock prices. Others benefitted from increasing demands and trade diversion effects. For the Japan-South Korea trade dispute, direct effects included boycotts, export problems, and declining tourist numbers. Indirect effects from both disputes include risk hedging measures by Japanese companies searching for new locations and partnerships, as well as Japan's government balancing between China and the US, and increasing multilateral economic cooperation. The analysis shows that the concepts of direct and indirect effects need to be modified to apply them to the China-US and Japan-South Korea trade dispute. Direct effects need to include positive spillovers in the context of Japan witnessing the China-US dispute. For indirect effects, not only risk hedging measures by economic actors, but also by political actors need to be included. This study of spillovers for Japan as a participant and bystander in two trade disputes allows general conclusions about potential economic risks of trade disputes for participants and bystanders. The analysis draws on theoretical findings by Baldwin and Kapstein (2020), Kawashima (2019), and others.

Keywords: Trade Dispute, Japan-South Korea Relations, China-US Relations, Japan-US Relations, Economic Conflict, Trade War, Economic Security, Political Conflict, Boycott, Tourism, Risk Hedging, Balancing, Multilateral Economic Cooperation

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Introduction

Since the onset of the China-US trade dispute in 2018, trade disputes have been widely discussed by the media. This paper analyzes and compares economic spillovers of the China-US trade dispute, and the Japan-South Korea trade dispute for Japan from 2018 to 2020.

Most research about trade disputes discusses legal dispute settlement, such as Elsig et al. (2021), Tevini (2018), or Shaffer (2021). Several studies focusing on the China-US or the Japan-South Korea dispute analyze impacts on global value chains and spillovers for participants of trade disputes, e.g. Hufbauer et al. (2012), or Itakura (2019).

Other researchers focus on spillovers for bystanders of the two trade disputes, i.e., third countries or regions uninvolved in the dispute. Miura (2019) estimates the spillovers of the China-US trade dispute on economic growth of China's neighbors, Devermont and Chiang (2019) or Martin (2021) focus on negative spillovers for developing countries.

Previous research about spillovers from trade disputes has not sufficiently considered the differences between spillovers of trade disputes for participants and bystanders. This study fills a research gap by providing a comparative analysis focusing on the case of Japan, which is a participant in the trade dispute with South Korea since 2019. At the same time, Japan is a bystander of the China-US dispute since 2018, experiencing spillovers from both disputes.

This paper argues that the China-US trade dispute since 2018 has entailed both negative and positive economic spillovers for Japan. In contrast, the country has experienced negative economic spillovers from the Japan-South Korea trade dispute since 2019 as a participant. The following exemplary analysis provides general insights about potential economic risks from spillovers of trade disputes for participants and bystanders applicable to other states.

The first chapter of this paper defines trade disputes in the current China-US and Japan-South Korea context. The China-US dispute and spillovers for Japan are discussed in chapter 2, chapter 3 analyzes the Japan-South Korea dispute and spillovers for Japan.

Both disputes entailed indirect effects for Japan to be discussed in chapter 4. Firstly, Japanese companies began to seek new business partners and locations. Secondly, the Japanese government engaged in a two-fold strategy of economic statecraft that includes balancing and increasing multilateral economic cooperation. Therefore, chapter 4 argues that the concept of indirect effects of disputes needs to be modified to include not only risk hedging measures by economic actors, but also by political actors.

1. Defining Trade Disputes in the Current China-US and Japan-South Korea Context

There is no fixed definition of trade disputes in IR or IPE literature, but several commonly used definitions. The following definition is applicable to the two trade disputes that will be discussed in this paper.

According to Petersmann (2003, p. 33), we can distinguish between four major categories of economic disputes. Two of the author's categories are relevant in the context of disputes between China, Japan, South Korea, and the US.

The first major category of economic disputes according to the author are “disputes over discriminatory and economically harmful border measures” (Petersmann, 2003, p. 33) that are brought to the WTO's dispute settlement system. This first category of economic disputes can be applied to the current Japanese trade dispute with South Korea, as it is characterized by Japanese export restrictions and a mutual “White List” removal of Japan and South Korea. These measures specifically target the respective other country, and were not economically beneficial. Additionally, the dispute has been brought to the WTO dispute settlement system with Korea requesting WTO consultations with Japan in September 2019. Therefore, the Japan-South Korea trade dispute fits into Petersmann's first major category of disputes and can be classified as a dispute over discriminatory and economically harmful border measures.

Petersmann's third major category of economic disputes are “high policy disputes” (Petersmann, 2003, p. 33). High policy disputes are also disputes over discriminatory and economically harmful border measures, but they also include negotiations *outside* the framework of the WTO. This latter category would be applicable to the China-US dispute since 2018. This dispute is characterized by economically harmful border measures, such as mutual tariffs that target the respective other state. Moreover, some of the restrictive measures by both parties have also been brought to the WTO dispute settlement system.

One example would be China requesting WTO consultations with the US about US tariffs on Chinese imports in April 2018. A WTO panel was formed to produce a WTO panel report in September 2020. This report stated that the US has not presented sufficient evidence of Chinese unfair trade practices. The WTO decision in favor of China is under appeal from the US side since October 2020 (WTO, October 2020).

In addition to bringing the dispute to the WTO, China and the US have been negotiating bilaterally about the dispute outside of the WTO framework. Therefore, the US-China dispute can be classified as high policy dispute, as it is characterized by negotiations within and outside the WTO framework. Finally, if Japan and South Korea started negotiations about the dispute outside the WTO framework, this dispute could also be classified as high policy dispute according to Petersmann.

2. The US-China Trade Dispute Since 2018

The US-China trade dispute started with former US president Donald Trump introducing tariffs on Chinese imports to the US in March 2018 by signing a memorandum on March 22 under Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, imposing 50 billion dollars of tariffs on Chinese imports (USTR, June 2018).

According to the Peterson International Economic Institute (PIIE), Chinese imports to the US were targeted with tariffs of up to 25% between July 2018 and September 2019. Whenever new US tariffs were imposed between July 2018 and September 2019, China reacted by imposing retaliation tariffs on import products from the US. According to the PIIE (2021), all tariffs and retaliation tariffs covered more than 50% of China-US bilateral trade in February 2021 (PIIE, March 16, 2021).

Despite several temporary tariff exemptions, the signing of the *Economic and Trade Agreement Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China: Phase One* in January 2020, and an online Xi-Biden summit in November 2021, a quick solution of the dispute is not in sight. There are new import restrictions in 2021 under current US

president Joe Biden. Finally, it is unclear if China can fulfil the goals stated in the agreement, and most mutual tariffs are still in place in November 2021 (China Briefing, November 25, 2021; PIIE, March 16, 2021; PIIE, November 24, 2021).

2.1 Economic Spillovers for Japan from the China-US Trade Dispute (2018-2020) as a Bystander

Japan has experienced economic spillovers for its trade dispute with South Korea, as well as for the China-US trade dispute. In the latter, Japan is a bystander, a third country not directly involved in the dispute. As the US and China are Japan's most important trading partners, their dispute affects Japan as well. It has entailed both positive and negative spillovers for Japan as a bystander.

Japanese companies have experienced direct effects as economic spillovers from the dispute. Vekasi (2014, p. 66, 99) distinguishes between direct and indirect effects as spillovers. According to the author, direct effects encompass all economic effects that can be measured and expressed in numbers. Therefore, they are directly connected to a companies' bottom line and include, for example, negative impacts on trade or investments, or boycotts.

For Japan as a bystander in the US-China dispute, we can observe three types of direct effects. Negative direct effects from the dispute were declining sales and declines in stock prices of some Japanese companies. The third type of direct effects was an increase of demands and therefore sales of products for other companies.

A study by Sun et al. (July 2019) shows negative spillovers from the China-US dispute for Japanese multinational corporations (MNC). The authors found a trend of declining sales for affiliates in China of Japanese MNC between March 2018, when Trump announced the tariffs, and July 2019, especially for those that have a high exposure to trade with North America. They also find a decline in stock prices for Japanese MNCs with China-North America exposure between March 2018 and July 2019.

Moreover, the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO) conducted a survey of over 2000 Japanese medium-sized and big companies between November 2019 and December 2019, asking about effects from the US-China trade dispute. 20% of the respondents stated they have experienced sales declines from the trade dispute.

According to JETRO (January 10, 2020), Japanese companies that experienced effects from the dispute can be divided into two categories: companies with subsidiary companies either in the US or China, and companies with sales exposure to the US or China. These two categories of Japanese companies were affected by the mutual tariffs. Therefore, they witnessed sales declines as their products became up to 25% more expensive and less competitive on the US or Chinese market.

On the one hand, Japanese companies producing in China and then shipping their products to the US were affected by the US tariffs on China. On the other hand, the effects of Japanese companies with subsidiary companies in China have not been entirely negative. Some Japanese companies asked by JETRO replied they saw an increase of demands from Japan, and therefore experienced increasing exports to their subsidiary in China (JETRO, January 10, 2020).

In an August and September 2019 survey by Nikkei Research among more than 500 Japanese medium-sized and big companies, 45% of respondents confirmed they had seen negative impacts on their profits from the US-China trade dispute. 6% replied their profits were strongly affected in a negative way (Kajimoto, September 12, 2021).

In contrast, according to UNCTAD (November 5, 2019), several Japanese companies in the chemical industry and the machinery sector experienced positive spillovers from an increase of exports to the US. The authors find trade diversion effects from the tariffs, i.e., former Chinese exports, especially for machinery and chemicals, have been replaced by imports to the US from Japan. This caused positive spillovers, namely, increasing profits, for Japanese companies in these specific sectors (UNCTAD, November 5, 2019).

All in all, we could observe negative and positive spillovers from the US-China trade dispute for Japanese companies with exposure to China and/or the US. Whether a specific Japanese company experienced positive or negative effects that directly affected its bottom line, depended on the type of the respective company and its industry sector.

3. The Japan-South Korea Trade Dispute Since 2019

The political context of the Japan-South Korea dispute is a continued debate about war reparations from Japan to South Korea that flared up again in recent years. In October 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court ruled that Japanese companies, e.g. Nippon Seitetsu, should pay reparations for Korean forced labor during World War II.

In June 2019, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea suggested that both Japanese and South Korean companies should pay reparations. Japan rejected both of that, citing Japanese reparation payments to South Korea that were made in 1965, when both countries signed the *Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea*.

Additionally, Japan introduced export restrictions to South Korea. These restrictions were placed on three semiconductor production materials, i.e., fluorinated polyimide, photoresist, and hydrogen fluoride. The June 2019 restrictions marked the beginning of this dispute.

South Korea removed Japan from its “White List” of preferred trading partners in August 2019, Japan did the same in September 2019 (METI, April 23, 2021; Reuters, June 20, 2019). South Korea requested WTO consultations in 2019. They could not resolve the dispute, and a WTO panel could not yet be formed (WTO, October 2020).

Japanese and South Korean business representatives held virtual talks in November 2021. They published a joint statement and agreed to meet personally after the corona pandemic, but have not made concrete plans (Yahoo News Japan, November 2, 2021). However, with the WTO panel to be formed, no bilateral negotiations between the two governments, and Japanese export restrictions still in place as of November 2021, the dispute is unlikely to be resolved quickly.

3.1 Spillovers for Japan from the Japan-South Korea Trade Dispute (2019-2020) as a Participant

Kawashima (September 4, 2019) emphasizes that Japan’s export restrictions and Japan’s “White List” removal of South Korea only imply longer export procedures as governmental

licensing is required for each shipment. The author points out that South Korea not being on the “White List” simply means that Japanese exports to the country have to go through the same procedures as exports to China and other Asian neighbors that are also not on the list (Kawashima, September 4, 2019).

In this dispute, we could observe Japan’s export restrictions and Japan’s “White List” removal of South Korea as two measures of Japanese economic statecraft towards South Korea. These two economic sanctions can be classified as “expressive bargaining behavior” according to Baldwin and Kapstein (2020, p. 100-102). They define the concept as follows: “sanctions may be intended to serve as a warning to the offending state or to other states that similar actions in the future will be punished” (Baldwin and Kapstein, 2020, p. 100).

This concept can be applied to Japan’s measures towards South Korea. They are primarily sanctions functioning as warning signals to show dissatisfaction with South Korean reparation demands. The measures are a warning signal rather than an action to cause actual economic damage for South Korea. Regardless of Japan’s intentions for its expressive bargaining behavior, the country has experienced spillovers from the Japan-South Korea trade dispute. Other than for the China-South Korea trade dispute, Japan is involved in this dispute as a participant.

For spillovers of the Japan-South Korea dispute, we can observe three types of direct effects: boycotts of Japanese products in South Korea, problems with Japanese exports to South Korea, and declining South Korean tourist numbers to Japan. The first direct effect of the Japan-South Korea trade dispute were temporary boycotts of Japanese products in South Korea. As a second type of direct effects, the dispute also entailed declined and delayed Japanese exports to South Korea: From July to August 2019, Japanese exports of materials used for semiconductor production, specifically fluorinated polyimide, decreased by 84%. Additionally, Japanese overall exports to South Korea declined by 8% from July to August 2019 (Yahoo News Japan, November 11, 2019).

As the Japanese “White List” removal means that these materials can only be exported to Korea if every single shipment receives governmental permission, we could observe Japanese exports of semiconductor production materials to South Korea slowing down. In October 2019, only 7 shipments of semiconductor production materials received governmental permission.

According to interviews with business representatives by Nikkei xTECH in fall 2019, governmental permission for Japanese companies to export these goods to South Korea is usually granted. Nonetheless, additional governmental licensing means longer export procedures (Nikkei xTECH, October 2, 2019).

As a third type of direct effects of the Japan-South Korea trade dispute since 2019, we can observe declining South Korean tourist numbers to Japan. According to the Japan National Tourist Organization (January 17, 2020), the number of South Korean tourist numbers to Japan has declined from 2018 to 2019, with 7.5 million South Korean tourists visiting Japan in 2018, and only 5.6 million tourists in 2019.

This decline becomes even more evident when considering monthly tourist numbers. JNTO (January 17, 2020) states that the situation of Japan with South Korea, and the reduced number of ferries and flights because of the trade dispute is responsible for declining tourist

numbers from July 2019. From the start of the dispute in July 2019 to November 2019, South Korean tourist numbers steadily declined from about 560.000 visitors in July to about 200.000 visitors in November (JNTO, January 17, 2020).

As discussed above, we could observe direct economic effects on Japanese semiconductor production materials in fall 2019. However, according to Teretō News (September 15, 2020) we could see a 78% increase of the export of Japanese semiconductor production materials from Japan to South Korea when comparing the period between January 2020 and July 2020 to the same period in 2019. Despite statements by the current South Korean president Jae-in Moon that the country will take measures to reduce dependence on Japan regarding semiconductor production materials, exports of relevant materials have only experienced a significant decrease in fall 2019.

In contrast to short-term effects on exports, it is unknown when the number of South Korean tourists to Japan will recover, especially since Japan decided to prohibit the entry of foreign tourists from March 2020 because of the global pandemic. According to JNTO (November 2021), South Korean tourist numbers continued to decline by 60% in December 2019 as compared to December 2018. They also declined by 60% in January 2020, and by 80% in February 2020, as compared to respectively January and February 2019 (JNTO, November 2021). Nonetheless, it is unclear how tourist numbers would have developed without the global pandemic and the Japanese entry ban.

4. Indirect Effects

After discussing direct effects from the China-US and the Japan-South Korea dispute, this chapter will argue that both disputes entailed indirect effects for Japan as well. Economic consequences of disputes that cannot be measured in numbers and that are not directly connected to a companies' bottom line are defined by Vekasi (2014, p. 66, 99) as indirect effects.

Vekasi (2014, p. 66, 99) emphasizes that indirect effects encompass all events that show Japanese economic actors are losing their trust in a profitable business environment with another state. Indirect effects also include risk hedging measures that are employed to avoid direct effects. Furthermore, indirect effects include missed business opportunities, such as or cancellations or postponement of business events, business trips, negotiations, meetings, or contracts not being signed or delayed because of a dispute.

4.1 Seeking New Business Partners and Locations

As mentioned before, Japan has experienced direct economic effects from the Japan-South Korea trade dispute as a participant in the dispute. Equally, the Japan-South Korea trade dispute entailed indirect effects for Japan.

Because of the 2019 export restrictions for Japanese semiconductor materials, Japanese companies, such as Tokyo Electron and Lasertech, have increased efforts to increase their presence on markets in Europe or the US, and establish new markets in Europe to reduce their dependence on the South Korean market. Moreover, they tried to establish new business partnerships for research and development with European semiconductor manufacturers and research organizations, such as the Interuniversity Microelectronics Centre (imec), a research center in Belgium (The Economist, September 22, 2021). These risk-hedging measures of

Japanese companies are examples for indirect effects for Japan from the Japan-South Korea dispute. They show Japanese companies' new efforts to reduce their economic dependence on the South Korean market, and to seek alternatives to South Korea as a partner in semiconductor research and development.

Another point is that several Japanese companies have reshored, moved, or newly offshored a part of their production or supply chains to avoid direct effects from both trade disputes discussed in this paper. According to JETRO (January 10, 2020), some Japanese companies reshored production back to Japan, or moved production or parts of their supply chain to South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, etc. Several companies have engaged in more than one of the above relocations as risk hedging measures to prevent direct negative effects from the trade disputes.

One example for reshoring and moving production out of China is Shibaura Machine co., ltd. The company moved its production of injection molding machines from China to Japan and Thailand in October 2018. The company told JETRO they made this decision because their products had been targeted by Trump's tariffs when exporting to the US (JETRO, January 10, 2020). To avoid direct effects of sales drops because of the tariffs, they decided to take this risk hedging measure.

Another example is the Japanese company Mitsubishi Electric. In fall 2019, they have reshored production for machine tools manufactured for the US market to avoid the tariffs on Chinese products imported to the US. At the same time, the company has outsourced production to China for those machine tools directed to all markets other than the US (JETRO, January 10, 2020).

4.2 Balancing

The previous section discussed how Japanese economic actors engaged in risk hedging measures as indirect effects of both trade disputes. This section will argue that not only economic actors have pursued risk hedging measures, but also the Japanese government. As an indirect effect, the spillovers motivated a two-fold strategy of Japanese economic statecraft since 2018.

On the one hand, this strategy consists of the Japanese government's efforts to balance between its most important economic partners by engaging both China and the US, and pursuing closer economic relations with both, without choosing one of the two parties. On the other hand, Japan's government has stepped efforts to increase multilateral economic cooperation including multilateral frameworks without the US, China, or South Korea, to mitigate spillovers from the trade disputes. To support the claim that Japan has increasingly engaged China as well as the US since spring 2018, this section will argue that one could observe several exemplary measures.

Japanese political relations to China have suddenly taken a positive turn in spring 2018. Japan's rapprochement with the PRC coincides with the beginning of the US-China trade dispute. More precisely, shortly after Trump announced 25% tariffs on Chinese imports on April 3, 2018, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe hosted the Sino-Japanese high-level economic dialogue in Tokyo on April 14, 2018. With difficult Sino-Japanese relations since fall 2010, this dialogue was held for the first time after 8 years.

Chinese Foreign Minister Yì Wáng has also made a trip to Japan to attend the economic dialogue. Equally, this was the first time for a Chinese foreign minister to be welcomed to Japan after 8 years. Chinese Premier of the State Council, Kèqiáng Lǐ, was also invited to Japan on this occasion, and visited Japan for the Japan-China Summit Meeting held by Abe in May 2018. There was also the first Abe-Xí telephone conversation in May 2018 (MOFA, May 2018; Nikkei Asian Review, April 23, 2018). Based on the agreements at the May 2018 summit, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation signed the *Memorandum of Understanding on Business Cooperation in Third Countries* with the China Development Bank in October 2018 (JBIC, October 26, 2018). Abe also visited China in October 2018. He agreed to participate in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to cooperate with infrastructure building in other Asian countries. Japanese delegates visited China for the BRI forum in 2019, unlike delegates from other countries, e.g. Australia, the US, or India, that did not follow the Chinese invitation to the forum.

This increase of political and economic exchange can be interpreted as a sign that the relationship between Japan and China has not only quickly improved in spring 2018, but also that Japan has made clear efforts to engage China as an economic and political partner since that time by responding to all Chinese initiatives. Nonetheless, according to Okano-Heijmans (December 2, 2019), Japanese engagement of China as an economic partner, e.g., within the framework of the BRI, remains conditional. For instance, Japan sent the heads of several business federations to the BRI forum in China in 2018 and 2019. In 2019, the Secretary General of the LDP, and the Vice Minister of Trade and Industry attended, but the Chinese request that Japan did not follow had been to send higher-level representatives from the Cabinet Office (Okano-Heijmans, December 2, 2019).

While engaging China economically and politically since the start of the China-US dispute, Japan demonstrated that it places high emphasis to engage the US as an economic partner at the same time. Whereas Japan and China agree they oppose US tariffs since 2018, Abe has also frequently met with Trump at the same time to maintain an uninterrupted political dialogue. According to Smith (May 23, 2019), Abe and Trump had more than 40 conversations on the phone and in person until May 2019, which is a record of conversations between the Japanese and the US heads of state.

One of several Trump visits to Japan in May 2019 was especially symbolic, when he visited the US naval base in Yokosuka, Tokyo. Abe gave Trump a tour of Japan's largest warship at the time, the Izumo-class helicopter carrier JS Kaga. Trump was also received by the Japanese emperor and became the first state leader to meet emperor Naruhito. How Trump was welcomed demonstrated the importance Japan placed on the alliance with the US (Gady, May 28, 2019).

Moreover, a new Japan-US trade agreement was announced when Abe and Trump met in August 2019 at the G7 summit. The *U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement (USJTA)* was signed in September 2019 and went into effect in January 2020 (Nikkei Shinbun, December 4, 2019; The Mainichi, August 26, 2019).

Abe's successor Yoshihide Suga from September 2019 also carefully engaged China and the US with a stronger focus on the latter. While Suga's first state visit was neither to China nor the US, but to Vietnam, Suga had a phone conversation with Xí in September 2019, and hosted US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, a month later (Nikkei Asia, October 28, 2020).

All in all, Japan and the US have maintained a close political dialogue in recent years. This will likely continue under the current Japanese Prime Minister since October 2021, Fumio Kishida. With Kishida's personal diplomatic ties to the US from his time as longest-serving Foreign Minister of Japan, Japan-US relations can be expected to strengthen, as opposed to Abe's and Suga's more careful approach to balance and engage China as well (Akimoto, September 7, 2021).

4.3 Multilateral Economic Cooperation

Since 2018, the Japanese government has also stepped up multilateral economic cooperation as the second part of its strategy to hedge economic risks from the two trade disputes. The efforts to increase multilateral economic cooperation include multilateral frameworks excluding the US, China, or South Korea, to mitigate spillovers from the trade disputes.

Firstly, Japan signed the *Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement* (EPA) in July 2018, shortly after the onset of the China-US dispute. Secondly, after the US retreat from the TPP in 2017, Japan has been an important driving force for renegotiations over the *Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership* (CPTPP, or TPP-11) concluded in October 2018. It includes eleven countries, e.g. Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc., making the CPTPP one of the largest free trade areas on the globe (Naikaku Kanbō, October 2021). Notably, this agreement for which Japan was eager to restart negotiations excludes the US, China, and South Korea.

Nonetheless, Japan also participates in multilateral forums that include some of these countries, such as the RCEP (*Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership*) signed in November 2020. This free trade agreement includes 16 states, among them China and South Korea, forming the biggest trading bloc in the world. According to the ASEAN Secretariat (2019), one of the benefits of the RCEP is to mitigate economic losses resulting from the US-China trade dispute for all states except the US and China. They estimate that RCEP and CPTPP together can help to counterbalance against negative economic spillovers from the U.S.-China trade dispute.

As Japan is among the countries with close economic relations to China and the US, and has also experienced spillovers from the trade dispute, mitigating spillovers is a relevant concern for the country. This concern is one of the reasons for Japan to participate in this trade agreement, in addition to the Japanese participation in the CPTPP (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2019).

Conclusions

The Japan-South Korea and the China-US trade dispute remain unresolved as of November 2021. As the scope of this paper is limited to spillovers for Japan from 2018 to 2020, follow-up studies are necessary to estimate potential long-term economic effects of the disputes, or the impact on other participants and bystanders.

Nevertheless, general conclusions about spillovers from trade disputes for participants and bystanders can be drawn from this exemplary analysis. This discussion of Japan as a participant and bystander in two trade disputes revealed that while experiencing negative spillovers as a participant, Japan partly benefitted as a bystander.

With Japan as a bystander in the US-China trade dispute, most Japanese companies affected experienced negative spillovers, such as declining sales or stock prices from the US-China tariffs. However, others benefitted economically, experiencing increasing sales because of trade diversion effects from US-China tariffs.

Vekasi's (2019) definition of direct effects as economic spillovers from disputes does not include positive effects on a company's bottom line. Since several Japanese companies have experienced positive spillovers, the definition needs to be modified in the context of Japan as a bystander of the China-US dispute. In contrast, as a participant in the Japan-South Korea trade dispute, we can find negative spillovers for Japan, e.g. boycotts, delays or declines on Japanese exports, and declining South Korean tourist numbers.

Among the spillovers of the two trade disputes for Japan, one could observe indirect effects as well: Japanese companies and the government have taken risk hedging measures to avoid direct effects. Japanese companies have increased their efforts to seek new business partners and locations, while the Japanese government has employed a two-fold strategy of economic statecraft that consisted of balancing between China and the US, as well as increasing multilateral economic cooperation.

The analysis showed that Vekasi's (2019) concept of indirect effects from disputes should not only include risk hedging measures by economic actors, but also by political actors. It is necessary to broaden the concept to include governmental measures of economic statecraft to avoid negative spillovers from trade disputes.

Lastly, it is unknown when the trade disputes will be resolved, and whether a resolution can be achieved by China-US bilateral negotiations or the Japan-South Korea WTO panel. However, given the background of the US-China great power rivalry and Japan-South Korea historical differences, similar disputes and spillovers are likely to occur again in the future.

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***Role of Female Physicians in Women's Health Movement in Japan:
The Case of Prescription-Free Emergency Contraception During the COVID-19 Pandemic***

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Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic brought challenges to global public health, along with new disruptions to people's conduct of their private lives due to the stay-at-home policy. This measure was intended to prevent the spread of COVID-19, but it also influenced intimate relationships in the private sphere, including the spread of unintended pregnancies, sexual violence, and domestic violence in the younger generations. At the local level, Japan reached a major turning point in the movement to improve access to emergency contraceptives by establishing the Citizen's Initiative for Pharmaceutical Access to Emergency Contraception (CIPATEC) in June 2020. A formal civil society organization, it was founded by three female co-chairs who have been working in the organization since 2018. Although this social movement enabled the provision of emergency contraceptives through online medical services, their main focus, namely, sale in pharmacies without a doctor's prescription, requires discussion in various fields, including in terms of the public policy, the medical establishment, and pharmacists' expertise. Women's health movements are important in terms of sexual and reproductive health and rights. CIPATEC is part of the broader women's health movement in Japan and is an example of a specific case in which health experts play a significant role. In particular, this study focuses on one female gynecologist, a co-chair of the CIPATEC, and examines her in the role of a female physician in bridging needs related to women's health from the perspectives of a woman and a physician.

Keywords: Female Physicians, Women's Health Movements, COVID-19

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Introduction

One of the goals of the women's health movements has been to democratize science, enabling women to regain ownership of their bodies, taking it from science, medicine, and the state (Turshen, 2020). As Meredith Turshen puts it, "women everywhere are fighting for control of decisions that affect their health" as "they argue with doctors, public health bureaucrats, medical and pharmaceutical companies, the health insurance industry, politicians, and religious authorities who regulate health care within countries" (Turshen, 2020, p. 1).

Brown et al. (2004) note that "women's health activists have greatly altered medical conceptions of women, broadened reproductive rights, expanded funding and services in many areas, altered many treatment forms (e.g., breast cancer), and changed medical research practices." The women's health movement could be categorized as one of the many health social movements (HSMs). It has several aspects in common with other HSMs found worldwide, including being "a constituency-based movement, but at the same time it contains elements of both access HSMs (e.g., in seeking more services for women) and embodied HSMs (e.g., in challenging assumptions about psychiatric diagnoses for premenstrual symptoms)" (Brown et al., 2004). Embodied HSMs such as the women's health movement are grouped together as embodied health movements (EHMs), and they represent "hybrid movements that blur the boundaries between lay and expert forms of knowledge, and between activists and the state" (Brown et al., 2004).

Study of women doctors involved in women's health movements has been conducted from the early twentieth century to the present day, and earlier studies have explored the work of individuals who worked as translators between medicine and activism. For example, in Japan, Dr. Shigeyo Takueuchi played a critical role in promoting women's health in public health policies in the prevention of venereal diseases in the late 1930s as a leader of an integration movement in both the private and public spheres (Meguro, 2021). Venereal diseases are complex problems, and efforts to address them have often been tied related to publicly registered sex workers, an arrangement that was instituted to allow men greater sexual freedom in early twentieth-century Japan. Venereal diseases were transmitted through sexual activity, making this occupation a public health concern. However, control was limited to sex workers and other women who could transmit the disease. Transmission from men to their wives at home was not adequately addressed. A movement intended to develop a debate on gender equality sprouted in Japan under the total war theory.

Although women's health movements have spread worldwide since the 1970s, studies reveal that the women's health movements in Japan have not been as impactful as in the West (Ogino, 2014; Mizushima, 2010). For instance, the Japanese movement of the 1970s did not attempt to rally for the involvement of medicine, science, engineering, or corporations, unlike the parallel movement in the United States (Mizushima, 2010). Studies analyzing cases from the United States have highlighted the important role that women employed in the sciences or as medical practitioners have had as translators between medicine and activism (Morgen, 2002, p. 133). However, only a handful of studies have focused on the role of women doctors and scientists in women's health movements in Japan.

The Citizen's Initiative for Pharmaceutical Access to Emergency Contraception (CIPATEC) [Kinkyū Hininyaku wo Yakkyoku de Project] is a movement calling for improved access to emergency contraceptives, headed by three female co-chairs, and it is an organization that

engages in social awareness-raising activities, signature campaigns, and lobbying. Their activities are among the foremost women's health movements in Japan. One characteristic of this movement is the participation of female physicians, whose role was relatively ignored mentioned in the second-wave feminism of 1970s Japan. The goal of the women's health movements is not only to provide women with the knowledge to make their own decisions but also to create an environment in which they can freely do so. In the latter case in particular, the existence of translators who mediate between activists and the existing systems, such as the medical and state systems, are the main interest of this study. The participation of female physicians in women's health movements plays an important role in creating a better environment for women by enhancing the systems to change, with the ability to understand the logic of the system and deliver the voices of women and communicate their needs. This study seeks to clarify the brief structure of CIPATEC activities drawing on information available on their website and suggests a future research agenda¹⁾.

Emergency Contraception in Japan and the Establishment of the Citizen's Initiative for Pharmaceutical Access to Emergency Contraception

Before the approval of the emergency contraceptive levonorgestrel in the form of NorLevo tablets in 2011, hormonal combination pills or intrauterine devices were used as emergency contraceptive methods in Japan (Japan Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 2016). NorLevo tablets must be taken within 72 hours of sexual intercourse, and since their approval in 2011, they have been prescribed with a doctor's note after a visit to a medical institution. In 2017, the idea of allowing general sale of emergency contraceptives in pharmacies was raised, but it was ultimately rejected. In 2019, discussions were initiated to allow online prescriptions of emergency contraceptives. However, it also strengthened the system for keeping women under medical supervision by requiring confirmation of medication intake in front of medical practitioners and confirmation of contraceptive success, and provide in face-to-face consultations. This is a precaution against the resale and transfer of drugs, but in many other countries, emergency contraceptives are already sold to the general public at pharmacies.

CIPATEC was inaugurated in 2018. The goals of their work include ensuring that all women at risk of unintended pregnancy have access to 1) emergency contraceptives from pharmacists at pharmacies without the need for a prescription, 2) secure face-to-face and online medical care for emergency contraceptives, 3) emergency contraceptives at a lower cost so that they do not have to give up access for financial reasons, and 4) appropriate information and services so that emergency contraceptives can be used appropriately and safely. Finally, CIPATEC works to bring the voices and concerns of citizens to the attention of the government and other relevant authorities.

During emergencies, such as the wartime regime of the late 1930s to the early 1940s, disasters like the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, and the stay-at-home policy during the COVID-19 pandemic, gender inequality becomes more acute and visible. A joint web-based survey by the #Nandenaino Project and the non-profit organization PILCON—whose founder co-chairs CIPATEC—has revealed anxiety about unintended pregnancies and access

¹ The website of Citizen's Initiative for Pharmaceutical Access to Emergency Contraception (CIPATEC) is <https://kinkyuhinin.jp/>.

to emergency contraceptives during COVID-19. In particular, they highlighted the high price of emergency contraceptives and women's resistance to visiting women's clinics.

After its establishment in 2018, CIPATEC launched an online signature campaign calling for improved access to emergency contraceptives and submitted 107,000 signatures to the Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare in 2020. They have also held in-house study meetings for Diet members and regularly presented the organization's research on the issue. Thanks to this support, online medical treatment for emergency contraceptives was conditionally approved in July 2019. However, while medical treatment can be prescribed online, women must still be checked to determine that they are taking their medication in the presence of a trained pharmacist and must have a face-to-face consultation three weeks later.

CIPATEC considers the paternalism of the Japanese medical system to be problematic and notes that medical care that controls women goes against sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR). Awareness of problems with reference to SRHR, in collaboration with international non-governmental organizations, has become a topic of conversation in social networking services and is becoming increasingly seen as an important issue for the younger generations.

Roles of the Citizen's Initiative for Pharmaceutical Access to Emergency Contraception Co-Chairs

The positions of CIPATEC's three co-chairs are held by the following three women.

Asuka Someya, who experienced an unwanted pregnancy and had an abortion as a university student, founded the non-Profit organization PILCON, which provides sex education for younger generations and continues to do so to this day. At CIPATEC, she plays a role in conveying the importance of sex education and emergency contraceptives to younger people in relation to the current state of sex education in secondary schools in Japan.

Kazuko Fukuda was selected as among the 25 She Decides SRHR Activists in worldwide in 2020. After studying abroad in Sweden, she became aware of the lack of an environment for promoting sexual health in Japan and initiated the #Nandenaino Project. She has been writing and lecturing on the development of a society structured to enrich people's lives instead of hurting them through their sexuality. She graduated with a master's degree in public health from a Swedish university and plays an important role in describing emergency contraceptives in other countries and regions according to the standards set by the World Health Organization from the perspective of international healthcare.

Dr. Sakiko Enmi, a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology, has been involved in sex education at the junior high and high school levels since she was a medical student. She has played an important role in raising concerns about the medical system and its realities, based on her experience as a doctor. In particular, she has strongly condemned medical paternalism, arguing that medical professionals should not discriminate against or judge women and that medical care should be provided safely and equally to all in a way that protects health. In addition to explaining the characteristics of emergency contraceptives as a physician, she has also identified the importance of pharmacists to the community and the need to leave emergency contraceptives to the discretion of pharmacists and physicians. She also highlights discriminatory attitudes toward patients seeking emergency contraceptives in the medical field, which she has witnessed as a gynecologist, and the lack of SRHR concepts in medical

education, as well as other problems with the medical system. As a mother of children herself, she champions sex education and a safe environment in which children can have access to medicine as needed.

Each of these three women, drawing on their own experiences and perspectives, is involved in a variety of activities, including submitting requests to the government, the Pharmaceutical Association of Japan, and the Japanese Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology, as well as communicating with the relevant ministries and agencies at in-house meetings.

Conclusion

Dr. Enmi in particular has acted as a translator between medicine and activism. However, her activities do not only depend on what she has seen as a physician but also stem from her awareness of the issues through sex education and the importance of the voices of the people that she has gained from other co-chairs. This movement will lead to the development of a medical establishment that takes into account the needs of people by blurring the boundaries between medicine and activism, which is what health social movements have aimed for.

A previous study has noted that it is rare in the women's health movement for translators to be women professionals who represent the movement as activists (Turshen, 2020, p. 9). They are usually to be found in these movements but are only rarely the center of the movement. In Japan, however, there have been cases in which women's health movements have been greatly promoted by women experts, such as the case of Dr. Shigeyo Takeuchi in the late 1930s. CIPATEC is a contemporary case of the same phenomenon. It is important to consider whether this is characteristic of the women's health movements in Japan.

In Japan, awareness of women's rights in medicine has blossomed significantly over the past few years. Women make up only about 20% of doctors in Japan overall (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2018). Relative to other developed countries, this percentage is extremely low. However, in 2018 and 2019, the discriminatory practice of deducting points from medical school entrance exams for being women was exposed, bringing the male-centered nature of the medical world in Japan into the spotlight (Makino, 2020). In a society where distrust of the medical establishment is on the rise, further development of HSMs, including the women's health movement, is expected in the future, and the relationship between the doctors' and scientists' activism of doctors and scientists in these movements is becoming increasingly important.

In the United States, women's health movements have played a particularly important role in blurring the boundaries between medicine, the state, and activism, which has led to the development of medical research for the benefit of the people. Will such a movement occur in Japan as well? This is an important topic that needs to be examined. Studies on CIPATEC, an important women's health movement, must be conducted to clarify the structure of conflicts between activism. It is necessary to consider what kind of expertise each actor has in participating in the movement and what boundaries they are blurring and reconstructing.

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