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*A Comparative Study of Religious Other-Making and Power between
Muslims and Christians at the First Crusade*

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Abstract

Religious othering means to recognize and approve the owning identity or discourse as the ultimate truth based on the negation of the other religious discourse. One of the examples has happened during the crusades. However, the extent of the religious essence's power in this othering process among Christians' and Muslims' both, based on the theoretical essentials towards each other -Christianity being accepted by Muslims, but Islam being denied as an Abrahamic religion by Christians- remains unclear. Therefore, this, by studying two historiographical books of the same period, owned by each side, the "al-Kamil fi'l Tarikh" of Ibn Athir and the "Hierosolymita" of Ekkehard of Aura, and by concentrating on the first crusade, questions the developing process of the emergence of the other-making phenomenon in these works and the possibility of considering religion itself as the main cause of the othering in both sides. Thus, by applying a comparative approach to the study cases at hand, the essay has initially sought for the controversies and continued with interpreting the data using Foucault's theory of the "Negative Discourse" and Derrida's Semi-Narrative-leading-to-the-law, has proved the wrong of similar popularizations of both Christians and Muslims, aiming to present a contemporary study of this concept. The essay finally concludes that in the Christian side, the will to other-making was more influenced by religion, while on the side of Muslims, although there has been similar intentions, the meaning of "the other" most likely alluded to a different geography or nationality, and not necessarily their religion.

Keywords: Crusades, Ekkehard, Al Kamil fil-Tarikh, Hierosolymita, Discourse, Othering, Ibn Athir

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Introduction

The excuse for the Crusades was the conflict between Islam and Christianity for occupying Jerusalem and in the middle of all this, "othering" was one of the concepts which was enforced on the basis of a variety of excuses; to be more precise, between Islam and Christianity, in these wars, "religious othering" and between different sects within these two religions, that is between Sunnis and Shias in Islam and Orthodox and Catholics in Christianity, a "doctrinal othering" took place. This concept, in overall, means a precise recognition and affirmation of one's own religious/doctrinal identity or discourse as truth on the basis of the negation or rejection of that of the other's which, in both forms of action and reaction, came into being during the Crusades.

The literature of this period, too, is a rich source of the manifestation of this state and the otherings that came along with it and in various forms and thus can be set forth as a discourse which confirms with pseudo-narratives that lead to certain unwritten laws against the "religious other." Yet, in words of Montandon (1997), this "manifestation of the other is better illustrated in some literary genres and sub-genres such as historical accounts, event or trip diaries" (P. 225) and these, in their own turn, play the role of the foundation for those images and figures that are applied by other literary genres and since in the Medieval Period "narrative," especially the one with a religious background, played the most pivotal role in shaping people's imagination and mental representations - regardless of the truth or falsity of such proposition or the ontological view towards them -, in their collective unconscious mind it was institutionalized and, in the same course of events, resulted in non-literary reactions to the exterior religious other.

Nevertheless, contrary to the common belief, and despite the existence of consistent themes around such wars, the extent of the force of religious nature in such otherings between the parties involved, that is Islam and Christianity, regarding the theoretical bases of these two religions in reaction to one another and on the basis of the recognition and acceptance of Christianity in Islam and, quite conversely, the rejection and negation of Islam as a legitimate Abrahamic religion by the Christians, and also the complicated networks of inter-religious sects within each of these two parties that led to certain intensifications or modifications of such otherings in various forms like mythologization of the evil or the formation of certain pseudo-narratives, is none a clear as it is claimed to be.

Because of this, the present study using the comparative method has made an attempt made to pursue a case-study of the two historicist texts of this period each of which pertaining to one side of this conflict, i.e. *Al'kamil fil-Tarikh* by Ibn Asir and *The Jerusalemite* by Ekkehard, the Great Monk of Aura, while focusing on the first Crusades in order to raise such questions as what constituted literary imaginations and representations in Christianity and its followers can be found in the former. Hence, a comparative image-analysis of these event pieces related to the aforesaid conflicting religious parties who had to constitute a "religious self" in order to be able to stand against each other, which of course was always in need of "a constitutive exterior" or an "other" in opposition to which this "self" can be formed, so that it makes it clear that to what extent the religious form has stimulated these otherings.

The Rejection of the Discourse, The Constituent Exteriorities, Pseudo-Narratives

One must not fail to notice that the "other" and "othering" in these historical events as literature and its pertaining interpretations should be in form of certain propositions dedicated to analysis in a way that they offer a combination of various theories around the topic so that a convergence among them becomes possible and they do function as each other's supplements; this is because our topic is not solely dependent upon literature and at least is rather easily drifting among history, sociology, and philosophy. (Chevrel, 2009: 16 & Amossy, 1999: 70 & Pageaux, 1994:148) To put it more clearly, it is necessary to adopt and compose an eclectic framework for interpretation. As a result, on the basis of its approach, first adopts the concept of "discourse and its rejection" (Miles, 2003: 91-92) in Foucault's thought (1971) , However, in a more applicable sense, as far as a better understanding of such otherings in the historical accounts is concerned, can be explained by Laclau's concept of the constituent exteriorities according to which the construction of the identity of "I" - which here is a religious one - is in need of an "exterior constituent", or an "other", so that "I" can be recognized with reference to the boundary that it has with the other, and as is pointed out in his discursive approach, in a work co-authored by Chantal Muffe (2001), the very existence of the discourses relies on an enemy or other. In this regard, the existence of an enemy is vital for the establishment of the boundaries of a political discourse. Hence each and every event is formed in an antagonistic sphere and it is there that it becomes meaningful. It is this very antagonism that, being supplied by imagination and by means of implication, leads to the discussion that can be formally adopted from Derrida's idea (1992) that pseudo-narratives result in canon (pp. 181-220) and as it has been said earlier are institutionalized in the collective unconscious and after that lead to non-literary actions against the religiously exterior other.

The adopted theoretical trajectory confirms that one must look closer at the concept of othering in the historical accounts as literature since it owes to the other sorts of "others" in philosophical or sociological theories and yet surpasses them by means of a creative imagination in a way that, for instance, the concept of the existence of a discourse being dependent upon a particular other or enemy in Laclau is doubtlessly, if taken into the territory of literature, tied to the vast realm of imagination in which the imaginary, dream, memory, myth, ideology, utopia, hope and the like are included and as a result it leads to the creation of certain images of the other which possess a distinguishing power and entity in comparison with their counterparts set forth by philosophy or sociology.

"Hierosolymita" by Ekkehard of Aura

In his not too voluminous treatise, Ekkehard attempts a variety of otherings of the Muslims and applies all kinds of imaginations to do this in a way that his historical account is a clear example of a text entirely based on religious othering. Even in this work preferring a historical description there are scenes imagined similar to that of the Apostles' revelations in Old and New Testaments, this is, of course, in agreement with his own statement that in the beginning chapters of this treatise that it has passingly used the "prophecies of the Bibles regarding the outbreak of the Crusades. Yet, in order to study the otherings manifest in his work, it is needed that one divides the

entirety of the treatise into separate sections so that the procedure of the formation of the religious other in his thought prone to a systematic investigation.

A. An introduction to the importance of Jerusalem includes its first chapters and is organized on the bases of three topics:

1. The reminiscences of the holiness of Jerusalem and its glorification which is retold by Ekkehard along with a brief history and the stories of the prophets and saints, and thus Jerusalem is introduced as the mother of Christian salvation and faith and the men who made a pilgrimage to it are thus united with the Father and the Heavenly Kingdom.

2. The acts of the Muslims against Jerusalem and the other centers related to the Christians and the Christians themselves; it is in this section that otheing takes place with reference to Jerusalem and its humiliation by the Muslims in a realistic way, and in the first encounter, the statement that says "the most savage race among the Turks who are the culprits of the destruction of Jerusalem"(Hierosolymita: Chapter I) is used to represent the Muslims who have brought the images of Christ, Holy Mary, and the temples of the Christians into ruins. Moreover, Eckkehard, on occasions quite vehemently and with too bruised an emotion, speaks of turning the holy places of the Christians into stable by the pagans, and of that such holy places were like playthings in their hands. One must notice that pagan and polytheism were both terms frequently used referring to Muslims and even when he does not speak of the destruction of such holy places, he mentions their being turned into a place for accumulating the derogatories of the religion of the polytheists who, during the reign of the Turks and Saracens, did not allow the Christians to enter such places. The occupation of Nicaea and the massacre of Christians, the destruction of Saint George Valley by the ruthless Turk king, Suleiman, are among the deeds of Muslims introduced in this treatise.

B. Preparing the Christians' mentality for war; In this section, a more organized attitude towards the Muslims is formed:

1. Emphasizing Christ and the power of his faith and recognizing the Muslims as the adversaries of him; Here, Ekkehard, with an inexpressible passion, speaks of the spread of Pope's invocation for the outbreak of the Crusades and quite sentimentally speaks of the the redemption endowed upon those thousands of individuals who accepted Pope's invocation and started crying where he was delivering his speech. He speaks of the formation of a Cross-carrying army that carries the Cross with a reminiscence of the passion of the Christ and is quite rest-assured of its victory against Christ's enemies, that is the Muslims. He even considers the massive army of the Christians and their faith for eliminating his enemies as the cause of the trembling of the earth at its core and envisages that the world will then lean towards a better future.

2. Prophecy and the pre-war sings; this section is the peak of imaginative otherings that are carried out in subjective and entirely revelatory way in order to justify the war against the Muslims. To do this, the tenth chapter of the treatise, "Various Signs Invoke the Totens to the Holy War," is furnished with images and imagination that demonstrates that the outbreak of the Holy War is inevitable. Here, Ekkehard claims that he has witnessed a number of signs firsthand. Observing a still comet whose light was blazing like a sword throughout the sky or another star that had a long lead from

East to West on 24th of February. He also claims the apparition of a sky replete with red clouds right before him or the eye-catching wave of fire at a midnight from the north and the fall of a star.

In his mind, these signs indicated an event in the East. Yet, the other more explicit signs that are directly related to the outbreak of the Crusades emerge from the inspiration of other people in a way that a priest, in the middle of the day, observes two horse riders in the sky eagerly fighting with one another or another priest, along with his two companions, who witnessed a mountainous sword in the sky while walking across a forest which drifted with a hurricane in an undistinguishable corner of the earth with a deafening clashing sound. Then, Ekkehard speaks of a more general scene and writes that some have witnessed a peculiar spectacle in the sky above the city: "a massive number of riders and warriors on whose foreheads, armors, and the other parts of body lied a printed cross. The observers considered them to be the army of the Lord."

The "creation" of these images and the fictional images that go through a transparent trajectory from the preliminary signs to the overtly explicit scenes for justifying the Holy War aside, in the 11th chapter, a number of "fictional interpretations" concerning events, behaviors and procedures in addition to "real" beings are taken to be certain signs in a way that Ekkehard considers all the being and creation as the army of the Lord besieged to play the role of prophetic signs of the war so that false prophets, mischievous women, the birth of retarded or misshaped children and the like lead to certain interpretations regarding the war with Muslims.

C. The time of the War and during the early years of the reign of the Latin king of Jerusalem; in this section, there is no sign of such revelatory and imaginative sings anymore but instead there is highlighted attention paid to the question of Lord's presence and the relation of all deeds to him. A God who has committed certain deeds in support of the Christians and against the Muslims. Ekkehard writes: "the kings and the leaders of Seracen rose against us, yet it was the Lord's will that they be conquered and crushed with much ease...the Lord imposed upon them the mishaps of the Antioch." (Ibid: Chapter XIV) He goes further by regarding the Christians' defeat and being surrounded as something caused by the lack of proper rituals of Thanksgiving; A God who nevertheless did not forsake them and empowered their hearts by the inspiration of the lost spear since the time of the apostles. A God who spreads the kingdom of the Christ and raises the churches from one sea to another and will crush the polytheists (Muslims) and the devil. At a point, he even decides to alter the fate of the king of Babylon due to his betrayal against the Franks and having them captivated. This relation of the deeds and acts to God is then tied to the conquest of Jerusalem and Christ's mercy in a way that, in the ending chapters and after an account of the massacre of the Muslims to such an extent that their blood rose up to the knee of the horses of the Christians it is stated that "this was Christ's mercy that saw to victory and all the savage filth and evil was thus purged." (Ibid: Chapter XXXIII)

The first Crusade is over but one must notice that it was the era of the first return to Jerusalem. After the outbreak of Plague and the contamination of water by the dead bodies of the Muslims, many Christians die. In order to prevent the city being evacuated by the Christians and Turks and their escape from the disease, Baldwin,

The Crusader King, and priest Arnulf, as before and in a quite vehement manner, try to portray the Muslims as others and entice the Christians and reconstruct their identity on the basis of the rejection of the religious other, and thus spur them to remain in the holy city as a sacred mission in a way that Baldwin, in a speech, calls the Muslims as the "foreign marauders of our land" to the extent that he holds that the fatherland of the Christians had become a shelter for the polytheist Muslims so that they send the followers of Christ to exile and secure their own victory. Arnulf, too, in a quite furious speech, incites the Christians so that, after stating some sentences on behalf of the Lord, saying that "here is the place in which I reside generation after generation, and thus I remain here since it is the place that I have chosen to dwell in" (Ibid: Chapter XXIX) adds in his own words that "lo! that infidels' character has thus challenged our predestined hope for the divine promise conferred upon the Popes by divine will. This character sets forth an ominously devilish prophecy that in this year we will all perish against them, that Jerusalem will be shattered, and that even the sacred stone of the Lord and the glamorous tomb will be insulted and torn into pieces. And then its remnants will be sent to the farthest corners of the sea on camels and will be drowned and the Christians will never be able to retrieve it." (Ibid)

Al Kamil fil-Tarikh

In this voluminous historical account in which the story of the Westerners and the battle with them is recounted through it, the act of othering the Christians is evidently and organizedly pursued as was the case of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, this does not indicate not being possible to recognize an underlying literary othering in the stories of the book. Hence, akin to Ekkehard's treatise, first we should focus on Ibn Asir's attitude toward the adverse Christians before the outbreak of the Crusades and then the encounter of the Muslims with their Western Christians in the battle over Jerusalem.

A. The period prior to entering the first Crusades; in this book, written a few years before entering the Crusades, there are many mentions of the Westerners especially regarding the Andalusia incident, Toledo and the occupation of Sicily in the years, 478, 784, and 485, and there is no doubt that such descriptions and accounts play a more significant role in introducing the Christians of the West to form enemies in the minds of the Muslims. Yet, despite the realism of the stories and accounts of this work, it is possible to find traces of imaginative othering in it:

1. Othering on the basis of prediction and foreseeing; the very first thing that comes to mind regarding the author's method of taking a prophetic or predicting approach against the Christians comes from a hint at a star in the sky akin to the one that is frequently mentioned in Ekkehard's work, yet the difference is that, here, the story in question is tacitly given among the stories attributed to the Westerners without having been explained through. The quotation that follows is related to the year 476 while speaking of the temporary victory of the Westerners at the wars of Andalusia: "In this year, in Safar (November), a star bursted on its way from the East to the West. It was as big as the moon and its light also a match for it, and crossed a long distance for about an hour in a slow pace, and bore no similarity with other stars." (Ibn al-Athir, 1989, Vol 23: 117) It seems that the reference as such is not in favor of Muslims but rather a sign of their downfall in the West which, by he insult it inflects to their pride, has taken the form of an othering. Yet, elsewhere, there is the discussion of a dream

seen by Andalusia's ruler. In his dream, he sees that he has a small drum before him while riding on an elephant and is beating on it continuously. A Muslim interprets his dream with reference to the Quranic verses that say: "Have you considered not how your Lord dealt with the Owners of Elephants" and "Then, when the Naqur is sounded. Truly, that Day will be a Hard Day -- far from easy for the disbelievers". and understands it as a sign of the demise of him and his army before the army of Islam, yet the Christian ruler mocks him saying: "with this army, I will face the God of Muhammad, the owner of Quran, you Holy Book." (Ibid: 130) Yet, he is defeated and Muslims make many a heap out of their beheaded heads and call to pray on top of those heaps as long as they became morbid and thus they burnt them.

2. Othering on the basis of ownership; this question is to be considered related to the previously mentioned foretelling in an implied way in a way that the burst star means losing a territory which has been previously under the reign of Muslims in the West and in Africa. This is to the extent that the statement "God damns the Westerners" is used by Ibn Asir on various occasions where assaulting the lands of Muslims is at issue: "In this year, the westerners, whom may be damned by the God, took away Toledo, one of the lands of Andalusia, from Muslims, a land that was considered as one of the vastest and most fortified ones in that region;" (Ibid: 60) "In this year, the Westerners, whom may be damned by the God, took over the entire Sicile Island which was once returned to Muslims and Islam by the great God" (Ibid: 170) or "in the year 480, Roger conquered the entire island and settled the Romans in there. The Westerners, whom may be damned by God, did not leave one single public bath, or mill, or stall, in there for the locals." (Ibid: 176) But, in recounting the Zilagheh battle in Andalusia, and the getaway of the Westerners, such concerns take a quite different shape even though, in their depth, are still closely tied to the concerns of ownership. Here, Ibn Asir, speaks on behalf of the Muslim rulers declaring concern about the outspread of Christianity due to the loss of the Andalusian territories and the insult to the pride of the Muslims to whom once the Christians were forced to pay poll and it is precisely after this section that the story of the Andalusian ruler's dream is recounted.

B. The time of war and the early years of the reign of the Latin king of the Jerusalem; In a section of *Al-kamil fi al-Tarikh* which is related to the first Crusades, one can see that even though the uncharacteristically religious attitude toward the Christians is gone to the extent that on two occasions Christ and the Christians are referred to with respect, despite the negative tone against crusaders (Westerners). On the first occasion, while recounting the claim of the holy spear being located and despite questioning the truthfulness of the Christian priest who had made such a claim that this certain object actually existed, Ibn Asir mentions Christ with respect and adds the title of "Peace be upon him" when mentioning him which, in Islamic literature, is an indication of religious respect. After that, in recounting the story of driving the Christians away from the city by the ruler of Antioch, Yaghisan, which was done out of fear of their cooperation with the Westerners who temporarily resided by the city walls, the author, quoting the ruler, promises the Christian to protect and nourish those members of their families who stay in the city and does not allow anyone to act against them with the excuse of them being Christians and so does he keeps his vow till the end. It seems that Ibn Asir is recounting this story with a sense of appreciation. Yet, one can trace minor otherings in such a narrative too:

1. Pleading with God; Ibn Asir states that "I earnestly plead with the great God to bring Islam and its believers relief and mind offering them help and drive away the evil from the people that he has passionate to (that is, the Muslims)." (Ibid: 385)
2. To consider the inspirations claimed by the Westerners especially regarding the significant occurrence of locating the holy spear whose narrator, the priest, is considered by him a crafty man. Ibn Asir states that: "he (the priest) had already buried a weapon in that place and swept its traces...they found it, and the priest told them may victory be with you thus." (Ibid: 253)
3. Emphasizing the despoilment, the massacre of the Muslims and enslaving their women; Even though Ibn Asir carries out the story in a realistic way, with a certain arrangement of the statements, he intensifies the event, hence the reaction of the Muslim audience, in such a way that regarding the massacre a question and after having mentioned the event and its spreading in Muslim lands he states: "this massacre took place in Ramadan and thus tears welled up from all eyes." (Ibid: 387)
4. Othering on the basis of hope and foretelling; while recounting the early years of the establishment of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, and despite all of its bitter events, Ibn Asir mentions the appearance of a star for the first time while discussing the Crusaders, yet, this time, this star indicates a certain hope towards the future for reclaiming Jerusalem by the Muslims: "In the last quarter of this year, a comet emerged in the sky as if a rainbow, that had stretched out from the West to the highest point of heaven, and before its appearance at the nightly heaven, it was seen close to the sun, and endured for a number of nights and then vanished." (Ibid)

The Analysis of the Dominant Sequences and Attitudes in the Two Treatises

At the time of Eckkehard, the "Catholic Christianity" is the dominant discourse and not only does his text attempt to establish and fortify it against other inter-social discourses, with the claim of being an Orthodox Christianity, and thus tries to inflect a certain kind of violence to them as the representative of the dominant discourse, but also tries to transform and reproduce the life-objects of the socio-religious aspects of the Christian life-form through defining the Islamic discourse as an extra-social and extra-religious question in order to firmly establish its own foundation and to intensify the significance of Christian identity within a conflicting discourse such as Islamic one in order to meet an objective higher than an inter-religious tension through achieving a common language. To this end, it even goes far enough to at least seemingly come in terms with other inter-religious discourses; yet, Eckkehard, in a quite naive manner, never exceeds the aim of conquering and hegemonizing Jerusalem anywhere beyond saving the Christian faith, and leaves the other dormant layers of the extension of power not highlighted or even abhorred. Nevertheless, in this treatise, the Catholic Christian discourse insists on its Christian identity and the acts related to vindicating it, and thus with a positively establishing approach, gives birth to the discourse of Holy War so that at its cost it succeeds in reproducing the Christian faith with the aim of extending its own power. This, at first, clearly relies on the convincing role of the discourse in order to meet its own goal.

This is in a way that, in the early chapters of his historical account, Eckkehard attempts to convince the Christian audience into the Holy War by referring to

Jerusalem and the relation that Christians bare with it, along with the inappropriate acts of Muslims. Here, the boundary between the sentimental and convincing roles of the paradigm in question are blurred due to the fact that the distance between the two is ignored in a way that calling Muslims infidels or pagans, and the use of religious pseudo-narratives in the fashion of the Testaments, and the prophecies play a role in-between of being reasons offered to convince, and being excuses to sentimentally and emotionally arouse the audience with the aim of providing the necessary ground for the acceptance of the new structures. Even though it is necessary to go beyond the Foucauldian discourse or non-discursive analysis and treat a vast range of linguistic and non-linguistic collected data as text in order to have a more realistic analysis of the problem at issue in a way that "the possibility of subjective articulating and ordering around a sign and a signifier and the formation of a significatory order and the hegimonization and establishment of it be provided on the basis of a secular and temporary conviction or agreement." So, one must consider that what exists at the heart of this emotional arousal of the audience with the aim of preparing the ground and reproducing an advancing Christian faith in Jerusalem is to give credit to the imaginative and unhistorical pseudo-narratives with the aim of forming an unwritten canon in Christian minds to the extent that Eckkehard offers a formation that can be the representation of the legitimization of the Biblical prophecies and the imagery along with all that can be defined within its limits for arousing the sentiments needed for committing actual acts against the religious other; This is done in a way that, here, we witness, first, the "creation" of fictional images and, after that, the "fictional interpretations" (within the framework of the biblical concepts) of events, acts, conducts, and procedures of the "actually existing" beings as an attempt made to realize actual and historical acts. In other words, quoting Derrida, "pesudo-narratives that, at the same time, carry the emblem of being a fictional narrative and an imagined one which, while being considered as the source of literature, it also appears as the source of canonization that presents the narrativity and a ghost-like or virtual story right at the heart of the canon."

As far as Ibn Asir's work is concerned, one should take a rather different procedure of apparent religious otherings; this is because, unlike *The Jerusalemian* in which the dominant discourse is systematically established and then turned into a source of provoking many acts with the aim of fictional stories, here, in this Islamic historiography, one can witness the traces of a rather more realistic attitude which even has the upper hand its fairly mild otherings of the opposing counterpart. Yet, one must keep in mind that, in the Islamic frontier, the tensions and conflicts of the inter-religious discourses play a much more emphatic role in the reduction of the religious othering of the Christians in a way that it prevented an integrated anti-Christianity discourses from being formed, while, in the Christian frontier, despite the religious otherings between the Catholics and Orthodoxy, the religious othering is pursued as vehemently and powerfully as possible and its religious discourse does not have a key role in modifying it in its different forms of appearance. Yet, despite the lack of a systematic order for othering tth crusader enemy in Ibn Asir's work, one can notice the problem of "naming" and "property ownership" or "land ownership" which, quite tacitly, turns the cruder enemy into an other to the extent that in studying the Crusades, this "naming" can perfectly clarify he position and the fundamental thinking of the multi-parties engaged in relation to one other and represents their attitude towards one another. This is in a way that the motivation of the Christians sent off to the East at the time of Crusades - apart from all the economic intentions at

work along with the religious ones - the dominant motto was "being at war with the infidels (especially the Muslims), and retaking Jerusalem from them." The "infidels" here is so religiously strong that has led to an "intense religious othering" for Christians to whom, at that time, Islam was a religious outside the Abrahamic tradition and its prophet, Muhammad, was either the Anti-Christ or a heretic of the Christianity itself; or even a belief in a main deity beside the other two which was a paganist belief in the existence of three Gods: Muhammad, Trivagan, Apolo. (Southern, 1978: 72) Because of all this, such an othering would apparently not bring about any problems or, in other words, "Islam and the Muslims already existed without or outside them." So, taking any position against them could not possibly inflict harm to the Christian ideology in general. This is while the general term adopted by the Muslims against the Crusaders - some exceptions aside - was "Westerners" which has got more the face of a "geographical othering" rather than a religious one since turning the Christianity into an atrocious other would be, to some extent, questioning a part of Islam itself as was accepted by the Muslims. On the other hand, what was tacitly yet strongly at work in recognizing the Westerners as the others in Ibn Asir's work was its emphasis on the concept of land and property ownership which is roughly the most emphatic reason for the existing minor otherings in the treatise in a way that even to understand and interpret the limited existing signs of prophecy in the section related to the Westerners in his account, one much take land ownership into consideration and not, as is the case of the prophecies of the Christians, the question of religious respect.

Conclusion

In Eckkehard's treatise, *The Jerusalemian*, religious belief and faith in the Lord and Christ's mercy leads the Christians forward and the dominant power is thus led to reproducing the revelations of the prophets and their interpretation is used for completing the convincing and the sentimental role of the discourse of Holy War. The images given regarding Islam and its followers, there, are at the service of forming a certain Christian identity against it and it is not the real images emerged from the Christian resurrectional thinking and concepts and not that of the real stories. Such images are either the representative of the infidelity or paganism and idolatry for committing real acts against the Muslims. Giving credit to these unhistorical and fictional pseudo-narratives leads to the formation of a canon in the Christian mentality of the Christians in order to commit actual acts against the Muslim counterparts, Yet, among the army of Islam, such attitudes - a number of exceptions aside - are considerably few in a way that no serious maneuver is used for turning Christianity into a religious other, far from it, the acts and deeds of the Christians for, first, gaining the ownership of land, and, second, for owning women and properties of the Muslims are in question and lead to the othering of the Christians. As a result, the extent of the provocative force of religion in committing othering by the Muslims and Christians during the first Crusades and with the aim of besieging the masses in either conflicting frontier is not identical and has a rather distinguished nature.

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Community - Based Tourism's Image Positioning and Strategic Management in Thailand and Lao PDR for Achieving ASEAN Community

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Abstract

This research paper is a synthesis of knowledge gathering from related researches in the realm of image, management, participation in tourism activities, strategic issues and competency development of community-based tourism in Thailand and Lao PDR for supporting ASEAN tourism expansion in 2015. The researchers have conducted a community survey in some villages where carried on community-based tourism in 4 provinces of Thailand which are Chiang Rai, Phayao, Nan and Uttaradit and 4 provinces of Lao PDR which are Luang Prabang, Oudomxay, Luang Namtha and Bokeo. This research has collected data from field research, an in-depth interview, a focus group, and questionnaires. Samplings are Thai/Lao stakeholders in community-based tourism. The findings are as follows; Lao PDR community-based tourism management and potential has had high criterion when compared with Thailand. Lao PDR community-based tourism's image is clearer than Thailand. The positioning of community-based tourism strategies and competency development can divide into 2 parts. Firstly, offensive strategies are (1) to build up a Thai/Lao community-based tourism network for developing cooperative tourism not competitive one (2) to mutually administrate and manage borderlands under collaboration of both local governments (3) to specify explicit image and positioning of community-based tourism and (4) to create new community-based tourism image and activities which link community tourist spots in Thai/Lao borderlands area. Meanwhile, defensive strategies are (1) to mutually develop community-based tourism skilled-human resources between Thailand and Lao PDR and (2) to support the possibility of food production for visitors in both countries.

Keywords: community-based tourism, Thailand, Lao PDR

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Introduction

Tourism is a substantial industry and it has generated significant incomes for many countries since the end of Second World War. The United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) has mentioned that there were worldwide tourists around 668 millions in 2000 and hit 1,000 million tourists in 2010. In addition, it has expected that in 2020, there will be more than 1,500 million tourists around the world (Sinth, 2002). The tourism growth rate is continuously increasing in spite of the uncertainties of international terrorism, natural disaster, epidemics, high-priced fuel, political-economic crises.(MOTS Thailand: 2012) In this regard, Tourism is an important mechanism for driving economy, nationally and internationally.

Achieving the ASEAN Community in the end of 2015, tourism is one of the key factors to support mutual cooperation among nation members. During the 15th ASEAN Summit in 2009 in Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand, the idea of “ASEAN Connectivity” has addressed and become a master plan to solidify ASEAN’s nation members and to integrate ASEAN Community. Under the Hanoi Declaration on the adoption of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (2010), the key elements of ASEAN Connectivity to support and facilitate the economic, political-security and socio-cultural pillars include (ASEAN Secretariat, 2011); Physical Connectivity: Transport, Information and Communications Technology, Energy; Institutional Connectivity: Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation; Investment and Services Liberalization and Facilitation, Mutual Recognition agreements/arrangements, Regional Transportation Agreements, Cross-Border Procedures, Capacity Building Programmes; and People-to-People Connectivity: Education and Culture, Tourism. In addition, ASEAN members have already had an agreement relevant to free flow of skilled labour called “ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement”. With this mechanism, tourism professionals is one of the eight career sectors (aside from tourism professionals they are architectural services, surveying, medical practitioners, dental practitioners, engineer services, nursing, and accounting services) which after the integration of ASEAN Community, it will facilitate the mobility of tourism skilled labours within ASEAN based on competence-based tourism qualifications. Also, it will strengthen mutual tourism professionals’ cooperations among ASEAN member countries.

Besides, the enhanced economic cooperation among six countries of GMS (Greater Mekong Sub-Region) which combines with China specifically Yunnan Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam under ADB (Asian Development Bank) assistances has widely supported ASEAN integration. The GMS has nine branches of collaboration which are Transportation, Telecommunication, Energy, Trade, Agricultural Investment, Environment, Human Resources Development and Tourism. Within tourism agenda, it has a marketing plan named “Six Countries One Destination” to support mutual tourism sites development and to make a linkage among GMS members. Therefore, tourism has played an important role to create a mutual cooperation and brought win-win benefits among ASEAN countries.

Thailand is one of the world’s top tourist destinations. In 2014, there were international tourists visiting Thailand around 24.7 millions (Department of Tourism, 2015: Online). The main international tourist came from China, Malaysia, Russia,

Japan, South Korea, India, Laos, United Kingdom, Singapore and Australia. In the eyes of tourists, Thailand's tourism images are renowned on nightlife, food, beaches and shopping paradises. (DASTA: 2014) Since 2012, tourism has been set as a national agenda and strategy under the 11th national economics and social development plan (2012-2016). For reaching the ultimate goal of Thailand tourism strategy, Ministry of Tourism and Sports has set the vision which is "Thailand is a prime tourism spot among world class tourism competency that generates and distributes incomes, justly, equally and permanently." The Thai government also supports entrepreneurs to create alternative tourism innovation and identity by concerning the local wisdom and sustainability such as health tourism, adventure tourism, spiritual tourism, MICE, sport tourism. However, the situation of tourism in Thailand recently has encountered the flux of tourists which directly affects on the deterioration of natural tourism sites.

Lao PDR is now one of the countries which have high potentials in tourism because it has plentifully and variously natural, historical and cultural tourism sites. Also, it has political stability and cordial people. In 2013, it was named the world's best tourist destination by the European Council on Tourism and Trade (ECTT). (Bangkok Post, 2013: Online) Lao PDR government has strongly supported tourism industry as a key factor for national incomes and development. The number of international tourists visiting Laos has gradually increased from 670,000 in 2000 to more than one million for the first time in 2005 and hit 2.5 millions in 2010. Expectantly, there will be 4.3 millions within 2020. The majority groups of international tourists are from Thailand, Vietnam, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, France, United Kingdom, Germany and the United States. Tourism sector has been the second largest national revenues placing behind mine industry. Lao government has launched the national tourism strategy (2012-2020) for supporting and developing tourism spots and products. It has also invested in public infrastructures such as nationwide connected highways for facilitating tourists and attracting foreign investment from outsiders especially accommodations, entertainment venues, casinos and golf clubs. Lao PDR looks at itself as "a land linked country" which not only intimately connects other ASEAN mainland members but also non-ASEAN member like China. (Department of Tourism Marketing, Laos: 2011) Albeit, Laos has completeness of tourism resources, it still has an inefficient management and lack of professional tourism staffs both public and private sectors.

What is Community - Based Tourism?

The concept of community-based tourism (hereinafter referred to as "CBT") is one of the alternative tourism which supports community to participate in tourism development process. (Hatton: 1999) The CBT is a tourism which concerns about social and environmental sustainability which is guided by community, managed by community, and owned by community. Therefore, community needs to make people feel proud and cherish on their identity. The CBT is a part of community development by supporting community participation to develop tourism activities based on local wisdom and environmental conservation. The examples of pattern of CBT are ecological tourism, cultural tourism, agricultural tourism, health tourism and so on. No matter what type of CBT, the purpose aims at develop and strengthen community by people in community. (Yot: 2001)

The principles of community-based tourism (Thailand Community-based Tourism Institute, 2013: Online) are (1) the ownership of community (2) participating of community in the right of decision (3) promoting community pride (4) enhancing quality of life (5) environmental sustainability (6) sustaining local culture and identity (7) knowledge engagement between different communities (8) valuing different culture and human prestige (9) fair yielding for locals in community and (10) income distributing for community's public benefits. When community is prompt for CBT site, it should have four matters to concern which are tourism activities, tourism services, tourism facilities, and managing mechanism. (Thailand Research Fund: 2004)




Figure 1: The comparison of Community Roles in Tourism Management

Regarding to Community-based tourism effectiveness evaluation, there are six indicators assessed by CBT scholars assessment and suggestion. (Pimrawee: 2010) First of all, the successful CBT derives from genuine participation of community. The community willingly aggregates for obvious tourism management. Secondly, the interests from CBT must be fairly distributed to community. Major interests are in socio-economic dimension such as revenues, enhancing living standard, poverty reduction, and increasing local employment. Thirdly, CBT management system must be carried out with good governance. Tourism management should gradually and cautiously develop for community adaptation. Fourthly, there should be collaboration from stakeholders both in and out community. Community can get assistance and support from business sectors, political and economic institutions. Fifthly, Community must have its own distinctive point of tourism resources for sustainable tourism development. For example; culture and traditions, man-made tourism site, historical tourism site etc. Lastly, CBT must be concerned about environment as well. Some communities may support natural tourism sites as a knowledge center for environmental conservation learning.

Therefore, nowadays the community-based tourism is an alternative choice of tourism. It creates the understanding of people in community by promoting tourism management participation. Locals will not only directly earn interests from CBT but

also take into consideration about the effect of tourism for utmost sustainability of CBT resources.

The Objectives

- 1) To analyse CBT image positioning and competency of Thailand and Lao PDR for achieving ASEAN Community.
- 2) To propose CBT strategic management of Thailand and Lao PDR for achieving ASEAN Community.

Framework and Methodology

This research paper is a synthesis of knowledge gathering from related researches in the realm of image, management, participation in community-based tourism activities, strategic issues and competency development of CBT in Thailand and Lao PDR for supporting ASEAN tourism expansion in 2015. It has been conducted a community survey in some villages where carried on CBT in four provinces of northern Thailand which are Chiang Rai, Phayao, Nan and Uttaradit and four provinces of Lao PDR which are Luang Prabang, Oudomxay, Luang Namtha and Bokeo. This research paper has collected data from field research, an in-depth interview, a focus group, and questionnaires. Samplings are Thai/Lao stakeholders in community-based tourism.

Research Findings

The CBT Image Positioning and Competency of Thailand and Lao PDR

Analysing the CBT image positioning and competency of four provinces of northern Thailand; Chiang Rai, Phayao, Nan and Uttaradit, are as follow. Firstly, Thakhunthong village, Chiang Saen district of Chiang Rai, is the best practice for CBT site's success. In 2013, it received Thailand Tourism Award for the Sufficiency Economy Village. The strong point of the community is the variety of tourism activities which based on the locals' pace of life such as cotton weaving lady's group, cricket farming, and tea plant. Specially, it has a historical guide tour for natural and historical sightseeing run by the locals for traveling alongside of Mekong River between Thai-Lao borderlines. It also has standard homestay accommodations. The participation of villagers for CBT management is somewhat active; this can be assumed from the role of local administration officers who play a substantial support the community development through CBT. Secondly, Ban Huak Checkpoint, Phu Sang district of Phayao, is named "the Valley of Two Lands One Heart" because of the border connection with Xayaboury province of Lao PDR. It is the strategic point of Phayao and Xayaboury for economic exchange and tourism. Besides, Ban Huak Checkpoint is a part of GMS strategic cooperation which links Northern Vietnam to Mawlamyine and Dawei of Myanmar. (Kannika and Adisorn: 2013) Thirdly, Huay Kon, Chalerm Prakit of Nan, is the international point of entry between Thailand and Laos. Mainly, tourists use this border immigration for visiting Luang Prabang. For the tourism sites, it has Thai-Lao border market, waterfalls, and communist base camp historical site. However, after surveying the research site, even though the number of tourists is increasing, it found that Huay Kon community has not yet established CBT because of more than 90 percents of the village are national conservative sites. In addition, the route from Nan city to Huay Kon village is somewhat inconvenient

because of topography. Lastly, Phu Doo village, Ban Khok district of Uttaradit, is also the permanent international point of entry between Thailand and Lao PDR. It has Thai-Lao border market but main products are household stuffs and made in Thailand. In addition, Lao products are wild products which do not meet the demand of tourists. After the field research, it is recently found that major agricultural areas both in Thailand and Laos are corn fields. This situation letting people in the village have operated homestay for buyers. Regarding to CBT, same as Huay Kon village, it has not yet concretely been CBT because of main area are conservative sites. However, local administration office is interested in CBT and need support from experts and also its locals. Recently, Uttaradit province has set a strategy for Phu Doo village by trying to carry out the public bus from Bangkok to Phu Doo which will increase the number of tourists.

Analysing the CBT image positioning and competency of four provinces of Lao PDR; Luang Prabang, Oudomxay, Luang Namtha and Bokeo, are as follow. Firstly, Luang Prabang is well-known as the UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1995. It is the second place for highest number of international visitors coming after the capital city of Vientiane. It is the main destination and a city where links to other provinces in northern region. Ban Phanom village, one of Luang Prabang city, is set as a cultural village by its province because of the famous cotton and silk weaving and easily access from international airport and bus terminal. In addition, Ban Pakham where is named a tourism center of Luang Prabang province because it is loaded with attractive tourism sites such as the Royal Palace which is now a national museum, a remarkable of Wat Xieng Thong temple, colonial styled architecture buildings and night market. Besides, there are various kinds of accommodation, cafés, restaurants which can respond for tourist needs. Secondly, Oudomxay is defined as “the Heart of Northern Laos” because of its location which connects to Southern China, Northern Vietnam and Northern Thailand. The provincial tourism office has supported CBT in some communities of Oudomxay. Pak Beng is a stopover village on the bank of Kong River where tourists need to stay a night before reaching Luang Prabang. It has standard accommodations, restaurants and other facilities which run by the locals.

There is also a homestay indigenous community that attracts visitors with authentic identity culture of Dai Lue in Bar Yor village. The interesting remark from field research is an active role from relevant government offices especially Oudomxay tourism agency. However, CBT sites lack of tourism management and language skills to communicate with international visitors. Thirdly, Luang Namtha has notable CBT image positioning as “Eco-Trekking Destination” especially in Ban Nam Aeng village where situated in mountainous area of the Nam Ha National Park. In the community, there are homestay accommodation and trekking tour guides by locals. Luang Namtha has borderline with China by Boten International Custom Checkpoint and R3A Road which can connect all six GMS member countries. It makes Luang Namtha a crossroad and stopover for Chinese visitors to travel along Laos and Vietnam conversely international tourists comfortably visit China. Lastly, Bokeo province is distinguished in both natural and cultural tourism resources. It is adjacent to Chiang Rai province of Thailand. In December 2013, the 4th Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge (Chiang Khong-Huay Xai) has been officially opened and strengthened relationship of both countries also linked the transportation throughout the region. Bokeo is now attractive for international investors especially from China and South Korea as they request for concession from Lao government for making investment in trades,

logistics, and tourism sectors. Ban Panna of Bokeo has continuously welcomed Chinese tourists who are brought into the village by King Roman Casino, one of the Chinese investments in Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone of Lao PDR. In the village, it is supported by local government to develop waterfall and forestry area for becoming village tourism spot. In addition, Ban Nam Chang where is close to the city but it still preserves unique culture and tradition of Luntan minority group which also attracted by the visitors. Regarding to field research, it seems that Bokeo province has been vigorously supported by government for CBT sites such as information center, handicraft distribution center, and standard homestay accommodations.

After showing distinctive points of each CBT research site of Thailand and Lao PDR, the researchers have made an evaluation for CBT image positioning by considering the tourism composition index which are Attraction, Accessibility, Accommodation, Amenity, and Activity. It has found that Lao PDR has better image positioning than Thailand in every index. Besides, the evaluation for CBT competency by using the index of a Diversity of CBT Tourism Resources, CBT Infrastructure, Marketing, Motivation for CBT Development, and Poverty Reduction. It has found that Laos is more competent than Thailand in CBT competency in every index. Furthermore, Chiang Rai province of Thailand and Luang Prabang province of Lao PDR are the best image positioning and the most competent in Community-based Tourism among the research sites.

The CBT strategic management of Thailand and Lao PDR

It is clear that tourism is substantial for Thailand and Lao PDR economic development. It generates revenues which make Thai and Lao government expect that tourism will be a crucial tool for poverty reduction, distribution mechanism, and growing community economy. Thailand and Lao PDR have set Community-based Tourism as a strategy for national tourism development. Regarding to CBT strategic management, there are two categories of strategy proposal which are offensive and defensive strategies.

For the CBT offensive strategies, there are four keystones. First of all, Thailand and Laos need to build up the network for developing a cooperative tourism not a competitive one. Also, both governments should support mutual linkage tourist destinations. For example; Chiang Rai – Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge – Bokeo – Luang Namtha – Luang Prabang. Secondly, they should closely have Thai-Lao borderlines management especially the role of local administration offices. Thirdly, they should specify explicit image and positioning of community-based tourism in both countries. Finally, they should create alternative tourism images and activities along the Thai-Lao borderland areas. For the CBT defensive strategies, there are two issues to concern about. Firstly, it should have the skilled-human resources development of Thai-Lao tourism staffs and stakeholders. Another one is the development of food production and distribution for tourists.

Conclusion

Thailand and Lao PDR have similar vision of tourism as a tool for poverty reduction and economic development. They have anticipated that their countries are the destination for tourism in global stage, For Thailand, it has already become in that

position but for Laos, it is worth to keep the eyes on. An interesting thing is the CBT competency index of Lao PDR is higher than Thailand. This is because of the comparison between borderline CBT sites of those two countries which Thai CBT areas are not well-developed and cooperative from their locals, also the lack of support by governmental sectors. While Lao CBT sites have mostly been received assistances and funds from their government and the outsiders such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID). However, this can be a two-edged sword for Lao CBT because either strategies or approaches are set by those organizations. This situation is challenging for people in Lao CBT sites whether they are able to manage their own communities. As the fact that CBT is linked to tourism system which tourism activities occurred by locals, controlled and managed by locals, those activities expressed the community culture and identity which are the core for attracting visitors. (Hinch and Butler: 1996)

Another challenge is the competency of community for sustainable tourism resources management. Sinth (2013) has reviewed CBT knowledge and raised the question that “Who does control CBT?” and “How the interests from CBT can fairly distribute to everyone in community?”. In fact, the CBT has been controlled by outsiders like interest groups, political groups, and entrepreneurs; that’s why CBT is not everyone in community needs. Therefore, if CBT will be a mechanism for sustainable community development, it should be concerned about (1) self-sufficiency of community (2) participation process in decision making (3) managing and bargaining power (4) role setting in mainstream tourism (5) sustainability of community ecology (6) community capacity for management (7) interests and individual response (8) strength of community culture and (9) CBT destination.

For achieving ASEAN Community, mutual CBT management along Thai-Lao borderlines can be a part to fulfill collaboration of ASEAN. The mobilization of tourists, local people, and cross-border economic activities will create opportunities for CBT sites to develop and make a growth for their societies. Also, the communities need to get ready for sustaining local value and wisdom in the midst of change in the near future.

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Gendered Filipino Migration in Bangkok: A Narrative

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Abstract

A look at the historical development of every migration pattern allows one to understand and appreciate the fact that migration, over the years, has taken some contours intertwining itself with gender. It is interesting to note that in the older models of migration, the "invisibility" of discussions that involved women was very much felt (See Willis & Yeoh, 2000; Pessar, 1986; Nash, 1986; Morokvasic, 1984; Bodnar, Weber, & Simon, 1982). As feminist theories that developed from 1980s through 1990s came to regard gender as a "social construction," this study looks into how such views impinge on immigration as a constitutive element of the human dynamics, social, and institutional infrastructures. In this vein, this investigation looks at gendered migration within the context of Filipino migrant work with regard to their access to social, religious, economic, and political networks in their intra-Asia migration in Thailand. To allow a comprehensive way of weaving gendered strands into migration, this paper chooses from among the main models of migratory processes (Castles, 2002) and attempts to illustrate the specific matrix within which gender is woven vis-à-vis migration flows, practices, construction of meanings, and forging of relationships, among others. In building the nexus of gendered migration, this paper adapts the framework proposed by Monica Boyd and Elizabeth Grieco (2003) and particularly examines the lives of Filipino informants through their life narratives. Following Boyd and Grieco, this study sections the discussion into three stages migrants typically experience, namely, "The Pre-Migration Stage," "Gender and the Transition across State Boundaries," and "Gender and the Post-Migration Stage" (2003). In using Boyd and Grieco's (2003) framework, the author seeks to explore how migration serves as a conduit to a change of status of the migrants, positioning gender within the analytical fabric of migration studies as "analysis remains within the traditional explanatory approach" (p. 12).

Keywords: gender and migration, Filipino migrant work, intra-regional migration

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Introduction

Known for its active role in the international labor circuits for almost five centuries, the Philippines continues to fortify its status as a labor brokerage state. In this respect, the country has been successful in turning "Philippine labor one of the 'natural resources' that the country could export" (Lorente, 2011, p. 187) and in being able to package an "internationally attractive labor force" (Tyner, 2004, p. 30) which it now markets to "numerous participants—including foreign employers, labor recruiters, politicians, and potential migrants—attempting to satisfy their own agendas (sic) as they simultaneously affect the global parameters of labor migration" (Goss & Lindquist, 1995; Tyner, 1994, 1996a, 1996b, Cited in Tyner, 1999).

What is interesting, however, is that in the face of every Filipino migrant worker's saga, a multi-fold of issues that probes into the very fabric of his personhood reveals his innermost pining. More often than not, the issues that propel him to leave home to eke a living in a foreign land are the very same concerns that constantly motivate and sustain him to be able to combat the numerous struggles and other forms of difficulties a migrant worker faces every day. Tons of studies along this line have already been done for a little more than two decades as "transnationalism [vis-à-vis diaspora and migration] has emerged as a new concept to describe new immigrant identities and communities in a globalized world" (Quirke, Potter, & Conway, 2009, p. 1; See also Levitt & Waters, 2002; Goulbourne, 2001; Portes, 1996; Vertovec, 1999, 2001, 2004)). A survey of existing related literature has made this author realize the richness of existing literature on said research breadth. Given this, this paper chooses to discuss instead another strand left under-explored up to this point.

A survey of the older models of migration will show that the "invisibility" of discussions concerning women was very much felt, if not needed (See Willis & Yeoh, 2000; Pessar, 1986; Nash, 1986; Morokvasic, 1984; Bodnar, Weber, & Simon, 1982). This is where the intrinsic value of this investigation comes in. Feminist theories that came out and developed from 1980s through 1990s came to view gender as a "social construction." This study attempts to explore how such perspective currently impinges on immigration as a constitutive element of the human dynamics, particularly the social and institutional infrastructures. Within this vein, this study examines the social lenses and probes on normative gender behavior observed in the home country and looks into whether it has led to the development of gendered migration among the Filipino migrant workers in Bangkok within the context of their access to social, religious, economic, and political networks. To allow a comprehensive way of weaving gendered migration into the study, this paper chooses from among the main models of migratory process (Castles, 2002) and attempts to illustrate the specific matrix within which gender is woven vis-à-vis migration flows, practices, construction of meanings, and forging of relationships, among others.

To be able to construct the nexus of Filipino gendered migration particularly in Bangkok, this paper adapts the framework proposed by Monica Boyd and Elizabeth Grieco (2003) and particularly investigates on the lives of Bangkok-based Filipino migrant workers. Following Boyd and Grieco, this study sections the discussion into three stages migrants typically experience, namely, "The Pre-Migration Stage," "Gender and the Transition across State Boundaries," and "Gender and the Post-Migration Stage" (2003). In using Boyd and Grieco's (2003) framework, the author

seeks to explore how migration serves as a conduit to a change of status of the migrants, positioning gender within the analytical fabric of migration studies as “analysis remains within the traditional explanatory approach” (p. 12).

Research Objectives

As there has been a dearth of research on Filipino migration in Thailand, much less on the gendering characteristics of migration within said migrant community, this study is being proposed. This investigation specifically aims to carry out the following objectives:

1. To provide migration scholars and academics relevant and recent data concerning the gendering characteristics of Filipino migration within the Thai context.
2. To probe into the developments of gendered migration as opposed to the “invisibility” of said discussion in older migration models.
3. To produce life history narratives that can possibly serve as a reference for future gendered migration studies.

Research Questions

To situate this paper into its proper research context, this study will aim to answer the following questions:

1. What are the variegated models and channels of migration the Filipino migrant workers in Bangkok take?
2. How do these models and channels constitute the gendered dimensions of mobility, which particularly place women in diverse gender structures?
3. How does gender as a social construction impinge on immigration as a constitutive element of the human dynamics, social, and institutional infrastructures particularly with regard to a migrant’s access to social, religious, economic, and political networks in said receiving country?

Methodology

A. Research Design

Data in this investigation was primarily gathered by collecting and analyzing data through a series of interviews. These interviews, qualitative by nature, are referred to as “in-depth, semi-structured, or loosely structured forms of interviewing” (Mason, 2006). With the rise of post-positivist research, dramatically increasing its legitimate use (Leonard, 1997; Reinharz, 1992, Cited in Fraser, 2004), narrative research has been made a major component of the over-all design of this paper. Narrative research was also supplemented by the author's use of the ethnographic approach, when and where possible, further demonstrated by the author’s being either a “complete participant or a complete observer” (Mason, 2002, p. 92). When observation took place within the researcher's own milieu, she took on the role of a complete participant.

Reasons for using narrative research can be substantiated by the following benefits it generally brings such as the following: they are “pathways to understanding culture” (Plummer, 1995, p. 19); personal storytelling is a means of providing “narrative truths for analysis” (Fraser, 2004, p. 18); it is helpful in organizing “experiences into meaningful episodes that call upon cultural modes of reasoning and representations” (Berger, Cited in Fraser, 2004); it may help researchers “move beyond a strict

problem focus to more generally explored social phenomena" (Fraser, 2004, p. 181), among many other reasons. In sum, the narrative approach was used to elicit richer data for a more comprehensive handling and analysis of information.

B. Data-gathering Procedures, Tools and Tasks

Open-ended and semi-structured interviews were employed to gather relevant data. The duration of each interview ranged from two to three hours. The author hired a research assistant to help her be more focused on the actual interviews. The author purposely chose a Filipino research assistant who had a background in the Social Sciences to help ensure ease in facilitating research-related tasks and avoid language, cultural, and other forms of barriers. Pre-interview preliminaries, such as making appointments with the subject/ interviewee, and post-interview set ups were done with the help of said research assistant. Transcribing interviews and consolidating interview results was also done with the aid of said research assistant. Some of the informants were chosen purposively aided by the author's connection within the Filipino community. In most cases, however, the snowball method was used as earlier-interviewed informants referred their friends who qualified in the interview criteria to become informants as well.

C. Subject/s

Because this study sought to probe into life histories so as to establish an in-depth analysis of the research issues at hand and not so much on the quantitative aspect of the source of information, it did not aim at involving a big number of interviewees. Rather, it sought to focus on only 14 subjects in extracting relevant information and employing "methods that allow for 'thick' or 'rich descriptions'" (Denzin, 1989; Plummer, 2001). This study gathered information from 14 identified Filipino migrant workers, all of whom were husbands and wives, who had stayed in Bangkok, Thailand over a significant period of time, spanning anywhere from a minimum of one (1) year to an ideal maximum of 15 years or more.

Findings and Analysis

To fully appreciate the context within which gender is closely intertwined with migration, this study problematizes said themes by exploring and analyzing the life narratives of the informants in keeping with the framework proposed by Monica Boyd and Elizabeth Grieco (2003). This study transpires from a closer introspection of gender, family, and normative gender behavior—as practiced in the Filipino migrants' point of origin and examines whether there is an observed reconstitution of gender thereby causing ruptures to the patriarchal Filipino households in the Thai host-country setting. The following discussion is sectioned based on Boyd and Grieco's (2003) three phases of migration, namely The Pre-Migration Stage (Phase One), Gender and the Transition across State Boundaries Stage (Phase Two), and Gender and the Post-Migration Stage (Phase Three).

Pre-migration Stage

An examination of a migrant's pre-migration experience affords one to have a better understanding of the gender-specific directions of his transnational activities in the receiving country context. This is not to say, of course, that a migrant's pre-migration experience and earlier-established family culture in the homeland will always shape his gender activities once in the host-country. Rachel Salazar Parreñas (2005)

elucidates Robert Connell's (1987) view by saying that although structural conditions can have the ability to control them, they

do not predetermine the gender outcome of the practices that constitute institutions. The reproduction of the social order depends on the constitution of practices. Disagreements in practices that emerge from internal contradictions in structural complaints may in fact subvert structures. This perspective suggests that actions potentially transform institutional orders and structures. (p. 5)

Susie Jolly and Hazel Reeves (2005) posit

Experience shows that migration can provide new opportunities to improve women's lives and change oppressive gender relations—even displacement as a result of conflict can lead to shifts in gendered roles and responsibilities to women's benefit. However, migration can also entrench traditional roles and inequalities and expose women to new vulnerabilities as the result of precarious legal status. (p. 1)

Within this vein, this paper examines whether the gender-specific structural conditions and practices that migrants had been previously exposed to in their country of origin held true or continued to be practiced after crossing borders and upon living transnational lives. Such an investigation is important as well to determine whether it is opportune to rethink gender and the household within which migrant life takes place.

Gender Relations and Hierarchies

Elizabeth Grieco and Monica Boyd (2003) argue that migration is influenced by a two-pronged circumstance. The first is contingent on the gender-specific capacity allowing one's self to cross borders. The second is hinged on the gender-specific capacity to provide one's self with the needed monetary and data capital. Boyd and Grieco posit that a person's capability to migrate is determined and, at times, limited by his/ her family and socio-cultural contextual relationships within which s/he is rooted. More specifically, the roles women take emanate from the family that often dictates the reasons for migration and controls how capital, that is, money and information, can be distributed. This, in effect, eventually controls women's propensity for migration. Studies show the centrality of households, often directing women's directions, activities, and values (See Lim, 1995; Boyd, 1995; Hondagneu-Sotelo & Cranford, 2006). To add to Lim's (1995) discourse on the chief role of one's family context, Boyd and Grieco make reference to Curtis (1986) underscoring the latter's argument that "the family is the primary unit generating gender inequality and that the roots of patriarchal authority are familial rather than sexual" such that a husband's authority over his wife goes beyond her non-familial tasks (In Boyd & Grieco, 2003, p. 14). Boyd and Grieco further assert that when this happens a husband's patriarchal performance bridges family and market frameworks. Tienda and Booth (1991) postulate that this assents non-monetary transactions rooted in a normative gender behavior, producing and sustaining gender imbalance and economic transactions that allow hierarchies that are based on one's sex (In Boyd & Grieco, 2003). Thus, this study argues that household dynamics anchored on gender relations should be factored in to further understand migration and its effects (Lawson, 1998;

See also Curran, Shafer, Donato, & Garip, 2006). Patricia Pessar (1999) asserts the need for “engendering” investigations and theories related to transnationalism as they are, in fact, interrelated. Deborah Boehm (2008) maintains, “Indeed, (im)migration research without a fully integrated study of the intimate workings of gender provides only an eclipsed view of transnational movement” (p. 18). The context of married couples and the families they are situated in posits that despite their boundedness as private social units unto themselves, such that they “can be wholly separated from the public sphere, [the family context] needs reconsideration” (Bielby, 2006; See also Ferree, 1990; Osmond, 1987). It is within this vein that this section examines the experience of 14 Bangkok-based Filipino married migrant workers, probing their pre-migration background as couples.

In the case of Len and Tosh, observing patriarchal traditions was the norm in their family in the homeland. When asked about their arrangements prior to their overseas work and how said set-up influenced Tosh’s decision to work abroad, Len revealed:

Of course as Filipinos, we have like ‘babae ka (You’re the woman), lalaki ka (You’re the man).’ So to us it’s like that. He felt, because he is the man, he needs to provide for the family. So that’s one of the reasons why he has to work here. ‘Cause with my income, with three kids, it’s not enough.

Although Len and their children followed Tosh in Thailand after two years with Len eventually finding a job for herself, Tosh’s decision to leave the Philippines for overseas work demonstrated masculinized migration that was “driven by economic necessity,” as it has been with the massive Mexican (im)migration to the United States (Boehm, 2008, p. 18). To be sure, spurred by the logic of human capital theory, Len’s job allowed their family to lead “in the direction of economic growth” (Mohlo, 1986, In Cooke & Bailey, January 1996, p. 39). Nevertheless, Len faced a gendered bind that subjected her “to existing and emergent ideas of masculinity and patriarchy in both places” (Boehm, 2008, p. 28). In fact, without any hint of contestation from her end, Len herself spoke of the patriarchal roles ascribed to men and embodied stereotypical concepts accorded to women within the family context, reflecting how gender traditionalism is prevalent in the Philippines.

As Len underscored her husband’s role as the breadwinner in the family, one that is heavily interpreted to be within the sphere of men, she also reinforced the concept of women’s dependency on them. Tosh also further reinforced Len’s beliefs about traditional gender relations when he talked about his disappointment upon realizing, soon after getting married, that Len did not know how to perform household chores such as cooking and washing clothes. To be sure, Tosh admitted to have had known and accepted Len’s perceived lack of domestic skills during their courtship period, but showed a shift in his attitude towards her as soon as they got married.

Because my wife belongs to, shall we say, elite family in Bacolod (a province in the Philippines). Her parents have high ranks in the Adventist community especially in their town. Now, my wife, as you know, is a pianist. So, in the house, she doesn’t wash clothes and doesn’t do the household chores like cooking. Before, I said, “Aileen, it’s okay” (Tosh taps Len’s shoulder). But when we got married, I was so shocked (laughs). She didn’t know how to cook, she didn’t know... I had done all of those. I had to work; yet upon

going home from work I still needed to cook, I needed to clean because I was not satisfied. And then I got tired.

In this case, Tosh's declaration reflects his shifting gender subjectivities about women's roles, dictated by the degree of responsibilities and kind of relationship he and Len had (See Boehn, 2008; Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton, 1995). Nevertheless, Tosh's gender sensitivity was not fluid enough to alter his notions of maleness and femaleness. He remained true to his patriarchal values. Additionally, Len and Tosh's family migration to Bangkok revealed a crucial traditional arrangement practiced back home. In the Philippines, Len and Tosh still needed to consult Len's parents before they could make major decisions. From Tosh's side of the family, his stepfather/ uncle held an important role as well, affecting how they managed their own family. His stepfather/ uncle even had a say on the littlest domestic details, such as keeping the house clean. Having lived in an extended family residence, Len and Tosh's decisions were made subject to the patriarchal traditions of their own parents.

Apart from Tosh and Len, another couple said that their situation back home was slightly similar to the former's set up, with family members observing gender norms. Vincent, for instance, said that while in the Philippines

I was the one working back in the Philippines. Before coming to Thailand, I worked in China and that's where we met. I was working back then in one company. Then, that's it... the rest is history. When we went to the Philippines, we were already together. She lived in the Philippines before coming here. (The wife is a Chinese national). I made majority of the decisions. Well, in terms of finances, we share because she's good at that. However, in most other things I was the one deciding on them because she was just new in the Philippines. Nevertheless, I explained things to her. When it comes to household matters, since she's home-based, then she was the one doing related decisions. I would cook, once in a while, but she was really the one in charge of domestic concerns.

Although Vincent said that he gave his wife a certain space for her to participate in some decision-making tasks, such as doing the finances as his way of showing credit to his wife's skill at numbers being Chinese, he confirmed as well that he decided on most other things alone in taking the lead role being the man in the family. However, apart from that, Vincent re-asserted his belief in gender roles: "As traditionally understood, if you're a man, you should be protecting your family and female siblings. Among the girls, they should know some household chores." Vincent and his wife's (Kaye) matrimonial dynamics underscore Wharton and Erickson's (1993) observation: "Family roles are thus characterized by an 'emotional division of labor,' whereby women and men are expected to perform different kinds and amounts of emotion management" (p. 471).

When asked about their concept of gender and hierarchy, Syd and Jhe promptly thought of their children. Syd recounted the time when he spoke to his son in the past and reminded him of his crucial role in the family. By explicitly telling his son “You’re the man of the house,” Syd communicated to their children the implicit role and status of each in the family. Furthermore, by reminding his son that he should be responsible for and protect the family, Syd’s patriarchal acts, just like Vincent’s in the previous discussion, were shaping sex-based hierarchies within their family context. Having examined the narratives of the three above-mentioned couples, this research noted that among married couples/ families with established gender hierarchies, negotiations creating understandings of gender and the roles associated to it put centrality to a man’s capacity to provide for the family’s need, a wife’s ability to be the major movers in overseeing “the physical activities of running a household” (Bielby, 2006, p. 393), the male children’s understanding of their responsibility to protect the family and their female siblings, and the female children’s acceptance of the fact that just like their mothers, they have to develop capabilities to undertake domestic chores and perform female-specific tasks.

Of the seven couples interviewed, the situation of three other couples was quite the opposite. Manny and Ella, for example, said that gender did not affect decisions made within his own family. Neither were status and roles dependent on a member’s gender.

We never had any issues regarding this matter. As a family, everybody could voice out their opinions then decided [on] things accordingly. All family members helped and supported each other. Every member of our family had a certain role and duty. Girls are not the weaker sex in our family. Well, in fact, they had done a tremendous job in our family in every aspect. Both respected each other’s capabilities, strengths, and even weaknesses. But female members in our family chose to show extra esteem toward male family members.

Eddie and Edna’s situation was similar as seen in Eddie’s account below:

We are very open in our family, but at the same time, we make sure that our children maintain their respect to the elders...definitely no gender issue with regard to the status and roles of each.

Frank and Elsie shared how open they were to adjusting to each other’s needs rather than carry on with the traditionally understood gendered moves. Frank and Elsie’s arrangement makes an example for the need to pay close attention to gender dynamics (See Hoerder, 2002). In their case, the “interplay of individual circumstances, familial relationships, larger economic cycles,” among others, became more crucial factors in their performance of household tasks than gender-based ones (Sinke, 2006, p. 82) so much so that they welcomed switching of roles, one that remains unimaginable within the patriarchal tradition.

Elsie: Both of us are teachers and we are from Camarines Norte. We’re not typical in the sense that we are not traditional because ever since we’ve had a baby, we already agreed to

divide the chores between the two of us since we're both working. Even if we had a nanny with us.

Frank: It's more of doing some adjustment on our part because she went through the C-section then. Since I was more capable, I did more of the adjustment to which I got used to anyway. I would wake up early in the morning and would take care of the other kids because she was having a difficult time then.

The account of the three above-mentioned non-traditional couples demonstrated that exposure to patriarchy acts prevailing in the homeland does not guarantee vulnerability to it within one's own matrimony. As studies reveal two of the key traits of gender being fluid and mutable (Stephen, 1991; Gutmann, 1996; Hondagneu-Sotelo & Cranford, 2006), the experience of the three non-traditional couples was simply an account of how individuals can manage to defy traditional family practices, construct and reconstruct their gender subjectivities, and reify non-normative gender behavior. Despite their family dynamics differences, these couples' experiences, together with the narratives of the three earlier-mentioned ones who rather advocated and reconstructed patriarchal traditions within their own matrimonial practices, all corroborated how gender serves as a nexus that organizes not only household labor, but also defines "the extent to which individuals are considered to be fulfilling their sex- and gendered-linked rights, responsibilities, duties, and obligations within the family" (Bielby, 2006, p. 393).

For Carmi and Enzo, their experience was different, particularly Carmi's. Carmi recalled how her extended family carried out familial roles then. Although Carmi generally observed her extended family to be traditional, it is important to note that she qualified her observation by saying that there were times when they also had to carry out chores traditionally assigned to men because their grandmother trained them that way.

We had specific roles in the house. There were roles specific to women, which we performed. The same was true to the men in the house. However, there were instances when we would do chores that were meant for men as our lola (Filipino word for grandmother) trained us that way. Since we grew up with our lola, we got used to that set up...not to mention that our brood is big.... For us, yes...we were very traditional. Our lola made it that way. The roles and tasks at home were clearly defined and very specific. You know...having grown up with the lola.... Apparently, having grown up with her was a big factor. That's why our individual roles in the family were clearly defined Yes, ours is a typical Filipino family. Roles and tasks for boys and girls were defined...I'd always attribute it to my grandmother.

In Carmi's account, although she underpinned how traditional her family was in observing restrictive gender roles, at the same time, she also repeatedly mentioned the pivotal role one female member of her family had: her grandmother. It is important to note, however, that although Carmi's grandmother was contributory to both the reproduction and performance of restrictive gender roles in their family, at the same

time, she (the grandmother) herself manifested non-normative gender behavior in two ways. First, by framing and strengthening her grandchildren's sensitivity to their own gender-specific roles within the family, she performed a task traditionally attributed within the sphere of men. Second, aside from the gender-specific household chores she required her grandchildren to do, she also constructed other ways for them that, nevertheless, were gendered. Thus, despite claiming that her family was traditional, Carmi's recounting substantiated Boehm's claim (January 2008) that "Far from passive, women are central players in the construction of gender, both reproducing previous restrictive gender roles and creating alternative ones" (p. 24).

Status and Roles

Boyd and Grieco (2003) argue that the status and gender role an individual possesses within the family and societal contexts control the person's gravity towards migration. In this study, the informants were asked how the members of their own families viewed the status and roles each of them had. They were asked to comment as well how said views were influenced by traditional roles ascribed to people based on gender.

While Len and Tosh were generally traditional, particularly in fulfilling their roles concerning their family's financial and domestic needs, both agreed that when it came to carrying out household chores, tasks were assigned based on one's capability to do them and not exactly on one's gender. By citing what he deemed to be a failure in her wife's family, that is, Tosh thought Len lacked household skills he believed she should possess, he was more open to training their children "to act independently." He expressed belief that both his daughter and son should be trained to perform domestic chores, except for those that his daughter cannot do due to the physical nature of the some tasks.

Actually, I train them to act independently. Why? Because I've seen the failure of my wife's parents. But here, definitely, I tell them, "How about when I'm dead? Mabubuhay ka ba?" (Would you be able to survive?). Sa family namin talaga, binibigyan ko siya (referring to Conan his son) ng responsibility, ng assigned work. Si Faith, maliit pa siya, pero meron na siya. (In our family, I assign them tasks. Faith may still be small, but she has something to do as well.)

Tosh added, however, that they tried to balance the work they gave with what they needed to do as kids, such as playing and studying. Nevertheless, Len and Tosh's children, at a young age, knew they needed to do domestic activities outside of their gender roles. Len emphasized this by saying: "Their household tasks were not dependent on their gender."

Admittedly, however, both Len and Tosh found practices in their own extended families in the Philippines very patriarchal as proven by their first-hand experience of having lived with both Len's and Tosh's families at different points early in their married life. Tosh, who earlier admitted as being traditional himself in his own family, found this to be true and did not seem to like it either.

When we were still in the Philippines, it was hard to impose my decision because we were living in her (Len's) parents' house, then in my uncle's. In every decision, my uncle always had the last word. We also tried [living] in their house, the same thing

happened. So, I decided, we needed to separate. But they had always followed us. I told her: “We wouldn’t ‘grow’ if we’d always be like this. I think we need to go farther (laughs).” A friend of ours asked if we wanted to come here to Thailand and teach. He said his daughter was working as an administrator and her school was looking for six teachers then.

Even Len and Tosh who themselves were brought up in patriarchal families could not stand being put through the same approach again and tried to find their way out of it. This case illustrates how, apart from monetary reasons, other factors such as one’s need to be away from undesired familial situations drive people to migrate. For Len and Tosh, migration was the answer to their problem that was difficult to escape from in the homeland.

For couples Vincent and Kaye and Syd and Jhe, believing in gender roles was their way of life and, thus, they practiced it in their own families. For both Vincent and Syd, fatherhood entailed teaching their sons the ideology that male members have the responsibility of protecting the family and their female siblings. Both of them echoed a statement typically heard from among homeland Filipino fathers often told to their sons: “You’re the man of the house.” For both couples, having girls perform household chores was the norm as well. Despite coming from a non-Filipino culture, Kaye resonated Vincent’s view when she said: “It’s part of my job, so I chose to give up my world.” Kaye, however, observed that in the Philippines the Filipinos were extremely close, even those in the extended family. For the same reason, Kaye and Vincent believed that teaching their children to be more responsible and independent would serve them best. They defined “independence” as one’s ability to carry out domestic duties, citing it as a skill their children should have. Syd’s views about family members’ status and roles foregrounded gender norms.

Very ideal, in theory...that the father provides. Then, the mother is responsible for taking care of the children because of that gentleness that she inherently has.

The four other couples interviewed, namely, Manny and Ella, Eddie and Edna, Frank and Elsie, and Enzo and Carmi, said otherwise. While they acknowledged the prevalence of patriarch-run families in the Philippines, they argued that things certainly changed already, to which they adhered.

Every member of our family had a certain role and duty. Girls are not the weaker sex in our family. Well, in fact, they had done a tremendous job in our family in every aspect. Both respected each other’s capabilities, strengths, even weaknesses. But female members in our family chose to show extra esteem toward male family members. It used to be [that way]. Nowadays, things have changed. Fathers and mothers do switch roles probably because of their certain needs, wants, and other factors and influences which have been happening these days.

Manny and Ella

We are very open in our family, but, at the same time, we make sure that we teach our children to maintain their respect to the elders; since we have two boys, we cannot compare their characters to girls. We treat our sons as our friends and definitely...no gender issues with regard to the status and role of each.

Eddie and Edna

We really cannot claim that we observe gender roles in our family. We don't view roles as something that's reserved only for boys or only for girls. Since we both went to graduate school, we're both open to gender sensitive issues. And because we both know that we're both tired from our day jobs, we both believe that we should share equally household chores.

Frank and Elsie

Yes. We also noticed that practice in the Philippines, but ours is different. We don't observe gender roles. We were brought up different from the traditional ones. In our case, we never really had. Each of us had our own approach to doing things, but never restricted to our gender.

Enzo and Carmi

The narratives of these four other couples illustrate a contestation of a situation back home they knew was prevalent. As opposed to the views held by the first three traditionally run families, these couples demonstrated that repudiating gender norms in a country where patriarchal views and practices were common could actually be a choice and something that could not be imposed by the society. Nevertheless, all the 14 informants' narratives also generally indicate that gendered moves and decisions made within the family, either by the potential migrants or other family members, can impact on the former's propensity to migrate. This finding adds to the often-cited economic situation of the migrants as the main reason for working overseas.

Structural Characteristics of the Country of Origin

Boyd and Grieco (2003) posit that the country of origin's macro or structural features help determine as well the likelihood of gendered migration. They further assert that a sending country's structural characteristics create varying effects on men and women, thus, impacting on their proclivity to migrate. Boyd and Grieco maintain that these structural characteristics influence the sex selection process of migrants, which include the following: the sending country's economic situation, the economic system types found in different communities, the varying degrees of displacement resulting from economic and technological changes impacting production, laws governing the use, possession, and purchase of land (land tenure laws), conditions relating to labor market and employment particularly the workers' compensation packages, the state's capability to offer its nationals employment and the kinds of work offered, the state's

infrastructure provisions such as education and work-related trainings, the geography and language/s of the sending country, the way the sending country's economy is connected and incorporated into the global economy, the availability of migrant workers and the need for them as a production condition for both the country of origin and the host country, and the existence of programs that address migration issues and the like.

A number of earlier studies claim that migration is mainly propelled by the overseas workers' financial needs. Said studies also state that because of the country of origin's poor macro/ structural characteristics, its people are driven away to work in other countries. While this investigation found that to be true, this same study also argues that being employed in the informants' country of origin was not enough. This reason turned out to be one of the major factors that drove them to work overseas. In fact, most, if not all, of them said that it was their desire to augment their current earnings to make living more comfortable that eventually forced them to work overseas. Of the various macro/ structural features present in the Philippine economy, the leading causes of migration that the informants cited involved conditions relating to labor market and their employment and the absence of state provisions such as infrastructure for further education, employment trainings, and the like. One commonly cited reason involving employment conditions had to do with a common practice of companies to hire employees on a contractual basis.

Definitely. Unemployment and lack of certain opportunities for most Filipinos and Filipino workers... Those who had connections and influential people would likely get the best or good positions even if they do not deserve [the job], while 95% of the Philippine population would only get minimal opportunities and most would turn out working as contractual...and the worst possible scenario could be unemployment.

- Manny

Being hired on a contractual agreement means that workers do not have any security of tenure, thus depriving them of benefits and other forms of compensation they need such as health insurance and educational support for dependents.

Back in the Philippines, I worked at a regional research institute which provided more than enough benefits to all their regular employees (way above what the government can provide). However, I was on a contractual basis which means that the total benefits that I received was far below that what the regular employees had...especially health and education support.

- Eddie

The informant in the above interview pointed out as well how the padrino system affects hiring processes in many establishments in the Philippines. The padrino system prevalent in the Philippine culture is a value system that allows one to gain favor, work promotion, or political appointment based not on merit, but on one's family connections or friendship (See Nung Wong, 2010). In addition to the macro/ structural characteristics cited by Boyd and Grieco (2003), which have often been cited as drivers for migration, another major complaint raised by the informants was the excessively high income tax levied by the Philippine government on all employees

from both the private and the government sectors. At the time of the interviews, the income of Philippines residents was taxed progressively at 32% (“The Philippines,” n.d.).

To be sure, the interviews demonstrated how the sending country’s macro/ structural characteristics played a major role in the informants’ decision to migrate. The generally poor structural features of their country of origin turned out to have a direct impact on their familial duties to which they were bounded. In this study, it was the male informants who turned out to have experienced direct impact from their country of origin’s ineffectual structural resources being the family breadwinners, a traditional role widely observed within the Philippine society. Within this strand, the force of the sending country’s social, cultural, and economic status and practices created an impact on them. By looking into the country of origin’s structural amenities, this study reveals that the level of sex selectivity for migration flows for these Thailand-based migrant-informants was initially higher, specifically during the pre-migration stage, among the males mainly because of the traditionally familial pressure to find a better-paying job to satisfy family needs and address other domestic issues. Although the female informants in this study migrated with their husbands as well, albeit at different points in the early phase of their family migration, their migratory probability was lower than their husbands’ as determined by their pre-migration position, influenced by the country of origin’s socio-cultural expectations from men as income-earners, and accorded gender-normative duty within the family. As it would be learned in the later part of the interviews, Philippine community norms and cultural values generally influenced the pattern of migration of these informants, such that the males migrated first and were soon followed by their wives and children (See (Morokvasic, 1984; Simon and Brettell, 1986). This should not be taken to mean, however, that the male informants in this study constantly held their role as the dominant actors in their entire migration process, exclusively reserving for them access to resources and authority, or that the female informants remained as dependents, making them subordinates all the time. Rather, an exploration of the informants’ pre-migration stage, as Boyd and Grieco (2003) argue, is a significant phase to examine in their movement to allow one to appreciate the bigger picture, illustrating how the “subordinate status of women vis-a-vis men in the familial, societal and cultural structures of both the sending and receiving societies act as a ‘filter’, gendering structural forces and influencing the migration and settlement experiences of women and men differently” (p. 3).

Gender and the Transition across State Boundaries Stage

In Rachel Salazar Parreñas’ (2005) *Children of global migration: Transnational families and gendered woes*, she speaks of the crucial role transnational families take as “they pose a challenge to the maintenance of the ideology of separate spheres as well as the traditional gender division of labor in the Filipino family” (p. 6). As this study is interested in exploring the gendered dimension of migration even outside of the homeland, it examines as well whether said challenges are present in the Thai host-country setting within which fieldwork for this research was done. More specifically, this research investigates the gendered activities of the informants and establishes whether there were transformations to their gender behavior after crossing the Philippine state boundaries while already in residence in Bangkok, Thailand.

Migration Policies of Thailand as the Receiving Country

Boyd and Grieco (2003) posit that a receiving country's immigration laws and regulations affect differentially the immigration of men and women. They argue that these policies are feared to possibly "reinforce some of the factors responsible for the social vulnerability of migrant women" (UN, 1995, Boyd, 1989, as cited in Boyd & Grieco, 2003). This, they argue, can be examined by looking at a number of ways through which men and women migrate.

This study learned, however, that although four among the seven male informants were given the status of being the head of their own household by the Thai immigration upon entry to the Kingdom, thereby classifying them as "independent" and their wives (together with their children) as their "dependent," the latter, nevertheless, did not raise any problems with such a classification. While foreign nationals are expected to obtain work permits to work legally in Thailand, the process to obtaining legitimate work documents in the Kingdom is not exactly intransigent and linear and, therefore, can be done following different routes. For one, brought about by the granting of tourist visa on-arrival to 48 identified countries and one special administrative region, Hong Kong, (with the exception of those who are coming from Burma, Laos, and Cambodia) and by the bilateral agreements on visa exemption Thailand has with Brazil, the Republic of Korea, and Peru (See "Tourist Visa Exemption," n.d.), many foreigners hold such a visa that allows them to stay in the Kingdom given a certain period of time, apply for a job, and secure a Non-Immigrant Visa and other work-related documents once accepted.

I was the first to come to Thailand in August 2006. Then my family joined me in November of that same year. I did prepare the documents for them. When I got my visa (Non-Immigrant), I talked to our visa officer and informed him that I wanted my family to follow me here. When I came here, my visa was that of a tourist. After a week, I was accepted in *** (name of school withheld to keep the privacy of the informant). After two weeks, I got my Non-B visa and work permit. I was informed by our visa officer that it would be easier for my family to come here if they already have the visa while they are in the Philippines. So, I prepared all the documents here and sent them to the Philippines. As soon as they received the documents I sent, they went to the Thai Embassy in the Philippines....then in just one day, they got their visa.

- Syd

In the case of Syd and Jhe, for instance, Jhe's "dependent" immigration status did not, in actuality, inhibit her to work in the country. In keeping with the Thai immigration laws, however, one should not overstay in the Kingdom or do a border run to keep the passport stamp updated and the tourist visa renewed.

Another couple, Len and Tosh, who also came to Thailand on a tourist visa, used this chance to their advantage. At the time of the interview, both of them were now employed in an international school in Bangkok where their two children attended school as well. In this regard, the independent-dependent categorization does not exactly deter foreign nationals with dependent status from shifting their roles, from

taking on a “family role” to a “market role” (See Boyd, 1975, 1976; Fincher, Foster, & Wilmot, 1994). Thus, given said immigration procedures in the Kingdom, this study reveals how the independent-dependent/ Non-O and Non-B immigration status ascribed to women does not always necessarily and automatically reinforce the supposed de facto economic dependency of this study’s female informants on their spouses as the door of employment opportunity was always open, affording them to seek employment and be financially independent. For instance, of the seven female informants involved in this study, six were initially placed with a “family role,” but later switched to their “market role” at different points in their first year of migration. Said conversion of women’s status from being “dependent” to “independent” proved to have benefitted them economically. With the help of Ella’s employment, their situation improved: “We became financially able and we could sustain most of our needs independently. Also, we could help our relatives more back in the Philippines.” In the case of Len and Tosh, not only did they boost their family’s financial standing, but they also managed to make an investment for a music studio that they planned to set up in the future in the Philippines.

Actually, last year, we just finished a project. We were able to raise money and buy a live sound system worth THB600, 000 for the music studio we plan to set up soon here in Thailand. This year, [we] are planning to buy a farm. Next year, a house and lot for business... for our music studio in the Philippines in preparation for our eventual going home.

Len and Tosh

Given the chance to convert her migration status, Len’s income combined with her husband’s helped enhance their family’s economic condition. By becoming a dual-income family, they attained financial independence signifying a progress observed among migrant workers who use their migration as a tool to practice “bounded solidarity” (See Portes, 1995; Guarnizo, 2003). Beyond the common practice of migrants’ sending of monetary remittances back home, Len and Tosh were working towards transforming themselves from being mere migrant workers to becoming migrant entrepreneurs. Guarnizo (2003) notes:

Migrants who invest in business in their homeland often do so either in order to return and have a steady, nonwage income, or to provide a steady income for their dependents in lieu of remittances. (p. 676)

To be sure, this migration situation may not always be true to other migrants and in other emigration countries like Thailand, hence the need to examine every receiving country’s immigration laws, if only to determine how a state’s immigration policies impact gender-specific migration propensities, status, and roles and, in such a case cited above, financial progress and success.

Gender and the Post-Migration Stage

Boyd and Grieco (2003) posit that it is important to examine migrants’ post-migration phase as it relates to features that directly impact them within the receiving country context. Just as the country of origin’s macro/ systemic characteristics affect their propensity to migrate, so do the receiving country’s, particularly the level of gender stratification in the labor market and micro features, particularly one’s change in status caused by migration.

Impact of Entry Status on Integration and Settlement

When migrants move to a destination country, their concerns involve a number of issues varying from the most immediate ones, such as dealing with the host country's immigration policy, to the most complex ones such as how to integrate and be fully settled. Boyd and Grieco's (2003) argument regarding a host country's immigration laws becomes more significant in this discussion because a migrant's entry status determines his/ her success outside the homeland. For instance, although female migrants who are initially identified with "family role" but later switch to "market role" can sometimes easily do so other entry-status concerns can pose complications especially when they entail residency, employment rights, and other forms of entitlements.

Largely determined, however, not only by the nature of standard immigration rules and regulations of Thailand as a country of emigration, but also by an earlier-discussed alternate immigration route commonly practice across Thailand that allows foreign individuals, including women, to convert their "dependent" status to "independent" once employed, the experience of the informants in this study demonstrated that the section in Boyd and Grieco's (2003) framework relating to the impact of entry-status on integration and settlement may not, in entirety and collectively, apply to women only all the time. Boyd and Grieco (2003) posit that

Entry status is more likely to handicap female migrants than male migrants because residency and employment rights and related entitlements often differ by gender. Also, because migrant women are often viewed by the state as "dependents", their rights may become legally dependent -- sometimes precariously so -- on the migration and residency status of other family members. (p. 22)

Given free access to said alternate employment procedure, migrant women (and men) who possess dependent entry-status in the initial stage of their migration are provided the opportunity as well to repudiate the handicap Boyd and Grieco (2003) have hypothesized. Nevertheless, this study does not claim that all female migrants dependent on their husbands can and/or choose to do so as converting one's status depends as well on many other personal factors relative to every foreign individual's distinct migration situation and needs.

Conclusion

With common knowledge that migration can be a very messy process particularly on the part of the migrants, the use of Boyd and Grieco's (2003) three-stage approach in this paper aimed at helping develop a gender-sensitive approach to the study of Filipino migration within the Southeast Asian region, particularly Thailand. While the existing literature about Philippine migration is relatively ample, much of it has been focused on migrant workers in the top-destination countries globally. Also, the focus has always been on the push-pull factors and other determinants for migration. A dearth of information exists with regard to gender and migration and how gender is intricately linked to the entire migration process. With the growing number of women migrants and with Southeast Asia as a fast-becoming country of destination, this paper hoped to have offered new insights in helping demonstrate how the migration of men and women creates varying effects on people's migratory experience.

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The Dynamics of Indonesia-Malaysia Bilateral Relations Since Independence: Its Impact on Bilateral and Regional Stability

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Abstract

The bilateral relations between Indonesia-Malaysia since the independence of Indonesia can be categorized in three phases. The first is the phase of Soekarno as the first president of Indonesia where his foreign policy towards Malaysia was to confront Malaysia due to his ideology of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. Soekarno emerged as the trigger factor of the neo-colonialism in Southeast Asian nations as Malaysia was perceived to be the puppet of the British government to arouse interest in Southeast Asia. Hence, Soekarno created Ganyang Malaysia foreign policy or "Crush Malaysia". The second phase, under President Soeharto, included harmony and full of cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia. Soeharto normalised the bilateral relations with Malaysia since he considered Malaysia to be an important ally in cooperating with the western countries such as Great Britain, Australia and the United States. As a result, Indonesia and Malaysia along with Thailand, Philippines and Singapore created the regional organization called ASEAN. The third phase, the phase after the Soeharto era and the reformation era has been quite complicated. The disputes of borders and cultures became the major consent of Indonesian government

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A. Introduction

Historically Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Thailand were under Majapahit Empire between 1293 – 1500¹. Majapahit Empire was claimed as the last Hindu-Buddha empires and it had been known as the most powerful and the greatest empire in the history of Southeast Asia as well as Indonesia which became the precedent for Indonesian modern boundaries². It is therefore not surprising as to why Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and South Thailand have a lot of things in common in terms of cultures due to the influences of the Majapahit Empire.

As a result of colonialism in Southeast Asia it split up the boundaries between Indonesia and Malaysia in which the Dutch had dealt with the Britain to do so. Hence, Indonesia and Malaysia are neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia that experienced European colonialism for centuries. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Europeans first came to Southeast Asia for trade and hoped to spread Christianity in the region³. The history of Southeast Asia has been characterized as an interaction between regional and foreign powers because most of the countries were colonized except Thailand. The Dutch colonised Indonesia for about 450 years. The Dutch first came to Indonesia in early 1602 as VOC (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie) or Netherlands' United East India Company monopolized the trade against other European countries and indirectly colonized the Indonesian archipelago by exploiting the colony, its natural resources, and turned Indonesian workers into forced labour or slaves in order to ensure high profits⁴.

In this paper, I intend to analyze the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Malaysia before and after 1965. The turning point was 1965 because the period before 1965 when Indonesia obtained independence from the Dutch in 1945 and Malaysia achieved independence from Britain in 1957 was characterized by conflict and hostilities. On the other hand, the period between 1965-1997 was characterised by peace and cooperation. Meanwhile, the period from 1998-present has been blighted by cultural and territorial disputes

Neo-liberal international relations scholars regularly employ game theory to explain why states do or do not cooperate⁵. Since their approach tends to emphasize the possibility of mutual wins, neo-liberalists are interested in institutions, which can arrange jointly profitable arrangements and compromises. According to Hollis and Smith, one of the basic statements of the realist approach to international relations is that nation-states are motivated only by their own self-interests. This school of thought highlights that nation-states consider the needs and interests of other nation-states only when the other nation-states have the ability to enforce their demands by threatening or performing damaging actions.⁶ This means that nation-states are not

¹ Hall D.G.E. (1956). "Problems of Indonesian Historiography". *Pacific Affairs* **38** (3/4): 353—359.

² Cribb, R. (2010). Digital Atlas of Indonesian History of Majapahit's Overseas Empire. Retrieved on March 6, 2014, from: <http://www.indonesianhistory.info/map/majapahit.htmlstory>.

³ Destination Asia, Sand of Time-A short story of Southeast Asia. Retrieved on December 26, 2013, from: <http://www.destination-asia.com/history/>

⁴ History of Southeast Asia, Princeton Edu. Retrieved on January 2, 2014, from: http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/History_of_Southeast_Asia.html

⁵ Keohane, Robert O. (1984)- *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton. p.49

⁶ Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve (1990) "Explaining and Understanding International Relations",

guided by ethical or humanitarian deliberations, and that international law and even treaties and similar validated agreements do not really restrict the international behavior of nation-states.

Game Theory discovers the nation-states as the closest real-life examples of its abstract constructs. This is true regardless of whether they are interacting with respect to security or economic issues. The interpretations above indicate that nation-states take into consideration the needs and interests of other nation-states only when these other nation-states are able, (i.e.) have the power to threaten or perform damaging actions, showing that the determinants of the power of the different nation-states must be one of the main concerns of the theory of international relations.⁷

B. Indonesia-Malaysia Bilateral Relations under Soekarno (1961-1965).

The confrontation foreign policy toward Malaysia by Soekarno was an undeclared war with most of the action occurring in the border area between Indonesia and East Malaysia on the island of Borneo (known as Kalimantan in Indonesia). The conflict was considered by self-possessed and isolated ground combat, set within tactics of low-level brinkmanship which means that the action that done by Soekarno at that time was not based on the state interest, but only based on his own belief and ideas. Hence, Indonesia's campaign of infiltration into Borneo sought to exploit the ethnic and religious diversity in Sabah and Sarawak compared to that of Malaya and Singapore, with the intent of unravelling the proposed state of Malaysia.⁸

Malaysia achieved its independence on August 31, 1957 from British colonial rule. Soekarno believed that the Federation of Malaysia was a new form of neo-colonialism, because it would become the way for the British to control and maintain its political and economic power in the Southeast Asian region after the end of World War II.⁹ As the first president of Indonesia who had struggled for independence from The Dutch colonial rule, Soekarno wished for the idea of “pure independence” which meant that the independence of the state should be without interference from external powers in internal and external policy of a state when a state gained independence from European colonial masters¹⁰. Therefore, Malaysia would become the puppet of the British to spread its imperialism within Southeast Asian nations.

Soekarno's confrontation policy towards Malaysian Federation did not only involve Malaysia, but also Great Britain and the US. According to Soekarno, US and Great Britain had economic, political and strategic interests in the Malaysian region¹¹. Indonesia too was an important country in the region and US needed to consider Indonesia in achieving stability in the region. Meanwhile, Soekarno's Indonesia in

Oxford University Press: New York, NY. p.10

⁷ Correa, H. (2001). *Game Theory as an Instrument for the Analyses of International Relations*. p.4

⁸ Meulia, I. (2011). *Semangat Perbatasan (The Border Spirit)*. Detik News. Retrieved on July 25, 2014, from: <http://harmenbatubara.blogdetik.com/semangat-perbatasan/>

⁹ Berdikari Online News. (2013). *Jejak Pemikiran Bung Karno di Malaya (Soekarno's thought about Malaya)*. Retrieved on July 25, 2014 from: <http://www.berdikarionline.com/bung-karnoisme/20130916/jejak-pemikiran-bung-karno-di-malaya.html>

¹⁰ *Ibid*

¹¹ *Op-cit (Soleman, M)*

the early 1960s had close relations with Soviet Union, China¹² and other communist countries.¹³ The structure of international politics in the 1960s offered advantages to Indonesia who had close relations with China. We could see that China and Soviet Union gave their support to Indonesia in the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict based on the ideological and East-West rivalry in the bipolar world structure. With strong support from China and Soviet Union,¹⁴ Soekarno launched the confrontation policy towards Malaysia in September 1963.¹⁵ The Soekarno government's administration was basically influenced by the internal situation and political structure where Soekarno directly launched the confrontation policy towards Malaysia in 1963.¹⁶

Soekarno's Game

Soekarno categorized that Malaysia was part of the European imperialism under British government. Hence, the formulation of the "Gayang Malaysia" or Anti-Malaysia foreign policy in Soekarno era was Soekarno's game in achieving his interest and his ideology to make Indonesia's independence absolutely free from western countries. Soekarno's realist point of view in looking at the state level of international relations was very interesting on how in the Cold War era, where US and Soviet Union were different blocks and waged a war towards ideology between communism and liberalism.¹⁷

Soekarno opposed the merger of the Federation of Malaya (Federation of Malaya), Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak, Sabah and Malaysia into one. Consolidation of Malaysia which had the approval of the United Kingdom made it resentful and brought Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation in the period between 1962-1966. So the confrontation was a war about the future of Malaya, Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak. Soekarno considered the formation of the Federation of Malaysia (now Malaysia) not matching the Manila Treaty which was signed on 31 July 1963 by the Federation of Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. In the agreement, the three countries agreed to urge the people of Sabah and Sarawak to self-determination through free election without coercion.

Furthermore, the Federation of Malaysia according to Soekarno was a British puppet. It saw it as a new style of colonialism and imperialism potential to disturb the peace of Indonesia and could trigger a rebellion in Indonesia¹⁸¹⁹

¹² Suryadinata, L, (1990), "Indonesia-China Relations," *Asian Survey*, vol. xxx, no. 7, July 1990, pp. 682-684.

¹³ Hindley, Donald, (1963), Foreign Aid to Indonesia and Its Political Implications, *Pacific Affairs*, vol. xxxvi, no. 2, Summer 1963, pp. 107-119.

¹⁴ Derkach, Nadia, (1965), Soviet Policy towards Malaysia and West Irian Issue, *Asian Survey*, vol. 5, no.11, pp. 566-571

¹⁵ *Ibid*

¹⁶ Hindley, Donald, (1964), „Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives," *Asian Survey*, vol. iv, no. 6, June 1964, pp. 904-913.

¹⁷ *Ibid*

¹⁸ Mardani. (2013). Zaman Soekarno dan Soeharto tak ada kata maaf untuk Malaysia (In Soekarno and Soeharto era, there were no excuses for Malaysia). Retrieved on July 25, 2014 from: <http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/zaman-soekarno-dan-soeharto-tak-ada-kata-maaf-untuk-malaysia.html>

¹⁹ *Ibid Kusumadewi (2014)*

July 1964, Soekarno announced action Crush Malaysia or “Ganyang Malaysia”. The following month, Malaysian soldiers were dealing with Indonesian guerrillas, thereby raising tensions in the Strait of Malacca. The battle occurred along the Kalimantan border. In Jakarta, the British embassy was burned and people occupied the Singapore embassy. In Malaysia, Indonesian agents were captured and Indonesian embassies attacked. Those conditions further deteriorated the bilateral relations between Malaysia and Indonesia.²⁰ Moreover, the regional stability within Southeast Asian Nations was also becoming unstable because of this condition. The US, Great Britain, and its allies easily came to Southeast Asia as supporter of Malaysia.

C. Indonesia-Malaysia Relations under President Soeharto (1966-1971)

Soeharto’s step when determining the foreign policy of Indonesia begins with the decision to resolve the problem of Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation that had been going on in the mid-1960s during the reign of Soekarno. Soeharto’s steps to normalize relations with Malaysia were part of the resolution in the country after the events of 30th September movement/PKI when the military coup occurred with Soekarno still as president of Indonesia at that time. The policy of confrontation undertaken by Soekarno in the view of Soeharto was merely a tactic to involve Indonesian Communist Party into confrontation as much as possible so that communist party would be able to gather strength that could eventually rebel and hold power.²¹

Relations between Indonesia and Malaysia in July 1966 showed that there was progress referred to normalization. As presented by Ali Murtopo (prominent Indonesian general and political figure) that the normalization relation between Malaysia and Singapore was the only remaining technical issue which was hoped to be better soon.²² The process of normalization between Indonesia and Malaysia was only a matter of time. Normalization process accelerated after successfully forming Ampera Cabinet on 25th July 1966.²³ After Ampera Cabinet was formed, the solution regarding confrontation was a priority for Indonesia. The problem enabled Malaysia to be cleared before 17th August 1966; it was as presented in the conference of Ampera Cabinet.²⁴

With the peace treaty with Malaysia was strived to be signed at the end of August, as planned, the normalization of Indonesia and Malaysia was realized on 11 August 1966, in Jakarta between Adam Malik and Tun Abdul Razak called as Jakarta Accord. The agreement contained the normalization of understanding between Indonesia and Malaysia. The Malaysian Government grant provided Indonesian general elections to reaffirm the desire of the people of Sabah and Sarawak. Government of Indonesia, Malaysia willing to acknowledge and accept and cooperate. While the Indonesian diplomatic relations did not immediately recover. But the office - no official

²⁰ *Ibid Kusumadewi (2014)*

²¹ Berita Sore News, (2008), Soeharto dan Kebijakan Luar negeri RI/Soeharto and Indonesian Foreign Policy. Retrieved on May 21, 2014, from: <http://beritasore.com/2008/01/12/soeharto-dan-kebijakan-luar-negeri-ri/>

²² Mackie, J. (1974) *Confrontation, The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963 1966*, London, Oxford University Press. p. 77.

²³ *Ibid*

²⁴ *Ibid*

diplomatic office in both countries had been opened. Indonesia's diplomatic relations - Malaysia fully restored in August 1967 after a general election in Sabah and Sarawak. By doing so, ended the tension that had developed between Indonesia and Malaysia for 3 years.

The relations between Indonesia and Malaysia were officially restored on August 31, 1967; the next step undertaken by Soeharto was rejoining the United Nations on 28 September 1966 after previously withdrawing Indonesia's membership on December 31, 1964. Independent and active foreign policy was a general principle of Indonesian foreign policy taken by Soeharto who led Indonesia for over 32 years since the end of the 1960s until the eve of the millennium or the late 1990s.²⁵ Therefore, from Soeharto's foreign policy took a consideration to make good bilateral relations with Malaysia as he did believe that it would become the way to improve the relations with other western countries²⁶. Game theory in international relations helps us to understand why the state was choosing to cooperate rather than confront based on the state's interest of what they are going to achieve while making the decision. Soeharto's main agenda was to clear to regain international trust and the western countries in order to help Indonesia's development which is absolutely opposite to what Soekarno did in the first place.

Under President Soeharto, Indonesia was also respected by Malaysia. Even in ASEAN, Indonesia is known as 'The Big Brother' or respected elder brother²⁷. The relationship of President Soeharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Mahathir bin Mohamad was also good. Mahathir also highly respected President Soeharto. Mahathir mentioned that Soeharto was a president of a great country, but he never forgot that between the two countries are allied nation that does not want hostile.²⁸ It made the bilateral relations between Indonesia-Malaysia even better and strengthened the regional stability by creating the regional organization called Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

The end of the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation has opened a new chapter in the history of Southeast Asia. Before the end of the formal confrontation, governments in Bangkok, Manila and Kuala Lumpur have shown their desire to revive the idea of regional cooperation and is bearing fruit with the implementation of a meeting of foreign ministers of Southeast Asia in July 1966. Regionalism has been the subject during informal bilateral talks between Indonesia and Malaysia long before the first initiative that determined the dismissal of Soekarno.²⁹ It is also on the agenda of formal talks between Adam Malik and Tun Razak in Bangkok at the end of May 1966.

Towards the establishment of ASEAN, the world situation was characterized by competition between the Western bloc led by the United States and the Eastern Bloc

²⁵ *Ibid*

²⁶ *Op-cit*

²⁷ *Ibid*

²⁸ Fadhillah, R. (2013). Zaman Soekarno dan Soeharto, Malaysia tak berani sebut 'indon' (*In the era of Soekarno and Soeharto, Malaysia was not dare to called Indon*). Merdeka.com. Retrieved on June 10, 2014, from: <http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/zaman-soekarno-dan-soeharto-malaysia-tak-berani-sebut-039indon039.html>

²⁹ Gordon, B. (1966). *Dimension of Conflict in Southeast Asia*. New Jersey. Prentice Press. p.65

led by the Soviet Union (now Russia). Both blocks were scrambling for power and influence in each region, including in Southeast Asia. Conditions of Southeast Asia prior to the formation of ASEAN were characterized by conflict and struggle for influence of the West and East Block.

Soeharto's Game

According to Soeharto, when the problem of Malaysia is complete, the state-Southeast Asian countries need to move in the direction of the activities in the field of foreign policy in close cooperation based on mutually favourable situation among Southeast Asian countries. The nations of Southeast Asia Maphilindo (Malaysia Philippines and Indonesia) can revive a broader scope for Southeast Asia which reaches cooperation in various fields, especially fields of economics, engineering and culture. If Southeast Asia can be established, then the rest of the world could be as well. This will be able to deal with external influences and intervention from any angle, as well as the arrival of both its economic and military physical intervention. An Asian Southeast cooperate, a united Southeast Asia, is a fortress and most solid foundation in the face of imperialism and colonialism in any form and from any angle advent.³⁰ Soeharto's idea about the Southeast Asian region is still like the view long held by the armed forces, which was about the relationship between management countries in Southeast Asia as well as the major role played by Indonesia in creating an orderly area. Indeed the view articulated in the month of August 1966 has been maintained for a long time without fundamental changes.

Including the field of foreign policy in the new order of government was used as an instrument to achieve its national interests. The important and priority in foreign policy is the development and stability of the country. It becomes a guide in foreign policy and became the antithesis of the new order comparing the foreign policy of Soekarno. The old order or the period of guided democracy in Sokerano era made its foreign policy as a tool for leaning to the east block. This was later changed by the new order, one of them broke off diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Although in 1990, Indonesia re-opened relations with economic reasons because Soeharto believed that economic development needed to be enhanced first in order to be a great country³¹.

In terms of the economy and relations with the western New Order, the government also repaired the relationship. This was directly related to the economy and development of the government's new order. New Order government requires a lot of funds to carry out development. To that end, the government held a meeting with donor countries to discuss the existence of the debt for construction. These countries in 1967 formed a forum called the Inter - governmental Group On Indonesia (IGGI)³². Moreover, the government makes laws that facilitate the investment of foreign investment into the country³³.

³⁰ Leifer, M, (1986). Indonesian Foreign Policy. Jakarta: PT Gramedia Publisher. p.174

³¹ Santosa, P, B. (2008). Mengkaji Pertanian Era Soeharto (Agricultural development in Soeharto era). Suara Merdeka News. Retrieved on July 25, 2014, from: <http://www.suaramerdeka.com/harian/0802/04/opi05.htm>

³² US Library Congress. The State and Economic Development of Indonesia. Retrieved on July 25, 2014, from: <http://countrystudies.us/indonesia/23.htm>

³³ *Ibid*

Therefore, we can conclude that Soeharto's administration included fixing a revolutionary foreign policy and becoming more friendly and active in the international world. The first thing to do was to fix and normalize diplomatic relations with Malaysia because Soeharto believed that Malaysia could become the great partner in terms of economic development in creating good images in international affairs and would be able to invite foreign direct investment to come to Indonesia and develop the Indonesian economy³⁴. It was done by the Soeharto government and it was the era of the establishment of regional organizations in Southeast Asia. It is intended to maintain the stability of the region and become a place of cooperation between the countries of Southeast Asia. Indonesia became one of the founders of the Regional Organization of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) from five countries who co-founded in Bangkok in 1967.

D. Indonesia-Malaysia Bilateral Relations after Democratization (1998-present)

The financial crisis of Asia in the year 1997 led to the emergence of *reformasi* (reformation) to change into an independent state. This was the time when there were high price shoot-ups in the prices of essential commodities in the country. After this, there were a number of social movements as well as demonstrations. The many struggles of the government to solve the issue could no longer bear fruits. Here, there was increased pressure between the security forces and the people who demonstrated³⁵. The political reaction from Soeharto was sluggish. There was increased violence in the country because the security armed forces began to deal directly with the people who demonstrated. Due to this, the level of violence in Indonesia began to increase in the country.

The relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia was complicated and hard to manage. This is especially when Soeharto stepped down because of the increasing social turbulence after the year 1998. This conflicting condition in the country was caused by the democratization pattern that existed in the two states. The relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia has been improved by some international factors and determinants such as NGOs, migrant labor, Anwar Ibrahim factor and mass media. Anwar was the Malaysian Prime Minister and had fine association with Soeharto and this helped to mend the differences between the two countries. These variables have played a crucial role in mending broken relationships between countries. Such variables symbolize the dynamics of people-to-people aspect in bilateral binding. In this case, the weakening of the relations between people calls for changes in the diplomacy between governments. On the other hand, bilateral relations may greatly face the challenge of relentless disagreements. This happens when the official diplomacy is incapable of reflecting accurate popular responses. The present relations developments between Indonesia and Malaysia have been influenced by the government and non-government actors.

³⁴ *Op-cit*

³⁵ *Ibid*

Border and Cultural Disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia in the Post-Soeharto Era

The issue of Sipadan and Ligitan was reported at the International Court of Justice in the year 1998³⁶. In the year 2002 the month of December, the International Court of Justice issued a decision on the conflict over power between the two countries that is Indonesia and Malaysia. Through the votes on the board, the Malaysian country won the case by a sixteen judges over a total of seventeen judges. Only one judge supported the Indonesia.

Out of them, only fifteen were set from International Court of Justice judge. At the same time a judge was selected by Indonesia and Malaysia to and as an alternative option. In this case, the country of Malaysia won the case because the judges considered the issue of effectiveness. They did not consider the crimes committed by Malaysia which is the colonial government. On the other hand, the tourism sector in Malaysia was not considered and a rejection based on the chain of title (possession chain from the Sultan of Sulu) was unsuccessful in highlighting the confines of the sea border between Indonesia and Malaysia and in the Straits of Makassar.³⁷ The citizens of Indonesian were not happy about this condition as they were well informed about it. Thos also worsened the people-to-people level relationship between the two countries.

The dispute of Discovery Channel that took place in August 2009 put together a series of documentaries selected "Enigmatic Malaysia". This underlined the Malaysian cultural customs. The 30-second promotional piece showed the characteristics of the "Pendet" which is the Balinese dance³⁸. This dance was presented by two dancers from Balinese and the dance originated from Indonesia. Indonesia, through its media saw this as one of the ways in which Malaysia was stealing from the culture of Malaysia.³⁹

Currently, the two countries have differences in the ownership of angklung⁴⁰ which is the bamboo percussion pipe. The conflict over the pendet controversy has cause serious emotional reactions from the Indonesia. In the online networks, Malaysia has been termed as a state of thieves⁴¹. Funnily, Malaysia has been branded as "Maling (thieving)-sia"⁴². Over a hundred official governmental websites were defaced hacked and replaced in the 31 August 2009 which is Malaysia's Independence Day. These websites were replaced by the slogans that belonged to Indonesia.

³⁶ International Court of Justice, (1998). *The Dispute Between Indonesia And Malaysia Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan And Pulau Sipadan*. Retrieved on June 3, 2014, from: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/102/7177.pdf>

³⁷ Pelita News. (2014) *Sipadan-Ligitan Lepas dari Indonesia, DPR Akan Minta Penjelasan Pemerintah (Sipadan-Ligitan released from Indonesia, House of Representative asked for explanation to the government)*. Retrieved on June 3, 2014, from: <http://www.pelita.or.id/baca.php?id=5100>

³⁸ The News Tribune. (2009) "Malaysia Blames Discovery Channel in Dance Flap." Retrieved on June 4, 2014, from: <http://www.thenewstribune.com/apheadlines/world/story/867447.html>

³⁹ Abdussalam, A. (2009). "Malaysia's Pendet Dance Ad Sparks Indonesian Protests." Antara News, Retrieved on June 4, 2014, from: <http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/1251197912/malaysias-pendet-dance-ad-sparks-indonesian-protests>

⁴⁰ *Op-cit Marks (2009)*

⁴¹ Pathoni, A. (2009). "Storm over "Stealing" of Balinese Dance." *Malaysiakini*, Retrieved on June 4, 2014, from: <http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/111938>

⁴² *See for example* <http://www.malingsia.com>

The vigilante's gangs terminated the anti-Malaysian temper⁴³. The army was carrying weapons of bamboo spears to the Jakarta streets in early September, looting Malaysian people.

The leaders of the two countries have urged their citizens to become peaceful and calm. Despite this, there is rise in the level of disagreements between the two nations⁴⁴. This shows that the various ways in which the rising emotional reactions connect to apparently undisruptive cultural arguments could lead to unmanageable ending. The ever increasing cultural conflicts between Indonesia and Malaysia should be clearly examined to establish its core causes⁴⁵. A number of nations in the regions of Southeast Asia share common cultural heritage and depend on these heritage fundamentals for diverse economical, socio-political as well as development plans. There is need to determine the causes of heritage conflicts and other disagreements related to cultural icons. The bilateral relations between the two countries were worsened by the rising disputes between them.

The political change in Southeast Asia was not caused only by resignation of Soeharto in Indonesia and the reformasi. Other factors such as "silent problems" amongst ASEAN nations and financial crisis played crucial role in political transformations in Indonesia. On the other hand, the conflict in the foreign relations between Indonesia and Malaysia has been greatly affected Soeharto's fall and reformasi in various sectors such as mass media liberalization.

In 2009, the Indonesian government decided not to stake asserts on communal artistic icons. This was when the president of Indonesia was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. According to Hasan Wirajuda, Foreign Minister of Indonesia, it was it was only normal for the two states to share the matching history and customs⁴⁶. The implementation of the ASEAN community and the incorporation of ASEAN associate countries led to the game played by the two nations. The main objective of ASEAN community is to incorporate the member countries in facing the expansion of global constellation in terms of politics, economy, security ideology and socio-cultural⁴⁷. Due to this belief and conformity amongst ASEAN member countries, Indonesia props up the teamwork amid ASEAN member states for common vision, common identity and common community. Consequently, by this standard, both Indonesia and Malaysia decided to shun all disagreements since as components of the ASEAN member states the two countries have important influences in developing the local organization.

⁴³ *Op-cit Croissant, A & Trinn C (2009)*

⁴⁴ Setiawati, I. (2009). "Anti-Malaysia Activists Launch Raid on Malaysians." The Jakarta Post. Retrieved on June 4, 2014, from: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/09/09/antimalaysia-activists-launch-raid-malaysians.html>

⁴⁵ Hermawan, A. (2009). "RI, Malaysia Agree to Avoid Cultural Controversy." The Jakarta Post. Retrieved on June 4, 2014, from: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/09/17/ri-malaysia-agree-avoid-cultural-controversy.html>

⁴⁶ Hermawan, A. (2009). RI-Malaysia agree to avoid cultural controversy. The Jakarta Post. Retrieved on June 24, 2014, from: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/09/17/ri-malaysia-agree-avoid-cultural-controversy.html>

⁴⁷ Indonesia National Defense, (2012). Peran Indonesia Dalam mewujudkan ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community guna Mendukung Ketahanan Nasional (Indonesia's role in creating ASEAN Socio-cultural Community for National Defence). Lemhannas Journal of Republic of Indonesia. p.93-94

E. Conclusion

Between 1961 and 1965, the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia during the Soeharto era was characterized by factors like confrontation, aggressions and conflict. The confrontation policy of Soeharto did not only affect Malaysia but also other countries like the US and the Great Britain. Soeharto argues that Great Britain and United States had political, strategic and economic interests in the region of Malaysian. In 1963, the confrontation policy was directly launched by Soekarno. Great moral and emotional support to the Soekarno rule was provided by successful culmination of West Irian matters in 1962. The territory of Indonesia was would be increased by the government in the Malaysia after settling the West Irian. This is because Indonesia had been economically strained by the West Irian campaign. The “Crush” which is the Malaysian campaign helped President Soekarno to deal with the domestic problems that were facing the society. This created a national problem in the country. Moreover, Soekarno could promise the community that the issues facing the social and economic sectors of Indonesia could be solved when the issues facing Malaysia would be solved.

In August 31, 1967, the relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia was reinstated officially. The main aim of Soeharto was to reinstate the international trust between them and the western countries. This was to assist in the development of Indonesia which completely conflicting to what Soekarno did in his regime. Soeharto had a different view of international relations which was more liberal as compared to the Indonesian first President. According to Soeharto, it is very important to have many international friends than enemies. The resignation of Soeharto and the *reformasi* wave in Indonesia were among other factors that brought about political transformation in Southeast Asia. After several challenges, the Indonesian government under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2009 came to an agreement not to risk claims on collective cultural icon and to value the sensitivity of the public to the issue with Malaysia.

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Japan, the Global Novel, and the Question of Responsibility

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Abstract

Recent years have seen the arrival of a number of novels, which, while they thematically touch on Japan to some degree, are best situated in a global rather than a national framework. This paper takes four of these novels—Kazuo Ishiguro's *An Artist of the Floating World* (1986), David Mitchell's *Ghostwritten* (1999), Murakami Haruki's *Umibe no Kafuka* (*Kafka on the Shore*, 2002), and Ruth Ozeki's *A Tale for the Time Being* (2013)—and looks at the way they deal with the question of responsibility. Naturally, the Pacific War provides an important backdrop to the examination of this question, most overtly in Ishiguro's novel, but also less directly in the novels of Murakami and Ozeki. Mitchell's novel, while orientated more to the present and future than the past, deals with related themes, trying to imagine in literary form a world of unintended global cause and effect. The notion of the global novel is highly contested and all four novelists dealt with in this paper have been implicated in these debates. While each touches on the question of Japan and responsibility in a global age, they also offer different visions of what a global novel might look like.

Keywords: The global novel, Kazuo Ishiguro, Haruki Murakami, Ruth Ozeki, David Mitchell

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Introduction

Though the adjectives offered to mark this new kind of narrative differ—“global, planetary, international, or simply ‘world’” (Irr, 2011, p. 660)—in recent years both critics and writers alike have begun talking about the emergence of a new holy grail in writing that transcends older, arguably equally impossible aspirations locked within national frameworks (perhaps the most famous earlier case being the Great American Novel). Naturally, not everyone is excited about this development. The author and translator Tim Parks, for example, worries about what is lost in literature when authors eye up, not national readerships, but international ones: “From the moment an author perceives his ultimate audience as international rather than national, the nature of his writing is bound to change. In particular one notes a tendency to remove obstacles to international comprehension” (Parks, 2010, para. 7).

Two of the authors considered in this paper are clear targets of Parks’ critique (Ishiguro and Murakami); yet the notion of the global novel is not limited to questions of audience and translatability alone. David Mitchell, for example, another “global author” considered in this paper, moves in the opposite direction; rather than reducing what Parks calls “culture-specific clutter”, he increases it to the point where it sometimes threatens to bog his narratives down, and the novel examined in this paper by Ruth Ozeki goes as far as including footnotes to explain the numerous Japanese terms she employs. Clearly then the notion of an emerging global novel is a complex one and points to many different trends at the same time.

One way of making sense of the directions in which a phrase like the global novel pulls is offered by Rebecca Walkowitz (2015) in her preface to the book *Kazuo Ishiguro in a Global Context*. Walkowitz proposes three ways an author’s status as a global writer—what she calls their “worldliness”—might be evaluated. First, we can look at their biography, at the way their personal story crosses borders and resists inclusion in a single national framework. Second, we can look at what they write, at the topics that interest them and the themes that flow through their works calling for a global interpretation. And third, we can look at issues of “global circulation and reception,” at the way issues of language and translation and the locations of readers and critics influence the way a work is received.

This paper touches briefly on four novels—Kazuo Ishiguro’s *An Artist of the Floating World* (1986), David Mitchell’s *Ghostwritten* (1999), Murakami Haruki’s *Umibe no Kafuka* (*Kafka on the Shore*, 2002), and Ruth Ozeki’s *A Tale for the Time Being* (2013)—and tries to understand their position as global novels that all include Japanese settings. Of course, there is some irony in examining the way four so-called, or at least aspiring “global novels” are dealing with one particular country—in this case Japan—but this only points to the way national frameworks remain relevant in our global age, even in creative works that are seeking to overcome them. In trying to focus my topic, I will leave aside Walkowitz’s first and third criteria for evaluating “worldliness”, as interesting as questions of biography and reception might be, and focus instead on her second criteria, and the way one theme in particular—responsibility—links these novels together.

What this theme of responsibility highlights is the way questions of the past, and particularly Japan’s role in the Pacific War, continue to haunt the country and hinder

its integration into global systems. This can easily be seen in the field of diplomacy—the ways China and South Korea, for example, continue to point to Japan's past historical wrongdoings in ways both sincere and cynical and the way Japan's leaders continue to both apologize for and embrace this same past. Similar contradictions appear in these narratives, and while the war is most clearly the backdrop to Ishiguro's novel, it plays some part in the novels of Murakami and Ozeki. An equally important consideration in these four novels, however, is the way questions of responsibility are complicated by increasingly complex global networks. This is most apparent in Mitchell's novel, but again it is a theme that can be seen, to some degree, in the other novels as well. The theme of responsibility, of course, is not the only element linking these four novels together, but it at least offers a starting point for considering what might be thought of as an emerging sub-genre: global novels dealing with Japan. The discussion that follows is far from exhaustive, but it is hoped that it can at least be suggestive of a trend that is deserving of further critical attention.

Unconscious Barriers to Responsibility in Ishiguro's *An Artist of the Floating World* and Murakami's *Kafka on the Shore*

This paper groups the four novels under discussion into two sets, starting with Ishiguro's *An Artist of the Floating World* and Murakami's *Kafka on the Shore*. These first two novels offer an interesting comparison in the way they deal with the theme of the effect of unconscious barriers on our ability to take responsibility. The basic trick of Ishiguro's novel is that while most of the time the reader is led to believe that it is a story about the way psychological defenses make it difficult for a person to accept responsibility for their actions, in the end it turns out to be less the narrator's fear of responsibility that hinders him—the painter Ono Masuji's inability to take ownership of his turn during the war from artist to propagandist—than it is his fear of insignificance: he's not afraid of admitting what he did during the war; rather, he's afraid that his life's work may have turned out to be something of little lasting value. This message is driven home in a number of encounters near the end of the novel, including forcibly by Ono's eldest daughter, Setsuko:

Forgive me, but it is perhaps important to see things in a proper perspective. Father painted some splendid pictures, and was no doubt most influential amongst other such painters. But Father's work had hardly to do with these larger matters of which we are speaking. Father was simply a painter. He must stop believing he has done some great wrong (Ishiguro, 1986, p.106).

Setsuko is concerned about her father's overestimation of his role during the war; she wants to reassure him that he doesn't belong in the same category as recent figures who found it necessary to commit suicide to accept responsibility for their actions. Both of Ono's daughters are particularly troubled by his actions during the marriage negotiations (*omiai*) for the youngest daughter, Noriko. After an earlier failed marriage negotiation, Ono comes to believe that the cause for this setback may be the new cultural milieu ushered in by the postwar American occupation, and so he quietly goes about meeting with old acquaintances and trying to smooth the way for the present negotiations (the concern being that detectives employed in the marriage negotiations will uncover unsavory aspects of his past). Of particular importance, it turns out that during the war Ono turned on one his star pupils, a young man named Kuroda, tipping him off to the authorities for what he saw as his unpatriotic activities. Yet while there is clearly shame and guilt hidden in Ono's past, the narrative's

fixation on these issues blindsides us when the issue of pride is finally revealed as the true underlying cause of his misrepresentations. As is common in Ishiguro's stories, our narrator has turned out to be unreliable, just not in the way we first expected.

Cheng (2010) has highlighted the defenses Ono employs in his narrative to suppress feelings of shame and guilt. The first of these defenses is projection, such as when Ono speaks harshly of a teacher who cut him off and destroyed his paintings after he, as a young man, broke ranks and moved onto the propagandist stage of his career, noting that this teacher's actions were a sign of "arrogance and possessiveness" (Ishiguro, 1986, p.175). Of course, the irony is that Ono has done exactly the same thing to his own student, Kuroda, though he is hesitant to admit it. As Margaret Scanlan explains, "[W]hen [Ono] talks about other people, he frequently appears to be talking about himself" (as cited in Chen, 2010, p.43).

Another defense employed by Ono, as noted by Chen, is the collapse of the personal 'I' into a collective 'we' that allows the individual to dissolve their personal sense of guilt into the group. This can be seen, for example, at the end of the narrative where Ono recalls the words of Matsuda, the man who encouraged him to take his nationalistic turn during the war. As Matsuda justifies:

We at least acted on what we believed and did our utmost. It's just that in the end we turned out to be ordinary men. Ordinary men with no special gifts of insight. It was simply our misfortune to have been ordinary men during such times (Ishiguro, 1986, p.194).

The problem for Ono is that to accept Matsuda's argument, he has to accept its supporting premise—that he was just an ordinary man—and this is what he struggles with. Ono's story drops a number of subtle clues, often made to look like digressions from the main narrative, that suggest he was once a person of some influence in the broader community. He is thus stuck between his desire to lessen his guilt for his actions during the war and his desire to hold onto an overdeveloped sense of self-importance. This tension is never entirely resolved in the narrative, though partial recognition does occur.

Ishiguro's interest in the psychological defenses of individuals and the ways this shapes their narratives is connected to his similar interest in how nations come to terms with their past, Japan being one example he took up early in his career, but by no means the only country he is interested in. Ishiguro explains,

[I] am interested in storytelling in the sense of what a community or a nation tells itself about its past and by implication therefore where it is at the moment and what it should be doing next. If you want to draw a parallel between how individuals come to terms with their past and decide what to do next, and how a nation or community approaches such things, then the issue of storytelling is an important one (Matthews and Groes, 2009, p.117).

Of course, Ono in *An Artist of the Floating World* cannot be conflated in any simple way with Japan and its national narrative. Ishiguro is not saying that Japan can get over its war guilt if it simply admits that it's just another ordinary nation. And yet there is a more general lesson here about the way all narratives are shaped by self-interest.

While Ishiguro's novel is interested in examining those psychological defenses that complicate stories of self and nation, the next novel I wish to briefly examine by Murakami seems more interested in sidestepping these defenses all together and going straight to the more chaotic material of the unconscious mind. What Murakami doesn't wish to sidestep through this move, however, is the question of responsibility, a theme he confronts directly in *Kafka on the Shore* through a quote attributed to the poet Yeats: "In dreams begin responsibility" (Murakami, 2005, p. 122).

Murakami's long fiction since 1995 often employs a similar strategy. At some point in the story a taboo will be traversed, often a sexual one, but the reality of this act in the context of the narrative will remain uncertain. Perhaps it really happened, or perhaps it occurred in some other metaphysical realm, and so the question of responsibility remains murky. The effect is something like asking someone how responsible they are for a dream in which they did something terrible. The dramatic claim of Murakami's post-1995 fiction, and particularly *Kafka on the Shore*, is that this is where responsibility begins.

The central protagonist of *Kafka on the Shore*, Tamura Kafka, is a fifteen-year-old boy who is struggling under the weight of an oedipal prophesy. Running away from home, he meets a woman in a library who he comes to believe or at least fantasizes might be his mother, and eventually he engages in sexual activity with her—first in a dream-like state and later in reality. He also becomes an object of police interest when his biological father is murdered in Tokyo. Kafka has an alibi; he is in Shikoku at the time of the murder, but this does not completely answer the question of his guilt, for on the night of the murder he blacks out in a Shinto shrine and later wakes up covered in blood. The novel is playing here with ideas of spirit projection such as are found in *The Tale of Genji*.

This short synopsis of the story hardly does it justice (in fact, it misses half the novel in that alternating with the chapters on Kafka are chapters dealing with an old man named Nakata and his dealings with a mysterious figure called Johnnie Walker). What I wish to focus on here, however, is the way Kafka decides to accept responsibility for his fantasies and dark impulses, regardless of their relationship to reality. Kafka's alter ego in the novel, the boy named Crow, expresses his determination in this way:

If there's a curse in all this, you mean to grab it by the horns and fulfill the program that's been laid out for you. Lift the burden from your shoulders and *live*—not caught up in someone else's schemes, but as *you*. That's what you want (Murakami, 2005, p.343).

This instinct to embrace his oedipal taboo rather than to run from it might be seen as an engagement with Freud's ideas in the essay *Totem and Taboo* (1918). In this essay, Freud offers an alternative mythology to the oedipal one for understanding the relationship between fathers and sons. He goes into a pseudo-anthropological mode, positing a male from the historical past who monopolized access to a harem of females, thus forcing his sons to eventually revolt against him and murder him. The collective guilt that ensued from this act provided the foundations for a new moral order and a proto-religion upon which later religions have subsequently borrowed.

This idea of taboos as the foundation of moral order and religion becomes important when one recognizes the way Murakami has been responding in his post-1995 fiction to the Aum Shinrikyō cult and its leader Asahara Shōkō who was behind the infamous sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system in March of 1995. When the young Kafka deliberately decides to embrace his curse, to accept responsibility for killing his father and sleeping with his mother, despite the ambiguity of these acts and despite the novels constant reminder that “everything is a metaphor”, he can thus be seen as trying to confront the very forces that from a Freudian perspective are the foundation of religion. The idea that literature might be capable of acting as an antidote to religion is a major theme in Murakami’s recent fiction, particularly in his large three-part novel *IQ84*, but even here in *Kafka on the Shore* one can see him wrestling with the question of how to confront a cult like Aum, his central argument being that responsibility begins in dreams.

Global Connections and New Forms of Responsibility

The next two novels I wish to briefly examine, Ozeki’s *A Tale for the Time Being* and Mitchell’s *Ghostwritten*, both provide metaphors for the global flow of people and ideas in today’s world and examine the ways new forms of agency and responsibility can potentially flower in such conditions. A central metaphor in Ozeki’s novel is gyres—what the novel explains are “a string of [ocean] currents” like a “ring of snakes, each biting the tail of the one ahead of it” (p. 13). These gyres become important to explain the way a diary written by a young girl in Japan could wash up on the shores of a small island off the coast of British Columbia and fall into the hands of a novelist named Ruth who chooses to believe that it is part of the leading drift from the 2011 tsunami. Reading this young girl’s diary, Ruth learns about Nao, a young Japanese female who is a victim of bullying and the daughter of a suicidal father. While Nao’s situation seems dire, and while her fate in the tsunami remains unknown, the narrative she shares includes stories of agency and responsibility that counteract this feeling of powerlessness, most clearly in the stories of the two Harukis.

The first Haruki in the novel is Nao’s great uncle who was a kamikaze pilot during the war. This first Haruki had been reluctant to fight in the war, but when forced to do so, ultimately made a decision not to fly his aircraft into the American ship that was his assigned target, instead ploughing it straight into the ocean. The second Haruki is Nao’s suicidal father, and while he is initially portrayed as a weak and emotionally fragile character, it is later revealed that the reason he lost his lucrative job in Silicon Valley that started him on his downward spiral was his objections to the way the interfaces he was designing for computer games were going to be put to military use. These interfaces would make it easier for American soldiers to hunt their enemy and perhaps in some way reduce it to the experience of playing a video game. Nao’s father believed that this would only heighten the guilt and the difficulties these young soldiers would face upon their return from war. When he later learns of the action of his Uncle, the first Haruki, Nao’s father links their stories together and tries to offer an apology of sorts to his daughter:

[S]o that’s why I cried today, when I read Uncle Haruki’s diary. I understood how he felt, you see? Haruki Number One made his decision. He steered his airplane into a wave. He knew it was a stupid, useless gesture, but what else could he do? I made a similar decision, so stupid and useless, only my plane

was carrying our whole family. I felt so sorry for you, and for Mom, and for everyone on account of my actions (Ozeki, 2013, p.388).

While making no promises about outcomes, Ozeki's novel celebrates these small moments of bravery and shows the way positive choices can continue to ripple over space and time. The last novel in this discussion, Mitchell's *Ghostwritten*, deals with a similar theme.

The Japanese setting in *Ghostwritten* is found in the first two chapters of the novel and in the epilogue-like final chapter. Chapter One begins in Okinawa, where a man has come to escape following his participation in a religiously-inspired attack on the Tokyo subway system that is clearly modeled after the Aum attack. Chapter Two focuses on the story of a young man working in Tokyo at a record store and his falling in love with a young girl who he later moves to Hong Kong with. Like many of the chapters in the novel, there is no direct narrative link between the two chapters except that a coded message the first man in Okinawa tries to send to his cult by telephone is mistakenly relayed to the young boy in Tokyo who has no idea what to make of the strange, cryptic message. This has little other significance for the story except that it delays the young man who is closing up the record store, allowing him to meet the young girl again who has become his love interest. Lives are thus interlinked in the novel in strange and not always predictable ways.

The novel moves chapter by chapter to different locations around the world, but clearly more than any single place, it is the feeling of the global present that links the chapters together. The man in the Okinawa chapter, for example, is mildly disgusted by the global uniformity he sees in Naha: "The same shops as anywhere else ... Burger King, Benetton, Nike ... High streets are becoming the same all over the world, I suppose" (Mitchell, 1999, p.11). This description is echoed in a later chapter, this time set in Petersburg, Russia, where a female narrator offers a similar observation: "All these new shops, Benetton, The Häagen-Daz shop, Nike, Burger King ... High streets are becoming the same all over the world, I suppose (Mitchell, 1999, p.211). Globalization is not an entirely attractive force within the novel, and yet it is an important part of what binds different characters together.

While Ozeki's novel has its gyres as a metaphor of global interconnection, Mitchell's novel includes transmigrating souls who travel between different characters in the story and travel over different places and times. Very similar to Ozeki's novel, the story also features a scientist who makes a conscientious decision to stop her technology getting into military hands to be used for purposes of which she can't approve. It is a complex novel, tracing over nine chapters different stories set in different global locales, all asking questions about chance and connection in modern life. While it's consequently a difficult novel to summarize, I believe Caroline Edwards' (2011) assertion that is a novel searching for the "continuation of some form of utopian alternative to our globalized neoliberal present," is a fair assessment of its intent (p. 179). There is a sense of the grand sweep of history in *Ghostwritten* and the example of many utopian dreams that turn out to be nightmares. In more modest ways, however, the novel asks the question of what new forms of belonging and hope could emerge instead, with Japan providing just one of the locales where such questions are asked.

Conclusion

The four novels I have briefly examined in this paper all offer Japan as a setting upon which questions of responsibility are then explored. They show the way Japan's role in the Pacific War still plays a dominant role in global discourses on Japan, but also the way the country is sometimes employed in contemporary literature as a more neutral site where global questions of connection and responsibility can be examined.

Schoene (2009), in his book *The Cosmopolitan Novel*, has argued for the emergence of a sub-genre in British fiction that the blurb for his book describes as particularly "adept at imagining global community". Writing about David Mitchell in this same book, Schoene writes that he articulates "a cosmopolitan vision [that] never deteriorates into facile utopianism" (p. 102). My argument in this paper has been that a similar sub-genre is emerging out of Japanese fiction, but its main difference with the British form Schoene identifies is that it is not limited to writers living in Japan and writing in Japanese. Of the four authors examined, only Murakami writes in Japanese, and while all four authors have lived in Japan at different periods, they have also lived long periods in other locations. The second difference in the Japanese case is the way historical questions continue to dominate the discourse.

As mentioned in the introduction, my argument is not that responsibility is the only theme linking these emerging global novels focused on Japan together; there are clearly many other equally important themes that deserve examination: the themes of growing up and demarcation with the other are two that come to mind. This study has merely offered a preliminary examination that picks one central theme in this emerging sub-genre and examines it in a limited way. A more comprehensive examination of this sub-genre is going to require the examination of other works and themes, as well as the other criterion Walkowitz identifies: biography and reception. It is my belief that there is enough convergence occurring between these four authors to make this a worthwhile endeavor.

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***Now the Powerless Speaks: A Study of Bama's Sangati and Baby Kamble's
'The Prisons We Broke' From a Dalit Feminist Standpoint***

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The Asian Conference on Asian Studies 2015
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Abstract

In the context of the powerful and the powerless in the social formation of India, caste system has been a matter of immense debate and discussion. Continuing for the centuries, (presumably from the time of the arrival of Aryans) caste system has been a parasitical condition prevailing, thriving and continually reforming, throughout India. Being an Indian one cannot but face its grips from the birth. Moreover, due to the recent phenomenon of reservation on the basis of caste, debates have been more frequent than before. In this paper, I intend to focus on dalit women, who are often considered as 'dalits among dalits', as represented in the literature written by them. For my present purpose I have chosen Bama's *Sangati* and Baby Kamble's *The Prisons We Broke*, two seminal novels written by dalit women writers, in order to discuss whether and how the dalit women are affected by the power dynamics functioning not only through the upper caste people (both men and women) but also lower caste men. And we will discover in the course of the study that state, gender, caste, class, religion, and community, each of them form an intersection in order to continue this disbalance of power. And this power here is not just electoral power but a state-generated, religion-fed hierarchy which continues to uphold gender and caste discrimination. And this becomes apparent when we see how the image of dalit women as represented by male writers stand in stark contrast to that of the female writers. A story of helplessness and limitation then becomes a courageous struggle for survival and self-identity.

Keywords: Dalit feminism, Standpoint theory, Power, Survival

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Introduction

Power is commonly understood as a mechanism to control, either through “one actor within a social relationship . . . in position to carry out his will despite resistance. . .” (Weber, 1978, p. 53), or as involving both coercion and consent (thereby leading to Gramscian hegemony), or in terms of Foucault, as “the multiplicity of force relations” (1979, p.92) that takes place through daily interactions between people and institutions. All these definitions harp on a major consensus that power creates binary in social system, where on the one hand there is the powerful, on the other hand, there is the powerless. This flow from ‘upward’ to ‘below’ necessarily results in inequality among people where one side of the scale always remains higher/lower than the other. The concept of power, when analysed through its structures or mechanisms, thus remains limited in the supposition about certain persons exercising power over others.

In context of the powerful and the powerless in the social formation of India, caste system has been a matter of immense debate and discussion. Caste, according to noted historian, Romila Thapar, is a form of social control based on heredity and a ritual observance of fourfold division. According to M. N. Srinivas, a well-known Indian sociologist, relations between castes are governed by the concepts of endogamy, pollution and purity, and maximum commensality. In a caste system, people are divided primarily into four categories: the ‘brahmins’ (or priests), the ‘kshatriyas’ (or warriors), the ‘vaishyas’ (or traders), and the ‘shudras’ (or slaves). A fifth category was added at a later period of the Vedic era comprising of ‘atishudras’ (or untouchables), now also known as ‘dalits’ (literally meaning ‘crushed’). Treated as pariahs, the untouchables were forced to live outside the boundaries of the villages and even their shadows were considered polluting. Continuing for centuries, the caste system has been a parasitical condition prevailing, thriving and continually reforming, throughout India.

The conference aims to explore why and how the vast networks of power relations get transformed into various institutions of state, legislature and religion, and affect the society. But at the wake of the growing influence of dalit studies we need to look at those people who are at the lowest stratum of the society. Our perspective therefore calls for a representational analysis from the standpoint of the lower caste people who get most affected by inequal distribution of power.

For this paper I have chosen Bama’s *Sangati* and Baby Kamble’s *The Prisons We Broke*, two seminal novels in dalit literature in order to discuss whether and how dalit women are affected by the power dynamics functioning not only through the upper caste people (both men and women) but also through the lower caste community. And this power here is not just electoral power but a state-generated, religion-fed, and community based hierarchy which continues to uphold gender and caste discrimination. This becomes apparent when we see how the image of dalit women as represented by male writers stand in stark contrast to that of the female writers. A story of helplessness and limitation then becomes a courageous struggle for survival and self-identity.

Underlining ‘Difference’: Dalit Male Writings VS. Dalit Women’s Writings

In a 1995 article titled, “Dalit Women Talk Differently”, Gopal Guru argues that dalit women need to speak ‘differently’ because they face exclusion not only in the political field but also in the cultural field. He writes: “Dalit male writers do not take serious note of the literary output of dalit women and tend to be dismissive of it.” (Guru, 1995, p. 2549) And he mentions three reasons for this attitude: “(1) It is not only caste and class identity but also one’s gender positioning that decides the validity of an event; (2) dalit men are reproducing the same mechanisms against their women which their high caste adversaries had used to dominate them; (3) the experience of dalit women shows that local resistance within the dalits is important.” (Guru, 1995, p. 2549) Two points that come out of his opinion are that: ‘differences’ exist not only among ‘Indian’ women but also within the dalit community based on gender, and that writing becomes a way for dalit women to articulate their struggles and resistances. Although Guru’s argument in favor of an identity based politics for dalit women (where only dalit women can speak for themselves) has been critiqued for a more affiliative approach by Sharmila Rege who argues that in order for dalit feminism to flourish, there needs to be “a transformation of ‘their cause’ into ‘our cause’” (Rege, p. 45), the idea of ‘difference’ pointed out by Guru is of utmost importance.

In dalit male autobiographies women are portrayed as victims or mothers. In Sharankumar Limbale’s *Akkarmashi*, the two major female characters, Masamai his mother, and Santamai his grandmother, are examples of this kind of representation. While Masamai forces the protagonist to go to the village feasts and scolds him for not bringing kheer for her, Santamai feeds him without eating her own share. For Limbale Masamai becomes the obstruction towards self-dignity, a woman who bows down to extreme hunger, and Santamai remains the source of inspiration.

Writings by dalit women, on the other hand, provide a different picture. Containing stories from the daily lives, songs, and folktales, dalit women’s writings present a narrative of survival and protest. Some of the major facets of contemporary dalit women’s writings have been identity, resistance, community, a critique of brahmanical and dalit patriarchy, and a critique of mainstream Indian feminism.

Commenting on what constitutes a ‘dalit literature’, Limbale writes, “Dalit writers believe that Dalit literature is a movement. They see their literature as a vehicle for their pain, sorrow, questions and problems. But when readers read the works of Dalit writers exclusively as ‘literature’, the common ground between the writer and the reader is disturbed.” (2014, p. 105). Limbale thus looks into the context of writing and its representation of the lived experience which does not fit mainstream ‘aesthetics’ and thus violates its parameters. Dalit literature disturbs the ‘pleasure’ value of literature by bringing in ‘disturbing’ images and language. According to Limbale, dalit literature’s engagement with material lived experience poses a challenge towards the canonical notion of ‘aesthetics’.

The two novels subject to study are important because they capture two different moods of two different times. Baby Kamble’s *The Prisons We Broke* symbolizes the energy and hope of the dalit female autobiography writers of the 1980s who participated in Ambedkarite movements, while Bama’s *Sangati* articulates the pessimism of the 21st century.

The Prisoners and the Prisons They Broke

Terming it as “socio-biography rather than autobiography”, Maya Pandit in the Introduction to *The Prisons We Broke*, writes about a distinct dalit feminist sensibility that appears as a contrast to dalit male writings. She writes:

In her forward to the original Marathi autobiography, [Baby Kamble] asserts, ‘Today, our young educated people are ashamed of being called a Mahar. But what is there to be ashamed of? We are the great race of the Mahars of Maharashtra. We are its real original inhabitants, the songs of the soil. The name of this land is also derived from our name. I love our caste name, Mahar—it flows in my veins, in my blood, and reminds me of our terrific struggle for truth’. (xiii)

It is interesting to see that while on the one hand there is *Joothan*, a well know dalit male autobiography, where the writer Omprakash Valmiki recounts his painful and deliberate attempt to keep his caste identity a secret, on the other hand dalit women writers are proud of their caste origins. Such assertion stemmed from Ambedkar’s call for self-respect. The very fact that the book itself is intricately linked to dalit women’s participation in the Ambedkarite movement, underline the lives of dalit women as a continuous struggle both within the house and outside.

Narratives of Humiliation and Survival

In the sphere of the ‘within’ Kamble describes how her father took pride in keeping her mother at home. She writes: “In those days, it was the custom to keep women at home, behind the threshold. The honour enjoyed by a family was in proportion to the restrictions imposed on the women of the house.” (5). Here therefore, we see an internal patriarchy imitating the upper caste practices of keeping women within the house. However, this intra-patriarchy was not just a reflection of upper caste patriarchy. It had its own workings of patriarchal systems as well. In Baby Kamble’s narrative we hear stories of young girls married off at an early age becoming subject to the verbal torture of the mother in law. Any attempt to escape this situation resulted in heavy physical torture such as beating and chopping off nose. With the mother-in-law fuelling the son with stories of the daughter-in-law’s ‘indecent’, ‘loss of respect’, and her ‘ill-starred’ fate, extreme violence was a daily occurrence for the young mahar women of Baby Kamble’s community.

Segregated both within and outside home, dalit women thus carry a memory of deprivation and repression writ through generations. However, these memories become a way of self-expression, rather than mute acceptance of fate. Baby Kamble writes about one incident during her childhood when Ambedkarite movement was at its peak. In school the upper caste girls would tease the mahar girls by saying: “That Ambedkar has educated himself, that’s why these dirty Mahars are showing off! That filthy Mahar, Ambedkar, eats dead animals but look at the airs he gives himself!” (109). To this, Babytai and her friends would reply: “You shaven widows, how dare you take our Ambedkar’s name! You have your own baldy, that stupid Gandhi! He has neither a shirt on his body, nor teeth in his mouth!” (109). This dialogue appears with a consciousness about differences within women, and the failure of Indian social reformists to meet the needs of the lower caste people. This narrative presents a struggle rather than a silent suffering.

Replete within the caste system is the concept of purity and pollution. In *The Prisons We Broke*, a huge conflict breaks out after a mahar boy touches the idol of god Vitthal. Religion becomes instrumental in continuing the caste discriminations. However, as Rege points out in her article “Dalit Women Talk Differently: A Critique of ‘Difference’ and Towards a Dalit Feminist Standpoint Position”, these practices were prevalent not so much to keep the polluted lower caste people away as it was to preserve the purity of the upper castes. Such discrimination practiced through religion also raised among the dalits a desire to break the shackles of Hinduism. The religious conversion of 1954 which followed after Ambedkar converted to Buddhism, is recounted in the book with great enthusiasm because it brought hope among the dalits of a change.

In *The Prisons We Broke*, Baby Kamble argues that memories of humiliation and perpetual slavery need to be reiterated because future generations must know the fiery ordeal that the earlier generations have gone through. Threaded within the narrative are occasional recounts of dalit women’s participation in activism. In the novel people gather at the chawde and discuss about Ambedkarite movement, his conversion, and their opinions on these movements. Their writing emphasises on dalit feminism’s claim that their theorization grows out of their activism because they consider mainstream Indian feminism to be elitist and incapable of understanding the true voice of the dalit women. Although this leads us to a broader question as to who can speak for whom and whether dalit women’s identity-based autonomy ultimately puts dalit feminism in the margins, dalit women’s writings become important, as Guru writes in the Afterword to *The Prisons We Broke*, “both for self-interrogation [here the ‘self’ being the non-dalit people] as well as the interrogation of the system that forced Baby Kamble to write her story.” (170).

Stories Not of an Individual, but of a Community

In the acknowledgement to *Sangati*, Bama writes, My mind is crowded with many anecdotes: stories not only about the sorrows and tears of Dalit women, but also about their lively and rebellious culture, their eagerness not to let life crush or shatter them, but to swim vigorously against the tide; about the self-confidence and self-respect that enables them to leap over threatening adversities by laughing at and ridiculing them I want to shout out these stories. (ix)

Termed as “autobiography of a community” (Lakshmi Holmstrom, Introduction to *Sangati*), Bama’s *Sangati* holds a unique position among dalit women’s writings because it does not centre around the life of a single protagonist. *Sangati* is truly a conglomeration of ‘events’ where numerous life-narratives converge and get strewn in a tapestry of what we may call ‘dalit women’s collective experience’

Gender/ Caste Roles: Justifying 'Difference'

In Bama's *Sangati*, the narrator as a young girl of twelve learns that boys have different roles to play than girls. And these roles are perpetuated in the form of gender games that they are made to play as children. While kabadi and marbles are meant for boys, girls are supposed to play cooking or getting married, home keeping, and so on. Conversion from one religion to another offers no respite. While Hinduism defines the ultimate form of oppression towards dalits, Christianity does the same. The white nuns, patti tells the narrator, "made a big effort" (30) to teach dalit women how to become ideal wives.

The possibility of the third axis of patriarchy in *Sangati* exists in the devaluation of dalit women's economic liberty. The very fact that dalit women cross the boundaries of home and earn money on their own, gives them a higher credibility and a more privileged position than the Brahmin women who remain economically dependent on their fathers, or husbands, or sons. However, the dalit women face physical abuse on a daily basis from the men in their families. As Paatti surmises the situation of women in her community: "We have to labour in the fields as hard as men do, and then on top of that, struggle to bear and raise our children. As for the men, their work ends when they've finished in the fields. If you are born into this world, it is best you were born a man. Born as women, what good do we get? We only toil in the fields and in the home until our vaginas shrivel" (6-7). Here we have an example of how dalit patriarchy subjugates the dalit women, not by imitating the upper caste men, but by making it into an everyday practice.

Interestingly, lower caste women's participation in social labour has often served as the justification for the upper caste men for the sexual availability of the lower caste women. To provide an instance from *Sangati*: Mariamma, a young woman from the pariah community is assaulted by an upper caste man, Kumarasami, who, in order to hide this incident, accuses Mariamma of having an affair with a lower caste boy, Manikkam. In the end, Mariamma is not only accused of being a 'loose' woman, she is beaten up and forced to pay fine as well. Whereas both Kumarasami and Manikkam are left unquestioned. Two things that are important here are: Mariamma's public humiliation by the upper caste man Kumarasami, and the physical abuse by her father. By shaming Mariamma in public, Kumarasamy proves that low caste women's sexuality becomes accessible because they participate in social labor. Such act also becomes a way to undermine the masculinity of the lower caste men (i.e. lower caste men are not men enough because they cannot save their women). At the intersection of patriarchies, gender ideologies, and caste is therefore the figure of dalit woman who becomes the site where these multiple structures perform their oppression and domination.

According to Ambedkar, endogamy is the root of caste system. In *Sangati*, the fear of an inter-caste union is recounted through the story of pey. A pey is the ghost of an upper caste woman named Esakki who was killed by her brothers for marrying a lower caste man. It is interesting how, even in the lower castes, the community system functions through similar parameters to control their women that the Brahmins employ. Transgression of the boundaries of endogamy, it is feared, would result in pollution. A menstruating lower caste woman who goes out to work is a threat to her society because she raises possibilities of an intercaste union. The very fact that the

dalit men tell the women about how the pey never attacks the Brahmin women because they stay inside the house, show the aspirational aspect of the dalit men who now want to reflect the brahmanical practice of 'purity' among women by confining them within the limits of the house.

Contesting Humiliation Through Language

According to Raj Gauthaman: "Dalits who have for so long been treated as commodities owned by others must shout out their selfhood, their 'I', when they rise up." (97) Using languages exactly spoken by the dalit people, their writings appear with an unmistakable sense of anger which has taken the form of protest against injustice. Such language has been used for various purposes. While in dalit male writing, such usage is directed towards the upper caste men who have kept them in slavery and ignorance, dalit women often use it against their own husbands in order to save themselves from being beaten up. In *Sangati* the narrator writes about an incident she witnessed among Pakkiaraj and his wife Raakkamma. Pakkiaraj was abusing her in a vile and vulgar way, and was just about to hit her. And Raakkamma was replying in equally abusive language in order to save herself from being beaten up. "Even before his hand could fall on her, she screamed and shrieked, 'Ayyayyo, he's killing me. Vile man, you'll die, you'll be carried out as a corpse, you low-life, you bastard, you this you that...'" (Bama, p. 61) In this way dalit writing not only brings a 'shock' value to literature, but also takes the readers out of the comfort zone of reading a 'literature' in the canonical sense.

What is a Standpoint? Why Do We Need Dalit Feminist Standpoint?

Sandra Harding, in her Introduction to *The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader*, writes: "Standpoint theory's focus on the historical and social locatedness of knowledge projects and on the way collective political and intellectual work can transform a source of oppression into a source of knowledge and potential liberation, makes a distinctive contribution to social justice projects as well as to our understanding of preconditions for the production of knowledge." (10)

A study from the perspective of dalit women, therefore, is epistemologically privileging because dalit women, being in the lowest rung of the society, have seen how power functions both among the powerful (in this case the upper castes) and the powerless (the lower castes). The vast network of power relations working through multiple institutions thus gets replicated and invented within the caste categories, and dalit women's writings become instrumental in unfolding the underlying politics of this. This standpoint also brings a radical revision in our understanding of 'woman' as a universal category, instead offering a multiplicity to the term 'women'.

An interesting aspect that these two writings in discussion portray is the transition from hope to skepticism. While Baby Kamble's writing holds a firm faith over the better-future-to-come, following the Ambedkarite movement, Bama's novel is born out of the skepticism about the hope and stability that the Ambedkarite movement had promised. These writings show how caste gets reproduced by modern institutions such as religion, law, and education, in the neo-capitalist India. In *Sangati* the narrator converts to Christianity, gets education, moves to the town but her caste identity does not leave her.

What binds the two narratives together is the spirit of struggle. These writings become important in the way they show how dalit women exist not as silent receivers of violence and brutality, but how they successfully convert their individual suffering into a collective political awareness. This is an awareness achieved through personal experiences and the narratives they hear. And it achieves the position of a standpoint which recovers the dalit woman within the new knowledge system and creates a possibility for a new narrative being written from a dalit feminist perspective.



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***Weaving the Traditions for the Future: Building a Sustainable Support Framework
for Iranian Traditional Hand-Woven Textile Arts***

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Abstract

Iran has been notably applauded for its luxurious handwoven textile art of the Persian carpets which has been a tremendous part of Iranian art, heritage and export. However, little attention has been paid to other kinds of Iranian handwoven textile traditions such as Kaarbafi, Daraibafi and Shaarbafi to name a few both domestically and internationally, which have been inherited from generation to generation and are now seriously facing the danger of extinction due to the modernization and economic and political reasons. In this presentation, I will illustrate my project in progress of providing a sustainable support framework for artisans of these textile traditions in danger by raising a financial support through charity exhibitions in order to maintain the traditions for the future. In particular, I will report the process of the charity exhibition and sales that I held in Tokyo in the summer of 2014 and discuss issues that arose from the exhibition. I argue that it is significantly necessary to develop a sustainable support framework by respecting the knowledge and skills of the artisans and giving market values to their textile products in order to save their weaving traditions. This presentation will resonate with one of the conference themes, "Power", in that it describes how an individual has power to bring differences to help dying traditions and their artisans.

Keywords: Iranian weaving arts, charity exhibition, sustainable support

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Introduction

Located in the middle of the ancient Silk Road, Iran, formerly known as Persia, whose history began thousands of years ago, historically acted as a strategically important center in cross-continental trade, commerce and cultural exchange where the East met the West for centuries. Persia manifested its cultural excellence even in its early establishment including the first Persian Empire of the Achaemenid dynasty and the following dynasties. Textiles almost always dedicated to their cultural and artistic prosperity. In fact, even today Iran is a place full of precious textiles.

When it comes to Persian or Iranian textiles, what first comes to your mind? I suppose it is solely quality Persian carpets. Iran has received international acknowledgement as a major producer of luxurious handwoven carpets. Both humble and luxurious pieces adorn the walls and floors of nomad tents, urban and rural homes, mosques and palaces, and can be found everywhere – from the remotest corner of Iran to the world's most prestigious museums (Cheng & Munakata, 2015, p.5). According to Nassiri (2010), among some early European researchers, the well-known Russian archaeologist Sergei Rudenko noted that the world's oldest pile carpet woven in the 5th century BC was excavated in Pazyryk in the Altai Mountains in Siberia and may be related to the Achaemenid dynasty although Rudenko's claim is an issue of debate. Nassiri also said that in the Safavid period (1499-1722) the arts including carpet weaving reached their highest level, and Persian carpets started flowing towards the European markets. Even today, carpets are one of the articles dominating the country's export along with natural resources such as oil, gas and agricultural products as Lorentz (2007) described. However, other kinds of handwoven textiles are actually found in Iran although they may be more simple and ordinary, produced in a smaller quantity and scale, and given less recognition both domestically and internationally compared to renowned Persian rugs. Yet, they also reflect the country's rich textile culture and history.

In this paper, I would like to report about my project in progress of supporting traditional Iranian handwoven textile arts putting aside Persian rugs. First, I will introduce three particular types of Iranian handwoven textiles. Second, I will describe the problems that these textiles have been facing. Then, I will explain how I have been supporting these textiles through fund-raising activities. Finally, I will touch upon further tasks and future implications that my project has raised. This report is significant as it introduces the precious Iranian handwoven textiles that have not been shed light on and gives you an overview of a rare project to build a support framework for these Iranian textiles.

Not Just Carpets

I have been living in Tehran, Iran for more than two years, and I have never become bored with the handwoven textile variety that the country offers besides luxurious rugs. From among the range of the traditional Iranian handwoven textiles I have encountered, I would like to introduce the following three types: Kaarbafi, Daraibafi and Shaarbafi. Kaarbafi is a plain cotton weave usually comes in a single or a few colors with occasional stripes. Kaarbafi can be found in different parts of Iran, but what is common is that this tradition has been taken over by women from generation to generation for years. Kaar means “work” and bafi means “weaving”.

The name originates in the fact that weaving has been essential part of women's daily housework routine. This fabric has been used in the home as covers, bedspreads, wipe cloths and so on (See Figure 1).

Daraibafi is ikat weaving as the Persian word of darai means "ikat" (See Figure 2). Ikat is a Malay-Indonesian word that is widely used to refer to the ikat pattern, the cloth, and the process of making it (Meller, 2013, p.55). In this process, the warp threads are first marked with designs, these markings are wrapped with covers that will resist the dye so that designs are pre-decided before the weaving process starts. This techniques is known and practiced in many other countries, but in Iran it is performed only by men in the city of Yazd, on the edge of the desert (Cheng & Munakata, 2015, p.7).

Shaabafi is woven in the city of Kashan. Shaar means "very fine hair" so that fabrics in this category are woven with very fine cotton or silk to ensure a shiny, smooth texture. Shaarbafi is a plain weave or twill that comes in different colors and often with stripes. This weaving tradition has been taken over by male artisans (See Figure 3).



Figure 1: Kaarbafi



Figure 2: Daraibafi



Figure 3: Shaarbafi

My first encounter with these beautiful Iranian handwoven textiles was at Tehran's Baagh Muze (Garden Museum) in the late spring of 2013. I visited the textile exhibition there run by the Tehran-based organization named the International Institute of Jam-e Miras-e Jahan (JMJI). Jam-e miras-e jahan means world heritage so that JMJI's main tasks are running workshops on Iranian culture, heritage and traditions for children and preserving traditional Iranian textile arts including Kaarbafi, Daraibafi and Shaarbafi along with other kinds besides Persian rugs. JMJI's textiles at their Baagh Muze exhibition amazed me with their versatile beauty, simplicity and practicality, and the warmth that the artisans had woven into them.

Dying Textile Arts

In contrast to their artistic representation and historical value, I was told at the exhibition that all of these handwoven textile arts have been facing a serious danger of dying out. I have observed the following reasons for their decline. First, as in most other countries, traditional handicrafts are given less attention and respect in Iran as machine-made fabrics are available and dominate the market these days. For example, textiles play an important role in Iranian women's daily fashion in accordance with the Islamic dress code. All women in Iran, no matter what their faith is, must wear a head scarf called "hejab" and a knee-length, long-sleeved jacket "manteau" to cover their hair and body especially when they are outside. Most of the hejab and manteaux sold at reasonable prices in every single bazar in Iran is machine-made and imported from China. In addition, one seller in the Tajrish bazar in the northern end of Tehran once told me that good-quality chador fabrics come from Japan. Chador is a tent-like full-body-length outer garment tossed over the women's head to wrap her whole body.

In addition to the dominance of machine-made or foreign textiles in the Iranian market, traditional weaving industry does not seem to be an attractive job option for younger generation people. Young people flee into bigger cities in search of better job or education opportunities. In fact, the Kaarbafi weavers I met in the town of Meybod on the outskirts of Yazd are women in their 60's and 70's. In Kashan, Shaarbafi weavers are always elderly men whose wrinkles tell how long and rich their career is. As for Daraibafi, the young weaver in his late 20's named Hameed Falahi told me that his family is the one and only Daraibafi producer in Iran. After having been working on the Daraibafi weaving art for more than 350 years, Hameed and his family are now in trouble of finding successors besides himself. Gillow (2010) pointed out that the practitioners of Iranian textiles today are few and that several textile crafts are in danger of disappearing due to the lack of skilled artisans.

Furthermore, the Iranian textile industry is also failing in gaining global recognition. Unfortunately, Iran does not have good opportunities to have ties with overseas as the country has been left in a difficult situation internationally. Since the West started imposing economic sanctions and limitations on political and diplomatic relationships on Iran in 2006, the flow of products and cultural exchange to and from the country has stagnated (Cheng & Munakata, 2015, p.15). Also, the information available in the media is also limited so it is very difficult for the Iranians to exchange information with abroad.

My Cause: Charity Activities

Because of the fact that Kaarbafi, Daraibafi and Shaarbafi have been facing the problem of disappearing due to the reasons described above, I felt an urge to preserve their rich history and tradition as I was greatly fascinated by these textiles. And I was quite confident that they should deserve more domestic and international recognition. Consequently, I came to the idea to initiate a cause to create a system that could provide adequate support to these textile arts. Then, I consulted JMJI for cooperation for they are an expert in the field.

As one of their major tasks is to preserve traditional Iranian weaving arts, JMJI launched their own textile brand called Sidaar in 2011 and has been actively working on preserving a variety of handwoven textiles since then – not only Kaarbafi, Daraibafi and Shaarbafi, but also Iranian silk brocade or sheep and camel wool fabrics as well. With the Sidaar brand, JMJI established a sustainable production cycle in which they work with weavers to create textile products adding modern, trendy design that appeals to more customers in Tehran. JMJI donates part of the profits to the weavers so that they will be able to achieve a stable income to keep weaving for Sidaar. Eventually, after some discussions, JMJI and I agreed that I would take charge of introducing Iranian handwoven textiles mainly outside Iran through fund-raising exhibitions. The reason why we decided on charity exhibitions was that I had resonated with JMJI's sustainable support cycle to work with weavers and to preserve their textile arts.

The Tokyo Exhibition

Now, I would like to give a summary of my first fund-raising exhibition of Iranian handwoven textiles that I held in Tokyo. It was held for two days in the summer of 2014. I chose a gallery located in one of the high-end areas in Tokyo called Jiyugaoka, where both residents and visitors are said to be highly conscious about leading a quality lifestyle with creative, original home decor and fashion items. A selection of textiles including Kaarbafi, Daraibafi and Shaarbafi mainly scarves along with some models of tablecloths and dishcloths was exhibited and available for purchase. A wide range of visitors from adults, students to passers-by showed up to see Iranian textiles except Persian rugs for the first time by examining the exhibit and audio-visual guide such as photos and video introducing the background of the textiles, artisans and history.

The Tokyo exhibition ended successfully receiving positive feedback to the Iranian textiles from the visitors. I conducted a visitor survey and asked the following questions:

- What was your impression about Iran before coming to the exhibition?
- Did your impression change in any ways after the exhibition?
- What do you think about the traditional Iranian handwoven textiles?

35 visitors answered the questions giving multiple answers and some of them left additional comment. Most of the respondents' initial impression toward Iran was quite negative. 10 said that Iran is a very far country which they had almost no information or impression about while 19 worried about the safety or economic and political instability of the country. However, 9 people named Iranian culture, history, traditions

or nature such as art, architecture, handicrafts, deserts and food culture. 3 of these people highly praised Persian carpets when it came to Iranian handicrafts. The visitors' overall post-exhibition views changed quite positively. 18 respondents answered that Iran is a surprisingly beautiful country. In addition, 6 people mentioned the country's rich, sophisticated culture and history. 14 felt ever closer to Iran as they learned about the country, handicrafts and culture in the exhibition. One person still did not deny his/her insecure feeling toward Iran.

As for the textiles, the respondents who left positive comment said that the textiles are beautiful yet practical for daily use with good colors, designs and texture. Other comments include that the textiles can be easily incorporated into today's Japanese fashion and home interior and that it was a good opportunity to learn about Iranian textiles except Persian carpets. Furthermore, some comments indicate that the charity and audio-visual presentation were especially meaningful in that visitors had an opportunity to learn about dying Iranian weaving arts and get familiarized with the artisans so that they shared my cause of preserving these arts. On the other hand, 9 people gave very encouraging but rather negative ideas. For instance, the textiles lacked a suitable variety of colors, sizes, designs and usage so that they would not match Japanese trends and tastes in fashion and home decor. Additionally, the textiles did not successfully appeal to male visitors.

How the Tokyo Profits Contributed

After the Tokyo exhibition, my biggest concern was how to donate the profits to the Iranian textile industry to use them at the fullest. JMJI helped me find a meaningful way to support the industry in the fall of 2014 while I was also preparing for another exhibition in Barcelona. My primary objective was not to simply give the money to artisans as a reward or income, but rather to focus on more fundamental issues such as training younger people as prospective weavers or improve the quality of the textiles so that the industry can keep moving forward in a sustainable cycle without the fear of getting completely disappeared.

After repeated discussions, finally in November of the same year, JMJI and I came to the agreement to donate the Tokyo profits to the Daraibafi weaver in Yazd, Hameed Falahi, who was in the process of opening a weaving center to train prospective weavers to weave for him in the future. He wants to save his family's tradition of Daraibafi from disappearing, and also to make job opportunities in his community. I found his personal yet social project interesting and contributed by installing three handlooms purchased by the Tokyo profits in his center. I visited Hameed's center in January 2015 to check upon the handlooms (See Figure 4).



Figure 4: Hameed Falahi and the handlooms donated to his training center

Having made a significant step forward in my project with the collaboration with Hameed, I still have more issues to define. For example, what kind of people is Hameed teaching in his center? How can trainees be motivated so that they will become weavers in the future? For whom or where will they be weaving after completing the course? Therefore, I am determined to continuously support Hameed along with JMJI, and I need to come up with a meaningful way of donating the Barcelona profits as well in order to contribute to his further success, which will eventually lead to preserving the dying textile art of Daraibafi.

Let me give you a brief summary of the Barcelona exhibition. In collaboration with Silvia Saladrigas Cheng and Teresa Rosa Aguayo, a textile documentation specialist at Center of Documentation and Museum of Textiles (CDMT) and a weaving teacher/artist respectively, I co-hosted my Barcelona exhibition in the Ramblas district in the city center on one weekend in December 2014. Silvia's passion for textiles and personal ties with Iranian textile artisan friends and Teresa's devotion to weaving greatly affected the success of the exhibition. A similar range of textiles to the Tokyo exhibition was presented and available for purchase along with audio-visual information of the textiles and weavers. Contrary to the Tokyo exhibition, although the visitors saw Iranian textiles for the first time, most of them were either textile experts, weavers or students leaning weaving.

Conclusion

To conclude this report of my project of giving a sustainable support framework for dying Iranian handwoven textile arts, I strongly insist that I need to encourage the most effective way in which artisans' traditional knowledge, skills and value are highly maintained. In addition, I need to primarily focus on supporting the sustainable development of the Iranian handwoven textile industry such as training in order to increase the number of weavers in the future. On the other hand, in my opinion, it is also important for the industry to have new visions to add commercial value to their traditional textile arts to create the income it needs to keep on going. For example, they should improve the quality of their products and cater to the needs, taste and trends of the wider international community as my Tokyo exhibition proved that Iranian handwoven textiles have a potential of being accepted internationally but they still lacks some elements to attract more interest. In any case, I am determined to gain international recognition for the amazing Iranian handwoven textile arts through fundraising activities, and devote the profits to establish a sustainable development for the future of the Iranian handwoven textile industry.

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Mutual Distrust between China and Japan and the Locked Sino-Japanese Relations

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A Brief Background of Sino-Japanese Relations with Mutual Distrust

Having inevitably been geographic neighbours of each other for thousands of years, the two giants in East Asia—China and Japan continue harvesting bittersweet fruits from the bilateral relations. For most of time in their history, the bilateral relations between China and Japan are considered to be positive. Though there have not been the mature international society or diplomatic relationship, the two countries are connected to some extent. The cultural exchanges and communications were supposed to be the most significant interaction in the relations. Since the science and technology and even the culture of China was comparatively advanced in the long period in ancient time, the major pattern of communication between China and Japan was that Japan sending students and envoys to China to learn different kinds of knowledge. In this way, it could be reasonable to see that the two states with close culture—such as Chinese characters in Japanese languages and the styles of architecture—could share a harmonious relationship. There are also different arguments on the way in which China and Japan could keep peaceful relations with each other. Due to the lack of effective transportations and information, the interactions between different states were quite limited so that disputes and wars were not easy to take place.

The pure exchanges and communications between the two countries had changed into the invasion of semi-colonial and lagging China by a modern Japan since the end of 19th century. In the beginning of its imperial era, Japan had achieved many of its goals of national interests in China as well as other Western states. The rise of Japanese militarism was then followed by the overall war between Japan and China as a part of the World War II which created a series of problems affecting the bilateral relations till now. The war led to millions of deaths and injuries in both countries and ruined the process of modernization. Moreover, the confrontation between the communist and capitalist camps made the timely reconciliation not possible as the two countries got involved in different ideological groups. It was not until in 1972 that China and Japan finally realized the normalization of official relationship—most of which should be owed to the re-engagement between the US and China.

Different from the situation with a deeper trust among European states such as France and Germany, the bilateral relationship between China and Japan does not go that smoothly. There was indeed a period of wonderful time of nearly two decades between the two states after the 1972 normalization. As soon as the normalization was achieved, the relationship between China and Japan warmed up rapidly. Though the two states did not form an alliance, the political atmosphere was overall positive, both on the intergovernmental level and the social level. Both the two states distrusted Soviet Union in the Cold War era, which might bring them together sharing a common strategic goal.

However, the trust between China and Japan was not stable. The political relations between China and Japan have been controversial since several decades ago. The status of the possible rivalry between the two states has not transformed into the mature friendship or the more cooperative relations even after the end of the Cold War. It is a worrying fact that the two most powerful actors in East Asia are experiencing an unstable relationship with more disputes and conflicts of interests.

Different from the situation with a deeper trust among European states such as France and Germany after the WW2, the bilateral relationship between China and Japan does not go that smoothly. After the down of Soviet Union, fiercer frictions on the disputes on the problems left unsettled during the normalization process were observed. The disputes on historical legacies soon emerged as the obstacles of the bilateral relations. With the growth of China's economic and military power, the Sino-Japanese relationship in the beginning of the 21st century has witnessed a wider scope of problems including both historical legacies and the strategic confrontations or competitions. Series of disputes existing in the Sino-Japanese relations occur occasionally with the tough attempts of cooperation, which could be interpreted as the lack of bilateral trust between China and Japan.

The Theoretical Discussion on Trust/Distrust in International Relations

There have always been academic debates on the theories of trust and distrust in international relations. There would be two approaches of trust including both the interest-oriented and morality-oriented ways on understanding the notion. Both Eric M. Uslaner and Brian C. Rathbun have introduced the 'strategic trust' and 'moralistic trust'. I would to some extent agree with the adaption of these ideas in Sino-Japanese relations—with some modifications and rejections as well. In terms of the trust /distrust between China and Japan, 'strategic trust on strategic issues' and 'moral and political trustworthy' would be the two approaches.

Strategic trust is a kind of assessment on the possibility to reduce the alert of others on harming the interests or even to realize a double win cooperative relationship. On the contrary, strategic distrust would turn into the worry about being damaged on the interests. It is more likely to be in the realist view of the world of anarchy that every single participant would have to be intensive and nervous on others in consideration of the security of themselves. The definition of moral trust here would be the judgements of normal values on whether another state tends to follow the international laws and principles in international relations.

One of the most important theoretical frameworks would be that strategic and moral trust / distrust could be interpreted as strategic calculations driven by rationality of states vs normative values in international relations.

By distinguishing the two terms of “norms” and “rational choice”, the thesis is using the narrative definition of them. Norms would refer to the normative assumptions and related behaviours, or what can be called moral norms. The rational choice assumption refers to the rationality of non-moral factors among states which means that countries would act in certain ways to grasp the benefits of cooperation among them. Exploring if trust complies with any characteristics of the two options will identify the way in which trust works in international relations.

As Kacowicz (2005, p.18) cites McElroy (1992, p.31), “a moral norm can be defined as a behavioural prescription that is universal in the claims it makes and that involves a view of the actors’ own interest, but from the point of view of the others’ interests.” In international relations, this would be the issue on whether countries would place the interests of others at a crucial place. The definition of trust from Hardin and other scholars might have similar essence with it that trust means that countries believe that their national interests will not be harmed by others in international relations. Though this is a generalized definition, there is the consistency between two notions. The moral norms in international relations represent the good wills of interstate behaviours. Trusting others in their nature, or even as Uslaner (2002) argues, holding the belief that other states should be trusted is the activity that obeys the moral norms and in correspond with the internal quality of “oughtness”. (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891) Hence, this certain kind of trust could be regarded as a moral norm. However, the political fact in international relations (or to be more optimistic, in the international society) shows that no essential institutions actually could support the moral requirement though following these principles might have been accepted as an universal value. The competitions of national interests highlight the significance of the other kind of trust and rationality within it.

As stated above, the thesis suggests that the rationality of countries will play an important role in international relations. If the moral norms and moral trust are irrational, does it mean that trust would not exist between states? It could hardly to say no on this question that trust could also be a rational choice for countries. The controversy lies in the gap between the sources of trust—moral motivation and information-based motivation. A country would trust another in international affairs according to the information it owns. Trusting others under this circumstance would be beneficial due to its characteristics of rationality. This is what will be discussed in the following sections as strategic trust—also mentioned by Uslaner (2001, 2002) and Rathbun (2009). One simple case of this kind of trust is that if a country trusts one of its neighbour states as it has enough empirical evidences to prove another’s harmless attitude and goals, the cost of military spending on the boundary will be reduced. In this way, trust might also be the result of rationality. Therefore, it will be important to understand how International Relations theories see the sources of trust in terms of normative behaviours and rationality.

The basic hypothesis of this research would be that both China and Japan would distrust each other on strategic and moral issues. At the same time, the two states have different priorities. Japan's priority would be on the strategic issues of the rise of China as a potential threat. China's distrust would focus more on the moral issues of history disputes. Japan's secondary concern would be the moral distrust on China. To be specific, Japan distrusts China's nature of being a responsible actor in international society. China's secondary concern would be that Japan's alliance with the US and the potential attempt to revive as a military power would become strategic challenge for China.

China and Japan has formed a mutual distrust situation in both the fields of strategic and moral issues. The source of the 'locked' status would be the asymmetries in bilateral distrust, which has formed a vicious circle. Although both the two states have their specific issues of distrust in both the two fields, they have different focuses and emphasises. From the Chinese perspective, the distrust on the moral issues of Japan should be the top concern. For Japan the situation is just opposite. The most significant trust crisis is the distrust on strategic issues. Under this circumstance, the logic evidence of forming the asymmetries should be that both the two states treat their own top concern as the key issue in the bilateral relations and they could hardly trust the other due to dozens of reasons (caused by the other), which means the requests of them on the main concerns have not been satisfied; meanwhile, the top concern of the other (country B) seems to be quite 'normal' in the perspective of itself (country A) which does not need to be modified to satisfy country B's request. Besides, the main focuses of the two states are not at the same level while the issues on the same level differs from each other in the fields. It could be understood better with the table above.

Case Study on Mutual Strategic and Moral Distrust

There have been cases to verify the hypothesis on this structure of China-Japan mutual distrust. For Japan's part, the strategic distrust could be reflected on the maritime disputes and the moral distrust on China's international identity. For China's distrust on Japan, the strategic cases would be on the US-Japan alliance and the moral cases of Yasukuni Shrine dispute.

In terms of the debate between normative relations and rationality of states, strategic trust and distrust will show its existence in the rational choice and the following foreign policies and actions. As rational actors, countries will have to consider the existing political realities and make predictions in responsible for its national interests including national security. Therefore, if there is either a lack of transparency or the clear rivalry activities of the other actor, the uncertainty would lead to distrust and other reactions. On the other hand, both the rationality of states and the approach of following international norms would require states to take actions with lower risks and costs to solve the problems and disputes. Even if a country values the normative

actions in international relations, the norm-breaking activities from the other actors would lead to the judgment of distrust. Therefore, the trend of trust and distrust could be identified in official and governmental documents including statements, records of press meetings, speeches and so on.

How to identify trust and distrust in these cases would be a methodological question. A discourse analysis method is suitable in measuring trust between countries. It would be extremely difficult to reach the materials and procedures behind the stage in the processes of foreign policy making. Therefore, both clear attitudes and behaviours of countries would be the way to approach to the status of trust and distrust. The discourse—no matter the governmental statements or the VIP speeches—would be meaningful as the official position as well as the guidance of foreign policies. The question would be what the standards are to identify trust and distrust in the discourse. There have been debates on the relationship between cooperation and trust, which has been proved that one could not equal to another, while in many cases cooperation could still be regarded as an important sign of trust. In terms of distrust between states, most negative discourse and behaviours could be regarded as distrust between states. What should be taken into consideration carefully is the difference between not to trust and distrust. There is a significant difference between not to trust and distrust that distrust refers to the category on the prediction of potential damage on national interest or dignity. At the same time, not to trust might have not reached such a negative level that actors have no positive or negative interactions and neither trust nor distrust would define the relationship. Therefore, the qualitative judgment on trust and distrust would rely on the discourse with certain attributes. On the other hand, there will be strong or weak levels of status of trust and distrust. Whether the certain discourse is emotionally strong or weak will with no doubt help in understanding the levels of trust and distrust between states.

Japan's Strategic Distrust on China

This paper tries to interpret distrust through explaining the discourse and activities of the two states. There will be quantitative data to verify the hypotheses. In terms of Japan's strategic distrust on China, I have collected 27 documents (see appendix) published on MOFA of Japan's website related to Japan-China maritime disputes. The general statistics of distrust discourse used in these documents is like this shown in the table. What can be concluded from the statistics would be that Japan clearly distrusts China on strategic issues. The appearances of "distrust" usage is much more than the "trust" ones (225-12). The most often usage of discourse are "Topple/change/challenge the status quo/ existing order (by force)" (31 times), "Escalation/escalate" (21 times), "(profoundly/extremely) dangerous" (18 times), "Unilateral/unilaterally" (17 times), "(extremely) provocative actions" (14 times), "(strong) protest" (28 times), "deep concerns" (22 times), and "Cannot/could not accept/ unacceptable" (18 times). A clear status of distrust could be observed through the comparison between distrust and trust discourse (see the table).

Words or sentences	Nature	Trust or distrust	Times of appearance
Topple/change/challenge the status quo/ existing order (by force)	Description of China's activity	distrust	31
Escalation/escalate	Description of China's activity	distrust	21
(profoundly/extremely) dangerous	Description of China's activity	distrust	18
Unilateral/unilaterally	Description of China's activity	distrust	17
(extremely) provocative actions	Description of China's activity	distrust	14
(extremely) regrettable	Description of China's activity	distrust	9
(unduly) infringe the freedom	Description of China's activity	distrust	5
have serious impacts/ serious problem	Description of China's activity	distrust	3
cause unintended consequences	Description of China's activity	distrust	3
Not transparent/ lacking transparency	Description of China's activity	distrust	3
have no validity	Description of China's activity	distrust	2
does not follow the instructed procedures	Description of China's activity	distrust	2
intrusions	Description of China's activity	distrust	2
extremely damaging	Description of China's activity	distrust	1
lead to an unexpected occurrence of accidents	Description of China's activity	distrust	1
deeply deplorable	Description of China's activity	distrust	1
incorrect and entirely irrelevant	Description of China's activity	distrust	1
Added up	Description of China's activity	distrust	134
		trust	0
Cannot/could not accept/ unacceptable	Japan's attitude/ Description of China's activity	distrust	18

Added up	Japan's attitude/ Description of China's activity	distrust	18
		trust	0
(strong) protest	Japan's attitude	distrust	28
(deep) concern	Japan's attitude	distrust	22
enhance this relationship	Japan's attitude	trust	7
Urge China to revoke	Japan's attitude	distrust	9
Request China to fulfill its responsibility/ request a sincere response	Japan's attitude	distrust	5
one of the most important bilateral relationships	Japan's attitude	trust	4
(strongly) demand the prevention	Japan's attitude	distrust	4
will not tolerate	Japan's attitude	distrust	1
Have strong doubts	Japan's attitude	distrust	1
we would like China to provide thorough explanations	Japan's attitude	distrust	1
cannot at all accept China's assertion	Japan's attitude	distrust	1
overreaction	Japan's attitude	distrust	1
Japan is ready to maintain close communications with China in an effort to ease tensions.	Japan's attitude	trust	1
Added up	Japan's attitude	distrust	73
		trust	12
Total		distrust	225
		trust	12

Japan's Moral Distrust on China

In terms of Japan's moral distrust on China, it is currently the secondary concern of the Japanese side. The moral trust and distrust would be based on whether moral norms could be respected. The moral norms in international relations represent the good wills of interstate behaviours. Therefore, if the expectation of one actor on its moral interests to be respected could not be fulfilled or even be threatened or damaged, moral distrust would be generated. Based on this theoretical framework, the standard of judging moral trust and distrust would be clear that certain discourse should be interpreted in terms of the principles of international moral norms.

There have been less discussions or criticism on moral issues from the Japanese official channel compared with the strategic issues. It is reasonable that firstly, these moral issues are not that crucial as strategic calculations, and in most cases countries might not take the risk of damaging bilateral relations to criticize another on its moral behaviours. Therefore, public opinion might reflect the overall distrust more clearly. For example, I will introduce some data from The 10th Japan-China Public Opinion Poll to verify the moral distrust.

In terms of the question of Reasons for Negative Impressions towards China, there are answers like “China’s action incompatible with international rules” (55.1%), “Criticism of Japan over historical issues” (52.2%), “Chinese media’s anti-Japan coverage” (41.1%), “Can’t understand Chinese people’s patriotic acts and views” (28.7%), “Different Political System” (25.7%) and “Chinese people’s entrenched nationalism” (18.4%) which are selected by the Japanese people. These are definitely the issues of normative values in international relations. When China fails to follow the values which are generally accepted by Japan, moral distrust would occur.

Another typical case might be reflected in the form of political correctness issue in international relations. To be specific, as China rejects the universal value such as western democratic system and human rights, which are also the core values of Japan, it would receive doubts and distrust. There would be arguments that the arc of freedom and prosperity raised by Japan was an example of distrusting China on these ideology issues.

Therefore, with these empirical evidences, it would be reasonable to say that Japan indeed distrusts China on strategic and moral issues and at the same time, strategic calculation would be the priority within the two.

China’s Moral Distrust on Japan

On the other hand, China distrusts Japan on both strategic and moral issues as well. The theoretical framework would be similar with that of Japan’s part while the hypothesis being different that China is focusing more on the moral issues. The moral issues from the Chinese perspective would be the history disputes. One of the typical cases would be the Yasukuni Shrine issue as an example.

From China’s perspective, respecting the history especially the history of invading another state should be a basic normative value in international relations. Since Japan failed to do so, China’s moral distrust is created. China worries about Japan’s ambiguous attitudes toward the history issues for the assumption that Japan is intentionally avoiding the responsibility. Although Japan repeated its attitude of introspection in many occasions, its activities could ruin the words viewed by China. On one hand, the activities of politicians such as the Prime Minister visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and the possibility of abandoning the past Murayama Statement will increase the worry of China on whether Japan is trying to regain its ‘glory’ in the

Empire era. It is reasonable that this possibility is unacceptable for China which has always been treating itself as the victim of the war. On the other hand, despite of the concern on the Japanese government, the influences on the civil society from the activities are also crucial. The key issue would be that the future generations might have a different understanding on the history of the war. This concern originates from the activities of ‘whitewashing’ the history from the Chinese perspective. Therefore, China’s moral distrust on Japan could be understood as the distrust on Japan’s claims on its introspection and the possible future of Japan reviving its militarism.

Let’s take the Yasukuni Shrine case as an example. The last time when Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine was on 26/12/2013. From then to May 2014, there had been at least 14 documents recording the speeches of Chinese high level politicians (including Foreign Minister, Foreign Ministry Spokesman, and Ambassador to Japan and so on) and a great amount of other documents on lower levels discussing the Yasukuni Shrine issue. According to the quantitative calculation, the Chinese side had expressed its distrust on Japan through the usage of diplomatic discourse with very strong emotional expression. 79 appearances of distrust discourse would prove that the Yasukuni Shrine issue keeps being a core concern of China. Among these words and sentences, ‘Deny and even whitewash the history of invading others’ (10 times), ‘Challenge international / post-war order’ (9 times), ‘Wrong words and deeds’ (6 times), ‘Create obstacles’ (5 times), ‘Strongly condemn / protest’ (5 times), ‘Challenge the historical conclusions’ (4 times), ‘cause vigilance’ (4 times), ‘firmly oppose’ (4 times), ‘Damage bilateral relations’ (4 times) are the most frequently used discourse. There are significant characteristics showing that the discourse from high-level Chinese channels could explain the attitudes towards the Japanese side on historical disputes. Firstly, the essence of history disputes could be interpreted as its judgement that Japan would not follow the normative values of respecting history. Secondly, the amount of appearances was huge. Thirdly, many of the discourse are emotionally strong, which are unusual to be observed in diplomatic consequences if no serious problems existing. With these characteristics, distrust could be observed.

China’s Strategic Distrust on Japan

There would also be explanations on the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations from the perspective of China’s strategic distrust on Japan. Although the strategic distrust is not the priority for China, it still exists as a problem. To be specific, China’s strategic calculations on Japan would be the assumptions on whether Japan is reviving as a military power and / or will balance against China with the US-Japan alliance.

For a long period of time after the normalization of bilateral relations in 1972, especially before the 21st century, the strategic concerns would not be the core focus of China in its relationship with Japan. Although the Cold War might have caused tensions between the two former rivalries, the common external threat of Soviet Union was regarded as the main problem in the regional relations. Therefore, the two

states have experienced the 'honeymoon' and stable period in bilateral relations. At the same time, based on the rationality of states, the strategic trust / distrust would rely on the rational calculation of whether the other state could be a strategic threat for its own national interests. In this way, it is reasonable that China could have fewer strategic disputes with Japan in that certain period because there were fewer conflicts on national interests considering the huge gap between the comprehensive national power and goals of the two states.

However, the situation would be quite different in the recent years. Firstly, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there would be no common threats for China and Japan so that they might pay more attention on each other—as they are the two most powerful regional actors. Moreover, the rise of the China has greatly changed the comparison of national power in this region. China would have settled the strategic goals that match its national power while Japan would modify its foreign policies to deal with the rise of China. In this way, the main strategies of Japan, including seeking for a position as a normal state and strengthening the alliance with the US could cause distrust from China.

There will also be empirical evidences showing that strategic distrust would be the secondary concern of China. On one hand, there are existing discourse and activities of China showing its concerns including refusing to accept Japan as a permanent member of UN Security Council in 2005 and upgrading its military force especially its navy as a strategic plan. On the other hand, it would have to be admitted that the direct and indirect discourse from the Chinese side would be much fewer than the moral distrust ones.

An Evaluation on the Hypothesis of Asymmetric Mutual Distrust and the 'Locked' Sino-Japanese Relations

If we go back to the asymmetric framework of bilateral distrust, we could have several key findings. Firstly, the different core concerns in this structure would lead to the 'locked' China-Japan relations. This would lead to a basic question of how would distrust shape interstate relations. States, as the main actors in international relations, should always be responsible for the national interests. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult for one state to make compromises before its own concerns being dealt with by the other actor. However, in the China-Japan relations case, the priori concerns of the two states are not in the same fields and not at the same level. Japan's distrust on strategic issues would not be the 'serious problem' for China and China's distrust on moral issues would not be a core concern for Japan. Both the two states might not take actions to solve the problems of distrust from the other state without its own concerns being dealt with in the first place. In this way, both the two states would not tend to take unilateral actions to break the locked relationship.

The other core issue would be how the bilateral relations would affect the status of trust/ distrust between states. Staying in the status of mutual distrust, the states would tend to be more conservative. When incidents and problems occur in bilateral relations, the relations might get worsen because of distrust. At the same time, in the negative bilateral relations, the worries and concerns would be 'verified' when problems and incidents occur so that the status of distrust would go deeper. Therefore, the vicious circle would be created: every actor wants its own priorities to be handled firstly while not taking the first step to satisfy another state. As the priorities of Japan and China are not at the same level, it would be extremely difficult to find the comprehensive solutions to fit the demands of both the two states at the same time.

Whether Japan and China could find a way to get rid of the locked status relationship and the mutual distrust would be a question. Although it is extremely difficult to predict what actions the two states would take, there are some facts which are clear for us. Firstly, the second and third largest economies cannot just keep the relations in the current status—they are interdependent and have to cooperate in sustainable economic growth and regional affairs, which would be the interests for the whole international community. Secondly, the process of unlocking the relationship would be accompanied by the process of building mutual trust. Building trust would be a tough job between states, however, with no doubt the positive future of Sino-Japanese relationship would be based on solving the distrust issues. We can observe that the leaderships of the two states have successfully achieved highest level summits for 2 times in 2015. Although the summits might not be that successful, the communications could help on reducing misreading and misunderstandings. The locked China-Japan relations would last for a long time until the top concerns receive solutions, which seem not to come in the foreseeable future.

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*Awakening from Dream, Back to the Pre-Modern: Satoh Makoto's
"The Dance of Angels Who Burns Their Own Wings"*

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Abstract

Japanese playwright and stage director Satoh Makoto (shows an acute insight that human suffering is the outcome of the illusion of human redemption that has been regarded as an ultimate goal of the linear time-space of the modernity. The linear time-space has killed the existence of God by replacing the multi-layered time-space of the pre-modern world in which the living and the spirits of the dead coexisted and the communication between the two worlds was possible. In the secular modern world with the belief in God removed, human suffering had a tendency of permanence in the lack of the savior. This is the human condition that Satoh understands. In his play *The Dance of Angels Who Burn Their Own Wings* (1970), especially in the three-fold dream text, Satoh puzzles out such human condition as suffering. He reaches to a conclusion that human desire for redemption or revolution in the modern world turns out endless dreams or illusions. As a strategy to break the chain of nightmarish human condition, he takes a decisive action to cut off the access to the first dream. Accordingly, Satoh attempts to quit the linear dimension of time-space as the outcome of modernization or westernization, and instead turn back to the multi-layered dimension of the pre-modern Japanese world, which is symbolically and effectively carried out in both dramaturgy and space-plan for stage performance.

Keywords: Satoh Makoto, *Dance of Angels Who Burn Their Own Wings*, Japanese theatre, dream text, modernity, the premodern paradigm

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Introduction: from Modern to Pre-modern

Japanese pre-modern theatre was the world in which the living and the dead were getting together. As seen in the world of Noh and Kabuki, the Japanese pre-modern stage was a kind of sacred shrine and religious rituals were set up to appease the divinity and pray for human welfare as rewards. The performance here was not only the entertainment for the living but also a religious rite of *chinkon*, that is, pacifying the spirits of the dead.¹ The performer in this place served as shaman who invokes a blessing from the spirits of the dead and brings the blessing to the living, as the medium between the two worlds. The pre-modern Japanese theatre was fundamentally multi-layered time-space. Here the historical time and the present crossed or fused each other. Here the rule of linear or chronological time lost its presence and meaning.

With the introduction of a world-wide upheaval of the Western-modernization in the late 19C, the entire Japanese world was placed in a critical condition. The Japanese theatre space was accordingly sucked into a sea change. The Japanese theatre, now granted a new label called 'modern,' was thrown into a secular world. Here the spirits of the dead are excommunicated, and only the livings are fussing about trifles. There exists nothing but an endless human suffering without the hope of the blessing from God.² Meiji government's adoption of the Western-modernization in 1868 was not unlike the acceptance of the world without God. Accordingly the Japanese modern stage was earthly and mundane with the chance of God's appearance and the subsequent encounter of God and human beings on stage becomes 'THE THING IMPOSSIBLE'. Now the Japanese modern theatre, just as the Western counterpart did, became a secular stage saturated with the optimistic belief that scientific thought and human rationality, independent from God, will make their life happier and more comfortable, and finally relieve themselves from the suffering.

However, the belief in scientific thought and technology turned out to a detonator rather than a solution to the human suffering. Especially, the atomic bombing onto Hiroshima and Nagasaki came out at the culmination of technology and the consequent blind optimism about the modernity. In the post-war era, disappoint from

¹ The act of *chinkon* is one aspect of paradigm in the pre-modern Japanese world. It is a technique of traditional shamans to manipulate the spirits. This technique contains a phase transformation through which the spirits borrow the body of shamans and present themselves in the world of the living. *Chinkon* is possible in the premise that the existence of the spirits or the dead is believed in the world of living. In this respect, ancient Greek and Roman theatres also had the dimension of *chinkon* in that they were religious rites to celebrate the gods for the purpose of human welfare in the living world.

² Realistic and naturalistic theatres were the outcome of the Western modernization. As the basic tool for realism and naturalism in theatre, scientific outlook restricted the pursuit of truth to the knowledge verified only through the five senses and direct observation. Accordingly, the realism playwrights denied illogical and supernatural values and wrote about what can be discovered in everyday life. Moreover, naturalist writers argued that theatre should show only a slice of life on stage. In Henrik Ibsen's *A Doll's House* and Emile Zola's *Thérèse Raquin*, actions are carried out in a segment of reality including living room and kitchen from which God is expelled.

and skepticism about the optimistic agenda led the Japanese young generation to the question about the Westernization or modernization. These young Japanese showed a tendency of bringing back the God to this secular stage as a way to liberate themselves from their existential or absurd condition of 'no way out' situation. Accordingly, they turned their eyes back to the pre-modern world: the world where the living and the dead are getting together; the world where the past and the present coexist.

It was no exception to the Japanese young generation theatre in the 1960s. They looked upon the theatre as the ground of searching for a solution that would liberate humans from the suffering. Accordingly, these young men were determined to return to the Japanese pre-modern stage. Among them was Satoh Makoto. In a series of theatre works with *My Beatles*, *Nezumi Kozō*, and *The Dance of Angels Who Burn Their Own Wings* (*Tsubasa o moyasu tenshi-tachi no butō*, 1970), Satoh experimented going back to multi-layered dimension of the pre-modern theatre and consequently bringing God's world back to the secular modern stage. *The Dance of Angels* is the most remarkable play. Unlike the others that stay at the analysis of cause of the human condition of the modern era, this play shows a more active and positive attempt to suggest a practical strategy to breakthrough the problem analyzed through the former works.

A Dream Within a Dream Within a Dream

Satoh's play *The Dance of Angels*, as a critical response to German playwright Peter Weiss's play *Marat/Sade*, questions the western sense of revolution and finds it lacking (Cody and Sprinchorn 1193). The play begins with the words on the screen appearing from the dark and silence. It says "THIS IS A DREAM" (302). The dream text in the play serves as the playwright's self-conscious strategy to break with the modern or westernized dimension and consequently get back to the pre-modern Japanese dimension in which logical and lineal flow of time-space is replaced by the multi-layered time-space and the worlds of the living and the dead are fused each other. Such a dream structure in the play reminds what Swedish playwright August Strindberg mentioned a half century ago in the preface to drama *The Dream Play* (1902). He explains:

In this dream play [...] Anything can happen; everything is possible and plausible. Time and space do not exist. Upon an insignificant background of real life events the imagination spins and weaves new patterns: a blend of memories, experience, pure inventions, absurdities, and improvisations [...] The characters split, double, redouble, evaporate, condense, fragment, cohere. (205)

Strindberg seeks a meaning in an incomprehensible universe, trying to reconcile disparate or opposite elements: lust and love, body and spirit, filth and beauty that were categorized by the modern principle of dichotomy. In his dream play, space shifts regardless of logical sequence, chronological time is broken, the real and the imaginary merge, and the depersonalized characters possess allegorical names like the Stranger, the Student, the Poet, the Hunter, and the Dreamer (Brustein 123).

Satoh's dream play also denies a logical flow of time and space, and the characters are depicted as depersonalized: the Winds, the Angels, and the Birds. Nevertheless, Satoh goes beyond the blind imitation of the dream text foreshadowed by the Western forerunner Strindberg. In *The Dance of Angels* Satoh experiments the dream text as a space-time where, as Strindberg says, "anything can happen" and "everything is possible and plausible" on one hand. Also, Satoh adds more complexity to the dream structure of his play by weaving it into a unique framework of 'a dream within a dream within a dream.' Satoh's play begins with the episode of historical figures Marat and Sade whose dream of revolution end in failure. It turns out that their dream was nothing but the dream of the Angels, another group of characters in the present, whose dream of human redemption also proves to be a failure. It turns out again that Marat and Sade's dream of revolution and the Angels' dream of human redemption are no other than the projection of the original dreamer, the King of the Birds. Through the whole structure of triple-dreams, raging from the past and to the present, Satoh discloses that the human redemption and revolution has been just an illusion. Arriving at this moment, Satoh takes a drastic action to break with the illusion, which is the awakening from the dream.

Topography of the Dream Text

Related to the multi-folded flow of dream structure, as facilitated by the projecting action of a dreamer, the 'dream within a dream within a dream' procedure in *The Dance of Angels* reminds of the three-step stages of 'desire theory' that French poststructuralist Jacques Lacan developed based on the Freud's interpretation of dreams. Lacan formulates the desire theory beginning with a concept of 'mirror stage.' According to him, an infant perceives itself as whole in a mirror's reflection. The infant makes an imaginary identification with its reflection and takes this as a model for its interaction with the mother. However, later, the advent of a father figure breaks off this imaginary unity, from which the infant's desire for the mother is endlessly replaced with the mother-substitutes, not fully satisfied. In short, the Lacan divides the development process of human desire into three steps—imaginary, symbolic, and real stages—and explains the development from one to the next stage as the projection of a castrated desire to a substitute and the endless repetitions of castration and substitution. Applied to the Freudian-Lacanian concept of human desire, Marat-Sade and the Angels in Sato's play are interpreted as the King of Birds' alter-ego or projection of his castrated desire to disguised forms in his dream.

1) King's Dream: the Imaginary Stage

The first dream by the King of the Birds is equivalent to the imaginary stage of the Lacanian desire theory. In the play, the King dreams a dream of revolution or redemption of humanity. In the dream, he ceaselessly insists on the coming of morning by continuously requesting for morning teas. The King's desire for revolution is nothing but a desire to be God, the savior of human beings. His position on stage is significant enough to deliver a theological sense of the meaning. Surrounded by the crowd of Birds, his own creatures, he sits on the Flower Bed, the highest place where he takes a bird's eye-view or air-view of the whole stage from above. He is the literal 'eye in the sky', or all-seeing eye of God.³

³ In *Eye in the Sky* (1957), a science fiction novel written by Philip K. Dick, the title

The Flower Bed reminds *hanamichi* (flower way), a raised passageway to the stage through the audience in the Japanese pre-modern theatrical form of *Kabuki*.⁴ Seemingly supporting its possible relation to this pre-modern paradigm, the space of the King and his Birds takes a metahistorical dimension where there is no separation between the historical and present time from neither the historical past nor the present (Goodman 291). In this world of the living and the dead called the Flower Bed, the King is God who grants himself the supreme divinity (Goodman 295), the King's desire is God's desire, and his dream is God's dream.

However, the King's morning never comes as does in Beckett's *Waiting for Godot*. Morning symbolizes revolution. Every time his request for morning tea is not served, his desire for the coming of morning is faced with the Freudian sense of castration repeatedly. His dream of revolution does not come true as long as he cannot be released from his literal dream. As long as the King cannot be released from the dream, God's dream of human redemption does not come true but remains in the state of dream. The imaginary equation between the King, God and the revolution proves to be just an illusion or the disguised form of the castrated desire or the impossibility in reality. Now the castrated desire of God remains in the King's subconscious and projected to the desire of his creatures Angels within his own dream.

2) Angels' Dream: the Symbolic Stage

The second dream by the Angles is equivalent to the symbolic stage of the Lacanian desire theory. Here, the castrated desire of God is projected to a group of his creatures, the Angels. Unlike the name's implication, the Angels are a motorcycle gang questing for redemption. Except for the 'holy' cause of human redemption, they are the people living in the secular world without God. They belong to the present by occupying the center of the performing area. The Angels are given a task by God to accomplish the redemption. And God's castrated desire for the ideal vision of redemption is projected to the 'Wings' of the Angels.

However, in the course of questing for redemption, the Angles are facing two conflicting tendencies within the group. One section moves toward unrestrained hedonism, the other moves in direction to totalitarian violence (Goodman 289)

refers to the gigantic, all-seeing eye of God. The same image is found in the cover of the British rock band The Alan Parsons Project's 1982 album *Eye in the Sky*.

⁴ *Hanamich* (花道: Flower Way) is essential feature of *Kabuki*. It functions as the entrance and exit for actors. It is also used as an extended performing space for actors. More importantly, *hanamich* plays a role to make spectators participate physically in the performance on stage. This physical participation, within the atmosphere of intimacy between actors and audience members, creates a world of immediate theatre reality over the whole of the auditorium. Consequently, the focal center of performance is made in the midst of the audience (Ernst 104). A fundamental importance is over the mentioned practical needs of *hanamich*. Commonly seen from Japanese and Chinese religious sacrificial rites, a passageway toward the altar is furnished for the entrance and exit of gods. In case of Chinese rites, flowers are often spread on the passage for gods, which might be the origin of the name of 'flower way' (Kim 66-69). After all, *hanamichi* is a symbolic channel connecting the worlds of the gods and the living.

Consequently, their desire for redemption falls short of accomplishment and meets castration again. The wings of the Angels represent the connection to the God's desire or 'phallus' in Freudian terms, but they manage to remain the connection in 'fragmented' shape or portion of the ideal vision of the phallus. If the God's desire for human redemption is impossible to be accomplished by Himself, it is double-time impossible for the Angels to achieve. After all, the Angels' castrated desire for revolution is repressed in their subconscious and will reveal in other disguised form within their dream.

3) Marat-Sade's Dream: the Real Stage

The third dream by the Winds is equivalent to the real stage, the last of the Lacanian three-step development process. On this stage, the Angels' dream of human redemption is projected in their literal dream to the Winds' dream of revolution. Particularly, on this stage, the Angels desire is projected to the real historical figures of French Revolution, Marat and Sade, who are the representative of the group of the Winds. The connection to God that has been fragmented but managed to survive in the forms of the wings of the Angel comes to be broken utterly. The principle of reality dominates 'this' world, which is completely detached from the world of God and ruled by the linear and historical time.

Marat and Sade, the two revolutionists and the Winds occupy the circular stage at the opposite end of the Flower Bed, double time detached from God. In this world of historical dimension, the Winds dream a revolution just as the Angels did in the previous stage. Just as the Angels did, the Winds also fail to meet agreement. While Marat representing the Red Wind follows the direction to Marxism, Sade representing the Grey Wind recoils from the violent line of the Marxist. As a result, their desire for revolution is subject to castration once more in the lack of consensus. The split in the revolutionaries is visually represented in the pie-shaped segments where the Winds occupy as their performing area. The desire to carry away all the pie pieces turns out a mission impossible. A piece of pie is left aside, set on too high up in the sky beyond the reach of human beings. The revolution they seek for becomes 'a pie in the sky.' The Winds' dream for revolution turns out an illusion. As long as they do not release themselves from the dream, their desire is subject to the endless repetition of castration.

Awakening from Dream, Back to the Pre-modern

Summing up the equivalent relation between the dream text of *The Dance of the Angels* and Lacanian desire theory, a diagram is drawn as following:




Diagram 1: Dream Text of *The Dance of Angels*

Seen from the Diagram 1, the King of the Birds' imaginary vision of human redemption and the desire to be God is castrated for the first time. On the second stage, the King's desire is projected in his dream to the Angles, and especially, the 'wings' functions as the symbolic signifier of the King's desire for redemption. However, the Angels' desire meets another castration. Their desire is projected again to the Winds' dream of revolution. This time, the King's original desire is projected to the real historical revolutionists Marat and Sade. Their desire for revolution is again subject to castration. As the two arrows in the diagram indicate, the castration of desire for redemption and revolution goes towards the 'permanence without fulfillment.'⁵

The dream text of *The Dance of Angels* delivers the author Satoh Makoto's vision of disillusionment that all the historical human desires to accomplish revolution are nothing but illusion. Right after an oblivious ecstasy, the dreamers are subject to disillusionment of the stark reality. What they think to be 'the' revolution is just 'another' revolution that will end unfulfilled, and what they think to get is not 'the' pie but 'a' piece of pie. Through the disillusionment of such dream text, Satoh suggests a possibility of breaking off the chains of illusion, that is, to awaken from the dream.

As a strategy to the awakening, Satoh keeps his eyes on the dream of the King of the Birds. Located in the metahistorical dimension, the Flower Bed, the King or God's area, has a significant meaning. The linear and historical time and space, that is the modern paradigm, is denied here. Instead, the past and the present fuse and cross each other. The worlds of the living and the dead coexist just as they do in the pre-modern Japanese world. The dream of the King or God is the place where the worlds of the living and the dead are separated first, the historical time-space begins for the first

⁵ The image of permanently repeated castration is implied from the words on screen appearing during the performance: "Dream at the end of dream; Revolution at the end of the revolution / Physical immortality" (Goodman 337).

time, and the first castration of desire starts. Seen from the Diagram 2, Satoh finds a crucial momentum right before the first stage passes into the next stage of the Angles. Here at this point, he carries out a decisive action to cut off the connection to the ceaseless repetition of castrations.




Diagram 2: Satoh's Cut-Off Point in the Dream Text

The cut-off action happens right before the King/God projects his desire to the wings of the Angels. The wings of the Angels are granted by God with an intention to make them descend to the world of the living and accomplish the castrated redemption. Nevertheless, at the very moment when God attaches the wings to the Angels' back, the separation of the worlds of the living and the dead comes into being, and consequently the journey of nightmare begins. To cut off the connection on this point means for Satoh to awaken the King/God from his dream text and turn him back to the situation prior to the nightmare. To this end, Satoh takes a decisive action to detach the wings from the back of the Angels, by burning them. As the whole time of the play implies, to 'burn' the wings of the Angels is the author's symbolic but self-conscious strategy to go back to the pre-modern time-space where the living and the dead are getting together in the vacuum of unnatural dichotomy and separation.

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***Re-Heating Hope through Recognition in Japanese Late Capitalism:
A Sociological Analysis of Ryo Asai's The Kirishima Thing***

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Abstract

How is invisible power exerted through recognition? By adopting David Harvey's social theory of postmodernity and Kazuo Seiyama's argument of power, this paper analyses Ryo Asai's movie *The Kirishima Thing* (Kirishima-Bukatsu-Yamerutteyo). Although the movie portrays daily life in a high school, the absence of the main character, Kirishima, throughout the entire film leaves it open to various interpretations. The interpretation put forward in this paper is that the movie depicts the exertion of power through mutual recognition to forcefully generate a sense of hope in the age of Japanese late capitalism. This article addresses the following two points. First, Kirishima's absence means that the students lack a source of reassurance, which adds to the dim prospects for their future. In this movie, recognition is achieved through engaging in Bukatsu: extracurricular club activities. Second, the Japanese expression '[...] katsu,' i.e. '[...] activities' is an ideology of 'reheating', which forces people to be enthusiastic about certain kinds of activities and attempts to recover a sense of hope. As there are an increasing number of similar expressions in Japanese, e.g. Kon-katsu [searching for a marriage partner] and Shu-katsu [job-hunting], power is exerted in a form of participation that aims to create a certain relationship with others. This paper is a pioneering attempt to examine literary works and movies by applying Harvey's theory and Seiyama's argument. The presentation also constitutes the first analysis of Ryo Asai's work that deals with the theme of generating hope through recognition.

Keywords: David Harvey, hope, Japan, movie, postmodernity, power, recognition, Ryo Asai, sociology.

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I. Introduction

How is invisible power exerted in the age of postmodernity in Japanese late capitalism? This paper analyses the sociological implications of Ryo Asai's movie *The Kirishima Thing* (*Kirishima-Bukatsu-Yamerutteyo*) and proposes that it depicts one form of exertion of power: the forceful generation of hope through recognition among Japanese younger generations (particularly high-school and university students). Although the movie portrays daily life in a high school, the absence of Kirishima (the captain of the volleyball team) throughout the entire film leaves it open to various interpretations. This article aims to examine such exertion of power through recognition and to evaluate its socio-cultural meanings and outcomes, by investigating the sociological implications of the movie.

Ryo Asai's popularity was recently established thanks to this movie, which is based on Asai (2010).¹ Asai's work commonly deals with teenagers and university students who are confronted with an unpredictable future, sometimes at the turning point of their lives, in the absence of significant individuals who give them existential reassurance. Asai's work can be classified into the following two categories:

- 1) School life: the works in this category describe the students' multiple perceptions of realities in the same social space: high school or university campus. The topics vary from job-hunting to school cultural festivals, extracurricular activities, and the high-school graduation ceremony (Asai 2012a, 2012b, 2011b, 2010).
- 2) Loss of father: the literature in this classification deals with the sudden loss of a father (sometimes accompanied by the loss of an elder sister). The widowed mother brings a new partner to the house after a year, and this incident leaves the main character (her son) mentally shocked. (Asai 2013, 2011a).

The notable characteristic of Asai's works is the usage of ensemble casting: a technique that is also used by some other Japanese writers. This technique leaves his works open to various interpretations from each character's perspective. Readers can decide who is the main character according to his/her interpretations.

This paper constitutes the first comprehensive analysis of Asai's work. Current accounts of Asai's literary works and the movie are limited to short explanations. In relation to this movie, some brief reviews introduce it as a story of '*school caste* (social hierarchy among students in the Japanese school)' and also explain that the division of students in the classroom is an analogy of class stratification in society (Furuichi and Yoshida 2012; Mizuno and Osawa 2013:280-4; Osawa 2012). Osawa (2012) also points out that Kirishima is synonymous with a god, since Kirishima is in the centre of school activities and is counted on by students. Furuichi and Asai (2014) exchange ideas on the current socio-cultural situations of Japanese younger generations (mainly high-school and university students) in a newspaper article by

¹ Asai (2010), the original literary work behind this movie, was awarded the 22nd Subaru Literature Rookie Award. In addition, the movie was awarded the 36th Japan Academy Award (Award for Best Picture, Directing, Film Editing, and Writing Original Screenplay), the Japanese Movie of Excellence Award, Mainichi Movie Competition's Best Directing Award, Yokohama Movie Festival's Directing Award, and the Japanese Best Picture Award.

referencing some scenes in the movie. Asai's works depict the socio-cultural situation of Japanese high-school and university students, with particular emphasis on the perplexed human subjects faced with an unpredictable future. Thus, Asai's works are worth sociological attention.

In contrast to the current interpretation of the movie, which focuses on students' hierarchy in the school, this paper interprets the movie's socio-cultural implication, namely the exertion of power. In order to achieve this goal, this article adopts social theoretical perspectives rather than using literary theories. In particular, David Harvey's examination of postmodernity and Kazuo Seiyama's argument of power are useful as a framework of analysis.² Harvey's examination of postmodernity, as shown in Harvey (1990a=1999, 1990b, 1989), has been discussed in sociological and critical urban geographical studies, but not in literary analysis, even though these studies mention literary works in their arguments. Moreover, Seiyama's interpretation of power has not been applied in literary analysis either. Thus, this investigation also constitutes the first examination of a literary work that adopts the arguments of Harvey and Seiyama.

The concept of recognition has been mainly discussed in political philosophy, but it has been given increasing attention in sociology in recent years. The definition of this concept is not necessarily strict, but thinkers share the following definition: giving a person a sense of being valuable through affirmative understanding and acceptance of his/her existence (cf. Honneth 2000=2005; Miyadai 2013:24-7, 34-6). Researchers have used the term flexibly, and this paper adopts a similar usage of this concept.

The contents of this paper follow: first, the article conducts textual analysis of *The Kirishima Thing*. It might seem that the main characters of this movie are Ryoya (the director of the movie club) and Kasumi (a member of the badminton club) as these two individuals are featured in the poster and advertisement for this film. However, this investigation regards Hiroki (a former member of the baseball club) as the main character. Second, this paper analyses the sociological implications of the movie. It interprets the film as a story of students' resignation towards their unpredictable future when it is increasingly difficult to feel a sense of hope. In this situation, students must forcefully 'reheat' and remotivate themselves to look for a sense of hope by engaging in *Bukatsu* [extracurricular club activities]. This section states that the expressions [...] *katsu* and [...] *ryoku* are a manifestation of exertion of power and interprets them as 'the ideologies of reheating'.

² Taylor and Lang (2004) criticise the explosion of small paradigms among sociological examinations. They propose that sociologists should conduct an innovative investigation based on alternative research methods. This paper uses the word postmodernity, as other terms do not necessarily show significant differences in their meanings (e.g. liquid modernity [Bauman 2000]). This applies to the usage of the concept of recognition in this paper.

II. Multiple Realities Portrayed in *The Kirishima Thing*

1. Formation of Groups among Students

The movie is classified into two parts. The first half is used for the entire portrayal of school life from multiple perspectives, focusing on 'Friday' to the following 'Tuesday'. The latter half of the film shows the unexpected communications between students' groups that are caused by the absence of Kirishima.

The characters in the movie can be divided into two large groups and six small groups. The first large group is the one under direct influence from Kirishima: the volleyball club and the 'going-home' club (*kitaku-bu*). The second large group is the one which Kirishima indirectly influences: the movie club, the badminton club, the brass-band club, and the baseball club. Based on this group classification, this section is devoted to the textual analysis of the contents.

2. On a Group under Direct Influence from Kirishima

1) The Volleyball Club

Kirishima is the captain and is in the position of 'libero'. Kirishima's membership as a player in the volleyball team representing the Kanto region shows his notable volleyball skills. However, because of Kirishima's absence, Fusuke replaces him in the position of 'libero'. Fusuke is happy about this unexpected chance to participate in the game. Although this emotion is not portrayed in the movie, it is articulated in the original novel version. However, Fusuke cannot perform well enough to distinguish himself in the actual competition. This failure causes him to receive harsh criticism from other teammates during the practice after being defeated in the competition. As a result, Fusuke shouts during the practice, 'no matter how much I do, this is all I can do!' Kirishima has been acclaimed by many students even outside the volleyball club activity, but Fusuke cannot get such positive recognition and evaluation from the team members.

2) The Going-Home Club

The purpose of the going-home club's 'activity' is to wait for Kirishima to go to cram school together. Hiroki and two other members of the going-home club play basketball together after school. When the news of Kirishima's absence is spreading, these three students are chatting about their *raison d'être*, as to whether they are superior to other students who engage in extracurricular club activities. Hiroki says, as if putting an end to the discussion, 'After all, the superior person can do everything, but the inferior people cannot achieve anything'. Two other members show envy and jealousy towards Hiroki, and they feel their limitations in having a sense of superiority to others.

3. On a Group that Kirishima Indirectly Influences

1) The Movie Club

Mainly two students, Ryoya and Takefumi, are featured in the movie. At the beginning, the movie club's original work, 'You wipe away my burning tears (*Kimiyo-fuke-bokuno-atsui-namida-wo*)', receives a prize in the competition called '*Eiga Koshien* (All-Japan high-school movie competition)'. The movie was shot and

acted by the students of the movie club, but the supervisor of the club wrote the scenario. Ryoya and Takefumi are praised for their achievement in front of all the students in their school meeting, but the title of the film is laughed at by the entire audience. Ryoya and Takefumi appear awkward and not to be enjoying the atmosphere.

Ryoya and Takefumi are familiar with topics related to movies and construct their own world through movies, though they usually do not communicate with other classmates. The supervisor of the club tells them to make a film dealing with topics related to student life, such as love, romance, friendship, and studying. Since the teacher wrote the former film, 'You wipe away my burning tears', Ryoya and Takefumi make up their minds to create their own film, one that they truly want to shoot. Takefumi encourages Ryoya, saying, 'you cannot step back. You must do it'. They decide to start shooting a zombie film, titled 'The Dead Student Representatives (*Seitokai-of-the-dead*)'. Even though they are not considered to be a popular group in the classroom, they show a sense of compassion for and recognition of each other.

2) The Badminton Club

This badminton club is in a unique position in the school. Mika and Kasumi show compassion for and recognition of the less privileged individuals, namely Fusuke and Ryoya.³ First, Mika silently understands Fusuke's situation and stops him from going to find Kirishima in a later scene in the movie. Second, Kasumi also silently supports the activities of the movie club. Even though the entire school scoffs at Ryoya's achievement, Kasumi does not look down on Ryoya. Although Ryoya's crush on Kasumi ends when he witnesses her together with her boyfriend in the classroom, Kasumi silently supports the activities of the movie club in the final part of the movie by hitting Sana, who looks down on the movie club.

3) The Brass-band Club

Aya, the director of the brass-band club, is the only character featured among the band members. She practises playing saxophone on the school's roof and in front of the science building, in order to look at Hiroki. This arouses conflict between Aya and the movie club. Aya is asked by Ryoya to vacate the place where she is playing saxophone so that he can shoot his movie, but she refuses, saying, 'this is serious practice'. Aya already senses that she cannot be Hiroki's girlfriend, and she is forced to give up this ambition when she witnesses Hiroki being kissed by Sana. During the conflict over places for practising her instrument, Aya also says to Ryoya, 'this is the final time', meaning that she wants to give up her crush on Hiroki and to successfully complete her duties as director of the brass-band club as the day of retirement approaches.

4) The Baseball Club

Hiroki uses a baseball bag when commuting, which indicates that he used to be a member of baseball club. The captain of the baseball club continuously approaches Hiroki to participate in the game, but he does not criticise Hiroki's absence and

³ Even though Mika and Kasumi associate with Risa and Sana, they keep their distance from them. Risa and Sana rely strongly on the presence of Kirishima. Mika and Kasumi also show a sarcastic attitude towards and slightly scoff at perplexed Risa in the absence of Kirishima. Mika also explains her activities at the badminton club as 'just for the sake of entering university easier' to them, but Mika tells Kasumi that she indeed likes playing badminton.

sabotage. After being approached by the captain several times, Hiroki asks why the captain does not retire from baseball-club activities even in autumn, since the third-year students are generally supposed to retire from club activities after completing competitions in the summer season. The captain's reply is that he is to continue 'until the draft-picking season ends' but that professional baseball-team scouts are not attempting to recruit him at that moment. Hiroki witnesses the captain practising alone in the public park afterwards, but Hiroki hides himself to avoid communicating with him.

4. On the Roof of the School

Although the first hour of the movie is used for portraying the groups and their own extracurricular activities, the situation suddenly changes in the final hour, when one member of the going-home club finds someone who looks like Kirishima on the roof of the school building. Every student in the movie, except those in the brass-band club and the movie club, starts running to the roof once the news is heard. In this scene, the brass-band club starts practising Elsa's Procession to the Cathedral, which is the only background music in the entire film.

The people who get together on the roof start arguing with each other. When the members of the volleyball club and the badminton club are running to the roof, the movie club is shooting the film. In this scene, the movie club does not seem to have identified the existence of Kirishima on the roof. Kubo from the volleyball club kicks away the stone that the movie club is using for filmmaking after realising that Kirishima is not there. Kubo and Ryoya are about to start fighting physically. Although Fusuke tries to stop Kubo from resorting to violence, he does so out of concern that the volleyball club might not be able to participate in the competition because of this incident. This shows that Fusuke is not sympathetic to the movie club. In addition, Kasumi hits Sana when Sana provokes Kubo to attack Ryoya. Ryoya directs the members of the movie club to start shooting the scene in the zombie movie when predators (acted by the movie-club members) eat and kill benign students (the volleyball-club members). This conflict between students ends with mutual rejection, without apology.

After the conflict between the movie club and the volleyball club, Hiroki picks up a lens cover from Ryoya's camera. The lens cover removes the barrier of communication between them. Their conversation starts when Hiroki taps Ryoya's shoulder, though these two individuals do not talk to each other. In the original novel version, Hiroki becomes tense and nervous when attempting to talk to Ryoya, though the novel does not explain the reason clearly. Hiroki asks if Ryoya is going to be a movie director, but Ryoya's answer, that he already feels that he cannot be a professional movie director in the future, surprises Hiroki. Ryoya also answers, 'I feel I am connected to the world when I shoot a film. The sun is sinking, but we have to survive in this world no matter what'. Hiroki starts crying with 'burning tears' at this moment, saying 'I have had enough already'. Hiroki calls Kirishima on the phone, but he does not answer.

III. Sociological Implications of This Film: [...] *katsu* and [...] *ryoku* as ‘the Ideology of Reheating’

It is possible to interpret this movie as a story of resignation towards an unpredictable future if the viewer regards Hiroki as the main character. In other words, Hiroki is questioning the meaning of engaging in *Bukatsu* [extracurricular club activities] because he is not sure why students are enthusiastic and heated about *Bukatsu*, even though they are not necessarily related to their prospective career and other activities in the future. First, Fusuke already senses that he cannot take over Kirishima’s position satisfactorily and surpass him in volleyball performance. Second, two students in the going-home club also sense that they cannot exceed Hiroki’s performance and might not be able to achieve anything in their future. Third, Ryoya feels that he cannot be a movie director, even though his team was awarded a prize at a national level. Fourth, Aya gives up trying to get Hiroki as a partner. Fifth, the captain of the baseball club feels that he cannot be a professional baseball player. Kirishima’s absence and subsequent incidents reveal that the characters are resigned to their future. At this very moment, faced with an unpredictable future, it is also revealed that students are forcefully ‘reheating’ and remotivating themselves by engaging with *Bukatsu*.

In the era of late capitalism, it is increasingly difficult for people to predict the possible future of society. Thus, the prospects of people possessing a positive sense of hope are not certain (Beck 1986; Beck et al. 1994; Furuichi 2010). Hage (2009; 2003) points out that it was possible for society to give a sense of hope to its citizens. Although Hage (2009; 2003) does not give specific examples of such components of hope or under what kind of socio-economic formations they might exist, this article argues that the components of hope in this sense are the various chances (e.g. opportunities of employment and education) that enable people to foresee the prospective visions of their future through socio-economic growth. As Yamada (2004) also points out, stagnation of economic growth since the 1990s in Japan prompts questions concerning the meaning of being enthusiastic or ‘heated’.

There have been proliferating numbers of slogans and catchphrases in Japan to ‘reheat’ the motivation of the younger generation (particularly high-school and university students) under the socio-economic stagnation. The most notable examples in recent years are the expression [...] *katsu* ([...] activities), e.g. *Shu-katsu* [job-hunting] and *Kon-katsu* [seeking for marriage partner], and [...] *ryoku* ([...] abilities), e.g. *Joshi-ryoku* [some abilities that make an attractive girl], *Communication-no-ryoku* [an ability to have efficient communication skills], and *Gogaku-ryoku* [an ability to use foreign languages fluently]. Such expressions and slogans, as shown in [...] *katsu* and [...] *ryoku*, function as a mechanism to remotivate the will of the younger generation, and then serve to reorient them to the ‘desirable (*nozomashii*)’ disposition in order to maintain and reproduce the current social order. Machimura (2000) defines such a mechanism of remotivating people as ‘the ideology of reheating’: remotivating the people’s will in the same manner as switching on electric devices. If one successfully internalises the norms that are endorsed by such ‘activities’ and ‘abilities’, one is considered to be ‘shining (*kagayaku*)’ or ‘desirable (*nozomashii*)’, and such a one tends to receive positive recognition and evaluation from his/her peers.

It is true that remotivating the will of Japanese younger generations through such slogans would be useful for the sake of maintaining social order in the era of Japanese late capitalism, but such discursive compulsion is likely to confuse them and to increase their anxieties if there is no proper understanding of the actual contents and meaning of such ideology. The definitions of such ‘activities’ and ‘abilities’ consist of several elements, but they only explain certain aspects of a human subject. For instance, in *Shu-katsu* [job-hunting], certain abilities, such as communication skills (*Communication-no-ryoku*), the reputation of university graduated from (*Gaku-ryoku*), and desirable personality (*Ningen-ryoku*) are highly evaluated, but other personal characteristics are likely to be discarded from evaluation. The discourse on such ‘abilities’ and ‘activities’ is increasingly becoming powerful ideology that dictates the behaviour and disposition of Japanese younger generations.

The very moment when power is exerted among people is when there is acknowledgement and recognition of such discourse. The subject that exerts power tends to be ambiguous and diffused in the age of globalised late capitalism. Although Michel Foucault’s explanation of power is fragmented and not clear, the Foucauldian conception of power identifies the exertion of power in all the social fields (Foucault 1976:120). Based on Foucault’s explanation of power, Seiyama (2000:14-6) proposes that recognition and acknowledgement of the current order (i.e. ‘knowledge [*savoir*]’) itself is the moment when the power is exercised. Unlike the conventional conception of power that assumes a closed society in which the powerful sovereign exerts a physical influence over the citizens regardless of their will, as typically shown in Weber (1922=1960:8), Seiyama’s conception provides an alternative view of exertion of power in the age of globalised capitalism, when borders have become increasingly porous and the technology of sovereignty is more complicated than before.

In his argument on postmodernity, Harvey (1990a=1999:367-9) points out that the lifespan of every product is now shorter than before, and that the advent of lifestyle based on mass consumption and disposal of such products has impacted every social relation in that it is regarded as disposable as well.⁴ ‘Disposable’ social relations expand to the realm of ‘lifestyle, value, architecture, attachment to a place, and the mode of act and existence’ (Harvey 1990a=1999:376). This means that temporal agreements, rather than permanent institutional systems and contracts, play dominant roles in the life of postmodernity, and participation in the established and eternal things gets increasingly difficult (Harvey 1990a=1999:375). It becomes hard for people to feel a sense of being recognised in this situation. As Harvey (1990a=1999) also argues, the pursuit of eternity and stability gets conversely stronger as seen in the growing popularity of the new types of religions and communities, in search of a place where one is recognised.

The very moment when power is exerted is at the endorsement of order that Kirishima generates. Kirishima symbolically represents the ‘desirable (*nozomashii*)’ being in the society, and the existence of Kirishima functions as a magnetic field of the exertion of power. Kirishima’s charismatic influence gives students around him a sense of

⁴ Harvey argues that social changes in the era of late capitalism have proceeded hand in hand with ‘time-space compression’ and ‘annihilation of space through time’ that have caused people to experience time and space in a different manner. The advent of change in the meaning of time and space has caused people to think, feel, and act differently (Harvey 1990a=1999). ‘Time-space compression’ has impacted politico-economic actions, and cultural and social life.

reassurance, in a situation where students find it difficult to regard their own future prospects positively. The absence of Kirishima makes students lose their temporal existential reassurance and leaves them perplexed in various senses. The students' search for Kirishima at the end of the movie means that they are chasing a sense of hope at the same time.

The title of this movie should be 'You wipe away my burning tears' if the movie is interpreted from Hiroki's perspective. The actual title, *The Kirishima Thing* (*Kirishima-bukatsu-yamerutteyo*; Kirishima seems to have quit from the volleyball club), implies that the events are seen from the perspectives of the girls and the members of the volleyball club. There is no clear explanation as to why Hiroki suddenly bursts into tears at the end of the movie. Hiroki was looking for answers to the meaning of being 'heated' in *Bukatsu* in the age of postmodernity in Japanese late capitalism. Hiroki thought that Ryoya might have an answer. That is why Hiroki was nervous in that scene in the original novel version. However, Hiroki realises that even Ryoya, the unfamiliar person in the other group, is not sure about the answer either, and Ryoya himself is already resigned about the future regarding becoming a professional movie director. Hiroki later calls Kirishima, who seems to have the answer, but Kirishima does not pick up the phone. The answer to the meaning of being 'heated' is not clarified at all in the movie scene.

IV. Conclusion

This paper analysed the movie *The Kirishima Thing* by regarding Hiroki as the main character among the multiple students featured in the movie and investigated one form of exertion of power in the age of postmodernity in Japanese late capitalism. First, the textual analysis revealed that students in the movie are forcefully generating a sense of hope by getting 'heated' with *Bukatsu*. It is increasingly difficult for Japanese younger generations to grasp something solid that reassures them in their existential anxieties regarding their unpredictable future. Kirishima is a charismatic figure in the school and embodies what the society considers to be 'desirable'. Kirishima is thus a magnetic field of the exertion of power. Many students find existential reassurance by being with him. Kirishima and Hiroki seem to have faced limitations in engaging in *Bukatsu*. In particular, Hiroki looks for the meaning of getting 'heated' with *Bukatsu* and other activities throughout the movie, but he ends up not finding a satisfactory answer. Hiroki's exploration reveals that each student is resigned about his/her future.

Second, this paper showed that the Japanese expressions [...] *katsu* and [...] *ryoku* function as 'the ideology of reheating'. It is true that some 'activities' and 'abilities' endorsed by such slogans serve to maintain the social order, particularly when Japanese younger generations feel it is increasingly difficult to predict their future. However, proliferating usage of such slogans can increase the anxieties of younger generations in the age of Japanese late capitalism if there is no proper understanding of the socio-cultural meanings of those slogans. Such discourse encourages them to have a certain disposition, though the 'activities' and 'abilities' described in such slogans only explain certain aspects of human traits. When the source of power is diffused and uncertain in the age of postmodernity, acknowledgement and recognition of such social order is the very moment when the power is exerted.

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Hear Their Voices: Asian Sex Workers in Australia

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Abstract

Internationally, the trafficking of women into the sex industry is a heinous crime deserving of attention in all source, transit, and destination countries. However, denying someone the right to work in the sex industry by labelling all migrant sex workers as trafficked is detrimental and removes their right to choose. Migrant sex workers in Australia, in particular those from Asian countries, face a situation where they may be homogenized and labelled as victims of trafficking and subjected to raids on their places of work. Western beliefs and values have shaped the current culture of Australia, where sex work is generally viewed as something no woman would do by free choice. Media coverage of incidents helps to fuel the belief this is indeed a dangerous form of work, entangled with drugs and crime. Stories of rescue appear, both relating to Australian situations and the work of Australian charity organizations in Asia, and yet very few cases of human trafficking into the Australian sex industry have been prosecuted. Reasons are given for this, focusing on the fear victims have of reprisals. The exertion of power over others, forcing them to work in the sex industry is an abuse of human rights. Evil does take place and needs to be stamped out. However, here I look at both sides of the story in a country where prostitution is not illegal, and free choice is generally encouraged.

Keywords: Anti-trafficking, sex work, migration for work

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Introduction

In this paper I do not defend human trafficking. I speak against specific anti-trafficking efforts that discriminate against those they claim to protect, showing I am anti anti-trafficking. According to Geertz, this double negative “enables one to reject something without thereby committing oneself to what it rejects.” (Geertz, 1984, p.264) By drawing on interviews and the literature, my paper presents some of the voices of Asian sex workers in Australia as they construct their reality, in conjunction with those who seek to disregard these voices. I adopt a constructionist approach to analyse how the Australian Government response to human trafficking shapes public perceptions of these migrant sex workers.¹

The labor force of today is globalizing, with many people migrating for work, taking advantage of opportunities they hope to find in destination countries. People who move from first world nations to settle in other lands are often referred to as expatriots, while those who re-settle from the developing world are known as migrants. This division of terms reflects a gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’, even though migration for work and/or a change of lifestyle are the primary motivation for both migrants and ‘ex-pats’. As a destination country, Australia is seen as an attractive option for overseas workers, with its generally high standard of living, favorable climate, stable political situation, and relatively crime free and safe communities. A good exchange rate, better working conditions, the possibility of more work available, as well as the draw of travel and experiencing life overseas are all factors that may influence a person’s decision to migrate for work, regardless of their skill level or economic status. Migrant sex workers are no different, with their patterns of migration for personal betterment corresponding to general migration practices.

Every year about 400,000 Australians visit my country. 280,000 Aussie men and 120,000 Aussie women come looking for adventure, to study, visit friends, find cheap shopping, or do business. Many work illegally, like teaching English, or doing computer work, import, export, translation. Many also overstay their visa, and worry about the police catching them. And every year about 76,000 Thai people visit Australia. Around 40,000 Thai men and 36,000 Thai women come looking for adventure, to study, visit family or to do business. Like the Australians I know, some will work illegally as farm workers, domestic workers, cleaners, sex workers, cooks, or masseuses. Some will also overstay their visa, and worry about the police catching them. Same-same, but different? (Pornpit Puckmai, a Thai background sex worker, quoted in E. Jeffreys, 2009).

There is a vast informal economic sector in most destination countries, with some migrants finding work for cash in labor intensive seasonal jobs such as fruit picking or selling articles on the street. These business ventures are unregulated and uncontrolled, yet they do not elicit the same interest as the sex industry. Here I note a recent media report on migrant workers being underpaid and mistreated in other Australian industries such as agricultural and factory work has triggered discussion on

¹ I would like to acknowledge the discussion and comments arising from my presentation at the Asian Conference on Asian Studies (ACAS) 2015. These helped me to shape the final version of this paper.

this subject. Labor hire firms have been accused of ‘skimming off’² wages paid to them by employers. The Government has responded by announcing it will examine the pay-slips of working holiday visa holders, aiming to stop workers from being exploited, while the Opposition has contacted the Fair Work Ombudsman asking for an interim report (Conifer, 2015). However, these workers are not labelled as victims of trafficking. The same response is not possible for migrant sex workers; nobody offers to examine their pay-slips, and the Opposition does not jump in quickly to suggest involving the Fair Work Ombudsman. Examining rates of pay and workplace practices appear to be of secondary concern to the Government, with moral issues about prostitution taking precedence over conditions of employment.

The association with sex overwhelmingly affects how migrants are treated, excluding them as travelers and workers, and constructing them as passive objects forced to work and travel in ways they never wanted. (Agustin, 2007, p.11)

This prevailing narrative fuels responses in Australia where migrant sex workers from developing nations are too easily labelled as victims of human trafficking, while those who visit from first world, western nations and work in the sex industry are generally thought of as being on holiday. They are referred to as touring girls by others in the sex industry³.

The sex industry is either legal or decriminalized in Australia, depending upon which state or territory is visited, whereas it is illegal in many source countries. However, migrant sex workers have been the primary target of anti-trafficking measures as Australia responds to the international problem of human trafficking. High profile brothel raids, organized by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection and the Australian Federal Police, and often with media coverage, have exposed migrant sex workers’ identities in an industry where confidentiality and non-disclosure of such details is respected by fellow workers (E. Jeffreys, 2008, p.196). The authorities tend to find that the migrant sex workers on the premises are working lawfully; they are not victims of human trafficking, and yet these raids continue in response to claims legalized prostitution fuels sex trafficking. Media reports in Australia have alleged links between the sex industry and international crime networks involved in human trafficking. However, the Australian Sex Workers Association, Scarlet Alliance, refers to this reporting as hysteria (ABC Radio Australia, 2012).

Trafficking Defined

The United Nations *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime*, which opened for signature in 2000, is the first international instrument to cover all forms of trafficking regardless of age and gender. It aims to prevent trafficking, protect victims, and promote cooperation between nations in dealing with this issue. Here we see the first universal definition of trafficking in persons,⁴ with it being considered as a form of organized crime to be tackled best through international cooperation. Australia ratified the Protocol in 2005 and is therefore obligated to observe and put into practice particular measures to

² Keeping some of the money received and paying the workers at a lower hourly rate than that provided by the employer.

³ Information gained from interviews with sex workers in Australia and New Zealand, 2011 – 2015.

⁴ A definition of Trafficking in Persons can be found in Article 3(a) of the *Trafficking in Persons Protocol* (United Nations, 2000).

criminalize trafficking offences as defined in the Protocol in an effort to combat human trafficking. However, the Protocol has been written in such a way as to allow nations their own interpretation of terms such as '*exploitation of the prostitution of others*' and '*sexual exploitation*', thus taking into consideration domestic policies on these issues (Schloenhardt, 2012, p.6). Australian policy makers have chosen to consider the exploitation of sex work, rather than sex work as exploitation, with sex work being defined as

the provision by one person to or for another person (whether or not of a different sex) of sexual services in return for payment or reward. (Sex Work Act 1994, Victoria)

By focusing on the exploitation rather than on sex work as exploitation, the Federal Government is able to detach itself from legislating about prostitution; this being under the jurisdiction of state legislation in Australia.

Anti-trafficking policymakers and non-government organizations (NGOs) are divided by the notion of whether sex work can ever be considered a choice. Abolitionists link prostitution and sex trafficking, seeing both as violations of a woman's human rights. This sentiment has its roots in the moral panic surrounding white slavery in Victorian England, when the migration of British women throughout the British Empire was seen as a potential threat to their sexual purity. Current fears concerning migration for sex work seem to stem from anti-immigration policies where migrants, especially women, are seen as a threat to the sovereignty of the state (Kamler, 2014).

According to the United Nations Trafficking Protocol, three core factors have to be present cumulatively for an incident to be labelled as human trafficking. These are: 1) the 'act' which encompasses recruitment, transportation, or harboring, 2) the 'means' where threat, use of force, deception, or coercion is used, and 3) the 'purpose' which is exploitation or the intent to exploit (Pearson, 2007, p.33). Subsections of Section 271 of the Australian Criminal Code outline human trafficking as organizing or facilitating the transportation of a victim into, out of or within Australia, by using force, threats or deception or by being reckless as to the exploitation of the victim (IDC, 2013, pp.13-15). However, the Australian Criminal Code does not seem to comply with the requirements of the Protocol, in that all three key elements of act, means and exploitation, do not appear cumulatively in each subsection. Section 271, referring to the trafficking of people, focuses on the act of organizing or facilitating the entry or exit of a person. This indicates an emphasis on the issue of irregular or illegal migration, rather than on the other elements that combine to indicate trafficking. Border security and maintaining state sovereignty seem to be the catalyst for Australian Government actions to combat human trafficking, with an over-emphasis on law enforcement to the detriment of a human rights approach.

According to Kneebone (2009), human trafficking in Australia is seen as a crime against the state not against the person, while those who are trafficked are treated as witnesses and victims of crime, not as having suffered human rights violations. Both state security and human rights should be considered to deal appropriately with the issue of human trafficking, where illegal acts occur, and the dignity of its victims is compromised. However, solutions to the problem of human trafficking vary depending upon how it is constructed and whose interests are being served.

In reference to the Trafficking Protocol in 2009,

A decade later, it is necessary to acknowledge that there is no way the international community would have a definition and an international treaty on trafficking if this issue had stayed within the realms of the human rights system. (Gallagher, 2009, p.793)

It is the strong desire for state sovereignty and border security, particularly since the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11, 2001, that has provided the impetus for policy makers to address the issue of illegal migration. Tackling this as human trafficking is a way of getting public opinion on side, especially when people smuggling is also seen as illegal migration and the terms ‘trafficking’ and ‘smuggling’ are often confused. A person’s right to arrive, work, and stay in Australia is a subject that causes great concern to some members of the community (The Conversation, 2014), reminiscent of the situation over the last century when the ‘White Australia’ Policy was in force.

Australia’s Response

Australia’s geographical isolation and lack of shared land borders, combined with its border security measures and strict immigration policies have resulted in low trafficking figures, (Attorney-General’s Department, 2015; Pearson, 2007). In spite of this lack of common borders, Australia has a history of restricting who is allowed to enter and work in the country. The Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, known informally as the ‘White Australia’ Policy, was used to restrict immigration on the grounds of race, gender, socio-economic status, disease, and type of employment, including prostitution (www.immi.gov.au, 2015). This was finally abolished in 1973, although it remains in force in more subtle ways, with Australia’s immigration requirements still limiting the entry of unskilled or poorly educated workers from less developed nations. Sex workers are able to migrate to Australia using legal channels, although they do require a working visa or working holiday visa, which may involve the use of a third party such as a broker or agent, or the use of illegal measures if they are unskilled and from developing nations. As yet, there is not a legitimate visa category for sex workers, resulting in false statements of work intentions in Australia. Campaigners for this addition to the visa application allege it would “strike at the heart of trafficking from South-East Asia” by removing the fear of discovery associated with false claims on legal documents, while those against this idea fear such a visa category would contribute to exploitation (Bell, 2011). This would imply a person could enter Australia on a working visa stating the occupation as sex worker, yet still be exploited once working; a situation conceivable in any field of employment. A new category of visa was established in 2004, whereby trafficked persons who agreed to assist with the investigation and prosecution of traffickers could stay in Australia. This was established partly in response to a media and public outcry over the treatment of trafficking victims as the guilty party through detention in immigration centers and deportation (Pearson, 2007, p38). However, these visas are linked to the criminal justice system and do not provide for long-term residency in Australia, thus causing anxiety to trafficked persons as they await the often lengthy trial procedures.

The Australian Government response to human trafficking has been criticized for its over-emphasis on illegal migration, where intercepting, detaining and deporting those who arrive through irregular channels is primary to border security. As Kneebone states,

the prediction that a focus on trafficking would exacerbate anti-immigration responses to international migration has proven to be an accurate reality. The trafficking-migration nexus has fueled an anti-immigration approach. (2010, p138)

This response neglects the needs of trafficking victims, who, like asylum seekers, may require support and protection instead of being returned home. By focusing on protecting the state against illegal migration instead of protecting these women against violence and abuse, the interests of the state are put before the interests of people. Such migration policies have been said to promote rather than prevent trafficking, as those seeking to migrate may need to use the services of agents or brokers to procure the appropriate papers required to enter Australia. This leaves them indebted to someone, with the guarantee of payment for these documents forming part of a contract to work in Australia. Here, because of the way human trafficking has been defined by the United Nations, is where what constitutes trafficking can occur as workers have a debt they must pay off. These debts may end up being inflated when other hidden costs and interest are added, resulting in the worker being under the control of the employer or a third party such as a recruitment agency in a situation of debt bondage, where exploitation can occur (Attorney-General's Department, 2015). Regardless of a person's willingness to come to Australia to work in the sex industry, even when in full knowledge of the debt they have incurred, the definition set out in the United Nations Trafficking Protocol can be used to label these migrant sex workers as victims of human trafficking.

Human trafficking in Australia is primarily seen as problem of female migrant sex workers, especially those from South-East Asian nations, while any form of trafficking other than for sexual exploitation, or indeed any domestic trafficking has been largely ignored (Schloenhardt, et al, 2009). Asian migrant sex workers in Australia are a marginalized group, both because of their chosen line of work and their migrant status. They may be subjected to negative opinions on migration, race, gender, and sex work as they try to fit into Australian society, while being portrayed as helpless victims of human trafficking. Popular media and some academics have constructed the sex worker as a victim without agency, as a catalyst for anti-prostitution sentiment, claiming eradicating the demand (prostitution) would halt the supply (trafficked sex workers) (Farley, 2003; S. Jeffreys, 2002; Norma, 2011; Raymond, 2003). Conversely, sex worker advocates claim this linking of sex workers and human trafficking has resulted in poor policy and fails to recognize migrant sex workers as self-determining agents. (Kim & Jeffreys, 2013, p.63)

Trafficked or migrating for work?

Incidents where workers are recruited and brought to Australia on Temporary Work (Skilled) visas have at times resulted in exploitation. This exploitation exists on a continuum in the workplace, with some migrants experiencing minor violations of their rights, while others become victims of severe exploitation which may lead to trafficking-like conditions. There is evidence that nurses, chefs, cooks, meat workers, domestic workers, agricultural and factory workers have been victims of workplace exploitation (David, 2010), and yet it is the sex industry that attracts the most attention. According to Elena Jeffreys, the 2012 president of the Australian sex workers association, Scarlet Alliance, the Australian Federal Police found 147 sex

workers working in trafficking-like conditions in the period from 2003 – 2012. This included those who had consented to poor working conditions. Jeffreys stated “This is not about force, and this is not about slavery. This is about work conditions.” She indicated that with over 20,000 sex workers working in Australia at any one time, “147 in 10 years is an issue, but not an everyday issue.” (Elena Jeffreys, interview on ABC Radio Australia, 2012) However, claims of the difficulty in researching trafficking, particularly within the sex industry, have led to a gross over-estimation on the size and nature of trafficking in the sex industry. (Kim & Jeffreys, 2013, p.65)

The Australian Non-Government Organization (NGO) Project Respect estimates around 1,000 women are trafficked to Australia each year. These women are said to be under contract and still paying off a debt. (Project Respect, 2008a) While not supported by evidence, this figure of 1,000 women has been re-quoted and used by other agencies to influence their anti-trafficking policies and actions. (ACRATH, 2011; humantrafficking.org, 2015) Over-estimating the number of sex workers trafficked to Australia serves to incite action and look for victims where they may not exist, such as happens when Asian brothels are raided.

“If Project Respect or the Salvos turn up at an establishment or event and you don’t let them in, they call the police and say you are all trafficked. This doesn’t help our relationship with the police.” (Quote from an Asian sex worker, Melbourne, 2014)

Project Respect is a feminist organization which aims to empower women in the sex industry, supporting them in whatever decisions they make. (Interview, Melbourne, 2013) However, members of Australia’s national sex worker organization Scarlet Alliance disagree with the actions and findings of Project Respect, seeing them as a group intent on getting women out of sex work. (Interview, Melbourne, 2014) In 2008(b), along with its seemingly high estimate of the number of women trafficked to Australia, Project Respect released a list of reasons why there would be a demand for trafficked women in the Australian sex industry. Firstly, this NGO determined there was a “lack of women in Australia who were willing to do prostitution” thus requiring trafficked women to fill the gaps in the supply and demand chain. The next two factors on the list reflect Project Respect’s negative view of men who purchase sexual services in Australia, stating customers demand women who are compliant and who they can be violent towards. These claims do not seem to be reflected in sex worker accounts of client behavior in Australia, either in the literature or the media. The final claim made by Project Respect is that customers in Australia have “racialized ideas that certain ethnicities such as Asian women have the above qualities;” compliant and willing to be subjected to violence. This is one of the many stereotypes Asian sex workers in Australia wish to overcome, with statements such as “We are strong and choose when, where and how we work” (Cross Borders Collective, 2012) and from an interview with a Korean sex worker who works in Brisbane, “Some men I see say I am an exotic flower. They treat me well and anyone who thinks he can get rough ... I tell him to leave. The house⁵ won’t allow it and I won’t allow it.” (Interview, Perth, 2012)

Sex workers face deep-seated stigmas which mean that if we don’t disclose our stories of tragedy and the demeaning experiences we have faced we run

⁵ Brothel

the risk of not being believed by many in the feminist movement. This has to stop, because we don't want to perform our 'tragedy porn' for you. (E. Jeffreys, 2011)

According to many sex workers and their advocates, there is a desire in the feminist movement to hear tragic stories of hardship from sex workers. The term 'tragedy porn' refers to those stereotypical narratives of physical and mental abuse, both in their past and from clients, often equated with sex workers. Addiction to alcohol and drugs, working in squalid conditions, rape, robbery, violence; all are elements of the tragic stories expected from sex workers. It is almost as if positive tales of a pleasant day at work are not welcomed by those who seek to abolish the sex industry. According to prominent abolitionist feminist writers and organizations, "the notion of a sex worker who is unharmed by her experience is an ontological impossibility: that which cannot be." (Doezema, 2001, p.27)

Trafficking discourses have been used as an arena for voicing differing versions of sex industry narratives, characterized by negative stereotypes of the men who purchase sexual services. One prominent writer, Mary Lucille Sullivan, claims "sexual harassment and rape are indistinguishable from the sex buyers purchase" (2007, p.5). She also writes of the sexual slavery experienced by all women who work in the Australian sex industry (2007, p.224). I take issue here with two factors; firstly, the lack of agency Sullivan attributes to sex workers in Australia, and secondly, her view of men purchasing sexual services. It would appear Sullivan does not credit sex workers with the ability to negotiate the services they will provide, to set boundaries, or to take control of the work situation. A client may be paying for a service, but this does not mean he has purchased total control over what is to happen. By stating all sex workers experience sexual slavery, Sullivan negates the positive and even the neutral experiences of many who work in the Australian sex industry, refusing to listen to their voices. She rejects any possibility a professional sexual encounter can be anything but damaging for the woman providing the service. In an interview with a prominent feminist (Melbourne, 2013), I was told any sex worker who claimed to have had only positive experiences, simply had not yet experienced a bad one. It is difficult to argue against such a statement. Such rhetoric serves to convince anti-prostitution lobbyists of the inevitable harm awaiting those working in the sex industry.

On the issue of clients, the assumption all men who purchase sexual services want to partake of sexual harassment, and what amounts to rape, of a sex worker is an injustice to the vast majority of those men, who for many reasons seek the services of a professional. Constructing all male clients as predators takes advantage of the fact that it would be difficult for the majority of those being accused to defend themselves against this accusation, given the need for discretion in such transactions between client and provider. The Nordic Model, where the sex worker is not prosecuted for selling a sexual service but the client is for purchasing the same, takes this injustice against men to the extreme and pushes sex work underground as sex workers try to make a living. Rather than preventing human trafficking, it has been reported that the price for purchasing sex in countries following the Nordic Model (Sweden, Norway and Iceland) has actually increased, thus making sex trafficking potentially more lucrative (Dodillet & Ostergren, 2011). Criminalizing either the sale or purchase of sexual services is not the answer to stopping human trafficking, but it does serve to pacify those seeking to abolish prostitution.

My body, my choice

“Do I think sex work makes me empowered? Does working in an office make you feel empowered?” (Interview with a sex worker from Melbourne, November 2014) This issue of empowerment is spoken of as an important factor for sex workers, and yet it is not a person’s occupation which empowers them. Rather, it is the process whereby the capacity to make choices and convert them into outcomes is increased. The empowerment of sex workers results from allowing their voices to be heard regarding decisions affecting their lives, and by affording them the freedom to choose to work in the sex industry. Specifically, migrant sex workers want to speak for themselves. Token consultation with them is not enough; they want to drive policy and be active in law reform processes. However, this is hindered by the preconceived ideas surrounding the image of an Asian sex worker who has come to Australia to work. Interviews with Asian sex workers revealed many disappointments about the way they are treated and viewed in Australia. “They take over our voice and our space!” and “They produce a caricature of what they think sex workers are or look like.” These women do not fit the image of a frightened victim of trafficking, unable to speak for themselves. The fact that English is not their first language does not mean they are unable to converse in English, and I have no doubt they would be able to control negotiations between sex worker and client. The following comment refers to interviewing migrant sex workers:

Don’t be patronizing. There’s a good chance that the other person is smarter, quicker, more experienced in survival, more successful and, sometimes, more informed than you are. (Prostitutes Collective of Victoria, 1994. P.47)

You can get bored in any job; sex work is no different. The following was told to me by a migrant sex worker in Melbourne 2014 when I asked her why she had come to Australia.

“I got bored with my job in Thailand tourist area of Phuket. Always the same. Tourist guys you see once then they go. I wanted to come to Australia to get different type of clients. Not so many tourists. Now I have regular clients who always see me. Sex is the same so the job is the same. But I feel good cos some men want to see me again and again.”

When I asked why she had chosen Australia, I was told her friend had come here then told her to come. This woman had chosen to come to Australia for better work opportunities and experiences. This is no different from those who migrate for other occupations, not seeking to change jobs but hoping a change of scenery would be good. The prevailing narrative is one of women migrating to improve their economic situation, while seeking better working conditions, and perhaps the adventure of living and working overseas. However, the construction of migrating for work in the Australian sex industry as a situation of human trafficking denies these women a voice, under the assumption they are unable to speak for themselves.

“Some people want to ‘rescue’ me but can’t cope with the reality. They see things from their point of view. If I don’t want to be saved by them, they say I must be scared of someone.” (Interview with Chinese sex worker C, Perth, 2014)

Asian sex workers in Australia want to be supported, not saved. They are able to make their own choices so want to be allowed to do so.

Conclusion

In this paper I have argued not all cases reported as human trafficking into the Australian sex industry are as they seem. Trafficking is a heinous crime, but the situation in Australia often appears to be concerned with border protection rather than the abuse of human rights. Asian migrant sex workers, unable to legitimately state their occupation on visa applications, are forced to state alternative reasons for wanting to visit Australia. This process may involve an agent or broker who arranges the paperwork, especially if the worker is unskilled and from a developing nation, introducing situations where a debt is incurred and the possibility of debt bondage is increased. However, labelling all migrant sex workers as trafficked constructs them as passive objects and takes away their freedom to travel and work. The danger here is policy makers are encouraged to do something based on misleading constructions of this perceived problem. The voices of Asian migrant sex workers provide a powerful key to addressing this issue.

People migrate for work, and this practice will continue regardless of whether or not safe migration processes exist. Improving access to legitimate visas may prevent people ending up in bad workplace situations. This would provide a solid, humanitarian approach to reduce the incidence of trafficking-like work conditions in Australia. This approach is appropriate for sex work as much as it is for other occupations. Opening up legal channels for sex workers to migrate for work would provide more freedom of choice to those who wish to take up this opportunity. In Australia, trafficking is a crime, sex work is not.

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Balancing among Superpowers: Japan-Yugoslavia Relations during the Cold War

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Abstract

If we consider power from the neorealist point of view, as an ability to influence others to work in our interest, we can observe that Japan came a long way to achieve power. She upraised herself from a war-destroyed, defeated country to a member of G7 within thirty years. From the perspective of neorealism, Japan aligned herself with the United States in order to secure its peace and prosperity. Within the balance of power framework, during the Cold War Japan was seeking a place for herself, aiming at gaining more power with limited resources and possibilities. Within the span of twenty years, Japan gained an unexpected amount of power, though it was not political but economic. Nevertheless, the economic power brought little by little power and influence to Japan in international relations, international organizations and, accordingly, a place among the greatest powers in G7. This paper investigates how Japan's development of relations with countries outside of the Western bloc represented a tactic of balancing among superpowers, and how it aided Japan in obtaining more power. In order to do so, this paper analyzes the case study of Japan's relations with Yugoslavia, based on diplomatic archival documents from Japan and Yugoslavia. The analysis of archival documents will show the motives behind the development of relations from both sides, as well as the nature of relations and merits/demerits which arose.

Keywords: balance of powers, international relations, Cold War, Japan, Yugoslavia

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Introduction

Within the Cold War structure, which was established soon after the end of WWII, Japan and the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter – Yugoslavia) found themselves with different political and economic systems, opposing ideologies. Furthermore, their bilateral relationship was restrained by the Cold War structure and interests of the superpowers. However, in spite of that, Japan and Yugoslavia have constantly worked on the development of their bilateral relations.

In order to investigate Japan-Yugoslavia relations during the Cold War, there are two research questions this paper attempts to answer by implementing analysis of the diplomatic archival documents. Those are: What was the scope of Japanese-Yugoslav relations during the Cold War and the meaning of their relationship in their respective foreign policies; and what were the implications of Tito's visit to Japan for both sides? The archival documents which were analyzed for the purposes of this investigation originated from the Serbian Diplomatic Archives (former Yugoslav Diplomatic Archives), the Yugoslav History Archives and the Japanese Diplomatic Archives.

This paper investigates Japanese-Yugoslav relations from the neorealist perspective during the Cold War, more precisely between 1952 and 1980. The year of 1952 was set for the beginning of this research because that was the year when Japan and Yugoslavia reestablished their bilateral relations. The end year for this investigation was chosen since that was the year when the domestic politics in Yugoslavia as well as her international position changed due to the death of President Tito.

Neo-realist perspective

Among the international relations scholars these days, realism and neorealism are not very much applied. Though realism emerged at the beginnings of the Cold War replacing liberalism, after the end of Cold War in 1991, emerged other, critical theories. Both realism and neorealism are being criticized for focusing only on systemic dimension in IR and that they overlook other dimensions, such as domestic and individual.

But if we are to look into the bilateral relations of Japan and Yugoslavia during the Cold War, we cannot help noticing that their relationship was developing within the Cold War structure and that it was heavily influenced by it. Both Japan and Yugoslavia were closely connected with one of the superpowers (or with both in Yugoslavia's case), the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Both countries foremost pursued their international interests and fought the restraints coming from the international system.

The IR theories in general are focusing on the great powers, and only vaguely are dealing with the smaller states. Nevertheless, core argument of the neorealism, that is, that the world is anarchic and that all states seek to maintain the existing balance of power (in the best case scenario) or attempt to acquire more power for themselves (in the worst case scenario) (Waltz, 1979), is applicable to Japan. First of all, Japan was a rather weak state after the WWII and due to the circumstances aligned with the US. Though the alliance was initiated from the US side, Japan certainly saw interest in it and continued to maintain it over many years. The alliances are, according to Waltz (1979), ways that states use to balance against the power greater than them. The international system is considered to be anarchic and in order for states to maintain

their security, they will form alliances in order to preserve the distribution of power in the World (Waltz, 1979).

Furthermore, there are three ways for the weak states to maintain their security. The first one is the balance-of-power, when the smaller states would more likely ally among themselves against the superpower (Waltz, 1979). The other way for a smaller state to secure its existence is bandwagoning, which is when weak states ally themselves with the adversary powers in order to preserve their security (Waltz, 1979; Wright, 1983).

The third one - balance-of-threat, predicts that states balance against threats rather than power alone, where threats are defined in terms of geographical proximity, perceived intentions and offensive capabilities (Walt, 1987).

Though none of the above can precisely describe Japan's behavior in international relations during the Cold War, this paper will show that Japan was seeking to preserve security by aligning with one of the superpowers, the US, which is bandwagoning, so as can focus on acquiring power. While doing so, Japan was balancing between the superpowers, or rather cooperated with both of them and their respective blocs in a degree that suited her interests the best.

The Cold War Structure and Japan's position within

The Cold War structure was essentially characterized by confrontation between the US and the USSR, and their respective economic, political and security systems. The intensity of confrontation varied considerably throughout the Cold War period, but occasionally spilled over into 'hot wars' in East Asia (the Korean War in the 1950s and the Vietnam War in the 1960s and early 1970s). Depending on increase/decrease of tensions between the US and the USSR, intensity of diplomatic and trade relations between the countries belonging to the opposite blocs varied.

The Eastern bloc was comprised of socialist states, members of the Warsaw pact (aligned around the USSR) along with Yugoslavia and Albania, which were not aligned with the USSR after 1948 and 1960 respectively. The communist states had centrally planned economic systems. On the other side, Western bloc was comprised of democratic states with capitalist economy systems, gathered around the United States.

At the beginning of the Cold war when the tensions were highest, US denied MFN status to all communist countries except Yugoslavia.¹ United States adopted a trade act which enabled MFN (most-favored-nation) treatment to communist countries only in 1974. Before that, US government implemented the Export Control Act (1949), which defined that strategically important goods are not to be exported to the communist countries, in order not to help their further development. West Europe and Japan followed these imputes, and at the beginning of the Cold War tensions they as well conducted trade with the East more cautiously. But the West European countries which were dependent on foreign trade soon renewed the trade with communist states (Schönfeld, 1974, p. 4). Different from the US which kept trade and political relations interconnected, Western European countries, United Kingdom foremost, pursued normalization of trade with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) (Woolcock, 1983, p. 4).

¹ After the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, Yugoslavia received US foreign aid via the Marshal Aid program and maintained good bilateral relations. But the two countries never signed de facto a trade agreement.

Similarly, Japan was developing trade relations with the countries outside of the Western bloc, since for Japan foreign trade was essential in order to develop. By the time she regained her sovereignty in 1952, the Cold War confrontation already started and Japan became a member of the Western bloc. Moreover, she was heavily dependent on the US defense umbrella and thus her foreign policy was influenced by the US interests.² Therefore, cooperation with the Eastern bloc was not always welcomed by the US.

Realizing that she could grow stronger only through economic recovery and development, Japan set economic development as one of the main goals of her foreign policy.³ Outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 coincided with this Japanese goal. Procurements for US needs in Korean War boosted Japanese economy sooner than expected. Additionally, Korean War pointed out geostrategic significance of Japan for the US interests in Asia.

The other important goals of Japan's foreign policy at the time were improving relations with the South East Asian countries and balancing relations with the US.⁴ In the line with economic diplomacy and improving relations with the SEA countries, Japan was promoting relations regardless of SEA country's political systems. At the time Japan was active in promoting relations with the Eastern European countries as well.

Japan's relations with the Communist countries

Due to the circumstances of the Cold War in South-East Asia, and her position within, Japan could not openly cooperate with the communist countries. But while belonging to the Western bloc and following the US imputes regarding foreign relations, Japanese leaders tried to pursue Japan's interests. In pursuit for economic development Japan first explored opportunities in SEA markets. Also, Japan explored options of conducting trade with the communist countries and not only the ones in Asia, but went even further, to Europe. As the Diplomatic Bluebook from 1957 states, Japan needed to improve a foreign trade exchange in order to develop her economy.⁵ The principle was to expand trade relations with any country, no matter the political system.

Regarding the Japan-PRC relations, though the normalization of relations was not agreed upon until 1972, and official peace treaty was not signed until 1978, the two countries developed cooperation earlier. They cooperated mostly on private sector level, but also conducted trade on governmental level, based on Japanese *seikei bunri* (separation of trade from politics) policy. In the recent years after the WWII and even after regaining the sovereignty Japan had her trade with China was watched closely by the US, sometimes having been approved and even supported and sometimes disapproved (Yasuhara, 1986). However, Japan had trade exchange volume with China greater than with other communist countries.

Japan restored diplomatic relations with the communist countries of the Eastern Europe by the end of 1950s. This was not possible earlier since Japan had not signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty with the USSR and her satellite countries in 1951. Japan signed peace treaties with these countries separately. The restoration of diplomatic relations and signing a peace treaty with USSR was followed with signing

² The US-Japan Security Treaty was signed in 1951, and was later renewed in 1960.

³ 外交青書 (Diplomatic Bluebook) 1957, 総説 (General topics)

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

a Protocol for developing MFN treatment agreement, Fishery Agreement and Joint Declaration of restoration of diplomatic relations in 1956. The following year Japan signed Joint declarations for the restoration of diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia and Poland.⁶

At the time of Japan's establishing of diplomatic relations with the communist countries in 1950s, Yugoslavia, though she was a communist country, was not the Soviet satellite. Japan and Yugoslavia formally signed agreement as early as in 1952. By the beginning of 1960s, Japan had signed Commerce and Navigation Agreements with all Eastern European countries, including Yugoslavia.

Japan-Yugoslavia Relations

Though they had different political and economic systems, Japan and Yugoslavia were politically and economically small countries. One more thing that Japan and Yugoslavia had in common was their aspiring role of being a 'bridge between East and West'.

To be clear, Yugoslavia and Japan did not have same position vis-à-vis Eastern and Western bloc or superpowers. Japan while belonging to Asia aligned with the West and particularly with the US. Throughout the Cold War Japan was attempting to serve as a link between them. On the other hand, Yugoslavia belonged to the East and nurtured good relations with the US. Later on, Yugoslavia took up a role of a bridge between the West and the East, and furthermore a bridge between the blocs and the Third World. Both Japan and Yugoslavia worked very hard to understand the balance of power between the blocs and to use it to their benefit.

In the mid-1950s, when Japan and Yugoslavia initiated their relations, Tito already started pursuing a policy of "peaceful co-existence". Yugoslavia started developing good and friendly relations with countries from the both blocs. Accordingly, Yugoslavia welcomed development of relations with Japan, especially growing trade relations. Japan pursued trade exchange based on the same principles of the *seikei-bunri* policy, principles that avoided direct government-to-government agreements and negotiations. But the credits and loans for investments for the Yugoslav industry were coming from the Japanese Export-Import Bank, which cooperated with Japanese private sector. Though the funds were coming from the Japanese government, this system of cooperation enabled Japanese government to distance herself from the communist governments. As Yugoslav officials noted, this was a way to avoid potential complications regarding the collision of Japanese politics with the communist politics.⁷

Throughout the 1950s Japan provided investment loans for construction and development of Yugoslav industry plants. The first investment loan of 12 million USD for the Viscose plant was provided in 1954, for buying equipment from Mitsubishi Company, and it was provided by the Export-Import Bank of Japan.⁸

After a few initial years of trade, Japan and Yugoslavia signed Trade and Maritime Transport Agreement in 1959, giving the MFN status to each other. This Agreement had political as well as economic impact on their bilateral relations. At the time both

⁶ Ibid., 各説/ 我が国と各地域との間の諸問題/ ソ連および東欧関係 (Various topics/ Issues between Japan and various regions/ The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe)

⁷ *Zapis iz razgovora Soica i Konoa* (Note from the conversation between Soic [Yugoslav Embassy] and Kono [Business department of Export-Import Bank Japan], 22.10.1959, B[ox]56F[older]41F[file] 430741, Y[ugoslav] M[inistry] of F[oreign] A[ffairs] D[iplomatic] A[rchives], [Year] 1959

⁸ *Informacija* (Information note), 08.02.1956, B42 F14 F44520, YMOFA DA, 1956

countries were still struggling with their economic development (Yugoslavia was struggling more). For Yugoslavia this agreement was part of the policy to lessen the dependence from both US and USSR. She needed alternative markets and trading partners if she wanted to succeed in it. Later on, along with the diversification of trade markets, Tito saw an opportunity to make alliances with the Third World countries in order to strengthen his political power within international structure. Yugoslavia already started at the mid-1950s to diversify her diplomatic and trade relations with many countries other than Japan.

As for Japan, through the 1950s, Japanese prime ministers focused on rebuilding relations with Asian countries. This was also an attempt to diversify the trade, but also to obtain support from the region and to strengthen her position vis-à-vis the US.

Table 1: Japan's and Yugoslavia's trade balance, in total and bilaterally, in 1959 and 1960 (in millions of USD).

1959				
Japan	Exports	Exports to Yugoslavia	Imports	Imports from Yugoslavia
	456	3.6	599	3.5
Yugoslavia	Exports	Exports to Japan	Imports	Imports from Japan
	77	3.5	87	3.6
1960				
Japan	Exports	Exports to Yugoslavia	Imports	Imports from Yugoslavia
	4 054.5	5.8	491.1	2.8

Source: JETRO White Paper, Year 1976, Table 4: Japan's trade balance according to region/country, p. 388.

If we look into the volume of bilateral exports and imports in 1959, we can notice that the trade was in balance, around 3.5 million USD on both sides. Nevertheless, those numbers still represent very small part of the overall Japan's and Yugoslavia's trade. For Japan 0,1% of exports and 0,09% of imports, and for Yugoslavia 0,72% of exports and 0,52% of imports. Also, we can observe that the Agreement was more beneficial to Japan than Yugoslavia, having caused the disbalance between the exports and imports.

However, the volume of bilateral trade was still rather low comparing to Japan's and Yugoslavia's total trade volumes. The agreement appeared to have more impact on developing friendly relations between the two distant countries. Both, Japan and Yugoslavia needed trading partners in order to pursue more balanced politics vis-à-vis the superpowers, upon which they were dependent. Though the bilateral trade volume was not significant for either side, their cooperation represented a step forward to independence from their dependence on the superpowers. Initial years of developing the relations during the 1950s set up a base for further development in the 1960s.

Tito's Visit to Japan 1968

The decade of 1960s was important for both Yugoslavia and Japan. Yugoslavia finally found her own place and stopped depending on the interests of the superpowers. She participated in creation of the third, non-aligned bloc. This obtained her with more power vis-à-vis superpowers and enabled her independence.

On the other side, Japan in the 1960s for the first time recorded a surplus in foreign trade and became world's third largest economy (after US and USSR). This put her in a long desired respected position in the international community. Although, respected position did not erase the fears of the Western European countries regarding Japan's (un)fair trade.

In any way, both Japan and Yugoslavia achieved a certain status and certain amount of power in the World during this decade. Mutual relations were also blooming, with intensified high-level state visits.

Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito, on his diplomatic travels around the World, visited Japan in April 1968. He was accompanied by a large delegation, which included Secretary General - Koca Popovic, Secretary of the State for Foreign Affairs - Marko Nikezic, Member of the Council of the Federation - Ivan Macek, Vice President of the Federal Executive Council - Rudi Kolak, President of the Executive Council Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Croatia - Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, and his spouse Madam Jovanka Broz. Tito and his associates stayed in Japan for one week (April 8-15, 1968). Furthermore, it was the first visit from one president of the communist country to Japan and the first communist leader who was welcomed at the Emperor's reception in Japan.

President Tito and his associates visited "sites of economic interest, cultural and historic places in the cities of Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto, which offered them an opportunity to get directly acquainted with the progress of the people of Japan in the economic and social fields well as with their cultural traditions."⁹

During the visit Yugoslav representatives had numerous meetings with representatives from the Japanese government, business circles and non-governmental organizations. Moreover, Tito had meetings with representatives of Keidanren, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Trade Association and Japan-Yugoslavia Association. They discussed various international problems and matters of common interest and exchanged views.¹⁰ One of the peculiarities of the visits was that Japanese Emperor and the Empress hosted the reception in their honor. Not only that it was not usual for one monarch to welcome one anti-monarchist and communist, but also this was a first occasion at the time. Tito was the first leader from the European communist country to meet the Emperor.

Tito and Japanese PM Eisaku Sato met for several times during the visit: when Sato first went to welcome Tito, during the three receptions (one at the Imperial Palace, one at the PM Sato's residence and one organized by President Tito) and during the official talks.¹¹

PM Sato was not unfamiliar with Yugoslavia and her domestic and foreign policies. Different from other Japanese prime ministers, he actually had visited Yugoslavia once before, in an official capacity as a head of the Science and Technology Agency, in 1964. Though according to the plan of his visit he was not scheduled to meet with

⁹ *Put J. B. Tita u Japan, 8-15.IV 1968, Zajednicko saopštenje, Komunique* (J. B. Tito's trip to Japan, 8-15.04.1968/ Joint statement/ Joint Communique), KPR I-2/38-1, Y[ugoslav] H[istory] A[rchives] - P[residential] A[rchives]

¹⁰ 欧州諸国大統領本邦訪問関係雑件 チトー・ユーゴスラヴィア大統領関係/ 一般 (Visits to Japan's Prime Minister from Europe; Yugoslav President Tito/ General informations), 1968, A'-0403, JMOFA DA

¹¹ *Ibid.*

Tito, he expressed wishes to do so. Unfortunately, this meeting was not possible at the time due to Tito's absence from the country.¹²

Later on, when he became a prime minister, on several occasions Sato expressed interest regarding Tito's diplomacy. On one such occasion, during the meeting with Yugoslav ambassador to Japan Vladimir Rolovic, where JMOFA deputy director for Eastern Europe and socialist countries was also present, Sato officially invited Tito to visit Japan. This invitation came as a surprise for JMOFA officials.¹³

For the official meeting, President Tito and PM Sato met on April 9th. They exchanged opinions regarding World's most important issues and expressed their respective foreign policy goals, where they found their common basis to be endeavors towards the world's peace. Both leaders considered that maintaining world peace had the top priority.¹⁴

The two leaders paid a special attention to the problem in Vietnam, crisis in the Middle East, disarmament, and economic situation of the developing countries. Furthermore, they discussed the efficiency of the United Nations and agreed to cooperate on endeavors for its improvement.¹⁵ Finally, President Tito and PM Sato agreed to continue to join efforts to promote world's peace, international cooperation, economic stability and progress of the developing countries, nuclear non-proliferation.¹⁶

In general, the visit of President Tito and his associates contributed to the better understanding between the two countries and for the advancement of the future cooperation in politics, economy and culture.¹⁷ Good organization of the visit and great media coverage in Japan indicated the great interests of Japanese government regarding this visit. The Japanese government had many interests to carry out this visit well, foremost to show the independent foreign policy. Furthermore, to improve her image within the Third World countries (especially in the South-East Asian region) in order to better pursue role of a bridge between Asia and the West. By improving relations with the countries from the region, Japan would gain more power vis-à-vis the US. Additional advantage of the visit was to obtain points from opposition parties and NGOs (Socialist Party of Japan and SOHYO).¹⁸ Both SPJ and SOHYO cooperated with their respective counterparts in Yugoslavia.

This visit aligned with Tito's foreign policy goals as well. At the time he was travelling around the world in a pursuit for building friendly relations with as many

¹² Put J. B. Tita u Japan, 8-15.IV 1968 / Dokumentacija o Pripremi posete/ Kako su tekli razgovori sa japanskom vladom o poseti druga predsednika Japanu (J. B. Tito's trip to Japan, 8-15.04.1968/ Documentation regardign the visit preparations/ Conversations with Japanese government regarding the prospects for the visit) by ambassador Rolovic, 1966, KPR I-2/38-1, YHA-PA

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ 欧州諸国大統領本邦訪問関係雑件 チトー・ユーゴスラヴィア大統領関係/ 会談関係 (Visits to Japan's Prime Minister from Europe; Yugoslav President Tito/ The talks), 1968

¹⁵ Put J. B. Tita u Japan, 8-15.IV 1968/ Komunike (J. B. Tito's trip to Japan, 8-15.04.1968/ Joint Communiqué), 15.04.1968, KPR I-2/38-1, YHA-PA; 欧州諸国大統領本邦訪問関係雑件 チトー・ユーゴスラヴィア大統領関係/ 共同コミュニケ (Visits to Japan's Prime Minister from Europe; Yugoslav President Tito/ Joint Communiqué), 15.04.1968, A'-0403, JMOFA DA

¹⁶ Diplomatic Bluebook (外交青書) 1969, 各説 / わが国と各国との諸問題/ ソ連・東欧地域/ 要人および使節団の来日/ ユーゴスラヴィアのチト大統領 (Various topics/ Issues between Japan and other countries/ Soviet Union and Eastern Europe/ Foreign dignitaries and delegations in Japan/ Yugoslav President Tito)

¹⁷ Joint Communiqué, 15.04.1968

¹⁸ 日本労働組合総評議会 = The General Council of Trade Unions of Japan

countries as possible in order to strengthen his position within the Non-Aligned Movement, so as to strengthen NAM's position vis-à-vis the blocs.

Further Developments

Starting from the late 1960s, once she grew economically stronger, Japan started promoting friendly relations with all the countries of the World who shared similar perceptions and goals. That meant with the socialist countries as well, since "they live in the same international society although their political, economic and social systems are different".¹⁹ The goal of this policy was to "make it possible for Japan to have more options and to act more flexibly to promote its national interests."²⁰

Japan created committees for improving trade relations with the communist countries of the Eastern Europe. The first committee which was established was the Japanese-Soviet Economic Committee in 1965 (Terada, 1972, p. 440). Members of this committee were representatives from economic institutions and social organizations, which differed depending on the country Japan was dealing with. Usually the committees were comprised of the Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations), the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and various civil organizations (Terada, 1972, p. 437). The committees with other Eastern European countries were established in 1971 (East Germany, Hungary) and in 1972 (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland and Yugoslavia) (Terada, 1972, p. 441).

Yugoslav side welcomed this initiative very much, since it meant improving the trade relations and possibly resolving the huge deficit on Yugoslav side which was a characteristic of the bilateral trade since the beginning.

One more peculiarity of the bilateral relationship development was that Japanese Crown Prince and Princess paid a visit to Yugoslavia in 1976. Yugoslavia was the first communist country to be visited from members of the Japanese Royal family. Few years later, in 1979, the Crown Prince and Princess visited Romania and Bulgaria.²¹

Conclusion

Although they were on the opposite sides during WWII, the end of the war left both Japan and Yugoslavia in an unfortunate state. They started rebuilding their respective countries from a rather poor position, both politically and economically speaking.

Initial development of their relations during the 1950s was slow, but this period paved the way for further, upgraded relations in the 1960s. A conclusion of the Trade and Maritime Agreement in 1959 proved to be less beneficial on the economic but more on the political level, since it boosted the development of their bilateral relations. Both Japan and Yugoslavia needed trading and political partners in order to pursue more balanced policies vis-à-vis the superpowers, upon which they were dependent.

During the decade of 1960s, bilateral relations between Japan and Yugoslavia flourished. This was possible due to the conditions on the international stage, the respective positions of both countries, and their foreign policy goals at the time. Both Japan and Yugoslavia gained a better position in the world. Yugoslavia found her place as one of the leaders of the Non-aligned Movement and established herself as an influential country within it. This membership helped her to decrease the pressures from superpowers and to pursue a more independent foreign policy. Japan became

¹⁹ 外交青書 (Diplomatic Bluebook) 1972, わが外交の基調/諸外国との関係の増進

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/about/gokomu/shinzen/gaikoku/gaikoku-s.html> (accessed: 20.04.2015)

economic power, surpassing the countries of Western Europe and becoming number three in the world. Along with economic power, Japan intensified her efforts for gaining political power as well.

Under these circumstances Japan and Yugoslavia expanded their cooperation, intensified official state visits, which culminated with the visit of President Tito to Japan in 1968. He was the first communist president from Eastern Europe to visit Japan. This visit was an expression of mutual interest towards the development of bilateral relations.

Yugoslavia and Japan did not hold the same position vis-à-vis Eastern and Western blocs. However, both of them had to fight for their independence in foreign policy making and worked very hard to balance their respective positions within the Cold War structure.

This paper demonstrated how, against common knowledge, the relations a political system of one country and her ideology did not make her blind and prevented her from pursuing her interests to the best of her ability. Yugoslav socialist/communist ideology always drew her towards the Eastern bloc and the USSR, but rationalities and awareness of the consequences were stronger. Japan, on the other hand, though was a democracy belonging to the free world (the West), in order to develop her economy cooperated with the socialist/communist countries as well.

According to the neorealist principles, after the WWII, Japan was bandwagoning by aligning herself with the US. While the US provided her with security, Japan could focus on restoration and further development of the country. Along with the pursuit for economic power, Japan was working on gaining trust and support from the countries of the region, thus was acquiring power little by little. Furthermore, once she reached economic power in the international arena, Japan started to pursue political power more confidently. Reaching out to Yugoslavia aligned with this Japan's foreign policy goals.

As it showed, Japan was developing relations with one communist country as a part of her foreign policy to find an alternative for predominance of US in her diplomatic relations. Furthermore, nurturing this bilateral relationship in times when Yugoslavia obtained power and established herself on the leadership position within the NAM, served Japan's interest to reach out to the regional third world countries. Moreover, having an ally which is influential in international relations (which Yugoslavia was in 1960s and 1970s) helped Japan to balance between the influences of the superpowers.

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Implications of the Japanese 2014 Election

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Abstract

As widely expected, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe led his conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to a landslide victory in the snap election held on December 14, 2014. With the support of its coalition partner the Komeito Party (KP), Abe's government enjoys a two-thirds supermajority of 326 seats in the Lower House of the Diet. Abe's success was mainly due to the unpreparedness and general disarray of the Opposition parties, rather than any great enthusiasm for the LDP, which effectively won by default. The LDP was aided by a record low voter turnout of only 52.63%, cynically encouraged by holding the election in winter. The short, low-key official campaign of only two weeks enabled the LDP to evade proper scrutiny of its policies and performance. The election was promoted by Abe as a referendum on his economic policies, popularly termed 'Abenomics'. Abe pledged to delay another raise of the consumption tax until 2017, after the last increase from 5 to 8% in April 2014 blunted consumption and tipped the economy into recession. Abe is likely to continue the core policies of Abenomics: the Bank of Japan's massive quantitative easing, and fiscal stimulus spending. There is speculation though that Abe will continue to delay the more complex and wide-ranging 'third arrow' of proposed structural reforms, putting off the difficult and unpopular tasks of deregulating the energy, agriculture, health, insurance and finance sectors, and cutting welfare. Enjoying a supermajority in the Diet, Abe will be able to pursue his treasured goal of reinterpreting the constitution, to allow Japan to participate in 'collective self-defence' with its allies. The Abe government is also likely to continue to increase defence spending and begin arms exports. Abe's decisive win entrenches his hold on the LDP leadership, and secures his government towards the next lower house election, now due in 2018, putting him on course to be the longest-serving postwar Prime Minister of Japan.

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Abe's Early Election Gamble

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe achieved a remarkable political comeback in 2012, returning to lead Japan's conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) back to office in the December Lower House election that year, defeating the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which had endured a three-year term of office marked by the 3.11 *Tohoku* disaster, an ongoing economic slump, and an annual turnover of Prime Ministers. Abe consolidated this victory in the Upper House elections in July 2013. However, the decision to raise the consumption tax in April blunted the economic recovery briefly enjoyed under Abe's signature stimulus policies, marketed as 'Abenomics'. As consumer confidence and aggregate demand was blunted, the economy slipped back into recession in mid-2014.

With declining approval ratings, and a Cabinet reshuffle derailed by scandal and resignations, it may have seemed politically counter-intuitive for Abe to have sought an early election, just when the economy had endured a recession. But following his return from the Brisbane G20 summit, he did so nevertheless. Although an election was not constitutionally required until late 2016, Abe called a snap election for the Lower House of the Diet on November 18, only half way through the government's first term. The Diet was dissolved on November 21st; and the election campaign proper commenced December 2nd, with the election set for December 14, for the ruling LDP-KP coalition to defend its comfortable majority of 325, out of the 480-member House of Representatives. Cabinet had been due to decide whether to proceed with a further raise of the consumption tax to 10% from October 2015; Abe switched the narrative to base the election campaign on seeking a mandate to delay the raise until April 2017 (BBC News, 2014a).

An election was not required for the delay though, as the opposition parties generally did not favour the increase, and so any required amending legislation for a delay would have easily passed the Diet. The consumption tax delay was therefore used rather artificially as a pretext to call the early election, and thus served the purpose of being a political circuit-breaker for the LDP. The Diet approved a supplementary budget before it dissolved, aimed at providing more stimulus spending of over ¥2 billion, particularly directed towards rural and regional areas already confronting stagnation, from their aging and shrinking populations; the supplementary budget also provided a useful coffer for election spending promises in the LDP's rural support bases. The main tactical motivation for the timing of Abe's decision for a snap election though was to press an advantage against the opposition parties, which remained weak and divided. The DPJ remained far behind in opinion polls, at only a 7.9% support rating, compared to 36.6% support for the LDP. Abe and the LDP thus hoped voters still regarded the DPJ as unfit to return to office, having presided over their politically inept period of government from 2009 to 2012, under a rotating series of Prime Ministers (Sieg, 2014a).

The political spectrum of Japan for the 2014 election remained further splintered by a bewildering range of shifting and reforming political parties, which endured even lower levels of public support. They included: the Japanese Communist Party (JCP); the populist and nationalist Japan Innovation Party (JIP), still weakened from the defection of its ultraconservative members, who had formed the Party for Future Generations (PFG); the populist People's Life Party (PLP) of Ichiro Ozawa; the

neoliberal Your Party (YP), which faced a potential split after losing its leader following a funding scandal; and the remnants of the progressive Social Democratic Party (SDP), which had far from its brief time in government in the 1990s. Numerous Independent candidates also contested the election. The generally high level of political apathy among the Japanese electorate, with around 40% of those polled expressing no support for any party, and voter turnout in recent elections of around 60% also usually played to the advantage of the incumbent LDP government (IIDEA, 2014).

Exploiting this sense of voter apathy, utilising the Thatcherite slogan, “There is no alternative”, the LDP ran a fairly desultory and low-key campaign, emphasising the necessity of continuing the economic plan outlined in ‘Abenomics’, despite the setback of raising the consumption tax. The campaign downplayed potentially controversial upcoming legislation and policies, particularly restarting nuclear reactors, and reinterpreting the constitution to allow participation in collective self-defence with Japan’s allies (BBC News, 2014b).

These unpopular issues could have proved problematic for the LDP in campaign, if the opposition parties had only managed to become competent enough to capitalise on them. The DPJ held talks with the YP, JIP, SDP and PLP to potentially form a coalition against the LDP, but any such alliance would have proved too unwieldy and ideologically fractious to pose any serious threat to the LDP-KP coalition, and nothing seriously came of it. Abe thus presented the election as a judgement on his once-lauded policy of ‘Abenomics’, centred on the combination of fiscal stimulus and extensive Quantitative Easing, although the ‘third arrow’ of widespread structural economic reform had so far proved more elusive. Abe espoused his determination to finally break the Japanese economy out of its decades-long deflationary slump. However, with Japan having sunk back into its fourth recession since 2008, the gloss of Abenomics had definitely worn off (Sieg, 2014b).

Abe’s Early Election Gambit Pays Off

As widely expected, Abe led the LDP to a landslide victory in 2014’s snap election, winning a majority of 291 seats out of 475 seats in the lower house of Japan’s parliament, the Diet. With the support of its coalition partner the KP, winning 35 seats, Abe’s government now enjoys a two-thirds supermajority of 326 seats. Abe’s success was mainly due to the unpreparedness and general disarray of the Opposition parties, rather than any great enthusiasm for the LDP, which had effectively won by default. The LDP was aided by a record low voter turnout of only 52.63%, cynically encouraged by holding the election in winter. The short, low-key official campaign of only two weeks enabled the LDP to evade proper scrutiny of its policies and performance (McCurry, 2014). The widespread apathy of the Japanese electorate has become deeply entrenched, with many feeling this early election was completely unnecessary. Nevertheless, the LDP won easily, even despite the economy having fallen into recession, with real wages in decline (NHK, 2014).

Indicating its poor state of readiness, the DPJ could not even afford to run candidates in enough seats to secure a simple majority in its own right. Despite increasing its number of seats to 73, the DPJ is still a long way off from ever returning to government. The Japanese Communist Party more than doubled its seats to 21,

continuing its role as a dissenting voice in Japanese politics. Other minor parties lost support, particularly the JIP at 41 seats; the Party for Future Generations, the Social Democratic Party and People's Life Party only won 2 each; and Independents won 18, leaving Japan's political opposition as splintered and isolated as ever (Asahi Shimbun, 2014a).

Having secured his election mandate, Abe pledged to delay another raise of the consumption tax until April 2017, after the last increase from 5 to 8% in April blunted consumption and tipped the economy into recession. While being likely to continue the core policies of Abenomics: the Bank of Japan's (BoJ) massive quantitative easing, and fiscal stimulus spending, doubts remain over whether Abe will continue to delay the more complex and wide-ranging 'third arrow' of proposed structural reforms, putting off the difficult and unpopular tasks of deregulating the energy, agriculture, health, insurance and finance sectors, and cutting welfare (Asahi Shimbun, 2014b). The LDP aims to restore the budget to surplus by 2021, but little detail on achieving this was given in the campaign. Abe pledged he will push for completion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade negotiations, and he also remained determined to restart Japan's nuclear reactors, despite ongoing public opposition. Japan would also restructure and continue its 'scientific whaling' program, despite longstanding international opposition (Economist, 2014).

Enjoying a supermajority in the Lower House of the Diet brings Abe closer to his treasured goal of reinterpreting the constitution, to allow Japan to participate in 'collective self-defence'. The Abe government is likely to continue to increase defence spending and begin arms exports. The LDP also wishes to press ahead with the drawn-out relocation of US bases on Okinawa from Futenma to the coastal area of Henoko, despite widespread protests from locals, who desire the total removal of the American military presence. The LDP lost all their Okinawan seats, their only regional setback (McCormack, 2015).




Figure 1: The 2014 Japanese Lower House Election Results

The LDP can also continue to implement its State Secrets law, already in effect, which has harsh penalties of imprisonment for public servants, journalists (and academics) who reveal or criticise classified government information. This law compounds rising fears by lawyers and civil libertarians that the LDP is steadily encroaching on overall freedom of expression, subtly pressuring the media to support a government-friendly perspective (Kingston, 2014). Following the APEC and G20 2014 summits, Abe hoped to improve relations with China and South Korea. However, these efforts at reconciliation have been undermined by numerous LDP Diet members continuing to downplay Japan’s historical record of atrocities in the Second World War (Adelstein, 2014).

Abe’s decisive win entrenches his hold on the LDP leadership, and secures his government to the next lower house election now due in 2018, putting him on course to be the longest-serving Prime Minister of Japan since the 1970s. The challenge for Abe will be whether a reboot of Abenomics can see Japan’s economy recover, confronted with ongoing deflationary stagnation, and long-term population decline (Schoppa, 2014). Weak consumption has been further hurt by the rising cost of imports, as the yen continues to decline, having fallen some 30% against the US dollar since 2012. Japan’s public debt, now 245% of GDP, will continue growing until a budget surplus is finally achieved (Sano, 2014). Following his election victory, Shinzo Abe was left almost unimpeded to further unsheath his ‘fourth arrow’, of revitalised Japanese nationalism.

Political Implications of the 2014 Election

Abe's snap early election echoed a previous era of LDP dominance, of frequent early elections to keep the opposition off balance, taking advantage of favourable timing in the economic and political cycle. While on the surface, the 2014 election result did not seem particularly impressive, with the LDP actually losing three seats, and the DPJ managing to gain sixteen, and the JCP nearly tripling its strength from 8 to 21 (largely at the expense of losses from the JIP and independents), the early election still exposed the relative overall weakness of the Opposition parties compared to the ruling LDP-KP coalition. After the election victory, Abe reappointed his new Cabinet, unchanged except for a new defense minister, Gen Nakatani. A former junior SDF officer, Nakatani had been an advocate for a more active role for SDF. However, the appointment had been required due to outgoing minister Eto being implicated in yet another misuse of electoral funding, demonstrating that the lingering risk of the taint of scandal will be an ongoing irritant, if not a potential wider electoral danger for Abe and the LDP (CPRO, 2015).

With the LDP's retention of power, Abe claimed Abenomics would remain his government's priority, while also continuing engaged and active diplomacy, with the aim of restoring relations with China, Korea. Abe was also determined to press ahead with introducing security bills to reinterpret the right to collective self-defence in 2015. The goal of a new permanent law to allow overseas dispatch of the SDF, and logistical support for allied forces in was in preparation, although the LDP faced restrictions from its doubtful coalition partner Komeito. A permanent law would aim to replace the restrictions of previous ad hoc laws authorising deployments of SDF, as during the Koizumi government, for the logistic support operation to Afghanistan, and the stabilisation force deployment to Iraq. The State Secrets law was already in operation by the time of the election, with over 400 'secrets' already notified by various government departments and authorities (Japan Times, 2014).

Following the DPJ's defeat, and the resignation of leader Banri Kaeda, a party leadership ballot on January 18th saw Katsuya Okada elected the new DPJ President and party leader, term that will last to September 2017. Okada will have the heavy burden of restoring the DPJ's fortunes after yet another defeat, amidst widespread public apathy. The JIP also faced a leadership vacuum, with Hashimoto temporarily stepping aside as co-leader. The JCP's increased numbers now allow it to sponsor legislation, although none of it is ever likely to pass; this higher profile nevertheless presents the JCP with more opportunities to raise issues of concern and criticise the Abe government. New DPJ leader Okada faces the challenge of uniting a demoralised, factionally divided party, at risk of further splits between the more leftist ex-Socialist Party members, and the more centre-right ex-LDP members. The fundamental obstacle for the DPJ is that it needs to develop and successfully promote a coherent and relevant policy platform and agenda. There are plenty of opportunities to exploit the unpopularity of many of Abe's policies, but it presently appears that the DPJ lacks the sense of political aggression and tactical ability to do so. The main policy positions of the DPJ in the 2014 election had centred on restoring the position of the middle class, greater environmental protection, and opposing collective self-defence; however, this had failed to make an impact on the public (Ito, 2015).

With the next round of the stimulus package in the FY2015 budget approved by

Cabinet and passed by the Diet, a corporate tax rate cut of 2.51%, to 32.11%, with further future reductions was mooted, proposed as part of possible future tax reform package. A partial public float of Japan Post was also planned, indicating that the LDP was finally prepared to proceed on the privatisation objectives originally proposed under the Koizumi government. However, in a post-election poll, the majority could see no direct benefit from Abenomics, and were also opposed to reactor restarts, or reinterpreting the constitution. Following Abe's speech opening the first post-election Diet session, on February 16th, Abe clearly stated his aim of implementing permanent legislation to allow the overseas dispatch of SDF, including the possibility of wider involvement in authorised peacekeeping operation. He also pledged to authorise extra ODA to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and committed to pursue the relocation of the US base in Okinawa from Futenma to Henoko. In his first Diet Question Time prompting from new Opposition Leader Okada, Abe also denied there was a serious income inequality gap in Japan, since people supposedly have a firm awareness of their 'middle class status' (DPJ, 2015).

April Local Elections

The next opportunity for political contest came with the launch of the April election campaign for local governments, along with gubernatorial elections for ten prefectures. The main issues for the April local elections included local and regional development, addressing population decline, and nuclear power restarts. The LDP was hoping to limit any potential losses; the other parties were hoping to make inroads, particularly the DPJ, facing its first major test under new leader Okada. The JCP was hoping to build on the momentum of its 2014 Lower House gains, emphasising issues such as cost of living pressures and child care (as well as opposing the TPP, and collective self-defence – despite these not directly being in the jurisdiction of local government). As well as continually deteriorating voter apathy, there was also a gradual decline in the number of candidates contesting the elections (NHK, 2015a).

In the first round of local elections on April 12, the LDP and Komeito were encouraged by the results; ruling coalition-backed candidates swept all 10 governorships, and increased their share of the vote in 41 elections held out of 47 prefectural assemblies, except for Osaka city, which was won by the JIP. The LDP won 1,154 seats, up from 1,119 in 2011; it won 2,284 assembly seats, the largest overall majority since 1991, enjoying a single majority in 24 prefectures. All of Komeito's 169 candidates were successful, its best result in eight years. DPJ representation declined, in another demoralising loss; it only won 264 assembly seats, down 82 from 2011, out of only 345 candidates, 40% fewer than 2011. This poor showing indicated the DPJ's lack of personnel, funding, and sorry state of morale since the 2014 national election defeat (Japan Times, 2015a).

The JCP built on their 2014 election improvement, fielding 275 candidates, a 50% increase, and gained representation in all assemblies, winning 136 seats, up from 80, its highest number in over eight years. This aided the JCP's growing reputation as the more effective party of protest in Japan. The JCP now outranked the DPJ, with more representation at the local level; the DPJ was now only the fourth-largest party, after the LDP and KP. The JCP claimed its strength was now 300,000 members, with 10,000 recruited in 2014; the daily circulation of its newspaper *Akahata* (Red Flag)

was at 1.2 million (the LDP claims to have 790,000 members). Encouraged by this continuing relative electoral success, the JCP felt emboldened to press ahead with promoting its long-held policies: ending the US military presence in Japan, abolishing the SDF, and opposing consumption tax hikes, corporate tax cuts, nuclear power restarts, and the TPP. With its increased strength in the Diet after the 2014 elections, it planned to introduce bills aiming to further restrict corporate donations to political parties, and improve the rights and conditions of younger workers exploited by 'black' companies; while the JCP has no hope of getting these bills passed, they at least hope to raise attention for these issues on its agenda (Economist, 2015).

The LDP promoted regional revitalization in the local elections as key part of Abenomics, and promised it could deliver increased cooperation with more LDP-aligned prefectural governments. But, as with the 2014 elections, the local elections again appeared to be more the case of a weak opposition failing to mount an effective challenge, rather than any great enthusiasm for the LDP. The DPJ backed independents also supported by the LDP in joint tickets in 6 out of 10 gubernatorial races, and did not even both fielding candidates in 2 others – only in Hokkaido and Oita prefectures did the DPJ (unsuccessfully) contest against the LDP. In the assembly elections in 41 prefectures, 17 cities, and mayoral races in five cities, a total of 3,272 candidates contested 2,284 prefectural assembly seats, and 1,476 candidates for 1,022 municipal assembly seats. Out of 960 local elections, in candidates ran unopposed in 501 of them. This was a competition ration of 1.55, giving local political candidates in Japan a relatively high chance of being elected.. 379 women candidates won 200 seats, up from 180 in 2011 (Hongo, 2015).

The JIP did fairly well in Osaka's municipalities; however, the JIP failed to gain a majority in Osaka prefectural assembly. Average voter turnout was 47% for the gubernatorial elections, and 45% for the assembly elections, varying at 40-50% between prefectures. This was the lowest ever recorded turnout for local elections, demonstrating that voter apathy was still widespread, although local elections always tend to have less prominence than national ones. The second round of local elections was held on April 26 for local assemblies, in 911 separate polls; however, only 728 were actually conducted, since the remainder ran unopposed. Second round elections were also held for the mayors of 62 cities, 69 towns and villages, and 11 out of Tokyo 23 wards. There was also voting for assembly members in 281 cities, 284 towns and villages, and 21 Tokyo wards. Mayoral voter turnout was at a record low of 50.53%, down from 52.97% in 2011; assembly turnout was also at record lows of around 50%. The LDP failed to win in two out of five prominent mayoral races, for Shibuya and Setagaya in Tokyo; but otherwise the LDP generally maintained its momentum of the first round of elections (Nikkei Asian Review, 2015).

Voter turnout suffered a particularly sharp drop in rural and regional areas, from around 70% to 55% on average; the rising proportion of the elderly population in rural areas is considered partly responsible, adding to generally higher apathy among younger voters. Out of 222 mayoral positions, only 4 were won by women; there are now two female governors, and 24 mayors. With only 8% women in senior private sector positions, 6% in the private sector, there is a long way to go to reach Abe's 'women can shine' objective of women holding at least 30% of senior positions in society. Japan is only 115th in the world ranking on women in parliament, one of the worst of any developed country (Daily Mail, 2015).

Prospects for Abe and the LDP

Following the April elections, Abe embarked on a visit to the US, where he gave a joint address to Congress, which heralded his intention to introduce the bills to allow Japan to engage in collective self-defence with friendly countries, principally the USA (MoFA, 2015). Security guidelines between the US and Japan were also updated during the US visit (DoD, 2015). After holding deliberations with its coalition partner the KP, the LDP introduced the controversial bills into the Diet in May, following their approval by the Cabinet. The Diet debate soon became bogged down, amid stronger-than-expected criticism by the Opposition parties, particularly the DPJ and JCP. In an extraordinary development, the LDP and KP decided to confirm an extension of the regular 150-day Diet session by 95 days, to September 27, indicating the determination of the LDP to pursue passage of the security bills. This is the longest ever postwar extension of the Diet, surpassing the record of 94 days in 1982 (Mainichi, 2015).

Abe claimed the extension was necessary to complete the passage of bills to implement the most important reforms of the postwar era, including in agriculture, medical care, labour, and international peace. The Diet extension was supported by the PFG, but opposed by the DPJ and JCP. The extension also overlaps into the LDP's leadership ballot at the end of September, which would create campaigning difficulties for any potential leadership candidates contemplating a challenge against Abe; it is now more likely he will be re-elected unopposed (Shiraishi & Tanikawa, 2015). Overall, there are severe concerns over the collective self-defense bills among academic experts as well as the general public, with a survey showing 56.7% believed the bills being debated in the Diet are unconstitutional. Critics and opposition parties maintain they are unconstitutional, in violation of Article 9; their vagueness in particular could allow the SDF to engage in combat operations, despite the limitations, restrictions, safeguards and restraints claimed by Abe and the government (Japan Times, 2015b).

Abe has been fairly successful so far in restoring the political dominance of the LDP, and initially boosted the economy – although the ‘third arrow’ of Abenomics has only just really been attempted, and is proving to be the most difficult, and most controversial aspect of Abenomics, which may only be overseeing the deeper entrenchment of inequality in Japanese society. The challenges remain of addressing a declining, aging population, a declining tax revenue base, and the highest levels of public debt in the OECD. Whether to raise the consumption tax again is looming as a major controversy, as the economy temporarily fell back into recession, following a decline in aggregate demand after the last increase in the sales tax in April 2014. Abe's geostrategic restoration may prove the most controversial of all, by altering, or even abolishing Article 9; which could contribute to ushering in a new ‘Cold War’ in the Asia-Pacific. This could even risk armed conflict breaking out, if a more assertive foreign/defence policy means Japan is unwilling to defuse or resolve the Senkakus Islands dispute with China. Overall, Abe's implicit ‘fourth arrow’ is stronger nationalism; a ‘reformed’ constitution which will allow Japan to regain its status as a ‘great power’ into the 21st century (Bisley & Taylor, 2015).

Abe is now the sixth-longest serving postwar Prime Minister, having passed the record of his grandfather Nobusuke Kishi (1,242 days). Having come so far, Abe

vowed, “I have a long way to go” – indicating his desire to contest and win the LDP leadership ballot in September, and possibly contest the 2018 election– another major reason for his move towards the snap election in 2014 (NHK, 2015b).



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Factors Affecting Malaysia-Singapore Relations During the Mahathir Era

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Abstract

The relationship between Malaysia and Singapore tends to fluctuate from time to time. At times the relation is very good but at other times it seems to be rather fragile. Some terms that have often been used to characterise the relationship are 'Siamese twins', 'sibling rivalry' and 'family quarrel', implying a complex love-hate relationship that grows out of shared common history and cultural background, coloured by political differences, economic competition and interdependency. This paper analyses some of the underlying factors that influenced Malaysia-Singapore relations during the period of Mahathir Mohamad's rule as the Prime Minister of Malaysia (1981-2003). This study suggests that the bilateral tensions between Malaysia and Singapore were affected, to a large extent, by three factors, which are the burden of historical baggage from their acrimonious parting in 1965 after unification for just two years; the differences in their perceptions and approaches in handling bilateral relations; and the differences in the political cultures and leadership styles of their prime ministers, and for the purposes of the present study those of Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew. In our view, understanding the underlying factors behind the state of bilateral relations between Malaysia and Singapore during Mahathir's era is a very important key in seeing how the seemingly deadlock in many bilateral issues can be conclusively resolved. It is hoped that analysing these factors will pave the way toward improving bilateral relations between these countries.

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Introductory Background

The relationship between Malaysia and Singapore presents a rather distinctive interstate relationship, and yet is difficult to fathom if one has not fully understood the causal factors influencing this relationship. Separated only by a kilometre long Tebrau Straits, the uniqueness of this bilateral relationship is perhaps epitomized by a variety of expressions, such as 'Siamese twins', 'sibling rivalry' and 'family quarrel.' These frequently used expressions imply a rather complex love-hate relationship in Malaysia-Singapore bilateral relations that grown out of geographical proximity, a shared common history and cultural background, coloured by political differences, economic competition and interdependency.¹

Since their brief unification under the Federation of Malaysia (hereafter the Federation) from September 1963 to August 1965 and their subsequent separation, Malaysia-Singapore bilateral relations have never been free from functional tensions and antagonisms, albeit one may notice that both countries have the inclination to adopt 'pragmatic' and 'business-like' approach, that is reflected in numerous mutually beneficial collaboration in security, economy and political spheres.²

Singapore's unceremonious ejection from the Federation marks, in the opinion of several observers, was the beginning of a new and more prolonged phase of disagreements and confrontations over many issues between the two countries.³ Throughout the long history of their constant bilateral tension in the post-independence period, the scope and volume of animosity between the two countries arguably intensified during the tenure of the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, from 1981-2003, who has been the longest serving Prime Minister to date.⁴ A myriad of tense bilateral issues either resurfaced or fresh ones emerged during his years in office. Some of these issues remain unresolved until today, and, regrettably, worsened by exaggeration and extreme comments made by certain quarters imbued with the motivations of gaining political mileage. These included: disagreements over the low price of untreated water paid by Singapore to Malaysia (3 Malaysian cents [US\$0.008] per 1000 gallons); alleged adverse environmental impact on Malaysia's territorial waters emanating from Singapore's land reclamation work; and the access of Malaysian airspace by the Republic of Singapore Air Force fighter jets for over-flight and training.⁵ Other contentious issues

¹ See, for example, the works by N. Ganesan. (1998). "Malaysia - Singapore Relations: Some Recent Developments." *Asian Affairs: An American Review*. 25(1), particularly at p. 25, and by the same author in (1991). "Factors Affecting Singapore's Foreign Policy Towards Malaysia," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. 45(2), p. 187; and Rusdi Omar, Mas Juliana Mukhtarudin & Mohamad Ainuddin Lee Abdullah. (2005). *Hubungan Malaysia-Singapura Era Mahathir*. Sintok: Penerbit Universiti Utara Malaysia, at p. 2.

² For detailed historical analysis, key determinant and political economy of Malaysia-Singapore bilateral relations, see K. S. Nathan, (August 2002). Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Retrospect and Prospect. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 24(2): 385-410.

³ Chandran Jeshurun, Kamarulzaman Askandar, and Syed Yusof Syed Kechik. (January-March 2003). "Malaysia-Singapore Relations: A Case Study of Conflict-Prone Bilateral Ties." *The Southeast Asia Conflict Studies Network Bulletin*. p. 8.

⁴ For details analysis of Dr. Mahathir's leadership styles in influencing Malaysia-Singapore relations, see Chapter 6.

⁵ Rusdi Omar. (2009). "Malaysia-Singapore Relations: Issues and Strategies", in David Martin Jones and Lili Yulyadi Arnakim (eds). *Regionalism and Political Development in Southeast Asia*. Kuala Lumpur: UM. p. 93-103.

which have now been fully or partially resolved by both countries include the proposed replacement of the Johor Causeway by a suspension bridge across the Tebrau Straits; the sovereignty status of Pedra Branca Island (or in Malay, Pulau Batu Putih); and the sovereignty of Keretapi Tanah Melayu (KTM) railway line crossing Singapore's heartland.⁶ The underlying reason triggering the above-mentioned long-standing issues between Malaysia and Singapore perhaps resided on the countries' adoption of non-compromising stand when dealing with the issues concerned, inevitably worsening their already strained bilateral relations.⁷

This paper will analyse some of the underlying factors that influenced Malaysia-Singapore relations during the period of Mahathir Mohamad's rule as the Prime Minister of Malaysia (1981-2003). This study suggests that the bilateral tensions between Malaysia and Singapore were affected, to a large extent, by three factors, which are the burden of historical baggage from their acrimonious parting in 1965 after unification for just two years; the differences in their perceptions and approaches in handling bilateral relations; and the differences in the political cultures and leadership styles of their prime ministers. The discussion on these factors will be highlighted after the theoretical/conceptual framework's subtitle.

Theoretical/Conceptual Framework

Before elaborating theories that will be used in this research, it is important to see the nature of tensions between Malaysia and Singapore. Tensions that often took place between the two countries relate to economic resources and management of borders but do not involve military conflicts and tensions. Both states have tacit commitment and developed a mutual understanding to negotiate the disputes in peaceful ways. Despite this general understanding, however, the solution of the disputes seemed to be complicated since they were not only related to technical issues but also to history, style of leadership and culture in these two states.

Given the above nature of relationship, which on the one hand has elements of conflict but on the other hand contains continuity and mutual interests, liberal perspective in international relations is the most relevant perspective compared to other perspectives such as realist. Disputes between both states have been resolved by negotiations although they may take a long time. In liberal international theory, the negotiations attempt to achieve a win-win situation for both parties. This happened in the case of Malaysia-Singapore relationship.

The negotiations are made possible if there have been mutual understanding between states. In the context of Malaysia-Singapore relations, similarity of domestic political regime types has contributed to the mutual understanding between two countries. In liberal perspective, similarities in political system and regimes, such as being explained in the 'democratic peace theory', can bring peace or at least no war among countries that adopt the system. Similar political regimes also relate to a development of similar political cultures. We need to use also this 'political culture theory' to

⁶ Detailed discussion of above-mentioned issues can be found in Chapter 3.

⁷ K. S. Nathan. (2010). "Malaysia-Singapore Relations: A Bilateral Relationship Defying ASEAN-Style Multilateralist Approaches to Conflict Resolution," in N. Ganesan and Ramses Amer (eds). *International Relations in Southeast Asia: Between Bilateralism and Multilateralism*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 263-281.

explain the development of mutual understanding between Malaysia and Singapore in solving their disputes. In addition to this, 'interdependency theory' can help explain why the conflicts between two countries did not escalate to war.

The Burden of Historical Baggage Following the Separation

History operates to provide perspective, continuity, and appreciation of past trends that condition current thinking, performance, and future behaviour. Indeed, it is this historical factor that binds these two nations together, and yet injects differential approaches to problem-solving within a national as well as regional context. But, the rows between Malaysia and Singapore have never been allowed to escalate into violence by both sides. Wide-ranging economic, political and social ties continue to develop between the two countries. Nonetheless, the bilateral relationship continues to be encumbered by the inability of Malaysia and Singapore to set aside mutual mistrust and misgiving, which is largely due to the burden of historical baggage of their separation. This is an important crosscutting factor that acts to frame and intensify ethnic, geopolitical, economic and other sources of conflict between Malaysia and Singapore.

Mutual mistrust derived from the ordeal of separation continues to linger in the consciousness of many Malaysians and Singaporeans. This mistrust continues to linger despite leadership and generational change, and the development of significant bilateral economic and social linkages, because both sides have tended to use the traumatic history of separation for nation-building or regime consolidation. Moreover, the lingering mistrust between Malaysia and Singapore from the merger and separation period was politicised in contemporary times especially during the Mahathir era by politicians, media and community leaders from the both countries. They use these events for tackling present-day problems.

Malaysia-Singapore relations are as equal as Malay-Chinese relations. Thus, the burden of historical baggage after the separation of Singapore from Malaysia is one of the main factors in influencing the state of Malaysia-Singapore relations. The ordeal of disengagement continues to influence the present-day Malaysia-Singapore relationship. As Chan Heng Chee noted, bilateral relations are still very much encumbered "by the bitterness of historical past borne out of merger and separation".⁸ Lee Kuan Yew continues to remember how he was treated while Singapore was in Malaysia, whilst Mahathir always views Singapore as a troublemaker. On several occasions in the 1990s and 2000s, Lee Kuan Yew would remark that separation was one of the "saddest moments" in his life. Clearly, Lee Kuan Yew cannot forget it and he still feel aggrieved. Hence, the older generations of both countries still remember these events because the former leaders, Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew have put their differences into the public domain. It influenced them in making decisions when they were dealing with the issues between the two countries.

The historical baggage that was seen as the barrier in the relations between the two countries will still linger for as long as the leaders that were in power during and after the period of separation are still alive and politically active. These leaders will still

⁸ Chan Heng Chee. (1992). Singapore 1991: Dealing With a Post-Cold War World. *Singapore: The Year in Review 1991*. Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies. p. 9.

continue to evoke the memories and the bitter after taste of separation to influence the governments of both sides in their dealing with the other party. This phenomenon is however slowly eroding. Mahathir is now retired though still active politically but his obsession is more focused towards domestic politics. Lee Kuan Yew is also retired and in the past has rarely made any controversial political statements that would undermine the relations between the two countries. On the other hand, the younger generations on both sides the causeway has already accepted that Malaysia and Singapore are two separate nations with different political agendas. Due to their geographical proximity and economic interdependency need each other. Some of the earlier political and economic rivalries were rather trivial but could not be resolved due to the pressure of this unnecessary baggage. The way forward for the two nations in order to move ahead is foster stronger bilateral relations that would benefit both countries based on pragmatic consideration taking into account that both countries can mutually benefit from each other's strength.

Handling Bilateral Relations: Differences in Perceptions and Approaches

In discussions on matters relating to resolving bilateral disputes between the two countries, there exists a marked difference in the manner both sides see how the problems ought to be resolved. Malaysia appears to be seeing the issues from the diplomatic perspective whilst Singapore, perhaps influenced by their pragmatic outlook is more inclined to be more legalistic in dealing with similar issues.

Despite the rather strained relations, both Malaysia and Singapore were acutely aware of the mutual importance of each other and continually look for ways and means to improve relations between the two countries. The differences of opinions are likely to continue for as long as both countries continue to adopt differing approaches in dealing with bilateral issues. In this respect, it might be a good idea for Malaysia to adopt the legalistic approach taken by Singapore, where the governing principles were more clearly defined and the issues can be dealt with devoid of emotional influence.

It also could be argued that Malaysia should be more willing to compromise in its dealing with Singapore regarding the resolution of outstanding bilateral issues. It should however be implemented based on the principles that would lead to a 'win-win situation' and adhering to the rules of international law. Singapore's well-being was important to Malaysia, as Singapore was one of its largest trading partners. The establishment of good relations with Singapore was therefore economically vital to Malaysia. The 'win-win situation' could only be achieved if both parties were willing to accept the fact that the key to solving the outstanding bilateral issues was their willingness to compromise. Malaysia would argue that this was something that has been commonly practiced by Malaysia and therefore an act that was not difficult to get into. Singapore, on the other hand, was begun to realize its economic and social vulnerability. It was aware of the importance of regional goodwill and cooperation in combating issues such as the recent outbreak of SARS. The realisation by both nations that compromise was the key to better relations could eventually lead to its adoption and therefore better relations.

To date, numerous bilateral issues have not been resolved by the two countries. If this was to be seen as an indicator of the state of relations between the two countries, then much was to be desired. However, seen from the broader overall perspective of the

bilateral relations, one would agree that the states of relations were still good, though there was plenty of room for improvement. Unlike the period immediately after the separation, the leaders of both countries no longer carry the political baggage that makes it difficult for outstanding bilateral issues to be dealt with in an unemotional manner. The leaders of both countries were known to have good personal relations between them. This was a very positive factor and should be further strengthened to facilitate a better state of official relations. Similar efforts must also be made to ensure that the same state of relations exists between the civil servants of both countries. Both countries were acutely aware of this and realise that economically, socially and politically both countries were mutually dependant of each other.

Political Culture and the Leadership Styles of Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew

Political culture and idiosyncratic factors of ruling elites have a strong influence in determining the foreign policy direction of a country and how foreign policy issues are approached by those particular nations. We believe that the emergence of two separate political cultures in Malaysia and Singapore have strengthened dominant and significant roles of elites in the bilateral relations between the two countries. The political culture during the period Singapore was in Malaysia revolved around the issue of the Malay-Chinese political rivalry and the quest by Lee Kuan Yew's party to seek equal rights for ethnic Chinese in Malaysia. The relations between Malaysia and Singapore during the period after the separation continued to be influenced by this culture with Singapore seen as a Chinese dominated nation and Malaysia as Malay dominated nation. The rivalry between the two countries continued to be along ethnic lines. Over the decades, Malaysia and Singapore have grown into two separate nations with two distinct political cultures. With the fading of the older generation leaders and the emergence of new generation leaders the political baggage that bogged down the relations between the two countries began to diminish. The trend is going to continue and this augurs well for both countries.

The above issues have come up and become contexts of many statements made by leaders of both states. Leaders, as social actors, also play an important part in determining the direction of conflict. Singaporean leaders, Goh Chok Tong and Lee Hsien Loong are widely perceived as merely continuing Lee Kuan Yew's policies, and as such there will not be major changes in the direction of Singapore's foreign policy towards Malaysia. Meanwhile Malaysia's foreign policy has been redirected to suit the priorities of the current leaders. Tunku Abdul Rahman was understanding and sympathetic towards Singapore. Tun Abdul Razak was more aggressive, while Tun Hussein Onn was just continuing the prevailing policies of the time. The biggest paradigm shift in Malaysia-Singapore relations could be seen during the tenure of Dr. Mahathir. His vision 2020 policy was more challenging to Singapore than other neighbouring countries.

In the case of Malaysia and Singapore, the leadership styles of Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew have been a strong influence in the bilateral issues between the two countries. Both leaders were aggressive in dealing with the issues. Both were also influenced by their past experience and the pre and post separation political baggage. Mahathir's view towards Singapore may have been coloured by his experience as a medical student in Singapore whilst Lee Kuan Yew's views towards Malaysia were mainly coloured by his involvement in Malaysian politics during the short period

Singapore was in the Malaysian Federation and relations with Malaysia during the period immediately after the separation.

Beside these underlying factors which affected this relations and although having the outstanding issues, both countries will be able to remain friendly and cordial. According to *Democratic Peace Theory*, this states that democratic countries do not go to war with other democratic countries. According to this theory, democratic countries would refrain from using force against each other, because they are accountable to their citizens. In the context of Malaysia-Singapore relations, both countries do not go to war because they are democratic countries and prefers to resolve the outstanding issues either through diplomacy talks or the third parties involvement.

In case of bilateral relations between Malaysia and Singapore, although these two states do not implement complete aspects of liberal democracy such as full freedom of speech and freedom to form organizations, they also do not use military force to settle their problems. They use dialogs and other peaceful measures to negotiate their bilateral issues. Therefore, despite the many bilateral issues that have surfaced in the course of Malaysia and Singapore relations, armed conflict is very unlikely to be a possibility, and certainly not when both countries are practising democratic forms of governance.

Given this situation, we need to search for additional factors to explain the no war situation between Malaysia and Singapore. As in many newly independent countries, the role of leadership is one factor that can bring a country to be a war-prone or peace-prone state. The new regimes of leadership will play important roles in fostering the relationship of both countries in relation to democratic peacekeeping. If Malaysia and Singapore did become engaged in a full scale war, we would have to discount the popular argument that democracies are not likely to go into war against each other, given the fact that both Malaysia and Singapore are governed on democratic principles. It may be argued that the apparent flaws in their brands of democratic system of government would be given as the reasons. However, both governments are led by rational and pragmatic leaders who understand the extent of the negative consequences of war to both countries, and therefore this worst-case situation is not possible.

In connection with improving Malaysia-Singapore relationship, economic interdependence is very significant for both countries in terms of their development process. With the importance of Singapore as a centre of commerce for most of Southeast Asia region, and in particular Malaysia, has much to gain in terms of trade and commerce. Similarly, Singapore, because of its own lack economic resources, will look towards Malaysia for its economic needs, such as investment in Malaysia, water and labour supplies etcetera. Such economic interdependence has long been recognized as important by both states as being important, and is arguably a reason that trade and investment between them remained substantial for several decades. The volume of bilateral trade between them has increased remarkably over the years. As it stands today, Singapore and Malaysia have somewhat established themselves as largest trading partners in ASEAN.

Conclusion

Malaysia and Singapore have a complex and uneasy relationship. Common sources of tension between proximate countries, such as economic rivalry and military insecurity, are not sufficient to explain the 'love-hate' relationship between Malaysia and Singapore. This research examined the deep-seated underlying factors that significantly have contributed to the current state of relations between these two countries. In our view, understanding the underlying factors that formed the state of bilateral relations, between Malaysia and Singapore, during Mahathir's era, is the key to seeing how the apparent deadlock in the many bilateral issues can be resolved. It is hoped that by analysing these factors, it may show ways to improve bilateral relations between the two countries.

In this research, we have shown some underlying factors that influence Malaysia and Singapore relationships. The first factor is the burden of historical baggage following the separation. Relations between Malaysia and Singapore are very fragile and are very much influenced by their historical backgrounds. Old problems continue to exist, often appearing in a more delicate manner and later compounded by a host of new issues and associated problems which compete for the attention of both countries leaders and the public. Moreover, the politicization of history, the rekindling of the past for contemporary political goals, has had the effect of reopening old wounds and imbuing a younger generation of Malaysians and Singaporeans with the prejudices and resentments of their ancestors. After 48 years of separate and independent existence, and regardless of the growth of extensive political and economic linkages, there is still a great deal of mistrust and resentment in both countries arising from the experience of separation. Many of the grievances accruing from the disengagement of August 1965 continue to ruin bilateral relations.

Related to the first factor, the second factor is the countries' perceptions of each other. All along, the bilateral relations have always been based on suspicion and distrust. This was clearly seen when Singapore in searching for her own identity had to rely greatly on the West for security purposes, allowing its military bases to be used by the British and US. Malaysia viewed this as an unfriendly act towards a friendly nation. Although the relationship between the two nations is special, conflicts arise from how the two states, through their political leaders, interpret the action of the other party. To what extent this mutual suspicion and mutual distrust between the two sides will be sustained in the future is uncertain.

The third factor that often disturb the relations of these two countries is the tendency for the countries, when dealing with issues affecting each other, to approach the problems at two distinctively negotiation approaches. From Singapore's standpoint, the relationship should be based on mutual respect, mutual benefit, and adherence to international law and agreements. Singapore will continue to seek new areas of cooperation to strengthen bilateral relations with Malaysia even further. From Malaysia's side, the relationship must be based on a 'win-win' situation approach, which means both countries will benefit from that relationship. In other words, Malaysia is more inclined to take the view that Singapore opts for a rather over-legalistic approach that conveys the impression that the city state is insensitive to the cultural milieu in which it finds itself. Malaysia tends to view such an approach as antagonistic and confrontational, and not in keeping with the general consensual

approach based on musyawarah (deliberation) and muafakat (consensus). Singapore, on the other hand, prefers to hold steadfastly to formal commitments that have issued from negotiations as its own survival and prosperity are firmly based on strategic planning to fulfil the aspirations of its citizenry and to remain competitive internationally.

The fourth and last factor that we saw as influential in influencing relations of both states is political cultures and the style of leadership of political leaders particularly with respect to Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew. It is during Mahathir as Malaysian Prime Minister the unsettled issues between both states became significant. During previous Prime Ministers, the longstanding issues such as water disputes and Malaysian railways had been there but were rarely seriously debated. Only after Mahathir took over the power, he started to renegotiate the issues. His style of leadership which was more direct and outspoken than previous Prime Ministers and his nationalistic character contribute to his efforts to resolve the longstanding issues between the two states. These attitudes had made public aware of the unresolved issues and pushed negotiations to take place. Statements made by Mahathir regarding Singapore's attitudes to the issues had often created uneasiness of relations with Singapore.

Despite the above problems, however, both countries have attempted to solve their conflict by peaceful measures such as negotiation. It is the trust of the study to also examine why this is so. This is, in particular, due to the closeness of both countries historically, politically and economically. History may cause problem but history also ties Malaysia and Singapore. On the one hand, it is clear that the history has been mentioned as barrier to develop relations because this may create suspicion and anger. However, on the other hand, they have to deal with the reality that they are two neighbours and need to overcome the politicization of history that may trap them in situation where they cannot cooperate. They learn from bad experiences in the past to mend the relationship.

Both countries also have rather similar approaches in political system and economic development which bring the countries to the same perceptions on how to deal with political and economic issues. These same perceptions make the leaders of both countries easier to deal one another. Both Malaysia and Singapore know the importance of political stability and their relationship towards the development and progress of their respective countries. Both countries realised that they are interdependent in terms of economic, security and social aspects. For example, in terms of the economic aspect, most Malaysians know Singapore is one of the biggest investors in Malaysia and vice versa. Furthermore, more than half of all visitor arrivals in Malaysia originate from Singapore. Singaporeans find Malaysia an attractive place to visit because of their shopping facilities, attractive holiday destinations and good food. It appears that the leaderships in Malaysia and Singapore have seen the benefit of cooperation and mutual understanding between them in economic, security and social aspects in order to realize their potential.

The tensions may continue to take place in relations between the two countries since there are still many unresolved issues between the two countries. There has been feeling in Malaysia that they always get disadvantaged when dealing with Singapore. This feeling casts a shadow over every administration in Malaysia when handling

negotiations with Singapore. As far as this research is concerned, Mahathir had attempted to overcome this feeling by outspokenly stating Malaysia's position. His position and policy became the trigger to keep renegotiating the longstanding issues and he successfully represented the people's concerns. Malaysian leaders after him also have to face similar issues of how to deal with Singapore in a way that can overcome this disadvantaged feeling so that Malaysia can at least get equal benefit like Singapore.



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Positive Disciplinary Power

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Introduction

Over the last few decades, scholars have developed analyses for uncovering oppressive forms of power in society. These analyses often reveal conscious and unconscious prejudices behind seemingly humanistic agendas. Academic research makes visible the power structures operating in society, allowing individuals to understand the ways they are subjugated so as to better resist control. Sometimes though, scholars overlook positive forms of disciplinary power, and they misperceive and wrongly judge policies. Taking criminalization as an example, I argue for a more reasonable and less rigid interpretation of power than one that emphasizes power as a force that limits freedom. As the law can be understood as lagging behind changing social situations, the evaluation of the disciplinary power of policies should be more deliberate and thoughtful.

The number of laws regulating behavior raises concern over whether society is overcontrolling. Debate regarding what conduct to criminalize is not new; behaviors that are not threats to society occasionally become so. As societies grow, the interdependence of individuals makes it necessary to enlarge the criminal law. The crux of the issue typically revolves around whether the conduct in question poses a significant harm. Philosophers and social scientists often disagree about this question, all citing empirical evidence in support of their positions. Frequently, new statutes are needed to meet the changing conditions of life, often inspiring discussion of the proper reach of the law. In describing contemporary criminalization, philosophers hold diverse views, some asserting that there is too much criminal law, and, as a result, too much punishment. But as technology changes, the law must catch up with these changes. Science develops and grows, our understanding of people and the world expands—and, consequently, behaviors come to be deemed harmful, and regulations are required. For the victims of wrongdoing, the proscriptions are always overdue. The law, therefore, needs to be carefully assessed to determine whether the power that is implemented increases or decreases personal freedom.

Society is sometimes described as disciplinary; in the modern age, individuals are made subjects through a complex network of controls implemented by governments, religions, schools, healthcare practitioners, etc. While it is important to know how subjects are created, it is also crucial to ask whether laws expand personal freedom. Harms are prior to laws, and in this sense, lagging criminalization better characterizes contemporary criminalization. The criminal law is always lagging behind, never catching up with the transformations that are occurring in society. At any moment, there is not enough law.

In the first part of this essay, I clarify my use of the terms “harm” and “just law.” I describe a dimension of the ideal society that pertains to the undercriminalization argument. I follow this with a thought experiment illustrating that the proscriptions given as examples of overcriminalization in fact relate to productivity-reducing behaviors, and thus, are not examples of too much criminal law. To do this, I examine claims in Douglas Husak’s *Overcriminalization: The Limits of Criminal Law* in which he argues that there are too many laws, and that the laws result in too much punishment. I assert that Husak is wrong, and I attack the red herrings of overcriminalization. Appearances are deceiving: what looks like overcriminalization is effective law enforcement and a justice system having integrity. Finally, I argue for undercriminali-

zation and suggest perceiving the law as a positive disciplinary power that expands freedom. Evolving technology brings about new ways to be productive, but it also gives birth to new harms that reduce productivity, expression, and security. A better understanding of human behaviors is acquired through science, but the law always lags behind developments. Danger is prior, so the law must catch up, must meet the demands of society; productivity and interdependence are essential to well-being. The evaluation of law must be less hasty and more thoughtful.

The Ideal Society and Other Terms

In an ideal society, people are productive, secure, and can express themselves. “Productive” should be understood broadly—it means that people have the opportunity to be workers, makers, and creators. What is required to approach this ideal is the criminal law, the identification of those behaviors which threaten the well-being of society. Those who engage in these behaviors the government punishes (Reid, 1995, p. 523). As Mark Tebbit (2005) comments, criminal conduct is “the kind of conduct—acts or omissions—that the law seeks to discourage or prevent through the implementation of punitive sanctions, whether or not [the conduct] is morally wrong or harmful” (p. 157). When determining whether a behavior is harmful, it is necessary to define “harm” in a manner consistent with that aspect of the ideal society discussed above. “Harm” is behavior which, directly or indirectly, results in people being less productive, less secure, and less able to express themselves. Harmful behavior hinders society. Harm sabotages the functioning of others and is not effectively balanced with a substantial positive weight. This is seen in the law when, as Murphy and Coleman (1984) show, the state chooses to prosecute crimes in favor of a victim even though the victim does not wish for them to do so (p. 119). In their *Philosophy of Law*, Murphy and Coleman (1984) point out that some philosophers advocate reducing crime by outlawing driving, since there are many crimes related to driving, most significantly Driving While Intoxicated (p. 118). Relying on Robert Nozick’s reasoning, they hold that a society needs to tolerate certain risks. The benefits of driving far outweigh the dangers; a proscription on driving would lessen productivity, not increase it. Criminalization of certain behaviors aims to reduce loss; the ideal society seeks to maximize productivity, security, and the capability of self-expression, and to that end, prohibits behaviors that reduce these things.

The component of the “just law” that is argued for in this essay identifies those behaviors that result in harm—and the prescribing of consequences for engaging in such behavior. These consequences will discourage engagement in the proscribed behavior and prevent offenders from continuing that behavior. The just law, together with the principle of harm herein presented, is not to be taken as a blind calculation, a weighing of “pros” and “cons”; rather, they are to be combined with and limited by various constraints. While my thesis is at variance with Husak’s theory of overcriminalization, this does not imply that constraints are not observed in determining punishment. No constraints on the law would be incompatible with a productive society, and it would be unjust if punishments were not deserved (as Husak’s makes clear). But there is also a place within the law for considering productivity and the consequences of behaviors. In short, the view that there are necessary constraints in the criminal law, along with the view that there is undercriminalization, can be simultaneously held. Husak identifies internal constraints, those that are derived from the law itself. There are four: nontrivial harm, wrongfulness, desert, and burden of proof. The third and

fourth constraints are not in conflict with what is presented in this essay and can be retained. The desert constraint maintains that punishment should only be given to the extent that it is deserved (Husak, 2008, p. 82). Husak cites the work of J.D. Mabbott, who holds that punishment is justified because a law has been broken. But according to Husak, Mabbott's view does not attend to the substance of law which determines its constitutionality; a punishment must meet constitutional requirements. For Husak, the burden of proof constraint requires that laws that punish conduct be justified. Lawmakers must be able to make a strong case for the laws; laws that are unjustified should not be enacted. This constraint requires lawmakers to exercise care in the creation of criminal laws. The other constraints Husak derives—nontrivial harm and wrongfulness—are too limited. Even Husak admits that the law determines what a harm or evil is, and the hard dilemma is what should count as harm or evil, a question the answer to which is obvious in some cases but not in others.

Red Herrings in the Criminal Law

Phenomena and statistics are misinterpreted, engendering the perception of overcriminalization. Rather, technological advances, effective crime investigation and law enforcement, and a judicial system having integrity account for the high incarceration rate and the perception that there are too many laws. In addition, discretion serves as a bulwark against too much punishment. These issues are contentious and problematic for philosophers and social scientists, and require analysis beyond the scope of this paper; nonetheless, several considerations cast doubt on commonly held assertions. Some aspects of Husak's *Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law* will serve as focal points of my discussion.

Husak's primary interest in *Overcriminalization: The Limits of Criminal Law* is the rise in punishment, as evidenced by criminal statistics and the U.S. prison populations. Husak notes that some commentators claim that the rise is owing to punishments being excessive and the criminalization of conduct that should not be treated as criminal. There is excessive punishment and questionable criminalization, but the increase in the number imprisoned and the expansion of the criminal law is best and most fully explained by changes in technology.

New technologies makes it possible to commit new kinds of wrongdoing. The fact that there are more punishments stems from recognized possible threats. Harm, whether possible or actual, usually precedes any law. The new potential harms, resulting from developing technologies, must be considered when appraising contemporary criminalization. Husak (2008) states: "Reasonable persons should anticipate that levels of punishment and amounts of criminal law on this massive scale will prove impossible to justify" (p. 4). However, technologies and the growth of society support the view that much more harm will occur if certain behaviors are not outlawed. New laws and regulations are constantly needed for an everchanging, evergrowing-more-complex society. According to Lawrence Friedman (1977), "The relationship among freedom, individual choice, and law (regulation) is by no means simple in modern society. In an urban, industrial world, freedom itself, paradoxically, gives rise to regulation, and individual choice creates conditions that demand a great deal of law. Traffic rules are largely unnecessary in a society of peasants tied to the soil" (p. 58). It is logical that a rapidly developing society requires more and more laws. Friedman (1977) asserts in the modern world, "Safety [is] an issue" that "accounts for tons of rules"

regarding transportation, construction, and so on (p. 58).

While some philosophers argue for a minimalist theory of criminal law, the demand for increasing productivity has engendered the creation of numerous statutes intended to maintain a functioning, efficient workforce. New technology brings about additional ways to be productive—but it also brings about new possible harms, new possible actions that would result in productivity, expression, and security being hindered or compromised. Software piracy laws, the law prohibiting unauthorized duplication of DVDs, seatbelt requirements, bans on texting while driving, banking regulations, smoke detector mandates—these all have as their ultimate aim a more productive society. We come to understand the dangers of smoking (smoking makes society less productive)—and we outlaw smoking in restaurants. Following 9/11, postal restrictions are implemented. Harm is done—and new laws are enacted.

Sometimes changes in human understanding bring about decriminalization—the elimination of laws prohibiting sodomy and interracial marriage are examples of this; sometimes changes in technology brings about decriminalization; there is, for example, little need today to regulate gas lamps and land-line telephones. There will always be laws that can be abolished or not enforced, but every new arena demands expansion of the criminal law. The growth of society means the need for more law, but new laws come at a slower pace than the changes that precipitate them, and, of course, the reasonable person *wants* productivity-fostering regulation.

Technological advances are one reason for the surge in criminal law and the growth in punishment. In limiting the use of certain technologies rather than permitting people to employ them however they wish, legislatures prevent harms. New laws and punishments are necessary; they are not a symptom of overcriminalization. After the introduction of cellphones, people took to talking on cellphones while driving, and their doing so resulted in many accidents. In response, legislatures passed statutes prohibiting talking on cellphones while operating a motor vehicle, and it is the rare person who does not see these statutes as reasonable and beneficial.

Although the example above is from the everyday, more grievous offenses can easily be conceived, such as the distribution of child pornography and the sexual predation of minors via the internet. Even if these crimes are punished too harshly, it is not true that they should be treated lightly; undeniably, if statutes outlawing such behaviors were repealed, children would suffer. Given the potential harms, it is better to err on the side of protection and to rely on the prosecutor and the judge to exercise their discretion to ensure fair treatment. Technological advances are the reason substantive criminal law has expanded; laws regarding behaviors made possible by developments in technology are not superfluous.

Drugs and Crime

The following examples illuminate the terms “harm” and “just law”; they also illustrate how laws prohibiting the use of drugs are necessary, and, consequently, do not represent overcriminalization.

Joe. Joe has three underage children. He regularly takes drugs, and his drug use precludes his being employed, and, consequently, he and his children are dependent on

government aid. Joe's lack of productivity results in his taking from others: revenue is needed to support him and his children, revenue that others must provide by way of paying taxes. There is less money for those providing the funds—less money for their personal expression, obtaining a better home, seeing a better doctor, and so on. People are compelled to relinquish resources which, left in their hands, would allow them to be more productive.

Peter. While enjoying drugs, Peter can keep a job and support his children, and he and his children receive no government aid. Some claim that the law treats Peter unfairly, that Peter should be allowed to take drugs since society is not injured by his doing so. Drugs, however, diminish the drug taker's capacity to be productive, and the consequences of drug taking include addiction, tolerance (needing higher doses to achieve intoxication), and time squandered acquiring and recuperating (Varcarolis, 1990, p. 634). A drug taker's behavior influences his children, increasing the likelihood of their using drugs and developing dependence; in addition, a drug taker's offspring are more likely to have birth defects, and drug taking often precipitates accidents causing injury and death.

Laws do not moralize, they answer society—and the outlawing of drugs answered people's hurting themselves and society by taking drugs. The only "benefit" of substance abuse is the user's pleasure, and this is not sufficient to outweigh the negative effects of the abuse. Prohibitions on drug taking address and discourage behaviors that diminish society while promoting the real self-interest of would-be drug takers, helping them preserve their mental and physical health. It may be true that punishment for drug offenders is sometimes excessive, but much harm results from the use of drugs, and when discussing laws that prohibit drug use and when discussing the notion of overcriminalization, this fact should be acknowledged.

There being anti-drug laws is not proof that there are too many laws. Husak (2008) reports that nearly "one of every five prisoners in America is behind bars for a nonviolent drug offense" (p. 16), suggesting that drug-related activity does society no ill. "Nonviolent" does not mean "not harmful," though, and moreover, many violent crimes—muggings, burglaries, and robberies—are committed to gain funds with which to purchase drugs. Drug laws can and should be understood as an assessment from evidence amassed over time that people doing what they wish with drugs reduces productivity.

Considerations Raised Against Overcriminalization

Most crimes are not discovered by law enforcement officers. Samaha (1988) remarks that if "victims or witnesses do not call, the police can do little or nothing" (p. 189). Communities regularly face threats, and people understand these threats and seek ways to combat them. Behind the criminal law are harsh realities that are oftentimes overlooked by those who do not have to deal with those realities. Yes, there is a lot of criminal law, but if this were not so, many communities would not be safe.

Husak (2008) points out that the number of imprisoned and supervised offenders has increased over the years, offering this as proof of overcriminalization (Husak, 2008, p. 5). Husak overlooks the fact that technological developments have improved policing and crime investigation, that the increase in the number of incarcerated offenders is

owing in large measure to better crime detection and law enforcement. GPS-tracking, immediate and mobile access to databases, and other technologies help police learn of and respond to crime, and these technologies, social media, the ubiquity and immediacy of news, digital bulletin boards, and television programs such as *America's Most Wanted* help police locate and apprehend criminals.

In the U.S., some break the law because they do not fear the justice system. According to Samaha (1988), studies show that many criminals are not afraid of the police or the law: "Prisoners admitted . . . they were neither frightened nor deterred by police" (p. 192). The justice system is not harsh enough for some crimes, and punishment is sometimes insufficient, especially when the offender has a support system. Husak claims U.S. prisons are very harsh, that offenders in the U.S. are punished more severely than offenders in Western European countries. He remarks that prison life is "boring and empty," evils which, according to him, are exacerbated by overcrowding (Husak, 1988, p. 5). Whether criminals are treated harshly in the U.S. is debatable, and it should be kept in mind that many programs—vocational training, work release, prison industries—aim to rehabilitate prisoners (Samaha, 1988, p. 595). Husak (2008) concedes that his primary premise cannot easily be proven, stating that the "extent of criminalization (and thus of overcriminalization) is largely a function of the breadth or reach of the criminal law, and we have no simple way to measure this variable at a given time or place. That is, no statutes can express whether or to what extent one jurisdiction criminalizes more or less than another" (p. 8). In other words, there being more criminal law does not mean there is overcriminalization.

It is sometimes argued that the U.S. has great numbers of prisoners, and that this proves that the system punishes too much and/or too harshly—that there is overcriminalization. When looking at the number of offenders imprisoned, it must be remembered that the population of the U.S. exceeds the population of Western Europe. The large prison population, moreover, reflects the integrity of the U.S. criminal justice system: police, prosecutors, judges, and juries are not generally susceptible to bribes, and media scrutiny, access to government documents, and the democratic process limit the extent to which the wealthy and connected can avoid prosecution and punishment.

Those in America's prisons should be in prison: the competency of police and forensic investigators, prosecutorial discretion, the providing of counsel, the evidentiary standard, the competency of judges, the appeals process—these things ensure that convictions are merited.

Conclusion

Undercriminalization—not overcriminalization—is the state of affairs in the U.S. Each new technology brings new dangers—new possible harms to productivity, expression, and security. Positive disciplinary power exists when new laws create freedom from these possible harms. There ever being new technologies, at every moment, we do not have all the laws we require. Effective crime investigation and law enforcement contribute to the number of incarcerated offenders, as does the integrity of the justice system. Many laws believed to not benefit individuals further self-interest by engendering productivity. Shallow are the accounts of contemporary criminalization that rest on the number imprisoned and/or the idea that drugs are harmless.

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The logo for the International Association for Asian Studies (iafor) is centered on the page. It features the lowercase letters "iafor" in a light blue, sans-serif font. The text is enclosed within a circular graphic composed of several overlapping, semi-transparent arcs in shades of red, orange, and blue, creating a stylized, multi-colored ring effect.

Million People March Against Pork Barrel Projects: from Potentiality to Actuality

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Abstract

In this essay, the authors endeavor to ask how virtual reality becomes a public space for advocacies, which call for crowd mobilization in the Philippines. They particularly analyze the Million People March against pork barrel, which happened on August 26, 2013, in Luneta Park, Manila. They also discussed how micro-blogging sites (facebook and twitter) on the cyberspace stirred up the event even before becoming a physical and material event. The authors try to use the concepts of public sphere introduced by Jurgen Habermas (1974, 1989) and as expanded by Lincoln Dahlberg (2007) as cyberpublic, and virtuality of Hayles and Deleuze (As Quoted in A. de Souza e Silva & Sutko, 2011). The authors also discussed the limitations and constraints to the participative and democratic potentials of blogosphere as explained by Cammaerst (2008).

Keywords: Million People March, Virtuality to Actuality, blogosphere, public space, cyberpublic

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Introduction

The interrelationship of media, politics and the Internet had been a major topic of research in the last two decades (See Kenski and Stroud, 2006; Chadwick, 2012; Michaelson, 2011). The trend seems to be gearing towards the utilization of the Internet media specifically the social networking sites like facebook, twitter, and the blogosphere for political and cultural intensions (Cammaerts, 2008). It is in this regard that I was incited to explore a specific event in Philippine politics where the Internet technology specifically blogs and micro-blogging sites played a vital role in putting together the Million People March Against Pork Barrel, which heretofore be referred to as MPM for brevity.

The authors endeavor to ask how virtual reality becomes a public space for advocacies, which call for crowd mobilization in the Philippines. We particularly analyze a specific event in the country's recent history, which is the MPM. I also ask how micro-blogging sites (facebook and twitter) on the cyberspace fired up the event even before becoming a physical and material event in Luneta Park, Manila on August 26, 2013. We try to use the concepts of public sphere introduce by Jurgen Habermas (1974, 1989) and as expanded by Lincoln Dahlberg (2007) as cyberpublic , and virtuality of Hayles and Deleuze. we also discussed the limitations and constraints to the participative and democratic potentials of blogosphere as explained by Cammaerst (2008).

Historical Overview of MPM

The MPM was the first of what was expected to be a series of protests against the Philippine Congressional Pork Barrel called PDAF. It started when Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) exposed the pork barrel scam in its issue dated July 12, 2013 identifying Janet Napoles as the mastermind of the scam and allegedly in conspiracy with several lawmakers including the Senators and Congressmen (Carvajal, 2013). The six-part exposure drew the attention and curiosity of the Filipino people thereby facilitated a widespread airing of sentiments and disgust over the issue through micro-blogging sites such as but not limited to facebook and twitter.

Ito Rapadas, a musician and artist, was the first to coin Million People March in his facebook post which says:

"What we need is a Million People March by struggling Filipino taxpayers- a day of protest by the silent majority that would demand all politicians and government officials (whatever the political stripes, color they may carry) to stop pocketing our taxes borne out from our hard work by means of these pork barrel scams and other creative criminal acts." (www.fb.com/ito.rapadas, np)

Ito Rapadas' post created a buzz among netizens which motivated other artists like Bernardo Bernardo and Ariel Pedrigal to create a Facebook Page entitled Abolish Pork Barrel (AFP, 22 August 2013). Peachy Rallonza-Bretana was the first to call for action and actual protest by reposting Ito Rapadas' status announcing a specific date and venue for the protest. She said that the event is going to happen on August 26, 2013, Luneta Park, Manila. She invited every Filipino citizen who shares the same sentiment to come and voice out his or her protests in the said venue on said date. (AFP, 22 August 2013).

Hence, the MPM Against Pork Barrel was put together in the cyberspace even before it finally ended up as a congregation of individuals yearning to put an end to the Pork Barrel System of Philippine Congress at Luneta Park, Manila on August 26, 2013. This is a clear demonstration of how advocacies in cyberspace could translate into real and physical crowd mobilization. This is a testament of a virtual reality becoming a physical political engagement.

Public Space and the Concept of the Virtual

The facebook status post of Ito Rapadas is just one of the many posts that flooded the networking site condemning what I considered to be the biggest scam to ever hit Congress both the Senate and the House. The mounting sentiments of the netizens on cyberspace could no longer be contained to remain on the virtual realm. After more than a month of public deliberation on cyberspace (blogsites, microblogs, etc), an agreement was finally arrived at--to translate the discourse into something actual. This is where Jurgen Habermas' concept of public space as expanded by Lincoln Dahlberg (2007) as cyberpublic could be best applied. The cyberspace has become a public space for the netizens to debate, deliberate, and to come to an agreement and call for action (Cammaerts, 2008).

This MPM event also manifested the correctness of Hayles (In de Souza e Silva & Sutko, 2011) concept of virtuality. Hayles (In de Souza & Sutko, 2011) argues that there is a link between material objects (which I think even material events are included in this claim) and information patterns abounding in cyberspace. This is demonstrated by the information generated by online blogsites, microblogging status and posts that cultivated much disgust and hatred towards the pork barrel issue which the authors think easily facilitated a physical call for protest and/or physical protest itself.

Hayles (In de Souza e Silva & Sutko, 2011) is correct in arguing that there is interdependency between the material and the virtual. The MPM event, which actually occurred in 2013 is entirely connected with the information generated by blogs and micro blogs over the virtual realm or cyberspace about the pork barrel issue. The event would not have occurred if it were not to the mounting sentiments on the cyberspace.

This is how Deleuze would look at it. He argues "that the process of the virtual is its actualization. The realization of a possible action eliminates its state of possibility, so the real resembles the possible, but there is no similarity between the actual and the virtual" (As Quoted by de Souza, 2011, p. 39-40). Meaning to say when the virtual like those information and various posts about the pork barrel issue and calls for action as generated in cyberspace becomes actual as MPM, it already eliminates its state of possibility because it has already transcended that state. It is already in its actuality state.

Hence, following the logic of Deleuze as he expanded Aristotle: the actual MPM is entirely not similar with Abolish Pork Barrel Call on virtual reality. This is because the actual MPM is the actuality of the virtual call. Simply, when the virtual becomes actual, it transcends its possibility and becomes another state. The metaphysics of it

is simple, the virtual reality of the call to abolish pork is not eliminated, what is eliminated is just the state of its possibility to become actual.

Constraints and Limitations to Democratic and Participative Potentials of Blogosphere

The MPM claims and appears to be free, democratic and open participation but I think otherwise. MPM is not wholly democratic because the discourse that happened on cyberspace or cyberpublic is not entirely democratic and free. When MPM was conceptualized, debated and deliberated on the cyberspace, there was a clear direction--that is to put a stop to the corruption being perpetrated by those government officials particularly the members of Congress. This means that the direction was already pre-determined even before it was rationally deliberated on cyberspace. If it was wholly democratic then even the end and ultimate objective of the call should be democratically discussed and debated in the public sphere (cyberpublic). In the authors' mind, this never happened. This is where the constraints and limitations to the democratic and participative potentials of blogosphere and cyberspace as observed by Cammaerst (2008) come into play. According to Cammaerst (2008), the participative and democratic potentials of blogosphere are limited by the following: colonization by the market; censorship by states, organizations and industries; appropriation by political (and cultural) elites; social control by citizens; and anti-democratic voices.

Cammaerst (2008) observed that there is what we call social control by individual bloggers usually use to intentionally hurl negative comments to another blogger which, successful or unsuccessful, could humiliate and intimidate the blogger being maligned. This situation, according to him, could render the collapse of participation. We prefer to expand my interpretation of Cammaerst argument by including intentionally designed purpose/objective, which was brought to the public space such as the cyberspace, not to be debated over and deliberated but for the purpose of imposing the predetermined design to the participants of the discourse. This means that under the guise of democratic participation, the bloggers such as those who started the call for the MPM on cyberspace, constrained the democratic potential of the cyberspace by imposing, albeit indirectly, their pre-determined design for MPM.

Finally, not all who arrived in Luneta for the MPM that day participated in the discourse before going there. Some were only drawn to the crowd without any knowledge on the issue of pork barrel. Various intensions were also present. There are those who participated in the mobilization for monetary gains. Examples of these would be those entrepreneurs who anticipated influx of crowd in Luneta came prepared with their merchandises with designs and inscriptions condemning pork barrel such as T-Shirts and Pins. These merchandises were sold like hotcakes to those who are part of the crowd. Others came to cover the event like reporters, media practitioners, etc. Some came just to observe.

Conclusion

In the essay above, the authors were able to prove that the MPM started on virtual reality but transcended its virtuality and became an actuality following the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle and his followers. The netizens brought their sentiments and hatred towards the issue of pork barrel before the altar of cyberspace or in the language of Habermas--the public space where rational, democratic deliberation and debate, agreement and action could be made possible. However, the authors also argued that the MPM, though appears to have been democratically deliberated on the public space, was not wholly democratic and free because of the pre-designed or pre-determined objective or purpose--that is to stop and abolish the pork barrel which facilitated widespread corruption by government officials.



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Correlation between types of Personality and Learning Styles of Selected Students of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines: Basis for Learning Enhancement Program

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Abstract

The Polytechnic University of the Philippines, as one of the top universities in the country, has to maintain its competitive edge as regards quality instruction and excellent curricular programs. To be able to do this, the University has to continuously devise programs that would further improve its students learning skills and capabilities. This study explores the correlations between the variables: Personality and Learning Styles. These variables are connected and many respects affect the learning process. The study attempts to determine and identify the different types of personality and learning styles of selected PUP students from various programs. An appropriate sampling method will be utilized to get a good number of representative samples. The study will be using descriptive-correlational method of research to answer the research problem.

Keywords: Personality Traits, Learning Styles, Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Learning Styles Inventory

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Introduction

The 16 Personality Factors test of Raymond Cattell is widely used for various purposes (Cattell and Mead, 2008). Personality tests have been employed for recruitment and selection (Stabile, 2002; Rothstein and Goffine, 2006), clinical and sometimes, personal purposes (Cattell and Mead, 2008). In this study, the researchers tried to use the test to analyze the personality of select students of Polytechnic University of the Philippines and try to find out the relationship of these personality factors with the Learning Styles Inventory of Kolb's as extended by Peter Honey and Alan Mumford (Honey and Mumford, 2006) with an end view of coming up with a Basic Enhancement Program for the University. It is stressed that the basic Learning Style Inventory of Kolb's remains to be the instrument that was employed by this research (Kolb, 1984; Kolb and Kolb, 2005).

Honey and Mumford adapted Kolb's learning styles. The two development specialists used four-way classification that in more ways resembles that of Kolb's. These categories are Activist, Reflector, Theorist, and Pragmatist.

In this present study, as to personality traits, the researchers likewise classified the 16 personality factors of Cattell into four categories: Social, Personal, Mental and Emotional. Social Traits are those that have something to do with the individual relationship with the others. Subsumed under social are the following: Warmth, Dominance, Vigilance, Liveliness and Social Boldness. Personal Traits are those that have to do with one's relationship and attitude towards the self such as Privateness, Openness to Change, Apprehension, Self Reliance, Perfectionism, and Tension. Emotional Traits pertain to those that involve the emotions such as Emotional Stability, and Sensitivity. Mental Traits are those that involve thinking processes such as Reasoning, Rule Consciousness, and Abstractedness.

To date, studies about personality traits and their relationship with learning styles include the following. Threeton and Walter (2009) conducted a study that determines the relationship between personality and learning style. The study is focused on technical and vocational education. The study uses Kolb's learning styles classification and it also uses a different set of personality traits. Another study is the one conducted by Ibrahimoglu, Unaldi, Samancioglu and Baglibel (2013) where a cluster analysis was used in trying to determine the relationship between personality and learning styles. The study also classified personality traits into two scales--- Low and High. This scales will be used in the present study in order to simplify the analysis on the personality traits of the respondents.

This study explores the correlations between the variables: Personality and Learning Styles. These variables are connected and many respects affect the learning process.

The study attempts to determine and identify the different types of personality and learning styles of selected PUP students from various courses. An appropriate sampling method will be utilized to get a good number of representative samples.

Research Locale

The Polytechnic University of the Philippines is the research locale. This is a state university in the Philippines with approximately seventy thousand students. It has around twenty two (22) campuses and branches scattered around the Luzon Island--the largest island of the archipelago. Its main campus is located at the center of the country's capital--Manila. Some of its campuses are strategically placed in remote areas where college education delivery is nearly impossible and/or difficult such as in the Municipalities of Mulanay, Lopez, and Unisan in the Quezon Province; Bansud in Mindoro Province, and others.

Having been established in 1904, the University is one of the oldest universities in the Philippines. It already reached a century mark. Though the university is consistently performing above average in various national board and licensure examinations and recognized as one of the top universities in the country, the university still continuously seeks ways on how to improve various areas of instructions, research, extension, administration and others.

Being a university that is funded by the national government of the Philippines, it is expected to produce quality graduates who can contribute immensely in nation building and development.

Methodology

A sample of 100 students from different Colleges of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (with age ranging from 17 to 19) participated in the study. Students who were not able to take either of the tests (Kolb's Learning Styles and Cattell's 16-Factor personality Test) were removed from the study, leaving a total of 95 students. Among this number, there were 27 boys and the rest were girls.

Design and Procedure

The 95 subjects took and completed two standardized tests, the 16-Factor Personality test of Cattell and the Learning Styles Inventory of Kolb as extended by Honey and Mumford. The tests were taken between the periods of March 15 and April 17, 2015. When all the completed tests were collected, the researchers tallied the data on excel sheets for easy reference.

For the Personality Test, the researchers classified the 16 personality factors into four categories: Social, Personal, Emotional, and Mental. For each category, specific personality factors were subsumed under. Hereunder is the simple matrix for the categories.

Matrix 1: Four Category Traits of Personality Factors

Social Traits	Warmth Dominance Vigilance Liveliness Social Boldness..
Personal Traits	Privateness Openness to Change Apprehension Self Reliance Perfectionism Tension.
Emotional Traits	Emotional Stability Sensitivity
Mental Traits	Reasoning Rule Consciousness Abstractedness

Each of the subjects is given a test where a 0-4 scoring for every personality factor is provided. When all the personality tests were collected and tallied, the scores for each factor were sum up and scaled into High (2.0-4.0) and Low (0.1-1.99). Then a simple frequency distribution and corresponding percentage is computed. The researchers also generated mean score for every category of personality factors.

For the Learning Style Inventory, the subjects were provided with Learning Styles Questionnaire which has 80-items. There are specific items for specific learning style category. In this study, the categories of Kolb were re-classified into Activist, Theorist, Reflector and Pragmatist (Honey and Mumford, 2006). These categories resemble that of Kolb's but they are more comprehensible and easy to understand on surface. The matrix below provides the general descriptions of these learning style categories.

Matrix 2: Learning Styles---General Descriptions (Honey and Mumford, 2006)

Activists	Activists involve themselves fully and without bias in new experiences. They enjoy the here and now and are happy to be dominated by immediate experiences. They are open-minded, not skeptical, and this tends to make them enthusiastic about anything new. Their philosophy is: `ill try anything once`. They tend to act first and consider the consequences afterwards. Their days are filled with activity. They tackle problems by brainstorming. As soon as the excitement from one activity has died down they are busy looking for the next. They tend to thrive on the challenge of new experiences but are bored with implementation and longer term consolidation. They are gregarious people constantly involving themselves with others but, in doing so, they seek to centre all activities around themselves.
Reflectors	Reflectors like to stand back and ponder experiences and observe them from many different perspectives. They collect data, both first

	hand and from others, and prefer to think about it thoroughly before coming to any conclusion. The thorough collection and analysis of data about experiences and events is what counts so they tend to postpone reaching definitive conclusions for as long as possible. Their philosophy is to be cautious. They are thoughtful people who like to consider all possible angles and implications before making a move. They prefer to take a back seat in meetings and discussions. They enjoy observing other people in action. They listen to others and get the drift of the discussion before making their own points. They tend to adopt a low profile and have a slightly distant, tolerant unruffled air about them. When they act it is part of a wide picture which includes the past as well as the present and others' observations as well as their own.
Theorists	Theorists adapt and integrate observations into complex but logically sound theories. They think problems through in a vertical, step by step, logical way. They assimilate disparate facts into coherent theories. They tend to be perfectionists who won't rest easy things are tidy and fit into a rational scheme. They like to analyse and synthesize. They are keen on basic assumptions, principles, theories, models and systems thinking. Their philosophy prizes rationality and logic. (Shortened)
Pragmatists	Pragmatists are keen on trying out ideas, theories and techniques to see if they work in practice. They positively search out new ideas and take the first opportunity to experiment with applications. They are the sort of people who return from management courses brimming with new ideas that they want to try out in practice. They like to get on with things and act quickly and confidently on ideas that attract them. They tend to be impatient with ruminating and open-ended discussions. They are essentially practical, down to earth people who like making practical decisions and solving problems. They respond to problems and opportunities as a challenge. Their philosophy is: 'there is always a better way' and 'if it works its good'.

A simple frequency and percentage distribution was used to present the learning styles of the subjects. After the subject completed the Learning Style Inventory, what is only registered is the category that earned the highest score. The individual scores generated for each category of learning styles were correlated against the categories of personality factors. For brevity, the researchers decided not to present all other tables in this paper. The only tables that are herewith presented are the correlation results as computed using Pearson correlation.

To get whether or not there is a significant relationship between the variables (personality and learning styles), the researchers used the Pearson Correlation.

The formula is hereunder illustrated.

$$r = \frac{\sum XY - \frac{(\sum X)(\sum Y)}{n}}{\sqrt{(\sum X^2 - \frac{(\sum X)^2}{n})(\sum Y^2 - \frac{(\sum Y)^2}{n})}}$$

Results and Discussion

Inasmuch as there are 95 subjects in the research, the researchers decided to correlate the responses for each test according to the following variables: Personality Factors--Personal Traits, Social Traits, Mental Traits and Emotional Traits and the other variable is the Learning Styles---Reflectors, Activists, Theorists, and Pragmatists. The succeeding tables present the computed results of the correlation.

Table 1: Pearson Correlation Results for Social Traits and Learning Styles

Learning Styles	Pearson Correlation Results/ (r)	Verbal Description
Activists	-0.0475	Negative Correlation
Reflectors	-0.1106	Negative Correlation
Theorists	-0.1101	Negative Correlation
Pragmatists	-0.0686	Negative Correlation

Note: The correlation result is analyzed according to -1 to 1 scale, where 1 is a perfectly positive correlation.

The above Table clearly shows no positive correlation between the responses for the social traits of the 16 factor personality test and the scores generated in Kolb's Learning Styles Inventory as Extended by Honey and Mumford (2006). The result is not consistent with the results that were generated with the study of Fariba (2013) where most of the correlation coefficients were positive except neuroticism, which generated a negative correlation.

Table 2: Pearson Correlation Results for Mental Traits and Learning Styles

Learning Styles	Pearson Correlation Results/ (r)	Verbal Description
Activists	-0.1428	Negative Correlation
Reflectors	-0.0611	Negative Correlation
Theorists	-0.1107	Negative Correlation
Pragmatists	-0.0001	Negative Correlation

Note: The correlation result is analyzed according to -1 to 1 scale, where 1 is a perfectly positive correlation.

Graf,et.al (2006) study seemed to be in contrast with the results of the above correlation where in the said study the personality trait is positively correlated with cognitive traits. In the present study, all the above data show that there are no correlations between the learning styles and the mental traits of the individual learners. The seeming contrast can perhaps be attributed to the difference between the tests conducted to the subjects.

In the above table, though all of the correlation coefficients(r) appear to be negative, the correlation between Mental Trait and Pragmatists is somewhere near the positive scale (r=-0.0001). This is a positive indication. This means that Polytechnic University Students can easily strike a balance between mental functions and real life practice.

Table 3: Pearson Correlation Results for Emotional Traits and Learning Styles

Learning Styles	Pearson Correlation Results/ (r)	Verbal Description
Activists	0.0343	Positive Correlation
Reflectors	-0.1641	Negative Correlation
Theorists	-0.0670	Negative Correlation
Pragmatists	-0.2594	Negative Correlation

Note: The correlation result is analyzed according to -1 to 1 scale, where 1 is a perfectly positive correlation.

The above table shows the correlation coefficient (r) between emotional traits and learning styles. The results show that there is only one correlation which turned out to be positive, which is the correlation between emotional trait and activists ($r=0.0343$). All the other results are negative ($r=-0.1641$ for Reflectors; -0.0670 for Theorists; and -0.2594 for Pragmatists). This result is not the as that shown by the study of Aliakbari and Abol (2013) where the emotional intelligence is shown to have significant relationship with learning styles.

Table 4: Pearson Correlation Results for Personal Traits and Learning Styles

Learning Styles	Pearson Correlation Results/ (r)	Verbal Description
Activists	0.1173	Positive Correlation
Reflectors	0.0197	Positive Correlation
Theorists	-0.0894	Negative Correlation
Pragmatists	0.1650	Positive Correlation

Note: The correlation result is analyzed according to -1 to 1 scale, where 1 is a perfectly positive correlation.

The table above presents very different results as compared with the other correlations in this study. In this table, where the personal traits were correlated with learning styles, majority of the correlations turned out to be positive ($r=0.1173$ for Activists; $r=0.0197$ for Reflectors; and $r=0.1650$ for Pragmatists).

Conclusion

The study shows that in all the correlations that were done between specific learning styles and personality factors, most of the results generated negative correlation except some few. Only four correlations turned out to be positive. These are when emotional traits are correlated with activists ($r= 0.0343$); and when personal traits are correlated with activists ($r= 0.1173$), reflectors ($r=0.0197$), and pragmatists ($r=0.1650$).

The results may seem to be in contrast with previous studies in different countries, however, many factors played in. First, most of the previous studies employed different personality tests. Second, the subjects are different. The research locale is also different.

If these results are to be used to develop a basic enhancement program for the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, the researchers hereby suggest that programs and delivery of lessons should be more focused on the personality of the learners that has to do with their personal traits rather than the other traits such as emotional traits, social traits, and mental traits.



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International Development in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) and Its Impact on East West Economic Corridor (EWEC)

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Abstract

Following the post-Cold War era in 1992, when the Mekong region countries, established an Asian Development Bank (ADB) for the development of their economies, societies and cultures. One of the projects, in the Mekong region The development of East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC) linking with Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar, for the purpose of trade, investment and tourism by linking the Pacific Oceans and Indian Oceans. This article attempts to tentatively answer which stakeholder countries will gain and which impacts from the EWEC, will act to strengthen the relationship of the countries on mainland Southeast Asia, which is consistent and linked to cooperation in the GMS and ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as well as the countries in the GMS as a base for manufacturing, marketing and logistics for the Important Geo-Economics in Southeast Asia.

Keywords: International Development, the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), Impact, East West Economic Corridor (EWEC)

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Introduction

The International Development country in the Mekong region in the post-Cold War established cooperation throughout the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) on 1992. With assistance from Asian Development Bank (ADB) to create unity, stability and prosperity of the countries in GMS. (<http://www.adb.org/countries/gms/main>) Including economic, social and cultural potential to GMS countries in the regional competition, both as the country's manufacturing base and market distribution of the region. (<http://adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2010/gms-action-plan-east-west.pdf>) and the development of the Greater Mekong Subregion, Ministerial Meeting of GMS 8th, 1998 in Manila. Have imposed economic corridor is divided into 3 main. (1) East-west Economic Corridor (EWEC) (2) North South Economic Corridor (NSEC) and (3) Southern Economic Corridor (SEC). (ADB,2010)

A key turning point was to determine the structure of the East West Economic Corridor (EWEC) which links the area from Vietnam through the Laos Bridge, the Second Thai–Lao Friendship Bridge (Mukdahan-Savannakhet) into Thailand, Friendship bridge Thailand - Burma and the Burmese. Also known as a route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The total distance of 1,450 kilometers, to serve geographic relationships of mainland Southeast Asia. (Wiemer, C. 2009)

This article on International Development in the GMS and its impact on EWEC hopes to answer that question. Why is the international development in GMS along the EWEC and such developments affecting the EWEC area including the international development in the sub-Mekong region within the framework of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, (www.mfa.go.th/internet/document/740.doc) to contribute to the economic liberalization of Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, aiming to promote the development of equality among the countries along the EWEC in the future.

Framework for International Development in GMS on the EWEC

International Development along the EWEC will cover four countries, including Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. The goals of the EWEC are (1) to enhance connectivity of the corridor areas by reducing cross-border transactions and transportation costs; (2) to increase competitiveness through economies of scale offered by cross-border investments that based on value-adding processes and take advantage of the comparative advantages of different areas within the corridor; (3) to empower the private sector by promoting joint financial, technological, marketing, production, and other collaborations in the EWEC areas; and (4) to reduce poverty, support development of rural and border areas, and increase the earnings and provide employment to the low-income groups. (ADB,2010)

The Flagship Projects: There are 12 flagship projects classified under two broad categories of transport and other infrastructure, and managed under various forums or working groups:

A. Core Transport (1) East–West Transport Corridor (2) Water transport development (3) Railway development (4) Air transport development (5) Cross-border facilitation in the movement of people and goods (6) Human resource development for the transport sector

B. Other Infrastructure (1) Development of electric power grid (2) Promotion of regional energy cooperation arrangements (3) Telecommunications backbone development (4) Tourism development (5) Economic corridor initiatives (6) Initiatives of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (ASEAN–METI), Economic and Industrial Cooperation Committee (AMEICC), and Working Groups on West–East Corridor Development

The path along the EWEC have linked the cities of Mawlamyine-Myawaddy (Myanmar) Mae Sot-Phitsanulok-Khon Kaen-Kalasin-Mukdahan (Thailand) Savannakhet- Dansavanh (Lao People's Democratic Republic)-Lao Bao-Dong Ha-Hue-Da Nang (Viet Nam) a crossing point three points (1) the border: Myawaddy, Myanmar (Burma) - Mae Sot (Thailand) (2) crossing point Mukdahan (Thailand) - Savannakhet (Laos) and (3) the border Dansavanh (Laos) - Lao Bao (Vietnam).



Figure 1 East–West Economic Corridor Nodes

The link between GMS countries along the EWEC areas that focus on the availability of routes. Associated with infrastructure improvements, such as Thai-Burmese Friendship Bridge, Thailand - Laos Friendship Bridge, And the border with Laos – Vietnam, to save time, reduce risk, cost, support trade and employment of people in the area. (ADB,2010) The point at Mawlamyine in Myanmar to the west and Danang in Vietnam to the east in both cities, there is a major port. Mawlamyine port, Dawei port, and Danang port. Which in affect link the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

Relationship between countries on the EWEC

Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam had a relationship for a long time. Sometimes there is a close relationship. But sometimes there are relationships that are far apart. Which is the result of political and economic development, and each country has a different political system, economic development model, and the level of development. Meanwhile, there is a point in the development along the EWEC, which is one of 12 projects developed with high priority (Flagship Programs) (ASEAN Office, 2007) to develop infrastructure to facilitate trade and investment, Tourism Promotion and is considered one of the nine economic corridor (Economic Corridors) within the framework of cooperation GMS. (<http://www.mfa.go.th/business/1092.php>.)

The geographic area of the EWEC has underlined the road cut through the middle of the GMS and the transition from the Transport Corridor Economic Corridor by adding to a plan to expand cooperation for more coverage, and facilitation of trade and transport. (Banomyong, R. 2010) Investment in EWEC prepared in the form of special economic zones, to encourage private sector participation in the development

of agriculture and agribusiness, Energy development and telecommunications Support the tourism sector, transportation and infrastructure construction and so on.

The countries on the EWEC have created special economic zones, (Ishida, M. 2008, and ITD, 2010) Special Economic Border Zones, economic zones and estates as follows:

Myanmar: Myawaddy Special Economic Zones was trading leverage the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), which is opposite to Mae Sot, Tak Province, (<http://www.gotomanager.com/news/details.aspx?id=86735>.) supported by the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand, Assisted by Exports of goods and design center. Myawaddy special economic zones have unlimited cheap labor in Myanmar, and a source of electrical power from Mae Sot. (Due to power shortages Myanmar) and also look forward to the textile industry from Thailand's Mae Sot relocated to Myanmar. So as to attract migrant workers from Myanmar to Thailand to work on it, however, the development of special economic zone has not progressed as much.

Thailand: Mae Sot Special Economic Zones, Mae Sot District, Tak Province, which lies west of Thailand to Myanmar, Policies of the government of Thailand to serve as a base for manufacturing and exports, such as textiles, ceramics and furniture, etc. In connection with the Myawaddy special economic zone, this features a twin city border trade. This work has been supported by the Department of Economic Affairs, Foreign Ministry, And the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand. We have studied the possibility to set up Logistics, Small and Medium Enterprise (SME). Including the development of the Mukdahan special economic zones, which is attached to the Lao PDR., by focusing on the Agricultural processing, Production appliances, Parts, motorcycle, and agricultural tools, as a production base for exports to Laos and Vietnam.

The development of industrial estates in Thailand. The Thai government has invested in infrastructure development in Mae Sot, Tak province, and Mukdahan province. The development of special economic zones to link neighboring countries and is the gateway to trade with Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. By Friendship Bridge Thailand - Lao 2 is driven to invest in industrial estates, and the establishment of distribution centers. And the establishment of distribution centers is assigned to the manufacturing and processing of agricultural products including rubber industrial targets (with the manufacture of latex, smoked rubber sheet, and processing of rubber products), ethanol (with sugar can bagasse from sugar residue to produce ethanol for export), and an area to gather, and distribution of products such as agricultural goods and industrial goods.

Laos PDR.: Savannakhet special economic zone, The Lao government has created Savan-Seno Special Economic Zone (SASEZ), Total area is 3, the first county near the Friendship Bridge Thailand - Lao 2 will focus on service businesses such as hotels, restaurants and casinos. The company's Thai Airport Ground Services (TAGS) joint venture 70 percent of the remaining 30 percent is invested by the government of Laos. The second area is focused on transportation, a joint venture between Japan, Laos, and Thailand, and is the third area of the industrial estate, to base the production exported to the country on the Mekong region. (<http://www.thailog.org/en/journals-and-articles/1867--east-west-economic-corridor-ewec--.html>)

Lao government to focus on developing areas of the country due to EWEC “Land Lock” is “Land Link” by pushing the development of special economic zones in Savannakhet area. The approved benefits to investors, but it still lacks an investor to participate in the construction and development costs. They have not yet developed the necessary infrastructure for investment. The government promotes projects such as construction and extraction of natural resources and so on.

Vietnam: The Vietnamese government has set up the Lao Bao special economic zone (LBEZ) along with developing infrastructure and providing benefits. The incentives for foreign investors interested in investing, Danang Industrial Zone (DIZ), and Industrial Zone, (A joint venture between the private estates, and Vietnam). Situated on the border of Lao Bao and Dong Ha. These estates were built to capitalize on the area EWEC. And to accelerate the development of the industrial possibilities, and Danang harbor, Investors from Thailand invest in Super Horse, cold beverages and manufacturing automotive components. Encouraging factories in Vietnam to enter the market, have deployed a promotional tour to interest businesses in Hue, which is a World Heritage historic.

Encouraging cooperation between countries in the GMS has helped economic development throughout the EWEC to proceed quickly facilitating trade, investment, development and energy sources. The growth of tourism, Human Resource Development, and environment protection. This is expected to help increase their chances for growth in employment, quality of life improvement and to reduce poverty of the local people in the surrounding area.

Impact on EWEC under AEC

International Development in the GMS has built roads and other transportation facilities, trade, and investment on EWEC to help alleviate poverty. (<http://www.dtn.moc.go.th/>) The company hopes to expand opportunities for people to access employment, Markets, and creating opportunities for people to earn more, whether in manufacturing or entering into labor contracts. However, our survey found that no information has shown clearly that facilities that are created have contributed significantly to reach their workplace, and commercial markets, or contribute to poverty reduction. It also does not appear to be the educated of the population in the affected areas of economic opportunity took the opportunity to use it as an escape from poverty, which is the hope of the EWEC in any way. (A report for consideration by Greater Mekong Sub-region’s 15th Ministerial Meeting June 19, 2009 Cha-Am, Thailand)

Impact on the social and cultural development is being watched by The Asian Development Bank (ADB) as a leader in the development of the Mekong to specify that, "Poorest countries will benefit most from the linkage path EWEC" because of the passage of goods and services. So that, in fact to have more impact, there are differences that occur between those investors who receive benefits. With a poor country is not very useful. Negatively impact on the borders factors more on doing business illegally. Environmental problems, transnational crimes are all factors of which can have an impact on urban EWEC mostly.

The roads are good at keeping in touch through traditional transport methods. Causing changes in all aspects of people effected, both positive and negative. In addition, the

road has increased commercial activity, and more frequent trips. The negative effects include eating and leisure pursuits, they progress to a level that creates problems, the smuggling, human trafficking, and prostitution. Which is the counterpart to the development of the tourism industry, and the impact on the health and social system. ADB study found a direct link between economic development and expansion of disease problems. Especially HIV / AIDS in the action plan of the EWEC is planning a campaign to educate local people about the outbreak of cross-border travel. A report on a study of 2008 people living in the EWEC in Laos and Vietnam, found that 59 percent of the Lao People's recognized and were aware of the outbreak. But consider them more vulnerable to disease, While 41 percent understand that the risk of sexually transmitted diseases, and other digestive disorders. The people in Vietnam, 51 percent agreed that they have the right to travel across the country even if they are infected. The local people were given information about the disease as well. Resources partly from the media and local health center EWEC. (<http://www.indochinapublishing.com/research/pdf/eastwes.pdf>)

The aim is to reduce the disparity between the levels of development of the country along the EWEC and to support the development of rural and border areas. By increasing employment and generating revenue for the low-income group. And focused on the migration of people along the EWEC especially along the border to help rural people, the various tribes, and give women the opportunity to work with the channel. Also receive social assistance, by increasing knowledge and access to social services, such as depictions of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV / AIDS) in the area of transportation along the EWEC prevention and treatment of infectious diseases in the community at risk, improving health-oriented environment, and reducing the number of diseases. In addition to a include the conservation of natural resources and the awareness of the environment.

The Bank of Thailand (BOT) has analyzed the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to the development of the Mekong and the impact the project area EWEC follows. (<https://www.bot.or.th/>)

Strengths: (causing spatial development, The Special Economic Zone, and industrial estates, the development of roads to link the Mekong region, and improving the quality of life of the population.)

Weaknesses: (degradation of natural resources, the flow of migrants, the spread of communicable diseases, Illegal trade, the imbalance of income, and poverty).

Opportunities: (Economic Development, increasing trade, and investment activities, the employment increase, and Tourism)

Threats: (political posts, creating balance in the distribution of income, spread prosperity, and development are equally)

The foundation of international development on the EWEC, contributing to economic growth, the government of Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, the four countries of policy cooperation and trust each other to develop. Meanwhile, there are powers outside the region, such as Japan and China are also helping to develop. Either in the form of loans, the grant of aid to the development and training of personnel, in order to stimulate the growth both social and economic.

Support the development of the community and the city on the EWEC. The goal of the project is Economic growth of the area, the development of public transport as well as infrastructure such as roads, electricity, and water supply and so on. Which have a beneficial effect on the quality of life of people in the urban and the rural. Along the route from the coast of Vietnam, Rural areas in Laos, Central Thailand, and the Myanmar border, with the growth of the manufacturing sector, according to the trade along the trade route, and the establishment of economic zones along the EWEC, and also the expansion of urban areas. Especially, in Vietnam such as Hue, Da Nang and Dong Ha, As a result, the movement of manpower, workers into the region's economy while traveling across the border along the EWEC, make it easy and quickly. After the development of transportation facilities, the development of transport and regulations relating to cross border.

International development has led to the development of economic, social and cultural communities, and cities Along the EWEC. When developing rapidly creeping into the community and the city. Would be directly affected, by the economic development that is not entailing an imbalance in the distribution of population in the area, Because the area that EWEC cuts through does not have the population of the 4 countries in balance, Partly because the incoming stakeholder interests or economic opportunity that arises is the major powers from outside the region or transnational. This makes the benefits often fall to the rest of the region over the community.

While, economic liberalization under the AEC (2015), causing an influx of people from rural to urban areas or the economy. So Thus, a shortage of labor in the countryside, And followed by social issues, such as the expansion of transnational crime, The spread of communicable diseases, or social problems Considered one of the countries in the GMS has lost to swap with the discourse on "development" that is important to many countries and the focus should turn to realize. With the goal of economic development to the quality of life of people in the GMS, while also need to review how the development is proceeding may not be the way of the development of GMS people in need.

Analyze the impact of international development on the EWEC

International Development in the GMS and the east - west economic corridor (EWEC) has analyzed the impact of the GMS, both in terms of economic and social benefits to the community on the EWEC to contribute to the development community on the EWEC, (ITD, 2010) as follows:

Myanmar

Myawaddy province, the establishment of the Myawaddy special economic zones. (Industrial estates, Distribution center, and tax-free) for development along the EWEC, with the development of the road construction Mae Sot - Myawaddy - foothills Tenasserim (0-18 km), Thailand a grant to create a path Mae Sot - Myawaddy a distance of 18 kilometers of the Road Construction foothills Tanintharyi - Gore's record distance of 40 kilometers. Which is still limited in transportation, can travel daily by switching on a single channel. Due to the narrow road and the traffic is not convenient enough. Then enter the town drunk Mawlamyine. This remains a problem in the construction and financing of the operation. The attitude of foreigners to stay to support the project, Myanmar's internal political problems, and minorities in

Myanmar. It could not be linked to the Indian Ocean truly. While deepwater Dawei, which is far from the harbor to the south Mawlamyine about 300 kilometers, which is linked to Europe, Africa, Middle East and South Asia. (<http://www.logisticsdigest.com/artical/logistics-insight/item/4285-dawei-port.html>.)

Thailand

Tak: Consider the EWEC Tak area to the west end of the Port Mawlamyine. Which is not yet fully developed as the eastern end of the Danang harbor. (Ishida, M., 2008) Economic activities need to be considered in conjunction with the airing of Myawaddy in Myanmar. The Myawaddy border has launched a special economic zone that is connected to a special economic zone in Mae Sot. The economic activities in line with the market based on border trade, and growth of an industrial area, the use of foreign workers, the natural and cultural tourism as a supplement. There are tourists traveling to Thailand in Myanmar through border Mae Sot - Myawaddy. And Friendship Bridge Thailand – Burma, Has increased, but there are limitations such as transport, regulations crossings, relations between Thailand – Burma, and unrest in Myanmar.

Phitsanulok and Khon Kaen: Which is a province in Thailand on EWEC border area. Phitsanulok has a geographical advantage. Since Phitsanulok is located on the intersection between the EWEC, a "bridge economy" (Land Bridge). Linking the east to the Pacific Ocean countries such as Japan, Korea, and China to the Western Hemisphere, the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Martaban in Myanmar, cut the North-South Economic Corridor (NSEC), which links China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand into Malaysia and Singapore. Makes Phitsanulok well known as that "Intersection of Indochina" to a central link of economic relations with its neighbors. Khon Kaen is a center for education which can support the education of students in the neighboring countries of Laos and Vietnam has potential educational financial benefits.

Mukdahan: As a gateway between Thailand, Lao and Vietnam, economic activity that occurs on the border between Thailand and Lao PDR., Laos and Vietnam over the west coast of Thailand and Myanmar. By a group of investors of Thailand, started to invest in Lao PDR, and travel between the three countries, mostly to overnight stays in Mukdahan to await the opening of border checkpoints across Thailand - Lao PDR. Laos. In the morning, through the Road Savannakhet City to Da Nang, Vietnam. The publicity tour is 1 day, eat 3 meals in 3 countries there is breakfast at Thailand. Lunch at the Lao PDR.. Vietnam and dinner The Friendship Bridge Thailand - Lao 2 legalized growth, and in line with the growth of Vietnam's economy.

The effects of the EWEC areas in Thailand, border provinces are affected differently than other areas, Due to migration from neighboring countries into trade unions in Tak and Mukdahan. Which are both legal and illegal. It also contributes to the impact on the social and cultural issues, such as, illegal migrants, the spread of drugs in the community, and human trafficking, as well as, the relationship between local people and migrants, such as including labor relations between capitalists and workers, the security and safety standards for Phitsanulok and Khon Kaen, social and cultural issues there are not many. This is because the provinces have no real close neighbors, so there is no problem with immigrants, Illegal immigration, and drug problems like Mae Sot, or Mukdahan province.

Laos

Savannakhet: Found that there were people who came in the province of Savannakhet area added to the tour, and do business. It is known that the EWEC a result, many travelers coming through the Savannakhet area, travel to Vietnam. These travelers have little opportunity to spend time in the province Savannakhet area, to shop or eat because attractions are few in Savannakhet area tourists are not much of an economic influence. Most tourists who cometake a walk around the town, the old buildings built since it was a colony of France, temples, and The Dinosaur Museum. There is also cultural tourism (local food, and ethnicity) tourism and natural history such as Ho Chi Minh trail.

Social impact varies on the project area, The EWEC area has resulted in Savannakhet I field a city; Multicultural Villagers lose arable land, and lifestyle of ethnic groups. It also has educational exchanges. The Lao people are leaving to study in neighboring countries. In addition, the area EWEC is beneficial to agriculture in terms of the commitment (Contract Farming) of Laos. Resulted in the migration of people coming into the concession area for planting crops, Investment, and moving freely within the AEC which foreign investment, has caused problems such as environmental issues, Contaminants from mining, and the reduction of forest areas. This has a direct impact on the living conditions of people in the area.

Vietnam

Vietnam is a country that is along the EWEC has seen a positive impact on the trail more than any other country. As can be seen from the number of foreign tourists increased dramatically after extending along the EWEC, There is also a source of economic EWEC conveyor inputs of Vietnam, copper and wood from Laos. However, Vietnam still can't fully benefit from such a path. Due to the path that is not in good repair, limiting the speed limit on a journey in Vietnam.

The effects of the AEC per province in Vietnam along the EWEC is found to have encouraged investors from ASEAN member countries, to invest in Lao Bao Special Economic Zone, Quang Chi, Hue, and urban / industrial area in the city of Da Nang. The form of investment in each area may be different. The goods will be sent out to the members of ASEAN, Due to the elimination of barriers of trade, tax and non-tax. Meanwhile, it will have to compete in the offering up of the production of the member countries of ASEAN.

Considering the special economic zone of the 4 countries along the EWEC is a Myawaddy special economic zone in Myanmar, Mea Sot Special Economic Zone and Mukdahan special economic zones (Thailand), Savan Seno Special Economic Zone (PDR. Laos), and Lao Bao Special Economic Zone (Vietnam), the Lao Bao Special Economic Zone, There seems to be a breakthrough in the economy over the next 4 because of its proximity to the port of Danang. It is an opportunity to transport goods to East Asia. For Savan Seno Special Economic Zone, although investors will ship along Route 2 is exported to the Laem Chabang port of Thailand, and the port of Da Nang in Vietnam. But the investment is still insufficient due to lack of infrastructure and skilled workforce. And in parts of Myanmar has set up a Myawaddy special economic zone and investors from Thailand to increase investment in the area.

International Development in the GMS has guided the views and ideas of development cooperation, and liberalization under the AEC to link GMS countries in which the benefits of economic development to meet the needs of people and a lot of interest, and causing economic cooperation, Political cooperation, and Foreign Policy.

The use of the EWEC area while continuing the game of GMS countries to focus on development assistance, the economic incentives, Human Resource Development, and cultural exchanges, etc.

Conclusion

International Development, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, previously had a relationship of economic, social and cultural, even in the post-Cold War conflicts and different political ideologies. The usurpation of some natural resources, but it is an area with a high economic potential. If the partnership will be beneficial to the country on the path of the four countries of the EWEC production, utilization of mineral resources, energy, trade, investment, and tourism and so on.

From the development of international transport, to link roads to the economy of the region (GMS) as a hub of continental Southeast Asia, Linked to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Consistent with the framework for cooperation in the GMS, ASEAN Economics Community, and expanded trade opportunities, and investment between all that will lead to economic liberalization between ASEAN and China, South Korea and Japan (ASEAN + 3).

Meanwhile, the cooperation in economic development on the EWEC is something that many countries would like to contribute to. Raising the level of economic development of the country, creating income and wealth, and the quality of life of the nation. Meanwhile, it is undeniable that the negative impact of social and cultural, changes in the way of life of individuals, communities, such as the disparity of development, Illicit Trafficking Migrants, Human trafficking, and environmental issues, including the inability to tackle poverty. However, countries in the GMS have a chance or hope that the development of the country. To avoid negative impact protection than it is as well to take advantage of investment and development related to technology. The Strategic Review Measures taken to Along with creating a surveillance system that was more closely in the future.

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Understanding the Contribution of Islam in Realizing ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC)¹

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Abstract

The ASCC reflects ASEAN's social agenda of poverty eradication and human development, which also addresses the cultural and civilizational cohesions in ASEAN (ASEAN, 2014). Success of such integration depends on the level of cooperation among the diverse cultural groups in ASEAN. The inspiration of specific religio-cultural norms and practices often dictates the inter-cultural cooperation. Islam as the most widely practiced religion in ASEAN inspires the success of ASCC. This paper provides an analysis of the potentials of Islamic values and cultural practices in ASEAN countries to materialize the ASCC. Since the focus of the ASCC is to realize the ASEAN community, it is important to assess the strategic objectives of the ASCC Blueprint and practical Islamic norms, namely the direction for cooperation, coexistence, and dialogue. The paper argues Islamic norms have historically provided stability and progress in various ASEAN nations. In recent global turmoil, Muslims in ASEAN countries have guarded intra-faith coexistence. Islam provides common understanding of values to its' ethnically and nationality varied followers located across ASEAN. The paper describes Muslims are proactively participating in the construction of ASEAN Community irrespective of their citizenry in the Muslim majority or minority countries. Through intensive documentary analysis and selected interviews, the paper identifies that Islamic values are in-line with the normative aspects required for the construction of ASCC. Islam dictates its members and inspires non-members to ascertain the common ground to create regional solidarity for a caring and sharing society by designing and shaping various practical programs across ASEAN.

Keywords: ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, Integration, Islamic Values, Common Identity, ASEAN Blue-print.

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Introduction

The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) addresses the realm of human development, cultural and civilizational diversities and prescribes the elements and actions for successful cohesions in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)² (ASEAN, 2014). In realizing ASCC, two intricate imperatives were identified by the ASCC Plan of Action. First, ASCC as the social agenda of ASEAN, it is focused on poverty eradication and human development; and second, the ASCC has to evolve while profound changes are taking place in the social landscape of ASEAN (ASEAN, 2014). The generic argument about these changes identifies the globalization and phenomenal expansion of liberal economy as the cause (Georgiadou, 2006; Steger, 2009). ASEAN integration, in the form regionalism, can be both cause and result of the pace of the changes (Paasi, 2009).

Importantly, the direction of most of the changes depends on the values and practices of the people of the ASEAN. In addressing these imperatives the religio-cultural considerations count greater significance. Since, Islamic norms, the values directed by the holy Quran, dictate the everyday actions of its believers (Muslims) - it tends to craft greater implication in both the private and public life of Muslims. Importantly, the followers of Islam constantly assess and validate the public policies with the norms of Islam as a religious requirement. Thus, the participation of Muslims in the realization of ASCC would be encouraged if ASCC programs match or at least not contradict with the normative guidelines of Islam.

The demographic fact of Islam being the religion of the majority in ASEAN underscores the importance of Islamic normative inspiration for the realization of ASCC. Islam has been the faith based inspiration for its follower to protect peace and stability and inspire coexistence in Southeast Asian region. Correspondingly, the ASCC blueprint has identified the inter-religious understanding by respecting different religio-culture of the ASEAN people as a core element of the ASCC (ASEAN, 2009). Thus, this paper attempts to understand the links between the Islamic norms and their role for the realization of the ASCC. The paper is based on qualitative analysis. Besides, the paper used the outcomes from selected semi-structured interviews. Ten expert interviews were taken on ASEAN, ASCC, Islam and its normative implication in regional integration.

Significance of the Paper: ASCC holds the human dimension of ASEAN, where religious coexistence and cultural tolerance is vital to create a common ASEAN identity. Since the integral focus of the ASCC is to realize the ASEAN community- it is important to link and assess whether the public norms of Islam; such as direction for cooperation, coexistence, and dialogue; inspire the strategic objectives of ASCC Blueprint. The emergence of the unique ASEAN identity doesn't negate or contradict the cultural practices of Islam. This paper signifies, first, by providing an analysis of the ASCC process and locating the critical role of Islam in the process, second, by showcasing inter-connectivity of the actions of Islamic believers and its mandatory normative guideline for nurturing the human, cultural and natural resources for

² ASEAN is the Southeast Asian regional organization. It was established on 8 August 1967 by signing the Bangkok Declaration. Presently, it has ten member states. Those are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Detail can be found at www.asean.org

sustained development and harmonious living, which is an essential feature of the realization of ASCC, and finally, by illustrating the positions of Islamic norms in building a caring and sharing ASEAN Community. The realization of ASCC would achieve enduring solidarity and unity among ASEAN people, which requires proactive participation of the Muslims. Finally, an analytical discussion addresses the challenges towards utilizing the potentials of Islam in realizing ASCC.

ASEAN and ASCC

In a region largely bereft of regional organizations, the ASEAN has been the most significant multilateral group in Asia for the past forty-five years (Kurlantzick, 2012). After its' initial attainment of averting Southeast Asia from additional occurrences of war subsequent to the Indochina Wars, ASEAN has invigorated its post-cold war role in the region by architecting its ambitious regional integration and community building project (Amador III, 2011). The ASEAN Leaders accepted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II in Bali, Indonesia on 7th October 2003 to establish an ASEAN Community by 2020. Later on, at the 12th ASEAN Summit on 13th January 2007 in the Philippines, ASEAN Leaders have affirmed their solid commitment to establish the ASEAN Community and signed the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 (ASEAN, 2009). The community is premised on three pillars, namely the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASCC. Each pillar has its own Blueprint, and, together with the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) Strategic Framework and IAI Work Plan Phase II (2009-2015), they form the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015 (ASEAN, 2015). Essentially, each pillar is focused on its own elements, and also appreciates its links with others. Following figure shows the complex and interrelated organization chart of the ASEAN.




Figure 1: ASEAN Organizational Chart (Wahyuningrum, 2014)

The interconnectivity among the pillars shows the enormity of ASEAN activities, where ASCC holds a significant segment. Although there is a large literature on

ASEAN integration and regionalism, comparatively little consideration has been provided to its efforts to form a shared social and cultural community (Hoa, 2013). The ASCC aims to contribute to the ASEAN Community through building peoples' orientation and making them socially responsible. The ASCC intends to forge a common identity and build a caring and sharing society which is inclusive and where the well-being, livelihood, and welfare of the peoples are enhanced (ASEAN, 2009). Thus, the ASCC strives to bring out the human dimension of ASEAN cooperation and an abiding commitment to address the region's aspiration to lift the quality of life for its people (ASEAN, 2013).

The 13th ASEAN Summit held in Singapore on 20th November 2007, agreed to develop an ASCC Blueprint to ensure that concrete actions are undertaken to promote the establishment of the ASCC (ASEAN, 2009), which was approved by the ASEAN Leaders in Thailand in 2009. The ASCC Blueprint (2009-2015) provides a framework to strengthen the ASEAN Community's belief in their peoples, appreciation of their shared cultural heritage, uphold and extol shared values, and strengthen the capacities and effectiveness of their institutions (ASEAN, 2013). Ever since, ASEAN governments have made some considerable headway in social and cultural collaboration with the goal of building a community of social stability, peace, economic prosperity, and cultural diversity.

However, for a region where the member countries are still at different developmental stages, are culturally diverse, and have different strategic goals, achieving the ASEAN community will be a challenging task (Hoa, 2013). The ASEAN member states are required to stick a critical balance between the human and non-human aspects of the integration. Here the human aspects would always demand more delicate, inclusive and pragmatic programming. The ASEAN Leaders has agreed upon several formal institutional mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Charter, ASCC Blueprint, and other policy guidelines to move forward to realize the ASCC. The realization of ASCC cannot be taken place without the realization of other two commitments for AEC and APSC.

Considerations for the ASCC

The ASCC is supposed to cover the social and cultural dimensions of the ASEAN integration process (Estrada, 2010). Although the architecture of ASCC is to form uniformity but the formal and informal constraints can oppose the institutionalization of the ASCC. The main purpose of institutions is to reduce uncertainty in exchange (Douglass, 1991). Theoretically it means building confidence in transactions or negotiations allowing contracting parties to dialogue on almost equal terms.

However, there are apprehensions about losing national authority in decision making once the ASCC would take place. Basically, during the process of regional integration, the policy decision-making of governments becomes prerogative of regional organs, governmental authority shifts toward the new regional decision-making centers, and the state's administration comes under central regional direction (Puchala, 1973). This is similar to the views expressed by Deutsch (Deutsch, et al. 1957). Under these conditions, it requires reciprocal obligations of governments and citizens in each member state to make the process possible (Pimoljinda, 2013).

Dr. Syed M. Khairudin of National University of Singapore expressed his thoughts quite distinctively from Pimoljinda and even from Puchala. Dr. Khairudin viewed that the impact of the integration shall be different for different individuals and groups. He believes that if the integration benefits the ethnic and religious majority people of ASEAN nations, the chances of depriving the ethnic and religious minority would be higher (Interviewed on March 24, 2015). The integrated ASEAN shall be better place for those who already has larger share in the policy making process of any given country.

Another aspect of ASCC realization is inter-dependency of its three pillars. The realization of ASCC is closely related to the success of AEC. Nevertheless, the AEC doesn't aims for ASEAN Union- it is rather a scheme for integration. Ms. Dato' Naziran Hussain, the Ambassador of Malaysia in Thailand, mentioned that "ASEAN Community is not a union- it is integration" (Interviewed on February 18, 2015). Dr. Sukree Langputeh of Fatoni University, Thailand elaborated that the ASEAN has been emphasizing on AEC, but it is merely economic integration (Interviewed on March 25, 2015). He further viewed the success of AEC can be jeopardized if ASCC fails. On the other hand, the ASPC seeks for a rule based society. The agenda for human development under the ASCC is linked inextricably with the economic and security pillars of the ASEAN Community (ASEAN, 2014). The ASCCs priority for human development and ensuring social protection is essential for uplifting the backward section and minimizing the future chance of intra-nation discontent.

Islam in ASEAN and its Role for ASCC

The ASEAN Muslims have largely avoided the cultural aspect from the religion norms. As a result Islam has made its way in Southeast Asia peacefully and gradually. It has also been provided historic references of non-violence growth in the region. However, one should not therefore be misled by the *abangan* "myth". A number of scholars have observed this phenomenon. As early as 1950s, for example, Harry J. Benda maintained that the Islamic history of Indonesia [as elsewhere in Southeast Asia] is essentially a history of *santri* cultural expansion and its impact on Indonesian religious life and politics (Benda, 1958). The peaceful and gradual Islamization has molded the Southeast Asian Muslim psyche into one which is cosmopolitan, open minded, tolerant and amenable to cultural diversity (Jilani, 2005). It is evident that Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in the world accepts "Pancasila"³ as its national principal. In contrast to Muslim nationalists who insisted on an Islamic identity for the new state, the framers of the Pancasila insisted on a culturally neutral identity, compatible with democratic or Marxist ideologies, and overarching the vast cultural differences of the heterogeneous population (Country Studies, 2011).

However, the reality is that while pre-existing local beliefs and practices resisted the continued process of Islamization, a purer and orthodox form of Islam did, nevertheless, steadily penetrate deeper into parts of the region (Azra, 2005). This trend could be accelerated if the backward sections of Muslim population feel that their concerns are not being addressed by the national/ASEAN Leaders. The sense of

³ The 1945 constitution sets forth the Pancasila as the embodiment of basic principles of an independent Indonesian state. The Pancasila principles are: belief in one supreme God; humanitarianism; nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia; consultative democracy; and social justice.

alienation could potentially be developed as resistance and conflicts. ASEAN former Secretary General Dr. Surin Pitsuwan at the “Seminar on Religious Pluralism in ASEAN” on August 24, 2012, where it was stated that:

“...some religious communities will resist some of the changes. The political and economic contexts of each of the member states are not going to be convincing enough for them to believe that growth and development are for them. Look at the southern Philippines, South Thailand or even the Rakhine state in Burma, (they are not) fully committed to growth. They are looking at and hoping for something else. Growth plus, dignity, freedom, space, sense of ownership and sense of belonging...” (Muqbil, 2012).

This clearly indicates that the ASCC shall be inclusive and that to say the concern of particular faith based groups needs to be included in the scheme, in this case it is the Muslim minorities in several ASEAN countries. The success of the ASCC depends on how strategically and justifiably the ASEAN Leaders can bring the disadvantaged groups into the mainstream process of the ASEAN community building.

Cooperation for Human Development: In the Quran, the God says in Chapter/Sura Al-Jumuah verse 10: “And when the prayer has been concluded, disperse on earth and seek from the bounty of Allah, and remember Allah often that you may succeed” (Al Quran). Here Allah instructs us to work and develop ourselves as well as the entire society. It also relates the cooperation and social development work with *Ibadah* (prayer), which is an element of the ASCC Blueprint (ASEAN, 2009). It is worthy to note that upon the completion of the prayer a Muslim is instructed to disperse on earth, not staying in the mosque or community. When Muslim travel throughout the communities, they will meet and know new people, culture, etc. Mr. Lutfi Rauf, the Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia in Thailand, identifies it as the basis of ASCC, where people to people contact is totally in harmony with the practice of Islam in ASEAN countries (Interviewed on March 3, 2015).

Islam dislikes poverty, which it describes as something that “approaches disbelief.” This means that poverty may lead people to deny God and His wisdom. Consequently, the roadmap of ASCC for poverty reduction in ASEAN and minimizing gaps between the nations is also in conformity with the concept of Islam (ASEAN, 2013). These examples demonstrate that the strategic plan of ASCC compliments rather than contradicts with the Islamic norms.

Coexistence for Cultural Consolidation: ASCC Blueprint directs activities to ensure solidarity and coexistence in ASEAN (ASEAN, 2009). To understand the role of Islam into that, we need to unveil the position of Islam in accepting diversity. It is overwhelmingly accepted by practitioners of the most theologies that Islam directs its followers to accommodate and appreciate diversity. Islam is a religion that teaches that all human beings are completely equal in God’s sight and are created as such and that all human beings are endowed with consciousness and wisdom through which he or she can know God personally (Ansari, 2011).

The diversity has its praiseworthiness in the normative direction of Islam. Islam and the Quran are clearly appreciative of diversity and dissimilarity -in creation, culture, and beliefs- within human world. In the Chapter/Sura Hood, verse 118, God mentions, “if thy Lord had so willed, He could have made mankind One People: but they will not cease to be diverse” (Al Quran). This indicates the intention of the God in his creation is to maintain diversity, which emphasizes the importance on coexistence. Finally, Islam provides family bonds among all humanity. God describes in the holy Quran that all human beings as part of one super unit which is humanity. The God addresses the totality of humanity as ‘Bani Adam’ (children of Adam). This underlines the importance of togetherness of humanity. Such fundamental of Islam is hugely potential for the realization the elements of ASCC related with coexistence.

Inter-civilizational Dialogue for ASEAN Cultural Heritage: Neither the ASEAN Charter nor the ASCC Blueprint make any reference to the dialogue of cultures and civilizations, or even to interfaith dialogue. It is reasonable to infer that some, if not all, member states have shied away from engaging with the dialogical agenda in the regional context for fear that such engagement might have political overtones, and allow regional institutions and process to intrude into the domestic political arena (Camilleri & Schottmann,2013). However, creation of common identity requires a form of dialogue among various groups.

Islam inspires the dialogue process from everyday life to international activities. In Chapter/Sura *al-Kahf*, 18:29, the God says “Now the truth has come from your Lord: let those who wish to believe in it do so, and let those who wish to reject it do so” (Al Quran). It is also emphasized in Chapter/Sura *al-Baqarah*, 2:256, that “there is no compulsion in religion” (Al Quran). The Quran and Sunnah demand that Muslims engage in dialogue. The changes in socio-political life in ASEAN make the demand for dialogue more pressing. Islam acknowledges the reality and inspires its followers to build the unity through dialogue.

Opportunities and Challenges

The discussion above demonstrates multi-level links between the Islamic norms and realization of ASCC. Those links can be traced either as opportunities or challenges. Following analysis demonstrates a critical account of those findings in seven points:

1. Balance Priority for AEC and ASCC: The AEC is the most dominant event in the entire ASEAN Community project. Considering the realization of AEC, ASEAN is the fast moving, divergent and competitive region in the entire world. If ASEAN were a single country, it would already be the seventh-largest economy in the world, with a combined GDP of \$2.4 trillion in 2013. It is projected to rank as the fourth-largest economy by 2050 (Vinayak, Thompson, & Tonby, 2014). Thus, the potentials of growth and prosperity through AEC are numerous. However, it is the less priority on ASCC could jeopardize the goal of AEC. The apprehension arises as most of the ASEANs’ futuristic plans are targeting the economic side of the integration- leaving little room for the people and cultural integration. Dr. Sukree Langputeh mentioned that if the ASEAN continuously prioritize economy over human the followers of Islam would find it less inspirational for the creation of common ASEAN identity, which is more of a human and value aspect than economy” (Interviewed on March 25,

2015). Thus, prioritizing one over the others might jeopardize the entire scheme of creating ASEAN community.

Importantly, consideration on Muslims' issues can link AEC and ASCC, e.g. Halal Economy. Dr. Sukree Lanputeh emphasized the same fact by saying that the three pillars of ASEAN community are interconnected. He emphasized Islamic or halal economy as linking tool between these two pillars by saying that the production of Islamic attires or facilitating the Islamic rituals can support the protection of religo-cultural identity of ASEAN citizenry as well as provide huge boost in production, service and logistic sectors in ASEAN economy (Interviewed on March 25, 2015). Ms. Dato' Naziran Hussain expressed similar view in her interview. She mentioned:

“the Sharia banking and Halal economy could be driving force of some major economy in ASEAN. It involves and benefits not only the Muslims but also non-Muslim in ASEAN Community. It also provides mutual understanding, which is necessary for peaceful coexistence” (Interviewed on February 18, 2015).

This demonstrates the balance outcome, which can satisfy both human and non-human parts of ASEAN integration.

2. Lack of Secretarial Capacity: It is the ASEAN secretariat that takes lead in implementing the huge scheme of ASEAN integration, which obviously requires capacitated both in human resource and orientations. The success of the realization of ASCC needs to be holistically understood by the officials involved in the scheme. Prof. Abdul Aziz B. AB. Latif of University of Malaysia Kelantan has described this key fact by saying that the ASEAN secretariat shall be sensitized about the importance of religious value, including Islamic values, to successfully implement ASCC agenda (Interviewed on March 24, 2015). The views of the secretariat officials about the potentials of religo-cultural values as the instrumental inspiration for the realization of ASCC can determine the pace of the program implementation.

Apart of the implementation of ASCC, the challenge remains about the maintenance and monitoring. The ASEAN Secretariat has been given the mandate to monitor and review the implementation of the ASCC Blueprint in each nation of ASEAN (ASEAN, 2009). Mr. Lutfi Rauf, expressed his mixed opinion about the performance of the secretariat for the monitoring of ASCC (Interviewed on March 3, 2015). The beginning of ASCC and its monitoring will be effective from the 31st December 2015. Given the short time the secretariats' capacity remains under question.


3. The Weak Decision Making Process: The concept of the “ASEAN Way” which means that decisions are made through consensus and that non-interference in the internal affairs cannot be violated is an example of such an informal rule (Amador III, 2011). This earlier decision making policy is hard to maintain with numerous new challenges in the face ethnic conflicts in Myanmar or other parts of ASEAN, which threatens the religo-cultural temper of ASEAN people. Mr. Lutfi Rauf mentioned:

“the ASCC expects the people of ASEAN to have a common sense of *We Feeling*, the sense of *ASEANness*. To build respects among ethnic

groups in ASEAN for cultural, language, and religion diversity through unity in diversity is not an easy task” (Interviewed on March 3, 2015).

Prof. M. Kamal Hassan of International Islamic University of Malaysia also expressed his careful optimism for the realization of ASCC. He viewed that the essence of Islamic notion of *Wasadia* (middle path) is a way to pragmatically realize ASCC (Interviewed on March 23, 2015). This can be elaborate by saying that the ASCC is not a radical shuffle of the identities of any ASEAN citizenry; rather it is an addition with the existing identity. It is important to review the decision making policy in light of the notion of coexistence and harmony but not compromising the interest of the interest of the oppressed section in ASEAN population.

4. Diversity in ASEAN: Although the diversity is optimistically considered an asset in modern globalized and pluralistic world (Basin, 2012), but the success depends mostly on the modality of utilizing the strengths of the diversity. The ASEAN is known not only for its huge economic influence but also for its cultural diversity.



Source : Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book (2009)

Figure 2: Map of Ethno-religious Diversity in ASEAN (CIA⁴, 2009)

Apart from physical landscapes, it is a community of divergent identities composed of five main religions (Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Confucianism) and some animist-influenced practices, as well as hundreds of ethnic groups living within the region (Acharya, 2003; Hirschman & Edwards, 2007; Loffelholz & Arao, 2010). In terms of demographic conditions, the Southeast Asian region is seen as a community-of-communities where there are many ethnic groups with diverse cultural heritages (Osborne, 2010). If the diversity wouldn't be managed properly, even the success of ASCC could be seriously threatened. A remarkable pessimist notion involved with this issue is that the closer their economic cooperation is, the more possibility that the diverse identities within and between member states may clash

⁴ CIA stands for the Central Intelligence Agency, which was created in 1947 with the signing of the National Security Act by President Harry S. Truman. Detail can be found at www.cia.gov

with one another (Beeson, 2002, 2003). In a larger extend, the success of the entire ASEAN integration scheme depends upon how well the diversity would be managed.

Islam praises diversity and emphasizes its followers to manage it with great care. In Chapter/Sura, namely Hujurat, verse 13, the God mentions:

“O mankind! We created you from male and female and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other). Verily, the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is he who is the most righteous of you” (Al Quran).

This verse is clearly directive, rather than persuasive, where God is ordering people to interact with people having diver background. It is also important to note that the verse is guiding it as the way for the righteous. In another place the “righteous” people are being described as successful. Thus, educating Muslims and informing non-Muslims in ASEAN with the right message of Islam would strengthen the possibility of realizing ASCC.

5. Demographical Reality of Muslim in ASEAN: Islam is the most widely followed religion in ASEAN with about 266 million followers, almost 42% of ASEAN population. Presently, about 20 percent of the world’s estimated 1.6 billion Muslims are living in ASEAN (Ali, 2002).

Country	Population	Muslim Population (%)	Muslim Population
Brunei Darussalam	415,717	67%	278,530
Cambodia	15,205, 539	4% (est.)	608,622
Indonesia	251,160,124	88%	221,020,909
Laos	6,981,166	1%	69,811
Malaysia	29,628,392	60%	17,777,035
Myanmar	55,167,330	15% (Est.)	8,275,099
Philippines	105,720,644	10% (Est.)	10,572,064
Singapore	5,460,302	16%	873,648
Thailand	67,448,120	10%	6,744,812
Vietnam	92,477,857	0.1% (Est.)	92,478
Total	629,665,191	42%	266,313,008

Figure 3: Approximate Muslim Population in ASEAN (Islamic Population, 2012)

In Southeast Asia Muslims are majorities in Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia, while Muslims are located in all other ASEAN countries as significant minority. Consequently, Muslims approach towards the ASCC would significantly determine its course of success.

6. Islamic Norms Providing Peace: Islam in Southeast Asia could be termed as least Arabicized. The reason behind the minimal impact of Arabian culture in Southeast Asian Islam is due to the process of Islamization in this part of the world. Islam has traditionally been a moderating and constructive force. The early arrival of Islam in Southeast Asia was from India and China, which was modified by the experience of Islam in India and had some very strong elements of Sufism in it (Shih, 2002). As a result Islam in Southeast Asia was an Indianized Islam came on top of an Indianized

local culture, which molded with local tradition and adjusted peacefully. Islamic growth has praised the local culture and practices, even to the extent that Muslims accepted all most every long practiced tradition in Southeast Asia unless it directly contradicts with basic notions of Islam. These flexibilities provided larger acceptance of Islam and inspires peace and stability in the region.

Even in the modern time, Muslims in ASEAN states are largely rejected the global trend of violent means and maintains regional stability. If well recognized and propagated this very aspect would potentially play a constructive role for the development schemes under ASCC.

7. Progressive Media Role: Islam offers its normative guideline for the promotion of human wellbeing and cooperation for the greater benefit for all creation, which is both living and non-living creation (including the environment), which is not much informed through media. This is to say that ASCC needs to further its objectives to improve the social justice, environmental protection and ensure the rights for all (ASEAN, 2009) can be complimented rather than contradicted by the Islamic notions. Mr. Lutfi Rauf mentioned that “as far I am concerned I do not see any contradiction neither discrepancy between the ASCC Blueprint and our practiced culture of Muslim societies in ASEAN” (Interviewed on March 3, 2015). Similarly, Ms. Dato’ Naziran Hussain mentioned that “Islam provided guideline for cooperation and assisting others in neighborhoods, society and in larger world. It is not only inspirational but mandatory for the followers of Islam. This is clearly in-line with the elements of ASCC” (Interviewed on February 18, 2015). Unfortunately, most of the Muslims are not aware about these vital duties. Media-based disseminating such information of Islamic guideline for environmental protection or development can enhance Muslims participation in the ASCC process.

Concluding Remarks

With these ethno-cultural dynamics in view, ASEAN governments, over many years or perhaps even since it was established in 1967, have advocated the so-called “network-style of regional cooperation” (Loffelholz and Arao, 2010). In doing so, ASEAN Leaders have considered the concerns and inspirations of its people. However, the ambition of transforming ASEAN into a community demands more sensible, target oriented and forceful initiative to include best practices, religio-cultural norms and values of its citizenry. Perhaps, the inclusion can be visible through expressive mentioning or referring to some of the common norms in its official noting.

It is also worthy to note that Islam is complementing the process of ASCC, not only due to its consistency with its fundamentals but also the procedural aspect of ASCC; it is even at the level of analysis the supreme authority in the formation of the ASEAN community. In ASEAN integration; under integration states don't share its sovereignty; Muslims will be able to participate as driving group without any struggle with its notion of sovereignty. It is not only the followers of Islam having the responsibility to build the ASCC into success but also the perception about Muslims among the others is vital. In this case the true realization of ASCC needs a greater understanding among various groups. ASEAN states require specific program to create mutual understanding and develop biasfree information, where all ASEN people can join with one common ASEAN identity.

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Between the Concept of Rights and the Philosophy of Ethics: An Investigation on the Concept of Marriage of Chinese Lesbians

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Abstract

This article examines the issue of how the Chinese citizen makes a choice when a conflict appears between the pursuit towards rights and the obedience to the code of ethics, and reveals the real situation of Chinese citizens' rights concept through an investigation of Chinese lesbians' marriage concept. It is indeed a new perspective to explore the consciousness of rights of Chinese citizen from the discussion of the marriage concept of Chinese lesbian. As a typical minority group living in a country which is mainly characterized as a compliance with rules, regulations and traditions in a relatively conservative traditional cultural system, Chinese lesbians have been struggling to make a balance between fighting for basic human rights and subjecting themselves to the framework of ethics. In this research, we mainly adopt two research methods to collect empirical data from the lesbian community in Beijing, which were the means of conducting depth interview and collecting material respectively.

Keywords: Concept of rights, Philosophy of ethics, Chinese lesbian, Marriage concept

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Introduction

In order to reveal the true situation of Chinese consciousness of rights, we conducted an investigation on the concept of marriage of Chinese lesbian in Beijing from October 2012 to August 2014. In this research, we mainly adopted two research methods to collect empirical data, which were the means of conducting depth interview and collecting material respectively.

We collected empirical data from a wide range of participants. The participants of this investigation were mainly the Chinese lesbians who had basically completed the process of homosexual identity. And, they could be categorized into two different groups according to their different birthplaces and residences. What's more, the participants came from different social realms and possessed various professional identities such as civil servant of government, executive of corporation, bank clerk, doctor, teacher, media worker, artist, animator, student, self-employed person and so on.

This article reveals the real situation of Chinese citizen's consciousness of rights through an investigation on Chinese lesbian's marriage concept. From the result of the investigation, we find that the marriage concept of Chinese lesbian is respectively the concept of pursuing individual rights instead of totally bending to the constraint of Chinese traditional moral ethics; the concept of confining themselves to the framework of Chinese traditional moral ethics and considering the behavior of getting married as a way to fulfill obligation; the concept of reconciling the contradiction between moral ethics and individual rights through seeking a silver lining in contracting a kind of special mixed-orientation marriage. Besides, this article also reveals that Chinese lesbian's marriage concept usually contains a huge tension to be reconciled between the adherence to the Chinese traditional ethic code and the claim for rights oppressed beneath the homosexual identity.

This article assumes that Chinese citizen's consciousness of rights is now in a relative immature stage under the strong impact of the Chinese traditional moral ethics established on the basis of the Chinese traditional philosophy which hardly nourishes the spirit of self-awareness and self-independence. However, under the background of the restricted social environment in China, although some Chinese people do have strong wills to call for their rights, they usually lack enough courage, social supports, professional skills and a tolerant social culture to put them into practice.

This article is organized by four parts. In the first part, the research background, methods and samples are given with some concise introductions; in the second part, the relationship between the concept of marriage and the consciousness of rights is revealed in the framework of queer theory; in the third part, the concept of marriage of Chinese people and the cause of its formation are specifically explained under the theoretical background of Chinese traditional philosophy and contemporary political practice; in the last part, Chinese lesbian's marriage concept and marriage modes are discussed in the context of the whole framework of the investigation.

The Introduction of Research Methods and Samples

We collected empirical data from a wide range of participants. As for the basic background of those participants, some important aspects could be given as follows. First of all, those participants were mainly Chinese lesbians who had basically completed the process of homosexual identity. Secondly, we had two different types of participants according to their different birthplaces and residences. Respectively, the first type of participants was born in Beijing and had been living in Beijing. The second type of participants was born in other provinces and moved to Beijing to live at least over three years. Thirdly, the age of those participants was at the range from 25 years old to 40 years old. What's more, those participants came from different social realms and possessed various professional identities such as civil servant of government, executive of corporation, bank clerk, doctor, teacher, media worker, artist, animator, student, self-employed person and so on. Accordingly, the income level of those participants varied either. Furthermore, those participants differed typically in educational background, which the highest degree obtained by those participants was doctor of philosophy, the lowest was high school diploma and the average education level was college degree. Besides, the marriage status of those participants varied mainly in three respects listed as follows: single, legitimate marriage, and a certain cohabitation which was outside the framework of the marriage law.

In this research, we adopted two main research methods to collect empirical data from the lesbian community in Beijing, which were the means of conducting depth interview and collecting material respectively. On the one hand, we collected first-hand data by means of depth interview conducted both in the real life face to face and in the cyber space. 18 interviewees in total provided us with their private information and basic attitudes towards homosexual marriage, who were mainly differentiated in age, profession, education background and marriage statuses. Respectively, as for the type of depth interview conducted in the real life face to face, the empirical data was collected by an approach of acquaintance recommendation which referred to the way in which an informant could usually be recommended to participate in our depth interview by his or her friends who had been interviewed in depth before. And, in order to obtain accurate and detailed interview materials, the interviewees were usually provided with relatively quiet and pleasant places including home, coffee shop and public garden during the period of being interviewed, and each and every interview would last about two hours averagely. As for the type of depth interview conducted in the cyber space, we adopted the way of recruiting lesbian volunteers in public by posting online on various popular chat communities in China such as lesbian post bar, homosexual forum and microblog to target potential lesbian participants. Besides, we also as anonymous guests concealed deliberately our true interviewer identities from others in order to gather more accurate first-hand data by participating in some lesbian chatting entertainments organized widely through some chatting websites such as QQ Chatting Group which was a virtual platform to assist users to make friends more freely and quickly by providing users with various convenient chatting tools. We kept talking to the lesbians in the same chatting group and then still kept in touch with them in order to find any changes of their concepts towards marriage. In total, we had participated in 7 chatting groups online, and the average number of lesbian in each group amounts to 80. As a whole, with recording and taking notes, we carefully invited 8 interviewees to conduct depth interviews in

the real life face to face and had 10 interviewees to conduct depth interviews online. However, considering the privacy of our respondents, we talked to those online interviewees through internet telephone and typewriting, each approximately two to three hours long. On the other hand, we also collected empirical data by means of collecting materials from some important homosexual NGOs in China including Beijing LGBT Center and Common Language.

The Concept of Marriage: A Mirror Reflecting the Consciousness of Rights

The concept of marriage is a kind of basic attitude towards marriage. It varies in different culture, and accordingly the contents of marriage in various cultural systems also possess obvious diversities. The concept of marriage is partly shaped by some concepts such as values, beliefs, ethics as well as the consciousness of rights in a political community. To some extent, the concept of marriage could be used as a way to evaluate the consciousness of rights. In other words, the formation of the concept of marriage usually depends on what kind of consciousness of rights citizens hold in a political community. Similarly, the true situation of the consciousness of rights could also be partly shown by the citizen's concept of marriage. Therefore, the dynamic relationship between the concept of marriage and the consciousness of rights provides us a new way to explore the real situation of the consciousness of rights in a political community.

With the advent of queer theory, the dynamic relationship between the concept of marriage and the consciousness of rights becomes much more clearly. Queer theory is a influential thought which derives from homosexual and bisexual political theory and practice during the last decades of the 20th century. Minton (1997) pointed out that "the essence of queer theory is derived from its appropriation of the word queer, which signifies a sense of difference or strangeness" (p. 337). In theory, queer theory is not a certain particular theory with a complete theoretical system but an integration of many interdisciplinary theories. Queer theory situates itself out of the framework of the main-stream cultural theory, and the theorists of queer theory can hardly find and are reluctant to find their places in the domain of the main-stream culture. Li (2002) explained that as a general term to describe a social community, the concept of queer signified the whole queers in sex orientation who were not consistent with the social norm under the background of the main-stream culture (p. 23). In the realm of culture, the phrase of queer is a non-straight expression to delineate the whole groups of people who could not be classified under the domain of main-stream social culture.

However, although the concept of queer has not been wholly becoming an unifying consensus for the social activities and the theorists of queer theory, queer theory as a relative new social thought is usually explained, explored and even redefined not merely in the context of theories of social activities of minority groups but also in the frameworks of other important theories and methods. Watson (2005) outlined the emergence and significant influence of queer theory and then provided a clear entry for those people who were not very familiar with queer theory (p. 68). Pinar (2003) explained the racial problem in the context of queer theory and he considered that the racial violence and racial politics should be well understood with the help of queer theory (p. 271). Faulkner and Hecht (2011) explored the problem of identity of the queer group through the method of identity narratives (p. 829). Eves (2004) explored the queer theory in depth by drawing on its nature and process of development (p.

480). Wight (2014) discussed the relationship between the digital space and the queer community including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (p. 129). Edwards (1998) provided a strong critique of queer politics in order to arouse a wide range of discussion on the research of sexuality (p. 473). Brintnall (2013) answered that “how to make full use of queer theory in religious studies” (p. 52). Seidman (1998) considered that “the queer theory had been limited by its reliance on psychoanalytical theory and a narrow linguistic poststructural language of social analysis” (p. 177). Reid and Isherwood (2007) examined that how to think and behave through the eyes of the queer group (p. 302). Oberstein (2010) explored the application of queer theory in some researches on the period of childhood (p. 310).

Actually, the emergence of the queer social practice and queer theory is an obvious manifestation, which the consciousness of rights has been gradually walking towards extremes, and finally the concept of marriage is reshaped with the fast growth of the self-awareness as well as the extreme consciousness of rights. On the contents of the queer theory, queer theory challenges not only the social dichotomy structure of the heterosexual group and the homosexual group but also the dichotomy structure of male and female. Therefore, the inner logic of the queer theory is undoubted to combat the whole strict methods of categorization. Totally speaking, queer theory with the spirit of radical reformation means to transform the old structure of the contemporary world in order to create a new lifestyle through challenging almost all traditional values in human society. Naturally, with the assistance of radical queer theory, the self-awareness as well as the consciousness of rights also present some revolutionary traits, which have been reshaping the concept of marriage. Similarly, it is the consciousness of rights such as the concept of liberty and equality that is reflected by the concept of marriage in a political community. Just as He (2010) explained that the equality rights was the basis of marriage also including homosexual marriage, and the liberty rights was the soul of it (p. 151). However, just as Yang (2007) pointed out that queer theory was also hard to escape the Achilles heel (p. 254). Inside the queer theory, the radical political idea of rebellion, various inside school of thoughts hardly to be reconciled and the suicide logical way which is against the whole dominant things would position queer theory on the place to be discussed fully.

The Concept of Marriage of Chinese People

In general, Chinese concept of marriage is the combination of Chinese traditional culture and modern civilization, which basically reflects the true situation of the consciousness of rights of the contemporary Chinese citizen. The concept of marriage of Chinese people is gradually shaped in the context of Chinese traditional culture and Chinese philosophy composed mainly by the convergence of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, and it is also given many new meanings in different times.

In Chinese philosophy, the thought of considering marriage as an inevitable thing is based on the philosophies of Confucianism and Taoism including the thought of the relationship between nature and human and the thought of the filial piety. On the one hand, under the philosophy of Confucianism, the behavior of getting married is justified as a kind of justice which naturally conforms to the philosophy of nature. As the heaven and the earth interact with each other and then several life forms appear at last, so man compared as the heaven and woman compared as the earth need to get married in order to comply with the basic law of nature. As Zhang (1996) pointed out

that the philosophy of Confucianism took the marriage for granted (p. 57). Similarly, not only the Confucianism but also the Taoism considers that the combination between the male and female could be beneficial to stay healthy.

On the other hand, getting married is also regarded as an inevitable thing because it is deemed as an appropriate way to practice the filial piety. However, how to understand the relationship between the filial piety and the formation of marriage concept in the philosophy of Confucianism? Basically, the main contents of the filial piety could be concluded in three respects: the concept of the patriarchal clan; the concept of showing obedience to parents; the concept of bring glory on ancestors. First of all, since breeding offspring as soon as possible is the most important thing to practice the filial piety according to the philosophy of Confucianism, marriage is naturally considered as a must with crucial responsibility. Besides, Jiang (2004) explained that most Chinese marriages were arranged by parents because showing respect and obedience to parents was a necessary way to practice the filial piety in China (p. 41). Furthermore, the family ethics of Confucianism puts emphasis on the natural relationship among self cultivation, family harmony, country management and world peace, and family harmony is the premise of country management, which the filial piety could be fully practiced through participating in political affairs and accordingly bringing glory to the whole family. Nevertheless, Chen (2005) considered that the essence of the filial piety was that children undoubtedly lived for their parents instead of themselves (p. 26).

In the modern times, especially from 1970s to 1980s, marriage is mainly considered as a standard to evaluate whether one person lives with a healthy life style as well as a practical way to protect female and reduce the crime rate. Under the impact of Chinese traditional thought of preferring boys to girls in China, the worst social problem during that period of time is the problem of sex ratio imbalance, which results in serious social problems such as the issue of harm to female. Accordingly, getting married becomes a necessary way to reduce crime rate in China.

What's more, with the higher speed development of economy in China, since the problems aroused by social stratification are becoming more and more serious, marriage is mainly regarded as a tool to complete the process of social mobility, especially the process of climbing the social ladder higher and higher.

Chinese Lesbian's Marriage Concept Based on An Investigation Conducted in Beijing Lesbian Communities

With the double impact of Chinese traditional marriage concept and Chinese lesbian's consciousness of rights, Chinese lesbian's marriage concept usually contains a huge tension to be reconciled between Chinese moral ethics and the consciousness of rights. Under this circumstances, most Chinese lesbians universally adopt several types of marriage modes as useful tactics to situate themselves into a relative comfortable place. Specifically, some of them confined to the traditional marriage concept have to give up homosexual identity and marry heterosexual male under the heavy pressure of moral ethics in China; some of them choose to accept their lesbian identities by coming out of the closet and marry their homosexual lovers under their push of strong consciousnesses of rights; some of them finally reach a compromise between the obedience to moral ethics and the pursuit of rights by contracting a mixed-orientation

marriage; some of them are still watching and waiting their time to decide how to win out of the battle between their families and themselves.

Basically, according to the investigation result, three main types of Chinese lesbian's marriage concept could be categorized carefully as follows. Respectively, the first type of Chinese lesbian's marriage concept is formed with relative strong consciousness of rights and relative weak concept of moral ethics. The main characteristic of this type is that in the problem of how to balance the relationship between the moral ethics and the individual rights, some of Chinese lesbians tend to claim for their individual rights rather than the traditional moral ethics, and they also consider their sex orientations as a matter of private, healthy, universal and normal thing, which should not be discriminated by others and also could not be changed by any kinds of excuses.

In the investigation, for instance, we interviewed a Chinese lesbian couple who had been maintaining cohabitation for five years and both had come out of the closet to their families and friends. Also, they had a big plan for their homosexual wedding. One of them said:

It is not shameful to recognize you are a lesbian. My girlfriend and I would very like to show our identities to other people no matter what attitudes they show to us. It is a normal thing, and we should not be criticized. At least, I should have the same rights to marry whom I would like to marry. As for my parents, I remember when I told them I was a lesbian, they had no idea about this term, and then they could not accept the fact that their girl loved another girl. They thought I was sick and needed to see a doctor. However, my parents accept my lesbian identity and also my girlfriend now. So, there are so many ways to show your filial piety to your parents rather than only one way which has to be taken at expense of sacrificing your own rights. (Lee, personal communication, November 10, 2013)

Lee and her girlfriend are typical lesbians who can well understand the nature of rights and put much emphasis on the practice of pursuing their own rights positively. However, according to the statistics gathered from this investigation, the Chinese lesbians with strong consciousness of rights are still in a small number which totally accounts for 12 percent of the total.

The second type of Chinese lesbian's marriage concept is formed with relative weak consciousness of rights and relative strong concept of moral ethics. This kind of Chinese lesbians tend to deny their lesbian identities and choose heterosexual marriage in the end under the huge impact of Chinese traditional marriage concept built on Chinese traditional philosophy of ethics. In our investigation, Chen is a 40-year-old executive of a company. She has married a heterosexual male for seven years and has a 3-year-old daughter. At first, Chen is reluctant to be interviewed because of her special social status and her sensitive situation without coming out of the closet, but at last she still accepts our depth interview with three hours long by a internet telephone call. According to Chen, her marriage now is a total disaster. The conflicts between her and her husband are so frequent that their daughter has suffered from a certain of psychological illness. Chen said:

I could not divorce because it will do harm to my reputation, and besides my daughter also needs a full home. I have been very much regretting choosing heterosexual marriage at expense of my own happiness. However, I could not manage a company with a lesbian identity. Besides, my parents want me to get married as soon as possible, and I also think getting marriage and building a normal family like others do are undoubtedly the only thing I can do for my parents. (Chen, personal communication, February 26, 2014)

Actually, we have several similar cases which all demonstrate that many Chinese lesbians with higher education and income tend to be confined in the cage of Chinese traditional moral ethics for their social status. Although they as the social minorities possess relative strong consciousness of rights, they still lack a relative tolerant social culture and a sound political system to protect them from being harmed.

The third type of Chinese lesbian's marriage concept is to make a compromise between the traditional philosophy of ethics and the consciousness of rights, which is mainly shown as a mixed-orientation marriage which is a term to describe the situation in which female and male who both possess homosexual orientations usually get married for a certain purpose which is usually to conceal their true sexual orientations to the public. For example, in a mixed-orientation marriage, a gay could marry a lesbian in order to avoid many unnecessary troubles caused by their true homosexual identities. Besides, they even live separately and still keep the romantic relationships with their own homosexual lovers. Therefore, the mixed-orientation marriage is not a marriage in real content but a marriage in form. However, for most Chinese lesbians, seeking for a decent partner to contract a mixed-orientation marriage is undoubtedly an appropriate way to ease the tension between the moral ethics and the individual rights in China. In the investigation, we interviewed a 31-year-old lesbian who had spent three years in a mixed-orientation marriage. She said:

My parents always urge me to get married, and even they frequently invite some male fellows to our house deliberately. But, I can understand because their biggest wish is to participate in my wedding one day. However, I am a lesbian and I have my beloved partner. So, it is a hard decision in front of my face. It means I have to do something that neither let my parents down nor make my girlfriend sad. Many of my friends suggest me to try a mixed-orientation marriage, so I finally see it as my last straw to clutch at. And, I am a lucky dog because I have a decent gay partner to get married. I have to say I am so wise to marry a gay because it not only makes my parents' dream come true but also makes me to still live my own life with my girl confidentially. (Zhang, personal communication, March 20, 2014)

However, although the mixed-orientation marriage is indeed a sort of useful tactic for most Chinese lesbians to balance the moral ethics and rights, it also reflects a true situation in which the consciousness of rights is so deeply influenced and even reshaped by Chinese moral ethics that a type of artificially distorted marriage is created unexpectedly.

Besides, investigation result shows that most Chinese lesbians are reluctant to face their marriage problems positively. They expect to flee from endless reproaches from their parents and friends under the veil of being singles with strict adherence to their single doctrines and playing as workaholics. Actually, the number of this kind of

Chinese lesbians accounts for 60 percent in total of the investigation. And, they could be considered as a type of large group with unstable marriage concept because some of them may hold the strong consciousness of rights and then come out of the closet; or some of them may be likely to comply with the norm of moral ethics and then have a mixed-orientation marriage in the future. However, to some extent, it can also be classified as a special marriage concept compared as a pendulum swaying between the moral ethics and the rights.

Conclusion

From the investigation, we could know that under the impact of Chinese traditional marriage concept and the consciousness of rights, the marriage concept of Chinese lesbian usually contains a huge tension to be reconciled between Chinese philosophy of ethics and rights. Under this circumstances, with having been trying to reconcile the conflict with which they have to be confronted, three main attitudes towards marriage of Chinese lesbian appear finally, which are respectively the concept of pursuing individual rights instead of totally bending to the constraint of Chinese traditional moral ethics; the concept of confining themselves to the framework of Chinese traditional moral ethics and considering the behavior of getting married as a way to fulfill obligation; the concept of reconciling the contradiction between moral ethics and rights through seeking a silver lining in contracting a kind of special mixed-orientation marriage.

Actually, from exploring the way Chinese lesbians thinking of their marriages, it is obvious to find the true situation of the consciousness of rights Chinese citizen hold. Specifically, Chinese traditional moral ethics has been exerting significant influence on the growth of Chinese consciousness of rights. However, their essences contradict radically. The important philosophy of Chinese traditional moral ethics lies in cultivating a spirit of obedience to the authority at the expense of sacrificing individual's spirit of self-awareness and self-independence. On the contrary, in nature, the consciousness of rights derives from the process of self-discovery, and it not merely underlines individual's positive initiative to cope with the relationship between individual and collective, between individual and individual, but also structures a framework in which entitlement and qualification could be given (not) to perform some actions. Unfortunately, Chinese special consciousness of rights is a deformed combination which is established on the basis of Chinese traditional system of moral and ethics which is hardly to provide enough nutrition for the continuous growth of the concept of rights in China. Besides, when the confliction appears between the traditional system of moral ethics and rights, Chinese people usually neglect their rights and emphasize the importance of adhering to the ethic code. Just as the marriage concept of Chinese lesbian is formed under this circumstances, every endeavor taken by Chinese lesbians usually ends up with the doomed outcome which is that the rights have to give way to the moral ethics. What's more, the consciousness of rights of Chinese people mainly varies in age, income and education background, and they are positively correlated according to the result of the investigation. However, under the whole social environment, although some Chinese people do have strong wills to call for rights, they usually lack the courage, social supports, professional skills and a tolerant social culture to put them into practice. Wholly speaking, Chinese citizen's consciousness of rights is now in a relative immature stage under the significant influence from Chinese moral ethics established on the

basis of Chinese traditional philosophy which hardly nourishes the spirit of self-awareness and self-independence which yet undoubtedly lays a solid foundation for stepping into the mature stage of the consciousness of rights in China.



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***Cultural Values in Selected Southeast Asian Countries As Reflected in
Representative Short Stories: Comparative Study***

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Abstract

The study on the “Cultural Values in Selected Southeast Asian Countries As Reflected in Representative Short Stories: A Comparative Study” reveals the intent of the researcher to investigate on the commonalities of cultural values in the community life and lifestyles of some selected Southeast Asian countries based on selected short stories of ASEAN literature. These selections were all written during the period from 1950s – 1990s against a background of profound political, social, and psychological change. The researcher has found out that it is not difficult to understand why the short story has been readily adopted by Southeast Asian countries and has gained prominence in the present-day literature of these countries. The adaptability of the short story has enabled them to encompass a wide range of human experience. For example, social stratification is present in practically all societies. The idea of inequality in power, status, wealth, or all three. In the traditional societies of Southeast Asia, stratification is seen primarily in terms of a social hierarchy which bestows status. This study of the cultural values offer valuable insights into the character and integration of Southeast Asian short stories. The short story, with its immersion in society and its concern for the individual, has continually engaged itself in discovering the patterns that emerge from the relationship between the individual and society. ASEAN literature is important in the society where it is written. People read a great deal of short stories, mostly for entertainment, the effects can be more profound and longer lasting than mere escapism. Content Analysis is a research technique which involves the objective systematic and qualitative description of the manifest content of communication. The researcher of this study deciphered the images that could be seen in the short stories under study through the chosen literary elements. From these literary elements, she identified the different social realities that are revealed through economy, politics, education and religious life of some selected Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. The primary focus of this study was the comparative analysis of the commonalities of cultural values in the community life and lifestyles of some selected ASEAN countries as reflected on representative short stories of ASEAN literature. The outputs of the system were the results, findings, and implications of the selected Southeast Asian countries for peace, unification, and solidarity in the Southeast Asian region. The researcher was also interested to know if there had been any change in the image depiction of the selected Southeast Asian countries in contemporary short stories from 1950s to 1990s.

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List of 35 Short Stories from Seven Southeast Asian Countries

Indonesia

1. "Inem" by Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1952)
2. "Sri Sumarah" by Umar Kayam (1975)
3. "The Soldier" by Nugroho Notosusanto (1956)
4. "The Decline and Fall of Our Local Mosque" by A.A. Navis (1956)
5. "Meant For Each Other" by Abdul Muis (1956)

Malaysia

1. "Mariah" by Che Husna Azhari (1993)
2. "Victoria and Her Kimono" by M.Shanmughalingam (1984)
3. "A Question of Dowry" by Siew Yue Killingley (1962)
4. "A Common Story" by Kassim Ahmad (1959)
5. "Grave Harvest" by Ajikik (1978)

Myanmar

1. "This Realm of Humans" by Khin Hnin Yu (1962)
2. "Neighbours" by Moe Moe (Inya) (1972)
3. "Mother's Merit" by Thu Maung (1980)
4. "The Kindergarten Teacher" by Aung Thinn (1960)
5. "The Carat 13-Diamond" by Daw Khin Myo Chit (1955)

Philippines

1. "Children of the City" by Amadis Ma. Guerrero (1971)
2. "Clay" by Juan T. Gatbonton (1951)
3. "The House on Zapote Street" by Quijano de Manila (1968)
4. "The Day the Dancers Came" by Bienvenido N. Santos (1967)
5. "Wedding Dance" by Amador T. Daguio (1953)

Singapore

1. "Bugis" by Alfian Sa'at (1997)
2. "The Martyrdom of Helena Rodrigues" by S.Kon (1960)
3. "The Effect of a Good Dinner" by Arthur Yap (1963)
4. "Monster" by Catherine Lim (1966)
5. "The Tiger" by S. Rajaratnam (1978)

Thailand

1. "As If It Had Never Happened" by Witthayakon Chiangkun (1974)
2. "The Grandmother" by K. Surangkhanang (1964)
3. "Lord Buddha, Help Me?" by Suchit Wongthred (1975)
4. "Michigan Test" by Wanit Jarungkit-Anan (1974)
5. "Thong Proi" The Rich Girl by M.R.Kukrit Pramoj (1954)

Vietnam

1. "New Virtue" by Nguyen Ban (1962)
2. "An Unsound Sleep" by Nhat – Tien (1974)
3. "The Cradles" by Mai Ngu (1962)
4. "The Blind Alley" by Ma Van Khang (1962)
5. "My Milk Goes Dry" by Minh-Quan (1974)

This study aimed to compare the cultural values of Southeast Asian countries as reflected in Southeast Asian short stories. Specifically, this study sought to answer the following questions

1. What elements did the writers use to show cultural values in the chosen short stories?
2. How did these cultural values relate to the prevailing situations, conditions, and actual events in Southeast Asia countries where the short stories were written?
3. How did the identified cultural values in the short stories reflect the roles of the following aspects in the lives of Southeast Asian people?
 - 3.1 Economy
 - 3.2 Politics
 - 3.3 Education
 - 3.4 Religious life
 - 3.5 Social life
4. How were the cultural values as reflected in the short stories among the selected Southeast Asian countries compared based on the ten motivational types of values as reflected in the short stories?

Summary, Conclusions, And Recommendations

Summary of Findings

Elements that Writers Used in the Short Stories to Show Cultural Values

Plot was used in twenty four short stories, symbolism was used in seventeen short stories, character in ten short stories, setting in six short stories, conflict in four short stories, and point of view in two short stories.

In Indonesia, plot and point of view were used by Pramoedya Ananta in showing conformity type of cultural values in the story "Inem". Umar Kayam used plot and character in showing benevolence in the story "Sri Sumarah". Nugroho Notosusanto used plot and conflict to show achievement. AA Navis used plot and symbolism to show power. Abdul Muis used symbolism and setting in showing conformity in the story "Meant for Each Other".

In Malaysia, plot and conflict were used by Che Husna Azhari in showing tradition type of cultural values in the story "Mariah". M. Shanmughalingam used plot and theme in showing benevolence in the story "Victoria and Her Kimono". Siew Yue Killingley used plot and symbolism to show conformity. Kassim Ahmad used character and theme to show universalism. Ajikik used symbolism and setting in showing tradition in the story "Grave Harvest".

In Myanmar, plot and symbolism were used by Khin Hnin Yu in showing achievement type of cultural values in the story "This Realm of Humans". Moe Moe (Inya) used character and theme in showing hedonism in the story "Neighbours". Thu Maung used plot and character to show benevolence. Aung Thinn used plot and setting to show achievement. Daw Khin Myo Chit used plot and symbolism in showing achievement in the story "The Carat 13-Diamond".

In Philippines, plot and symbolism were used by Amadis Ma. Guerrero in showing stimulation type of cultural values in the story "Children of the City". Juan T. Gatbonton used plot and setting in showing security in the story "Clay". Quijano de

Manila used plot and character to show achievement. Bienvenido N. Santos used symbolism and character to show universalism. Amador T. Daguio used symbolism and character in showing tradition in the story "Wedding Dance".

In Singapore, plot and conflict were used by Alfian Sa'at in showing Self Direction type of cultural values in the story "Bugis". S. Kon used symbolism and conflict in showing security in the story "The Martyrdom of Helena Rodriguez". Arthur Yap used symbolism and theme to show hedonism. Catherine Lim used plot and theme to show power. S. Rajaratnam used plot and symbolism in showing universalism in the story "The Tiger".

In Thailand, plot and symbolism were used by Witthayakon Chiangkun showing benevolence type of cultural values in the story "As If It Had Never Happened". K. Surangkhanang used character and setting in showing security in the story "The Grandmother". Suchit Wongthred used plot and character to show self direction. Wanit Jarungkit-Anan used theme and point of view. M.R. Kukrit Pramoj used plot and character in showing hedonism in the story "Thong Proi The Rich Girl".

In Vietnam, plot and symbolism were used by Nguyen Ban showing achievement type of cultural values in the story "New Virtue". Nhat-Tien used plot and symbolism used symbolism and character in showing self direction in the story "An Unsound Sleep". Mai Ngu used plot and symbolism to show self direction. Ma Van Khang used plot and symbolism. Minh – Quan used plot and symbolism in showing security in the story "My Milk Goes Dry".

The Relationship of the Cultural Values to the Prevailing Situations, Conditions, and Actual Events in the Southeast Asian Countries Where the Short Stories Were Written

Indonesia

Indonesia is now the world's third most populous democracy, the world's largest archipelagic state, and home to the world's largest Muslim population. Current issues include: alleviating poverty, improving education, preventing terrorism, consolidating democracy after four decades of authoritarianism, implementing economic and financial reforms, stemming corruption, holding the military and police accountable for human rights violations, addressing climate change, and controlling infectious diseases, particularly those of global and regional importance.

Malaysia

Malaysia, a middle-income country, has transformed itself since the 1970s from a producer of raw materials into an emerging multi-sector economy. It was indeed an achievement obtaining social approval for Malaysia. During the 22-year term of Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammad (1981-2003), Malaysia was successful in diversifying its economy from dependence on exports of raw materials to expansion in manufacturing, services, and tourism (achievement, personal success and ambition).

Myanmar

Britain conquered Burma over a period of 62 years (1824 – 1886) and incorporated it into its Indian Empire. Prior to colonization, present-day BURMA was dominated by a series of small monarchies and dynasties. Burma was administered as a province of India until 1937 when it became a separate, self-governing colony; independence

from the Commonwealth was attained in 1948 and a democratic republic was established.

Philippines

A 20-year dictatorship by Ferdinand Marcos was toppled in 1986, when a “PEOPLE POWER” movement in Manila (EDSA 1”) forced him into exile and installed Mrs Corazon C. Aquino as President. Her Presidency was hampered by several Coup attempts that prevented a return to full political stability and economic development. Fidel V. Ramos was elected President in 1992. His administration was marked by increased stability and by progress on economic reforms. In 1992, the US closed its last military bases on the islands.

Singapore

On 7 August 1965, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, seeing no alternative to avoid further bloodshed, advised the Parliament of Malaysia that it should vote to expel Singapore from Malaysia. Despite last-ditch attempts by PAP leaders, including Lee Kuan Yew, to keep Singapore as a state in the union, the Parliament on 9 August 1965 voted 126–0 in favour of the expulsion of Singapore, with Members of Parliament from Singapore not present. On that day, a tearful Lee announced that Singapore was a sovereign, independent nation and assumed the role of Prime Minister of the new nation. His speech included this quote: "For me, it is a moment of anguish. All my life, my whole adult life, I have believed in merger and unity of the two territories."

Thailand

The unstable condition by then was always toppled by several military coup d’etat starting 1951 until 1958. The country was virtually placed under the state of martial law which lasted for a decade. King Bhumibol Adulyadej proclaimed an interim constitution in 1959 and named Sarit premier. When Sarit died in 1963, Thanom Kittikachorn was returned to power. A new constitution was finally promulgated in 1968. Under Sarit and Thanom the country's economy in the 1960s continued to boom, spurred by a favorable export market and considerable U.S. aid. (Thailand’s economy continued to boom- achievement and competent performance)

Vietnam

The conquest of Vietnam by France began in 1858 and was completed by 1884. It became part of FRENCH INDOCHINA in 1887. Vietnam declared independence after World War II, but France continued to rule until its 1954 defeat by Communist forces under Ho Chi Minh. Under the Geneva Accords of 1954, Vietnam was divided into the Communist North and anti –Communist South. US economic and military aid to South Vietnam grew through the 1960s in an attempt to bolster the government, but US armed forces were withdrawn following a cease-fire agreement in 1973. Two years later, North Vietnamese forces overran the South reuniting the country under Communist rule.

The Roles of the Aspects in Bringing Out the Cultural Values of Southeast Asian People As Reflected in the Short Stories

Economy plays a big role among the people in the selected seven Southeast Asian countries. It is the root why people value self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence, and universalism. All countries were colonized except Thailand. The major industries that developed in the Southeast Asia were based largely on the following basic modes of production. Coercion, capitalism, peasant-intermediary industries. Economy of the seven ASEAN countries is mostly import dependent and export oriented.

Politics plays a crucial role among the people in the selected seven Southeast Asian countries. It is the essential core among the people in seven ASEAN countries. It is the heart why people value benevolence, concern for family, helpful, forgiving, loyalty, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, and universalism.

The Philippines became a self-governing entity under American tutelage (Commonwealth) in 1935 and this started the country's independence after a 10-year transition. In 1942 the Philippines was occupied by the Japanese during World War II, and US forces and Filipinos, especially guerilla groups such as the HUKBALAHAP (People's Army Against the Japanese) fought during 1944-1945 to regain control. On 4 July 1946 the Republic of the Philippines attained its independence.

Indonesia has tried to prevent terrorism, consolidating democracy after four decades of authoritarianism, implementing economic and financial reforms, stemming corruption, holding the military and police accountable for human rights violations, and controlling infectious diseases, particularly those of global and regional importance.

Malaysia, in order to attract increased investment, Najib has raised possible revisions to the special economic and social preferences accorded to ethnic Malays under the New Economic Policy of 1970.

Myanmar, there was the transfer of state assets, especially real estate, to cronies and military families under the guise of a privatization policy. Other areas, such as manufacturing, tourism and services, struggle in the face of inadequate infrastructure, unpredictable trade policies, neglected health and education systems, and endemic corruption.

Thailand, from tiger cub to crisis, there was massive inflow of short-term international funds, private debt, creation of bubble economy, and severe corruption and indecisive government officials.

Vietnam, the major political challenge for Vietnam has been creating an economic governance in which the government can create enough jobs.

Education plays a big role among the people in Indonesia. It is the origin why people value conformity and honoring parents and elders self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, tradition, benevolence, universalism.

Indonesia

The population lacks education and productive skills, particularly in the poverty-ridden countryside, which suffers from an almost total lack of basic infrastructure.

To establish a high-quality and self-reliant human being whose values are based on PANCASILA (i.e. State Ideology, spelled out in the 5 basic principles of the Republic of Indonesia: belief in One God; just and civilized humanity, including tolerance to all people; unity of Indonesia; democracy led by wisdom of deliberation among representatives of the people; and social justice for all.

Malaysia

The Education Act, 1996 repealed the Education Act 1961. It is the parent legislation on education and covers all levels of education under the national education system. The Act stipulates the use of the national language as the main medium of instruction, a national curriculum, and common public examinations.

Myanmar

The economy suffers from macroeconomic imbalances – including unpredictable inflation, fiscal deficits, and multiple official exchange rates that overvalue the Burmese kyat, a distorted interest rate regime, unreliable statistics, and an inability to reconcile national accounts.

Philippines

The government has not protected the looming problem of youth unemployment. And refraining from too much expanding of recruitment to address the increase of population. An ominous decline of discipline in schools and spread of drug culture that gives a constant stress on their economic development.

Singapore

Singapore's national curriculum continues to provide students with a strong foundation in the core areas of literacy, numeracy and scientific literacy as these core areas provide the foundation for future learning. The study of the humanities will be reinforced as the humanities have the value in developing students' ability to understand and appreciate different perspectives, as well as nurture cultural sensitivities and civic awareness.

Religion plays a big role among the people in Seven Southeast Asian countries. It is the origin why people value conformity and honoring parents and elders, self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, tradition, benevolence, and universalism.

Religion plays a big role among the people in Indonesia. It is the origin why people value conformity and honoring parents and elders. Just like the protagonist Ajo Sidi in the story "The Decline and Fall of Our Local Mosque" by A.A. Navis, (1956).

Religion plays a big role among the people in Malaysia. It is the root why people in Malaysia value tradition and devout of religious rites, beliefs, and symbols. Just like the protagonist Kiman in the story “Grave Harvest” by Ajikik (1978)

Religion plays a big role among the people in Myanmar. It is the light why people value benevolence concern for family, primary groups, and for other’s welfare. Just like the protagonist Mother Nyo in the story “Mother’s Merit” by Thu Maung (1980) the people in Myanmar have the habit of being generous, charitable and peaceful.

Religion plays a big role among the people in the Philippines. It is the root why people value universalism and nationalism. Just like the protagonist Fil in the story “The Day the Dancers Came” by Bienvenido N. Santos (1967) they have the habit of welcoming Filipino tourists in America. They long for the presence and camaraderie of Filipino visitors in America. The great majority of the Philippine population is bound together by common values and a common religion.

Religion plays a big role among the people in Singapore. It is the root why people value family security and sense of belonging. Just like the protagonist Helena in the story “The Martyrdom of Helena Rodrigues by S. Kon (1960). The Singaporean mothers have the tendency to become over-protective of their sons to the extent that they forget to give Christian martyrdom, as opposed to simple or unrefined domestic martyrdom, is suffered with sweet forgiveness and under veils of retirement.

Religion plays a big role among the people in Thailand. It is the root why people value self-direction and independence. Just like the protagonist Maha Bunman in the story “ Lord Buddha, Help Me ?” by Suchit Wongthed, thais have the habit of offering food to the monks thinking that they will have a better hierarchy in the next life.

Religion plays a big role among the people in Vietnam. It is the root why people value self – direction and creativeness. Just like the protagonist Old Blind in the story “The Cradles” by Mai – Ngu,(1962) they have the eagerness to rehabilitate their war-torn country with the help of each other.

The Role of Social life

Social life plays a big role among the people in Indonesia. It is the root why people value power and social status. Just like the protagonist Ajo Sidi in the story “The Decline and Fall of Our Local Mosque” by A.A. Navis(1956), they have the habit of praying and contemplating. They forgot to work hard while praying at the same time. Social life plays a big role among the people in Malaysia. It is the root why people value tradition and and respect. Just like the protagonist Imam in the story “Mariah.”by Che Husna Azhari, they have the custom and belief for men seeking for second wife.

Social life plays a big role among the people in Myanmar. It is the root why people value hedonism and gratification for oneself. Just like the protagonist Aye Aye in the story “Neighbours” by Moe Moe in (1972). It was so embarrassing to Aye Aye. She wants her husband to find another house. She is sick and tired of prying and quarrelsome neighbours.

Social life plays a big role among the people in the Philippines. It is the root why people value universalism and nationalism. Just like the protagonist Fil and Tony in the story, “*The Day The Dancers Came*” by Bienvenido N. Santos (1967) Santos “memorialized the tenderness, nostalgia,” and “bittersweet story” of Filipino *manongs*, a title or designation referring to male old-timers from the Ilocos region, living in the United States by creating tales based on “his memories” of his own “generation. (benevolence, smooth group functioning, concern for family, helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, true friendship, matured love, and spiritual life - Those cultural values were very evident in Filipino culture locally or internationally.)

Social life plays a big role among the people in Singapore. It is the root why people value self-direction and creativeness. Just like the protagonist Sazalie and Salmah in the story “Bugis” by Alfian Sa’at, both of them want independent thought. They didn’t like the society to control and to manipulate them so much.

Social life plays a big role among the people in Thailand. It is the root why people value benevolence and concern for family. Just like the protagonist Thong Muan in the story “As If It Had Never Happened Before” by Witthayakon Chiangkun, The university students have the program in their curriculum of serving the people in countryside.

Social life plays a big role among the people in Vietnam. It is the root why people value self-direction and independence. Just like the protagonist Ms. Phan in the story “An Unsound Sleep” by Nhat –Tien. They have the habit of being faithful and loyal to Mahayana Buddhism in 1963. Vietnamese life is profoundly influenced by ancestor worship. Children learn at a very early age that they owe everything to their parents and their ancestors.

A Comparison of the Cultural Values as Reflected in the Short Stories Among the Selected Southeast Asian Countries Based on the Ten Motivational Types of Values

All four stories “Bugis” by Alfian Sa’at of Singapore, “Lord Buddha, Help Me?” by Sachit Wongthred of Thailand and two stories from Vietnam, “An Unsound Sleep” by Nhat – Tien and “The Cradles” by Mai Ngu emphasize the intention of characters to do what they like in life. They want to have freedom and independence to express their creativity. All these are Self-direction type of values.

The cultural values of Stimulation are reflected in the short stories of Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. The short stories are “Children of the City” by Amadis Ma. Guerrero of the Philippines, “Michigan Test” by Wanit Jarungkit of Thailand and “The Blind Alley” by Ma Van Khang of Vietnam. Self direction and stimulation are types of values that suggest the people’s openness to change. Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam reflect these two motivational types of values are open to changes as what the characters in the stories show. People want to try exciting migration in order to have better means of livelihood. People seem not afraid of many difficult challenges in life.

Hedonism types of cultural values are reflected in the short stories of Myanmar, Singapore, and Thailand. These stories are “Neighbours” by Moe Moe (Inya) of Myanmar, “The Effect of a Good Dinner” by Arthur Yap of Singapore, and “Thong Proi the Rich Girl” by M.R. Kukrit Pramoj of Thailand. In “Neighbours” by Moe Moe (Inya) of Myanmar, intrusive, nosy, and gossip kind of people are also like members of anyone’s own family. They care and they are willing to render a helping hand during difficult times.

The three short stories show how people treat other people towards gratification for oneself, needs and pleasure; and how they enjoy life towards self indulgence.

Achievement type of values is reflected in the short stories of Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, and Vietnam. These stories are “Soldier” by Nugroho Notosusanto of Indonesia, In “Soldier” by Nugroho Notosusanto of Indonesia, “This Realm of Humans” by Khin Hnin Yu, the “The Kindergarten Teacher” by Aung Thinn, “The Carat 13-Diamond” by Daw Khin Myo Chit also of Myanmar, “The House On Zapote Street” by Quijano de Manila of Philippines, “New Virtue” by Nguyen Ban of Vietnam. These four countries showed in their stories cultural values of personal success, competent performance, obtaining social approval, self – respect, social recognition, and ambition in the midst of oppression they experienced under their colonizers. The characters survived and remained low profile in spite of their achievements and became survivors despite the burdens brought to them by war, poverty, and oppression.

Power, type of values are reflected in the short stories of Indonesia and Singapore. These short stories are “The Decline and Fall of Our Local Mosque by A. A. Navis of Indonesia and “Monster” by Catherine Lim of Singapore. The two short stories, “The Decline and Fall of Our Local Mosque by A.A. Navis of Indonesia and “Monster” by Catherine Lim of Singapore showed how power brought out people’s social status, prestige, control and dominance over people and resources, authority, wealth, social power, preservation of public image and social recognition.

Security is reflected in the short stories of Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. There are four short stories that have shown cultural values. They are “Clay” by Juan T. Gatbonton of the Philippines, “The Martyrdom of Helena Rodrigues” of Singapore, “The Grandmother” by K. Surangkhanang of Thailand, and “My Milk Goes Dry” by Minh-Quan of Vietnam.

The short stories show the cultural values of security of families, stability of society, national security, social order, family security, reciprocation of favors, sense of belonging and safety. All these are motivated by the characters’ intention for security and provide for their loved ones. The Southeast Asian countries prioritize family security, so much so, that most of the times parents sacrifice their own happiness for the sake of their own children.

Conformity is reflected in the short stories of Indonesia and Malaysia. These stories are “Inem” by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, “Meant for Each Other” by Abdul Muis, “A Question of Dowry” by Siew Yue Killingley.

Tradition, is reflected in the short stories of Malaysia and the Philippines. The three short stories are “Mariah” by Che Husna Azhari of Malaysia, “Grave Harvest” by Ajikik also of Malaysia, and “The Wedding Dance” by Amador T. Daguio of the Philippines

The three short stories from Malaysia and Philippines emphasized respect, commitment to cultures and traditions, as well as devout of religious rites/beliefs and symbols even if they mean sacrificing personal happiness.

Schwartz’ Benevolence and concern for family, primary groups, and for others’ welfare are very dominant in the short stories of Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand. The four short stories are “Sri Sumarah” by Umar Kayam of Indonesia, “Victoria and Her Kimono” by M. Shanmughalingam of Malaysia, “Mother’s Merit” by Thu Maung of Yangon, Myanmar, “As If It Had Never Happened” by Witthayakon Chiangkun of Thailand. Because of benevolence, the stories and characters show enhancement of the welfare of the in group for smooth group functioning and concern for family, primary groups and for others’ welfare. They become helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal for the sake of true friendship, mature love and healthy spiritual life.

Universalism, nationalism, and protection for nature/environment, are very reflected in the short stories of Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore. The short stories are “A Common Story” by Kassim Ahmad Malaysia, “The Day The Dancers Came” by Bienvenido N. Santos of the Philippines, and “The Tiger” by S. Rajaratnam of Singapore.

The stories are motivated by universalism that made the characters manifest the cultural values of nationalism, understanding, tolerance, protection for nature and environment, social justice, equality, world peace, spiritual life, and protection for the welfare of all people.

Benevolence and universalism are motivational values that show self-transcendence. The five countries that show the cultural values of benevolence and universalism are the countries that prioritize concern for family and true friendship. They also value extremely social justice, equality, and world peace.

The individual level values theory has identified ten basic, motivationally distinct values that people in virtually all cultures implicitly recognize. Cultural values are one important, especially central component of our self and personality, distinct from attitudes, beliefs, norms, and traits. Values are critical motivators of behaviors and attitudes (Schwartz, 2012).

Conclusions

Based on the findings the following conclusions are derived.

1. Cultural values can be reflected in short stories using the elements of plot, symbolism, character, setting, theme, conflict and point of view.
2. Cultural values reflected in short stories are related to the prevailing conditions and actual events in the countries where the stories are written.

3. The cultural values of the country are influenced by the prevailing situations or conditions of their economy, politics, education, religion, and social life.
4. The cultural values reflected in short stories of different countries can be compared using the ten motivational types of values.
5. Man's actions and decisions in life are influenced by the ten motivational values of Shalom Schwartz.

Recommendations

Based on the conclusions, the following are recommended.

1. Teachers of Literature may focus on cultural values in teaching short stories.
2. History can be taught by integrating the five aspects of people namely, politics, economy, education, religion, and social life.
3. Timeline may be traced to compare changes and development of each country.
4. The ten motivational values of Shalom Schwartz may be used as an instrument in analyzing literary genres.
5. Future researchers may compare contemporary short stories with the subjects of the current study.

Keywords: Cultural Values, literature, short story, culture shock

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*Power Struggle between Bonifacio and Aguinaldo:
A Manifestation of a Divided Nation*

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Abstract

This historical and documentary research will be dealing with the struggle for power that happened between the two heroes of the Philippine Revolution---Emilio Aguinaldo and Andres Bonifacio. These two figures of the Philippine revolution, with their respective followers, tried to ease out each other in getting control of the central revolutionary government during the latter part of the Spanish occupation of the archipelago. Although the struggle is more political than physical, the violent death of Andres Bonifacio concluded it. Implications of the political rift of the two heroes reverberated until today, as there are factions and historians who are still trying to unearth ideas, comments and opinions for and against the heroes.

This paper will explore how the rift between the heroes affected the homogenous revolution. It will also show how the conflict and the power struggle between the two heroes manifested that the nation is not fully united and that personal and regional factors played important roles in further dividing the nation.

The paper will be utilizing important documents and historical references, which will be juxtaposed to the personal and scholarly evaluations of the researchers. Opinions of experts and recognized historians will also be taken into account in trying to come up with an academic conclusion.

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Introduction

In the latter part of August 1896, during which time hundreds of the Katipunan (KKK ANB) members were already arrested when the organization was discovered by the Spanish authorities, the leadership was compelled to start an armed revolution. This was to protect themselves and at the same time manifest loudly their dissent. This decision was drawn from heated debates that occurred during an emergency assembly in Kangkong, Caloocan (Luzon, Philippines). The radical members led by Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Jacinto prevailed and convinced the majority to go underground and commence the protracted revolution. The organization marked August 29, 1896 as the start of the revolutionary struggle (Kalaw, 1925). Bonifacio led a series of attacks in the areas of Marikina, Mandaluyong, San Mateo and San Juan Del Monte.

In Kawit, Cavite, Emilio Aguinaldo called upon the membership of the Katipunan and some leaders of the local lodges of the Masonry, to which he was also connected, to decide on what to do about the situation. The assembly decided to start their own revolutionary campaign. Aguinaldo took over the Spanish encampment in Kawit and then proceeded to attack other Spanish controlled towns and *haciendas*. Parading the success of Kawit, Aguinaldo incited other towns of Laguna, Cavite and Batangas to join them in their campaign.

Bonifacio and Aguinaldo undoubtedly were the major figures of the revolutionary struggle under the banner of the Katipunan (KKK ANB). The campaigns in (Metro) Manila and Rizal areas, where either lead or inspired by Bonifacio while Aguinaldo and his followers manned the mobilizations in the areas of Laguna, Batangas and Cavite. The revolution became widespread, as other provinces where the Katipunan has strong links, such as Pampanga, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Bataan and Zambales, have already withdrawn their allegiance from Spanish government.

This paper discusses the possible cause/s of conflict between Aguinaldo and Bonifacio. It also tries to explore the goals of the revolution from the points of view of Aguinaldo and Bonifacio. It also ultimately discusses how the Aguinaldo-Bonifacio conflict affected gravely the otherwise homogenous revolution.

A Venue of Pronounced Conflict

If there was any palpable evidence of conflict between Aguinaldo and Bonifacio, this may perhaps be the assembly that happened in Tejeros, Cavite. The Tejeros Convention/assembly on March 22, 1897 was intended to thresh out some factional differences and issues in the revolution that greatly affected the movement. The convention was initiated by Jacinto Lumbreras with the intention of transforming the Katipunan movement into a revolutionary government. He suggested that there should be a democratic election to be conducted. When the election commenced, Emilio Aguinaldo won the Presidency, Mariano Trias was elected Vice President, Artemio Ricarte was the Captain General (Kapitan Heneral) and Emilio Riego de Dios was the Director of War. Bonifacio was elected Director of the Department of Interior (Kagawarang Panloob) but Daniel Tirona questioned Bonifacio's qualification. Tirona said: "The position of Director of the Interior is very great and should not be occupied by one who is not a lawyer, Jose Del Rosario, who should be declared elected" (Kalaw, 1926). Bonifacio was insulted so much that he walked out of the assembly declaring the election invalid and void. Because of this incident, the election of the other positions did not continue (Kalaw, 1925).

Thus, instead of achieving the original objectives of the convention, the factional conflict between the Magdalo (Aguinaldo's) and the Magdiwang (Bonifacio's) groups widened even more. Some historians believed that the incident in Tejeros was a clear manifestation of class conflict. Aguinaldo and his followers in the Magdalo group represented the *illustado*, educated, elite and the wealthy; whereas, the group of Bonifacio represented the poor, uneducated and the masses (The Philippine History Site--/Text by Grace Mateo <http://opmanong.ssc.hawaii.edu/filipino/struggle.html>).

It should be stressed, however, that the Tejeros Convention was not the only incident where the dysfunctional conflict between the Magdalo and the Magdiwang was pronounced. Even during the latter part of 1896, during the Imus Assembly (Malaking Kapulungan) at the house of friars, the two groups did not reach an agreement as to the specific roles to be played by Bonifacio in the Revolutionary government. They agreed, for the sake of the revolution, that they just operate separately as they always did (May, 2007). But the animosity between the two factions continued.

In both the Imus Assembly and the Tejeros Convention, conflict between the two factions was very apparent. Since the interests of the two classes differed, their intentions and motivations in the revolution were also apart (Mateo, 2003). Aguinaldo and his men would like to preserve, restore and protect their old glory as *illustrados* while the group of Bonifacio just wanted to see the Spaniards end their occupation and exploitation of the masses or as the noted historian De Viana (2014) puts it "build an organization to end the bondage of the motherland to Spain". This was how historians played out the conflict. It was a conflict of classes (Mateo, 2003; Constantino, 1975).

Glenn May (2007), on the other hand, perceived the conflict as something that was rooted on the two leaders' military strategies and approaches. According to May (2007), "Bonifacio adopted a consultative approach to warfare, derived from a pre-conquest leadership style, whereas Aguinaldo favored a centralized, hierarchical military approach, relying on bureaucratic arrangements similar to those in the Spanish colonial regime." It was more a conflict between 'charismatic' and 'bureaucratic' leadership styles (May, 2007). The conflict is more on the level of political rather than class.

The researchers, however, believed that the conflict between the two revolutionary figures might have arisen from pride and sense of superiority. The sense of pride of the Aguinaldo faction might have been generated from the circumstances of their military exploits and victories in their campaign, while the Bonifacio camp cultivated their sense of pride from the fact that they started out the Katipunan and the revolution itself. The sense of superiority of the Aguinaldo camp is coming from the fact that most of the members are moneyed and educated and they perceived the group of Bonifacio as their lesser counterparts. This conflict of perception was made apparent when Bonifacio refused to recognize the results of the Tejeros convention. He voided the election on his belief that he still enjoys superiority over the Katipunan. He could not have declared the convention invalid, had he not considered himself superior. The same was also true to the Aguinaldo group; they asserted their superiority over Bonifacio and his men. They maintained the validity of the Convention without regard to Bonifacio's declaration. In fact, when Aguinaldo heard about a meeting in Naic, Cavite, where Bonifacio's men were planning to annul the Tejeros action, Aguinaldo immediately went to the place and even won over most of the leaders including Mariano Trias and Severino de las Alas (Kalaw, 1926). Aguinaldo even asserted firmly his superiority

when, upon learning about Bonifacio's efforts to solicit support of the revolutionaries of the Province of Batangas, he issued a letter of command stating that:

“Once more, I wish to impress upon your minds, the fact that the Government in its efforts to carry out its purposes, must be supported by everyone, and that if you give it your assistance you will deserve not only the thanks of the whole country, but mine as well; but, on the other hand, if you should fail to give me the assistance which I request of you, my regret will be great, for I shall consider your indifference to matters affecting our country as a sign of a lack of patriotism, which the nation should punish with utmost severity and without delay.” (Philippine Insurgent Records as quoted in Kalaw, 1926)

The letter above shows two things: first, Aguinaldo clearly asserted his superiority over the revolutionaries and second, Aguinaldo, wittingly or unwittingly, equated himself to the level of `country` when he said: “you will deserve not only the thanks of the whole country but mine as well”.

Opinions about the conflict seem to point that the conflict between Aguinaldo and Bonifacio was never personal. It could be a conflict of classes, a conflict of approaches and a conflict of perception.

Teleology of the Philippine Revolution

In any organization, a clear teleology is key to its success. This was an idea that was developed by Max Weber. According to Weber, the organization must have a concrete set of goals in order to be efficient (Kendall, 2004). When the Tejeros Convention was held, there was no concrete and one goal agreed upon by the entire membership of the Katipunan as to the course to be taken by the revolution. There were various goals heading in different directions. Some goals were political; others were either personal or organizational.

The Convention in Tejeros in 1897 was aimed, among others, at transforming the Katipunan into a revolutionary government. The Convention was actually under the influence of Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo, in his manifesto dated October 31, 1896, proposed to establish a revolutionary government that would be composed of a central committee consisting of six members and local committees (Kalaw, 1926). Some Magdalo members felt that because of the victories of the Katipunan revolutionaries particularly in Cavite, it was already an opportune time to go to the next level—that is to establish a government instead of continuing the Katipunan.

Bonifacio believed otherwise. He maintained that there was no need to establish any other government than the Katipunan. He was very disgusted about the plan of the Magdalo council of Aguinaldo. In one of his letters to Emilio Jacinto, Bonifacio said:

“Here the enmity between the two factions is very great, because those of Magdalo want to rule all and the entire Philippines, because they say that nothing but the government of Imus is recognized there and throughout Europe.”

The Government they try to establish here is as follows: President and General-in-Chief “Magdalo”; Director of Military Works, “Baldomero” and those of Magdiwang will simply

act as sub-director or sub-minister. This plan truly disgusted the ministers of the Magdiwang, who saw through their game that if Imus is elected, they will govern here in Malabon. The selfishness of Magdalo is truly disgusting and has been the cause of their many reverses in the field (Quoted in Kalaw, 1926).

Even at the first instance, Bonifacio did not approve of any revolutionary government to be established other than the Katipunan. Whatever drove Bonifacio to participate and preside in the election at the Convention was not fully known; other than the fact that he was made to believe that he was about to be elected as president. Bonifacio was presiding when the Republic of the Philippines was proclaimed. He even remarked at one time during the convention that whoever received majority votes in the election must be respected and supported regardless of culture and intentions (Kalaw, 1926). When Bonifacio was not elected and was insulted by Tirona, he walked out and voided the entire proceeding. This was despite his statement that he was willing to acquiesce in the decision of the majority. Perhaps, Bonifacio was also blinded by the prospect of becoming the president of the newly proclaimed republic but apparently he was deceived.

Personal goals of the figures of the revolution were obvious. When Bonifacio lost the election, he was said to have campaigned against the revolutionary government. His goal was coming from his personal hatred and vindictiveness. He, perhaps, wanted to get even with the Magdalo group. He was said to have recruited men from Limbon and he armed them in order to overthrow the revolutionary government of Aguinaldo.

Apolinario Mabini also observed Aguinaldo's personal goals. Mabini, who himself a big player of the revolution, said that the death of Bonifacio in the hands of the followers of Aguinaldo was a crime. He said that: "the death of Bonifacio constitutes the first triumph of personal ambition over true patriotism (Quoted in Kalaw, 1926)."

Max Weber would interpret this scenario of the revolution as an organization that is not goal-oriented and thus doomed to fail (Weber, n.d). Inasmuch as the Philippine revolution is getting divided and its goals are becoming more and more scattered, the revolution has not become efficient. Weber's prediction about the propensity of the organization to become oligarchic and the control of the social and economic forces by only a few was predicted (Weber, n.d). This was the reason why in the latter part of the revolution, many elite classes become so involved in the revolution to control and maintain their economic and social statuses. The masses remained to be in the sideline.

Aguinaldo's revolution was not national and homogenous¹

In the late 19th century Philippines and earlier, there was no concept of "nation" to speak of. Attitudes of people then were more regional than national. The regional characters and color of each uprising that transpired in different parts of the archipelago were palpable. This is notwithstanding claims to the contrary, such as the interpretation of a Cavite scholar named Alfredo Saulo, who said that national unity was made possible by Aguinaldo (Saulo, 1987). Saulo mistakenly premised his argument on the observation of General Arthur MacArthur that "Aguinaldo held the whole people in the hollow of his hand, because he was their recognized leader, the incarnation of their aspirations" (US Senate Document, 1902).

¹ The entire section was borrowed from an online article written by J. Reylan Viray entitled "Macabebes: A Descendant's Insights Part 2", which can be accessed through <http://eksite.com/y.html?q=http://eksite.com/viray.071029.html>.

Arguably, this testimony could not be enough proof of national unity. MacArthur's statement, if pitted against documented events, would prove to be false. Besides, his statement was not even clear whether he was referring to the entire Filipino people or he was just referring to the people (particularly and mostly the Tagalogs) who believed in Aguinaldo's cause. Generally, Filipinos then did not think of themselves as one homogenous race (Mateo, 2003).

Indeed, there was diversity in the "Revolution." For example, the revolt in Cavite which begun in 1896 was principally religious, while the revolt of the Manila-based Katipunan of Bonifacio was political (Schumacker, 1976). The article which was published by the University of Hawaii, through its Office of Multicultural Student Services, to show this point, has this account:

"In the first two years of the Revolution, battles raged mainly in the Tagalog provinces. Outside the Katagalugan, responses were varied. Pampanga, which was close to Manila, was uninvolved in the Revolution from September 1896 to the end of 1897, perhaps because the conditions which drove the Tagalogs to rise in arms were not totally similar in Pampanga. For instance, friar estates or church monopoly of landholdings which triggered agrarian unrest in Tagalog areas was not pervasive in Pampanga" (Mateo, 2003) .

Ethnic, cultural, and regional distinctions were rooted on the policy of divisiveness of the Spanish conquerors. The Spaniards diluted the concept "Filipino" by calling the natives Indios and by identifying them according to their regional and ethnic affiliations such as Tagalog, Kapampangan, Cebuano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, etc (Robles, n.d). Aguinaldo tried to popularize and promote the Tagalog brand of revolution by encouraging his military officials to return to their native provinces and solicit sympathy and support. However, Aguinaldo failed in his vision because most revolutionary groups in the provinces, including the Ilonggos, suspected his motives and agenda. They preferred instead a federal arrangement composed of the three main island groups (Robles, n.d). Accordingly, Iloilo leaders changed the name of their provisional government and called it the Federal State of the Visayas since they did not recognize the supremacy of Aguinaldo and the Tagalogs.

The Demoralized Troop

The low morale of the revolutionary forces, after the execution of Bonifacio, hugely contributed to the successive defeats for the rebels. In May 1897, the augmented Spanish forces occupied Maragondon, Cavite which drove the rebels of the Philippine Republic to move to Mt. Buntis. In the following month, Mendez, Nuñez, Amadeo, Alfonso, Bailen and Magallanes were captured by the Spanish forces without much resistance. Apolinario Mabini himself, a former close ally of Aguinaldo, observed that this tragedy of the revolution was brought about by the discontent resulting from the death and execution of Bonifacio.

Mabini argued:

“This tragedy smothered the enthusiasm for the revolutionary cause, and hastened the failure of the insurrection in Cavite, because many from Manila, Laguna and Batangas, who were fighting for the province of Cavite, were demoralized and quit. (Mabini, A. (1969).

The defeats of the Philippine revolutionary forces compelled Aguinaldo and his group to retreat to the mountains of San Miguel de Mayumo, Bulacan. Here in 1897, on orders of Aguinaldo, the Republic of Biak-na-Bato was established. The establishment of this Republic, barely months after the Tejeros Convention, was an implicit dissolution of the earlier revolutionary government formed during the said convention. The establishment of the Biak-na-Bato republic could also be taken as a manifestation of the weakening hold of Aguinaldo over the katipunan revolutionaries who were sympathetic to Bonifacio. Hence, to remove all clouds of doubts over his authority, Aguinaldo resorted to constituting the new Republic. This rendered a fresh mandate for him, or so he thought.

Later, with the mediation and negotiation facilitated by Pedro Paterno between the Aguinaldo government and the Spanish government, the Pact of Biak-na-Bato was signed on December 15, 1897. Then on December 29, 1897, Aguinaldo and his top officials left for Hong-Kong to comply with the agreement set forth in the Pact. After payment of \$400,000 by the Spanish government, the last installment was not paid and never received. The amnesty was also not granted because the Spanish government still had to contend with some skirmishes on the ground hinting that Aguinaldo did not have the widespread authority over the rebels as he pretended to have.

William M. Abbott, S.J. has this to say:

“The euphoria following the signing of the pact of Biak-na-Bato on 14 December 1897, was short-lived. Unrest continued north of Manila and, within a month, the colonial government was faced with uprisings in Zambales, Ilocos, and Cebu. In Manila itself, a plot was uncovered and its brutal suppression looked bad for the future relations between the Filipinos and Spaniards.” (William J. Abbot, SJ, Jose Arcilla SJ, 2006.)

It is safe to assume that these skirmishes and unrests were not in conformity with the pact and/or agreement entered into by Aguinaldo and his associates.

Aguinaldo's Revolutionary Government not nationally accepted

Even before the revolution commenced in 1897, the provinces and other ethnic groups in the provinces suspect the intentions of the Tagalog revolt of Aguinaldo and Bonifacio. The provinces, especially in the Visayas, doubted the objective of the Katipunan revolts. They suspect that the Tagalogs would just lead the revolution against Spain in order to dominate other ethno-linguistic groups (Andaya, 2001).

This was the reason why Andaya argued:

“The initial response from other provinces was a combination of apathy and suspicion of the Tagalog. It was an understandable reaction, reflecting the manner in which ethnolinguistic identity had been fostered over the centuries by the religious orders.”

It was not surprising then that many factions did not consider the Aguinaldo Revolutionary government as nationwide when it was established in Tejeros and later in Biak na Bato. Even so, when the Bonifacio-Aguinaldo conflict was made known to the entire membership of the Katipunan, the Aguinaldo government began to gradually lose hold of the entire revolutionaries. This was actually embodied in the actions of some revolutionary generals who, even after the pact at Biak na Bato, preferred to disregard the treaty and continued the revolution.

Bonifacio associates such as Emilio Jacinto and Macario Sakay did not subject their armies under the command of Aguinaldo. And hence, did not recognize whatever was agreed upon in the Pact of Biak na Bato. Another, Francisco Makabulos even established an Interim Government through a Central Executive Committee. In other words, revolutionary operations by those who did not recognize the treaty resumed. The operations become even more widespread, now originating from various provinces in the country.

The Aguinaldo-Bonifacio conflict affected the Filipino-American war

When Aguinaldo returned back from his sojourn in Hongkong right after the collapse of the Biak na Bato pact because of trust issues, the Caviteño leader established a dictatorial government and declared Philippine independence on June 12, 1898. By the time the dictatorial government was being organized and structured, General Anderson's brigade and General Merritt's command had either reached Cavite or about to arrive the shores of the province. This made the relations of Filipino and American forces problematic (Mabini, 1969). And on February 4, 1899, the American forces started operations that facilitated the outbreak of hostilities. The Filipino-American war broke out months thereafter.

There was no question about Aguinaldo's dictatorial power and influence during the Fil-Am war. This was even affirmed by Apolinario Mabini, his former close associate. He observed:

“On the other hand, the siege of Manila by the Filipino forces was stalled because of the lack of coordination in the activities of the columns operating in the different zones, and Aguinaldo, who, by virtue of his prestige, could alone impose such unity... (Mabini, 1969)”.

There were camps, however, that despised Aguinaldo's command such as those, which were aligned and sympathetic to Bonifacio. And later, those, which were disappointed to Aguinaldo's forces because of the death of General Antonio Luna in Cabanatuan in the hands of his (Aguinaldo) men. Mabini has this opinion:

“The death of Andres Bonifacio had plainly shown in Mr. Aguinaldo a boundless appetite for power, and Luna's personal enemies exploited this weakness of Aguinaldo with skillful intrigues in order to encompass Luna's ruin.

“To say that if Aguinaldo, instead of killing Luna (allowing Luna to be killed), had supported him with all his power, the Revolution would have triumphed, would be presumption indeed, but I have not the least doubt that the Americans would have had a higher regard for the courage and military abilities of the Filipinos. Had Luna been alive, I am sure that Otis's mortal blow would have been parried or at least timely prevented, and Mr. Aguinaldo's unfitness for military command would not have been exposed so clearly (Mabini, 1969)”.

Sensing that there was a division among the Filipino forces, the American government easily maneuvered and planned their course of action. The American forces identified those, which maintained hatred and abhorrence towards Aguinaldo. Gen. Frederick Funston, a young US General, recruited the Macabebe mercenaries of Pampanga, known for their military skills and considered as relatives of Bonifacio. In March 23, 1901, the Macabebes willingly posed as revolutionaries with a Caucasian prisoner (Funston). This facilitated the easy access to Aguinaldo's camp in Palanan, Isabela.

The Macabebes, even today, believe that the capture of Aguinaldo is not a treachery to the nation and the revolution. The revolution failed not because of the mercenaries but because of the leadership of Aguinaldo. According to Mabini:

“...the Revolution failed because it was badly led; because its leader won his post by reprehensible rather than meritorious acts; because instead of supporting the men most useful to the people, he made them useless out of jealousy” (Mabini, 1969).

Macario Sakay: Revolution without Aguinaldo

The continued operations of Macario Sakay in the mountains of Laguna, Batangas, and Cavite, even after the capture of Aguinaldo, were manifestations of a divided revolutionary nation. This was despite Aguinaldo's call for the end of hostilities. This was understandable because Sakay was a recruit of Andres Bonifacio and a close ally. He never had any belief in the revolution represented by Aguinaldo. His exploits have alarmed the Americans until his death in the hands of their hands by execution in 1907.

Conclusion

As it was established above, Aguinaldo and Bonifacio (and their respective followers) cultivated conflict during the start of the first phase of the revolution and this conflict culminated during the Tejeros Convention and ultimately caused the death of Bonifacio and his brother.

This conflict, as shown, was also apparent in the second phase of the revolution against the Americans. The failure of the revolution was attributed to the Bonifacio-Aguinaldo rift.

The troops in various parts of the country were demoralized by the death of Bonifacio. Successive defeats that befell upon the revolutionary forces pointed to this demoralization. The Aguinaldo revolution likewise was not accepted as national and unifying. The military operations of Bonifacio associates like Emilio Jacinto and Macario Sakay could suggest this apparent disunity. Even after our struggles against Spain, the revolutionaries remained divided because of the persistent distrust of the revolutionaries who were sympathetic to Bonifacio. During the Filipino-American war, Macabebes who were said to be relatives of Bonifacio played an important role in the capture of Aguinaldo in Palanan, Isabela. The operations of Sakay until 1907 also indicate that Aguinaldo did not have the authority as he projected over all the Philippine revolutionaries.

Arguably, the Philippine revolution was compromised by the Bonifacio-Aguinaldo conflict. Mabini blames Aguinaldo for this:

“Identifying the aggrandizement of the people with his own, he judged the worth of men not by their ability, character and patriotism but rather by their degree of friendship and kinship with him; and, anxious to secure the readiness of his favourites to sacrifice themselves for him, he was tolerant even of their transgressions. Because he thus neglected the people, the people foreshook him; and forsaken by the people, he was found to fall like a waxen idol melting in the heat of adversity. God grant we do not forget such a terrible lesson, learnt at the cost of untold suffering. (Mabini, 1969)”

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